ETHICS

First Semester/ A.Y. 2020-2021

http://www.drewmeyersinsights.com/2017/10/01/direct-manager-instructing-something-disagreed-handle/

Course Number: GE 107

Course Description: This course is a study of morality, including the theory of right
and wrong behavior, the theory of value (goodness and badness), and the theory of virtue and
vice. Besides providing familiarity with the primary questions addressed within moral
philosophy and the most influential answers given by well-known philosophers, this course is
designed to help students develop their abilities to read, explicate, analyze, and evaluate
philosophical literature, write and express themselves well about their own ethical positions,
and think critically and analytically about ethical issues.

Course Facilitator:
JAY LORD B. ASIS, MAT
Instructor

Facebook: jl asis
Email: [email protected]
Contact Number: 09123205675
MODULE 1

ETHICS: CLARIFICATION AND TERMINOLOGY

Overview:

This particular chapter presents ethics as a science and its significance to human
existence. It also presents the scope and limitation of such science which determines whether
a specific human act calls for moral valuation or otherwise.

Learning Objectives: At the end of the lesson the learners should be able to:

1. Define and explain the term Ethics

2. Identify the object, importance, division and assumptions of Ethics
3. Determine whether an act or situation is subject to moral valuation

Content:

In August 2007, newspapers reported what seemed to be yet another sad incident of
fraternity violence. Cris Anthony Mendez, a twenty-year-old student of the University of the
Philippines (UP), was rushed to the hospital in the early morning hours, unconscious, with
large bruises on his chest, back, and legs. He passed away that morning, and the subsequent
autopsy report strongly suggests that his physical injuries were most probably the result of
“hazing” (the term colloquially used to refer to initiation rites in which neophytes may be
subjected to various forms of physical abuse. What exactly happened remains an open
question, as none of those were with him that night came forward to shed light on what had
transpired. Needless to say, none of them came forward to assume responsibility for the death
of Cris.

Even as the leaders of the Sigma Rho Fraternity publicly denounced the death of Cris,
those members of theirs who had been with him that night vanished, avoiding and refusing to
cooperate with legal authorities. Meanwhile, UP students and the general public clamored for
justice. In a move that surprised the student body, the UP chancellor called on all fraternities
to justify their continued existence. Meanwhile, the case of the tragic death of Cris Anthony
Mendez was left unresolved. It remains the way up to this day.

No one knows just what exactly happened. No charges have been filed, no definitive
testimony has been forthcoming. But there is more to this for us than just criminal mystery.
Pondering on the death of Cris, we may find ourselves asking questions such as “What is the
value of one’s life?” What exactly were the wrongs done to Cris by his so-called fraternity
brother?” or perhaps even “Is there any good to fraternities?” these questions that concern
good and bad, or right and wrong – and these are questions concerning value – are the kind of
questions that we deal with in ethics.
 ETHICS

Ethics comes from the Greek word ethos which means “custom”. At times, Ethics is
also called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy because the word moral comes from the
Latin term mos (singular) or mores (plural) which means “custom”. Hence, generally
speaking, “ethical” and “moral” and/or “ethics and “morality” can be used interchangeably.
But to establish distinction between the two, morality points to something personal and
normative, whereas ethics is the standards of “good and bad” distinguished by a certain
community or social setting.
For example, your local community may think abortion is immoral, and you
personally may agree with that. However, the distinction can be useful if your local
community has no strong feelings about abortion, but you consider abortion immoral on a
personal level. By these definitions of the terms, your morality would contradict the ethics of
your community.

It is also important to consider how the two terms have been used in discourse in
different fields so that we can consider the connotations of both terms. For
example, morality has a Christian connotation to many Westerners, since moral theology is
prominent in the church. Similarly, ethics is the term used in conjunction with business,
medicine, or law. In these cases, ethics serves as a personal code of conduct for people
working in those fields, and the ethics themselves are often highly debated and contentious.

ETHICS AS A SCIENCE

Ethics is defined as the practical science of the morality of human act.

Ethics is a science = it is a complete and systematically arranged body or data, which

relate to the morality of human conduct, and it presents the reasons which show these data to
be true
.
It is a practical science = it presents data, which directly imply and indicate
rules/directions for human conduct. If the data of a science enrich the mind without directly
implying rules or directions, the science is called speculative. A speculative science presents
truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be acted upon.

It is a science of human conduct = it simply treats of human act or any action done
by the agent/doer. “Human acts make human conduct”.

It is the science of morality of human conduct = it studies human activity to

determine what it must be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason.

What is the Material Object of Ethics?

Material object refers to the subject matter of the science, i.e. human acts or human
conduct. Any action done by a moral agent, such as the act of telling the truth, helping
others in distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving other’s trespasses, including malicious
deeds, such as killing, stealing and lying, refers to the material object of ethics.
 What is the Formal Object of Ethics?

Formal Object Quod refers to the aim or point of view that the science employs in
studying or dealing its material object, i.e. rectitude/morality of human acts. It refers to
whether the act done by the doer is right or wrong, good or bad.

Formal Object Quo refers to the medium by which the science studies its material
object, i.e. human reason.
.
IMPORTANCE OF ETHICS

Ethics employs the marvellous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important
question what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science.

Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men are regulated, without it
disorder or disharmony prospers.

