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THE ARAB GULF STATES
AND THE WEST

This book examines the changing image of the Arab Gulf States in the West. It
addresses the question of perception in international relations and how the
Arab States of the Gulf have pursued various endeavors to project themselves into
Western imagination.
The book chapters generate ideas on how perceptions came about and ways
to improve cultural and political realities on the ground in the Arab Gulf States.
Thus, it paves the way for a new area of research in the field of Gulf Studies that
extends beyond traditional international relations frameworks by weaving elements
of intercultural communication into the mix. Recognizing, yet extending beyond,
a traditionally realist framework, which has dominated the analysis of Arab Gulf
States’ foreign relations with western countries, this book tackles both the materialist
and the symbolic in the efforts and initiatives launched by the Arab Gulf States.
Some chapters maintain a social-scientific approach about the politics of the Arab
Gulf States in the West from an international relations lens. Others employ
theoretical frameworks that were founded on the notion of the “encounter,” with
anthropological lenses and concepts of intercultural communication. In addition
to the value of this academic research agenda, as such, some of the chapters also
touch upon the added importance of policy-oriented input.
As the Arab Gulf States actively engage with the West, the book would widely
appeal to students and researchers of Gulf politics and international relations.

Dania Koleilat Khatib currently holds the position of Executive Director at

Al Istishari Al Strategy Center for Economic and Future Studies, a UAE based
independent think tank. She specializes in US–Arab relations. She is the author of
the book The Arab Lobby and the US: Factors for Success and Failure (Routledge,
2016).

Marwa Maziad is an International Relations and Middle East Media and Politics
expert. She’s currently a Turkey Civil-military Relations Researcher and Israel
Studies Research Scholar at the University of Washington. Dr. Maziad is also a
regular Political Analyst on Aljazeera English, BBC Arabic, France 24, and CNN
International.
UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED)

Series Editors
Steven Spiegel, UCLA
Elizabeth Matthews, California State University, San Marcos

The UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED) series on Middle East
security and cooperation is designed to present a variety of perspectives on a
specific topic, such as democracy in the Middle East, dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian
relations, Gulf security, and the gender factor in the Middle East. The uniqueness
of the series is that the authors write from the viewpoint of a variety of countries
so that no matter what the issue, articles appear from many different states, both
within and beyond the region. No existing series provides a comparable, multi-
national collection of authors in each volume. Thus, the series presents a
combination of writers from countries who, for political reasons, do not always
publish in the same volume. The series features a number of sub-themes under a
single heading, covering security, social, political, and economic factors affecting
the Middle East.

11. Track Two Diplomacy and Jerusalem

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative
Edited by Tom Najem, Michael Molloy, Michael Bell, and John Bell

12. Reconstructing the Middle East

Political and Economic Policy
Edited by Abdulwahab Alkebsi, Nathan Brown, and Charlotta Sparre

13. Governance and Security in Jersualem

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative
Edited by Tom Najem, Michael J. Molloy, Michael Bell, and John Bell

14. Contested Sites in Jerusalem

The Jerusalem Old City Initiative
Edited by Tom Najem, Michael J. Molloy, Michael Bell, and John Bell

15. The Arab Gulf States and the West

Perceptions and Realities – Opportunities and Perils
Edited by Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/UCLA-

Center-for-Middle-East-Development-CMED-series/book-series/CMED
THE ARAB GULF
STATES AND
THE WEST
Perceptions and Realities –
Opportunities and Perils

Edited by
Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2019 selection and editorial matter, Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad to be identified as the
authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters,
has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification
and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Khatib, Dania Koleilat, editor. | Maziad, Marwa M., editor.
Title: The Arab Gulf states and the west: perceptions and realities – opportunities
and perils/edited by Dania Koleilat Khatib and Marwa Maziad.
Other titles: UCLA Center for Middle East Development (CMED) series; 15.
Description: Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019. |
Series: UCLA center for Middle East development (CMED); 15 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018026487| ISBN 9781138585362 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781138585379 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780429505300 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Persian Gulf Region—Foreign relations. | Persian Gulf
Region—Relations. | Persian Gulf Region—Foreign public opinion.
Classification: LCC DS326 .A645 2019 | DDC 303.48/253601821—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018026487

ISBN: 978-1-138-58536-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-58537-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-50530-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon, UK
CONTENTS

Notes on contributors ix

Introduction – The Arab Gulf States in the West:

imaginings, perceptions, and constructions 1
Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

SECTION I
Evolving perceptions of the Arab Gulf States in the US 15

1 It didn’t JASTA be this way: the passage of the Justice

Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ( JASTA) as a failure
of Arab lobbying 17
David Des Roches

2 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US in the wake of the

Arab Uprisings 27
Dania Koleilat Khatib

3 The United States and the Gulf in the age of Trump:

perceptions, possibilities, and challenges 47
Charles W. Dunne

SECTION II
Arab Gulf States in Europe and the non-Arab Middle
East: France, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Israel 63

4 The perception of the Gulf States in France: from support

of terrorism to the risks to national sovereignty 65
Rachid Chaker
vi Contents

5 The public diplomacy paradox: Saudi Arabia’s negative

image in the UK 82
Najah Al-Otaibi

6 The Turkish burden: the cost of the Turkey–Qatar alliance

and hard power projection into Qatar’s foreign policy 106
Marwa Maziad

7 The continuity and change of the Gulf States’ image in the

Israeli epistemic community 134
Mohamed Abdallah Youness

SECTION III
Competing images of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates: nation branding, regional
leadership, and projections in film, media,
and culture 155

8 Virtual enlargement in practice: investment policy as

branding in the case of Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates in the crisis-hit European Union 157
Máté Szalai

9 Saudi Arabia’s national roles conceptions after the

Arab Uprisings: the image transformation from Western
whist partner to proactive regional leader 181
Luíza Gimenez Cerioli

10 Film festivals in the Arab Gulf States: global image

projection or local industry construction? 203
Abdulrahman Alghannam

11 The Gulf in Western hearts and minds: the dilemma

of stereotypical frames and perceptions 223
Khalid Al-Jaber, Mokhtar Elareshi, and Abdul-Karim Ziani

SECTION IV
The Arab Gulf States in international organizations:
NATO and the United Nations 243

12 NATO and the threats to Gulf regional security (2011–2017) 245

Ashraf Kishk
 Contents vii

13 Relations between the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO):
perceptions of change 266
Angus Taverner

14 Dialogue as progress? Islam and UN Human Rights Treaty

ratification in the Gulf Cooperation Council States 289
Rachel A. George

Index 308
CONTRIBUTORS

Abdulrahman Alghannam is a teaching assistant at King Faisal University, Saudi

Arabia. He completed his Master of Arts in Mass Communication at the University
of Central Missouri, US. Alghannam is currently a doctoral student at the Uni-
versity of St Andrews, Film Studies Department, UK. He explores the development
of film industries in the Gulf region.

Khalid Al-Jaber is Assistant Professor of Political Communications in the Gulf

Studies Programme at Qatar University. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the
Peninsula newspaper published by Dar Al-Sharq Press, Doha, and works as principal
at Global Media Consultants Organisation, Atlanta, GA, USA. Al-Jaber earned
a PhD in Media and Communication from University of Leicester, UK (2013).
He also holds an MA and a Diplomas from Fordham University, NY, Stanford
University, San Francisco, CA, and Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Al-Jaber is a scholar of Arab and Gulf studies whose research focuses on global
media organisations, political science and international communications. He has
published scholarly works in several academic and professional journals including
the World Press Encyclopedia and Gazette.

Najah Al-Otaibi is a senior analyst at the Arabia Foundation based in London.

Prior to joining the Arabia Foundation, Al-Otaibi was a research fellow at the
Henry Jackson Society. Earlier in her career, she worked as a researcher at the
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. She has written for leading British news-
papers including The Times, the Independent and has appeared as a commentator
on CNN and BBC. She holds a Master’s degree in international journalism from
London City University and a Bachelor’s degree in English from King Saud
University in Riyadh. She is currently completing her PhD in Public Diplomacy
at the University of East Anglia.
x Contributors

Luíza Gimenez Cerioli is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Near and Middle
Eastern Studies (CNMS) at Marburg University, Germany. She holds a Master of
Arts in International Relations and Comparative Foreign Policy from the University
of Brasília, Brazil, and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Her fields of interest are Middle
East Politics, particularly Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign policies, United States’
Middle East ‘policy’, geopolitics and foreign policy analysis.

Rachid Chaker is a PhD student in International Relations (University Pantheon-

Assas – Paris). He works on the rivalries of influence in the Gulf since the Iraq
War. He has published several articles for the French Yearbook of International
Relations (AFRI) and for other specialist French journals.

David Des Roches is Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for
Security Studies, National Defense University, in the United States. Des Roches
was awarded the Bronze Star for service in Afghanistan. He has commanded con-
ventional and special operations parachute units and has served on the US Special
Operations Command staff as well as on the Joint Staff.

Charles W. Dunne is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Center Washington, DC,

and a scholar with the Middle East Institute, also in Washington. Prior to that,
he was Freedom House’s Director of Middle East and North Africa programmes,
in which he focused on human rights and democracy promotion in the region.
Before joining Freedom House, he spent 24 years as a diplomat in the US Foreign
Service, serving overseas in Cairo, Jerusalem and Madras, India, as well as at the
National Security Council, the Joint Staff in the Pentagon and as a member of the
Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff.

Mokhtar Elareshi is Assistant Professor of Media and Communication Studies and

Public Relations, Tripoli University, Libya, where he was also the former Head
of Media Department, Azzaytuna University 2003–2006. Elareshi earned a PhD
from the Media and Communication Department, University of Leicester (2012).
He is the author of News Consumption in Libya (Cambridge Scholar, 2013), the
co-author of The Future of News Media in the Arab World (Lambert, 2013) and co-
editor of Social Media in the Arab World (I.B. Tauris, 2016). His research interests
include news consumption, youth and media, new media and satellite TV.

Rachel A. George is a researcher residing in London, UK, working on issues of

Islam, human rights, law and women’s rights. Her work has focused on the Gulf
Cooperation Council states and the Middle East and North Africa region. She
holds a BA in Politics from Princeton University, an MA in Middle Eastern
Studies from Harvard University, and a PhD in International Relations from the
London School of Economics and Political Science.
 Contributors xi

Dania Koleilat Khatib’s specialty is US–Arab relations with a special focus on

lobbying. Dr. Khatib’s research also spans media biases, sectarianism, extremism,
and governance. She currently holds the position of executive director at Al
Istishari Al Strategy Center for Economic and Future Studies. She authored a book
on the Arab lobby in the United States and the factors for success and for failure
(Routledge). The Arabic version is published by the Center for Arab Unity
Studies in Beirut. Dr. Khatib published on US relations with the Arab Gulf States
in several regional newspapers and academic journals. Dr. Khatib has participated
and spoken in numerous workshops and conferences. She holds a PhD in Politics
from the University of Exeter and both an MA and a BA in Business Administration
from the American University in Beirut.

Ashraf Kishk has occupied the position of Head of Strategic Studies programme
at the Bahrain Center for Strategic International and Energy studies since September
2017. Dr. Kishk received his PhD with honours in 2009 from Cairo University.
His thesis was titled: “The development of Gulf regional security since 2003:
A study in the influence of NATO.” Dr. Kishk has published research on Gulf
security. His main focus is NATO’s relations with the region.

Marwa Maziad is an International Relations and Middle East Media and Politics
expert. She is a columnist for Almasry Alyoum, Egypt’s leading independent daily
newspaper. Dr. Maziad received her MA in Intercultural Communication from
the University of Washington. Her PhD at the University of Washington is on
comparative civil-military relations in Turkey, Egypt and Israel. Dr. Maziad is a
former faculty member at Qatar University and Northwestern University in Qatar.
She was also a Visiting Scholar at Istanbul Şehir University and the American
University in Cairo. She has published extensively on Gulf Studies including a
book chapter entitled “Qatar: Cultivating the Citizen of the Futuristic State,”
Routledge 2016; and “Qatar in Egypt: The Politics of Aljazeera,” forthcoming in
the peer-reviewed academic journal Journalsim. Dr. Maziad is also a regular Political
Analyst on Aljazeera English, BBC Arabic, France 24, and CNN International.
Her research agenda includes: Comparative Politics; International Relations;
Communication Studies; Security Studies and Civil-Military Relations.

Máté Szalai is an assistant professor and doctoral candidate at the Corvinus

University of Budapest and the coordinator of the Middle East research programme
at the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His primary fields of
research include the international relations of the Gulf region.

Angus Taverner is the Global Affairs Director of the Dubai-based think tank,
b’huth. He is a specialist in political risk, security analysis and strategic com-
munication. He has worked with governments and organisations across Europe,
the US and the Middle East involving: news analysis; social trend analysis; reputa-
tion management; and providing regular commentary on strategic issues that
xii Contributors

influence political, diplomatic and economic debate around the world. Angus has
contributed to a number of books on the strategic use of ‘Soft Power’ and the
strategic employment of Information and Influence Campaigns. He is: Director of
the political risk and strategic communications’ consultancy, Smith Taverner Ltd;
Director of Dubai Research Ltd and an Associate Consultant to Unicorn ARC,
Iota Global and Reeve Communications.

Mohamed Abdallah Youness is a Political Science Assistant Lecturer at the Faculty

of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. His research is inter-
disciplinary in nature; connecting comparative politics to strategic studies, especially
the impact of domestic state-society transformations on the national security
policies of Middle East countries.

Abdul-Karim Ziani is Associated Professor of Journalism Studies, Department

of Media, Tourism and Arts, Bahrain University, Bahrain. He is the author of
American Press: Developing, Philosophy and Treatment (2005) and Conflict of Wills:
Gaddafi’s Image in the Washington Post Newspaper in the Era of President Reagan
(both Talta Publishing House, 2007). Among his special areas of interest are
international political communication, journalism education, new media and
politics, and news coverage.
INTRODUCTION
The Arab Gulf States in the West:
imaginings, perceptions, and
constructions

Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

“How do they see us?” At the heart of international relations as well as intercultural
communication, lies this question of perception. How do you perceive the Other?
How does the Other perceive you? What is the nature of the encounter when it
happens? Recognizing, yet extending beyond, a traditionally realist framework,
which has dominated the analysis of Arab Gulf States’1 foreign relations with
Western countries—conceptualized in the broader sense to be based on sheer
pragmatic economic and security interests—this book tackles both the materialist and
the symbolic in the efforts and initiatives launched by the Arab Gulf States (AGS).
The book traces how the Arab States of the Gulf pursue these endeavors in order
to create themselves into Western imagination. As these Arab Gulf States actively
engage with projecting themselves into the West, perceptions shape up and realities
manifest. As opportunities emerge for further cooperation, perils also surface and
can potentially proliferate. Hence, the conceptualization of the present book: The
Arab Gulf States and the West: perceptions and realities—opportunities and perils.

The Arab Gulf States: variation and visibility

The initiatives undertaken by the Arab Gulf States to project themselves into the
West are indeed both varied and visible. They range from setting up Arab and
Middle East Centers at distinguished universities in the Western capitals, to
employing sports diplomacy to win bids for hosting sports events such as Qatar
World Cup 2022. They include Saudi Arabia’s hiring of ten lobbying firms aiming
to favorably influence US policies towards the Kingdom, as well as the United
Arab Emirates’ building of stadiums pairing the name Emirates with Arsenal in
London; all while being crowned the world’s top humanitarian donor nation in
2013. But to what end results do these efforts lead? How well cemented have
Western–Arab Gulf relations become? Or how jeopardized have they remained?
2 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

Moreover, are these relations reserved to state-to-state dealings, without adequate

attempts for convergences on shared societal values between these two parts of the
world? And if there are no sufficient efforts to highlight convergences on shared
meanings, what are the consequences?

Out of sight, out of mind

Research shows that the degree of foreign countries’ public relations endeavors in the
US directly impacts how the American public perceives those countries. Moreover,
the more visibly and favorably covered foreign countries are in the US media, the
more positively the American public perceives those countries (Lee and Hong,
2012). Thus, if the Arab Gulf countries are out of favorable sight, they would
remain out of mind. However, if they do enter the imagination of Western
audiences with positive connotations, perceptions can shift, favorably. Finally, it
is argued that the image(s) and their perceptions are not monolithic and separate
realms. But they rather co-constitute one another. Further confirming this, research
findings, primarily in psychology, have found correlations between attitude and
behavior. It is a two-way relationship (Reibstein et al., 1980). A change in the
experience of a certain subject matter can affect our attitude towards it. Does this
apply in the case of the Arab Gulf States? How? Why? Or why not? Some of the
chapters in this volume address Arab Gulf States’ initiatives and/or evaluate their
effects, with both intended and unintended consequences.
We see for example how Western societies that experienced terrorist acts by
Daesh/ISIS have experienced increased negative attitudes towards Qatar and Saudi
Arabia; since both adopt the Wahhabi creed that Daesh claims to follow. Most
recently, however, due to Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Egypt, the UAE, and
Bahrain—states that are actively distancing themselves from Qatar, through the
June 5th 2017 boycott—this Saudi change in policy orientation became quite a
significant signal that Saudi Arabia is trying to maneuver away from connotations
that feed into jihadist terrorism; aiming instead to frame Qatar, alone with its
Turkish ally, as the two countries implicated in allegations of current support for
regional and global jihadism. For instance, in February 2014, the late King Abdullah
bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud had declared harsh prison sentences for any youth traveling
overseas to fight or help others to do so. The king also announced prison punish-
ment for those perpetuating extremist ideology and for groups adhering to such
ideology (Sabq, 2014). Egypt and Turkey, with diametrically opposite regional
views had intensively alternated in their visits to the Kingdom during this critical
juncture year of 2014, competing over Saudi Arabia’s alliance. Egypt and the UAE
won the bid over shifting Saudi regional policies away from Turkey and Qatar’s
regional pan-Islamism (Maziad, in this volume).

