Aura Heydenreich

Albert Einstein’s “Physics and Reality” and

“The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”
The Process of Interformation, Semiologic Foundations
and Epistemic Transformations (Part II)

Abstract: Now that in the first paper I have analysed the functions of epistemic
narrativity for the process of scientific modeling in the follow up paper the ana-
lytical perspective will change gears and focus on the semiologic practices of
scientific modeling as well as their epistemic functions for the development of
Einstein’s special theory of relativity. The interformative process, described
here can only be understood when multiple levels of modeling are differenti-
ated. We must therefore distinguish three levels of modeling: primary, second-
ary and tertiary. In order to describe this process of three-fold modeling, I first
turn to Einstein’s 1936 text “Physics and Reality,” which presents a metareflec-
tion of epistemic practices in theoretical physics. From this it will become clear
that it is necessary to distinguish the modeling levels, because each level com-
prises its own possibilities and restrictions. This differentiation hopefully leads
to a better understanding of theoretical modeling in physics from the point of
view of literary studies. In the second part of the paper I focus on the process of
interformation in physics and discuss the development of the theory of special
relativity from a systematical perspective.

In order to analyse the modeling strategies in theoretical physics, and to de-

scribe its various levels, I initially consider in the first paper a meta-theoretical
text of Einstein’s “Physik und Realität” [“Physics and Reality” (1936a)]1 from
1936.2 In this text Einstein reflects retrospectively on the process of theory-
formation that led to the foundations of the theory of relativity. Three different

1 Einstein’s text appeared in the Journal of Franklin Institute as an original text in German lan-
guage and was provided with a translation by Jean Piccard. Here both the original and English
versions of the citations are provided.
2 I am grateful to Michael Sinding for the translation of the paper. Also I am grateful to Klaus
Mecke for the exchange of ideas on the process of interformation in physics and literature, to
Christine Lubkoll, Alexander Laska, Lothar Ley, Benjamin Specht, Clemens Heydenreich, and
Miriam Rückelt for having read and discussed this paper with me thoroughly.

Open Access. © 2021 Aura Heydenreich, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110481112-004
106 Aura Heydenreich

levels of theoretical modeling are distinguished in the analysis: primary, sec-

ondary and tertiary modeling. The necessity of the internal differentiation of
these levels is required from a semiologic perspective, as each level operates
with its own symbolic codes and therefore carries out different epistemic func-
tions. I turn in the next step to the 1905 article “On the Electrodynamics of Mov-
ing Bodies.” To be shown is how the principles and modeling practices of
mechanics and electrodynamics are intersected in a modeling configuration,
from which the theory of special relativity results.
In Languages of Art Nelson Goodman (1976, 27–31) establishes two modes
of symbolic reference and accordingly distinguish two types of representation:
‘denotation’ or ‘representation of,’ and ‘exemplification’ or ‘representation as.’
Catherine Elgin refines these two types of modeling and reflects from the point
of view of philosophy of science (Elgin 2009, 2010–2012). Roman Frigg (2017,
2010; Frigg et al. 2009) and James Nguyen (Frigg and Nguyen 2016) argue that
“representation as” is the typical mode of scientific modeling and argue in the
tradition of Goodman for scientific modeling as an anti-mimetic form of repre-
sentation (cf. also Peschard 2011).
I would like to urge that “representation of” and “representation as” are not be
seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, they can be conceptualized as successive
stages in the encompassing modeling process, as the following will demonstrate.
Thus I would like to show that “representation of” can be attributed to the primary
modeling level, while “representation as” operates at the secondary modeling level
and “representation through” (introduced here and to be described below) at the
tertiary level. So each level provides a slightly altered symbolic code.
This process-oriented reading is grounded, from a philosophy of science
perspective, on Nancy Nersessian’s approach of “model-based reasoning” (Mag-
nani and Nersessian 2002; Nersessian 1987, 1984) and on Bas van Fraassen’s
Scientific Representation (2013). Nersessian and van Fraassen propose not to fol-
low the way of retrospective logical reconstruction of scientific theories “from
above,” in a bird’s-eye-view, but rather to take on a new analytical perspective
and set the focus of the analysis on the process of modeling. Van Fraassen calls
this analytical perspective the “view from within.”3
Nersessian takes up the distinction4 between the “context of discovery” and
the “context of justification” of scientific theories, which goes back to Hans

3 Compare the relevant chapter in Van Fraassen’s monograph in the philosophy of science,
which is devoted to the problems and paradoxes of scientific representation: “Relating the
views ‘from above’ and ‘from within’” (Van Fraassen 2013, 184–190).
4 On the relevance of this distinction in philosophy of science research, cf. Schickore and
Steinle 2006.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 107

Reichenbach (1938). The representative of logical empiricism concentrated on

the context of justification. Nersessian fully recognizes the validity of this perspec-
tive. She proposes additionally to shift the focus and to observe theory-formation
itself in the “context of discovery.” That is, to trace the concrete practices of model-
ing, to analyze the functions of its acts, and thereby to finally describe the process
as a scientific and cultural-semiological practice.

A […] recasting of the problem of conceptual change in science shifts the focus of the
problem from the conceptual structures themselves to the nature of the practices em-
ployed by human agents in creating, communicating, and replacing scientific representa-
tions of a domain. That is, it shifts the focus from the products to the processes, from the
structures to the practices. Conceptual changes need to be understood in terms of the
people who create and change their representations of nature and the practices they use
to do so. To be successful in building an account of conceptual change, thus, requires
both a model of the scientist qua human agent and knowledge of the nature of the prac-
tices actually used in creating and changing conceptual structures.5 (Nersessian 2008, 5)

1 Creation as reconfiguration
Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin describe this kind of epistemic process of
generation of new, innovative ideas, which cannot be integrated in the existing
epistemic corpus, but rather subvert it, reveal fractures in its foundation and
thus trigger a transformation, as a process of “creation as reconfiguration”
(Elgin 2002). Elgin points out that this case concerns another route to knowl-
edge than that of gaining new information in the context of an existing theoreti-
cal frame:
Ordinarily, cognitive advancement is construed as the growth of knowledge. It is accom-
plished by the acquisition of new (justified or reliably generated) true beliefs. A person
becomes aware of a hitherto unknown but properly grounded truth and smoothly incor-
porates it into his epistemic corpus. On this picture, information comes in discrete bits,
and the growth of knowledge is additive. To be sure, we learn some things this way. If I
was previously ignorant of the atomic number of gold, I learn something new when I
find out that it is 79. (Elgin 2002, 14)

According to Goodman and Elgin, the generation of new information through

research is important, in order to supplement or complete an already existing

5 Nancy Nersessian has affirmed this research position in the philosophy of science through
an entire series of relevant historical case studies: Nersessian 1984, 1987; Magnani and Nerses-
sian 2002.
108 Aura Heydenreich

theoretical model. This is however merely an additive cognitive process, be-

cause new information can be unproblematically integrated into the available
“epistemic corpus” of theoretical modeling, without codes having to be
changed:

Adding discrete bits of information to one’s epistemic corpus does not advance under-
standing much. The reason is this: That the atomic number of gold is 79 is not at all sur-
prising. No expectations are violated, for the fact fits neatly with what I already knew or
reasonably believed. Nor does the information generate fruitful consequences. It does, of
course, equip me to infer infinitely many more truths. But they are on the whole pretty
insignificant, being logical consequences of things I already know. (Elgin 2002, 14)

