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Russias Invasion of Ukraine Helps The Taliban and Makes Afghans Worse Off

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
31 views8 pages

Russias Invasion of Ukraine Helps The Taliban and Makes Afghans Worse Off

MUN HELP

Uploaded by

Shaurya Chauhan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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https://www.usip.

org /publications/2022/03/russias-invasion-ukraine-helps-taliban-and-makes-afghans-worse

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Helps the Taliban and


Makes Afghans Worse Off
With Western attention pulled toward Ukraine, aid to Afghanistan might wane just as
Afghans need it most.

Wednesday, March 16, 2022 / By: Scott Worden

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an acute disaster for Ukraine and Europe. But it also has a
profound geopolitical impact — one that will have ripple effects for the major humanitarian
disaster in Afghanistan. An active war in Europe is bad news for Afghanistan, as this
draws away resources, sympathy and attention from the millions of Afghans that are also
struggling to get cash, food and protection from human rights abuse. And the Taliban
stand to benefit, since they no longer appear to be the world’s most notorious aggressor
and will gain political space to consolidate their control over the country.

As Western attention wanes, Afghanistan


policy will become more a product of
regional interests, dominated by Pakistan
and, behind it, China. That may not be
welcome news to the region, however,
because even though the end of the
Taliban’s insurgency has brought about a
reduction in violence, the Taliban’s
authoritarian rule leaves the state without
the money or technical capacity needed
for effective governance. This makes it Men sell supplies in Ghazni, Afghanistan, in
more likely that the Afghan crisis will December 2021. (David Guttenfelder/The New
deepen and last longer, because as York Times)
disruptive as Western engagement in
Afghanistan has been, history shows that Western disengagement has been worse.

Dual Demands on Humanitarian Assistance


The most immediate effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is to move Western
attention away from the Afghanistan crisis and onto Ukraine. Afghanistan has already
suffered from NATO members’ war fatigue. Now, the Ukraine conflict offers a familiar

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Cold-War narrative for Americans and poses a much more immediate threat to
Europeans. We can expect this diverted attention to be followed with a shift in resources
for humanitarian aid and refugee assistance from Afghanistan to Ukraine.

An estimated 24 million of Afghanistan’s 38 million people require urgent humanitarian


assistance, pushing the United Nations to make a record-breaking appeal for $4.5 billion
in humanitarian and $3.5 billion in development assistance for this year.

Ukraine has a similar sized population — and as of today, there are an estimated 3 million
refugees and tens of millions who face severe shortages of food, shelter and medicine.
And while the United Nations has not released a specific appeal for Ukraine, a key date to
watch is March 31, when the U.K. is hosting a donor pledging conference for Afghanistan
humanitarian assistance. Will Western donors fill that request with another huge need on
the horizon in Ukraine?

Does the Enemy of an Enemy Equal a Friend?


The political impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on Afghanistan are more difficult to
discern. Russian and U.S. goals in Afghanistan are largely aligned, as evidenced by a
series of joint statements issued by the United States, Russia, China and Pakistan calling
for a more inclusive Taliban government, counter terrorism guarantees and respect for
universal human and women’s rights. Despite the vastly increased tensions between the
United States and Russia over Ukraine, the common Afghan interests remain largely
unchanged.

In the years leading up to the Taliban takeover, Russia developed a tactical relationship
with the Taliban, aiming to antagonize the United States and hedge in case the Taliban
won (although Russia ultimately hoped the Afghan Republic would remain intact). Russia
is now more willing to engage diplomatically with the Taliban but has not recognized the
Taliban government out of concern that drug trafficking and terrorism will flow north into
Russia’s sphere of interest in Central Asia.

It isn’t clear whether a deeper relationship with Russia would be worth much to the
Taliban, either. The Taliban crave international legitimacy, but little of that will come
through support from a newly minted international pariah like Russia, especially since
Moscow has no money or military force to spare. The Taliban must also have serious
reservations about cozying up to Russia, even in a time of need, when the Russian
assault on Ukraine is looking more and more like the Soviet Union’s devastating
occupation of Afghanistan. The Taliban have even used the Ukraine crisis to audition for
the role of a responsible member of the international community by calling “for both sides
of the conflict to resolve the crisis through dialogue and peaceful means."