The genesis of the book

The chapters stemmed from contributions to a workshop entitled “The Arab Gulf
States in the West: Perceptions and Realities; Opportunities and Perils,” that took
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 3

place within the 8th Annual Gulf Research Meeting, at the University of
Cambridge, UK, August 1–4, 2017. While the paper entries addressed the different
efforts Arab Gulf States have initiated in order to project a certain favorable image
of themselves into the West, the workshop itself offered a forum to dissect successes
and failures, across the country cases, which have engaged with the ambitious
enterprise of penetration into the West. The result of these scholarly deliberations
was the revised paper contributions, which eventually constituted the chapters in
the present volume. Emphasis throughout has been given to the dual-issue of
image projection and image perception. The book offers chapters that explore these
questions employing a number of angles, theoretical frameworks, as well as research
methods.
The objective of the book was to curate chapters that discuss and analyze
previous and current Arab Gulf States’ outreach efforts into the West. Arab Gulf
States’ commercial activities, lobbying and politicking, cultural and sports sponsor-
ships, as well as academic endowments have all witnessed a surge in the last decade
or so. Dubai captures the world’s imagination and stands as a beacon of globalized
trade, scientific progressiveness, modern infrastructure and, increasingly, artistic
and cultural experimentations—the latter is especially salient when it comes to
other regions in the United Arab Emirates such as Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. Qatar,
on the other hand, has exhibited a sequence of mixed connotations. Qatar first
projected itself at the forefront of news media, with Al Jazeera brand. Yet this was
eventually eclipsed and does not stand as solidly credible as before. Qatar ventured
into international sports and won the bid to host the World Cup 2022. But that,
too, was accompanied by allegations of bribery, corruption, and accusations of
labor rights violations. In recent years, during and post the Arab uprisings, Qatar
has been praised for its support of Arab youth. However, Qatar became entangled
in accusations of destabilizing the region and co-creating “competing orders of
violence” (Maziad, 2013). Qatar has been confined by its perilous alliance with an
increasingly expansionist pan-Islamist Turkey, under authoritarian-in-the-making
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The ramification of this Turkish–Qatari alliance
cost Qatar its current isolation since June 5th, 2017, as the major players of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Bahrain sided with Egypt to form a quartet with demands explicitly addressing the
Muslim Brotherhood’s regional ideological expansionism and Turkey’s capacity
for 5,000 military troops in Qatar. Marwa Maziad addresses these perils in her
chapter “The Turkish burden: The cost of the Turkey–Qatar alliance and hard
power projection into Qatar’s foreign policy.”
As for Saudi Arabia, it has been under the international spotlight for its shifting
state–society relations, human rights record, military operations against Houthi
militias in Yemen, its rivalry with Iran, plummeting oil prices, and the recent
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ( JASTA) that enables families of 9/11
victims to sue the Saudi government. In fact, the list is long. So much so that Saudi
Arabia has hired up to ten lobbying firms in the United States just to help improve
its image in the US media, and among American politicians and the public.
4 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

Yet the challenge is that in a multi-vocal world of social media and citizen journal-
ism, the traditional hegemony or mere impact of such lobbying firms—in general–
is being debated and questioned. This certainly applies to the Saudi Arabian case.
Dania Koleilat Khatib addresses the Arab Gulf States’ lobbying endeavors,
evaluating their mixed results, in her chapter entitled “Arab Gulf States’ lobbying
in the US in the wake of the Arab Uprisings.”
Yet, Saudi Arabia, in its newly cemented alliance with both secularist-leaning
Egypt and United Arab Emirates as opposed to the political Islam model of Turkey
and its Qatari adherent, seems to have been jumping through many hoops that
approximate it to universal values shared by the West. The news about granting
Saudi women the legal right to drive; headlines about the Russian Bolshoi Ballet
company that performed in Riyadh in 2018; or announcements regarding the
opening of movie theatres in the Kingdom—when none of these banal civic-life
activities have been taking place in Saudi Arabia, despite having proliferated
for decades throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds just the same as they do in
Western European countries—all these developments only mean that Saudi Arabia
is recreating itself, not only in the imagination of its Western audiences but also
actually taking huge steps (and risks) into morphing state–society relations on the
ground, at home. This very metamorphosis, celebrated by many, be it in the West
or the East alike, could have represented a perilous gamble. Too rapid a change
and stability could be threatened. Yet, it seems that through the Emirati and
Egyptian influence, Saudi Arabia realized that too slow a change might have
actually been even more dangerous. It seems, so far, that Saudi Arabia is striking
a sustainable balance, as it undergoes these state–society transformations. Moreover,
Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain represent comparative and contrasting cases to the
currently more salient Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and
Qatar. Comparing the cases helps us discover dynamic relations vis-à-vis the
endeavors and the most currently visible activities of the more visible three GCC
countries.

Perception is reality
A big question which this book tries to answer is how does the West perceive the
Arab Gulf States and what have the Arab Gulf States done to influence this percep-
tion? We cannot say that the book gives a definitive, comprehensive, and complete
answer to the question. However, given the diverse perspectives presented in the
chapters included, the book gives a series of well-informed views by scholars
and practitioners who spent time dissecting the issue of perception. The differ-
ent chapters offer evidence for the major theory this book presents: perceptions
can affect political behaviors within international relations the same way they can
affect individual behaviors. One might argue that the issue of perception is an
element affecting individuals’ behaviors and is only relevant in personal social
contexts, and that when it comes to politics and international relations, only real
interests matter. However, realpolitik has failed, in many instances, to give a
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 5

straightforward answer to international relations. It cannot always explain political

behavior and national decisions. In democracies, the political elite are accountable
to their constituencies and hence cannot take decisions that are unpopular. In
autocratic states, many decisions are influenced by dictators’ whims, egos, and
insecurities. Therefore, a rational assessment of interests at stake cannot be the sole
source to predict the course of relations among states. This applies to Arab Gulf–
US relations. If decisions were purely made on a pragmatic rational interests basis,
why did Congress vote for the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)
despite the shared interests between Saudi Arabia and the United States? According
to the chapter by David Des Roches, the passage by Congress of JASTA is
against the US interest. Des Roches states that the bill waives the immunity of
friendly states. It creates a dangerous precedent for the US as no other country has
as many interests, personnel, and soldiers around the world. Therefore, if sovereign
immunity is to be lifted by the United States, it can be lifted for the United States.
However, the law was passed against the Obama presidential veto, due to domestic
politics. The general mood was favorable to such legislation because of the
prevalent perception that Saudi Arabia is, in one a way or another, implicated in
the 9/11 attacks. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s attempts to block the legislation
by hiring a large team of lobbyists, or the foreign minister’s threat to liquidate
Saudi assets in the US, were negatively perceived in the US, and were not able
to deter the passage of the law.
In the post-Cold War era, perception as an element in analyzing international
relations is more important than ever. One might think that during the Cold War,
ideologies were the main driver behind policy, as the two-Blocs, the Soviets and
the free world, represented adversarial worldviews. The West embodied liberalism,
democracy, and free economy, while the Soviet Union represented communism,
the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party, and planned economy.
During the Cold War, the “enemy” was well defined. It was a Bloc: the Soviet
Union and its allies. The general perception of Western national interests was to
contain this enemy as much as possible. At the time, the perception did coincide
with reality. The Soviets were perceived as the enemy and they did pose an
existential threat to the free world. The overall concept of national interest was
well defined in the mind of the average citizen as well as in the minds of the
political elite. There was no discrepancy between the real and the perceived. In
this case, analyzing what is real was sufficient. Accordingly, the national interest
in the minds of the western elites, when it came to the Arab Gulf States at the
time of the Cold War, was to keep oil-producing counties in the Western camp.
Preventing the Soviets from reaching the oil fields and securing the flow of oil on
which the West depends for its daily functioning was of prime importance. Hence
the Carter doctrine, which states that the US will be ready to use its military
arsenal to protect oil fields of the Arab Gulf States (Stork, 1980). However, now
that the main Soviet enemy is gone, what stands for the national interest in the
psyche of the average Western citizen? What is national interest for an American,
for a Frenchman, for a Briton, or a German? The concept has become fluid with
6 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

the absence of a concrete enemy. Amid the absence of a consensus on national

interests, where does the Arab Gulf States stand? In the eyes of the average
Western citizen and the Western political elite what role does the Arab Gulf States
play? Are they still perceived as strategic allies? If so, why have Qatari investments
in France been frowned upon, by the media, the masses, and the political elite?
Again, if the Arab Gulf is perceived as a strategic asset why did JASTA pass? Hence
the question of perception is a very important factor to be studied in assessing the
relation of the Arab Gulf States with the West. As mentioned before, the West
adopts democratic systems and political elites are accountable to their constituencies,
accordingly they cannot make decisions that are too unpopular. Western politicians
find difficulty dealing with states that are negatively viewed by their voters.
Furthermore, at the theoretical level, Charles Stangor (2011) described how
social cognition is influenced by affective state. Daesh/ISIS terrorist bombings of
2015 and 2016 in the heart of Europe, in France and Belgium, created an extremely
negative reaction to Islamic terrorism in the US. That presented an opportune
moment for the legislators who championed the JASTA law in 2016 to get the
support needed to pass the bill that had been floating since 2009. This is why
sporadic terrorist acts have a long-lasting effect on the way Westerners view Islam.
These acts create a negative affect for Westerners when the issue of Islam is
brought up in the media. The impression of Islam created by those acts is likely
to last a long time unless other favorable events and narratives mitigate it. Reibstein
et al. (1980) wrote how perception influences attitude, and attitude influences
behavior. Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) have found that cognition affects our
feelings and our behavioral intention, i.e. our inclination to act in a certain way
towards an object. Therefore “liking” an object is a function of our perception of
this object. In this respect, the negative image of Islam or the negative perception
of Islam are bound to affect behavior towards Gulf States that are seen as Islamic
states, since Islam is a major attribute of their state character and legislation. This
was seen in the negative coverage and in the negative public opinion towards
Qatar’s massive investment in France. Rachid Chaker’s chapter addresses the
issue of perceptions of Qatar in France. Though foreign direct investments are
usually viewed positively as boosters of the national economy, given the Arab Gulf
State’s negative image, Qatari investments were viewed as a tool by a malignant
state to influence French politics and to infringe on the sovereignty of the French
state. The far right rode on this trend and showed an aggressive attitude towards
Arab Gulf States that suffer from a negative image, in order to portray themselves
as adamant about preserving the French national character and national sovereignty
from foreign manipulations. To this end, in 2013, Marine Le Pen announced in
a statement to the French press “France has become the strumpet of Qatar.” In
the fall of 2016, two French journalists, Christian Chesnot and Georges Malbrunot,
published a book highlighting the suspicious links between several French politicians
and rulers of the Gulf monarchies, mainly from Qatar. Even during the 2017
presidential race, two main candidates, François Fillon and Bruno Le Maire, called
for redefining the relations between France and the Gulf countries. These are
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 7

some of the examples presented by Chaker to show how negative perception

affects the political rhetoric and behavior towards Arab Gulf States.
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) studied how accidentally activated prior social
knowledge, which is acquired while reading or imagining news events, affects our
behavior in many domains. This is why, for example, reading a certain article or
even coming across a fictional character can create a certain image about people of
the Arab Gulf States in the mind of the average Westerner, affecting their behavior
towards the former. The meaning we give to objects we encounter, the embodi-
ment of visualization, is affected by preconceived precepts. The processing of
information we receive is influenced by the internal symbols and mental repre-
sentations we have (Niedenthal et al., 2005). In his book From Beirut to Jerusalem,
Thomas Friedman mentions an encounter with a Palestinian woman who asked
him why the West puts more value on Israeli lives than Palestinian ones. Friedman
explained that the story of Israelis is part of the Old Testament. The Old Testament
is one of the supra stories that has shaped the Western worldview. This is why the
average Westerner has more affinity with a Jewish Israeli than with an Arab. Arabs
have not made themselves part of any supra story; they are alien to the Western
psyche. Hence, the Western perception of Arabs starts from a deficit (Friedman,
1995). This dilemma applies to the Arab Gulf States; the average Westerner has
little affinity with the Arab Gulf countries. This element is discussed in Rachel
A. George’s chapter, “Islam and UN Human Rights Treaty Ratification in the
GCC.” Here, the focus is on the United Nations UN Convention Against Torture
(CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and
the various ways Islam has been evoked by the Gulf States, in the process of UN
ratification. The key conclusion from reading her chapter is how the concept of
human rights alternated between universalism and relativism. While the Declaration
of Human Rights is believed to be supposedly founded on Western percepts, in
fact it is a product of deliberations from all religious and cultural backgrounds, and
that is why the West treats the Declaration as a reflection of universal values, while
non-Western countries are not as cognizant of the diverse streams that informed
the Declaration of Human Rights at the time of its ratification. And that is why it
is unfortunate that some non-Western publics take an antagonistic attitude toward
the notion of “Human Rights,” incorrectly assuming it is exclusively Western,
when it is not. In the different discourses surrounding those treaties, the different
Arab Gulf States expressed their discontent with the imposition of human rights
percepts that they deemed “alien” to the Islamic culture. While Muslim societies
have their own version of human rights that are applied in a holistic Islamic
environment, the West looks at their reluctance as a refusal to adhere to universal
human rights standards—when in fact the incidents of hesitations were far from a
blanket refusal of human values.
Therefore, the West often understands some Arab Gulf norms, deemed
“incompatible” with specific Western practices, as a lack of respect for human
rights and universal values more generally-defined—which should not be the case.
8 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

This misperception occurs because the West neither fully understands the Islamic
culture in its totality, nor the internal dynamics that govern relations between
members of Muslim societies. Western analyses often merely examine individual
episodes and use them to pass judgments on and assessments of the entire social
order of Muslim-majority states. For example, polygamy, as a legal contractual
variation in marriage practices, which is an accepted norm in Islamic Arab Gulf
societies, is frowned upon by the West and is linked to depriving women of their
rights and to gender discrimination; when the practice of polygamy legally and in
practice necessitates the consent of all partners involved, certainly including the
women. Nonetheless, polygamy stands for a particular image of a backward practice
in the Western contemporary imagination. This is the kind of selective stimulus,
about which Charles Stangor (2011) speaks, where the judgment is made based
on a certain attribute that is accessible and easy to process. Stangor gives as an
example a consumer behavior, where the consumer selects a product because the
packaging is attractive; or rejects another product altogether because one attribute
in the packaging is not as attractive. The consumer makes such choice, because
packaging is the easiest criterion on which to base a decision, while ignoring other
qualitative attributes of the product. This explains why flashy current events are
immediately used to generalize about Arab Gulf States and their societies, albeit
as an unattractive package. This is the mechanism by which an average citizen of
the West resorts to passing judgment on Islam and hence the entire Arab Gulf
countries, by referring to erratic terrorist acts instead of taking a comprehensive
look at Arab history and Arab culture and their developments over long periods
of time of oscillating practices.
Ferguson and Gallagher (2007) discusses the issue of frame valence, i.e. framing
a certain issue or attribute positively is likely to generate a positive perception of
it and hence acceptance. People tend to have positive feelings when the messaging
is framed positively. For example, a product that says 95 per cent fat-free is viewed
more positively than a product that has 5 per cent fat though both messages are
the same. The difference in framing the product, contributed to a difference in its
perception. In this respect, the Gulf States and societies have not fully succeeded
in framing themselves positively. Some initiatives reinforce the preexisting Western
stereotypes. However, some newer initiatives tap into the shared values of Arab and
Western audiences alike. For example, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s
weeks-long visit to the US in 2018 was effective in shifting perceptions. He met
with Bill Gates of Microsoft and Jeff Bezos of Amazon in Seattle; dined with
movie producers in Hollywood and spoke to Oprah Winfrey (Paton, 2018).
Abdulrahman Alghannam writes in this volume about movie festivals
in Arab Gulf countries and tries to depict how they have played a vital role in
portraying a certain image globally. Alghannam examines Dubai International
Film Festival and the Saudi Film Festival to understand the extent to which these
film festivals have contributed to project images of the nation-state. The chapter
concludes that those festivals, while meant to promote the UAE, for example, as
an exotic touristic destination, have indirectly enforced the Western image of Arab
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 9

Gulf people as desert dwellers. Referencing Nancy Jackson (2011), Alghannam

writes, “Prestigious, glamorous, lavishly funded and well-attended from Western
figures in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and even Doha Tribeca film festivals re-enhanced
the cultural image of the ‘Orient’ supplied by Hollywood hegemony and con-
sumed unthinkingly by the global audiences.” It is argued that those festivals could
have thus far contributed to Orientalizing the “self.” A new shift, however, from
this Orientalizing self-perception within the Gulf States, and therefore self-
projection towards Western audiences, is equally detected. More self-assured
representations by Arab Gulf content creators are currently on the rise.
In their chapter “The Gulf in Western hearts and minds: the dilemma of
stereotypical frames and perceptions,” Khalid Al-Jaber, Mokhtar Elareshi,
and Abdul-Karim Ziani highlight how the Western media portrays Arabs. The
media influences public opinion but also reflects it. The study used a total sample
of 2508 newspaper articles published in mainstream Western media from January
1st to December 31st, 2016. The chapter concludes that: “negative Arab and
Muslim stereotypes and frames are still around as the mass media, and now social
media as well, continue to reveal their problematic attitude when it comes to
Arabs and Muslims.”
The negative perception is likely to become more problematic with time, as
Arab Gulf oil has been suffering from a diminishing strategic value. Given the
technological advances in shale oil and in clean energy production, the Carter
doctrine, in which President Jimmy Carter stated that the United States would
use military force, if necessary, to defend its national interests in the Gulf, is no
longer as valid. This top-down government-to-government approach is no longer
sufficient. What is necessary now is that Arab citizens from the Gulf, and their
states, need to be “liked” by Western publics in order to maintain a strong alliance
with their democratically elected governments. In democracies, popular preferences
trickle “up” to political decisions, not the other way round. Likability will increase
when converged upon shared values are highlighted, instead of diverging anta-
gonistic differences.
The problem of perception, accordingly, is two-fold. On one the hand, the
Islamic cultural ecosystem is conceived as totally separate, or even alien to Western
culture: as in some points, it is incompatible with Western values. On the other
hand, Arab Gulf States have not yet fully mastered an effective strategy to portray
themselves positively to Western societies as opposed to sheer pragmatic interests-
based relations with their Western governments. This is mainly due to the approach
they adopt. Each country individually focuses its public relations effort on boosting
the image of the ruling family, at best, of the nation-state. This for example
changed to a remarkable degree with Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman’s visit
with its emphasis on technology and media, and highlighting Saudi nationals who
work in those two advanced fields. However, the main reason why Arab Gulf
States have a negative image is due to the negative image of Islam, as a cultural
prism. In their effort, Arab Gulf States have thus far sought to treat the symptom
while providing no cure to the ailment. Promoting the image of Islam has to be
10 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

done by explaining to the West, Islam as a system with its own particularities, as
well as much more importantly its shared convergences with other world religions,
specifically Judaism and Christianity. Thus, framing seemingly “Islamic” cultural
practices in a manner that can be accepted by the West is key so as to highlight
similarities and convergences as opposed to differences and divergences. Focusing
on the contribution of Islam to the development of Western culture as well as the
contemporary contribution of Muslims to Western societies is of prime importance.
This is a project that not only Arab Gulf States have to conduct collectively; it is
a project that has to be undertaken jointly with Muslim and Arab communities in
the West. These communities make the best conduit to promote a certain image
to the societies of which they are part. A case in point is how football fans love
Liverpool forward Mohamed Salah of Egypt, as he won the Premier League’s
Player of the Season award. As an Arab Muslim individual he has done much more
for the image of Islam, through his record-breaking professional success, than
myriad state-sponsored campaigns. Unless Arab Gulf States realize the importance
of image management, they will continue to struggle in their relation with the
West. In this respect, we can say perception has created a new reality with which
the Arab Gulf States have to deal, and are starting to do so.

