Shell

Interpretation: If the affirmative does not disclose 30 minutes before the round, they must offer an
anonymous opt out google form that describes any potentially graphic or sensitive content in the
affirmative.

Violation:

Standards:

Gerke ’14 clarifies. Gerke 14-Markus, In Defense of Trigger Warnings (… as a Practice, not a Policy),
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2014/06/19/in-defense-of-trigger-warnings-as-a-practice-not-a-policy/-

that trigger warnings are

The rhetoric in an article in Inside HigherEd exemplifies some of the problems with the debate about trigger warnings. It states

meant to warn students of “sensitive material” like “sexual assault …, and the like” but that students have “differing
sensibilities”. Meanwhile, a New York Times article states that professors are concerned that trigger warnings assume students possess a “fragility of mind that higher learning is meant to

. A trigger warning is a practice of – and thus

challenge, not embrace”. This framing of what trigger warnings are meant to be, misses the point

only one possible strategy to do so – acknowledging and dealing with the reality that some of
our students may have experienced violence and trauma in the past and that certain type of
material may inflict serious harm on these students. This is not to warn students that they may feel “uncomfortable” and excuse them
from doing so, and it is not about “sensitive” material or “sensibilities” but about the potential of

material to re-traumatize some students.

Trigger warnings allow for a more inclusionary space and allow students to overcome
trauma.
Gerke 2 Gerke 14-Markus, In Defense of Trigger Warnings (… as a Practice, not a Policy),
http://thesocietypages.org/sociologylens/2014/06/19/in-defense-of-trigger-warnings-as-a-practice-not-a-policy
 trigger warnings in my syllabus and rather than censoring and limiting what and how I teach, I like to think that it empowers me (and I’d
I do use specific

like to hope: the class,b too). When mentioning the trigger warning at the beginning of the

semester; I use it [is] as a teaching moment and explain[s] to students the reason behind
including this trigger warning and the power some material may have to inflict emotional
pain to specific individuals. Not only does this result[s] in a discussion about how to debate in
a college classroom and to think about the ways in which students voice their contributions
but it also gives me the confidence that students in the classroom are somewhat emotionally
prepared to discuss this material. Moreover, we do know that strong emotional distress – as
opposed to productive disagreement and strong reactions – have no pedagogical value to the student experiencing it, which is why I allow students to make the informed and ‘adult’ decisions
to stay away or leave class during this session if they anticipate it will inflict emotional harm on them without penalty to their grade (and guess what? attendance is not lower than on any other

triggering potential of material can have

given day) – this is actually the opposite of infantalizing students. In other words, a discussion of the

positive effects both on how students express their opinions and can serve as a tacit contract
that empowers students to discuss the material, as we have established that everyone in the room is prepared to do so. Rather
than censorship, trigger warnings can thus be a an additional tool in negotiating how to
include material that may be harmful to some students but that we still think serves
pedagogical goals in the context of our class.
D. Voter: This is an independent voting issue – assumptions like these make debate
unsafe and exclude people from the activity
Teehan ’14. Ryan Teehan [NSD staffer and competitor from the Delbarton School] – NSD Update comment on the student protests at
the TOC in 2014.
Honestly, I don't think that 99% of what has been said in this thread so far actually matters. It doesn't matter whether you think that these types of assumptions should be questioned. It
doesn't matter what accepting this intuition could potentially do or not do. It doesn't matter if you see fit to make, incredibly trivializing and misplaced I might add, links between this and the

