Reading Comprehension (Psychology)

1. A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situa>on in which two or more “players” make
choices among available alterna>ves (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it
is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the
“interests” of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only
par>ally opposed depends on the type of game. Psychologically, most interes>ng situa>ons arise when the
interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a
conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to
cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own
individual interests. Internal conflicts are always psychologically interes>ng. What we vaguely call “interes>ng”
psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important
component of serious literature as dis>nguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the
serious novel, reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story, on the other hand,
depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) iden>fies stem in
these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primi>ve
level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fis>cuffs between the protagonists of good and
evil, no psychological problems are involved, or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representa>ons of
conflict. The detec>ve story, the “adult” analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at >mes been described as a
glorifica>on of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is
sustained by withholding the unravelling of a solu>on to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself
not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scien>st
supposedly unravels by deduc>on. If the adversary ac>vely puts obstacles in the detec>ve’s path toward the
solu>on, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interes>ng only to the extent that it contains
irra>onal components such as a tac>cal error on the criminal’s part or the detec>ve’s insight into some
psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly ra>onal manner is
psychologically no more interes>ng than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both
players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interes>ng but only to the
extent that it is played not quite ra>onally. Played completely ra>onally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-
toe. In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interes>ng
conceptual problems, is not interes>ng psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from ra>onal
norms.

(1) According to the passage, internal conflicts are psychologically more interes>ng than external conflicts because:
A. internal conflict, rather than external conflicts, form an important component of serious literature as
dis>nguished from less serious genres.
B. only juveniles or very few “adults” actually experience external conflict, while internal conflict is more widely
prevalent in society.
C. in situa>ons of internal conflict, individuals experience a dilemma in resolving their own preferences for different
outcomes.
D. there are no threats to the reader (or viewer) in case of external conflicts.

(2) Which, according to the author, would qualify as interes>ng psychology?

A. A sta>s>cian’s dilemma over choosing the best method to solve an op>misa>on problem.
B. A chess player’s predicament over adop>ng a defensive strategy against an aggressive opponent.
C. A mountaineer’s choice of the best path to Mt. Everest from the base camp.
D. A finance manager’s quandary over the best way of raising money from the market.

(3) According to the passage, which of the following op>ons about the applica>on of game theory to a conflict-of-
interest situa>on is true?
A. Assuming that the rank order of preferences for op>ons is different for different players.
B. Accep>ng that the interests of different players are o]en in conflict.
 C. Not assuming that the interests are in complete disagreement.
D. All of the above.

(4) The problem-solving process of a scien>st is different from that of a detec>ve because:
A. scien>st’s study inanimate objects, while detec>ves deal with living criminals or law offenders.
B. scien>sts study known objects, while detec>ves have to deal with unknown criminals or law offenders.
C. scien>sts study phenomena that are not ac>vely altered, while detec>ves deal with phenomena that have
been deliberately influenced to mislead.
D. scien>sts study psychologically interes>ng phenomena, while detec>ves deal with “adult “analogues of
juvenile adventure tales.

2. Our propensity to look out for regulari>es, and to impose laws upon nature, leads to the psychological phenomenon
of dogma>c thinking or, more generally, dogma>c behaviour: we expect regulari>es everywhere and a_empt to find
them even where there are none; events which do not yield to these a_empts we are inclined to treat as a kind of
‘background noise‘; and we s>ck to our expecta>ons even when they are inadequate and we ought to accept
defeat. This dogma>sm is to some extent necessary. It is demanded by a situa>on which can only be dealt with by
forcing our conjectures upon the world. Moreover, this dogma>sm allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by
way of approxima>ons: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very
nearly right.
It is clear that this dogma>c aatude, which makes us s>ck to our first impressions, is indica>ve of a strong belief;
while a cri>cal aatude, which is ready to modify its tenets, which admits doubt and demands tests, is indica>ve of a
weaker belief. Now according to Hume ‘s theory, and to the popular theory, the strength of a belief should be a
product of repe>>on; thus, it should always grow with experience, and always be greater in less primi>ve persons.
But dogma>c thinking, an uncontrolled wish to impose regulari>es, a manifest pleasure in rites and in repe>>on as
such, is characteris>c of primi>ves and children; and increasing experience and maturity some>mes create an
aatude of cau>on and cri>cism rather than of dogma>sm.
My logical cri>cism of Hume ‘s psychological theory, and the considera>ons connected with it, may seem a li_le
removed from the field of the philosophy of science. But the dis>nc>on between dogma>c and cri>cal thinking, or
the dogma>c and the cri>cal aatude, brings us right back to our central problem. For the dogma>c aatude is
clearly related to the tendency to verify our laws and schemata by seeking to apply them and to confirm them, even
to the point of neglec>ng refuta>ons, whereas the cri>cal aatude is one of readiness to change them - to test
them; to refute them; to falsify them, if possible. This suggests that we may iden>fy the cri>cal aatude with the
scien>fic aatude, and the dogma>c aatude with the one which we have described as pseudo-scien>fic. It further
suggests that gene>cally speaking the pseudo-scien>fic aatude is more primi>ve than, and prior to, the scien>fic
aatude: that it is a pre-scien>fic aatude. And this primi>vity or priority also has its logical aspect. For the cri>cal
aatude is not so much opposed to the dogma>c aatude as super-imposed upon it: cri>cism must be directed
against exis>ng and influen>al beliefs in need of cri>cal revision œ in other words, dogma>c beliefs. A cri>cal
aatude needs for its raw material, as it were, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogma>cally.
Thus, science must begin with myths, and with the cri>cism of myths, neither with the collec>on of observa>ons,
nor with the inven>on of experiments, but with the cri>cal discussion of myths, and of magical techniques and
prac>ces. The scien>fic tradi>on is dis>nguished from the pre-scien>fic tradi>on in having two layers. Like the la_er,
it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a cri>cal aatude towards them. The theories are passed on, not as
dogmas, but rather with the challenge to discuss them and improve upon them.
The cri>cal aatude, the tradi>on of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering their weak spots so that
they may be improved upon, is the aatude of reasonableness, of ra>onality. From the point of view here
developed, all laws, all theories, remain essen>ally tenta>ve, or conjectural, or hypothe>cal, even when we feel
unable to doubt them any longer. Before a theory has been refuted, we can never know in what way it may have to
be modified.

(1) In the context of science, according to the passage, the interac>on of dogma>c beliefs and cri>cal aatude can be
best described as:
A. A duel between two warriors in which one has to die.
 B. The effect of a chisel on a marble stone while making a sculpture.
C. The feedstock (natural gas) in fer>lizer industry being transformed into fer>lizers.
D. A predator killing its prey.
E. The effect of fer>lizers on a sapling.

(2) According to the passage, the role of a dogma>c aatude or dogma>c behaviour in the development of science is.
A. cri>cal and important, as, without it, ini>al hypotheses or conjectures can never be made.
B. posi>ve, as conjectures arising out of our dogma>c aatude become science.
C. nega>ve, as it leads to pseudo-science.
D. neutral, as the development of science is essen>ally because of our cri>cal aatude.
E. inferior to cri>cal aatude, as a cri>cal aatude leads to the aatude of reasonableness and ra>onality.

