We Cannot Confirm nor Deny

us Department of State

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us Embassy in Guatemala

The three declassified us government documents presented below give a sense of

debates among diplomats about how to respond to mounting state terror in Gua-
temala, as well as the strategies they deployed in denying such terror was taking
place. In the first memo, dated October 5, 1981, an official from the us Department
of State’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs assesses the us gov-
ernment’s options for dealing with repression in Guatemala. The memo notes cases
where similar repression has “succeeded,” such as the dirty wars in Argentina and
Uruguay, and also cases where such repression has exacerbated support for the
insurgency. The memo recommends the State Department adopt a wait-­and-­see
approach to Guatemala: “If the repression does work and the guerrillas, their sup-
porters and sympathizers are neutralized, we can in the aftermath of the repression
work to restore normal relations. . . ”
The next two cables, dated October 21, 1982, are related to the San Francisco
massacre described by Ricardo Falla in the previous selection in this volume. One
describes an aborted embassy mission to the department of Huehuetenango to in-
vestigate accusations that the army had massacred villagers. Bad weather prevents
the mission from reaching the massacre sites, and the cable notes that the attempt
has exhausted the embassy’s travel money, precluding further attempts to verify the
situation. The next cable, issued a day later, is a systematic attempt to discredit
the work of international human rights organizations such as Amnesty Interna-
tional. These groups, the cable asserts, are being used as part of a “disinformation
campaign” to blame the Guatemalan army for the violence and prevent the United
States Congress from authorizing military aid to Guatemala.
 We Cannot Confirm nor Deny 379
Guatemala: What Next?
UNCLASSIFiED
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
TO: APR/PPC—­Mr. Einaudi
FROM: HA/HR—­Robert J. Jacobs

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SUBJECT: Guatemala: What Next?

I read with keen interest Ambassador Chapin’s assessment of General Wal-

ter’s recent visit to Guatemala. In essence Ambassador Chapin concludes
that President Lucas is not going to address our human rights concerns,
that we must recognize this fact, and that we must now decide whether
“national security considerations” require that we nevertheless go ahead
with security assistance.
The following observations and conclusions are predicated upon the im-
plicit assumption that those around General Lucas—­if not General Lucas
himself—­are at least “amorally rational”—­that is, their fundamental objec-
tive is their survival and they will do nothing which they know will result
in their self-­destruction.
In conversation with General Walters, President Lucas made clear that
his government will continue as before—­that the repression will continue.
He reiterated his belief that the repression is working and that the guerrilla
threat will be successfully routed. He prefers us assistance in this effort but
believes that he can succeed with or without us help.
General Walters’ efforts to persuade President Lucas that the repression
will only spread the guerrilla contagion were evidently unsuccessful.
Historically, of course, we cannot argue that repression always “fails”
nor can Lucas argue that it always “succeeds.” Recent history is replete with
examples where repression has been “successful” in exorcising guerrilla
threats to a regime’s survival. Argentina and Uruguay are both recent ex-
amples which come to mind. Indeed, in Guatemala during the late 1960s and
early 1970s, a policy of repression succeeded in routing the guerrilla threat to
the then existing regime. However, there are also contemporary examples
where repression “failed”—­Greece under Col. Papadopalous, Iran under
the Shah, Nicaragua under Somoza, and Venezuela under Pérez-­Jiménez.
The point is the rather obvious one that only in time will we and the
Guatemalans know whether President Lucas is correct in his conviction
that repression will work once again in Guatemala. If he is right and the
policy of repression is succeeding and will result in the extermination of
380 United States Embassy
the guerrillas, their supporters, and their sympathizers there is no need for
the us to implicate itself in the repression by supplying the gog [Govern-
ment of Guatemala] with security assistance. We did not provide such as-
sistance to Argentina in waging its “dirty war” against the guerrillas in that
country. Now that that “war” has been concluded, we are endeavoring to
re-­establish more normal relations with Argentina. It would seem that the