While this is indeed important, says Elgin, it is however no special challenge

for cognition. That is, there is no disruptive effect, because what the new infor-
mation does is to confirm what the epistemic community had already logically
deduced. “Moreover, the newly acquired information creates no ripples. I don’t
need to reassess formerly accepted conclusions, reconsider my methods, or re-
vise my standards. Rather like a piece in a jigsaw puzzle, the new information
fits neatly into a cognitive slot that was already prepared for it” (Elgin 2002, 14).
That’s why I propose the term of interformation for that modeling process
that puts the scientist in front of a much greater challenge stated by Elgin: to
reassess formerly accepted conclusions, to reconsider scientific methods and to
revise the standards through the introduction of new epistemic practices that
postulate the reconfiguration of fundamental theories. Following such a trans-
formation, the knowledge systems would have to be completely reorganized:
This corresponds to the process of interformation I want to illustrate in these
two chapters on Einstein’s theory of relativity.
As I pointed out at the beginning of the paper, in Languages of Art Nelson
Goodman (1976, 52–57) distinguished between two forms of reference-relations:
denotation and exemplification. Denotation is the conventional form of refer-
ence-relation to empirical reality. It is correlated with “modeling of,” with the
primary modeling in my systematization. Exemplification models its reference-
relation itself. It presents characteristics of objects through symbolic self-
reference. Therefore it stands for “modeling as,” for the secondary modeling. I
propose the following systematization: for the level of denotation, of “represen-
tation of,” primary modeling is to be reserved. For the level of “representation
as,” of secondary symbolic modeling, the symbolic form of reference of exem-
plification is to be reserved. Finally, for the tertiary level of modeling, for the
level of transformation, the formulation “representation through” is to be re-
served: representation through the intersection of modeling practices between
mechanics and electrodynamics, whereas the theory of relativity evolves. These
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 109

intersections are part of the dynamics of the process of interformation. The lev-
els mentioned above can be correlated with the distinctions proposed in my
study Physica Poetica (Heydenreich 2022): between a) the primary level of
modeling, which connects to the empirical world via measurements, b) the sec-
ondary level of modeling, which operates in the code-system of mathematics,
and c) the tertiary level of modeling, which intersects two previously incongru-
ent modeling practices from which a third practice derives. The latter shows the
necessity of the transformation of the laws, premisses and categories of the first
two levels and results in the new theory of special relativity.
From the perspective of theoretical physics Klaus Mecke (2015) has proposed a
metatheoretical representation of scientific modeling processes in physics, which
makes a systematic distinction among measurement-narratives, model-narratives
and event-narratives. I will refer to these in my analyses. Mecke’s distinction be-
tween “measurement-narratives” and “model-narratives” corresponds to my dis-
tinction between primary and secondary modeling in physics.
Tensions and resistances arise from the fact that, at the intersection point
of tertiary modeling, at the crossroads of interformation, a moment of auton-
omy and creativity is embedded that might elude rule-guided modeling. At
this point, modeling transcends its own presuppositions: in a brief but deci-
sive moment of inventio. One may think this the moment of Aristotelian anag-
norisis, of re-cognition. This is because what one previously held as
knowledge suddenly no longer applies: the concepts of absolute time and
space. Instead, a new frame of knowledge is revealed based on the constancy
of the light velocity and the relativity of simultaneity – the theory of relativity.
Models are understood here according to Gelfert (2016; cf. 2017) as func-
tional entities that can be configured symbolically, semiotically, mathemati-
cally, diagrammatically or aesthetically. With Morgan and Morrison (1999b,
1999a), they exhibit an explorative dimension in theory development and thus
function as mediators between denotation and representation up to experimen-
tal simulation and the exemplification of new symbolic correlations. With
Knuuttila (2005), models can also be understood as “epistemic tools,” as episte-
mic artefacts. They make it possible to configure the knowledge relevant to un-
derstanding of a certain area formally, medially, symbolically or materially in
order to re-correlate it and reinterpret it accordingly. From the perspective of
philosophy of science the correlations between models and fictions have been
explored by Roman Frigg (2009, 2010) and Mauricio Suárez (2009, 2010). But
now let’s get started by considering Einstein’s metatheoretical reflections in his
paper “Physics and Reality.”
110 Aura Heydenreich

2 Ternary modeling process in Einstein’s

“Physics and Reality”
The essay “Physics and Reality” begins with a first section entitled “General
Consideration Concerning the Method of Science.” Here Einstein addresses the
image of the “philosophizing physicist” (cf. Einstein 1936a, 349 and Einstein
1936b, 313) He asks if it would not be better to leave the philosophizing to phi-
losophers. His answer is that this is justified for times in which physics rests on
secure foundations, but not for those times, in which “the very foundations of
physics itself have become problematic […]” (Einstein 1936a, 349).6 When this
process of reconceptualization of fundamental concepts is at issue, physicists
also turn to self-reflective analysis of their own methods of modeling, according
to Einstein: “At a time like the present […] the physicist cannot simply surrender
to the philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; […]
In looking for a new foundation, he must try to make clear in his own mind just
how far the concepts which he uses are justified, and are necessities” (Einstein
1936a, 349).7

2.1 Primary modeling

In the following, Einstein presents what he calls the “Stratification of the Scien-
tific System” (Einstein 1936a, 352):8

We shall call “primary concepts” such concepts as are directly and intuitively connected
with typical complexes of sense experiences. All other notions are – from the physical
point of view – possessed of meaning, only in so far as they are connected, by theorems,
with the primary notions. […] Science concerns the totality of the primary concepts, i.e.
concepts directly connected with sense experiences, and theorems connecting them. In
its first stage of development, science does not contain anything else. Our everyday think-
ing is satisfied on the whole with this level.9 (Einstein 1936a, 352)

6 “das ganze Fundament der Physik problematisch geworden ist […]” (Einstein 1936b, 313).
7 “In solcher Zeit kann der Physiker die kritische Betrachtung der Grundlagen nicht einfach
der Philosophie überlassen; […] auf der Suche nach einem neuen Fundament muss er sich
über die Berechtigung der von ihm benutzten Begriffe nach Kräften klar zu werden versuchen”
(Einstein 1936b, 313).
8 “Schichtenstruktur des wissenschaftlichen Systems” (Einstein 1936b, 316).
9 “Die mit typischen Komplexen von Sinneserlebnissen direkt und intuitiv verknüpften Begriffe
wollen wir ‘primäre Begriffe’ nennen. Alle anderen Begriffe sind – physikalisch betrachtet – nur
insoweit sinnvoll, als sie mit den ‘primären Begriffen’ durch Sätze in Verbindung gebracht sind.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 111

The “objects” that are described in physics correspond only partially to the
“objects” that we encounter as empirical phenomena in everday experience.
The latter are not yet physical objects. They first become physical objects
when they are assigned an operational definition in terms of measurement
units and quantities based on physical theory. Thus these objects are pri-
mary-modelled in the conceptual framework of a physical theory. Only by
means of these ‘operational concepts’10 – that is indeed what Einstein means
by “primary terms” – do they find an access from “reality,” the “external
world of perceptions,” into the semiological realm of physics.
Primary modeling or measurement corresponds in van Fraassen’s sense of
modeling to the selection of knowledge-relevant aspects of an empirical phe-
nomenon, its measurement, and the symbolic representation of measurement
results, which situates them in a theoretical, logical space: “The measurement
is an act – performed in accordance with certain operational rules – of locating
an item in a logical space” (Van Fraassen 2013, 165; cf. also 141–190).
Van Fraassen, Cassirer and Mecke unanimously explain this with the use of
the thermometer for measuring temperature. Temperature is not a substance-
concept, nor a ‘property of bodies,’ but rather a functional-concept. The func-
tional-concept defines a measurement-rule, which determines an equality-relation
between two functors that occur in thermodynamic equilibrium.
Klaus Mecke (2015, 61) denominates all processes that belong to primary
modeling using the term “measurement narrative.” Measurement corresponds
there to a conventionally fixed, rule-governed action-instruction with appropri-
ate information for the selection of relevant aspects of the object to be mea-
sured, to the establishment of a scale that makes comparison of measurements
between the scale and the object to be measured possible and the concrete execu-
tion of the measurement. This narrow narrative concept, introduced from the per-
spective of theoretical physics, corresponds to a minimal definition of narrativity,11
which presupposes a change of state, and thus temporality and sequentiality (cf.
Abbott; Schmid 2010, 2014, 3; Forster 1974, 93). The concept of narrativity has