Thematic threads
The topics covered in this book are broad in scope, yet specific in focus, and
therefore the theoretical frameworks of contributing chapters have been inter-
disciplinary in nature. Authors focused their chapters in order to bridge and/or
combine humanities and social sciences methods as they addressed the nature of
perception and realties as well as opportunities and perils facing the Arab Gulf States’
engagement with the West. The chapters reflect diverse authors with backgrounds
as scholars and researchers as well as strategic communication practitioners and
policymaking experts. Some chapters offer a theoretical overview of the notion
of perception. Others offer a historical analysis across the social sciences and
the humanities, as their focus is on the question of image. The presentation of
empirical research, case studies, and/or “hands-on” qualitative research was also
greatly encouraged and reflected in the various contributions in this volume.
Contributions can be sorted into thematic threads in the following four sections.
Section I: Evolving perceptions of the Arab Gulf States in the US starts with
Chapter 1 by David Des Roches, who addresses the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act ( JASTA) in his piece entitled “It didn’t JASTA be this way: the
passage of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act as a failure of Arab lobby-
ing.” Chapter 2 by Dania Koleilat Khatib looks at the challenges of the lobbying
efforts in her work on the “Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US in the wake of
the Arab Uprisings.” In Chapter 3, Charles W. Dunne examines “The United
States and the Gulf in the age of Trump: perceptions, possibilities, and challenges.”
Section II: Arab Gulf States in Europe and the non-Arab Middle East:
France, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Israel begins with Chapter 4 by Rachid
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 11

Chaker, who investigates “The perception of the Gulf States in France: from
support of terrorism to the risks to national sovereignty.” Najah Al-Otaibi looks
at paradoxical Saudi relations with the UK in Chapter 5, “The public diplomacy
paradox: Saudi Arabia’s negative image in the UK.” In Chapter 6, “The Turkish
burden: the cost of the Turkey–Qatar alliance and hard power projection into
Qatar’s foreign policy,” Marwa Maziad analyzes the Qatari–Turkish alliance, as
she conceptualizes Turkey’s pan-Islamist regional expansionism to be a burden on
Qatar’s once much more agile and independent foreign policy, causing Qatar’s
regional isolation. In Chapter 7, “The continuity and change of the Gulf States’
image in the Israeli epistemic community,” Mohamed Abdallah Youness traces
the perception of the Arab Gulf States in key Israeli think tanks and research
centers, and how the production of knowledge morphed over the years from “no
interest” to “high interest” and designation of specific publications dedicated to
Gulf Studies.
Section III: Competing images of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates: nation branding, regional leadership, and projections in film, media, and
culture zooms in on case studies from the three countries in relation to these
themes. Chapter 8 by Máté Szalai compares international investment policies of
Qatar and the UAE, through the concept of “Virtual Enlargement,” where a
given small state expands its clout and influence through certain policies. His
chapter is entitled, “Virtual enlargement in practice: investment policy as branding
in the case of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the crisis-hit European
Union.” He argues that the UAE has had more success than Qatar, because it had
been an early trendsetter and less aggressive in its acquisitions. His findings
somewhat triangulate with those of Rachid Chaker on resistance to Qatar’s
investment purchases in France. In Chapter 9, “Saudi Arabia’s national roles
conceptions after the Arab Uprisings: the image transformation from Western
whist partner to proactive regional leader,” Luíza Gimenez Cerioli argues that
Saudi Arabia incrementally changed its role in the region, thereby constituting its
own national interests agenda more independently from US influences, as well as
gaining more power over regional dynamics. Shifting to film, media, and culture
in Chapter 10, “Film festivals in the Arab Gulf States: global image projection or
local industry construction?” Abdulrahman Alghannam contrasts the UAE to
Saudi Arabia and highlights the glitzy nature of the Emirati festivals as opposed
to the organic and indigenous nature of film festivals in Saudi Arabia, given their
very nascent stage of development, as Saudi Arabia has only begun to allow movie
theaters this year. Staying in the same sphere of media, but focusing on three major
newspaper websites in France, the US, and the UK, authors Khalid Al-Jaber,
Mokhtar Elareshi, and Abdul-Karim Ziani examine in Chapter 11 those
media outlets and reconfirm the prevalence of negative stereotypes of the Arab
Gulf States in their content-analysis based study entitled, “The Gulf in Western
hearts and minds: the dilemma of stereotypical frames and perceptions.”
Section IV: The Arab Gulf States in international organizations: NATO and
the United Nations explores the ties that bring the Arab Gulf States to international
12 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

defense and human rights forums. In Chapter 12, “NATO and the threats to Gulf
regional security (2011–2017),” Ashraf Kishk focuses on the transforming security
needs of the Arab Gulf States and distinguishes between the nature of alliances
versus partnerships, arguing that NATO might form a partnership with the Arab
Gulf States but that does not advance to an alliance that guarantees the Gulf
security. This dynamic pushes the Gulf States to diversify their sources of security
and rely more on themselves. In a parallel but somewhat different vein, Angus
Taverner focuses in Chapter 13, entitled, “Relations between the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):
perceptions of change,” on what he calls a shift in the “strategic kaleidoscope,”
which brings in Russia closer to the region. This circumstance of Russian
prevalence, which was a key reason for the emergence of NATO to begin with,
could represent an opportunity or a peril for NATO–GCC relations. This may be
driving the two international bodies of NATO and the GCC in different directions
or may bring them together as NATO needs to secure its southern flank and to
guard the Indian Ocean region. Finally, in Chapter 14, “Dialogue as progress?
Islam and UN Human Rights Treaty ratification in the Gulf Cooperation Council
States,” Rachel A. George focuses on the way Islam has been differentially
evoked during the various Arab Gulf States’ recorded deliberations on the United
Nations UN Convention Against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The argument here is that there is no
monolithic or uniform use of Islam, as an analytic to engage with universalist or
relativistic discussions on human rights. Indeed, Islam is evoked differently from
one Arab Gulf State to another, and even by the same state, over time.

Conclusion
Perceptions of the Arab Gulf States and their actual realities are timely topics as
the rise of ISIS between 2013 and 2017 has negatively affected the image of some
Arab Gulf States, namely Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The leaked emails (McKernan,
2016) indicating that Hillary Clinton believed back in 2014 that “Qatar and Saudi
Arabia fund ISIS” highlighting their “rivalry over dominating the Sunni Muslim
World” had placed these countries in a negative light, regionally and internationally.
Over the past year, however, Saudi Arabia has veered towards Egypt and the
United Arab Emirates, and abandoned earlier visions of utilizing Islamic doctrine
in its strictest sense of Wahabbism as it used to do. Saudi Arabia had long used
Islamism for the purpose of exercising dominance over the region, in reaction to
yet another Iranian Islamic revolutionary hegemonic project next door. But most
recently, Saudi Arabia has shifted gears away from earlier exportation of Wahhabi
Islam. By contrast to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE together on the one hand,
Turkey and Qatar remained together in their pan-Islamist support for armed non-
state actors, which eventually proved to be a failing regional vision. The rivalry
between Turkey/Qatar together on the one hand and Egypt/Saudi Arabia/United
 The Arab Gulf States in the West 13

Arab Emirates together on the other hand not only played out in the region but
also manifested in competitive lobbying strategies in Washington, especially with
the Trump administration, and other Western capitals in Europe. ISIS military
losses as well as the US withdrawal from the Obama-brokered Iran Deal are direct
manifestations of the seeming success of lobbying efforts of the UAE, Saudi Arabia,
and Egypt as opposed to Turkey and Qatar—even if momentarily.
The book chapters generate ideas on how perceptions came about and ways to
improve cultural and political realities on the ground in the Arab Gulf States, for
the hope that they can directly feed into the perceptions of the Arab Gulf States
and their societies in the West. Very little research has been done on the image of
the Arab Gulf States in Western countries. Even less research has systematically
followed and analyzed the inventory of efforts the Arab Gulf States have made in
order to nurture public support inside these Western countries, or delineated the
outcomes of such efforts. There is a gap in the literature, which this book attempts
to fill, in the sense that research has thus far focused primarily on the relations of
the Arab Gulf States with Western countries from a realist interests-based inter-
national relations perspective. Other aspects that mix the materialist and the symbolic
do not get enough attention. Thus, it is hoped that the arguments made in the
various chapters, and which were based on deep deliberations during the Gulf
Research Meeting 2017 Workshop will pave the way for a new area of research in
the field of Gulf Studies that extends beyond traditional international relations
frameworks by weaving elements of intercultural communication into the mix.
Indeed, some chapters were welcomed to maintain a social-scientific approach to
the politics of Arab Gulf States in the West from an international relations, global
political economy, and/or comparative world politics lens. Yet some of the
theoretical frameworks employed in other chapters are founded on the notion of
the “encounter,” with anthropological lenses and concepts of intercultural commu-
nication. In addition to the value of this academic research agenda, as such, some
of the chapters also touch upon the added importance of policy-oriented input. For
example, by examining and evaluating Arab Gulf States’ attempts to engage Western
countries, researchers were encouraged to put forward recommendations on effective
and efficient communication strategies and media narratives that place the emphasis
on shared human values that “bridge a seeming cultural gulf” between the Arab
States and societies of the Gulf and the Western world. Such recommendations can
prove relevant to Arab Gulf States’ foreign policy makers. Thus, it is this book’s
purpose to examine the current imaginings of the Arab Gulf States in the West:
how Arab Gulf States and their citizens are imagined, constructed, and perceived.

Note
1 In this book, Arab Gulf States, or Arab States of the Gulf, refer to the six Arab member
states of the “Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf ” originally, and still
colloquially, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC Countries are:
Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, State of Kuwait, State of Qatar,
Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
14 Marwa Maziad and Dania Koleilat Khatib

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PART I

Evolving perceptions
of the Arab Gulf States
in the US
1
IT DIDN’T JASTA BE THIS WAY
The passage of the Justice Against
Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)
as a failure of Arab lobbying

David Des Roches

The passage of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act ( JASTA) is perhaps
the greatest failure of Saudi lobbying in the long history of United States–Saudi
relations. The act allows individuals harmed by terrorism acts to take legal action
in American courts against countries which may have sponsored terrorist
individuals. While the plain language of the legislation does not specify any spe-
cific country, the discussion leading up to the passage of the act was exclusively
about the role of Saudi Arabia in the 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington and
Pennsylvania.
The act allows individual American citizens to sue foreign governments with
assets in America. It thus overrules the centuries-old doctrine of “sovereign
immunity” which holds states (but not individuals) immune from lawsuits for
national action (Congressional Digest, 2016).
The legislative history of the law is extraordinary: it is one of the few bills that
President Obama vetoed, and the only veto that Congress overturned in his
administration. The House of Representatives overwhelmingly supported the bill;
only one Senator voted against it.
While the law requires a plaintiff to prove government complicity in order to
seize assets, it should be noted that in the American system of legislation the
process is effectively punishment – litigation is expensive and can drag on for
years, and many choose to make a small payment to settle obviously frivolous
claims rather than pay more for litigation which may ultimately yield an expensive
Pyrrhic victory. Saudi Arabia, which has extensive financial interests in the United
States, obviously fears this.
The passage of JASTA was an exception for three reasons. The first is that the
law was opposed by a well-funded lobbying effort paid for by the Saudi government
in Washington. This lobbying effort included many well-connected establishment
18 David Des Roches

figures, but ultimately proved to be ineffectual. The second reason was the entire
United States government executive branch – to include the Departments of State
and Defense (Wong, 2016) – was opposed to the passage of JASTA because of the
implications to the United States of eroding sovereign immunity. President Obama’s
veto of JASTA was the only overridden veto of his presidency (Kim, 2016). The
third exceptional circumstance was the opposition of United States veterans groups
– normally one of the most powerful interest groups in American politics – again
due to the erosion of sovereign immunity and the subsequent effect on Americans.
The passage of JASTA in the face of this opposition and the overriding of the
Presidential veto was indeed extraordinary. Weighing against this is the visceral
and powerful political “victim” constituency – the relatives and heirs of the 9/11
attacks (Schorn, 2006). This group stands almost alone with Holocaust survivors
as one of the most unquestioned groups of victims, and thus is difficult to oppose
in any public forum.
In this chapter I will examine this situation as a case study in the use and limits
of lobbying in Washington and develop recommendations for future practices.

The 9/11 attacks and their impact on America

The attacks on New York, the Pentagon and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001
were a turning point in American history. On a beautiful fall day, thousands of
Americans lost their lives to a non-State group in what remains the largest foreign
attack on American soil. Since then the country has been at war.
In the initial days following the attacks, there was tension between the United
States and Saudi Arabia. The identity of the attackers was unknown for some time;
eventually it was discovered that 15 of the 19 attackers were Saudis. For a few
days civilian air travel to, from and within the United States was halted; however,
key members of the Saudi royal family who were in the United States were
allowed to leave the country.
Given the circumstances, it was indeed unusual that there wasn’t more tension
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Most credit this to the unique
relationship between President George W. Bush and the Saudi royal family, who
still remembered his father’s expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the months that followed the 9/11 attacks, the United States took several
major steps. After determining that Afghanistan was sheltering the al-Qaeda
planners of the attack, the United States invaded Afghanistan, setting off a war
which continues to this day. With a somewhat less established set of facts, the
United States invaded Iraq.
Domestically, the major change from 9/11 was the establishment of a Depart-
ment of Homeland Security along the lines of a European Ministry of the Interior.
This is something that Americans, with their proud tradition of Federalism,
had previously rejected (Moyer, 2015). A Director of National Intelligence, with
power to direct all 16 American intelligence agencies, was established. These were
both steps that Americans had opposed on philosophical as well as practical matters.
 It didn’t JASTA be this way 19

Yet, given the scale of the 9/11 attacks, they were undertaken with almost no
domestic opposition. It was as if the importance of the attacks had the power to
sweep aside years of principled opposition.

The 9/11 report

Much of the internal United States government reforms were directed by the 9/11
report, which was a bipartisan panel set up to examine failures that led to the
attacks and recommend ways to prevent future attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004).
Most of the panel’s recommendations were made public in the years after the
attack. However, there was a 28-page classified annex, which detailed Saudi
government links to some of the attackers, and that remained classified for years,
to include during the initial stage of the debate over JASTA. It became an item
of faith among some that this annex was a “smoking gun” which proved Saudi
complicity in (9/11 Commission redacted, 2004) if not direction of the attacks,
and that it was suppressed by corrupt American politicians who had business
dealings in the Kingdom.
In fact there were disturbing details of various Saudi embassy officials having
contact with (and even providing money to) some of the hijackers prior to the
attacks. While this sort of behavior may be unexceptional by Saudi diplomats, it
is unheard of in the West. This fueled a considerable amount of suspicion of Saudi
Arabia in America.

Arguments for JASTA

JASTA was introduced in Congress by a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most
notably members of the New York Congressional delegation, as a means of pro-
viding relief for relatives of those killed on 9/11. There is a significant body of
law in the United States which allowed Americans to bring suit in US courts
against foreign governments which had been formally designated by the govern-
ment as state sponsors of terrorism. For the most part, this was an irrelevance. Most
of these states – such as Iran – did not have assets in the United States which could
be seized in the event of a judgement.
While JASTA is a universal power – that is, cases could be brought against any
government which abetted terrorist acts against the United States—the public and
Congressional background dealt exclusively with Saudi Arabia.