Ethics provides methods or principles to distinguish good from bad, right from
wrong actions.

DIVISION OF ETHICS

General Ethics presents truth about human acts and from these truths deduces the
general principles of morality.

Special Ethics is applied ethics. It applies the principle of General Ethics in different
departments of human activity, individual and social.

ASSUMPTIONS OF ETHICS

Like any other disciple, ethics proceeds from some basic assumptions. Assumptions are
fundamental beliefs or statements that are accepted to be true without burden of proof or
proving. The two important and most common assumptions are the following:

1. Man is a rational being. This means that man is rational has a reason and acts with a
purpose. Unlike brutes, they merely act out of instinct and reflex.

2. Man is free. Ethics assumes that man is free to act according to his will and he has
the power to act, speak, or think if he chooses to restraint.

FORMS OF ETHICAL ANALYSIS

1. Descriptive = aims to discover what moral beliefs are held by a given society, social
group or social organization

2. Normative = examines the standard for the rightness or wrongness of actions. It deals
with what makes an action right or wrong
 Major Normative Ethics

1. Teleological Ethics (Consequentialist) = maintains that the morality of an action is

determined solely by its consequences.

Ex: Utilitarianism judges consequences by a “greatest good for the greatest

number” standard. Hedonism, on the other hand, says something is “good” if the
consequence produces pleasure or avoids pain.

2. Deontological Ethics (Non-consequentialist) = assert that the morality of an action

depends on its intrinsic nature, its motives or its rules and principles.

3. Authoritarian Ethics = appeals the morality of an action to authority force in

determining what constitute right from wrong, good from bad, moral from immoral.

4. Theological Ethics = holds that the will of God determines the rightness and
wrongness of an act

5. Legalistic Ethics = determines right from wrong, based on a body of clearly state and
well-documented body of laws.

6. Situational Ethics = asserts that the morality of an action depends on the situation
and not the application of moral laws to the case.

In general, Ethics is about matters such as the good thing that we should pursue and the
bad thing that we should avoid; the right ways in which we could or should act and the
wrongs ways of acting. It is about what is acceptable and unacceptable in human behaviour.
Evaluation: EXERCISE 1

Name: _______________________________________ DATE: _____________

Course & Year: _______________________________ CAMPUS: __________

TRUE or FALSE. Write your answer before the number.

_________ 1. The material object of ethics is the human act.

_________ 2. Ethics and Morality does not have any distinction whatsoever.

_________ 3. General Ethics presents truth about human acts and from these truths deduces
the general principles of morality. .

_________4. Ethics is a practical science that deals purely with theories and principles.

_________5. Normative analysis examines the standard for the rightness or wrongness of
actions.

_________6. Legalistic Ethics determines right from wrong, based on a body of clearly state
and well-documented body of laws

_________7. The formal object of ethics is the rectitude of reason.

_________ 8. Non-consequential ethics maintains that the morality of an action is determined

solely by its consequences.

_________ 9. Ethics and Morality have practically the same literal origin or etymology,
which refers to “custom.”

_________10. Ethics is also known as Moral Theology

References:

Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018).
Ethics: Foundations for Moral Valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
Glenn, P. (2013). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. USA: Literary Licensing,
LLC
Shafer-Landau, R. (2017). The Fundamentals of Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press.
MODULE 2.0:
HUMAN ACTS

Overview:

This particular chapter studies the human act itself, defines it, classifies its varieties,
discerns its essential elements, and discusses the things that may modify the human act and
make it less human..

Learning Objectives: At the end of the lesson the learners should be able to:

1. Discuss human act in itself and identify its classification and constituents
2. Differentiate between human acts and acts of man
3. Identify the different degrees of voluntariness
1. Identify the different modifiers of human acts

Content:

HUMAN ACT IN ITSELF

Human Act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man. It is an act
performed with advertence and motive, an act determined by the free will. Such an act alone
is proper to man as man for he is rational, that is to say, he has understanding and free
willing. In a wide sense, the term human act means any sort of activity, internal or external,
bodily or spiritual, performed by a human being.

What makes an act human?

Human Acts are those performed by a person who is acting knowingly, freely, and
wilfully. These actions are deliberate, intentional, or voluntary.
 Act is done knowingly when the doer is conscious and aware of the reason
and the consequence of his actions.
 Act is done freely when the doer acts by his own initiative and choice without
being forced to do so by another person or situation.
 Act is done wilfully when the doer consents to the act, accepting it as his own,
and assumes accountability/responsibility for its consequences.

Examples of Human Acts:

the act of telling the truth, helping others in distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving
other’s trespasses, including malicious deeds, such as killing, stealing and lying, etc.
All of these acts become human acts because they are performed knowingly, freely
and wilfully the doer himself/herself.
Therefore, Human Acts are acts only proper to man because of all animals ( man as
rational animal), he alone has knowledge and freedom of will. They are acts which, we are
conscious, are under our control and for which we are responsible.
 *Only human acts have moral significance.
*A human person is the source of a willed action.
*Moral acts are willed acts, moral acts are identified with human acts.
*Moral action is willed action and morally good actions arise from a good will

“A man is what his human acts make him”

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN ACT AND ACT OF MAN

Human Act is an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man.
Examples:
the act of telling the truth, helping others in distress, fulfilling a promise, forgiving
other’s trespasses, including malicious deeds, such as killing, stealing and lying, etc.