Holocaust. All of the arguments that talk about how debate is a unique space for questioning assumptions make an
assumption of safety. They say that this is a space where one is safe to question assumptions and try new perspectives. That is not true for everyone.
When we allow arguments that question the wrongness of racism , sexism, homophobia, rape,
lynching, etc., we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to

question all assumptions is the definition of privilege, it begins with an idea of a debater that can question every assumption. People who
face the actual effects of the aforementioned things cannot question those assumptions, and making debate
a space built around the idea that they can is hostile . So, you really have a choice. Either 1) say that you do not want these people to debate so
that you can let people question the wrongness of everything I listed before, 2) say that you care more about letting debaters question those things than making debate safe for everyone, or 3)

debate is not the real world". Only for people who

make it so that saying things that make debate unsafe has actual repercussions. On "

can separate their existence in "the real world" from their existence in debate. That means privileged, white,
heterosexual males like myself. I don't understand how you can make this sweeping claim when some people are clearly harmed by these arguments. At the end of the

day, you have to figure out whether you care about debate being safe for everyone involved. I don't
think anyone has contested that these arguments make debate unsafe for certain people. If you care at all about the people involved in debate then don't vote on these arguments. If you care
about the safety and wellbeing of competitors, then don't vote on these arguments. If you don't, then I honestly don't understand why you give up your time to
Reject case cross apps and impact turns – 1. Language isn’t violent – it’s a question of
models of debate that are best for the activity, not an enforcement of a norm 2. Form
over content – your impact turns stem from a content level argument that you claim
to be true but if the form in which you present them is wrong because you aren’t
topical the judge shouldn’t evaluate them 3. Lack of engagement means all your
arguments are presumptively false since we didn’t get a fair opportunity to test them
Drop the debater – 1. Deterrence – Prevents reading the abusive practice in the future
since it’s not worth risking the loss which is k2 norm setting indefensible practices die
out
Competing Interpretations – 1. Arbitrariness – the aff will always cherry pick a
brightline that allows for as much abuse as possible while allowing them to read their
aff, means checking abuse is impossible 2. Encourages a race to the top to ensure the
best model of debate, which encourages critical reflection on the nature of the activity
No RVIs – 1. Baiting – encourages them to be as abusive as possible for the purpose of
dumping on theory in the next speech 2. Forces me to argue for a bad norm if I come
to the realization in the middle of the round which kills any substantive education we
could’ve gotten otherwise.
Use a norm setting model – it views each debater as proposing a model of debate and
the better model is voted for, which encourages critical reflection about the best
possible version of debate we can have. That means we don’t enforce a particular
norm violently onto someone else, but have won our world of debate is better.
Debate is good – 1. The nature of the activity is one that questions governmental
structures and modes of thought since we are allowed to read whatever arguments
we desire without imposition by some higher authority 2. Denying debate is good is a
double turn since A) It is the activity through which you learned your position B) It is
where you attempt to spread your message C) You are at a debate tournament which
proves that you found some inherent value in the activity 3. Inesecapability – When
we participate in certain institutions we bind ourselves to our rules. Even if the police
are bad, a cop is still A) instrumentally bound by their rules and B) defined by adhering
to those rules. Thus it’s a contradictory for you as a debater to argue such.
 Shell
Interpretation: Debaters cannot impose race specific burdens
Prefer
[1] Blood Quantum DA: Drawing racial lines for arguments sanctions the same genetic
purity tests used during american indigenous genocides, jim crow laws, and nazi
concentration camp policy.
[2] Dolezal DA: Race specific burdens incentivize racial role playing for ballots. We
aren’t saying you are, but its about norm setting.
[3] Legitimacy DA: Racial differentiation delegitimizes the success of all black debaters.
Outweighs skews in this one round on community wide impacts
[4] Racism DA - Normatively Justifies being racist against minorities because it
prioritizes one group over another. They will say nonunique but that begs the
question of how their arguments have an impact.
 K
The AFFS method depicts a White master, who has access to privileges that black
subjects are denied. Desire organized within such frames resists a master, without
resisting mastery and subscribe to a futile project of filling the lack. The link is the aff’s
process of self-identification, which is always viewed in relation to a subject perceived
as non-lacking, the drive to be whole in relation to whiteness.
Rogers 15. Juliet Brough Rogers, professor of political science at the University of Melbourne
(Australia), “A Stranger Politics: Resistance in Psychoanalytic Thought and Praxis” in Jacques Lacan:
Between Psychoanalysis and Politics, Routledge, 2015: 186 //recut ahs emi