Why Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Arabia is different. There is significant Saudi investment in the United States,
and there are substantial Saudi accounts in various American financial institutions.
If cases would be allowed against governments not designated by the American
government, the amount of money at stake almost ensured that there would be
endless expensive litigation.
20 David Des Roches

The advocates for JASTA felt that Saudi Arabia had provided moral and material
support to at least some of the hijackers, but was escaping responsibility because
of geopolitical concerns and the relatively obscure legal doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
While America is Saudi Arabia’s oldest partner and the developer of its oil
industry, Saudi Arabia has never been close to the heart of the average American.
The United States made a political compromise with the Kingdom: they would
partner to oppose other countries seeking to establish dominance in the region
(the Soviet Union, revolutionary Iran), but American support was not an
endorsement of the Kingdom’s absolute monarchy, repressive human rights regime
and limited rights for women.
Indeed, when pressed, American diplomats have generally said that they are
working to promote reform in Saudi Arabia. This reform movement, however, is
possibly the slowest in history. There is still little movement towards genuine
political reform in the Kingdom, and there is no chance that the Kingdom will
allow, say, free expression of religion in my lifetime.
American distaste for Saudi Arabia (Gallup, 2017) is complicated by the role of
the Kingdom in establishing overseas Islamic institutions throughout the world in
the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the charities and mosques funded by the Kingdom
have been linked to terrorist organizations or attacks. Osama bin Laden’s role as
the scion of one of the largest construction companies in the Kingdom has always
been perceived with suspicion in America. Taken together, all of these factors
meant that there was very little sympathy for Saudi Arabia or its concerns across
American society. Within the Washington/New York foreign policy establishment,
Saudi Arabia is recognized as a vital partner. But this is an elite view confined to
a relatively elite group.

Sovereign immunity
After JASTA was introduced in 2016, it became apparent that arguing on behalf
of Saudi Arabia’s concerns in Congress was not going to be an effective or winning
argument. Instead, opponents of the bill focused on what the bill actually did:
waive sovereign immunity for friendly states. This is an extremely dangerous
precedent for the United States – no other country has so many interests around
the world, and no other country has so many soldiers and security personnel
operating around the world. The United States has economic assets in virtually
every country in the world. If sovereign immunity were to be lifted by the United
States, it is not inconceivable that it could be lifted for the United States (Holcombe,
2017).
Opponents of JASTA chose this ground to fight on. The Secretaries of
State and Defense, along with the Director of the CIA, all argued that revoking
sovereign immunity would be a disaster for the American government. Soldiers
who called for artillery fire in Afghanistan could find themselves facing suit in
American courts decades later, argued American pundits.
 It didn’t JASTA be this way 21

Normally, an appeal of this sort to the interests of soldiers is considered to be

infallible to Congress. The American military is generally the highest regarded
constituency in America; a credible argument in favor of it is usually a winning
one in America. However, this argument was made late in the debate over the
bill, and was only made by the heads of government departments. As such, it was
easily dismissed as an elite concern only.
The waiver of sovereign immunity was thus not raised early on in the anti-
JASTA campaign. This can be characterized as a failure of lobbying. Those who
raised issues of American vulnerability to sovereign immunity were generally
government officials acting on their own. There was no coordinated campaign
by Saudi Arabia’s legion of lobbyists. Measures that could have been effective
in bringing this argument to the American people – such as a letter to national
newspapers signed by retired generals – never occurred. A key constituency wasn’t
reached by Saudi Arabia’s lobbyists, and thus a key argument was poorly deployed.

The financial argument

In September 2016, when the passage of JASTA seemed to be assured, the Saudi
government raised a new argument. It noted the vulnerability of Saudi holdings
in the United States to endless lawsuits, and stated that if JASTA were to become
law, Saudi Arabia would withdraw all of its substantial financial assets from the
United States (Mazetti, 2016).
Saudi Arabia has considerable assets in this country which could conceivably
be seized in a JASTA judgement. In addition to its national airline, the Kingdom
owns one of the largest oil refineries in the country, substantial real estate holdings,
and has billions on deposit in various American financial institutions. Presumably
a Saudi withdrawal would also precipitate a withdrawal from other countries
which are friendly to Saudi and fear JASTA lawsuits, e.g., the UAE (which
produced two of the 9/11 hijackers).
This argument turned out to be counterproductive. By having a Saudi
government official raise the argument (instead of, say, a reporter or commentator),
the proponents of JASTA were able to portray the threat to withdraw assets as
Saudi bullying (Collins, 2016). Indeed, the argument backfired in the general
JASTA narrative: the Saudis would use their money and influence to evade justice
for their complicity in the 9/11 attacks. By having officials of a generally disliked
Saudi regime publicly threatening the American Congress, the Saudi effort
provoked scorn and probably damaged the Saudi cause.

The key to legislative success: sympathetic cases

The Saudi fight against JASTA was always going to be an uphill battle. The main
reason for this was framing of the issue. In American politics, if you can identify
a cause with a sympathetic victim then your proposal will always meet with a
greater chance of success. For example, the main federal law providing AIDS care
22 David Des Roches

funds is named after Ryan White – a young boy who contracted the disease
through a blood transfusion (HRSA, 2017) – and not any of the thousands of
prominent homosexuals who died of AIDS. At a time when homosexuality was
considered in a negative light by most Americans (Pew, 2012), a law that invoked
a less sympathetic figure would have stood a smaller chance of success. But by
invoking a child, the bill was much easier to support and much more difficult to
oppose.
Similarly, popular or sympathetic groups in America such as farmers, coal
miners and industrial workers often find that they are frequently invoked and
receive an inordinate amount of government resources and assistance. Farmers, for
example, have an entire federal department devoted to their assistance as well as
federally regulated crop price support, export support and a myriad of insurance
schemes. All of this persists even as family owned farms dwindle to relatively
insignificant numbers. The government schemes exist because the family farm is
an iconic American image, and most American legislators will seek to provide
assistance to family owned farms.
In a similar vein, policemen and firefighters generally receive a higher level of
Federal assistance than do other local workers such as sanitation or mental health
workers. Groups which have a high level of sympathy among the American public
tend to do better out of the legislative process.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there was no group of Americans treated
with more sympathy than the 9/11 survivors and their family. Extraordinary
measures were taken to meet their needs. A general compensation fund was
established to pay family members of those who died in the attacks; widows of
victims appeared in the press advocating specific policy goals, such as the formation
of a Department of Homeland Security, and numerous Federal regulations were
modified to accommodate their concerns.
Put simply, the 9/11 survivors are a group of Americans that no legislator wants
to be seen to oppose. JASTA was framed as a way to allow the 9/11 survivors to
achieve justice at the expense of a rich but repressive and duplicitous foreign
country. To go against this group required a coordinated and indirect campaign
– something the expensive but disjointed Saudi lobbying effort never achieved.

Lobbying and the limits of power

For years Saudi Arabia had considered its position in Washington to be unassailable.
The Kingdom retained numerous blue-chip lobbyists (Frank, 2017) at multiple
firms within DC to monitor legislation and advance its interests. At the same time,
the Kingdom had enjoyed a long period when its ambassador, Prince Bandar, was
widely considered to be one of the most effective in the United States. There were
two periods when this power most visibly asserted itself.
First, during the Reagan administration, Congress tried for the first (and only)
time to block a weapons sale that the President was determined to proceed with.
President Reagan was determined to sell the AWACS command and control
 It didn’t JASTA be this way 23

aircraft to Saudi Arabia; supporters of Israel were against the sale. Reagan pushed
the sale through Congress in a historical confrontation and Saudi Arabia became
the first Arab state with a persistent aerial command and control presence.
The second triumph was during the war to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
It was clear from Saddam’s lightening capture of Kuwait that he was capable of
proceeding relatively quickly into the interior of Saudi Arabia if he wished to do
so. America did not have a mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia or Kuwait,
but still mobilized over a quarter of a million of its own soldiers, built a much
larger international coalition, and prepared to sustain tens of thousands of casualties
to recapture Kuwait and restore the Saudi borders. This effort was not universally
supported in the United States at the time – various lobbying firms employed by
the Saudis and Kuwaitis were active in helping to secure Congressional approval
for military action (New York Times, 1992).

Diplomacy versus lobbying

Given this impressive record, it is quite possible that the Saudis were overconfident
about defeating JASTA. They had as many lobbyists as before, and they had (in
Adel al-Jubeir) an extremely effective ambassador in Washington, DC for years.
Al-Jubeir had been promoted to Foreign Minister about a year before the JASTA
bill was introduced, but he is an extremely hands-on minister, and the Saudis
probably felt he could manage the bill.
The effectiveness of Saudi diplomacy (as distinct from the failed lobbying effort)
can be seen in the universal support within the executive branch of the US
government for the Saudi position. The State Department, Defense Department
and Office of the President all agreed that JASTA was bad law and should not
pass. All supported the veto of JASTA. These are the agencies that the Saudi
Embassy works with. Diplomacy worked where lobbying failed.

Why did Saudi lobbying fail?

In contrast with Israel or the United Nations, there is no local constituency for
Saudi issues. Saudi lobbying in America is limited to what the Saudi state can
purchase. When one deals with the normal business of government – issues such
as trade and treaties – this is sufficient. But when one deals with an emotionally
charge issue that has strong visceral and grassroots support throughout American
(such as responding to 9/11), then the Saudi effort falls short. Put simply, the Saudi
lobbying effort was focused on elites and elite issues in an era when populism is
in the ascendant.
First, while Saudi interests were represented at the elite level in Washington by
the best representation money could buy (US Department of Justice, 2017), there
was (and is) no grass-roots support for Saudi Arabia in America. Most Americans
view Saudi Arabia either as an ally of conveniences in a proxy war against Iran or
as a duplicitous enemy which seeks to covertly undermine American interests in
24 David Des Roches

the service of Islam. The state of human rights and especially women’s rights in
Saudi Arabia is a sore spot with Americans, who in any case are uneasy supporting
an absolute monarchy.
Second, the expensive and polished nature of the Saudi lobbying effort may
have worked against itself. By hiring “big names,” the Saudi effort played into the
narrative of a rich but unsympathetic foreign power trying to subvert a sympathetic
cause for its own ends (Levine, 2017). The Saudi effort looked corporate at a time
and on an issue where the local and genuine was going to prevail. Given that
various lobbyists were all vying to increase their billable workload, it is not unusual
that the Saudis were counselled to step up lobbying efforts in the run-up to the
JASTA vote and veto override. But this advice was often self-serving and self-
defeating.
Saudi Arabia did seek to generate a grass-roots domestic lobbying effort by
paying for veterans to lobby Congress over the issue of sovereign immunity.
However, this effort was actually dysfunctional – the role of Saudi Arabia in
paying for veterans to travel to Washington to meet with Congressmen, and
payments to veterans’ organizations were exposed and played out in America as a
sordid commercial transaction (Paton, 2017). Even worse, it emerged that at least
some of the veterans who traveled to DC were unaware that the Saudis were
paying their expenses – this led to a series of denunciations (Gambrell, 2017). It
was seen as an attempt to “rent” a lobby, and confirmed some of the worst
stereotypes about lobbying in America and about the role of foreign governments
in seeking to influence American legislation. If the Saudis had done nothing, they
would have probably been better off.

Going forward: how can Saudi Arabia win?

JASTA is now American law and is unlikely to be repealed in the short term. The
cases against Saudi entities are proceeding. If this law evolves in litigation as have
other laws, such as the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) act,
we will probably soon see a multitude of lawsuits against a multitude of countries.
America leads the world in the development of innovative strategies for bringing
legal claims, and JASTA holds the promise of many rich paydays. There is no
doubt that plaintiff attorneys are scouring the globe looking for American citizens
harmed by a government which can lead to a lucrative settlement or judgement.
There were some minor victories in the Saudi lobbying effort. Senator Lindsey
Graham (D, SC), who has served with a noticeable lack of distinction as a legal
officer in the Air Force Reserve (Whitlock, 2015) and considers himself an expert
on military issues, inserted a number of qualifications in the final bill which, in
the opinion of at least one litigator, will make it very difficult for any plaintiff to
bring suit against Saudi Arabia or any other entity (Barret, 2016). But there is no
evidence that this change was made in response to any Saudi effort – it seems to
have been Senator Graham’s own doing based on his concerns over sovereign
immunity.
 It didn’t JASTA be this way 25

The underlying problems of Saudi Arabia still remain, however. The country
is an absolute monarchy, with a version of Islam which is irreconcilable with
contemporary Western political thought. This situation ensures the Kingdom will
continue to be a target for laws such as JASTA.
First, there should be some movement towards adoption of universal principals
of human rights in the Kingdom. The Kingdom has taken a laudable step forward
by eliminating the most emotive, hot-button issue in the West: the prohibition
against women driving (Hubbard, 2017), but the bigger issue is the guardianship
laws for women (Oliphant, 2017). These are counterproductive in a number of
ways, particularly in an era when Saudi women are becoming more educated and
oil revenues are shrinking. No country can have a modern economy (as laid out
in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030) when half the population is marginalized.
Second, there needs to be some movement towards a genuine participatory
political system in the Kingdom. An easy criticism of the Saudis is to note that
Iran has more democracy than they do. Successive American administrations have
said they are pushing for reform – some needs to happen. There are steps in this
direction, but the pace of reform needs to quicken.
Third, Saudi Arabia needs to develop a grass-roots constituency in America and
the West, one that is entirely separate from religious groups. This is a generation-
long project, and the hard spadework of building local groups (such as model Arab
leagues) and inviting students, college faculty, and local opinion leaders on tours
of the Kingdom should have begun during the initial oil boom of the 1970s.
This effort needs to be completely secular, lest it invites comparison to the
Saudi overseas charities fiasco, and will take decades to yield results.
The bottom line is that JASTA passed because the Saudis have missed
opportunities to make themselves and their cause sympathetic to the American
people. They won’t be able to correct this quickly, and they won’t be able to
correct this by just lobbying. But a more attuned lobbying effort and a more grass-
roots organization will be able to make a difference on this issue and others.

References
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p6/a308032 [Accessed October 14, 2017].
Barret, Paul. “Another dispute over the Sept. 11 lawsuit bill,” Bloomburg Businessweek,
October 17, 2016, pp. 22–23.
Collins, Jim. “Saudi Arabia’s Threatened Divestiture of U.S. Assets Wouldn’t Hurt as Much
as You Think,” Forbes, April 20, 2016. www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/
04/20/saudi-threat-to-divest-u-s-assets-meaningless-should-not-deter-search-for-911-
truth/2/#3f2f56d046d7 [Accessed October 14, 2017].
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26 David Des Roches

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Act Undermines Our Security and Its State Purpose,” Journal of Gender, Social Policy
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[Accessed October 14, 2017].
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2
ARAB GULF STATES’ LOBBYING
IN THE US IN THE WAKE OF
THE ARAB UPRISINGS
Dania Koleilat Khatib

Introduction: scope and methodology

The scope of this chapter revolves around direct lobbying i.e. the use of the
countries under study of paid lobbyists. A lobbyist as formally defined by the
Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1995, “is any individual who is retained by a client
for financial or other compensation for services that include more than one
lobbying contact.” This contact can be an oral or written communication. It
includes communications with members of Congress, their staffs, and high-level
executive branch officials, regarding the formulation, modification or execution
of a legislation or regulation, the adoption of a contract, or the nomination of an
individual for a government position (Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Countries that have the most active lobbying in Washington, DC, i.e. Saudi,
the UAE and Qatar are selected for the purpose of this research. In this chapter
these three countries are compared in their lobbying mode as well in the
effectiveness of their lobbying in reaching their goal given the overall image of
the countries, the general mood in the US, the overall administration inclination,
geopolitical factors and the counter lobbying they face.
This chapter looks at the selected issues to conduct a general assessment of
lobbying of these countries and whether lobbying has resulted in any positive
outcome. Special attention is given to the messaging used in presenting those
issues as well as to the counter-narrative offered by antagonistic groups. Lobbying
is not studied intrinsically, i.e. not as an independent phenomenon. The instru-
mental approach is used to discuss the different issues. In the instrumental approach,
the case offers a means to come out with findings concerning elements of the
research and is not by itself the object of the research (Stake, 1995). Examples of
lobbying are selected for each country and their outcomes are compared with
the intended goals in order to measure the effectiveness of lobbying in pushing
28 Dania Koleilat Khatib

the agenda of Arab Gulf countries with policy makers. Since only selected issues
are put under study, lobbying cannot be studied in its totality. The effectiveness
of the different countries’ lobbying cannot be deduced with certainty, but this
chapter offers an indication of the effectiveness of their effort. The issues handled
are Iran, Syria, Yemen, the Muslim brotherhood and the Qatari blockade. In the
first three issues the different countries had a similar position, on the Muslim
Brotherhood, Qatar had a different position than its two neighbours and in the
last case the UAE and Saudi are lobbying against Qatar and vice versa. Each
lobbying effort concerning those issues is not studied chronologically or in detail,
but the chapter will try to gauge the overall lobbying effort around them. This is
because the public lobbying records, the Foreign Agent Registration Act records,
held by the Department of justice do not always detail the purpose of the contact
with the policy maker.
The chapter will start by describing the evolving geopolitical situation since
the Arab uprisings and how these different issues emerged. It will also discuss the
foreign policy trend in Obama’s administration as well as the current Trump
administration’s perspective on foreign policy and the region. The executive
branch sets the context and mood for lobbying. Depending on the administration,
the lobbying effort is either accelerated or blocked (Baumgartner et al., 2009).
The data used is mixed between primary and secondary. The primary data con-
sist of in-depth interviews with respondents whose experiences can give different
perspectives on Arab Gulf lobbying: lobbying experts, scholars, US statesmen with
experience in the Gulf and members of the Arab-American community. The
mode of interviews is unstructured to insure maximum information is obtained
from interviewees. The secondary data includes media reporting and articles as
well as FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act) records held by the department
of justice. Those records detail the foreign agent contact with policy makers on
behalf of their clients as well as the amount paid to them by their clients.