[…] Die Wissenschaft braucht die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit der primären, d.h. unmittelbar mit
Sinneserlebnissen verknüpften Begriffe sowie der sie verknüpfenden Sätze. In ihrem ersten
Entwicklungsstadium enthält sie nichts welter. Auch das Denken des Alltags begnügt sich
im grossen Ganzen mit dieser Stufe” (Einstein 1936b, 316–317).
10 Cf. Winfried Thielmann’s paper “Concept Formation in Physics from a Linguist’s Perspec-
tive” in this volume.
11 It must be clarified at another point to what extent it can act as a rule-guided illocutionary
speech act, but which can also be granted the status of narrative, as Ricœur does with model-
ing. Cf. here Ricœur’s (1973) narrative concept, which in this essay is also oriented to speech
act theory.
112 Aura Heydenreich

been examined in the course of the narratological analysis of the Einsteinian trea-
tise in my first paper in this book.
As the measurement narrative plays a decisive role in Einstein’s “On the
Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies,” it is introduced here in greater depth. In
Einstein’s treatise the measurement is performed to justify the necessity of
changing it.12 Einstein’s treatise proposes an alteration of conventional mea-
surement practices of time and space that have considerable consequences for
the conceptualization of the space-time structure. Thus let us first briefly ex-
plain the tradition of measurement convention using an example.
The measurement process is a comparison: a certain dimension of the body
is assessed, for example the length of a rod. This is set against the convention-
ally agreed scale, which reproduces the SI-mass unit, and compared with it. A
number on the scale then establishes the connection between body-dimension
and measurement-convention. This measurement result can thus be accepted
as objective, because it rests on a social convention and thereby on a code. Yet
this convention has emerged from a process of social negotiation. The conven-
tion is based on a factual narrative, which enacts the rules, the codes of mea-
surement. For example, the idea of agreeing on a general length-unit of
the meter is indeed not yet so old; it dates back to a 1799 decision of the French
National Assembly. At that time the original meter was defined. This was a proto-
type made of platinum, based on the topographic narrative of earth-measurement.
Its length corresponded – according to the then-current measurement – to the
ten-millionth part of the distance from the North Pole to the Equator. This narra-
tive turned out to be objectifiable around 1800 and became a codified measure-
ment practice.
It replaced earlier measurement narratives, which had human limbs as ref-
erence systems: whether finger or hand width, hand span, elbow, foot, step,
etc. It is obvious that these were less objective. Yet later the topographic mea-
surement narrative also proved unsuitable. When it was realized that the earth
is not a perfect rotational ellipsoid and hence provided only inexact meter-
measurement-units, it was necessary to agree on a new convention. The
“length” of a rod can thus not be considered as a “substance-property” of itself,
because it is fixed by different measurement codes in different historical
epochs. The current measurement code for the meter was first set in the interna-
tional measurement-unit system only in 1983. It is based on the decision to de-
fine measurement units in terms of constants of nature. Today’s meter-unit

12 Cf. section 3.2.1 of Aura Heydenreich’s paper “Epistemic Narrativity in Albert Einstein’s
Treatise on Special Relativity” in this volume.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 113

corresponds to the length of the path that light in vacuum reaches within 1/299
792 458 seconds. This is a measurement code defined on the basis of the speed
of light as a natural constant, as introduced by Einstein in 1905.13
As van Fraassen and Mecke emphasize, every measurement is preceded by
a physical theory, which sets the conventions for the production of a sign-
function. On the basis of such a measurement theory, empirical phenomena
can be symbolically represented in the theoretical domain of physics by num-
bers and physical units. Numbers have the function of connecting the conven-
tionally established measurement system with the measured body. A number
creates a connection in the semiotic sense. It is the common third which consti-
tutes the sign-function, which connects the selected body-dimension with the
scalar dimension. Relevant knowledge elements are selected and semioticized,
i.e. symbolically integrated in the physics semiosphere.
From the semiotic perspective, one may, with Lotman, call the process of
selection of extra-discursive elements and their representation in the discursive
semiological realm of physics a process of external recoding. Thus “primary
modeling” is always accompanied by “external recoding.” The term “coding”
clarifies that the process of semioticization, the transfer process from the extra-

13 A proof of the conventionality of these measurement-rules was provided in the press re-
lease (Simon 2018a) of the German national metrology institute (Physikalisch-Technische
Bundesanstalt), which announced that the measurement-rules of nearly all basic physical
units were fundamenally revised on 16 November 2018 in Versailles: they would from now on
be newly defined in terms of various combinations of natural constants. As of 20 May 2019,
new measurement rules and new definitions come into force for the units kilogram, Ampere
and Kelvin, which are defined through seven natural constants, including the speed of light
in a vacuum, the Boltzmann Constant and Planck’s Constant. To this we may add a further
explanation from the Federal Technical Institute on the definition of the meter: “The previ-
ous definition of the meter, for instance, which was based on a wavelength of light as an
elementary length, was an example of such a ‘simple attribution.’ In contrast, the new SI re-
quires higher intellectual transfer capacities. Nearly all quantities used in mechanics (which
are formed on the basis of the units of time, length and mass) are realized via the three con-
stants of a frequency, a velocity and an action” (PTB 2017b; cf. also 2017a). “On the occasion
of their 26th General Conference on Weights and Measures (Conférence Générale des Poids et
Mesures, CGPM) on 16 November 2018 in Versailles, the signatory states of the Metre Conven-
tion resolved to fundamentally reform the International System of Units (SI). This resolution
stipulates that, in the future, all SI units will be based on the values laid down for seven selected
natural constants. In passing this resolution, the General Conference has followed a recommenda-
tion issued by the International Committee on Weights and Measures (Comité international des
poids et mesures, CIPM)” (Simon 2018a; cf. also 2018b).
114 Aura Heydenreich

semiotic into the semiotic domain, is a rule-governed process. Epistemic com-

munities agree on these rules of symbolization through lengthy communication
and negotiation processes within the research process.
With Eco’s semiotic code-theory, this process can be described a little more
precisely. If the translation process from the extra-semiotic to the semiotic do-
main occurs according to conventionally accepted rules, then Eco speaks of a
coding-process that is epistemically and communicatively unproblematic: a
ratio facilis coding-process.14
It may also be the case, however, that the coding rules must be changed in
the course of modeling. If new rules are introduced, which are as yet unknown
to the addressees – in Einstein’s case the scientific community – then this, in
Umberto Eco’s (1987, 145–247) semiotic theory, is a ratio difficilis coding-
process. This would be a form of coding that supplies its own rules, or intersects
them with modeling practices from another theoretical or conceptual frame.
This precedes the negotiation process. In the course of modeling it is still open
whether it will at some point become conventionalized. Thus in its first applica-
tion, the formal modeling of the code plays an important role. Here the code
itself is the goal – it is not merely a means for the modeling process.
I therefore distinguish between ratio facilis and ratio difficilis, as I would
like to link a hypothesis to the distinction: The greater the proportion of new
rules, and the more unconventional the concepts introduced by the exploratory
modeling (Gelfert 2018, 2016) procedure, the more important is the way in which
these are introduced. In such ratio-difficilis cases – as I have already argued in
my first paper – the factual scientific text itself relies on narrativity and fiction-
ality, on the procedures and techniques of thought experiments, because it
models possibilities of changing codes and practices. The new knowledge pre-
sented through the exploratory modeling still has to be semioticized via the
thought experiment and its narrativization strategies.15
As I have already shown in my first paper, this is essentially what Einstein
does in his treatise on special relativity theory 1905: He proposes an alteration of
the measurement narrative for the dimensions of time and length. He demands
that both physical quantities be measured on the basis of the central parameter:

14 On Eco’s semiotic code theory, cf. Eco 1976, 48–150 and 1987, 76–197.
15 Cf. the literary and cultural scholarship on the function of narrative thought experiments:
Macho and Wunschel 2004; Davies 2007. On the research perspective of philosophy: Andreas
2011; Behmel 2001; Buzzoni 2007; Gähde 2000. From the perspective of philosopy of science:
Bokulich 2001. From the perspective of physics: Bishop 1998. From the perspective of Science
and Technology Studies: Brown 2010.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 115

the constancy of the speed of light. The modifications of rules and their expe-
riential implications first have to be narrated in order to make them cogni-
tively accessible for the human frame of reference. The thought experiment is
text-strategically designed in a threshold-space, in which old rules – the Galilean
transformations and the Newtonian time and space – no longer fully apply and
new rules – the Lorentz transformation and the new spacetime conception – are
not yet fully established. The thought experiment uses narrative techniques in
order to simulate and negotiate discursively alternative practices of measure-
ment – based on the constancy of the speed of light – and new transformation
relations from one reference frame to the other. My first paper in this book argues
on narrative strategies of physical modeling and discusses them in detail.16 The
result of this was that absolute simultaneity, and therefore also absolute time,
cannot longer be logically inferred. In this paper I discuss the semiologic founda-
tions of the modeling strategies and their interpolation during the process of
interformation.
But first, back to the paper “Physics and Reality:” Einstein argues that the
stratification of the scientific system is necessary because the primary modeling
of empirical data is not fully sufficient for the theoretician. “Such a state of af-
fairs cannot […] satisfy a spirit which is really scientifically minded; because,
the totality of concepts and relations obtained in this manner is utterly lacking
in logical unity” (Einstein 1936a, 352).17

2.2 Secondary modeling

Therefore the theoretician cannot rest here. He must go beyond such a pri-
mary – mimetic – modeling, because a modeling grasped on the basis of ob-
servational data is only the first stage of selection. At the same time, it is the
stage of external recoding, which first situates these observational and mea-
surement data in a theoretical framework in order to analyze them logically,
as Einstein states in “Physics and Reality:”

In order to supplement this deficiency, one invents a system poorer in concepts and re-
lations, a system retaining the primary concepts and relations of the “first layer” as

16 Cf. Aura Heydenreich’s paper “Epistemic Narrativity in Albert Einstein’s Treatise on Special
Relativity” in this volume.
17 “Diese kann […] einen wirklich wissenschaftlich eingestellten Geist nicht befriedigen, da
die so gewinnbare Gesamtheit von Begriffen und Relationen der logischen Einheitlichkeit völ-
lig entbehrt” (Einstein 1936b, 317).
116 Aura Heydenreich

logically derived concepts and relations. This new “secondary system” pays for its
higher logical unity by having, as its own elementary concepts (concepts of the second
layer), only those which are no longer directly connected with complexes of sense expe-
riences.18 (Einstein 1936a, 352–353)

Mathematics sets a new framework, which entails a new “keying,” new codes
and operative restrictions, but also other possibilities of logical correlation. In
this secondary framework, one asks from which systematic point of view the
primary modeling data should be considered. According to this question, one
decides which correlations can be established between the symbolic configura-
tion of data, and to what end. The goal of theoretical modeling is the logical
correlation of terms among each other for the purpose of further logical deriva-
tions. The results of this enable a new view of reality that is (re-)presented
through the model. For physics, this is accomplished through mathematics with
the repertoire of symbolic operations it makes available. This is where the level
of secondary modeling follows in the theoretical process. The modeled objects
have to comply not only with the correspondence-criterion of the first modeling
stage, but also with the requirement of logical coherence according to the sym-
bolic system of mathematics. Sometimes there exist some discrepancies between
the two levels of modeling. But at the end the whole modeling process has to
meet the criterion of empirical adequacy (cf. Van Fraassen 1980). Yet complex
mathematical modeling always goes hand in hand with a loss of semanticity –
the possibility of recurring back to the ‘immediate complexes of sense-
experience’ diminishes. Especially since mathematical modeling is symbolic.
Klaus Mecke points out that measurement quantities – which in my ap-
proach belong to the primary modeling system – must not be confused with
state quantities – which belong to the secondary modeling system. “State varia-
bles are physical measurement variables translated into a mathematical model.
State variables are not measurement variables, since they are not just numbers,
but rather contain a set of mathematical structures […]” (Mecke 2015, 61).19
State variables are quantities that are linked to mathematical objects so that

18 “Um diesem Mangel abzuhelfen, erfindet man ein begriffs- und relationsärmeres System,
welches die primären Begriffe und Relationen der ‘ersten Schicht’ als logisch abgeleitete Be-
griffe und Relationen enthält. Dieses neue ‘sekundäre System’ erkauft die gewonnene höhere
logische Einheitlichkeit mit dem Umstande, dass seine an den Anfang gestellten Begriffe (Be-
griffe der zweiten Schicht) nicht mehr unmittelbar mit Komplexen von Sinneserlebnissen ver-
bunden sind” (Einstein 1936b, 317).
19 Transl. by MS. “Zustandsgrößen sind physikalische Messgrößen, übersetzt in ein mathema-
tisches Modell. Zustandsgrößen sind keine Messgrößen, da sie nicht nur Zahlen sind, sondern
eine Reihe von mathematischen Strukturen in sich tragen […]” (Mecke 2015, 61).
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 117

they may be operationalized in the framework according to the rules and codes
of mathematics. “Thus the measurement variable ‘place’ [in mechanics] is sim-
ply a […] number, the state variable ‘place’ by contrast [in mathematics], is a
continuous and differential function r(t), when the model-narrative ‘point parti-
cle’ is used” (Mecke 2015, 61; added by AH).20 In the conceptual framework of
field theory, however – for example in the Maxwellian frame – the same vari-
able of place can be assigned a different form of mathematical conceptualiza-
tion. Thus the secondary modeling of physics takes place in the framework of
symbolic, mathematical modeling. The secondary system is a system that
largely adheres to a logical, systematic form. In Cassirer’s system, this would be
the symbolic form of mathematical physics.
I call the modeling of mathematical quantities secondary modeling, because
the physical quantities cross over into another semiological field. Mathematics
works with new structures and operations, codes and conventions, and forms
state variables as functional-concepts (cf. Cassirer 2003 and 2000). For the justi-
fication of these functional-concepts one can no longer argue essentialistically,
because mathematics operates in another frame of modeling. If primary model-
ing is still linked to “reality” via a conventional denotation system, this is no
longer the case with secondary, mathematical modeling. Its system can largely
set its own rules. Here correlations can exist, if they are proven to be logically
coherent. A certain tension builds up against the primary modeling. On the one
hand the recognizability of the “objects” introduced into the semiological space
of physics by primary modeling becomes problematic. On the other hand, theo-
retical modeling – now considered retrospectively – must, firstly, be correlat-
able with primary modeling, and secondly, prove itself empirically adequate.
This is the demand for the possibility of semantic and physical “comprehensi-
bility” (Einstein 1936a, 351),21 to which Einstein draws attention in “Physics and
Reality.” In his Nobel Prize lecture Einstein refers to the “principle of significa-
tion” (cf. Einstein 1967 and 1923a). Secondary modeling makes it possible to es-
tablish new, deeper, mathematical correlations among mathematical state
variables. In this way equivalences can be discovered, not between empirical
phenomena themselves, but between the mathematically modelled state varia-
bles that represent these phenomena in a certain theoretical space.