(3) Dogma>c behaviour, in this passage, has been associated with primi>ves and children. Which of the following best
describes the reason why the author compares primi>ves with children?
A. Primi>ves are people who are not educated, and hence can be compared with children, who have not yet been
through school.
B. Primi>ves are people who, though not modern, are as innocent as children.
C. Primi>ves are people without a cri>cal aatude, just as children are.
D. Primi>ves are people in the early stages of human evolu>on; similarly, children are in the early stages of their
lives.
E. Primi>ves are people who are not civilized enough, just as children are not.

(4) Which of the following statements best supports the argument in the passage that a cri>cal aatude leads to a
weaker belief than a dogma>c aatude does?
A. A cri>cal aatude implies endless ques>oning, and, therefore, it cannot lead to strong beliefs.
B. A cri>cal aatude, by defini>on, is centred on an analysis of anomalies and “noise”.
C. A cri>cal aatude leads to ques>oning everything, and in the process generates “noise” without any convic>on.
D. A cri>cal aatude is an>the>cal to convic>on, which is required for strong beliefs.
E. A cri>cal aatude leads to ques>oning and to tenta>ve hypotheses.

(5) According to the passage, which of the following statements best describes the difference between science and
pseudo-science?
A. Scien>fic theories or hypothesis are tenta>vely true whereas pseudo-sciences are always true.
B. Scien>fic laws and theories are permanent and immutable whereas pseudo sciences are con>ngent on the
prevalent mode of thinking in a society.
C. Science always allows the possibility of rejec>ng a theory or hypothesis, whereas pseudo-sciences seek to
validate their ideas or theories.
D. Science focuses on anomalies and excep>ons so that fundamental truths can be uncovered, whereas pseudo-
sciences focus mainly on general truths.
E. Science progresses by collec>on of observa>ons or by experimenta>on, whereas pseudo-sciences do not worry
about observa>ons and experiments.

3. The mo>ve force that has carried the psychoanaly>c movement to a voluminous wave of popular a_en>on and created
for its considerable following those discontent with tradi>onal methods and aatudes, is the frank direc>on of the
psychological instruments of explora>on to the insistent and in>mate problems of human rela>ons. However false or
however true its conclusions, however weak or strong its arguments, however effec>ve or defec>ve or even pernicious
its prac>ce, its mission is broadly humanis>c. Psychological enlightenment is presented as a program of salva>on. By
no other appeal could the service of psychology have become so glorified. The therapeu>c promise of psychoanalysis
came as the most novel, most ambi>ous, most releasing of the long procession of cura>ve systems that mark the history
of mental healing.
To the contemporary trends in psychology psychoanalysis actually offered a rebuke, a challenge, a supplement, though it
appeared to ignore them. With the prac>cal purpose of applied psychology directed to human efficiency it had no direct
 rela>on and thus no quarrel. The solu>on of behaviourism, likewise, bidding for popular approval by reducing
adjustment to a program of condi>oning, it inevitably found alien and irrelevant, as the behaviourist in reciprocity found
psychoanaly>c doctrine mys>cal, fantas>c, assump>ve, remote. Even to the cognate formula>ons of mental hygiene,
as likewise in its contacts with related fields of psychology, psychoanalysis made no conciliatory advances. Towards
psychiatry, its nearest of kin, it took an unfriendly posi>on, quite too plainly implying a disdain for an unprogressively
rela>ve. These estrangements affected its rela>ons throughout the domain of mind and its ills; but they came to head
in the prac>ce.
From the outset in the days of struggle, when it had but a sparse and sca_ered discipleship, to the present posi>on of
prominence, Freudianism went its own way, for the most part neglected by academic psychology. Of dreams, lapses
and neuroses, orthodox psychology had li_le said. The second reason for the impression made by psychoanalysis when
once launched against the >de of academic resistance was its recogni>on of depth psychology, so much closer to human
mo>va>on, so much more in>mate and direct than the analysis of mental factors.
Most persons in trouble would be grateful for relief without cri>cal examina>on of the theory behind the prac>ce that
helped them. Anyone at all acquainted with the ebb and flow of cures – cures that cure cures that fail – need not be
told that the scien>fic basis of the system is o]en the least important factor. Many of these systems arise empirically
within a prac>ce, which by trial, seems to give results. This is not the case in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis belongs to
the typical groups of therapies in which prac>ce is en>rely a deriva>ve of theory. Here the per>nent psychological
principle reads: “Create a belief in the theory, and the fact will create themselves”.

(1) The dis>nc>ve feature of psychoanalysis is that

(a) it provided the laymen with a scien>fic basis to the theories of psychology.
(b) it blasted the popular theory that the conscious mind could be aptly linked the >p of an iceberg.
(c) it provided effec>ve means for the cure of mental disorders.
(d) it rendered exis>ng trends in psychology defunct.

(2) The dis>nc>on between behaviourism and psychoanalysis that is heightened here is which of the following?
(a) Behaviourism is wide in scope, psychoanalysis more restricted.
(b) Behaviourism is more tolerant in their outlook, psychoanalysis more dogma>c.
(c) Behaviourism traces all ac>on to condi>oning by habit, psychoanalysis to the depths of the human mind.
(d) Behaviourism is more circumspect and deliberate in their propaga>on of theory; psychoanalysis jump to conclusion
impetuously.

(3) The statement which is refuted by the passage is this:

(a) The popularity enjoyed by psychoanalysis is partly due to the disenchantment with tradi>onal methods of
psychology.
(b) Psychoanalysis wooed people dissa>sfied with other branches of psychology to swell their ranks.
(c) Psychoanalysis were pioneers in the realm of analysis of the subconscious mind.
(d) Psychoanalysis alienated allied branches of psychology.

(4) Create a belief in theory and

(a) belief will be created itself.
(b) theory will be created itself.
(c) facts will be created themselves.
(d) All of the above.

(5) Psychoanalysis is of the opinion that:

(a) methods of psychoanalysis must be in keeping with individual needs.
(b) inferences can be drawn empirically from repeated experiments with any given theory.
(c) theory leads to prac>ce.
(d) prac>ce culminates into theory.

(6) Freudian psychoanalysis was ignored by academic psychology because of which of the following?
 (a) Its theories were not substan>ated by prac>cal evidence.
(b) It probed too deep into the human mind thereby dives>ng it of its legi>mate privacy.
(c) It did not have a large following.
(d) It was pre-occupied with unfamiliar concepts such as dreams and the subconscious mind.

(7) The only statement to receive support from the passage is which of the following?
(a) Psychoanalysis concentrated more on the theore>cal remedies than their prac>cal implementa>on.
(b) Psychoanalysis broke the shackles of conven>on in its involvement with humanis>c issues.
(c) The aatude of psychoanalysis towards allied branches of psychology could at best be described as indifferent.
(d) Psychoanalysis dispelled the prevalent no>on that dreams were repressed desires.