Background to the Arab Uprisings

US relations with the Arab Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, started with the
discovery of oil, in the mid-forties and at the time of post-WWII dynamics.
Relations became stronger in the wake of the Iranian revolution in 1979, as the
US lost their other ally in the region: the Shah of Iran. The deployment of
American troops and establishment of US bases that followed the first Gulf war in
1991, co-related with the emergence of terrorism, in rejection of such proliferation
of a US military footprint. The inception of Al Qaeda was caused by Bin Laden
and his followers’ objection to the existence of American bases in the land of the
Prophet Mohammed (Otterman, 2005). However, the US saw in Saudi Arabia an
ally against terrorism. The September 11 attacks created friction between the US
and Saudi Arabia, as 19 of the hijackers were Saudi nationals (Moore, 2004). As
a result, the US started looking at Saudi Arabia, as a problematic source of Jihadi
 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US 29

Salafist ideology. Though the rift was only more saliently visible with the Obama
administration, overall US discontent with relations with Riyadh had been brew-
ing for a while. For example, different presidential nominees since September 11
have put as one of their campaign goals the weaning of the US from Middle East,
i.e. Saudi, oil (The New York Times, 2004). Moreover, Iranian interference in Arab
countries started with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Shia-Iraqi leaders,
who were exiled in Iran, went back to Iraq, albeit still with strong ties to Iran—
the country that had given them refuge. Accordingly, Iran was able to exert
influence in post-Saddam Iraq. The late Seoud Al Faisal accused the US of handing
Iraq to Iran on a silver plate (Nasr, 2007). However, the influence of Iran in Iraq
was curbed with what became known as the US military “Surge”, the Arab
Awakenings (Al-Sahwa), and the national reconciliation that confined the Shia
militias as well as the Jihadists and brought back the Sunnis to the political process.
Nevertheless, outcomes of the Awakening and the Surge were shortly reversed
when the Obama administration decided to withdraw prematurely from Iraq
while keeping the sectarian Shia Prime Minister Nouri Al-Malki in place. Al-Malki
conducted a second round of ridding the state of former Iraqi Baath Party members,
who were mostly Sunni, but not identifying as such per se in a secularist Iraq,
under Saddam Hussein. What became known as the de-Baathification process
further radicalized the Sunni community which became receptive to extremists’
callings (Sky, 2015).

The Arab Uprisings and the changing geopolitical situation

The so-called “Arab Spring” created a new factor for the US as well as for
Arab Gulf countries. The reaction of the American administration facing the Arab
Uprisings has shaken the Arab Gulf trust in the US as their long-term ally. The
American non-intervention coupled with the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran,
which was discussed independently from key Arab Gulf States, has put Arab
Gulf States on high alert (The New York Times, 2015). The chaos of those revolts
created a fertile ground for new actors to emerge. Iran, whose interference was
confined in Iraq, was able to expand its influence through its proxies. The Jihadists
found a new ground to restart their operations (Gerges, 2016). The Muslim
Brotherhood, underground for years, was able to rise on the public scene in many
Arab countries, supported by Turkey. Those different factors emerged simul-
taneously creating a chain reaction. The Arab Gulf States reacted to those factors
in different ways. They took initiatives in responding to those events, while trying
to garner American support.
The Arab Uprisings created an opportunity as well as a threat to Iran. Initially,
defectors from the Syrian army created the free Syrian army, aiming at toppling
the Assad regime (Montagne, 2012). This posed a direct threat to Hezbollah as
Syria and Iraq represent a vital bridge between Iran and Hezbollah. Hezbollah is
of prime importance to Iran. Distinctively from (Sunni) Hamas, for example, that
30 Dania Koleilat Khatib

was also supported by Iran, (Shia) Hezbollah is the rather ideological brainchild of
Iran. Hezbollah embodies the success of a main premise of the Islamic Iranian
republic, which exports its revolution to the region and the Islamic world (Qassem,
2012). Therefore, Iran could not afford the fall of the Assad regime. When Hezbollah
joined the fight to support Assad, it created a game changer in the Syrian revolt.
On the other hand, Qatar funded Jabhat Al Nusra in Syria, a (Sunni) Islamist
group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the group that dates its inception
in Egypt as an Islamist movement back to 1928, and one that managed to rise to
power for the first time, in the first elections, shortly after Mubarak was toppled
in February 2011. The Arab Gulf saw the unrest in Syria and the potential for
toppling Assad as an opportunity to curb Iranian influence in the region. The
Iranian–Saudi rivalry, more broadly put, the Arab Gulf States versus Iran rivalry,
was transferred to Syria.
Though the Muslim Brotherhood’s position on Syria coincided with the
position of the Arab Gulf States, the UAE and Saudi opposed the rule of the
Muslim Brotherhood. However, Qatar, from the beginning, has supported
the Muslim Brotherhood with Al Jazeera offering them decidedly positive coverage.
Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood was not circumstantial of the 2011
uprisings or purely pragmatic. Qatar has been hosting Al Qardawi since 1961 and
made him a TV star with the program “Sharia and Life” that was broadcast on
Al Jazeera from 1996 until 2011 (Williams, 2014). The cleric has long had a
prominent role within the intellectual leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Moreover, Al Qardawi is known to be close to the Qatari political leader-
ship (Raghavan and Warrick, 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood’s transnational
ideology is not confined to Egypt, and similar to Nasser’s pan-Arabism, has the
potential to expand regionally. The UAE and Saudi saw in them a threat for
different reasons. The Muslim Brotherhood has an affiliate in the UAE, Al Islah,
which is banned by the government (The National, 2014). The Islamist party
opposes the liberal system in the country and seeks to change the regime to a more
Islamized form. Therefore, the UAE saw in the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood
a direct threat to its liberalizing regime.
Later on, in April 2013, the chief of Dubai police Dahi Khalfan announced
that the Muslim Brotherhood was plotting to bring down some Gulf rulers
(Boghardt, 2013). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia did not want another Islamic
system that might contest the legitimacy of its own Islamic regime. For example,
the Muslim Brotherhood had been accused back in 2002, by Saudi Minister of
Interior Affairs Nayef Bin Abdul-Aziz, of “politicising Islam for self-serving
interests”(Toumi, 2017).
This is why Saudi Arabia and the UAE immediately backed the second wave
of popular protests that started on June 30th, 2013, against the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt. Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported General Abdul Fattah El Sisi in
his subsequent rise to power. In 2013, shortly after Interim Egyptian President
Adly Mansour took office, and while the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
was in the picture during the post-Muslim Brotherhood transitional period, Saudi
 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US 31

Arabia offered $US 5 billion, in support of Egypt, while the UAE offered 3 billion
(Werr, 2013). The subsequent election of President Sisi in 2014, on one hand,
eliminated one source of danger presented by the Muslim Brotherhood, but on
the other hand it weakened the Arab Gulf States’ position on Syria. Egyptian
President El-Sisi saw Jabhat Al Nusra, the Islamist jihadists in Syria, as allies to his
transnationalist foes, the Muslim Brotherhood, a threat to Egypt.
In Syria, the dilution of the secular opposition through the financing of
Islamist Sunni groups such Jabhat Al-Nusra offered solid excuse for Hezbollah and
the Shia militias backed by Iran to increase their involvement in the conflict.
ISIS/ISIL/Daesh saw in Syria, a country shattered by war and by the embittered
Sunnis, a fertile soil to start its endeavour. In March 2013, the Syrian city of Raqqa
was the first provincial capital to fall under the control of the radical group (BBC
News, 2014).
Meanwhile, the Arab Gulf States felt their long-time ally had abandoned them.
The US had refrained from striking the Assad regime, despite reports on the
latter’s alleged use of chemical weapons on the civilian population, and despite
Saudi Arabia’s request for the US to execute a military strike (Blair, 2014).
The other point of contention with the US is Yemen. The government was
taken over by the Houthis, who were joined by already ousted Ali Abdallah Saleh,
who during his rule has managed to cultivate many alliances on the grassroots
level. This represented a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and to the maritime route
of oil tankers. Al Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, told the US that Iran was now
in the backyard of Saudi Arabia (Mazzetti and Schmitt, 2016). Saudi Arabia
became encircled by Iran via Iraq in the north and Yemen in the south. Given
these events directly affecting the Arab Gulf States, how did they use lobbying and
how effective was it in pushing for their issues with the American administration?

Syria
The Syrian crisis started in the midst of the 2012 US presidential race. While Mitt
Romney had arming the Syrian rebels on his foreign policy agenda, Obama had
a different approach. The humiliation from which Obama suffered for opposing
the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, led to his reluctance to involve the US
in Middle East problems (McGreal, 2010). His first trip to Asia at the outset of his
second term gives an indication to his reluctance to get deeply implicated in the
region’s problems. In an interview by Thomas Friedman on the nuclear agreement,
when asked about Syria, Obama answered that Syria is an Arab problem. Hence,
Arab countries have to handle it (The New York Times, 2015).
The ambiguous US position on Syria led to the complication of the crisis.
First, in August 2011 when the Arab wave of protests hit Syria, Obama announced
that it was time for Assad to leave, as he was standing in the way of the Syrian
people towards freedom. However, the verbal endorsement was not coupled by
the necessary support to remove Assad (Blair, 2014). Then, by 2012, Obama
announced that using chemical weapons was a red line. The year after, Assad was
32 Dania Koleilat Khatib

reported to have allegedly used chemical weapons. Obama presented the case to
strike Assad’s regime to Congress. The strike was not voted on. The decision
to turn the issue to Congress to decide on came after the US intervention in
Libya which had generated numerous criticisms towards Obama as the decision
was taken without referring to Congress (Savage, 2011). Though some Arab
Gulf countries offered to foot the entire bill to topple Assad, the lobbying of
the Arab Gulf States was not able to garner enough support in Congress in support
of the vote (Martosko, 2013). Feeling let down by Obama’s inaction, many
members of the Free Syrian Army, who are mainly defectors of the regular army,
joined the ranks of the Islamist factions. This in turn made the issue of Syria
and the removal of Assad more difficult to lobby for. The rise of Islamist factions
allowed Assad to reframe the Syrian crisis from a popular revolt against a brutal
dictator to a struggle between a secular state and fundamentalist Islamists. Assad
was able to reach out to a grassroots base and to promote himself as the dictator
protecting the minorities. In June 2013 two bishops, Richard Pates of Moines,
Iowa and Gerald Kicanas of Tuscon, Arizona, sent a letter to Secretary of State
John Kerry, urging him to refrain from arming the rebels and to seek a political
solution to the crisis.
Libya was an example given by those opposing the armament of the Islamist
rebels. Their argument was that removing Muammar Gadafi in Libya, led to more
bloodshed and to more violence (Goodenough, 2013). Also Assad was able to send
reputable Syrian Christian clerics to make his case with the devout Christian
community in the US (Dias, 2014). Additionally, Assad was able to get domestic
US-based organizations to support him such as In Defense of Christians, a grassroots
organization set up by Gilbert Chagouri, the Nigerian-Lebanese businessman. The
organization adamantly opposed the removal of Assad and succeeded in garnering
support from the evangelical community in the US (Berry, 2014). Therefore, on
the Syrian issue Arab Gulf State lobbyists had already an uphill battle because of
the grassroots support that Assad was able to gain. Assad supporters in the US were
able to reframe the issue as the protection of the Christian and minorities in the
Middle East, an issue to which the average American is very sympathetic. This is
why several Congress members expressed opposition to arming the rebels. Ilena
Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) said minorities are prone to persecution in Syria, while
Frank Wolf (R-VA) stressed the need to protect minorities from being killed by
rebels (Powers, 2013; Ros-Lehtinen, 2014).
Saudi Arabia had hired Qorvis-MSL Group to influence public opinion on
Syria. The agency managed the Twitter account @SyrCoalition, which is touted
as the “official” voice of the Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad. However, since
they do not have strong ties with the Syrian community in the US this made their
effort lack legitimacy (Fang, 2014). They lobbied independently despite the
existence of many domestic organizations pushing for the removal of Assad, such
as the Syrian Institute, the Syrian American council, the Syrian Forum USA, the
Syrian Emergency Task Force, United for Free Syria, American Syriac Union
and Syrian Christians for Peace.
 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US 33

Iran
Since its inception, the Islamic Iranian Revolution of 1979 was based on the
premise of exporting the ideology of Khomeini to the Islamic world. Therefore,
Iran was seen as a threat to the Arab Gulf States. As said before, the invasion of
Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, a regime that was antagonistic to Iran,
allowed Iran to spread its influence in Iraq (Nasr, 2007).
The increasing influence of Iran in Iraq pushed the US in 2006 to join European
countries in going into negotiations with Iran. Condoleezza Rice spoke about
incentives to make Iran relinquish its nuclear program. However, President George
W. Bush was quite hawkish on Iran and called it an axis of evil (Frontline, 2002).
This approach totally changed with the Obama administration. Facing his failure
to bring any solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, ending the break with Iran
became Obama’s priority. This is why the Obama era did not represent a receptive
period for Arab Gulf States lobbying against Iran, as did the Bush era.
The Iranian agreement was interpreted as a signal of shifting alliances away
from the Arab Gulf States. Robert Fisk in an op-ed in the Independent, said that
the US turned its back to Israel and Saudi Arabia and will be looking to Iran as
the policeman of the region (Fisk, 2014).
On Iran, the Arab Gulf States had a very ambiguous position, which also
weakened any lobbying effort. The lack of clarity in the overall position did not
allow the lobbying to be effective. On the one hand, the Arab Gulf States felt
potentially endangered by a nuclear Iran. On the other hand, they equally did not
want to push for a military strike that could have repercussions on their own
countries. Wikileaks records show that the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
asked the US “to cut the snake’s head,” referring to Iran, while the Saudi
government denied asking for any military intervention (Colvin, 2010). On the
other hand, the UAE ambassador to the US said during a presentation at the Aspen
Institute (2010) that his country supports a military strike. He explained that even
though such an intervention would initially be unpopular as the US would be
attacking a Muslim country, it would have positive effects in the long run (Lake,
2010). Such contradiction in positions did not really help the case of the Arab Gulf
States against Iran.
The Saudis have been trying to use lobbying to undermine the nuclear deal.
In September 2015, Republican political operative and lobbyist Ed Rogers from
the BGR group, wrote an article in the Washington Post arguing that Jimmy Carter
did a better deal with Iran than Obama. A week later he penned yet another article
in a Washington Post column, slamming President Barack Obama’s nuclear deal
with Iran. BRG lobbies on behalf of Saudi Arabia. Their commissioned work
includes public relations and media management. The contract was signed with
the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court in August 2015,
with a value of $US 500,000 (Perez, 2016).
Several intellectuals of Iranian origin such as Seyed Hossein Mousavian and
Vali Nasr promoted the idea that the extremism that can hurt the West is the
34 Dania Koleilat Khatib

Sunni extremism. This created an important barrier to Saudi lobbying efforts. In

2007, Nasr wrote a book The Shia revival that started this percept. This coincided
with the early years of the US invasion of Iraq, where the Iraqi-Shias showed
cooperation with the US. Ayatollah Sistani asked the Shias in Iraq not to resist the
Americans. This idea was further enforced later on, when ISIS emerged and
started attacking Western cities. The pro-Iranian anti-Saudi lobbying strategy
promoted the idea that ISIS adopted the Wahhabi ideology, the official doctrine
of Saudi Arabia (Mousavian, 2016). Counter lobbying, Saudi Arabia started to
concentrate its effort in order to shift the focus to Iran and to the destructive role
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are playing in the region (Perez, 2016).
Moreover, the nuclear deal created momentum for Iranian-American organizing,
that had focused on domestic affairs prior, to coalesce and to migrate towards
foreign policy issues and hence to create a counterweight to Saudi lobbying
endeavors. Trita Parsi, the head of the Iranian American Council, is a regular critic
of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States. In this respect, the organization has
legitimacy as it represents a faction of US citizens of Iranian origin, who happen
to advocate Iranian–American rapprochement, as opposed to paid lobbyists on
behalf of Saudi Arabia, without a grassroots base to support. Thus, the foreign
lobbying efforts are viewed with more scrutiny (Smith, 1996).

