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Non-Cartesian dualism
Cartesian dualism, as I have characterized it, includes a number of components.
First, minds and material bodies are taken to be distinct substances. Second, minds
and material bodies are assumed to interact causally. This interaction goes in both
directions: mental events cause and are caused by material events. We have seen
that it is possible to start with Cartesian dualism and modify particular elements to
produce new conceptions of minds and their relation to the material world. Parallelists
and occasionalists deny that minds interact with material bodies. Idealists reject
material substance and with it the notion of mind-body interaction. Epiphenomenalists
disavow mental substances, but allow mental events as causally inert by-products of
events involving material substances.

There is, however, a third component of the Cartesian view. Mental and material
substances are distinguished by unique attributes. Minds are thinking substances,
bodies are extended substances. No material body thinks, no mind is spatially
extended. Suppose we retained the first two components of Cartesian dualism, and
rejected this third component. On such a view, minds and bodies would be regarded
as distinct substances capable of causal interaction, but minds might nevertheless
possess properties Descartes would have restricted to material bodies.

Why should anyone be attracted to such a view? One reason is that by allowing that
minds can be spatially extended, the notion that they interact causally with material
bodies becomes less mysterious. We can make a start on understanding what is at
stake here by first considering a little more carefully the principles we deploy in
distinguishing substances.

Think of a boat made of wooden planks. How is the boat related to the collection of
planks? It is tempting to think that boat just is the collection of planks (and nothing
more). After all the boat goes where the collection of planks goes; the boat weighs
what the collection of planks weighs; if you purchase the boat, you thereby acquire
the collection of planks. A long tradition in philosophy, stemming from Aristotle (384-
322 BC), rejects this picture. Ordinary substances are distinguished from one another
by conditions of individuation and persistence. These conditions tell us, in effect, what
counts as a particular thing or substance and what sorts of change it could undergo
without ceasing to exist. Consider the collection of planks that makes up the boat.
Suppose you remove a plank from the collection, burn it, and replace it with a new
plank (as you might do in refitting the boat). The collection no longer exists; in its
place is one that differs from the original collection by a single plank: a new collection.
The boat, however, survives this transformation. You have changed the boat, you
have not destroyed it. Imagine now that you dismantle the boat and

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use the planks to build a belvedere. The collection survives, but the boat does not.

This line of reasoning requires an especially strict understanding of what constitutes a

collection. Collections, in this strict sense, cannot gain or lose parts without ceasing
to exist: a collection just is the sum of its members (or perhaps the sum of its
members in a particular relationship). Our everyday understanding of collections is
less rigid. You can add to your collection of baseball cards or stamps, or replace
some with others, and the collection remains. (We shall return to these matters in
chapter six.)

We might explain these facts about the boat and the collection of planks that makes it
up by allowing that the conditions of individuation and persistence for a boat differ
from those for a collection of planks. Now the tricky bit. If a boat could continue to
exist when the collection of planks that now makes it up does not, and if a collection
of planks that now constitutes a boat could exist when the boat does not, then a boat
cannot be identified with the collection of planks that makes it up at a given time.
More generally, if A can exist when B does not, then A and B cannot be the selfsame
thing. A boat and a collection of planks can spatially coincide during a period of time.
The boat, during that period, is made up of the collection of planks. Indeed, at a
particular time, the boat’s existence depends on the existence of the collection of
planks. This merely shows, however, that material composition and dependence do
not add up to identity.

I have been tossing around a number of unfamiliar technical notions: substance,

composition, identity, dependence. The best way, indeed the only way, to get a grip
on these notions is to see how they function in metaphysical theories. It is possible,
however, to say a word about each at the outset and thereby to avoid potential
confusion.

We have encountered the traditional notion of substance already, the notion of a

particular thing: this particular billiard ball, the tree in the quad, your left ear.
Substances can be made up of substances. The billiard ball, the tree, and your ear,
are made up of bits arranged in particular ways, and these bits are themselves
substances. Simple substances can be distinguished from complex substances.
Complex substances have simple substances as parts. Simple substances, in
contrast, lack parts.

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This last claim needs qualification. A simple substance cannot have parts that are
themselves substances—substantial parts. A simple substance might, however, have
non-substantial spatial or temporal parts. Suppose a simple substance is square, for
instance. Then it has a top half and a bottom half. If the square is four inches on a
side, then its surface comprises sixteen distinct regions, each of which is one inch
square. However, the square, if it is simple, is not composed or made up of these
regions in the

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way a watch is composed of gears, springs, and a case. Gears, springs, and cases
can exist when no watch exists, but its spatial regions cannot exist independently of
the square.