20 Transl. by MS. “So ist die Messgröße ‘Ort’ [in der Mechanik] einfach eine […] Zahl, die
Zustandsgröße ‘Ort’ dagegen eine stetige und differenzierbare Funktion r(t), wenn die Modell-
erzählung ‘Punktteilchen’ verwendet wird” (Mecke 2015, 61; added by AH).
21 “Begreiflichkeit” (Einstein 1936b, 315).
118 Aura Heydenreich

2.3 Tertiary modeling

Thus Einstein argues that in order to do justice to the complexity of modeling,

one must introduce an additional tertiary system. “Further striving for logical
unity brings us to a tertiary system, still poorer in concepts and relations, for
the deduction of the concepts and relations of the secondary (and so indirectly
of the primary) layer” (Einstein 1936a, 353).22 Interestingly, Einstein points
here to a possible feedback from the tertiary back to the secondary and pri-
mary levels. Moreover, Einstein also disagrees at this point with those who in-
terpret the stages of modeling merely as increasing abstractions. On the
contrary, it concerns – as Cassirer also described in his investigation of the
scientific practice of theoretical physics in the The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
(1957) [Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (2010)]23 – the transformation of con-
ventional codes of modeling as a consequence of the identification of possible cor-
relations between mathematical structures, which open up new possibilities:

An adherent to the theory of abstraction or induction might call our layers “degrees of
abstraction”; but, I do not consider it justifiable to veil the logical independence of the
concept from the sense experiences. The relation is not analogous to that of soup to beef
but rather of wardrobe number to overcoat.24 (Einstein 1936a, 353)

The connection between wardrobe number and coat can be understood from
the semiologic perspective as a three-place sign-function.25 A symbolic sign,

22 “Weiteres Streben nach logischer Einheitlichkeit führt zur Aufstellung eines noch ärmeren
tertiären Systems von Begriffen und Relationen zur Deduktion der Begriffe und Relationen der
sekundären (und damit indirekt der primären) Schicht. So geht es fort, bis wir zu einem Sys-
tem von denkbar grösster Einheitlichkeit und Begriffsarmut der logischen Grundlagen ge-
langt sind, das mit der Beschaffenheit des sinnlich Gegebenen vereinbar ist” (Einstein 1936b,
317).
23 Cf. the third part: “The Function of Signification and the Building Up of Scientific Knowl-
edge,” 279–480 / “Die Bedeutungsfunktion und der Aufbau der wissenschaftlichen Erkennt-
nis,” 323–556. Here see especially: “Symbol and Schema in the System of Modern Physics,”
447–480 / “‘Symbol’ und ‘Schema’ im System der modernen Physik,” 518–556.
24 “Ein Anhänger der Abstraktions- bzw. Induktions-Theorie würde die vorgenannten
Schichten ‘Abstraktions-Stufen’ nennen. Ich halte es aber für unrichtig, die logische Unabhän-
gigkelt der Begriffe gegenüber den Sinneserlebnissen zu verschleiern; es handelt sich nicht um
eine Beziehung wie die der Suppe zum Rindfleisch, sondern eher wie die der Garderobe-
Nummer zum Mantel” (Einstein 1936b, 317).
25 The connection can be represented as a three-place sign-function: between the sought-for
object, the coat, and the sought-for position of the hook in the room. A third symbolic sign
refers to this, the plate with the wardrobe-number, which points to the location of coat and
hook.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 119

for example “42,” the number on the brass plate, establishes the connection
between the coat and its owner; it refers both to the coat as a sought object and to
its position in space. Yet the number alone is useless. It is only a symbol that refers
to the general order of natural numbers, to the ordering system that assigns each
number a neighborhood, omits no number, and states an ascending series of num-
bers (Cassirer 2003; cf. also 2000).26 Based on this order one introduces the concept
of the wardrobe.
It is human reason that has introduced this semiological system of sign-
functions and its underlying conventions. All positions in space are equivalent,
insofar as each has a natural number assigned to it. The order of natural numbers
helps the wardrobe attendant to orient himself in space quickly. The number it-
self as the quintessential concept of mathematical exactitude is Janus-faced, be-
cause it unites in itself a dual function: that of equivalence and that of difference.
Equivalence is set in relation to all other numbers from the set of natural num-
bers. In this regard the number is an ‘equal among equals.’ But its numerical
value distinguishes it from all other numbers. In this concrete context it also as-
sumes a special function through the founding of an identity relation to the brass
plate from the hand of the theater guest. It produces a sign-function with two
functors as objects, which correspond to one another: the brass plate from the
visitor’s hand and the cloak-room hook of the visitor’s coat. Plate and coat are
ultimately exchanged for one another because they bear the same number.
The sign function relies here on equal numbers and on social codes. These
conventional and therefore stable reference relations serve men, as “animal
symbolicum” (cf. “Vorbemerkung” to Cassirer 2007, 5), for orientation. Yet the
modeling game with signs is a possibility that requires prior sign conventions.
The task of theory, this point suggests, is to fill out successively the semiotically
“amorphous,” structureless void with signs, correlations and sign-functions,
with multiple layers of structure, so that on the basis of these structures mathe-
matical objects can operate, be correlated with one another and transformed.
The following will show that threefold modeling is necessary because each
modeling level opens a new frame. Each frame offers a new ordering system
with slightly modified rules and new codes. Therefore each frame also unfolds,
due to its rules and notations, its potential for producing correlations. Thus
each frame also opens new possibilities for describing and organizing experi-
ence. And yet: despite all of the various rules and codes, despite the tensions

26 Cf. chapters on number systems, especially the two chapters “On the Theory of the Forma-
tion of Concepts,” 1–26 / “Zur Theorie der Begriffsbildung,” 1–26, and “The Concept of Num-
ber,” 27–67 / “Die Zahlbegriffe,” 27–70.
120 Aura Heydenreich

and differences between the levels, a succesful modeling is characterized by the

fact that its ternary structure shows coherence. The levels mutually relate to
one another, condition one another. Yet any new framing reveals new princi-
ples of symbolic organization of experience. How can a coherent configuration
be constructed that will ultimately prove to be empirically adequate? Perhaps
here too the “principle of minimal departure” applies, as Marie-Laure Ryan
(1991) has shown for narrative modeling.27 In my reading this would mean that
the rules of each successive level of modeling may well differ from the first level
onwards, otherwise they would not be justified as new levels.
Morgan and Morrison (1999a), in their approach to “Models as Mediating
Instruments,” argue for a form of autonomization of modeling from empirical
data as well as from theories. This is the function of the tertiary level of model-
ing. From this point of view it seems reasonable to argue that the process of
modeling goes through phases of selection, denotation and finally symbolic (re-)
presentation through exemplification and interformation, and thereby becomes
autonomous step by step. The clear separation of modeling levels in the present
description is to be understood as ideal-typical. It is to be used as a heuristic
instrument. The textual reality looks a little different – transitions, overlaps
and feedbacks are found here, like Einstein states:

The layers are furthermore not clearly separated. It is not even absolutely clear which
concepts belong to the primary layer. As a matter of fact, we are dealing with freely
formed concepts, which, with a certainty sufficient for practical use, are intuitively con-
nected with complexes of sense experiences in such a manner that, in any given case of
experience, there is no uncertainty as to the applicability or non-applicability of the
statement. The essential thing is the aim to represent the multitude of concepts and the-
orems, close to experience, as theorems, logically deduced and belonging to a basis, as
narrow as possible, of fundamental concepts and fundamental relations which them-
selves can be chosen freely (axioms).28 (Einstein 1936a, 353)