(8) The popularity enjoyed by the psychoanaly>cal movement may be directly a_ributed to
(a) dissa>sfac>on with exis>ng methods of psychology.
(b) its logical, coherent process of ra>ocina>on.
(c) its novel unconven>onality in both postulate and prac>ce.
(d) its concentra>on upon the humanis>c aspect of psychological analysis.

4. Aggression is any behaviour that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or
group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behaviour in order for it to be
considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an
aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental
aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an
enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the
torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad,
and includes many categories of behaviour (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group
conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of
behaviour, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common
system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the
three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the
aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The
third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or
group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result
of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that
predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviours, including suicide (self-self-directed aggression) and mental
illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives
supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition
of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property
accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviours ranging from minor
street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies.
For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviours when injected into
animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than
men and women convicted of non-violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ethnic
groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviours
(e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is
based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
(1) “[A]n enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those
inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject.” Which one of the
following best explicates the larger point being made by the author here?
a. In certain kinds of aggression, inflicting pain is not the objective, and is no more than a utilitarian means to
achieve another end.
 b. When an enemy combatant refuses to reveal information, the use of torture can sometimes involve real feelings
of hostility.
c. Information revealed by subjecting an enemy combatant to torture is not always reliable because of the
animosity involved.
d. The use of torture to extract information is most effective when the torturer is not emotionally involved in the
torture.

(2) All of the following statements can be seen as logically implied by the arguments of the passage EXCEPT:
A. Freud’s theory of aggression proposes that aggression results from the suppression of aggressive urges.
B. the Freudian theory of suicide as self-inflicted aggression implies that an aggressive act need not be sought to be
avoided in order for it to be considered aggression.
C. a common theory of aggression is that it is the result of an abnormally low neural regulation of testosterone.
D. if the alleged aggressive act is not sought to be avoided, it cannot really be considered aggression.

(3) The author identifies three essential factors according to which theories of aggression are most commonly
categorised. Which of the following options is closest to the factors identified by the author?
A. Extreme – Moderate – Mild.
B. Hostile – Instrumental – Hormonal.
C. Aggressor – Circumstances of aggression – Victim.
D. Psychologically – Sociologically – Medically.

(4) The author discusses all of the following arguments in the passage EXCEPT that:
A. aggression in most societies is kept under control through moderating the death instinct identified by Freud.
B. the nature of aggression can vary depending on several factors, including intent.
C. men in general are believed to be more hormonally driven to exhibit violence than women.
D. several studies indicate that aggression may have roots in the biological condition of humanity.

5. Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioural ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the
cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . "Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is
an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future," says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the "marshmallow test" . . . During the original marshmallow test,
psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if
they waited 15 minutes and didn't eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study
showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish
version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and
presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes' favourite food is
live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers
couldn't explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain
shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so
that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labelled with a circle to mean "immediate,"
held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labelled with a triangle to mean "delayed," held live grass shrimp. During a
control experiment, square labels meant "never."
"If their self-control is flexible and I hadn't just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to
take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it's their second preference," says Schnell . . . and that's what they
did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn't reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the
experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn't jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labelled with a triangle
“many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked
another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited
was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they
waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn "as if to distract themselves from the temptation of
the immediate reward." In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while
waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social
lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don't form relationships even with mates or young. . . .
"We don't know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are
lacking in less social species," says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.

(1) All of the following constitute a point of difference between the "original" and "modified" versions of the
marshmallow test EXCEPT that:
A. the former correlated self-control and future success, while the latter correlated self-control and survival
advantages.
B. the former was performed over a longer time span than the latter.
C. the former had human subjects, while the latter had cuttlefish.
D. the former used verbal communication with its subjects, while the latter had to develop a symbolic means of
communication.

(2) Which one of the following, if true, would best complement the passage's findings?
A. Cuttlefish wait longer than 100 seconds for the shrimp drawer to open up.
B. Cuttlefish live in big groups that exhibit sociability.
C. Cuttlefish cannot distinguish between geometrical shapes.
D. Cuttlefish are equally fond of live grass shrimp and raw prawn.

(3) In which one of the following scenarios would the cuttlefish's behaviour demonstrate self-control?
A. Asian shore crabs and raw prawns are simultaneously released while a live grass shrimp drawer labelled with
a triangle is placed in front of the cuttlefish, to be opened after one minute.
B. raw prawns are released while a live grass shrimp drawer labelled with a square is placed in front of the
cuttlefish.
C. live grass shrimp are released while two raw prawn drawers labelled with a circle and a triangle respectively
are placed in front of the cuttlefish; the triangle-labelled drawer is opened after 50 seconds.
D. raw prawns are released while an Asian shore crab drawer labelled with a triangle is placed in front of the
cuttlefish, to be opened after one minute.

(4) Which one of the following cannot be inferred from Alexandra Schnell's experiment?
A. Intelligence in a species is impossible without sociability.
B. Like human children, cuttlefish are capable of self-control.
C. Cuttlefish exert self-control with the help of diversions.
D. Cuttlefish exercise choice when it comes to food.

6. Today we can hardly conceive of ourselves without an unconscious. Yet between 1700 and 1900, this notion
developed as a genuinely original thought. The "unconscious" burst the shell of conventional language, coined as it had
been to embody the fleeting ideas and the shifting conceptions of several generations until, finally, it became fixed and
defined in specialized terms within the realm of medical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis.
The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. The
enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-
honoured expressions and traditional catchwords. At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to
themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of
preoccupations that as a group had not existed before. The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the
unconscious brought together the spiritualist and the psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as
apparitions, spectral illusions, haunted houses, mediums, trance, automatic writing); the psychiatrist or alienist
probing the nature of mental disease, of abnormal ideation, hallucination, delirium, melancholia, mania; the surgeon
performing operations with the aid of hypnotism; the magnetizer claiming to correct the disequilibrium in the universal
flow of magnetic fluids but who soon came to be regarded as a clever manipulator of the imagination; the physiologist
and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anaesthesia, the influence of the mind on the body in
 health and disease; the neurologist concerned with the functions of the brain and the physiological basis of mental life;
the philosopher interested in the will, the emotions, consciousness, knowledge, imagination and the creative genius;
and, last but not least, the psychologist.
Significantly, most if not all of these practices (for example, hypnotism in surgery or psychological magnetism)
originated in the waning years of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as
did some of the disciplines (such as psychology and psychical research). The majority of topics too were either new or
assumed hitherto unknown colours. Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between
creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .
Striving vaguely and independently to give expression to a latent conception, various lines of thought can be brought
together by some novel term. The new concept then serves as a kind of resting place or stocktaking in the
development of ideas, giving satisfaction and a stimulus for further discussion or speculation. Thus, the massive
introduction of the term unconscious by Hartmann in 1869 appeared to focalize many stray thoughts, affording a
temporary feeling that a crucial step had been taken forward, a comprehensive knowledge gained, a knowledge that
required only further elaboration, explication, and unfolding in order to bring in a bounty of higher understanding.
Ultimately, Hartmann's attempt at defining the unconscious proved fruitless because he extended its reach into every
realm of organic and inorganic, spiritual, intellectual, and instinctive existence, severely diluting the precision and
compromising the impact of the concept.
(1) Which one of the following sets of words is closest to mapping the main arguments of the passage?
A. Imagination; Magnetism; Psychiatry.
B. Unconscious; Latent conception; Dreams.
C. Language; Unconscious; Psychoanalysis.
D. Literary language; Unconscious; Insanity.