Act of Man is an act performed by human beings without advertence or without the
exercise of free choice. In other words, act of man refers to the involuntary, intuitive or
reflex acts exhibited by a man.
Examples:
the blinking of the eye, the beating of the heart, sneezing, yawning, breathing, and the like.

Note: Sometimes acts of man become human acts by the advertence and consent of the
human agent.
For instance, my eyes fall upon an indecent sight, or upon a page of obscene reading
material. The act of seeing and even of reading and understanding the words is an act of man;
but it becomes a human act the moment I deliberately consent to look or to read.

CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS

I. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts

1. Elicited Acts – acts that begin and are perfected in the will itself or begin in the
will and are perfected by other faculties under the control of the will.

a. Wish – the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a
thing without, whether this thing be realizable (attainable) or not.

Ex: I wish or I should like to go to Europe

b. Intention – the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regard as

realizable (attainable), whether the thing is actually done or not.

Ex: I am going to Europe next summer

 c. Consent – the acceptance of the will of the means necessary to carry out
intention; further intention of doing what is necessary to realize the first or
main intention.

Ex: If I intend to go to Europe, I consent to the necessary preparation for

the journey.

d. Election – the selection of the will of the precise means to be employed in

carrying out an intention.

Ex: While I may go to Europe either by ship or by plane, I cannot go by

both simultaneously, but must elect or select one of the means. By election I
choose to sail on a certain day, from a certain port.

e. Use – the employment by the will of powers (body, mind or both) to carry out
its intention by the means elected.

Ex: If I ride a plane going to Europe, and elect sleep the whole duration of the
trip, I exercise the will-act of use by putting my body in motion or not ( by
staying awake or asleep inside the plane)

f. Fruition – the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will’s act of
satisfaction in intention fulfilled

2. Commanded Acts – acts that do not find their adequate cause in the simple will act,
but are perfected by the action of mental or bodily powers under the control of the
will or under orders from the will.

a. Internal – acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will.
Examples: acts performed mentally such as reasoning, imagining,
remembering and reflecting.

b. External – acts affected by bodily powers under command of the will.

Examples: acts performed bodily, such as walking, dancing,
talking and writing.

c. Mixed – acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental
powers.
Example: Study, which involves use of intellect, and use of eyes in
reading the lesson.
To further illustrate:
I intend to go to my room and study (Elicited Act)
I walk to my room, turn on the light, sit at my desk, take down a book,
turn to the lesson, bend my eyes upon the page (Commanded Acts)
II. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason

Human Acts are either in agreement or in disagreement with the dictates of reason,
and this relation (agreement and disagreement) with reason constitutes their morality. On the
score of morality, human acts are:
1. Good – when they are in harmony with the dictates of right reason.

2. Evil – when they are in opposition to these dictates.

3. Indifferent – when they stand in no positive relation to the dictate of reason.

Indifferent human acts exist in theory but not as a matter of practical experience. A
human act that is indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the
circumstances which affect its performance, especially the end, motive or purpose in
view of the agent.

CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT (What makes an act a human?)

In order that an act be human, it must possess three essential qualities:
1. Knowledge – advertence of what the moral agent is doing, thinking or willing;
deliberation about the means to perform an action and about the end to be achieved;
awareness and consciousness of the conditions and implications of our actions.

No human act is possible without knowledge.

(I cannot will to love and serve God if I do not know God.)

2. Freedom – the power to choose between two or more courses of action without being
forced to take one or the other by anything except our own will.
Every human act must be free.
3. Voluntariness – a formal quality of human act, and for it to be present, there must
ordinarily be knowledge and freedom of the agent. In other words, actions are
voluntary if they are will-acted upon.
Voluntary act is synonymous to human act.

To further illustrate:

A Catholic is aware that today is Sunday and that he has obligation of hearing Mass
(knowledge)

He is free to attend Mass or to stay away;

to perform the duty or leave in unperformed. (freedom).

He wills to do or not to do his duty and to hear mass (voluntariness)

Evaluation: EXERCISE 2.0

Name: _______________________________________ DATE: ______________

Course & Year: _______________________________ CAMPUS: ___________

Human Act or Act of Man. Write your answer before the number.

_____________________ 1. Satisfyingly watching a movie/series

_____________________ 2. Automatic Circulation of the blood

_____________________ 3. Sharing spare resources with others

_____________________ 4. Praying intimately and sincerely

_____________________ 5. Spontaneous closing of the eyes while sleeping

_____________________ 6. Engaging in social media (like Facebook and Youtube)

_____________________ 7. Doing household chores

_____________________ 8. Regular digestion of food in the stomach

_____________________ 9. Studying different modules

_____________________ 10. Complaining about complicated lessons.

References:

Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018).
Ethics: Foundations for Moral Valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
Glenn, P. (2013). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. USA: Literary Licensing,
LLC
Shafer-Landau, R. (2017). The Fundamentals of Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press.
MODULE 2.1 THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACT

I. KINDS OR DEGREE OF VOLUNTARINESS

1. Perfect and Imperfect

a. Perfect Voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent fully knows
and fully intends the act.
 Full knowledge and full consent.

b. Imperfect Voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the agent’s

knowledge, intention or both.
 Partial knowledge and partial consent.
Example: A deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; a person who
signs away some rights in a contract without fully realizing what the
consequences of signing away those rights could be.
2. Simple and Conditional

a. Simple Voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the agent

likes or dislikes doing it.

b. Conditional Voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to do something

other than that which he is actually doing, but doing it with repugnance or
dislike. In other words, when a person is forced by circumstance to perform an
act which he would not do under normal condition is subject to conditional
voluntariness.