In sum: primary modeling is a symbolic mapping from outside of the semio-

sphere to inside it, whereby the knowledge-relevant variables are situated in a

27 Cf. here especially the chapter “Reconstructing the Textual Universe: The Principle of Mini-
mal Departure,” 48–60.
28 “Ferner sind die Schichten nicht klar gegeneinander abgegrenzt. Nicht einmal die Zugehörig-
keit eines Begriffes zur primären Schicht ist völlig scharf. Es handelt sich hierbei eben um
freigebildete Begriffe, die mit einer für die Anwendung hinreichenden Sicherheit mit Komplexen
von Sinneserlebnissen intuitiv verknüpft sind, so dass bei dem Konstatieren des Zutreffens oder
Nicht-Zutreffens eines Satzes für einen besonderen Erlebnisfall (Experiment) keine Unsicherheit
besteht. Wesentlich ist nur die Bestrebung, die Vielheit der erlebnisnahen Begriffe und Sätze als
logisch abgeleitete Sätze einer möglichst engen Basis von Grund-Begriffen und Grund-Relationen
darzustellen, die ihrerseits an sich frei wählbar sind (Axiome)” (Einstein 1936b, 317–318).
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 121

symbolic framework through a rule-guided modeling practice. The theory deter-

mines how this symbolic framework looks like, which parameters are to be sym-
bolized as relevant variables, and how the variables have to be correlated.
Meanwhile in physics and philosophy of science it is common sense that a
measurement can hardly be carried out without theoretical assumptions. Thus
Van Fraassen also speaks of: “measurement [as] an operation that locates an item
(already classified as in the domain of a given theory) in a logical space (provided
by the theory to represent a range of possible states or characteristics of such
items)” (Van Fraassen 2013, 164). Therefore primary modeling as measurement is
also an incomplete picture. It is the projection of relevant data and their “external
recoding” as physical variables in the language of physics. Through representation
in a specialized semiotic realm, they can be operated upon. In the next phase,
physical variables become mathematical variables, state variables, internally re-
coded and transferred to the semiosphere of mathematics (cf. Mecke 2015, 61). In
this framework, the variables can be secondarily modelled according to the “key-
ing,” the rules and methods of mathematics. ‘External recoding’ means the appli-
cation of those semiotic rules that ensure the transfer from the semiotically
amorphous external region into the semiotic code of experimental physics and its
experimental practices. ‘Internal recoding’ corresponds to the semiotic transition
between primary and secondary modeling; in Mecke’s terminology: from measure-
ment narrative to model narrative or from the realm of experimental physics to
that of theoretical physics. It is the transfer to a second-order semiological sphere,
since it concerns the distinction between and the transition from the measurement
variables of physics, which are determined by specific rules, to the state variables
of mathematics, which in turn have their own operational rules and symmetry
structures.
The term ratio facilis characterizes those semiological practices that follow tra-
ditional, known, socially accepted and habitualized practices. An internal recod-
ing according to ratio facilis is the transformation of physical variables into
mathematical variables. In the case of the praxeology of ratio difficilis, the rules
and practices of modeling itself come under the lens of observation. Those are pro-
blematized, classified as deficient, and changed in the course of modeling, even if
this involves a break with tradition. This is the function of tertiary modeling.
In his article, Einstein chooses this way of recoding, which takes place in
actu, in the midst of the process of modeling. He states that time can no longer
be measured according to conventional practices – according to ratio facilis.
In this respect, I will show that interformation is a modeling practice of the
ratio difficilis kind, because the cross-over of rules, principles and modeling
practices between two theories – mechanics and electrodynamics – brings
forth completely new rules and practices of modeling. The interpolation of
122 Aura Heydenreich

principles gives birth to the special relativity theory and is mediated by epi-
stemic narrativity, as I have shown in my first paper. The new formal sym-
bolic correlations open up, by a new theory, new possibilities of epistemic
organization of experience, and a new view on reality.
Einstein’s recoding of the measurement of time (simultaneity) and length
occurs entirely during the modeling process in a ratio difficilis mode as the inter-
formative narratological reading of the first paper demonstrated. The rupture
with the tradition occurs in the context of a thought experiment. His recoding of
the measurement narrative breaks abruptly with any conventional consensus
on the measurement of time and distance that had applied before 1905. Willard
V. O. Quine’s selected as motto for Word and Object a quotation from Otto Neu-
rath that illustrates the above mentioned process:

We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it
in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials.29 (Neurath 1959, 201)

3 Interformation in Einstein’s “On the

Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”
3.1 The constancy of the speed of light transferred
to measuring practices of mechanics
In the first part of his work – in the first five sections of the kinematic part –
Einstein transfers to the measurement practices of mechanics the principle that
resulted from the experiments of electrodynamics: the constancy of the speed
of light. He also analyses the consequences of the Michelson-Morley experiment
in respect of a fundamental principle of mechanics, the theorem of addition of
velocities.30 In the theoretical frame of mechanics, it had been assumed that the
speed of light emitted from a body is always dependent on the velocity of that
body, i.e. from its state of motion. Einstein revises the principle of addition of
velocities in §5 of his paper. Michelson and Morley (1886, 1887; Michelson 1881)
provided, through interferometer-measurements, the decisive proof that the
speed of light remains constant and independent of the state of motion of the

29 “Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in
einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können” (Neurath, quoted
in Quine 1960, vii; cf. also 1980, 5).
30 For a historical survey on the importance of the Michelson-Morley-Experiment cf. Swenson
1972.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 123

body that emits it. Einstein argues that the addition-theorem of velocity, which
is still fundamentally valid in mechanics, must be revised. The propagation of
the speed of light depends on neither the rest nor the movement of the observer
and their reference-systems. The speed of light, instead of space and time,
could be explained as invariant that does not depend on any reference-system.
Einstein demonstrates that the Galilean transformations between the space
and time coordinates of two inertial frames of reference had to be replaced by
the spatial and temporal coordinate transformation called Lorentz transforma-
tions. The result of this is the reconfiguration of the theoretical framework of
mechanics from a relativistic perspective. This concerns the primary as well as
the secondary modeling practices of mechanics, i.e. the practical principles of
measurement as well as the principles of theoretical modeling. There also re-
sults a reconceptualization of the concepts of time, precisely of the absolute si-
multaneity, and of space (as the length/extension of an object in space).

3.2 Principle of relativity is transferred to electrodynamics

In the second part of his treatise – sections 6 to 10 of the electrodynamic part –

Einstein applies the principle of relativity, which stems from mechanics, to elec-
trodynamics. The principle of relativity implies that rest and motion are not abso-
lute physical values. An observer who must define his own state of rest or motion
can do this, first, only with respect to his own system, and second, relatively
to a second system. Galilei (1632; cf. also 2014, 220–222) and Newton had con-
cluded from this that there can be no principled distinction between a station-
ary inertial system and one in uniform motion. The laws of physics must apply
equally in both systems. Yet in the frame of electrodynamics this principle did
not apply to Faraday’s law of induction.
For Maxwell’s equations this applied only in limited ways. Faraday’s law of
induction – which is a component part of the Maxwellian system of equations –
was an exception. Einstein showed a definite contradiction between the laws of
mechanics and those of electrodynamics. The laws of mechanics obeyed the
principle of relativity fully, the laws of electrodynamics only partially. The
contradiction in relation to the Faradayan law of induction was interpreted by
Einstein as an asymmetry: If one observes how a magnet and a conducting
medium that are adjacent to one another interact with one another electrody-
namically, one notices that their interaction is not symmetrical. If one sets the
magnet in motion while the conductor remains at rest, an electrical field
forms around the magnet, which generates electrical current when touched by
the conductor. The reverse, however, does not hold: If the magnet remains
124 Aura Heydenreich

motionless and the conductor is moved nearby, no electrical field is created

around the magnet. Instead, an electromotoric force arises in the conductor
(Einstein 1989, 140; cf. also 1905, 891). If one assumes, however, that “the relative
motion in the two cases considered is the same,” (Einstein 1989, 140)31 then, as
Einstein showed, a second-order equivalence can be established, despite the
stated first-order difference (electrical field around the magnets or electromotoric
power in the conductor). As Einstein puts it:

But if the magnet is at rest and the conductor is in motion, no electric field arises in the
surroundings of the magnet, while in the conductor an electromotive force will arise, to
which in itself there does not correspond any energy, but which, provided that the rela-
tive motion in the two cases considered is the same, gives rise to electrical currents that
have the same magnitude and the same course as those produced by the electric forces in the
first-mentioned case.32 (Einstein 1989 [1923], 140)