(2) Which one of the following statements best describes what the passage is about?
A. The discovery of the unconscious as a part of the human mind.
B. The identification of the unconscious as an object of psychical research.
C. The collating of diverse ideas under the single term: unconscious.
D. The growing vocabulary of the soul and the mind, as diverse processes.

(3) "The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that
underlie time-honoured expressions and traditional catchwords." Which one of the following interpretations of this
sentence would be closest in meaning to the original?
A. The meanings of time-honoured expressions were changed by innovations in literary and intellectual language.
B. Time-honoured expressions and traditional catchwords were enriched by literary and intellectual language.
C. All of the options listed here.
D. Literary and intellectual language was altered by time-honoured expressions and traditional catchwords.

(4) All of the following statements may be considered valid inferences from the passage, EXCEPT:
A. New conceptions in the nineteenth century could provide new knowledge because of the establishment of
fields such as anaesthesiology.
B. Unrelated practices began to be treated as related to each other, as knowledge of the mind grew in the
nineteenth century.
C. Eighteenth century thinkers were the first to perceive a connection between creative genius and insanity.
D. Without the linguistic developments of the nineteenth century, the growth of understanding of the soul and
the mind may not have happened.

7. Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was
innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice
in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a "linguistic genius." Since this message was
couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible
even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr.
Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In "The Language Instinct" he
has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and
speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have
been programmed with "super-rules" (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls "universal grammar"), and that these rules
are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a "black box" theory, since
one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But
now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] "black box" is situated in and around Broca's area,
on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian
natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps
have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their
brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the "language instinct," when it first appeared
among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their
competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a "grammar gene" any
more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly
raise the hackles of some behavioural psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea
that human behaviour may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem
to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay
such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one
language by an extra-terrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world's cultures, so beloved to
anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only "skin deep."
The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
(1) Which one of the following statements best summarises the author's position about Pinker's book?
A. Anatomical developments like the voice box play a key role in determining language acquisition skills.
B. The universality of the "language instinct" counters claims that Pinker's book is racist.
C. The evolutionary and deterministic framework of Pinker's book makes it racist.
D. Culture and environment play a key role in shaping our acquisition of language.

(2) According to the passage, all of the following are true about the language instinct EXCEPT that:
A. all intelligent primates are gifted with it.
B. not all intelligent primates are gifted with it.
C. developments in neuroscience have increased its acceptance.
D. it confers an evolutionary reproductive advantage.

(3) From the passage, it can be inferred that all of the following are true about Pinker's book, "The Language
Instinct", EXCEPT that Pinker:
A. writes in a different style from Chomsky.
B. disagrees with Chomsky on certain grounds.
C. draws extensively from Chomsky's propositions.
D. draws from behavioural psychology theories.

(4) On the basis of the information in the passage, Pinker and Chomsky may disagree with each other on which one
of the following points?
A. The possibility of a universal grammar.
B. The Darwinian explanatory paradigm for language.
C. The language instinct.
D. The inborn language acquisition skills of humans.

8. Humans today make music. Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement: that
only certain humans make music, that extensive training is involved, that many societies distinguish musical specialists
from non-musicians, that in today's societies most listen to music rather than making it, and so forth. These
qualifications, whatever their local merit, are moot in the face of the overarching truth that making music, considered
from a cognitive and psychological vantage, is the province of all those who perceive and experience what is made. We
are, almost all of us, musicians - everyone who can entrain (not necessarily dance) to a beat, who can recognize a
repeated tune (not necessarily sing it), who can distinguish one instrument or one singing voice from another. I will
often use an antique word, recently revived, to name this broader musical experience. Humans are musicking
creatures. . . .
The set of capacities that enables musicking is a principal marker of modern humanity. There is nothing polemical in
this assertion except a certain insistence, which will figure often in what follows, that musicking be included in our
thinking about fundamental human commonalities. Capacities involved in musicking are many and take shape in
complicated ways, arising from innate dispositions . . . Most of these capacities overlap with non-musical ones, though
a few may be distinct and dedicated to musical perception and production. In the area of overlap, linguistic capacities
seem to be particularly important, and humans are (in principle) language-makers in addition to music-makers -
speaking creatures as well as musicking ones.
Humans are symbol-makers too, a feature tightly bound up with language, not so tightly with music. The species
Cassirer dubbed Homo symbolics cannot help but tangle musicking in webs of symbolic thought and expression,
habitually making it a component of behavioural complexes that form such expression. But in fundamental features
musicking is neither language-like nor symbol-like, and from these differences come many clues to its ancient
emergence.
If musicking is a primary, shared trait of modern humans, then to describe its emergence must be to detail the
coalescing of that modernity. This took place, archaeologists are clear, over a very long durée: at least 50,000 years or
so, more likely something closer to 200,000, depending in part on what that coalescence is taken to comprise. If we
look back 20,000 years, a small portion of this long period, we reach the lives of humans whose musical capacities
were probably little different from our own. As we look farther back we reach horizons where this similarity can no
longer hold - perhaps 40,000 years ago, perhaps 70,000, perhaps 100,000. But we never cross a line before which all
the cognitive capacities recruited in modern musicking abruptly disappear. Unless we embrace the incredible notion
that music sprang forth in full-blown glory, its emergence will have to be tracked in gradualist terms across a long
period.
This is one general feature of a history of music's emergence . . . The history was at once sociocultural and biological . .
. The capacities recruited in musicking are many, so describing its emergence involves following several or many
separate strands.
(1) Which one of the following sets of terms best serves as keywords to the passage?
A. Musicking; Cognitive psychology; Antique; Symbol-makers; Modernity.
B. Humans; Psychological vantage; Musicking; Cassirer; Emergence of music.
C. Humans; Capacities; Language; Symbols; Modernity.
D. Humans; Musicking; Linguistic capacities; Symbol-making; Modern humanity.

(2) Based on the passage, which one of the following statements is a valid argument about the emergence of
music/musicking?
A. Anyone who can perceive and experience music must be considered capable of musicking.
B. Although musicking is not language-like, it shares the quality of being a form of expression.
C. 20,000 years ago, human musical capacities were not very different from what they are today.
D. All musical work is located in the overlap between linguistic capacity and music production.

(3) "Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement . . ." In the context of the passage,
what is the author trying to communicate in this quoted extract?
A. A bald statement is one that is trailed by a series of qualifying clarifications and caveats.
B. Although there may be many caveats and other considerations, the statement is essentially true.
C. Thinking beyond qualifications allows us to give free reign to musical expressions.
D. A bald statement is one that requires no qualifications to infer its meaning.

(4) Which one of the following statements, if true, would weaken the author's claim that humans are musicking
creatures?
 A. Musical capacities are primarily socio-cultural, which explains the wide diversity of musical forms.
B. Non-musical capacities are of far greater consequence to human survival than the capacity for music.
C. As musicking is neither language-like nor symbol-like, it is a much older form of expression.
D. None of the above.