Example: The commander of a distressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable

goods overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is simply voluntary. Still he
dislikes doing it, and would not do it if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He
wishes to keep the goods, but throws them away. This act is what we call conditional
voluntary.

3. Direct and Indirect

a. Direct Voluntariness (Voluntary in se) is present in a human act willed in

itself. It is when the act is intended for its own sake, either as a means or as an
end.
e.g. He who intends to go to the party in order to drink with friends wills both
the going to the party and the drinking with friends. Both acts, therefore, are
directly voluntary.
b. Indirect Voluntariness (Voluntary in causa) is present in that human act
which is the foreseen result of another act directly willed. It is an act which is
not intended for its own sake but which merely follows as a regrettable
consequence of an action directly willed.
 e.g. Throwing precious cargoes from a sinking boat to save lives of
passengers. Here the throwing and losing of the cargoes is not desired or
intended. It comes as a consequence of saving the lives of passenger.

Example: A man kills a rabbit for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as means
to an end to be achieved, that is to have something to eat for dinner. This is what we call
direct voluntariness. Now suppose the rabbit was a tame animal that had played about the
man’s grounds and had given his children pleasure. The man knows that by killing the rabbit
he will deprive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This, indeed, he does not
directly will, but, inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequence of his directly willed act, he
wills it indirectly, or on its cause. In other words, he direct wills the cause of his children’s
sorrow, and thus indirectly wills the sorrow itself.

4. Positive and Negative

a. Positive Voluntariness is present in a human act of doing or performing.

e.g. Going on a walk
b. Negative Voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting or refraining
from doing.
e.g. Refraining from talking
A Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (positive voluntariness).
A Catholic deliberately misses Mass on Sunday (negative voluntariness)

5. Actual, Virtual, Habitual and Interpretative

a. Actual Voluntariness is present in a human act willed here and now.

b. Virtual Voluntariness is present in a human act done as a result of a formerly

elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now or forgotten.

c. Habitual Voluntariness is present in a human act done in harmony with, but

not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention.

d. Interpretative Voluntariness is that voluntariness which, in the judgment of

prudence and common sense, would be actually present if opportunity or
ability for it were given
Examples:

(a) A man makes the morning offering. He actually, here and now, intends to live for
God, and to serve Him in all thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of
offering is an actual intention; it is a will-act in which there is actual
voluntariness.
(b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it.
Nevertheless, his day is without sin which would contradict his pious intention,
and we say that the power or virtue of the intention endures, and that, as a result of
the intention, all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for
God. The man takes breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends
time in recreation, etc. in all these acts he has no actual (“here and now”) intention
of doing them for God, but he has the virtual intention of so doing them. Hence all
the acts that the man performs throughout the day – even those that are in
themselves acts of man – are human acts if service by reason of their virtual
voluntariness.

(c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic Years pass, and he does
not carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken suddenly ill, and
lies unconscious at death’s door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of
receiving the sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and
unrevoked, and the man is said to have habitual intention for that act. The act,
however, is not the result of the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of
that intention cannot reasonably be presumed to endure throughout a long period
of neglect and unfulfillment. For, if one makes an intention of doing a thing, and
fails to do it throughout years of continues opportunity for its accomplishment, it
is obvious that the virtue or power of the original intention is null. Still, as long as
the original intention is not revoked, it remains with its author, and his worn, so to
speak, like a forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless actively to produce
a result, but remaining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind. It is a mark
of habitual voluntariness.

(d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No

knowledge is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of
receiving the sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered.
Here the act or receiving the sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with
the will of the recipient, so that, if he could but know its great value, he would
certainly wish to receive it. Thus is his will interpreted by sound common-sense.
In the act of receiving the sacrament the man said to have an interpretative
intention. Such an intention, then, is an intention that may be prudently presumed,
not indeed as present, but as an intention that would be present, but as an intention
that would be present if proper knowledge and freedom were available to him in
whom it is presumed. Similarly, infants are baptized, and the receiving of the
sacraments is in them a human act, by reason of interpretative voluntariness.
Again, the small boy who has literally to be carried to school and kept there
against his will, has an interpretative intention of going to school. For parents and
teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the value of schooling, he would
certainly will to attend.
II. Indirect Voluntariness

Indirect Voluntariness or Voluntariness in Cause is present in that human act is an

effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed.
Human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that, since the will
controls such acts, the will is responsible for them. In other words, human acts are imputable
(worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment.)
Now the moment we bring together the matters of indirect voluntariness and imputability,
two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The questions are:
1. When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?
2. When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good
another one evil? (Principle of Double Effect)

When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?

a. The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way.

b. The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil
effect.
c. The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the
effect.

Examples: Applying the principles on the following cases:

(a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use
blasphemous language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly
enough, that he hates intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and
scandal. Nevertheless, he drinks liquor and the foreseen evils occur. How far is
Michael responsible for these evil effects? When does he incur their guilt?