The electrical currents that result from both motions are manifested as quite
distinct phenomena. But Einstein shows that an equivalence can be established
between them: For the magnitude of electrical currents that result from the dif-
ferent motions is comparable. From this Einstein concludes that, measured by
the observed effect – the size and course of electrical currents – only relative
movements count. In sum, Einstein transfers the principle of relativity from the
theory of mechanics to the theory of electrodynamics.
This is the scenario that Einstein calls up before the eyes of the reader. He
presents the example of relative motion between conductor and magnet and the
generation of electrical current, and thereby implicitly evokes the entire discursive
formation of the unification of electricity and magnetism. This began with Hans
Christian Oersted’s discovery of the deflection of magnetic poles by electrical cur-
rents (cf. Brain et al. 2007). The next step was the theoretical action-at-a-distance
model provided by André-Marie Ampère (1826; Ampère and Babinet 1822) and
Charles Augustine de Coulomb (1785a, 1785b, 1785–1789). Finally, Faraday (1852,
2004, 2016) discovered the law of induction,33 the effect of moving magnets on
electrical conductors. He introduced the proximity-effect theory, i.e. field theory, in

31 dass die “Gleichheit der Relativbewegung bei den beiden ins Auge gefaßten Fällen” gilt
(Einstein 1905, 891).
32 “Ruht aber der Magnet und bewegt sich der Leiter, so entsteht in der Umgebung des Mag-
neten kein elektrisches Feld, dagegen im Leiter eine elektromotorische Kraft, welcher an sich
keine Energie entspricht, die aber – Gleichheit der Relativbewegung bei den beiden ins Auge
gefaßten Fällen vorausgesetzt – zu elektrischen Strömen von derselben Größe und demselben
Verlaufe Veranlassung gibt, wie im ersten Falle die elektrischen Kräfte” (Einstein 1905, 891).
33 Cf. Kieran Murphy’s paper “Induction after Electromagnetism: Faraday, Einstein, Bache-
lard, and Balzac” in this volume.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 125

experimental ways – through primary modeling. This process of unifying electric-

ity and magnetism ultimately culminated in the theoretical modeling of Maxwell’s
(1856, 1865, 1955) equations of electromagnetism. These equations provided a pre-
cise description of electrodynamic and optical phenomena that had been experi-
mentally confirmed from 1865 – the date of their first publication – until 1905.
They also gave rise to the theoretical value of the speed of light in a vacuum,
which itself was confirmed by numerous measurements and experiments. Never-
theless, as already shown, not all of these laws were conform to the principle of
relativity.
But both the principle of relativity and the principle of the constancy of the
speed of light in vacuum were fundamental. In order to avoid a contradiction,
Einstein faces the dilemma that either the principle of relativity or the con-
stancy of the speed of light must be renounced. A considerable dilemma, be-
cause he needed both for his argumentation and for the modeling of special
relativity theory. What does Einstein do? He maintains both principles, even
though they contradict one another in the old framework, and takes just this
contradiction as an opportunity to intersect the modeling practices of both
theories, to transfer them into a new theoretical configuration of the special
relativity theory and to transform them.
This new configuration of the theory of relativity served to unify the two
principles that were previously contradictory. But for this purpose both previ-
ous theoretical frameworks had to be changed – that of mechanics and that of
electrodynamics. Trough the cross-over of the two principles of relativity and of
constancy of the speed of light in vacuum, it became necessary to represent the
discrepancies between the previous theoretical frameworks of mechanics and
electrodynamics and negotiate the differences between them by rule-based
transformations. So one can conclude that precisely the sustained contradiction
initiated a new theoretical dynamic. It turned out that neither of the two princi-
ples, neither that of relativity nor that of the constancy of the speed of light,
was dispensable, because both proved to be logically necessary. By contrast,
the concepts of space and time, which were still considered absolute in Newto-
nian mechanics and in Kantian philosophy, turned out to be habits of thought,
which themselves needed reframing. The contradictions that are manifested
through this intersection of principles processualize further modeling insofar as
they challenge almost every traditional concept of the two older theories: for
mechanics, the concepts of absolute simultaneity, absolute length, absolute
mass and of the additivity of velocities; for electrodynamics, the concept of the
ether. In the following, the above-mentioned modeling practices are described
and the solution presented by Einstein is discussed. I will show, that it presup-
poses an interformative modeling process on the three modeling levels.
126 Aura Heydenreich

4 The process of interformation

For a better understanding of the praxeology of interformation in the case of
special relativity theory, let us first describe step-by-step the various stages of
the process of remodeling and reconceptualization shown in the following three
diagrams of a double cone starting with Fig. 1.

Fig. 1: The process of interformation part I: Formation © Aura Heydenreich.

 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 127

4.1 Formation

Einstein proceeds from two fundamental theories of physics: mechanics and

electrodynamics. I represent these two fields of “formation” along the left lat-
eral line of the cone surface. The under-side of the double cone stands for the
two modeling stages of mechanics. The upper side of the double cone stands for
the two modeling stages of electrodynamics. This division is justified because
the first half of Einstein’s paper (the first five sections) is devoted to mechanics,
and the second half (the last five sections) to electrodynamics. Additionally, for
both mechanics and electrodynamics, I differentiate between the practice of
primary modeling of physical measurements and experiments (A1, B1) and the
practice of secondary mathematical, theoretical modeling (A2, B2). I propose
to locate Einstein’s modeling process of special relativity theory at the inter-
section of the double cone: (C3).
Mechanics was the result of the theorization of the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries by Galilei, Newton and their followers. Electrodynamics was
conceptualized in the nineteenth century, mainly by Oersted, Ampère, Cou-
lomb, Faraday and Maxwell.
For mechanics I assign point A1 to primary modeling, which may be exempli-
fied by Galilei’s measurements and experiments, as represented in Dialogue Con-
cerning the Two Chief World Systems (1953) [Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi
del mondo (1632)] and Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences (1914) [Discorsi e
dimostrazioni matematiche intorno à due nuove scienze (1638)]. Galilei introduced
the principle of relativity into mechanics and showed how mass and velocity can
be measured. This includes selecting relevant features of empirical bodies and
representing these in a symbolic configuration framework, so that they can be
related to one another. These are the beginnings of experimental physics.
Again for mechanics I assign point A2 along the left lateral line of the cone
surface secondary modeling. Secondary modeling refers to the symbolic, mathe-
matical modeling that uses the mathematical procedures of differential analysis
as in the case of Newton’s mechanics. The arrow on the cone surface line points
upwards, in the direction of the intersection of the double cone, because New-
ton’s and Galilei’s modeling will be incorporated into special relativity theory,
although they will be transformed by it.
A similar ordering would be assumed for electrodynamics on the upper sur-
face-line of the double cone, yet here the arrow points in a downwards direc-
tion. At the outermost left point of the upper cone is the primary modeling of
electrodynamics, which I designate as B1. This is what Faraday’s (2016; Steinle
2004) groundbreaking measurements and experiments stand for, as docu-
mented in the numerous volumes of Experimental Researches in Electricity
128 Aura Heydenreich

(1831–1855). Faraday’s methods were summed up by the historian of science

Friedrich Steinle (2005a, 2005b, 2010) with the formula of “explorative experi-
ments.” Naturally, Oersted, Ampère and Coulomb, among others, have also
contributed to the conceptualization of electrodynamics. The latter continued
to base their studies on Newton’s remote-action theory. Faraday chose a radical
new way and proposed a field-theory on the basis of experiments, which was
finally developed mathematically by Maxwell on the basis of Faraday’s experi-
ments. Faraday’s law of induction from 1831, which described the generation of
an electrical field by the alteration of magnetic flux-density, is mentioned in
Einstein’s preliminary considerations of “On the Electrodynamics of Moving
Bodies.” The law of induction proved problematic because it was not consistent
with the principle of relativity of classical mechanics.
James Clerk Maxwell’s work refers explicitly to Faraday’s experiments, and
advances its assumptions theoretically. In 1865 he achieved the mathematical –
secondary – modeling of electrodynamics in “A Dynamical Theory of the Electro-
magnetic Field.” In the diagram this point on the left surface-line of the upper
cone is marked B2. Through his equations Maxwell accomplished the theoretical
unification of all previously known theoretical fields of electricity and magnetism
into the theory of electromagnetism: Voltaic electricity, Coulomb’s law, Faraday’s
law of induction. Hertz then succeeded in proving, in 1888, that Maxwell’s sec-
ondary modeling was empirically adequate, and that it also included electromag-
netic waves, i.e. electromagnetic light-phenomena. Faraday’s law of induction,
the Maxwell-Hertz equations and Lorentz’s contributions to electrodynamics play
a crucial role in the argumentation of Einstein’s article of 1905.