9. Interpretation in our own time, however, is even more complex. For the contemporary zeal for the project of
interpretation is often prompted not by piety toward the troublesome text (which may conceal an aggression), but by
an open aggressiveness, an overt contempt for appearances. The old style of interpretation was insistent, but
respectful; it erected another meaning on top of the literal one. The modern style of interpretation excavates, and as
it excavates, destroys; it digs “behind” the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one. The most celebrated and
influential modern doctrines, those of Marx and Freud, actually amount to elaborate systems of hermeneutics,
aggressive and impious theories of interpretation. All observable phenomena are bracketed, in Freud’s phrase, as
manifest content. This manifest content must be probed and pushed aside to find the true meaning—the latent
content beneath. For Marx, social events like revolutions and wars; for Freud, the events of individual lives (like
neurotic symptoms and slips of the tongue) as well as texts (like a dream or a work of art)—all are treated as
occasions for interpretation. According to Marx and Freud, these events only seem to be intelligible. Actually, they
have no meaning without interpretation. To understand is to interpret. And to interpret is to restate the
phenomenon, in effect to find an equivalent for it.
Thus, interpretation is not (as most people assume) an absolute value, a gesture of mind situated in some timeless
realm of capabilities. Interpretation must itself be evaluated, within a historical view of human consciousness. In
some cultural contexts, interpretation is a liberating act. It is a means of revising, of transvaluing, of escaping the
dead past. In other cultural contexts, it is reactionary, impertinent, cowardly and stifling.
(1) What does the author mean by “Thus, interpretation is not…a gesture of mind situated in some timeless realm
of capabilities?”
A. Interpretation is act of understanding, developed by timeless experts.
B. Interpretation is about erecting another meaning on top of the literal one.
C. Interpretation is an act of mind which is situated in a changeless domain.
D. Interpretation is about revisiting and reinventing meanings.
E. Interpretation is being evaluative of the meaning created by an authority.

(2) According to the passage, which of the following is NOT an act of interpretation?
A. Investigating class-conflict in Charles Dicken’s novels
B. Finding underlying causes of a social evil described in a book
C. Searching for underlying themes in a historical document
D. Critical appreciation of a literary text
E. Labelling a text as blasphemous

(3) Which of the following BEST differentiates manifest content from the latent content?
A. Manifest content is natural whereas latent content is cultural
B. Manifest content is apparent whereas latent content is hidden
C. Manifest content is a superset whereas latent content is a subset
D. Manifest content is loaded whereas latent content is elusive
E. Manifest content is obscure whereas latent content is lucid

10. Stupidity is a very specific cognitive failing. Crudely put, it occurs when you don't have the right conceptual tools for
the job. The result is an inability to make sense of what is happening and a resulting tendency to force phenomena
into crude, distorting pigeonholes.
This is easiest to introduce with a tragic case. British high command during the First World War frequently
understood trench warfare using concepts and strategies from the cavalry battles of their youth. As one of Field
Marshal Douglas Haig's subordinates later remarked, they thought of the trenches as 'mobile operations at the
halt': i.e., as fluid battle lines with the simple caveat that nothing in fact budged for years. Unsurprisingly, this did
not serve them well in formulating a strategy: they were hampered, beyond the shortage of material resources, by
 a kind of 'conceptual obsolescence', a failure to update their cognitive tools to fit the task in hand. In at least some
cases, intelligence actively abets stupidity by allowing pernicious rationalisation.
Stupidity will often arise in cases like this, when an outdated conceptual framework is forced into service, mangling
the user's grip on some new phenomenon. It is important to distinguish this from mere error. We make mistakes
for all kinds of reasons. Stupidity is rather one specific and stubborn cause of error. Historically, philosophers have
worried a great deal about the irrationality of not taking the available means to achieve goals: Tom wants to get fit,
yet his running shoes are quietly gathering dust. The stock solution to Tom's quandary is simple willpower. Stupidity
is very different from this. It is rather a lack of the necessary means, a lack of the necessary intellectual equipment.
Combatting it will typically require not brute willpower but the construction of a new way of seeing our self and our
world. Such stupidity is perfectly compatible with intelligence: Haig was by any standard a smart man.
(1) Which of the following statements BEST summarizes the author's view on stupidity?
A. The inability to avoid forcing our current views on a new situation is stupidity
B. Comprehending a problem by applying our existing world view is stupidity
C. The inability to comprehend what is happening around us is stupidity
D. The novelty of the problem, in relation to our cognitive capacity, is the cause of stupidity
E. Pushing our extant solution to fix an alien problem is stupidity

(2) Which of the following statements BEST explains why stupidity for a smart person is 'perfectly compatible with
intelligence'?
A. Intelligence, when perceived through past successes, makes any rationalization of a new phenomenon
acceptable.
B. Intelligent people are scared to admit their lack of knowledge, and therefore, try to explain everything
including things they do not understand.
C. Past successes make us believe that we are intelligent and capable of explaining any new phenomenon.
D. Intelligence is poorly defined, and is usually a perception, making it compatible with stupidity.
E. A new phenomenon creates fear, rushing intelligent people to explain it to put others at ease.

(3) Based on the passage, which of the following can BEST help a leader avoid stupidity?
A. Be ready to discuss with everyone before taking a decision
B. Being aware that we must handle future with a different cognitive tool
C. Being aware that our current answers are only applicable to the current context
D. Being aware that we are short of the required resources
E. Be cautious in taking a decision until the future unfolds

11. What Arendt does for us is to remind us that our 'publicness' is as important to our flourishing as our sociability and
our privacy. She draws a distinction between what it means to act 'socially' and what is means to act 'politically.'
The social realm for Arendt is both the context where all our basic survival needs 'are permitted to appear in public'
and also the realm of 'behaviour.' One of the things she fears about modern societies is that society - focused on
how we behave and what we will permit for ourselves and others - becomes the realm of conformism. This is
worrying not just because we don't really get vibrant societies out of conformism and sameness, but also, Arendt
says because there is a risk that we think this is all there is to our living together. We lose ourselves in the tasks of
managing behaviour and forget that our true public task is to act, and to distinguish ourselves in doing so. The risk,
says Arendt, is therefore that we confuse behaviour with action, that in modern liberal societies 'behaviour replaces
action as the foremost mode of human relationship.' This confusion can happen in any area of our modern lives and
institutions, secular or faith-based. None is immune.
Arendt wants to drive home the point that the healthy public life requires that we do not just see ourselves as social
actors but also as fully public persons, committed to judging and acting as members of a common world we want to
inhabit and pass on. Arendt tells us that public action is action in which we stand out, are individuated, become in
some way excellent in a manner that is of service to others and a greater good. This is the space where we take
risks, subject our common life to scrutiny, seek justice (that sometimes requires us to transgress what seem like
accepted laws) in order to be increasingly open to the claims and needs of other humans - ones who are not our
household and our kin.
 (1) According to the passage, who can be BEST categorised as a 'public person'?
A. A wildlife photographer who highlighted the plight of poverty-stricken migrants by posting their pictures.
B. A parent who organized protests against the random fee hike by a local school.
C. An NGO employee who was tasked to lead a campaign against tribal land acquisition.
D. A local politician who filed RTI applications to unearth financial scams by a village panchayat.
E. An online fraud victim who ran a campaign against online fraudsters.