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Argentina experience is relevant to Guatemala. Having failed in our efforts
to dissuade the gog from its policy of repression we ought to distance our-
selves from the gog and not involve ourselves in Guatemala’s “dirty war.”
If the repression does work and the guerrillas, their supporters and sympa-
thizers are neutralized, we can in the aftermath of the repression work to
restore normal relations with the successors to President Lucas.
Our conviction that repression will not contain the guerrilla threat but
only exacerbate and compound it, will likewise only become evident over
time. At such time as the failure of repression to contain and eradicate the
guerrilla threat becomes evident, demands for a change in policy within
the gog—­and the army in particular—­should emerge. At such a juncture
the crisis in relations between Guatemala and ourselves will have politi-
cally “matured” in the sense that it will then be ripe for a successful us
diplomatic initiative. The gog under internal pressure will have no choice
but to seek political and military assistance from the us more or less on our
terms.
Whether President Lucas is right or wrong in his conviction that repres-
sion will succeed in neutralizing the guerrillas, their supporters and sympa-
thizers, the us posture ought remain one of distancing itself from the gog.
If Lucas is right and the gog can successfully “go it alone” in its policy of
repression, there is no need for the us to provide the gog with redundant
political and military support. The provisioning of such assistance would
needlessly render us a complicit party in the repression. If we are correct in
our conviction that the repression will not succeed and will only exacerbate
and compound the guerrilla threat, then we ought to distance ourselves
from the gog until such time as it arrives at this realization and is prepared
to address our human rights concerns in return for renewed us political and
military support.
The remaining question is whether we indeed have the time to await
either the success or failure of the gog’s present repressive policies. The
answer to that question depends upon an assessment of whether the guer-
rillas represent a proximate, intermediate, or long-­range threat to the gog.
If there is no proximate threat—­that is, the guerrillas do not represent a
military threat to the survival of the present Guatemalan regime over the
 We Cannot Confirm nor Deny 381
next 12 months—­then it would seem that we can await either the success or
failure of the gog’s repressive policies. The nature of military threat posed
by the guerrillas can best be assessed by the intelligence community. Before
deciding upon any next step in Guatemala we ought, therefore, undertake
such an intelligence assessment.

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We Cannot Confirm nor Deny
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
OCTOBER 21, 1982
FM: AMEMBASSY Guatemala
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ATTEMPT TO VERIFY ALLEGED MASSACRES
IN HUEHUETENANGO

Summary: Three Mission officers visited the department of Huehuetenango

by air on October 20 in an attempt to check the villages of San Francisco
and Petanac, sites of alleged large-­scale massacres purportedly carried out
by the Guatemalan army. Bad weather forced us to turn back from the
highest elevations of northern Huehuetenango; we were unable to reach
either village. emboff did, however, reach the conclusion that the army is
completely up front about allowing us to check alleged massacre sites and
to speak with whomever we wish. End summary.
The purpose of this visit was to check first-­hand two sites of alleged gog
massacres . . . Petanac, where the army is supposed to have killed 89 people
on July 14; and Finca San Francisco (actually a small village), where the
army allegedly slaughtered some 300 people on July 18. Both villages are
located in the municipality of San Mateo Ixtatan. The army has denied that
either incident took place.
We flew to the army base at Huehuetenango proper on October 20. . . .
We were again informed that the military situation in Huehuetenango is
fairly well in hand. Nevertheless, there are areas that the gog does not con-
trol, mostly the fringe areas of the department that border Mexico. Guer-
rillas apparently cross the border with some frequency, spreading mayhem,
propaganda and terror. San Francisco and Petanac are in such an area, far
north from central Huehuetenango. We were told that San Francisco and
neighboring Yalambojoch had been abandoned because of guerrilla ac-
tivity in the area. Petanac was said to have few people still living there,
but no civil defense patrol. We were invited by the military authorities in
382 United States Embassy
Hue­huetenango to travel wherever we might wish, with the caveat that
we were on our own if we touched down outside of the area secured by
the army. Suitably advised, we left for San Francisco. The weather was bad
when we left and worse when we attempted to rise yet higher in northern
Huehuetenango. The pilot advised us he could not reach the area in such
weather. We returned to the army base in Huehuetenango proper.