4.2 Intersection

In the context of the treatise “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” all pre-
viously stated primary measuring and secondary theoretical modeling practices
are found superimposed in the diagram on the cross-cutting plane (C3), the
level on which they are reciprocally transformed, and transferred into a new,
relativistic theory. I discuss this in further detail in the next section.
The intersection of modeling practices occurs, as shown in Fig. 2, at the in-
terformation point C3, which is at once the meeting-point of formation lines and
the starting point of the transformation dynamics. The modeling practices of
the two theories meet here, are intersected, and are transferred into special rela-
tivity theory. This process of transformation is symbolized by the arrows, which
depart from the intersection point of interformation.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 129

Fig. 2: The process of interformation part II: Intersection © Aura Heydenreich.

4.3 Epistemic transformation

The diagram shows the cross-cutting plane (C3): the level on which previous
modeling practices are intersected and reciprocally transformed, and trans-
ferred into a new, relativistic theory. The new correlations established through
intersection show that it will be necessary to revise certain assumptions of the
theories of mechanics and electrodynamics. This is symbolized by the transfor-
mation arrows that depart from the point of interformation. The contrasting ar-
rows, which lead back to the base-levels (downwards to the primary modeling
of mechanics and upwards to the primary modeling of electrodynamics), show
that there is a transformation of the two original primary and secondary
130 Aura Heydenreich

modelings of the left side: Classical mechanics is transformed into relativistic

mechanics, electrodynamics has to be re-conceptualized without the ether hy-
pothesis. This is represented on the right side of the cone in Fig. 3.
At the end of the Einsteinian interformation process are the following
results:
– A1, which stands for the primary modeling of mechanics, is transferred
from left to right, and intersected with B1. B1, which stands for the primary
modeling of electrodynamics, crosses through the entire interformative
modeling diagram on the diagonal from top to bottom and is intersected
with A1. The primary modeling, the measurement codes and practices of
mechanics, A1, is transformed through the intersection with the measure-
ment codes of electrodynamics, B1, hence with the concept of the con-
stancy of light velocity, to A1 × B1: mechanics is thereby transformed into
relativistic mechanics. Absolute space and time have to be refuted, the rel-
ativity of simultaneity and the relativity of distance-measurement result
out of this.
– A2, the secondary modeling of mechanics, i.e. Newton’s theory, is inter-
sected with Maxwell’s theory, which is transferred diagonally downwards
from B2. Both are correlated and transformed into A2 × B2. As a result, the
Galilean transformation is replaced by the Lorentz transformation.

Now I focus on the upper cone, the modeling of electrodynamics:

– B1 is transferred from left to right and meets on the right at A1. A1 is trans-
ferred from the bottom to the top and crosses through the entire interforma-
tive modeling diagram – in all three differentiated modeling stages – on the
diagonal. A1 is transformed and finally intersected with B1 at the top end of
the double cone. Thus the reconceptualization of electrodynamics is achieved
through the intersection of B1 × A1: The measurement narratives of electrody-
namics around 1900 still assumed the existence of an aether, in which electro-
dynamic phenomena diffused in a wave-like manner. Einstein’s modeling
shows that the assumption of the aether is superfluous.
– The reorganization of symbolic modeling on the secondary level (A2 × B2) is
also considered: The model-narrative of electrodynamics, which Maxwell
founded and Lorentz further developed, B2, remains valid. Einstein shows,
however, that the principle of relativity, in the form he proposes, applies to
it too: B2 × A2 are intersected. Thus Einstein demonstrated that both second-
ary modelings, A2 × B2 and B2 × A2, are Lorentz-covariant – and thus also
equivalent with one another.
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 131

Fig. 3: The process of interformation part III: Epistemic transformation © Aura Heydenreich.
132 Aura Heydenreich

This result has of course a double price, which Einstein announces early, in the
preliminary remarks of the article. If one accepts this intersection of principles
of these two different knowledge-systems – mechanics and electrodynamics –
and models their consequences theoretically in the course of the process of in-
terformation, then one can no longer accept the necessity of absolute simulta-
neity and absolute length-measurement, as Newton had to postulate them. The
necessity of accepting the ether likewise disappears.
The essential mechanism of interformation consists in starting from two
distinct theories, knowledge and/or symbol systems that are in certain respects
incompatible with one another and establishing correlations between them
through a ternary modeling configuration. This reflects both differences on the
primary semio-logical and second-order equivalences conditioned by the possi-
bility of the mutual transformation of primary codes from the perspective of a
tertiary level. What is concretely achieved is the production of second-order
equivalences due to the secondary semio-logical sphere and its codes while pre-
serving first-order differences. The latter differences indicate that the crossover
of the two theory-frames in the context of an epistemic configuration requires the
mutual transformation of both preceding systems. The production of second-
order equivalence-relations while maintaining first-order differences requires a
new, tertiary level, which makes visible mathematical symmetry-relations for the
interactive transformation of the codes of the previous theories, that entered the
process of interformation.
To summarize: The primary level is that of denotation, which links the ter-
nary modeling frame with immediate reference to empirical reality, while the sec-
ondary symbolic level is the level of exemplification. Thus the reference-relation
is double-coded: on the one hand to empirical reality through measurement, on
the other hand to symbolic modeling through mathematics. The tertiary level of-
fers an alternative model of the symbolic organization of reality due to an aequi-
valence to another quantitative relation from another frame. The tertiary level is
that of transformation. What tertiary modeling proposes, then, is orientation to
the symbolic coding of another domain of reality and the possibility of intersect-
ing the two codes and their modeling principles and practices. But this does not
occur without certain constraints. For this purpose the level of tertiary modeling
has to institute a complex transformation relation, which fulfills a double func-
tion: to accept the differences between the primary measurement-modeling of the
two domains while at the same time indicating the equivalences between the
two existing mathematical configurations. If the symbolic integration suc-
ceeds in being logically convincing due to a complex symmetry-relation, then
this induces a renewed feedback with the two secondary and primary modeling
levels of both initial theories (mechanics and electrodynamics) – and these are
 Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity and the Process of Interformation (Part II) 133

thereby transformed relativistically: both the correspondance relation and the co-
herence relation of the primary and secondary modeling level change. Because
now they are dependent on the transformation result of the tertiary modeling
level – that of correlation between the two theoretical fields. This feedback-
process that induces the epistemic transformation is marked on the diagram by
the two arrows on the right side of the double cone. This means that the entire
ternary modeling process should be read from this intersection-point of interfor-
mation: and indeed as a reciprocal transformation of both previous primary and
secondary domains of modeling of mechanics and electrodynamics.
Interformation is thus a process of “creation as reconfiguration” through
the intersection of modeling practices from different semio-logical fields per-
forming that test-simulation which demonstrates that both differences and the
possible equivalences conditioned by a transformation relation can be legiti-
mated in their logical necessity. The art of emplotment through epistemic narra-
tivity in the new framework consists of showing the epistemic fruitfulness of
equivalence and difference on different levels, and assigning them to their ap-
propriate epistemic function in the modeling architecture, so that contradic-
tions indeed arise, but on different semio-logical levels, so that these can be
taken into account as opportunities for epistemic transformations.
At this point, the process of interformation goes decisively beyond the
process of metaphorical correlation. For it initiates the concrete symbolic for-
mation of a new modeling configuration, which provides the new world-
model of the special relativity theory mathematically-symbolically and also as
a physical world-model, and thereby narrates it in new ways. It is thus a mat-
ter of the setting of a new framework, which draws new boundaries that cross-
cut the traditional differentiations. I’ve showed this in detail through the anal-
ysis on the epistemic value of narrativity in Einstein’s treatise of special rela-
tivity in my first paper in this book.

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