(2) Based on the passage, which of the following options BEST describes 'public action'?
A. Acting in a way that is seen as acceptable to the society
B. Acting based on our core beliefs while being mindful of what society thinks
C. Acting in a way that is perceived to be anti-social
D. Acting for a just cause regardless of what society thinks about it
E. Acting based on our conviction regardless of what society thinks

(3) Which of the following is the BEST reason for focusing on behaviour instead of acting in public?
A. To survive is not to distinguish ourselves from others
B. Our fear of being called out on our imperfect thoughts leads us to behave
C. We are dependent on each other, leading to focus on what is accepted by others
D. Our focus is to survive and not to flourish
E. The foundation of any vibrant society is based on cooperation and not confrontation

12. We stand before this great world. The truth of our life depends upon our attitude of mind towards it - an attitude
which is formed by our habit of dealing with it according to the special circumstance of our surroundings and our
temperaments. It guides our attempts to establish relations with the universe either by conquest or by union, either
through the cultivation of power or through that of sympathy. And thus, in our realization of the truth of existence,
we put our emphasis either upon the principle of dualism or upon the principle of unity.
(1) Which of the following statements can be BEST inferred from the passage?
A. Conquest and union are two ways of realising the truth of our life.
B. Our habits and surroundings determine the truth of our life.
C. War and conquest are a part of the truth of our life.
D. Principle of dualism is inferior to the principle of unity.
E. The truth of our life co-evolved with our quest for sympathetic supremacy.

(2) According to the passage, our emphasis on dualism or on unity is BEST guided by:
A. Our attitude of mind, formed by our habits
B. Our desire to achieve versus our focus on contentment
C. How powerful or sympathetic our surroundings and temperament are
D. How we deal with our surroundings and our temperaments
E. Our deals with the universe, based on special circumstances

13. Multitasking has been found to increase the production of the stress hormone cortisol as well as the fight-or-flight
hormone adrenaline, which can overstimulate your brain and cause mental fog or scrambled thinking. Multitasking
creates a dopamine addiction feedback loop, effectively rewarding the brain for losing focus and for constantly
searching for external stimulation. To make matters worse, the prefrontal cortex has a novelty bias, meaning that
its attention can be easily hijacked by something new—the proverbial shiny objects we use to entice infants,
puppies, and kittens. The irony here for those of us who are trying to focus amid competing activities is clear: The
very brain region we need to rely on for staying on task is easily distracted. We answer the phone, look up
something on the Internet, check our email, send an SMS, and each of these things tweaks the novelty-seeking,
reward-seeking centres of the brain, causing a burst of endogenous opioids (no wonder it feels so good!), all to the
detriment of our staying on task. It is the ultimate empty-caloried brain candy. Instead of reaping the big rewards
that come from sustained, focused effort, we instead reap empty rewards from completing a thousand little sugar-
coated tasks.
 In the old days, if the phone rang and we were busy, we either didn’t answer or we turned the ringer off. When all
phones were wired to a wall, there was no expectation of being able to reach us at all times—one might have gone
out for a walk or be between places, and so if someone couldn’t reach you (or you didn’t feel like being reached),
that was considered normal. Now more people have cell phones than have toilets. This has created an implicit
expectation that you should be able to reach someone when it is convenient for you, regardless of whether it is
convenient for them. This expectation is so ingrained that people in meetings routinely answer their cell phones to
say, “I’m sorry, I can’t talk now, I’m in a meeting.” Just a decade or two ago, those same people would have let a
landline on their desk go unanswered during a meeting, so different were the expectations for reachability.
(1) According to the passage, why do people in meetings routinely answer their cell phones to say, “I’m sorry, I can’t
talk now, I’m in a meeting.”?
A. Because, it is convenient for people to send a message.
B. Because, if you carry a cell phone, you have to reply.
C. Because, it conveys that the receiver is a busy person.
D. Because, people don’t mind if somebody takes a brief phone call.
E. Because, in meetings, cell phones allow people to multitask.

(2) What does the author BEST intend to convey when he says, “Now more people have cell phones than have
toilets?”
A. The need to be connected is more pronounced now.
B. The number of cell phone users has increased over time.
C. Cell phones have become a bigger necessity.
D. The usage of toilets is limited, while cell phones are used all the time.
E. Everybody wants to stay connected, using cell phones.

(3) Which of the following can be BEST inferred from the passage?
A. Multitasking gives you happiness, single-tasking gives you satisfaction.
B. Multitasking gives you a feeling of achieving many things, single-tasking enables actually achieving
something.
C. Multitasking helps you move towards different goals, single-tasking helps you achieve the one.
D. Multitasking helps you complete thousands of tasks, single-tasking makes you do one.
E. Multitasking takes you all over, single-tasking helps you achieve some goals.

14. Once, during a concert of cathedral organ music, as I sat getting gooseflesh amid that tsunami of sound, I was struck
with a thought: for a medieval peasant, this must have been the loudest human-made sound they ever
experienced, awe-inspiring in now-unimaginable ways. No wonder they signed up for the religion being proffered.
And now we are constantly pummelled with sounds that dwarf quaint organs. Once, hunter-gatherers might chance
upon honey from a beehive and thus briefly satisfy a hardwired food craving. And now we have hundreds of
carefully designed commercial foods that supply a burst of sensation unmatched by some lowly natural food. Once,
we had lives that, amid considerable privation, also offered numerous subtle, hard-won pleasures. And now we
have drugs that cause spasms of pleasure and dopamine release a thousandfold higher than anything stimulated in
our old drug-free world.
An emptiness comes from this combination of over-the-top nonnatural sources of reward and the inevitability of
habituation; this is because unnaturally strong explosions of synthetic experience and sensation and pleasure evoke
unnaturally strong degrees of habituation. This has two consequences. First, soon we barely notice the fleeting
whispers of pleasure caused by leaves in autumn, or by the lingering glance of the right person, or by the promise of
reward following a difficult, worthy task. And the other consequence is that we eventually habituate to even those
artificial deluges of intensity. If we were designed by engineers, as we consumed more, we’d desire less. But our
frequent human tragedy is that the more we consume, the hungrier we get. More and faster and stronger. What
was an unexpected pleasure yesterday is what we feel entitled to today, and what won’t be enough tomorrow.
(1) Which of the following options BEST reflects the author’s understanding of human perception of pleasure?
A. Pleasure comes from whatever we are exposed to for the first time
B. Pleasure comes from what appears to be a valuable discovery or invention
 C. Pleasure comes from what we are accustomed to
D. Pleasure comes from what we are deprived of
E. Pleasure comes from what is perceived to be extraordinary