The conundrum of change in psychoanalysis (and beyond) highlights the first of two particular problems of, and with, resistance that appear
when the subject attempts such a change of rules. First, change rarely (if ever) involves the creation of what Douzinas (2013: 141) calls ‘a new political subject’. That is, subjects are always

the subjects’ imaginations,

already subjected – let us say occupied – a priori and thus all imaginations of resistance are framed in a priori discourse. As such,

including their imaginations of the results of revolution – or of a new mode of being – are always
colonized with what is available to them. This is why – for Žižek (2007) and for Lacan (2007) – in post-revolutionary states, what the subject will get
is more of the same. The second problematic that haunts acts of resistance, and of more specific concern to psychoanalytic practice, is that any employment of violence as a

means to an end, and particularly as an effort toward a violent unsettling of the regime, can only be understood
as the effort to capture a definitive answer to the insistent and formative question to the Other, expressed by
Lacan (2006) as,‘che vuoi Autre?’ – ‘what do you want from me?’ In some cases this may be a violent effort toward capture, exercised to the point of a defiance of the

existence of the question. What this means is that one acts, violently, in order to produce a known future , as the answer. The two problematics

of resistance overlap because the answer is always imagined in the terms/signifiers available from the past . That is, the

answer appears in the frame of the categories which produce the subject , and thus recruits the first problematic: ‘you are
(always) already subjected’. I’ll tackle these problematics in turn. First, ‘you are already subjected’. If we even partially accept Judith Butler’s (1997: 6) treatise on the formation of subjectivity
as a series of ‘passionate attachments’ to ‘subjection’,10 then it is difficult to understand how the subject might be what Douzinas (2014) described as ‘re- or de-subjectivised’ in the first site of
becoming a resisting subject.11 For the political subject of democracy, recognition is, as Claude Lefort (1989) has told us well, the condition of being a subject. This means recognition within
the signifiers – let us call them biopolitical categories – allocated to the identity of the subject of democracy. The stage of political recognition is populated by signifiers which broker little
dissent – by others and even by the self. In Butler’s terms, we are ‘passionately attached’ to our gender, imaginations of health, rights, and, in Lacan’s terms, the ‘goods’ – as objects and as

ideas – which offer us the imagination of recognition.We are occupied as subjects through our own occupation with a
recognizable identity before democracy, with the qualities (objects) that reflect that identity. This
occupation allows for little, if any, dissent as to the naturalness, goodness, and reality of the signifiers
that produce the subject – as signifiers which adhere fundamentally to economies of desires: as desires
for recognition of identity and rights, as desires for capital. That is, the subject is occupied a priori with
these categories and recognizes (and demands recognition) via these categories. If we accept the premises of subjection
framed above then the argument follows that the resisting subject is still a subject, but one who looks for recognition

beyond the common political forms. That is, we can say that the resisting subject is still ‘passionately
attached’ to the ideas and objects which offer recognition, but these may be recognition by an alternative political
party, a Cause or, in Lacanian psy- choanalysis, we would say s/he attaches to (another) Master’s discourse. They may resist one Master,

but they chose another Master. They do not resist mastery. And here we have the basic difficulty with theories and actions of resistance.
These difficulties are that somehow, in some way, any acts of resistance always become modes of , in Lacan’s terms, the desire for

(another) Master (2007). Resistance, understood this way, is a state of being that is always already
subjectivized within the parameters of its own claims, or within the parameters of the subject’s
imagination of its goals. This is the obvious reference made by Lacan in his comments to the students who participated in the ‘resistances’ of 1968 in France (and
elsewhere). As he says, ‘What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a Master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007: 207).14 The provocative comment to the students