(b) John says, “If I go to the meeting and hear Jones say sharp things about our party, I
know I’ll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones career that I
alone know. John goes to the meeting: the evil of detraction follows. Determine
John’s responsibility, and the moment at which his guilt is imputed to him.

(c) Mary knows that by persistent company keeping with a non-Catholic she will
encourage the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the consequent danger of an
invalid marriage: for Jane idolize Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes,
foolishly but sincerely, that she herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the
danger in which Jane is placed through her example. Nevertheless, she persists. Jane
imitates, and eventually commits the sin of an attempted marriage outside the Church.
How far is Mary to blame? Why?
 (d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by prudent persons against attendance at a
secular university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers
to his faith. He declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends
the university gradually loses his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At
what time does his lapse become imputable to him? Why?

(e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forgetting to set the alarm. Before falling
asleep he recalls the omission, but he does not rise top adjust the clock. He knows that
he is a very heavy sleeper, and that he will probably not awake in time for Mass on
Sunday. This is precisely what happens. When does Timothy incur the guilt of
missing Mass? Why?

(f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday Night. But,
contrary to all his experience, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he
attends very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter? Why?

(g) Again, Timothy deliberately neglects to set the alarm on Saturday night. Again, by an
almost miraculous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time for Mass on
Sunday. But, he reasons, since he has already missed Mass in cause, there is now no
obligation incumbent upon him of attending. He stays at home and does not hear
Mass – Here Timothy was altogether wrong. He willed an evil in cause, and his will-
act stopped there. Through no merit of his own, the cause failed to function as a
cause, and he awoke in time for Mass. Now, by a new and direct will-act he wills to
miss Mass. Here is a new evil, directly willed.

In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect,
and his obligation arises from the very fact that the effect is evil. Why, them, did we list three
conditions for the imputability of evil in cause? Why not simply say that two conditions are
requisite for such imputability, that the agent he able to foresee the evil effect, and that he be
free to avoid the cause? Is not the fact that the effect is evil always a prohibition obliging the
agent to refrain from the cause of that evil? Not always. Sometimes there is a good effect as
well as an evil effect proceeding from a single cause. This brings us to the second question:

When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good
another one evil? (Principle of Double Effect)

a. The evil effect must not precede the good effect. The good effect must not come from
the evil effect. It is never justified to do evil in order to attain something good.
If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good
effect, and is directly willed as such a means.
 Fundamental Principle of Ethics: “the end does not justify the means”
= It means that we cannot do evil that good may come of it.
There is no good that can justify the direct willing of evil. However, if a lie – even a
“harmless” lie – will save a life – even an innocent life – the lie may not be told. Notice well
that the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the good effect;
we do not say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either
precede the evil or simultaneously with it. The good effect must outweigh in importance the
evil result.

b. There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect.

If this condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all,
and the act is prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the reason
must be determined by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in
question, and by the proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil
effect.

c. The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must directly intend the
good effect and merely permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.”

If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being
permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always against reason,
and hence against the principle of ethics. But, unless the agent directly wills
the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect – else he has no adequate
motive for performing the act at all.

Examples: Applying the principles on the following cases.

(a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants
will be killed yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the
general’s act allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step
towards ending the war with victory for the just cause – a good effect; and the killing
of non-combatants an evil effect.

(b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy’s country,
he will seriously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. At
the present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy
future supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many a farmer and
his family, but ultimately it will help win a just war. May the general lay waste the
farms-lands?
(c) In view of your answer to the foregoing question, would you justify or condemn the
havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea?

(d) A doctor can save a mother’s life by destroying the life of her child. May he do so?
Why not?

(e) A child’s life can be saved by destroying the life of the mother. May this be done?
Why not?

(f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical relief there is none. Life cannot last
beyond a few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and
quickly? Why not?

(g) A student of very frail health has been promised lucrative position upon graduation.
He need the situation to support his aged and impoverished parents. He knows he
must study hard, else he will fail in his examination, lose his degree, and, in
consequence will not secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study
may seriously impair his health. May he study hard and run the risk of permanent
infirmity?
Evaluation: EXERCISE 2.1

Name: _______________________________________ DATE: ____________

Course & Year: _______________________________ CAMPUS: ___________

TRUE or FALSE. Write your answer before the number.

_________ 1. The means does not justify the end.

_________ 2. Actual Voluntariness is present in a human act willed here and now.

_________ 3. Perfect Voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent does not fully
know and fully intends the act. .

_________4. In Principle of Double Effect, the good effect must outweigh in importance the
evil result

_________5. Indirect Voluntariness or Voluntariness in Cause is present in that human act is

an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed

_________6. Imperfect Voluntariness is present when there is no defect in the agent’s

knowledge, intention or both

_________7. It is moral to do evil so that good may come of it.

_________ 8. Interpretative Voluntariness is that voluntariness which, in the judgment of

prudence and common sense, would be actually present if opportunity or ability for it were
given
.
_________ 9. Negative Voluntariness is present in a human act of doing or performing.