(2) Going by the author, which of the following options BEST answers the question “how can one sustain the
pleasure derived from any experience?"
A. Periodic displeasure with synthetic experiences leads to sustaining pleasure
B. Awareness of a habituation moment helps sustain pleasure
C. The closer the experience is to nature, the more sustainable it is
D. Training to appreciate sweet whispers and fleeting moments of joy to sustain pleasure
E. The harder to replicate, the more sustainable the pleasure from that experience

(3) Which of the following options BEST describes “emptiness” as described in the passage?
A. A feeling, evoked by the carefully designed commercial foods, alluring us to them
B. The inevitability of habituation that one gets from repeated consumption of manmade foods or drugs
C. A feeling of absence of sources of pleasure when extant sources are in abundance
D. Yearning for newer sources of pleasure when extant sources are in abundance
E. A feeling of weariness around extant sources of pleasure that are in abundance

15. There is nothing spectacularly new in the situation. Most old-societies-turned-young-nation states learn to live in a
world dominated by the psychology and culture of exile. For some, the twentieth century has been a century of
refugees. Others like Hannah Arendt have identified refugees as virtually a new species of human being who have
come to symbolize the distinctive violence of our time. Refugees as contemporary symbols, however, proclaim
something more than a pathology of a global nation-state system. They also represent a state of mind, a form of
psychological displacement that has become endemic to modernizing societies. One does not even have to cross
national frontiers to become a refugee; one can choose to be seduced by the ‘pull’ of self-induced displacement
rather than be ‘pushed’ by an oppressive or violent system at home. It is this changed status of territoriality in
human life that explains why, in immigrant societies like the United States, the metaphor of exile is now jaded.
Some have already begun to argue that human beings need not have a ‘home’ as it has been traditionally
understood in large parts of the world, that the idea itself is a red herring. While the idea of exile begins to appear
trite in intellectual circles, an increasingly large proportion of the world is getting reconciled to living with the labile
sense of self. Exile no longer seems a pathology or an affliction. Displacement and the psychology of exile are in;
cultural continuities and settled communities are out; there is a touch of ennui about them.
(1) Which of the following options is CLOSEST to the meaning of the phrase “labile sense of self”?
A. Humans are not meant to be shunted around.
B. The self does not belong to a particular geography.
C. Geography does not imprison the self.
D. The self-adapts to a new geography.
E. History does not confine the self.

(2) Based on the passage, which of the following will the author DISAGREE the MOST with?
A. Intellectuals find the notion of exile irrelevant.
B. Being a refugee is a state of mind.
C. Refugees symbolize exploitation and abuse of our times.
D. A feeling of alienation in modernizing societies is a common phenomenon.
E. One does not have to cross frontiers to become a refugee.

(3) Project Affected Families (PAF) are those that are physically displaced due to construction of a large project (dam,
factory etc.) in an area where the PAF traditionally resided.
With insights from the passage, what would a project proponent, dealing with PAF, reading the following options
agree the MOST with?
A. Don’t worry about PAF, they will eventually resettle and rehabilitate.
 B. Emotional estrangement of PAF is not an area of concern.
C. PAF as a concept is irrelevant since human displacement is a historical phenomenon.
D. Industry and government should care equally about profits and people.
E. PAF do not have a labile sense of self.

16. Does having a mood disorder make you more creative? That’s the most frequent question I hear about the
relationship. But because we cannot control the instance of a mood disorder (that is, we can’t turn it on and off,
and measure that person’s creativity under both conditions), the question should really be: Do individuals with a
mood disorder exhibit greater creativity than those without? Studies that attempt to answer this question by
comparing the creativity of individuals with a mood disorder against those without, have been well, mixed.
Studies that ask participants to complete surveys of creative personality, behaviour or accomplishment, or to
complete divergent thinking measures (where they are asked to generate lots of ideas) often find that individuals
with mood disorders do not differ from those without. However, studies using “creative occupation” as an indicator
of creativity (based on the assumption that those employed in these occupations are relatively more creative than
others) have found that people with bipolar disorders are overrepresented in these occupations. These studies do
not measure the creativity of participants directly, rather they use external records (such as censuses and medical
registries) to tally the number of people with a history of mood disorders (compared with those without) who
report being employed in a creative occupation at some time. These studies incorporate an enormous number of
people and provide solid evidence that people who have sought treatment for mood disorders are engaged in
creative occupations to a greater extent than those who have not. But can creative occupations serve as a proxy for
creative ability?
The creative occupations considered in these studies are overwhelmingly in the arts, which frequently provide
greater autonomy and less rigid structure than the average nine-to-five job. This makes these jobs more conducive
to the success of individuals who struggle with performance consistency as the result of a mood disorder. The
American psychiatrist Arnold Ludwig has suggested that the level of emotional expressiveness required to be
successful in various occupations creates an occupational drift and demonstrated that the pattern of expressive
occupations being associated with a greater incidence of psychopathology is a self-repeating pattern. For example,
professions in the creative arts are associated with greater psychopathology than professions in the sciences
whereas, within creative arts professions, architects exhibit a lower lifetime prevalence rate of psychopathology
than visual artists and, within the visual arts, abstract artists exhibit lower rates of psychopathology than expressive
artists. Therefore, it is possible that many people who suffer from mood disorders gravitate towards these types of
professions, regardless of creative ability or inclination.
(1) Go through the following:
1.Mood disorders do not lead to creativity
2.The flexibility of creative occupations makes them more appealing to people with mood disorder
3.Mood swings in creative professions is less prevalent than in non-creative professions

Which of the following would undermine the passage’s main argument?

A. 2 & 3
B. 1 & 2
C. 3 only
D. 2 only
E. 1, 2 & 3

(2) All of the following can be inferred from the passage except:
A. Individuals with mood disorder often do better in creative job profiles than in regular nine-to-five jobs.
B. In creative professions, people with mood disorder are more creative than those without mood disorder.
C. Mood disorder is more prevalent among people in creative occupations than in non-creative occupations.
D. An architect is more likely to have mood disorder than a botanist.
E. An abstract painter is less likely to have mood disorder than an interpretive dance performer.

(3) Which of the following will make the authors contention in the passage fallacious?
 A. Everyone in a mental asylum is potentially a great artist.
B. Patients in mental asylums prefer time-bound repetitive jobs.
C. Creative geniuses never end up in mental asylum.
D. Those with a creative spark will land up in a mental asylum.
E. Creativity is a form of bipolar disorder.