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Comment: Although we were unable to reach San Francisco and Peta-
nac, there are several points worth noting about the attitude of the army.
emboff knows that the ranking officials at the Huehuetenango base were
perfectly aware of the purpose of our visit. Yet, the commanding, civic ac-
tion, operations and intelligence officers all offered us the run of the depart-
ment, and this without an army escort. If these officers have something to
hide, they do not seem overly concerned about us finding it. Then again, if
San Francisco is now abandoned—­and emboff believes that it is—­we would
have found nothing to confirm or deny the massacre reports. Petanac, how-
ever, is apparently still inhabited. If the weather was clear, we could have
easily reached either village. In sum, we cannot at this time confirm or
deny the reports of massacres in this area; we can, however, affirm that the
army has no objection to our crisscrossing their combat zones in search of
information we deem necessary to possess.
This trip, at a cost of approximately $1,600, has exhausted Embassy
travel money. We should like to attempt to check these sites again in better
weather. We will need, however, additional funding. End comment. [Fred-
eric] Chapin [us ambassador to Guatemala]

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
OCTOBER 22, 1982
FROM: AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS ON GUATEMALA
BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, wola/nisgua, AND
GUATEMALAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Summary. The Embassy has analyzed reports made in the us by Amnesty

International, wola/nisgua [the Washington Office on Latin America and
the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala] and the Guatema-
lan Human Rights Commission. We conclude that a concerted disinforma-
tion campaign is being waged in the us against the Guatemalan govern-
ment by groups supporting the Communist insurgency in Guatemala. This
 We Cannot Confirm nor Deny 383
has enlisted the support of conscientious human rights and church organi-
zations which may not fully appreciate that they are being utilized. This is
a campaign in which guerrilla mayhem and violations of human rights are
ignored; a campaign in which responsibility for atrocities is assigned to the
gog [Government of Guatemala] without verifiable evidence; a campaign
in which gog responsibility for atrocities is alleged when evidence shows

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guerrilla responsibility; a campaign in which atrocities are cited that never
occurred. The campaign’s object is simple: to deny the Guatemalan army
the weapons and equipment needed from the us to defeat the guerrillas.
Thus, the groups backing the guerrillas intend to win the war against the
gog by making the us Congress the battlefield. It is the old but effective
strategy of “divide and conquer.” As Solzhenitsyn pointed out in his Nobel
lecture, “Anyone who has once proclaimed violence as his method must
inexorably choose the lie as his principle.” If those promoting such disin-
formation can convince the Congress, through the usual opinion-­makers—­
the media, church and human rights groups—­that the present gog is guilty
of gross human rights violations, they know that the Congress will refuse
Guatemala the military assistance it needs. Those backing the Communist
insurgency are betting on an application, or rather misapplication of hu-
man rights policy so as to damage the gog and assist themselves. In the
fight to win Central America, the Communists know full well the impor-
tance of Guatemala: the largest and most economically potent country in
ca, strategically located next to Mexico. The Embassy notes that the three
human rights groups whose reports are analyzed in this cable, whatever
their nominal allegiance, use many of the same incidents of alleged atroci-
ties in their reports; nor do the reports ever cite alleged guerrilla atrocities
or assassinations of police and government officials with the exception of
four or five incidents in the ai report. It seems beyond question that the
three reports are drawing on many of the same sources, sources specified
in the wola/nisgua report—­sources most of which are well-­k nown Com-
munist front groups in Central America and in the us. Although Embassy
believes it likely that the Guatemalan army has indeed committed some
atrocities, the assertion that they committed all the massacres attributed
to them is not credible, especially since analysis indicates the guerrillas are
responsible in many cases. If the gog were indeed engaged in massive ex-
trajudicial executions—­a “mad, genocidal campaign”—­in the highlands,
one must wonder why Indians are joining the civil defense patrols in great
numbers, and why thousands of Indians are coming to the army for ref-
uge in such places as Nebaj, Choatulum, and San Martín Jilotepeque. In
sum, Embassy believes that what is being planned, and successfully carried
384 United States Embassy
out, is the Communist-­backed disinformation plan mentioned above. End
summary.
What follows is a selection of comparisons of what each human rights re-
port says about a particular incident, what Guatemalan press or other Em-
bassy sources say about that incident, and a conclusion. The list is selective
merely to conserve time and space; Embassy has analyzed and compared

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every one of the 145 incidents in wola/nisgua, 47 in cdhg, and 68 in ai,
and selects those below to illustrate the five principal characteristics that
became apparent in the analysis: common source, “double reporting” (one
incident reported twice or three times as separate incidents), responsibility
undeterminable, distortion or press reports, and incident unverifiable. . . .