What of composition? The composition relation holds among substances. Several

substances compose or make up a complex substance when they are grouped
together appropriately. What constitutes an appropriate grouping will depend on the
character of the collection. The cells making up your left ear are densely packed
together and have a more or less definite boundary. In contrast, the atoms making up
my desk are, at the microscopic level, widely scattered. Not every collection of
substances makes up a substance. Consider the collection of substances consisting
of your left ear, this billiard ball, and the tree outside my window. Such a collection
does not add up to a substance. Complex substances are collections of substances
appropriately organized, where the organizing principle stems from the nature of the
substance in question. The organizing principle of the planks making up a wooden
boat differs from the organizing principle of the cells that at a given time make up
your left ear.

When we asked whether the boat was nothing more than the collection of planks, we
were asking whether the boat and the collection were identical. The notion of identity
thus appealed to is that of selfsameness. A is identical with B, in this sense, just in
case A and B are the selfsame individual. This notion of identity, strict identity, is to
be distinguished from a weaker colloquial notion. We may say that two dresses are
identical, meaning, not that the dresses are one and the same dress, but that they
are exactly similar. Henceforth, in speaking of identity, I shall mean strict identity,
selfsameness. In cases where the weaker sense is intended, I shall speak of
similarity or exact similarity.

The notion of dependence, or metaphysical dependence, is the notion of the

existence of one thing’s absolutely requiring the existence of some other thing. An A

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metaphysically depends on some B when A could not exist unless B exists.

Metaphysical dependence is to be distinguished from causal dependence. You could
not exist in the absence of oxygen, and so your existence depends on the existence
of oxygen. The dependence here is causal, however, not metaphysical. You might
have existed (if only for a brief period) in the absence of oxygen. Compare
dependence of this sort with the metaphysical dependence of a whole (the wooden
boat, for instance) on its parts at a given time. Although we can imagine the boat
surviving the replacement of individual parts over time, we cannot imagine the boat’s
continuing to exist at a time when none of its parts exist.

Armed with this vocabulary, we can begin to see how a dualism of substances need
not imply Cartesian-style dualism. The boat, let us suppose, is a substance distinct
from the collection of planks that make it up at

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a given time. The boat metaphysically depends, at that time, on the collection of
planks. Moreover, the boat, although distinguishable from the collection of planks, is
not an immaterial substance. Indeed, at any given time it shares a number of
properties with the collection of planks that make it up. The boat and the collection of
planks have the same mass, the same spatial dimensions, and occupy the same
region of space-time.

Now suppose we extend this point to the relation minds bear to bodies. Imagine that
minds—or, following Descartes, selves—were regarded as substances
distinguishable from, but dependent on, the material substances in which they were
embodied. Selves, thus considered, could possess ordinary material properties:
mass, size, and spatial location, for instance. In this regard, they would differ from
Cartesian selves.

A view of this kind has been eloquently defended by E.J. Lowe. Lowe distinguishes
selves from their bodies in the way we have distinguished a boat from the collection
of planks making it up. A self has a body, a complex material substance, on which it
depends for its existence. When you identify yourself, you are identifying a substance
that has, and depends on, a body, but which is not identical with that body. Nor are
you to be identified with any part of your body (your brain, for instance). At this point
the boat analogy breaks down. Although the self shares some properties with the
body, it is not made up of the body or the body’s parts as a boat is, at a particular
time, made up of a collection of planks.

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Bodies and selves have very different persistence conditions, so you are not identical
with your body. Similar considerations lead to the conclusion that you are not
identical with any part of your body, your brain, for instance. Your body is a complex
biological substance that includes complex substances as parts. Your brain is one of
these substantial parts. Your brain could exist when you do not. Further, you have a
particular height and mass. These you share with your body, not with your brain and
not with any other part of your body.

Even if we accept all this, even if we grant that the self is a substance, distinct from
the body but nevertheless sharing some of the body’s properties, why should we
imagine that the self is a simple substance, one without substantial parts? Lowe turns
the question around: what could parts of the self be? If we grant that the self is not
the body or a part of the body, then parts of the body could not be parts of the self,
unless the self has, in addition, other, non-bodily parts. But what might these parts
be? There are no obvious candidates.