Moving From the Main Stage to the Side Show

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As U.S. and NATO leverage declines in Afghanistan, regional powers will assume a
greater degree of influence over Afghanistan’s fate. China is the largest regional power
but has so far been minimally affected by the war in Afghanistan. With the Ukraine conflict
accelerating the pace of Western disengagement, China will become a more relevant
actor in Afghanistan, particularly through its ally Pakistan. Gaining enhanced regional
influence and control is not automatically a good thing for China, however, because now
Afghanistan is more of a liability than an asset on the geopolitical balance sheet.

Over the past 20 years, China was a minor economic and political actor in Afghanistan,
as well as a non-factor militarily. China’s greatest influence is through Pakistan, which
backed the Taliban and now can be considered the greatest political influence on them —
although the Taliban resent the patronizing role Pakistan has played and have pushed
back in some prominent ways on Pakistani political demands since the Taliban takeover.
With the Ukraine crisis causing geostrategic uncertainty on a global level, one can expect
China to work even more closely with Pakistan to achieve a condition of stability in
Afghanistan. This could include more political support to the Taliban and maybe more
aid. Yet China will remain wary of giving too much power to an Islamic fundamentalist
group that, in Beijing’s eyes, might make the Uyghurs look harmless in comparison.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has increased the value of stability for Afghanistan’s northern
Central Asia neighbors as well. Central Asian states are frightened by President Putin’s
justification for the Ukraine invasion because it applies equally to them: All are new states
that were initially part of the Russian empire and then received their current boundaries
from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Western economic sanctions have caused collateral
damage in the short term in Central Asia because they cut off Russian trade and
remittances. This increases the desire of Central Asian states for more stability on their
southern flank. But Central Asian states have relatively little influence over the Taliban
and, by themselves, cannot alter the economic or political fragility that threatens them
from Afghanistan.

An Ounce of Prevention Versus a Pound of Cure


Geopolitically, the Russian invasion of Ukraine fundamentally alters the context of
strategic competition between the NATO alliance and Russia, with implications for
Western-Chinese competition as well. One can assume that cooperation on mutual
interests like an inclusive and stable Afghan state will become more difficult in an
atmosphere of increased tensions — although cooperation was not leading to apparent
breakthroughs in Afghanistan before the Ukraine invasion anyway.

Some argue that dimming the spotlight on Afghanistan could allow for quiet diplomacy to
work better. But there is not a great track record of Afghan peace agreements formed
without significant outside pressure. More likely, as Western policymakers focus on the
resurgent threat of inter-state conflict, they will try to shift the resolution of intra-state
conflicts like Afghanistan to regional solutions. In that case, Afghanistan will become even
more subject to the foreign policy of Pakistan.

3/8
The bottom line is that the Ukraine crisis relegates Afghanistan from a second-tier
security threat to major powers before the invasion to probably a third-tier security threat
now, which means the major powers will spend less effort trying to solve it. That is, until
the Taliban’s inability to govern the country tips into civil war or renewed international
terrorism. To avoid that much worse fate, the United States can take several pragmatic
steps to mitigate the Afghanistan humanitarian crisis at the same time as confronting
Russia on Ukraine:

Continue robust humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan because turning away


makes civil war and terrorism more likely and the United States and Europe cannot
afford state collapse in Afghanistan right now.
Walk and chew gum at the same time with Russia: Do not let animosity over
Ukraine damage fundamental cooperation and shared interests between the United
States and Russia on Afghanistan. The Extended Troika dialogue among the United
States, Russia, China and Pakistan should be continued.
Seek to counter inherent Chinese geopolitical gains from the Ukraine conflict by
consciously investing more U.S. money and attention in Central Asia and South
Asia.
Avoid inconsistency on democratic ideals. If Ukraine is fundamentally a fight for
democracy and free choice, ensure those principles are applied to an Afghan
political solution. Do not recognize the Taliban if they dictate an insular and
authoritarian form of government.
Make it clear to Pakistan that the Pottery Barn Rule applies to them with respect to
Afghanistan. Their support is a key reason the Taliban were able to overthrow the
elected government in Kabul, and they must help to mitigate the negative
humanitarian and security consequences of Taliban rule.

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Afghanistan’s Crisis Requires a Coherent, Coordinated International
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Tuesday, May 16, 2023

By: William Byrd, Ph.D.

Over the past year, especially in recent months, the Taliban have made several missteps.
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