17. Elevation has always existed but has just moved out of the realm of philosophy and religion and been recognized
as a distinct emotional state and a subject for psychological study. Psychology has long focused on what goes wrong,
but in the past decade there has been an explosion of interest in “positive psychology”—what makes us feel good
and why. University of Virginia moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, who coined the term elevation, writes, “Powerful
moments of elevation sometimes seem to push a mental ‘reset button,’ wiping out feelings of cynicism and replacing
them with feelings of hope, love, and optimism, and a sense of moral inspiration.”
Haidt quotes first-century Greek philosopher Longinus on great oratory: “The effect of elevated language upon an
audience is not persuasion but transport.” Such feeling was once a part of our public discourse. After hearing
Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address, former slave Frederick Douglass said it was a “sacred effort.” But
uplifting rhetoric came to sound anachronistic, except as practiced by the occasional master like Martin Luther King
Jr.
It was while looking through the letters of Thomas Jefferson that Haidt first found a description of elevation.
Jefferson wrote of the physical sensation that comes from witnessing goodness in others: It is to “dilate [the] breast
and elevate [the] sentiments … and privately covenant to copy the fair example.” Haidt took this description as a
mandate.
Elevation can so often give us chills or a tingling feeling in the chest. This noticeable, physiological response is
important. In fact, this physical reaction is what can tell us most surely that we have been moved. This reaction, and
the prosocial inclinations it seems to inspire, has been linked with a specific hormone, oxytocin, emitted from Vagus
nerve which works with oxytocin, the hormone of connection. The nerve’s activities can only be studied indirectly.
Elevation is part of a family of self-transcending emotions. Some others are awe, that sense of the vastness of the
universe and smallness of self that is often invoked by nature; another is admiration, that goose-bump-making thrill
that comes from seeing exceptional skill in action. While there is very little lab work on the elevating emotions, there
is quite a bit on its counterpart, disgust. It started as a survival strategy: Early humans needed to figure out when
food was spoiled by contact with bacteria or parasites. From there disgust expanded to the social realm—people
became repelled by the idea of contact with the defiled or by behaviours that seemed to belong to lower people.
“Disgust is probably the most powerful emotion that separates your group from other groups.” Haidt says disgust is
the bottom floor of a vertical continuum of emotion; hit the up button, and you arrive at elevation. Another response
to something extraordinary in another person can be envy, with all its downsides. Envy is unlikely, however, when
the extraordinary aspect of another person is a moral virtue (such as acting in a just way, bravery and self-sacrifice,
and caring for others).
(1) Which of the options below is false according to the passage?
A. Elevated language is highly persuasive.
B. Elevation results in a sense of moral inspiration of and purges us of negative emotions.
C. Reactions to extraordinary external stimuli inevitably purge us of evil.
D. Admiration is a more appropriate antonym of disgust than elevation.
E. Elevation is admiration of virtue; admiration for skill is known as admiration: awe inheres in admiration and
is generally caused by the majesty of nature.

(2) Which of the options will complete the statement given below meaningfully and appropriately, according to the
passage?

Disgust is not a self-transcending emotion because it ________.

A. is the antonym of elevation
B. springs from love
C. is linked to invocation of nature
D. it creates 'us versus them' divide based on group identities
 E. is about experiencing a moment when the ‘self’ reigns supreme

(3) Which of the options below correctly identifies the function of elevation?
A. It helps us in creating national identities.
B. It helps leaders to attract followers.
C. It helps us become religious.
D. It helps to enforce moral and ethical values in a society.
E. It helps transcendence to a higher plane.

18. It is sometimes said that consciousness is a mystery in the sense that we have no idea what it is. This is clearly not
true. What could be better known to us than our own feelings and experiences? The mystery of consciousness is
not what consciousness is, but why it is.
Modern brain imaging techniques have provided us with a rich body of correlations between physical processes in
the brain and the experiences had by the person whose brain it is. We know, for example, that a person undergoing
stimulation in her or his ventromedial hypothalamus feels hunger. The problem is that no one knows why these
correlations hold. It seems perfectly conceivable that ventromedial hypothalamus stimulation could do its job in the
brain without giving rise to any kind of feeling at all. No one has even the beginnings of an explanation of why some
physical systems, such as the human brain, have experiences. This is the difficulty David Chalmers famously called
‘the hard problem of consciousness’.
Materialists hope that we will one day be able to explain consciousness in purely physical terms. But this project
now has a long history of failure. The problem with materialist approaches to the hard problem is that they always
end up avoiding the issue by redefining what we mean by ‘consciousness’. They start off by declaring that they are
going to solve the hard problem, to explain experience; but somewhere along the way they start using the word
‘consciousness’ to refer not to experience but to some complex behavioural functioning associated with
experience, such as the ability of a person to monitor their internal states or to process information about the
environment. Explaining complex behaviours is an important scientific endeavour. But the hard problem of
consciousness cannot be solved by changing the subject.
In spite of these difficulties, many scientists and philosophers maintain optimism that materialism will prevail. At
every point in this glorious history, it is claimed, philosophers have declared that certain phenomena are too special
to be explained by physical science – light, chemistry, life – only to be subsequently proven wrong by the relentless
march of scientific progress.
Before Galileo it was generally assumed that matter had sensory qualities: tomatoes were red, paprika was spicy,
flowers were sweet-smelling. How could an equation capture the taste of spicy paprika? And if sensory qualities
can’t be captured in a mathematical vocabulary, it seemed to follow that a mathematical vocabulary could never
capture the complete nature of matter. Galileo’s solution was to strip matter of its sensory qualities and put them
in the soul (as we might put it, in the mind). The sweet smell isn’t really in the flowers, but in the soul (mind) of the
person smelling them … Even colours for Galileo aren’t on the surfaces of the objects themselves, but in the soul of
the person observing them. And if matter in itself has no sensory qualities, then it’s possible in principle to describe
the material world in the purely quantitative vocabulary of mathematics. This was the birth of mathematical
physics.
But of course Galileo didn’t deny the existence of the sensory qualities. If Galileo were to time travel to the present
day and be told that scientific materialists are having a problem explaining consciousness in purely physical terms,
he would no doubt reply, “Of course they do, I created physical science by taking consciousness out of the physical
world!”
(1) Which of the following statements captures the essence of the passage?
A. Materialists redefine the hard problem by changing the issues.
B. The hard problem cannot be solved by materialists.
C. Materialists can explain the reasons humans see a particular colour.
D. Materialists and philosophers agree on the concept of consciousness.
E. The hard problem can best be solved by segregation.

(2) Which of the following options would most likely be an example of the hard problem?
 A. Feeling the heat while holding a glass of hot water
B. Experiencing joy after doing well in an examination
C. What makes us tired after walking for 20 kilometres?
D. Why we prostrate in front of a deity?
E. Why do humans take birth?

(3) Which of the following statements can be inferred from the passage?
A. The passage argues that science could uncover all mysteries of the world.
B. The passage argues that science could uncover all mysteries of the world by giving alternative explanations.
C. The passage argues that science could never uncover all the mysteries of nature.
D. The passage argues that science and consciousness are two different domains.
E. The passage argues that nature is so mysterious that humans are not even aware of the phenomena that
can be researched.
Answer key:

(1) 1 2 3 4
C B D C
(2) 1 2 3 4 5
C E D B A
(3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C C B C C D B D
(4) 1 2 3 4
A C C A
(5) 1 2 3 4
A B A A
(6) 1 2 3 4
C C A A
(7) 1 2 3 4
B A D B
(8) 1 2 3 4
D C B A
(9) 1 2 3
D E B
(10) 1 2 3
E C C
(11) 1 2 3
A D C
(12) 1 2
A D
(13) 1 2 3
B E B
(14) 1 2 3
E C E
(15) 1 2 3
D C B
(16) 1 2 3
C B B
(17) 1 2 3
C D E
(18) 1 2 3
B E D