– some of whom have come to listen to him and some who have come to (apparently) resist him – is a
comment on their acting out the discourse of the Master that they imagine they can overcome,
through listening (or even objecting) to another Master, namely, Lacan. In this attempt at resistance which falls prey to its own
conditions of subjection, we can say that the subjectivity of the resisting subject – the student – is preoccupied with the

signifiers available to resist, where the best they can hope for is to be re-occupied by the imagination
of securing (another) truth. This hope, at least for the students in France at this time – understood through Lacan (and his discussions in 1969) – is the
hope for the Other’s knowledge. A knowledge which the subject presumes the Other has. A knowledge which is imagined to be able to be accessed and had. A
knowledge which is presented as the answer to the question ‘che vois Autre?’ And here appears the second psychoanalytic concern with resistance: resistance as a belief in

an access to an answer, or, in its most extreme or crude terms, resistance as psychosis. Resistance, understood as a desire for a
Master, becomes a performance of what the subject imagines is the answer . The answer as a closed
course of action with a fixed teleological imagination, such that the resisting subject might say: ‘If I do this I
will be this’, or ‘if I do this then the final result will be this’, or, in its psychotic form, ‘if I do this the
world will be this’. It is important to stress, however, that this may not follow for all acts of resistance –
which I will postulate later – but when Lacan says of the students in France that what they want is a
Master, this form of psychotic achievement of an answer is precisely what he is referring to . Theirs is the
desire for a discourse that holds within it the knowledge that the subject imagines is required (and
can be acquired/obtained/had) to achieve a perfection of the signifier, an imagination that the subject
can acquire, what Lacan (2007: 14–15) describes as the ‘Other’s jouissance’. The students, in Lacan’s suggestion, want to
resist in order to obtain the answer when it is the existence of an answer at all they are supposedly
resisting.

The affirmatives utopian reimagining without explicit praxis to overcome the

structural realities of oppression is not a benign political demand – it is empty rhetoric
and symbology that reduces the subject to an object of our own sadistic enjoyment.
Lundberg 12 Christian O. Lundberg, Director of Cultural Studies and Associate Professor of Rhetoric at
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of
Rhetoric, pub. University Alabama Press, p. 165-175 // recut ahs ss
The first reading, which focuses on Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ, takes up the economic exchange between identitarian practices and the ontological register of public making by
tracing the metaleptic exchanges that constitute an evangelical Christian public around the metaphor of constitutive violence. i engage in a close reading of The Passion and the tropological
exchanges it performs in constituting an evangelical public through, around, and beyond the film. The sec ond reading focuses less on a close reading than on characterizing the logic of
investment and formal rhetorical processes that animate a specific kind of demand: in this case, the demands of radical antiglobalization protestors to be recognized as dangerous. Thus, my

reading of radical anti-globalization protest takes up the political possibilities of the democratic demand , arguing
that a purely formal account of the demand eschews attention to the rhetorical production of enjoyment

and therefore overstates the political potential both of the democratic demand and a politics of
resistance. Here i would like to show how a rhetorically inflected reading of Lacan’s work provides an analytic
prescription for public politics that moves beyond enjoyment and aims at the articulation of collective
political desire. if the first reading is focused on the relationship between the specific imaginary contents that underwrite a public bond, the sec ond is engaged in understanding
the ways that symbolically constituted practices of address and investment imply determinate political

consequences. Both of these readings imply critiques of conventional rhetorical practices of

interpretation, suggesting an alternative analytic practice of engaging the nexus between trope and
affective investment. Thus, these readings form a criti cal-inter pretive couplet: in reading The Passion, i would like to demonstrate the shortcomings of fetishizing the
imaginary in isolation from the broader symbolic economy that underwrites it; conversely, in reading the demands of radical antiglobalization protest , i would like to show

the shortcomings of a purely formal account of the demand that operates in isolation from the practices
of enjoyment and the imaginary relations of address under writing radical demands .
Their politics based in ethnic-racialized identity drawing lines between practices and
people results in color-checking and a new standard of “recognizable ethnicity”.
Gaztambide 14 Daniel, doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of Applied and Professional
Psychology, Rutgers University. He currently serves as an adjunct lecturer at Hunter College Silberman School of
Social Work, where he teaches courses on race, gender, class, and sexuality and psychoanalytic developmental
theory. He is an APA Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) liaison to the APA Committee on Ethnic Minority Affairs and a
fellow in APA's Minority Fellowship Program. “I’m not black, I’m not white, what am I? The illusion of the color line.”
Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1088-0763 Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society Vol. 19, 1, 89–97 97.