Yemen
Countries participating in the Saudi-led coalition in the war on Yemen, faced a
lot of heat from human rights organizations such as the Human Rights Watch
(Mepham, 2017). In this respect, Saudi Arabia hired lobbyists who have strong
connections. They hired David Adams, who was Hillary Clinton’s top legislative
aide at the US State Department. He is part of the Podesta group, a firm with
strong connections to the Obama administration and to the Clinton family. John
Podesta was the Chairman of Hillary Clinton’s Presidential Campaign of 2016.
Adams had started lobbying for Saudi Arabia in 2015. He was reported to contact
the members of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs regarding the air strikes
in Yemen (American Liberty Report, 2016).
However as the war unfolded into a humanitarian crisis, the intervention in
Yemen became more difficult to defend. In order to promote a positive image of
the war in Yemen, Qorvis—Saudi Arabia’s main agency in Washington—struck
a deal with Targeted Victory, a digital strategy firm co-founded by Republican
National Committee official Michael Beach, in order to promote the Kingdom.
The campaign was targeting media outlets, as well as congress members in order
to put a positive spin on the war in Yemen. It created a portal called Arabia Now;
targeted members of the press, Congressmen, and think tank analysts. The campaign
aimed at getting support for the war and at speeding up the approval of a $1.29
billion smart bombs purchase, which the State Department had endorsed the pre-
vious November (Luck, 2016; Emons, 2017).
 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US 35

Muslim Brotherhood
The position on the Muslim Brotherhood changed in the US. Obama’s
administration had a positive stance on the Muslim Brotherhood. They also had
Hillary Clinton’s backing (Gertz, 2016). After the massive street protests against
the Muslim Brotherhood one-year regime in Egypt, on June 30th, 2013, and the
subsequent military-backed government of Interim President Judge Adly Mansour,
the Obama administration weighed in as to not call the events a coup, as to not
withhold military aid from Egypt. However, the Obama administration delayed
some of the returned deliveries of military equipment that were sent for
maintenance in the US (Labott, 2013). This attitude changed with the election of
President Trump, who openly endorsed President Abdul Fattah El Sisi and said in
their first invited meeting to the White House Oval Office, that El Sisi had done
a “fantastic job in a very difficult situation” (Goodenough, 2017).
On a parallel track, the UAE conducted an intensive lobbying campaign against
the Muslim Brotherhood, and has pressed the White House to name it as a terrorist
organization (Pecquet, 2015). The UAE even put CAIR and MAS, two Muslim
American organizations with alleged ties to the Brotherhood, on their terrorist list
in 2014. The decision was said to encourage other groups in the US antagonistic
to those organizations to enforce lobbying against them (Startfor, 2014).
On the other hand, Qatar, a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood used
its leverage to frame the regime change in Egypt as a coup. Shadi Hamid the
director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, which is heavily funded by
Qatar, with even a Doha-based branch, wrote on an op-ed in The New York Times
on July 4th 2013 in which he called the Muslim Brotherhood fall, despite the
massive protests, “a military coup,” “demoting democracy in Egypt” (Hamid,
2013). Framing El Sisi’s ascension to power as a “military coup” was aimed at
undermining the legitimacy of the new Egyptian government, supported by the
UAE and Saudi. Later on, Brookings, the think tank, issued several reports
denouncing the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization
(Hamid and McCants, 2017; McCants and Wittes, 2017).
The legislation to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization
was introduced as s68 Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2017 by
Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) on January 9, 2017 and was introduced as HR 377 to
the House of Representatives on the same day by Rep Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL)
(Taylor, 2017).
The Muslim Brotherhood sympathetic grassroots base inside the US lobbied
aggressively against the designation. A New Jersey-based, grassroots organization
called Egyptian American for Freedom and Justice made a tour to lawmakers on
May 4 2017, urging them not to support the designation of the Muslim Brother-
hood as a terrorist organization (Farahat, 2017). The plan to declare it as terrorist
organization has been paired with a plan to similarly designate Iran’s Islamic
revolutionary corps as terrorists. Leaders of the corps and Quds forces have already
been put on the terrorist list but Republicans have been advocating adding
36 Dania Koleilat Khatib

the corps themselves (Baker, 2017). Though the Iran part went through, the
momentum to name the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization has been
waning due to objections from officials in the State Department and the National
Security Council. In February 2017, an internal memo was sent against the move,
saying the movement is a broad concept and has ties with different factions across
the region. The memo signalled that designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization might alienate the US in countries where the it has presence or
affiliations, CAIR which is a large Muslim civil-society organization with a fairly
large grassroots base all over the US objected to the designation. Ibrahim Hooper,
the spokesperson for the CAIR, said that the designation “would inevitably be
used in a political campaign to attack those same groups and individuals to
marginalise the American-Muslim community and to demonise Islam” (Baker,
2017). Human rights activists also endorsed opposition to the designation. Laura
Pitter of Human Rights Watch noted, “the Brotherhood is a large and complex
political organisation operating in many countries.” The designation was framed
by its opponents as a crackdown on civil liberties and as a barrier to democratic
participation abroad and an excuse to target the Muslim community at home
(Tanter and Stafford, 2017).

Qatar
The Saudi and Emirati feud with Qatar and the lobbying that followed came in
two episodes: 2014 and 2017. In 2014, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and the UAE
withdrew their ambassadors from Doha under the pretext that the latter had
breached a security pact and was interfering in its neighbours’ affairs. The main
reason for the clash was Qatar’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood and political
Islam, with which Saudi and the UAE have been at odds since the spark of the
Arab uprisings (Vela, 2014). In 2014, the UAE retained the Camstoll Group,
which is staffed by several former Treasury Department officials to liaise with
journalists, for the purpose of generating articles critical of Qatar’s links to financing
terrorism (Greenwald, 2014). This effort came following allegations by the US
treasury of Qatar financing terrorism (Blair and Spencer, 2014; Weinberg, 2014).
The Camstoll Group has had a contract with a UAE-owned entity, called Outlook
Energy Investment (FARA, 2012). The firm earned 4.3 million USD in 2012 and
3.2 million in retainer and expenses for 2013. Under the contract, Camstoll would
be consulting on “issues pertaining to illicit financial networks, and developing
and implementing strategies to combat illicit financial activity,” (Archive, 2013).
In its registration as a foreign agent, Camstoll reported that it “has conducted
outreach to think tanks, business interests, government officials, media, and other
leaders in the United States regarding issues related to [combating] illicit financial
activity” (FARA, 2012). Camstoll reached out to multiple media outlets to brief
them about Qatar’s role in terrorist fundraising. The list included The New York
Times, the Washington Post, the Daily Beast, Dow Jones Newswires, the Financial
Times, Bloomberg News, CNN, and the Washington Free Beacon (Dorsey, 2017).
 Arab Gulf States’ lobbying in the US 37

In order to push back against those allegations, in September 2014, Doha began
a six-month contract with a Washington-based PR firm Portland PR. The contract
included lobbying Congress and briefing journalists. Qatar has contracted during
this period Patton Boggs, Barbour Griffith and Rogers BGR Government Affairs.
Doha has used philanthropy to create an outreach in the US. Its activities varied
from sponsoring student exchange programs to sponsoring a congressional charity
baseball game. Qatar International Academy for security studies hired former
White House spokesperson Robert Gibbs’ public relations company. They gave
the nascent agency one of its first jobs which involved holding an event on
countering violent extremism (Dickinson, 2014; Ahmed, 2015).
However, the 2017 episode witnessed an increase of lobbying among the three
countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The lobbying has
become counterproductive following the Arab-Quartet boycott of Qatar, as they
started lobbying against each other (Meyer and Toosi, 2017). Since the boycott,
Qatar has hired seven companies and spent $US 4.7 million in order to plead its
case (Gulf News, 2017). The Qataris hired Information Management Services on
a three-month contract for more than $US 1.1 million and rehired Levick, a firm
they had let go of, a year earlier. They hired Mc Dermott Will and Emry, for a
sum of $US 40,000, monthly retainer. They also signed contracts with Avenue
Strategies Global, for $US 150,000 monthly retainer, and Nelson Mullins on $US
100,000 monthly retainer for three months (Meyer, 2017). They also recently
hired a law firm, Stonington Strategies and an advertising firm, Audience Partners
Worldwide. Moreover, the Qataris also hired the firm of former US Attorney
General John Ashcroft to assist in “evaluating verifying and strengthening the
client anti money laundry and counterterrorism financial compliance program and
[in] providing legal advice and recommendation to enhance and improve such
efforts,” according to a contract signed on June 7, 2017, two days after the Gulf
States and Egypt cut their ties with Qatar. Qatar committed to pay $US 2.5
million for three months of work by Ashcroft (Associated Press, 2017). Qatar also
planned a series of TV ads under the title, “Lift the blockade against Qatar,” which
were spotted on billboards in the New York subway, and the ads were to be aired
on Fox News, Fox Business, CNN, CNBC and MSNBC (Leathley, 2017). In this
respect, Qatar is using multiple avenues: direct lobbying, public relations, above
the line advertising, legal filing, in order to frame the boycott as illegal and to
portray itself as the reliable ally of the US, in the fight against terrorism.
Qatar also hired a lobbying firm to justify the ransom that was paid to free
kidnapped Qatari royal family members, while on a traditional sports hunting
excursion in Iraq (Wilson and Mitchell, 2017). Sheik Khalifa bin Fahad bin
Mohammed al Thani, a Qatari Royal family hired the San Diego-based firm
Global Strategies Council in March 2017, for a contract worth $US 2 million. The
firm was hired to obtain proof of the life of the hostages as well as to lobby the
US government to seek their release, prior to Qatar’s payment of the huge sum
of almost a $US 1 billion ransom to the Iran-backed militia kidnappers. However,
the contract also included a social media campaign and hackers and the firm
Another random document with
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voices harmonize charmingly; in a word, young Lufton has begun to joke
me about her.

Unfortunately my visit draws to a close, and unless I can make a

tolerably deep impression before I leave, she will have forgotten me by next
season. She is only sixteen; but to look at her you would say she was
twenty; and to talk to her you would say, much more. She is one of the
precocious, and has been bred up in a queer way. Adieu! We shall meet at
the club next week.

P.S.—I open this to tell you that they will not part with me here, and that
I have promised to remain till the shooting begins, though I told them I had
no longer any pleasure in shooting. But I was too happy for any excuse to
remain under the same roof with the enchanting Violet.

CHAPTER IV.

CECIL EXHIBITS HIMSELF.

The three letters, just given, will save me a great deal of explanation and
description and, as the horses are at the door, we have no time to waste.

Mrs. Langley Turner, Sir Harry Johnstone, young Lufton, Cecil, and
Violet are preparing to ride out, and afterwards to lunch at the Grange.

Cecil rode remarkably well, and was proud of it; besides, he looked
handsomer on horseback, as then his head and bust were seen to full
advantage, of which he was also aware; and Violet, who had of late been
accustomed to follow the hounds, and spend the greater part of every day
on horseback, looked upon him with fresh admiration, as she marked the
graceful mastery of his bearing. With a more than womanly contempt for
effeminate men, she had at first imagined Cecil one, from the delicacy and
dapperness she noticed in him. But finding that he was an excellent shot
with the rifle, that he even excelled her with pistols, that he fenced well, and
rode boldly, she gave him her esteem,—and was nearly giving him her
heart; but that was not gone as yet. She was charmed with Cecil's manner—
she admired him, and saw his admiration for her; but she loved him not as
yet, however fast she might be galloping on the road to it.

Off they started, Shot barking and leaping up at the nose of his
playfellow, Violet's bay mare, Jessy, while a sedater hound trotted slowly
behind. Mrs. Langley Turner, Sir Harry, and Lufton rode abreast, discussing
the proposition which had just been started, of getting up private theatricals
at the hall. Violet and Cecil followed, talking of favourite books and
favourite composers, comparing sentiments, and looking into each other's
handsome faces, suffused with the bright flush of excitement.

"Here we are at the Grange," said Violet, as they cantered within sight
of the lodge gates.

"Alas, yes!" replied Cecil.

He sighed at the thought of his delicious tête-à-tête being broken up;

and, though he consoled himself with the idea that, since he was to remain
at the hall, many other opportunities must occur, yet he knew by experience
that there is no such thing as the repetition of a scene in which emotion
plays the principal part. You cannot command such things. They spring out
of the moment. They are dependent upon a thousand circumstances, over
which you have no control. The mood of mind, the state of the atmosphere,
the accident of association, all concur in investing some ordinary occasion
with a magic charm, which may never be felt again. "I was a fool not to
have declared myself. She would certainly have accepted me," he said to
himself, as he dismounted, and passed into the drawing-room, where he
found Mrs. St. John, Julius, the clergyman's wife, and Marmaduke Ashley,
who had just come down on a visit at the Grange. Maxwell, with Mr. and
Mrs. Meredith Vyner arrived shortly afterwards, and the whole party sat
down to a merry luncheon.
 "I'm delighted to learn that you are going to prolong your stay down
here, Mr. Chamberlayne," said Julius St. John; "and hope you will not
confine your shooting to Wyton. The Grange, they tell me, is famous for its
game."

"You are very kind," replied Cecil; "but I shall scarcely avail myself of
your offer. I am no sportsman."

Violet, turning suddenly round upon him, with a look of incredulity,

said,—

"No sportsman?—and such an excellent shot!"

"Don't confess it before her," said Vyner, laughing; "or you will be lost
in her estimation. She is a true descendant of Diana; and, like her mythic
ancestress,—

Sævis inimica Virgo

Belluis...."

"I'm grieved, indeed!" replied Cecil; "but treat me as a cockney; shower

contempt upon me for the confession; but, the truth is, I never found much
pleasure in any sport, except hunting; and the little pleasure I used to find in
shooting was destroyed five years ago."

"How was that?"

"The anecdote is almost childish, but I am not such a child as to be

ashamed of relating it. I was one day rambling over the wood at Rushfield
Park, with my rifle in my hand tired of shooting at a mark. There started a
hare at a tempting distance from me, I fired. A slight appearance of ruffled
fur alone told me that he was hit. He ran leisurely away, and described a
circle round me, till approaching within a few paces he lay meekly down,
and died. I know not wherefore, but the death of this hare was indescribably
touching to me. It was not the mere death: I had killed hundreds before, and
often had to despatch by a blow those only wounded. But this one had died
so meekly, without a cry, without a struggle, and had come to die so
piteously at the feet of him who had shot it, that I took a sudden disgust to
the sport, and have never fired a gun since at either hare or partridge."

There was a slight pause. The emotion of the speaker communicated

itself to the audience, and Mrs. Meredith Vyner, with tears in her eyes,
declared, that for her part she so well understood what his feelings must
have been, that she must have hated him (hated was said with the prettiest
accent in the world), if he had not relinquished shooting on the spot.

Violet would have said the same, but her mother having volunteered the
observation, closed her mouth. She really felt what her mother only spoke;
but the intuitive knowledge of her mother's insincerity—the thorough
appreciation of the tear which so sentimentally sparkled on that mother's
eyelid—made her dread lest any expression of her own sentiments should
be confounded with such affectation, and she was silent.

Cecil was hurt at her silence. The more so as she did not even look at
him, but kept her eyes fixed upon her plate.

Meredith Vyner, who had been vainly beating his brains for a pat
quotation, now gave up the attempt and said,—

"But then, my dear, you have so much sensibility! Why, I vow if the
story hasn't brought tears into her eyes—

Humor et in genas
Furtim labitur.

Certainly, there never was a more tender-hearted creature—nor one

shrinking so much from the infliction of even the smallest pain."

Vyner, as he finished his sentence, turned aside his head to fill his nose
with a pinch of snuff adequate to the occasion—as if it was only in some
vociferous demonstration of the kind that he could supply eloquence
capable of properly setting forth his wife's sensibility.
 At the mention of her tender-heartedness, both Marmaduke and Violet,
involuntarily looked at her, and as they withdrew their eyes, their gaze met.
No words can translate the language which passed in that gaze: it was but a
second in duration, and yet in that second each soul was laid bare to the
eyes of each. The ironical smile which had stolen over their eyes changed,
like the glancing hues on a dove's neck, from irony to surprise, from
surprise to mutual assent, from assent to superb contempt. Marmaduke and
Violet had never met before, yet in that one glance each said to the other,
"So, you know this woman! You appreciate her sincerity! You know what a
cruel hypocrite she is!"

Mrs. Wyner did not observe that look. She had felt Marmaduke's eyes
were upon her, and affecting not to know it, threw an extra expression of
sensibility into her face.

When Cecil fairly caught a sight of Violet's face, he saw on it the last
faint traces of that contempt which she had expressed for her mother, but
which he attributed to her unfeminine delight in field-sports, and her
contempt for his sensibility.

He was glad when luncheon was concluded, and the party rose to
ramble about the grounds. As they were walking through the garden, he
managed to bring up the subject, and frankly asked her if she did not feel
something like disdain at his chicken-heartedness.

"Disdain!" she exclaimed, "how could you imagine it? Knowing you to
be so little effeminate that it could not spring but from a kind and
affectionate nature, I assure you I look upon it as the very best feather you
have stuck in your cap—at least in my presence. I have only contempt for
the affectation of sensibility."

"It was what your father said——"

"My poor father understands me about as little as he understands mama.

Less he could not. Fond as I am of hunting and everything like exercise in
the open air, I have seen too much of the mere Nimrods not to value them at
their just ratio. Good in the field: detestable everywhere else."
 "I'm delighted to hear you say it."

"I must confess to prizing manliness so high, that I prefer even brutality
to cowardice. There is nothing to me so contemptible in a man or woman as
moral weakness, and therefore I prefer even the outrages of strength to the
questionable virtues of a weak, yielding, coddling mind."

"What do you mean by the questionable virtues of such a mind?" he

asked.

"They are questionable, because not stable: the ground from which they
spring being treacherous. A man who is weak will yield to good arguments;
but he will also yield to bad arguments; and he will, moreover, yield against
his conviction. A man who is timid will be cruel out of his very timidity, for
there is nothing so cruel as cowardice."

By this time they had left the garden, and joined the others, who had
disposed themselves in groups, which permitted their tête-à-tête to
continue. Meredith Vyner, Mrs. St. John, and the clergyman's wife were in
advance. Mrs. Langley Turner and young Lufton followed, conning over
London acquaintance and London gossip. Marmaduke, Sir Harry, and Mrs.
Vyner were very lively, talking on an infinite variety of topics—Mrs. Vyner
making herself excessively engaging to Marmaduke, whom she had not
seen since that Sunday night when his last words had been so
contemptuous, his look so strange and voluptuous. She did not doubt that
the great motive of his visit at the Grange was to put his threat of vengeance
in execution; and determined either to soften him, or to learn his plans, the
better to combat them.

George Maxwell walked behind them, scowling.

Julius remained in doors; so Violet and Cecil had only to lag a little
behind, to enjoy a perfect tête-à-tête. Shot walked gravely at their heels.

The ramble about the grounds lasted all the afternoon. There only
occurred one incident worth relating, as bearing upon the fortunes of two of
the actors.
 Cecil and Violet, in stopping to pick many flowers, had been left so far
behind the others, that they determined to take a shorter cut to the house
through a meadow lying alongside of the shrubbery. They had not gone
many steps across the meadow before a bull seemed to resent their
intrusion. He began tearing up the ground, and tossing about his head in
anger.

"I don't like the look of that animal," said Cecil. "Let us return."

She only laughed, and said:—

"Return! No, no. He won't interfere with us. Besides, when you live in
the country you must take your choice, either never to enter a field where
there are cattle, or never to turn aside from your path, should the field be
full of bulls. I made my choice long ago."