_________10. Conditional Voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the

agent likes or dislikes doing it

References:

Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018).
Ethics: Foundations for Moral Valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
Glenn, P. (2013). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. USA: Literary Licensing,
LLC
Shafer-Landau, R. (2017). The Fundamentals of Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press.
MODULE 2.2
MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS

The Modifiers of Human Acts

By the modifiers of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the
essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less perfectly
human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently
diminish the responsibility of the agent.

I. Ignorance is the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. It is a negation of

knowledge. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to be present, the
ignorance is not merely negative but privative.

Thus, ignorance of the higher mathematics in a structural- steel worker is merely

negative; but such ignorance is privative in the architect or engineer who designs steel
structures such as bridges and the framework of buildings.
Ignorance has a positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of knowledge,
but in the presence of what is falsely supposed to knowledge. Thus if I see a stranger in the
street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely negative.
But if I am misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him to be a
well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is positive towards him: I have what I judge to be
positive knowledge of his identity. Such positive ignorance is called mistake or error.

1. Ignorance in its Object – a thing which a person may be ignorant.

a. Ignorance of Law – the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule or

regulation.
Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local
speed limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the
game-laws forbid such an act. A young Fresh man leaves the campus during noon-recess, not
knowing that his action is a violation of the college rules.
b. Ignorance of Fact – the ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as
forbidden.
Examples: A motorist knows the speed limit, but unknowingly violates it because of
an inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and
kills game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows that he must not leave the
campus, but goes out of bounds through misinformation about the extent of the college
property. – Thus, ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing
comes under the prohibition of a known law.
 c. Ignorance of Penalty – the lack of knowledge of the precise sanction affixed
to the law.
Examples: A motorist knowingly violates the speedometer, not knowing that, in that
particular locality, the set punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of
which no amount of money will be accepted. A hunter violates the game-laws, believing
that, if apprehended, he will be merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense
is the revocation of the license to hunt. A freshman wilfully leaves the campus, thinking that
he will escape with an admonition not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his
offense is the suspension of all student-privileges for a period of two weeks.

2. Ignorance in its Subject – in the person in whom ignorance exists.

a. Vincible Ignorance or Conquerable Ignorance – ignorance that can and

should be supplanted by knowledge and that can be dispelled by the use of
ordinary diligence. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable
ignorance.
- It does not destroy or remove voluntariness, nor
responsibility. Acts done in vincible ignorance are still
voluntary and the agent is still responsible for them.
 Crass or Supine – if it be the result of total or nearly total lack of
effort to dispel it.
 Simply Vincible – if some effort worthy the name, but not persevering
and whole-hearted effort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it.
 Affected – if positive effort is made to retain it.
e.g. A Manila resident who violated traffic laws, not knowing of such laws
before, would still be responsible for his act, because his ignorance is
vincible. For ignorance of the law excuses no one.
A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the college rules of
order, is in the state of vincible ignorance in the matter. If he has made no effort, or scarcely
any, to know the rules his ignorance is crass or supine. If he has positively avoided learning
the rules so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may be able to say when taken in
violation of order, “I did not know the rule,” his ignorance is affected. If he has made some
inquiries about the rules, or has tried once or twice, without success, to procure a copy of the
rule-book, his ignorance is simply vincible.
b. Invincible Ignorance – ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence
cannot dispel. This sort of ignorance is attributed to one of two causes: either
the person in whom the ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his
lack of knowledge, or the person who realizes his ignorance finds
ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is never the
fault of the person in whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable
ignorance.
 Two Degrees of Invincible Ignorance:

 Physically – if no human effort can dispel it

 Morality – if such efforts as good and prudent men would expand to
dispel it is found to be ineffective.

To illustrate: A Catholic eats meat, wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here his
ignorance is invincible – even though in itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the
nearest person for the day of the week – and even physically invincible, because no effort can
be used with effect where there is no realization whatever is needed.
To illustrate: A man seeking for a seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds
himself constantly referred in learned books on the subject of economics. After months and
months of searching through libraries and following elusive clues, the man discovers that
there is only one copy of the pamphlet in existence; that this copy is in the library of a recluse
who resides in a foreign country, far across the sea; and that, although one may be permitted
to read it, the pamphlet may neither be borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of
invincible ignorance with regard to the contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not
physically invincible, for he could make a voyage to the land of the recluses, and study the
pamphlet in the latter’s library. Still, the course would involve difficulties and inconveniences
out of all proportion to the importance of the matter about which ignorance exists. We say
therefore that the man’s ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is morally invincible.

3. Ignorance in its Results (ignorance with reference to acts performed while ignorance
exists.)

a. Antecedent Ignorance – that which precedes all consent of the will

A man, wholly unaware that today is a holy day of obligation, misses Mass. He would
certainly not miss if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is antecedent to his
act of missing Mass, and we say that the act is done through or in consequence of ignorance.
Antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible ignorance.

b. Concomitant Ignorance – the ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an

act that would have been performed even if ignorance did not exist.

A nominal Catholic misses the Mass, not unaware that the day is a holy day. Yet,
even had he known, he would have missed mass. His act of missing Mass does not come
from ignorance, but happens in company with his ignorance, and we call the ignorance
concomitant. An act done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary.
 c. Consequent Ignorance – that which follows upon an act of the will
Consequent ignorance does not differ from vincible ignorance. A careless Catholic
suspects that the day is a holy day but deliberately refrains from making sure, and does not
attend mass. If he positively avoids knowledge in the matter, his (affected) ignorance is
directly willed; if he fails to acquire knowledge through sheer carelessness, his (crass or
supine) ignorance is indirectly willed.