wola/nisgua: March 24. Alta Verapaz. Villages of Sacatalji, Cruxmax, San

Isidro Samuc, Pacayas Cisiram, El Rancho Zuixal, Chiyuc, in Coban
township. 100 peasants killed by army. Villages burned and bombed.
Source: cuc [Committee for Peasant Unity].
cdhg: Reported for March 24: names first three villages, no victims,
burned all houses. For March 24–27: names Las Pacayas, Quixal, Chi-
yuc. 100 victims. Bombed from helicopters. Source: (for all cdhg cita-
tions) “Guatemalan press.”
ai: As in cdhg, reports as two incidents of same dates as in cdhg, adding
the village of Samuc de Coban for March 24, saying the villages were
all reportedly burned to the ground; casualty figures are “not clear”
for March 24–27; ai gives Las Pacayas, Cistram (or Cisirau), El Rancho
Quixal, and Chiyuc, saying the villages were bombed, leaving 100 peo-
ple dead. No source.
Newspapers: No such report, contrary to cdhg claim.
Conclusion: Note cuc source, shared language, double-­reporting in cdhg
and ai, and lack of any Guatemalan newspaper report. Incident unveri-
fiable, possible fabrication.

wola/nisgua: March 30. Quiche. Chinique. 55 peasants murdered by

army. Source: cuc.
cdhg: Reported for April 13. Same place, same number. Source: “Guatema-
lan press.”
ai: Reported for March 30–April 3. Same place, same number. Authorities
claim encounter between guerrillas and civil defense patrol.
Newspapers: Army reported terrorists killed over 40 persons.
Conclusion: cdhg distortion of press (cdhg implies gog responsibility;
press stated army attributes to terrorists). ai even-­handed, actual re-
sponsibility undeterminable.
 We Cannot Confirm nor Deny 385
ai: March 31. Chimaltenango. Estancia de la Virgen, in San Martín Jilote-
peque township. 29 peasants killed (15 shot, 4 burned to death) by heav-
ily armed men. Most huts burned. Peasant groups blame army.
wola/nisgua: Not cited for that date, but see April 14. 20 peasants mur-
dered by army. Source: El Dia (Mexican).
cdhg: Not cited for that date, but see March 23 for Estancia de la Virgin

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(sic), Chicocon, Chuatalun (actually, Choatulum) and Chipila, 250 vic-
tims, houses burned, corn taken (or burned?); see also cdhg April 15,
Estancia de la Virgen, San Martín Jilotepeque, 250 victims (again?), “cal-
culate that since December, 1500 killed, 175 houses burned.” Apparent
double reporting.
See also ai at April 26–27, “32 peasants murdered in different communities
in Quiche and Chimaltenango, during the latter half of April, 27 stran-
gled in Estancia de la Virgen, Tioxia, Chuatatlun (sic), and Chicocon,
township of San Martín Jilotepeque.”
Newspapers: No such report for March 31. For April 14, newspapers re-
ported survivors said armed men burned about 150 homes.
Conclusion: There is no newspaper report about March 23 (cdhg), or
March 31 (ai), or April 26–27 (ai). If the newspapers’ April 14 report is
backdated to ai’s March 31 incident, survivors blamed armed men, not
army. At best, responsibility undeterminable, and confusion of dates
and numbers makes any clear picture impossible. . . .

wola/nisgua: April 23. Suchitepequez, Mazatenango. 2 prisoners mur-

dered, 2 kidnapped by death squad. Source: El Dia (Mexican). Compare
wola/nisgua same date, same place, same source, 3 men (two named)
kidnapped by death squad.
cdhg: Nothing cited.
ai: Nothing cited.
Newspapers: Police reported 2 prisoners killed, 2 kidnapped from police
car.
Conclusion: The first part of the wola/nisgua incident cited above is pos-
sible. Responsibility undeterminable; it could have been a death squad,
or it could have been leftists. The second incident appears to be double-­
reporting; incident unverifiable. It bears saying that this is one of only
two incidents on the entire comparative rundown that Embassy con-
cluded was possibly true as set forth, which is why it was selected for
inclusion here. The other appears at May 16.