This was said with a sort of mock heroic air, which quite set Cecil's
misgivings aside. He thought she must certainly be perfectly aware the bull
was harmless, or she would not have spoken in that tone; and above all,
would not have so completely disregarded what seemed to him rather
formidable demonstrations on the part of the animal. They continued,
therefore, to walk leisurely along the meadow, the bull bellowing at them,
and following at a little distance. He was evidently lashing himself into the
stupid rage peculiar to his kind, and Shot showed considerable alarm.

"For God's sake, Miss Vyner! let us away from this," said Cecil,
agitated.

"He doesn't like Shot's appearance here," she calmly replied, as the dog
slunk through the iron hurdles which fenced off the shrubbery.

She turned round to watch the bull, and her heart beat as she saw him
close his dull fierce eye—the certain sign that he was about to make a rush.

Cecil saw it too, and placing his hand upon the iron hurdle, vaulted on
the other side, obeying the rapid suggestion of danger as quickly as it was
suggested.
 No sooner was his own safety accomplished, than almost in the same
instant that his feet touched the ground, the defenceless position of Violet
rushed horribly across his mind.

"Good God!" he said to himself; "what have I done? How can I ever
explain this?"

He vaulted back again to rush to her succour; but he was too late. His
hesitation had not lasted two seconds, but they were two irrevocable
seconds; during which Violet, partly out of bravado and contempt for the
cowardice of her lover, and partly out of that virile energy and promptitude
which on all occasions made her front the danger and subdue it, sprang
forwards at the animal about to rush, and with her riding-whip cut him
sharply twice across the nose. Startled by this attack, and stinging with
acute pain—the nose being his most sensitive part—the brute ran off
bellowing, tail in air.

He had already relinquished the fight when Cecil came up. The
coincidence was cruel. He felt it so. Violet, pale and trembling, passed her
hand across her brow, but turning from Cecil, called to her dog.

"Shot! Shot! come here, you foolish fellow. He won't hurt you."

This speech was crushing. Cecil felt that he had slunk away from danger
like the dog, and that Violet's words were levelled at him. Never was man
placed in a more humiliating position. To have left a young girl to shift for
herself on such an occasion, and to see her vanquish the enemy in his
presence; to appear before a brave girl as a despicable coward, and to feel
that he could not by any means explain his action, except to make himself
more odious; for if he were not himself too terrified to face the danger, what
utter selfishness would it appear for him to have so secured his own safety!

Cecil felt the difficulty of his position, and that chained his tongue.
Violet, who was suffering morally as well as physically, was also unable to
speak. The shock given to her frame by the recent peril was in itself
considerable; and she trembled now it was past, almost as much as another
would have trembled at the moment. But, perhaps, the moral shock was as
great. She had begun to consider Cecil in the light of a lover, and was
almost in love with him herself. What she had just witnessed turned all her
feelings against him. Deep and bitter scorn uprooted all her previous regard,
and she was angry with herself for having ever thought of him kindly.

They joined the rest of the party, without uttering a word. "My dear
Violet," exclaimed Mrs. Vyner, "how pale you look! Has anything
happened? Are you ill?"

Cecil's temples throbbed fearfully. He expected to hear himself exposed

before them all, and was trying to muster courage to endure either their
scorn, or Violet's sarcastic irony in her description. She only said,—

"Oh, nothing; only a little fright. There was a bull in the meadow who
took offence at Shot, and began to threaten us. It is very foolish to be so
agitated; but I can't help it."

"Very natural, too, my dear," said Mrs. St. John. "Come and let me give
you a glass of wine: that will restore you."

"No, thank you," she replied; "it's not worth making a fuss about. It will
go off in a minute or two. Well, Mrs. Langley Turner, have you settled
anything about the theatricals?"

"Settled nothing, my dear, but projected an immense deal. Let us lay our
heads together a little."

Mrs. Langley Turner twined her arm round Violet's waist, and moved
away with her.

Cecil was intent upon the structure of a dahlia.

Nothing more was said on the subject of the fright; and amidst his
poignant sense of shame, there was a feeling of grateful reverence to Violet
for having spared him. He knew her well enough to be certain that, as she
had not revealed his conduct then, she would not whisper it in private. He
knew her capable of crushing him in her scorn by some epigram, such as
she had uttered in the meadow, but incapable of a spiteful innuendo, or
sarcastic narration, in private.
 Nevertheless, she knew it. How could he again face her? How could he
dwell under the same roof with her? He would not. He would set off on the
morrow. He would invent some pretext; anything, so that he had not to
encounter the scorn of those haughty features.

The ride home was a painful contrast to the setting out; at least for the
two lovers. The rest were as gay and chatty as before; the horses pranced,
and shook their heads; Shot leaped up at Jessy's nose, and the sedater hound
trotted calmly behind. The ring of laughter, the clatter of hoofs, and the
barking of Shot, only made Cecil more conscious of the change. He rode on
in sullen silence. Violet had taken her mother's place in the carriage, not
feeling quite recovered: her mother mounted Jessy.

It would fill a volume to tell all that passed in the minds of Violet and
Cecil during that ride. Her thoughts were all thoughts of unutterable scorn;
his thoughts were of overwhelming humiliation. There was an oppressive,
moody, suffocating sense of remorse and rage weighing down his spirits.
He cursed himself for that unreflecting action as deeply, perhaps more
deeply, than if he had murdered a man. In his impotent rage, he asked
himself how it was that he had so utterly forgotten her to think solely of
himself; and cursed his ill fortune that had placed the fence so close to him.
Had it been only half a dozen paces removed, he should have thought of her
before reaching it, and then he could have been spared this galling shame.

Violet tried to find excuses for him, but could not. As he rode past, rapt
in gloomy thought, crest-fallen, shame-stricken, she wondered that she had
ever thought him handsome. The scales had fallen from her eyes.

Who has not experienced some such revulsion of feeling? Who has not
looked with astonishment upon some delusion, and asked himself, "Was it,
then, really so? Was this the person I believed so great and good?" Alas! no;
not this, but another. It was your ideal that you loved, and mistook for the
reality. Seen in the bright colours of your fancy, that man appeared
admirable whom now you see to be contemptible.

The other day I took up a common pebble from the shore; washed by
the advancing waves, and glittering in the summer sun, it looked like a gem.
I carried it home; arrived there, I took it from my pocket: the pebble was
dry, its splendour had vanished, and I held it for what it was—a pebble.

Such is life, with and without its illusions.

CHAPTER V.

A TRAIT OF JULIUS ST. JOHN.

As Cecil was dressing for dinner that day, he asked himself whether he
really loved Violet; the answer was a decided negative. He had loved her till
that afternoon: but that one fatal incident as completely turned his love into
dislike, as it had turned Violet's into scorn. He disliked her, as we dislike
those who have humiliated us, or who have witnessed some action which
we know must appear contemptible in their eyes, but which we feel is not
really so contemptible. He resented her superior courage; called her coarse
and unwomanly, reckless and cruel. He remembered her beating Shot on the
morning of their first interview, and it now seemed to him, as then, an act of
wanton severity. He remembered what her father and mother said of her
temper. They were right; she was a devil!

He went down to dinner quite satisfied that she was not at all the
woman he should choose.

She was seated on the sofa, talking to Mrs. Broughton, and caressing the
head of her favourite Shot. Marmaduke stood by her side, gazing enraptured
upon her beauty.

Never was there a more adorably imperial creature than Violet. If in her
riding habit, the prompt decision and energy of her manner conveyed the
impression of her being somewhat masculine; directly she doffed it for the
dress of her sex, she became at once a lovely, loveable woman.
 I have a particular distaste to masculine women, and am therefore
anxious that you should not imagine Violet one. She had, indeed, the virile
energy and strength of will, which nature seems to have appointed to our
sex; but all, who had any penetration, at once acknowledged that she was
exquisitely feminine. Her manner had such grace, dignity, softness, and
lovingness, tempering its energy and independence. She had grandeur
without hardness, and gentleness without weakness. Her murderous eyes,
whose flashing beauty few could withstand—there was something
domineering in their splendour and fulness of life—had, at the same time, a
certain tenderness, the effect of which I know not how better to describe,
than in the bold felicitous comparison used by Goethe's mother, when she
wrote to Bettina thus: "a violoncello was played, and I thought of thee; it
sounded so exactly like thy brown eyes."

I dwell with some gusto on the beauty of this creature; she was so
beautiful! Majesty generally implies a certain stiffness: dignified women
are detestable; but there was such majesty in Violet—such commanding
grace—accompanied by such soft, winning manners, that, in the midst of
the sort of awe she inspired, you felt a yearning towards her. Firenzuola
would have said of her, and said truly, that "getta quasi un odor di regina,"
and yet, withal, no one was more simple and womanly.

As Cecil entered the room, he just caught this conclusion of Violet's

speech:—

"Besides, had it come to the worst—had the bull made his rush, I was in
very good hands. Mr. Chamberlayne and Shot were with me."

This was uttered before she saw Cecil. She coloured slightly as he came
in, but continued her conversation in an unaltered tone. He felt no gratitude
to her for sparing him, as, by this account of the affair, it was evidently her
intention of doing; his self-love was so deeply wounded, that he only
perceived the covert sarcasm of again coupling him with Shot. It made him
congratulate himself on being no longer in danger of offering her his hand.

"What a wife!" he mentally exclaimed, as he walked up to Rose and

Julius, and broke in upon their tête-à-tête, for which neither thanked him.
 At dinner he sat between Mrs. Broughton and her niece, who, regarding
him as a wit, giggled at whatever he said. He was in high spirits. His gaiety
was forced, indeed, but it inspired some brilliant things, which I do not
chronicle here for two reasons. First, they had no influence whatever on
subsequent events. Secondly, very few repartées bear transplantation; they
have an àpropos which gives them their zest, and are singularly tame
without it.

"By the way, Mr. St. John, Wincot has a mysterious story about you
which ought to be cleared up."

"Pray, what is it?"

"Oh! something impossible, grotesque, inconceivable, but true; at least,

he swears to it," said Cecil.

"Let's hear it," said Mrs. Langley Turner.

"By all means," added Mrs. Broughton.

"By all means," echoed Julius. "I find myself the hero of a romance
before I was aware of it."

All eyes were turned upon Tom Wincot.

He was not averse to be looked at, so neither blushed, nor let fall the
glass suspended to his eye.

Wincot is young, good-looking, well-dressed; rides well, waltzes well;

gains his livelihood at whist and écarté; pays debts of honour; has no ideas;
knows nothing beyond the sphere of a club or a drawing-room, and has no
power over the consonant r.

"I consider this vewy twaitewous," he said; "when I told Chamberlayne

the stowy it was under strict secrecy."

"That is to say," rejoined Cecil, "that you wished me particularly to

divulge it."
 "Not at all, not at all, a secwet is a secwet."

"You excite our curiosity to the highest pitch," said Mrs. Langley
Turner.

"Quite thrilling," said Rose.

"Tell us the story yourself, Mr. Chamberlayne," said young Lufton.

"No, no; it is Wincot's story."

"Well; if your cuwiosity is excited, I must gwatify it. Besides, Mr. St.
John has pewhaps some explanation. Yesterday, as I was wambling along
the woad to town I saw him wide down by the wiver. Well, would you
cwedit it? he was cawying, its twue I vow, cawying a side of bacon!!!"

"Is that all?" asked Violet.

"All!" exclaimed the astonished dandy; "All! why Miss Violet, I pledge
you my vewacity that I wefused to believe it, it was so twemendous an
appawition! Fancy, widing acwoss countwy with a side of bacon on your
saddle! It must have been a wager. It must. Why, I would as soon have
dwiven my gwandmother down Wegent-stweet; dwank clawet at an inn;
gone to a soiwee in shoes; or anything equally atwocious!"

"But let Mr. St. John explain," said Cecil gaily. "This is a serious
imputation on his dandyism. Unless he can clear himself of the charge, he
will be utterly lost."

"What was it Julius, my dear?" said Mrs. St. John.

"One of those things which he alone is capable of," interposed

Marmaduke, warmly. "I will ask the ladies present to judge. Happening to
meet Julius with that same side of bacon, I naturally asked him how he
came to have it, and he told me the story with his usual simplicity. This it is.
He was riding through Little Aston on his way home, he stopped opposite a
broker's shop where an auction was going on. A side of bacon was knocked
down to him, much to his astonishment, but he paid for it, threw it across
his saddle, and carried it twelve miles as a present to one of his poor
cottagers. The poor woman was as much shocked as Mr. Wincot, to see the
young squire so equipped, but her gratitude was unbounded. I could have
hugged him for it; the more so, as, with all my admiration for the simple
goodness and courage of the act, I doubt whether even now I should have
courage to imitate it, and certainly should never have had such an idea
come unassisted into my head."

"You are trying to make a mountain out of a molehill, Marmaduke,"

said Julius. "The thing was quite simple. I had to pay for the bacon; why
should not one of my cottagers benefit by it?"

"Yes, yes; but carrying it yourself."

"I had not my servant with me. It was no trouble. As to what people
thought, that never troubled me. Those who knew me knew what I was;
those who knew me not did not bestow a thought about me."

Every one declared that it was an act of great kindness and philosophy;
except Tom Wincot, who pronounced it vewy extwaowdinawy, and seemed
to think nothing could justify such a forgetfulness of what was due to
oneself. But of all present, no one was more proud, more pleased than Rose,
who looked at her "dear, little, ugly man," as she called him, with fresh
admiration all the evening afterwards. It was a trait to have won her heart;
if, indeed, her heart had not been won before.

CHAPTER VI.

HIDDEN MEANINGS.

The subject of private theatricals was again started that evening, when
all were assembled in the drawing-room; and as the conversation happened
by chance to be one of those underneath which there runs a current of deep
significance to certain parties, while to the apprehension of the rest there is
nothing whatever meant beyond what is expressed; I shall detail some
portions of it.

But first to dispose of the scene, as it is rather crowded. In the right-

hand corner there is a rubber of whist played between Meredith Vyner and
Mrs. Broughton, against Sir Harry Johnstone and Mrs. St. John.

Seated on the music-stool is Rose, who has just ceased playing, and by
her stands Julius, who, having turned over her leaves, is now talking to her.

At the round table in the centre, Mrs. Meredith Vyner, Mrs. Langley
Turner, Miss Broughton, and Violet are disposed among Marmaduke,
Maxwell, Tom Wincot, Captain Heath, and young Lufton; the ladies
knitting purses, and engaged on tambour work: the gentlemen making
occasional remarks thereon, and rendering bungling assistance in the
winding of silk.

To the left, Blanche and Cecil, the latter with his guitar in his hand.

The fire blazes cheerfully. The room is brilliant with light. Mrs.
Meredith Vyner is applauding herself secretly at her increasing success with
Marmaduke, who she doubts not will soon have lost all his anger towards
her. Maxwell looks blacker than ever, but is silent. Violet is recovering from
her disappointment, and settling into calm contempt of Cecil. Marmaduke
laughs in his sleeve at Mrs. Vyner's attempts, but is too much struck with
Violet, not to be glad of anything which seems likely to smooth the path of
acquaintance with her. Captain Heath is rather annoyed at having lost his
accustomed seat next to Blanche, with whom he best likes to converse.
Cecil has completely shaken off his depression, and is wondering he never
before discovered what incomparable eyes Blanche has.

"But about these theatricals," said Mrs. Langley Turner. "I am dying to
have something settled. You, Mrs. Vyner, are the cleverest of the party, do
you suggest some play. What do you say to Othello?"

"Oh!" said Mrs. Broughton, "don't think of tragedy."

 "No, no," rejoined Mrs. Vyner; "if the audience must laugh, let it at least
be with us."

"By all means," said Vyner, shuffling the cards; "remember, too,

Male si mandata loqueris

Aut dormitabo aut ridebo.

"At the same time," observed Mrs. Vyner; "Mr. Ashley would make a
superb Othello."

"I rather think," replied Marmaduke, slightly veiling his eyes with the
long lashes; "Iago would suit me better."

Mrs. Vyner affected not to understand the allusion.

"You would not look the villain," she said.

"Perhaps not," he replied, laughing; "but I could act it."

"By the way," interposed Julius, "surely that's a very false and un-
Shakespearian notion current, respecting Iago's appearance: people
associate moral with physical deformity, though as Shakespeare himself
says—

There is no art
To find the mind's construction in the face.

The critics, I observe, in speaking of an actor, as Iago, are careful to say, 'he
looked the villain.' Now, if he looked the villain, I venture to say he did not
look Iago."

"Mr. St. John is right," said Cecil. "Had Iago 'worn his heart upon his
sleeve,' no one could have been duped by him. Whereas everybody places
implicit confidence in him. He is 'honest Iago'—a 'fellow of exceeding
honesty;' and he is this, not only to the gull Roderigo, and the royal Othello,
but equally so to the gentle Desdemona, and his companion in arms, the
'arithmetician' Cassio."

"So you see," said Marmaduke, turning to Mrs. Vyner, "in spite of your
handsome compliment, I might have the physique de l'emploi. Then Cecil
would be a famous Cassio,

Framed to make women false."

Mrs. Vyner asked herself, "Is he showing me his cards? Does he mean
to play Iago here, and to select Cecil as his tool? No; he can't be such a
blockhead; but what does he mean then?"

"If we are not to play tragedy," observed Mrs. Broughton; "what use is
there in wasting argument on it. Let us think of a comedy."

"The Rivals," suggested Captain Heath; "it has so many good parts, and
that I take to be the grand thing in private theatricals, where every one is
ambitious of playing primo violino."

"Very natural too!" said Julius.

"Very!" rejoined Heath, sarcastically.