Principles Regarding Ignorance:

 Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.
 Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
 Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.
 Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases
voluntariness.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: Invincible Ignorance destroy the voluntariness of an act.

Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in

its turn, depends upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then, voluntariness
depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an
inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as its proceeds from invincible
ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. – To
illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact that the day is Friday, eats meat. It
may be both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of
abstinence, it is neither voluntary nor free. The act of eating meat, in so far as it is a violation
of the law of abstinence, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act
for which the agent is responsible. - A further illustration; A Catholic child uses very evil
language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes the
sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry about the
past, yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in invincible ignorance,
and therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is not imputable to the child.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Vincible Ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.

Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lacks of knowledge in the edge. On the

contrary, it supposes knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty of
dispelling ignorance. Hence, the agent has knowledge which bear indirectly upon the act
which be performs in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect
voluntariness, and is a human act imputable to the agent. – To illustrate: a careless Catholic
suspects that the day is Friday, but fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain; and he
eats meat. Now, while the agent does lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has
knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and of his obligation to acquire knowledge.
Failing to make proper effort to dispel his ignorance is, in some sense, the cause of his
violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he wills this violation in cause. His act has indirect
voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible.
THIRD PRINCIPLE: Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.

While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens
voluntariness, makes the act less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The
agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, none the less, he lacks direct
and perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while
possessing voluntariness. Voluntariness is, therefore, impaired or lessened

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way
increases voluntariness.

Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively
fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which is implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct
and perfect, and, in so far, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the
other hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin
against a law, shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist in such sins. It is thus
said to increase the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to indicate an increased
voluntariness in the act that comes from it.

II. Concupiscence or Passions are psychic responses. They are either tendencies
towards desirable objects, or tendencies away from undesirable objects. They are
those bodily appetites or tendencies which include love, hatred, joy, grief, desire,
aversion or horror, hope, despair, courage or daring, fear and anger.

1. Antecedent – when passions spring into action unstimulated by and any act of the
will. It is an act of man, and not human act. It is therefore a non voluntary act, and the
agent is not responsible for it.

2. Consequent – when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs the passions up or fosters
them. It is the fault of the agent, for it is willed either in itself or in cause. The agent
is responsible for it.

To illustrate: the feeling of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a
splendid landscape; the anger that surges in resentment of unjust and offensive treatment; the
first feeling of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or thought, good or evil; the
leaping desire for revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty; the first feeling of hatred that
comes with the thought or sight of a bitter enemy; the shrinking in aversion from an
unpleasant task; the urge to “give up” in despair in the face of crowding difficulties – all
these are examples of antecedent concupiscence or passion. These movements or bodily
appetites become consequent when they receive the approval of the rational will. Thus, the
passion of anger that arises antecedently when one is insulted, becomes consequent when the
feeling is deliberately retained. Thus, the first movement of pleasure in an unwholesome
thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will consents to retain that thought or fancy.
 Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore a non-
voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concupiscence, however is
the fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, that is, either in itself or in
cause. The agent is, in consequence, responsible for it.

Principles Regarding Concupiscence:

 Antecedent concupiscence lessens but does not remove the
voluntariness or responsibility of an act.
 Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
 Consequent concupiscence however great does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act and may even increase accountability.

FIRST PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.

Some ethicians use “voluntariness” to mean will force, vehemence or intensity of

will-act. These assert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they are
right, for concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from it is more
vehement and intense by reason of the concupiscence. But we do not use the word
voluntariness in the sense of will-force, or will-intensity; we use the term to indicate the
human character of an act, the essence of a human act. We keep human act and voluntary act
as synonyms.

We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that come
from it. Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent concupiscence
disturbs the mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon
the moral qualities of an act; hence it impairs the knowledge necessary for perfect
voluntariness. Again, antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and
thus it lessens the full and prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly
voluntary act; hence it impairs freedom. Therefore, on the score of the both knowledge and
freedom, antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence,
diminishes the responsibility of the agent.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of

an act.

Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupiscence, they are
not destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may
sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less grave
than it would be if committed, dispassionately and, so to speak, “in cold blood.” To
illustrate: Jones, under the influence of antecedent anger, strikes Smith and injures him
seriously. While the voluntariness of this act is lessened by antecedent concupiscence, and
while Jonas is less responsible than he would be if struck the blow in cold deliberation, still
the act is truly voluntary, and Jones is responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset
and disturbed by strong passion, is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, and
does it freely. Passion may make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not
make such control impossible. If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of
agent’s acts impossible, then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not human acts,
but act of man. Here, however, we speak only of human acts as influenced by antecedent
concupiscence.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the
voluntariness of an act.

Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or indirectly. Hence the acts that

proceed from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To illustrate: Jonas wishes
to be revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to
stir himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seriously. Here
we have direct voluntariness throughout. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly
wills the anger as a means to the accomplishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with
rage at the moment of performing the act, he is nonetheless doing what he directly willed to
do, and his concupiscence cannot affect the full voluntariness of that act. Again: Smith
broods upon wrongs suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee)
that if he continues to nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to act of violence against
the person of Jenkins. Nevertheless, he continues to brood. He became wild with passion,
seeks out Jenkins, and seriously injures him. Here the anger was directly willed, and the act
of violence was willed in cause with the anger, and in itself at the moment of attack. Even if
Smith’s passion was so vehement as to overwhelm his rational control of his acts, even if,
that is to say, the attack itself did not proceed from Smith as a human act, it was nevertheless
willed in cause, and has its proper voluntariness as such: an indirect voluntariness which is in
no wise diminished by concupiscence.

III. Fear – the shrinking back of the mind from danger. It is the agitation of the mind
brought about by the apprehension of impending evil. It is also the disturbance of the
mind a person who is confronted by a danger to himself or loved ones.
 Difference Between Acting With Fear and Acting Out of Fear
o Acting with fear are actions which are difficult or dangerous just like
new experiences such as speaking in front of a crowd.
o Acting out of fear are actions where in fear causes one to act just like
jumping from the top floor of a burning building.

Principles Regarding Fear:

 An act done with fear is voluntary and is accountable.
 An act done from fear, however great is simply voluntary, although it
is regularly also conditionally involuntary.
PRINCIPLE: An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is
regularly also conditionally involuntary.

The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding
from fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned
voluntariness in that which is performed with fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon
taking valuables from a house at night, proceeds with fear that he may be apprehended; but
he does not commit burglary through or from fear.

An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we speak
of a human act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily
insane, the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an act of man and not a human
act. But as long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from fear are simply
voluntary. For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that
of which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But the act
is also regularly involuntary in as much as the agent would not perform it in other
circumstances; were it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be performed.
To illustrate: A man denies his faith to escape torture and death. His denial comes from fear.
Hence, according to our principle, the act is simply voluntary, and the man is responsible for
the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man would not have denied his faith except for the
influence of fear, we discern a conditional involuntariness in his act which renders it less
sinful than it would be where it done in cold deliberation, apart from the influence of fear.

The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from
it. Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the
influence of fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although never to such an
extent that the agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape responsibility for his act.

The positive (“statue”) law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from
grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent perform an act
that is against his will, is an invalid act or one that maybe invalidated. Even though such an
act is simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear
to stand as valid and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a
gun, or under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, on positive law, to fulfil the contract.

IV. Violence or Co-action – the external force applied by a free cause for the purpose of
compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will.

Example: the Martyrs suffered violence when they dragged to the altars of idols in
the effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods.

Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not
controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of bodily action, and since this
command is limited or destroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be indirectly
affected by violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make the bodily
members offer due resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such resistance is lacking, in
the act done under violence.
Principles Regarding Violence:
 Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence.
  External acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered,
are in no wise imputable to the agent.

V. Habit – understood as operative habit. It is a lasting readiness and facility, born of

frequent repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner.

Principles of Habit:
 Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always
voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.
Thus, a man who has always endeavoured to speak the truth has a habit of
truthfulness, and it goes against his habit to lie. A man, who has the habit of lying, finds it
very easy to falsify or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when a lie
would prove convenient. Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds profane words
slipping from him with great ease and readiness, while it requires a special watchfulness on
his part to avoid uttering them.

PRINCIPLE: Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are
always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.

Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts
done from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in themselves acts of man, the
habit itself, so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to
overcome it, is willed as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are
human acts. To illustrate: John has the bad habit of using profane language. He is conscious
of this fault. Being conscious of it, he has knowledge of it; and he is free to determine upon
overcoming it, or to allow it to endure. Hence, both knowledge and freedom are present, and
there is nothing to balk voluntariness. John is therefore responsible for the bad habit as much,
and, since it is the cause of the profane words – many of which are uttered without advertence
– he is responsible in cause or indirectly for each profane utterance. Now, if John determines
to overcome his evil habit, he disowns it; he wills not to utter profane speech. But, “He that
wills the end wills the means to that end.” Hence, John, to be honest in his will to reform,
must consent to ceaseless watchfulness over his tongue. While his good intention endures,
and while his watchfulness continues, the profane utterances that “slip out” are acts of man
and not human acts, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are not imputable to
John, but the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consent indirectly to let the
habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable, even if they slip from him
unnoticed.
Evaluation: EXERCISE 2.2

Name: _______________________________________ DATE: ______________

Course & Year: _______________________________ CAMPUS: ___________

Choose only three among modifiers of human acts (Ignorance, Concupiscence, Fear,
Violence, Habit) and provide an example or situation for each chosen modifier.

Examples: Concupiscence = the ambivalent feeling upon seeing for the first time the person
whom I truly admire the most.
Ignorance = driving along the road without knowing that such road has a
local ordinance enforcing the “one way” rule or “no U-turn spot in this specific area”

Answers:

1.)_________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

2.)_________________________________________________________________________
__

___________________________________________________________________________

3.)_________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

References:

Bulaong, O.G., Calano, M.J.T., Lagliva, A., Mariano, M.N.E., & Principe, J.D.Z. (2018).
Ethics: Foundations for Moral Valuation. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
Glenn, P. (2013). Ethics: A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy. USA: Literary Licensing,
LLC

Shafer-Landau, R. (2017). The Fundamentals of Ethics. USA: Oxford University Press.