what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers
Part of what I am talking about here is
to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby
there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress,
and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-
enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as
one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very
particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is
also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of
identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a
place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard
as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can
glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps
provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise
chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At
the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me,
Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate
closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be
more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of
the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-
producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to
see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial
signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the
production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and
define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s
(2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown –
falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the
encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom .
To give one
example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear
than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters
experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at
the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating
their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying
the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino
community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have
that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask
underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as
myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a
How we exclude
critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector.
one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it
means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us
further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a
minority.”

We don’t need an alternative besides our framework of analysis – the fantasy will
reveal itself as long as we continue asking questions to expose their concealment of
the lack – in other words, it’s your job to confuse and frustrate them via a refusal to
partake in their politics
Dean 6 (Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges,
Zizek’s Politics, Taylor & Francis: London and New York, 2006, p. xvii-xx)
By inserting popular culture into his writing, and himself into popular culture, Zizek enacts the way enjoyment colors or stains all thinking and acting. What this means, as I set out in detail in Chapter Three, is that there is a deep
nonrational and libidinal nugget in even the most rational, formal ways of thinking. Again, it is not simply that popular culture is at the core of the theoretical enterprise of his books—it is that enjoyment is. Enjoyment is an
unavoidable component of any philosophical effort (though many try to deny it). Zizek thus emphasizes the inevitable stain on philosophy, on thought, as he tries to demonstrate a way of thinking that breaks with (Zizek often uses
Lacan's term traverses) the fantasy of "pure reason."

This leads to another key element of Zizek's thought: the possibility of taking the position of the excess. As I explain in discussions of his readings of St. Paul and Lenin, Zizek theorizes revolutionary politics as occurring through the
occupation of this excessive place. Paul endeavors to put the Christian message to work, to establish new collectives beyond old oppositions between Greeks and Jews. Lenin also breaks with the given, arguing against all around
him and against Marxist orthodoxy that the time for revolution is now, that it cannot be predicted, awaited, but must be accomplished with no assurances of success. Like Paul, he puts truth to work, organizing it in the form of a
revolutionary political Party.

Zizek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for "the discourse of the analyst" (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psycho-analysis, the analyst just sits there, asking
questions from time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as

But, really, the analyst does not know.

someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better.

Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No
ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic,
Zizek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as
some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not
know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on
with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own
limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive
place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process.

Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how
he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things
for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger
to himself, a decentered agent "struggling with a foreign kernel."8 What is more likely than self-
understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one's fundamental misperception of one's own
condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis.
Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our
activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this
external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is
more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves.
Paul's Christian collectives and Lenin's revolutionary Party are, for Zizek, similarly formal arrangements, forms "for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective
political subject."9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a
political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but
has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger.

In my view, when Zizek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that
cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Zizek as occupying the position of the
analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Zizek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world's problems. The
analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In

adopting the position of the analyst, Zizek is also practicing what he refers to as "Bartleby politics," a
politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of
mind!) violently passive object who says, "I would prefer not to."10 Thus, to my mind, becoming
preoccupied with Zizek's style is like becoming preoccupied with what one's analyst is wearing. Why
such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our
desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Zizek (or the analyst) will not tell us
what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11
Case
 OV
1] I get 2nr theory – constitutive – it’s a response to 1ar arguments
2] Grant me artificial sufficiency on the tricks – a. Using anti-blackness to justify tricks
and theory obfuscate the discussion of actual anti-black violence and proves
commodification of oppression that turns it into a tool for the ballot b. Turns to reps
voters mean you lose since if inclusion is a voter it flows both ways – you causing
more anti-blackness is a reason you also lose
3] Reject all of the 1ACs claims that are about things like black fairness or essentially
just vote for me because im black – it delegitimizes the win for the black individual
and means people will just think u won bc ur black, not because u actually won the
debate.