"When people laugh," said Julius, "at the vanity displayed by amateur
actors, in their reluctance to play bad parts, it is forgotten that there is a
wide distinction between playing for your amusement, and playing for your
bread. Every actor on the stage would refuse indifferent parts, were it
possible for him to do so. And when gentlemen and ladies wish to try their
skill at acting, they very naturally seek to play such parts as will give their
talents most scope."

"We really ought to thank Mr. St. John," said Mrs. Vyner, "for the
ingenious excuse he has afforded our vanity, and he must have a good part
himself as reward."
 "You are very kind," said Julius; "but I have no notion whatever of
acting, and must beg you to pass me over entirely, unless you want a
servant, or something of that kind."

"I am sure," said Rose, in a low tone, "you would act beautifully."

"Indeed, no."

"Did you ever try?"

"Never. I have no vis comica; and as to tragedy, my person excludes me

from that."

Rose was silent and uncomfortable; all people are when others allude to
their own personal deficiencies.

"Will you play Sir Anthony, Sir Harry?"

"Two by cards ... I beg your pardon, Mrs. Vyner .... Sir Anthony
Absolute? Yes, yes, you may put me down for that."

"And who is to be Captain Absolute? You, Mr. Ashley?"

"Perhaps Mr. Ashley would play Falkland," suggested Mrs. Broughton.

"No, no, Falkland is cut out for Mr. Maxwell—he is the most tragic
amongst us."

Maxwell answered with a grim smile.

"At any rate," said Mrs. Langley Turner, "let me play Mrs. Malaprop. I
quite long to be an allegory on the banks of the Nile."

"And Violet," said Mrs. Vyner, with the slightest possible accent of
sarcasm, "can be Lydia Languish."

"No, mama," replied Violet, "you ought to play that—it would suit you."

"I play? ... my dear child!"

 "Do you not intend to take a part?"

"My dear Violet, how could you suppose such a thing?"

"I imagined," replied Violet, with exquisite naturalness, "that you were
an accomplished actress."

"So I should have said, from the little I have the pleasure of knowing of
Mrs. Vyner," observed Marmaduke.

The two arrows went home; but Mrs. Vyner's face was impassive.

"How imprudent Violet is!" said Blanche, in a whisper, to Cecil.

"Do you understand that?" said Rose to Julius.

"What?"

"Nothing, if you did not catch it."

"But who is to be Sir Lucius, we haven't settled that," said Mrs.

Broughton.

"I wather think I should play Sir Lucius O'Twigger, as my bwogue is

genewally pwonounced so vewy Iwish."

"But," interposed Marmaduke, "we have forgotten Cecil ... Oh! there is
Acres—a famous part!"

"Surely, Captain Absolute would be better," suggested Violet.

"Is that a sarcasm?" Cecil asked himself.

"Anybody," rejoined Marmaduke, "can play the Captain, whereas Acres

is a difficult part. It is not easy to play cowardice naturally."

This is one of those observations, which, seeming to have nothing in

them, yet fall with strange acrimony on the ears of certain of the parties. It
made Violet and Cecil uncomfortable.
 "Besides," pursued Marmaduke, "it is a rule in acting, that we always
best play the part most unlike our own; and as Cecil happens to be the
coolest of the cool in a duel, he ought to play the duel scene to perfection."

"Did you ever fight a duel, then?" exclaimed Miss Broughton. "How
romantic!"

Violet was astonished. Cecil, delighted at this opportunity of redeeming

himself in her eyes, said, "Marmaduke, who was my second, will tell you
that it was by no means romantic, Miss Broughton. A mere exchange of
harmless shots about a very trivial circumstance."

"And," inquired Miss Broughton, with inimitable naïveté, "were you not
afraid?"

A general laugh followed this question, except from the whist players,
who were squabbling over some disputed point, and from Violet, who was
asking herself the same question.

"Why," rejoined Cecil, gaily, "I suppose you would hardly have me
avow it, if it were so; cowardice is so contemptible."

"Oh, I don't know," said Miss Broughton.

"If I may speak without bravado, I should say that, although I am a

coward by temperament, I do not want bravery on reflection."

"What the deuce do you mean by bwavewy on weflection?"

"Some people," interposed Rose, laughing, "have de l'esprit après coup;

so Mr. Chamberlayne doubtless means that he has courage when the danger
is over. I had you there, Mr. Chamberlayne. That is my return for your
uncomplimentary speech to me at dinner."

Violet blushed; Rose's jest seemed to her so cruel that she quite felt for
Cecil. He also blushed, knowing the application Violet would make. The
rest laughed.
 "Without accepting Miss Rose's unpardonable interpretation," said
Cecil, "I may acknowledge some truth in it; and as I am thus drawn into a
sort of confession, forgive my egotism if I dwell a little longer on the
subject. I am of a very nervous, excitable temperament. I shrink from
anything sudden, and always tremble at sudden danger. Therefore am I
constitutionally a coward. My instinct is never to front danger, but to escape
it; but my reason tells me that the surest way of escaping it, in most cases, is
to front it; and as soon as the suddenness is over, and I have familiarized my
mind with the danger, I have coolness and courage enough to front it,
whatever it may be. This is what I call bravery on reflection. My first
movement, which is instinctive, is cowardly; my second, which is
reflective, is courageous."

"This is so pwofoundly metaphysical that I can't appwehend it at all."

"I think I can," said Violet; "and the distinction seems to me to be just."

Cecil was greatly relieved, and he thanked her with a smile as he said, "I
remember, some years ago, being with some ladies in a farm-yard, when a
huge mastiff rushed furiously out at us. Before I had time to check my first
instinctive movement, I had vaulted over the gate and was beyond his
reach; but no sooner was I on the other side than I remembered the ladies
were at his mercy. I instantly vaulted back again; but not before the dog was
wagging his tail, and allowing them, to pat his head. But imagine what they
thought of my gallantry! They never forgave me. I could offer no excuse—
there was none plausible enough to offer—and to this day they despise me
as a coward."

"Had you given them on the spot," said Violet, gravely, "the explanation
you have just given us, they would not have despised you."

"I am greatly obliged to you for the assurance."

He looked his thanks as he said this.

"Still, it must be deuced stwange to find oneself in a pwedicament, and

no cowage àpwopos, but only on delibewate weflection."
"It is one of the misfortunes of my temperament."

"It certainly is a misfortune," said Violet.

She became thoughtful. Cecil was radiant.

 CHAPTER VII.

MUTUAL SELF-EXAMINATION.

The entrance of tea changed the conversation, and changed also the
positions of the party. Cecil relinquished his place by the side of Blanche,
much to her regret, and managed to get near Violet, who was anxious to
make up for her previous coldness and contempt. She felt that she had
wronged him. She admitted to the full his explanation of the incident which
had so changed her feelings, and, with the warmth of a generous nature
owning its error, she endeavoured to make him understand that she had
wronged him. Two happier hearts did not beat that night.

Could they have read aright their feelings, however, they would have
seen something feverish and unhealthy in this warmth. It was not the
sympathy of sympathetic souls but a mutual desire to forget, and have
forgotten the feelings which had agitated them a little while ago.

Mrs. Meredith Vyner was more taciturn than was her wont. The covert
insinuations Marmaduke had thrown out puzzled her extremely; while they
were in sufficient keeping with what had gone before, to prevent her
supposing he attached no meaning to them.

"Could he really suppose her in love with Cecil?" she asked herself;
"and was he serious in thus presenting himself in the character of an Iago?"

Much did she vex her brain, and to little purpose. The truth is, she was
attributing to these words a coherence and significance which they had not
in Marmaduke's mind. She assumed them to be indications of some deeply-
laid scheme; whereas they were the mere spurts of the moment, seized upon
by him as they presented themselves, and without any ulterior purpose. He
had no plan; but he was deeply enraged against her, and lashed her with the
first whip at hand. Had he been as cunning as she was, he would never have
betrayed himself in this way; but being a man of vehement passions, and
accustomed to give way to his impulses, it was only immense self-
command which enabled him to contain himself so much as he did. Julius
went home to dream of Rose. Marmaduke to pass a sleepless night thinking
of Violet. He had never seen a woman he admired so much. For the first
time in his life, he had encountered a gaze that did not bend beneath his
own; for the first time he had met with one whose will seemed as
indomitable as his own, whose soul was as passionate. It was very different
from the effect which Mary Hardcastle had excited: it was not so irritating,
but more voluptuous. In one word, the difference was this: Mary excited the
lower, Violet the higher qualities of his nature. There was reverence in his
feeling for Violet; in his feeling for Mary there had been nothing but a
sensual fascination.

Maxwell was restless. He was growing very jealous of Marmaduke—

Mrs. Vyner's interest not escaping him. Violet was also sleepless. She
thought of Marmaduke, and of the two interchanged glances which told her
how they had both read alike the character of her mother; and wondered by
what penetration he had discovered it. She thought him also a magnificent
—a manly man; but she thought no more. Cecil occupied her mind.

As I have said, her first impulse was to admit to the full Cecil's
explanation, and to revoke her sentence of contempt. As she lay meditating
on the whole of the circumstances, and examined his character calmly, she
was forced to confess that if he did not deserve the accusation of cowardice,
yet by his own showing his first impulse was to secure his own safety, and
then to think of others. This looked like weakness and selfishness: two
odious vices in her eyes.

The result of her meditations was, that Cecil had regained some portion
of her liking, but had lost for ever all hold upon her esteem. Pretty much the
same change took place in his mind with regard to her. He admitted that she
was high-minded, generous, lovely—but not loveable. There was something
in her which awed him, and which he called repulsive.

He went to sleep thinking what a sweet loveable creature Blanche was,

and how superior to Violet.
 CHAPTER VIII.

THE DISADVANTAGES OF UGLINESS.

The next day Julius was meditatively fishing in the mill-pool adjoining
the village school, and trying to decipher the character of Rose, who
alternately fascinated and repulsed him by her vivacity.

I have said that he was utterly destitute of all personal beauty. This is so
common an occurrence, that it would scarcely be worth mentioning in any
other case: beauty being the quality which, of all others, men can best
dispense with. A charm when possessed, its absence is not an evil. In
Julius's case, however, it happened to be important, from the importance he
attributed to it, and the excessive importance given to it by him thus
originated.

His nurse was a very irascible woman, and whenever she was angry,
taunted him with being such "an ugly, little fright." As she never called him
ugly but when she punished him, he early began to associate something
peculiarly disagreeable with ugliness. This would have soon passed away at
school, had not the boys early discovered that his ugliness was a sore point
with him; accordingly, endless were the jests and sneers which, with the
brutal recklessness of boyhood, they flung at him on that score. The climax
of all, was on one cold winter morning, when the shivering boy crept up to
the fire, and was immediately repulsed by a savage kick from one of the
elder boys there warming himself. Crying with the pain, he demanded why
he was kicked. The why really was a simple movement of wanton brutality
and love of power, usual enough among boys; but the tyrant chose to say,
"Because you're such a beast!"

"No, I'm not," he sobbed.

"Yes, you are, though!"

 "You've no business to kick me; I didn't do anything to you."

"I shall kick you as much as I like; you're so d—d ugly!"

It had never occurred to him before to be thrashed for his ugliness; and
although he deeply felt the injustice, yet he, from that day, imagined that his
appearance was a serious misfortune.

Increasing years, of course, greatly modified this impression, but the

effect was never wholly effaced. From the constant dinning in his ears that
he was ugly, he had learned to accept it as a fact, about which there could be
no dispute, but which no more troubled him than the consciousness that he
was not six feet high. He became hardened to the conviction. Sneers or
slights affected him no more. He was ugly, and knew it. To tell him of it
was to tell him of that to which he had long made up his mind, and about
which he had no vestige of vanity.

It is remarkable how conceited plain people are of their persons. You

hear the fact mentioned and commented on in society, as if it were
surprising; and you catch yourself "wondering" at some illustration of it, as
if experience had not furnished you with numberless examples of the same
kind. But the explanation seems to me singularly simple. You have only to
take the reverse of the medal, and observe that beauty is not half so
solicitous of admiration as deformity, and the solution of the question must
present itself. Conceit—at least that which shows itself to our ridicule, is an
eager solicitation of our admiration. Now, beauty being that which calls
forth spontaneous admiration, needs not to be solicitous; and the more
unequivocal the beauty, the less coquettish the woman. When, however, a
woman's beauty is so equivocal that some deny it, while others admit it, the
necessity for confirmation makes her solicitous of every one's praise; and
she exhibits coquetry and conceit—due proportion being allowed for the
differences in amount of love of approbation inherent in different
individuals (a condition which influences the whole of this argument).
Carry this further, and arrive at positive plainness, and you have this result:
the amour propre of the victim naturally softens the harsh outlines of the
face. He sees himself in a more becoming mirror. However, the fact may
have been forced upon him, that he is ill-looking, he never knows the extent
of his ugliness, and he is aware that people differ immensely in their
estimates of him; he has—fatal circumstance! even been admired. Now,
admiration is such a balm to the wounded self-love, that he craves for more
—he is eager to solicit an extension of it, and hence that desire to attract
closer attention to him manifested by audacity of dress, certain that the
closer he is observed, the more he must be admired. He feels he is not so
ugly as people say; he knows some do not think so; he wants your
confirmation of the discerning few. In a thousand different ways he solicits
some of your admiration. You see his object, and smile at his conceit.

Now the effect of Julius St. John's education had been to cut out, root
and branch, that needless desire to be admired for what he knew was not
admirable. He had made up his mind to his ugliness. The benefit was
immense. It saved him from the hundred tortures of self-love to which he
must otherwise have been exposed—that Tantalus thirst for admiration
which cannot be slaked; and it imparted a quiet dignity to his manner,
which was not without its charm.

The deplorable circumstance was, that he had also imbibed a notion of

the great importance of beauty in the eyes of women, which made him
consider himself incapable of being loved. As a boy, maid-servants had
refused to be kissed by him, because he was "a fright." As a young man, he
had often been conscious that girls said they were engaged when he asked
them to dance, because they would not dance with one so ugly. In the
novels which he read the heroes were invariably handsome, and great stress
was laid upon their beauty; while the villains and scoundrels were as
invariably ill-favoured. The conversation of girls ran principally upon
handsome men; and their ridicule was inexhaustible upon the unfortunates
whom Nature had treated like a stepmother.

One trait will paint the whole man. They were one day talking about
ugliness at the Hall, when Rose exclaimed: "After all beauty is but skin
deep."

"True," he replied, "but opinion is no deeper."

That one word revealed to her the state of his mind on the subject. And
although he often thought of Swift, Wilkes, Mirabeau, and other hideous
men celebrated for their successes with women; he more often thought of
the bright-eyed, hump-backed, gifted, witty, humble Pope, who so bitterly
expiated his presumption in raising his thoughts to the lovely Mary Wortley
Montague. If genius could not compensate for want of beauty, how should
he, who had no genius, not even shining talents, succeed in making a
woman pardon his ugliness?

That Julius was strangely in error you may easily suppose; but this was
perhaps the only crotchet of his honest upright mind. A truer, manlier
creature never breathed. He was carved from the finest clay of humanity;
and, although possessing none of those distinguished talents which separate
a few men from their contemporaries, and throw a lustre over perhaps weak
and unworthy natures, yet of no one that I have ever known could I more
truly say,—

His life was gentle; and the elements

So mixed in him, that Nature might stand up
And say to all the world, This was a man!

To know him was to love him; it was more, it was to revere him. There
was something ennobling in his intercourse. You felt that all he did and said
sprang from the purest truth. He was utterly unaffected, and won your
confidence by the simple truthfulness of his whole being. There was
perhaps as little of what is supposed to captivate women in his person and
manner as in any man I ever knew; but, at the same time, I never knew a
man so calculated to make a wife adore him. In a word—he could not flirt,
but he could love.

The reader will be at no loss to discover the reason of certain doubts and
hesitations on his part respecting Rose, with whom he was greatly charmed,
and of whom he was also greatly afraid. The very vivacity which allured,
alarmed him. She was so bright, so brilliant, that he was afraid to trust his
heart in her keeping, lest she should be as giddy as she was gay; and, above
all, lest she should scorn the mediocrity of such a man as he knew himself
to be. His first impulse was always to seek her society, to sun himself in her
eyes, to let his soul hold unrestrained communion with hers; but, when he
came to reflect on the delicious hours he had spent by her side, he trembled
lest they should be only luring him into an abyss from which there would be
no escape.

Early in life he had suffered bitterly from such a deception. He fell in

love with a beautiful and lively cousin of his, who, perhaps from coquetry,
perhaps from thoughtlessness, certainly exhibited such signs of returning
his affection, that he one day ventured to overcome his timidity, and
declared his passion. She only laughed at him; and that very evening he
heard her answer her mother's remonstrances on the giddiness of her
conduct towards him by saying, "But, dear mama, who could have
supposed that he was serious; the idea of a woman marrying him."

"He is an excellent creature," said the mother.

"Perhaps so, but you must confess he is very ugly."

Julius heard no more; it was a girl of sixteen in all her thoughtlessness

who spoke, but those words were never effaced from his memory.

The truth is, Rose was as saucy as youth, beauty, and uncontrollable
spirits could make her, and the general impression she made on men was,
that of being too flirty and giddy for love.

Julius was fishing that day with no sport but in the chase of his own
fantastic thoughts; which every philosophic fisherman must admit is part of
the great pleasure in throwing out the line. People wonder what amusement
can be found in fishing, and Dr. Johnson's definition is thought triumphant;
but if they will allow one of the most unskilful anglers that ever handled a
rod to answer, I would say, that when you have good sport, it is a pleasant
excitement, and when you catch nothing, it is a most dulcet mode of
meditating. You sit in the boat or stand on the bank: the river runs gently
and equably before you; the float wanders with it; and the current of your
thoughts is undisturbed.

No sport did Julius have that day; not a single "run;" but as a
compensation he was joined by Rose herself, who had been to visit Mrs.
Fletcher, the schoolmistress, to encourage the children.