One possibility is that the self has psychological parts. It is common nowadays (as it
was in Descartes’s day) to suppose that minds include distinct “faculties” or
“modules.” You have various perceptual faculties, for instance, as well as a faculty for
memory, and a faculty of imagination. Might these faculties be regarded as parts of
the self? Again, Lowe holds

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that this is unlikely. In the sense in which faculties might be regarded as parts of
selves, they are not substantial parts, they are not substances in their own right
capable of existence independently of the self in the way a brain or a heart is capable
of existing independently of the body of which it is a part.

Let us suppose that Lowe is right about this: the self is a simple substance distinct
from the body and from any substantial part of the body. What characteristics do
selves possess? You—that is, your self—possess some characteristics only
derivatively. Your having a left ear, for instance, amounts only to your having a body
that has a left ear. But you also have a particular height and mass. These
characteristics are, in addition to being characteristics of your body, characteristics of
you, your self. This is where Lowe and Descartes part company. According to
Descartes, selves, but not bodies, possess mental characteristics; bodies, but not
selves, possess material characteristics.

What accounts for the distinction between material characteristics you have and

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those you have only in having a body that possesses them? If the self is simple, then
it can possess only characteristics capable of possession by a simple substance.
Because ears have substantial parts, ears can be possessed only by complex
substances. In contrast, being a particular height or having a particular mass does
not imply substantial complexity.

In addition to possessing a range of material characteristics, selves possess mental

characteristics. Your thoughts and feelings belong, not to your body, or to a part of
your body (your brain), but to you. More generally, selves, but not their bodies,
possess mental characteristics.

Because selves, on a view of this sort, are not regarded as immaterial substances,
the Cartesian problem of causal interaction between selves and material substances
does not arise. Still, we are bound to wonder how a self, which is not identical with a
body or with any part of a body, could act on the world. You decide to take a stroll
and subsequently move your body in a characteristic way. How is this possible? The
causal precursors of your strolling include only bodily events and external causes of
bodily events.

Lowe contends that the model of mental causation inherited from Descartes is
inappropriate. Descartes imagines selves initiating causal sequences in the brain.
One worry about such a view is that it apparently violates our deep conviction that the
material world is causally self-contained. Perhaps such a conviction is, in the end,
merely a prejudice or, more charitably, a presumption that we could find good reason
to abandon. Until we are presented with such a reason, however, we should do well
to remain suspicious of those who would deny it solely in order to preserve a favored
thesis.

Lowe argues that there is, in any case, a more telling difficulty for the Cartesian
model. Consider your decision to take a stroll, and your right

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leg’s subsequently moving as a consequence of that decision. A Cartesian supposes

that your decision, a mental event, initiates a causal chain that eventually issues in
your right leg’s moving, a bodily event. This picture is captured in figure 2.10 (M1 is
your deciding to stroll; B1 is your right leg’s moving; E1 and E2, intervening events in
your nervous system; t0 is the time of the decision; and t1, the time at which your
right leg moves).

Figure 2.10

The Cartesian picture, Lowe thinks, includes a distortion. Imagine tracing the causal
chain leading back from the muscle contractions involved in the motion of your right
leg. That chain presumably goes back to events in your brain, but it goes back

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beyond these to earlier events, and eventually to events occurring prior to your birth.
Further, and more significantly, when the causal chain culminating in B1 is traced
back, we discover that it quickly becomes entangled in endless other causal chains
issuing in a variety of quite distinct bodily movements. (See figure 2.11.)

Here, B1 is your right leg’s moving, and B2, and B3, are distinct bodily motions. B2
might be your left arm’s moving as you greet a passing

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Figure 2.11

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acquaintance, and B3 might be the non-voluntary movement of an eyelid. The

branching causal chains should be taken to extend up the page indefinitely into the
past.

Now, although your decision to take a stroll is presumed to be responsible for B1, and
not for B2 and B3, the causal histories of these bodily events are inextricably
entangled. Prior to t0, there is no identifiable event sequence causally responsible for
B1, but not for B2 or B3. It is hard to see where in the complex web of causal
relations occurring in your nervous system a mental event might initiate B1.

Lowe contends that we can abandon the Cartesian model of mental causation, and
replace it with a model reminiscent of one proposed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
The self affects the material world, although not by initiating causal chains. Indeed, in
one important respect (and excluding uncaused events), nothing in the world initiates
a causal chain. Rather, to put it somewhat (and perhaps unavoidably) mysteriously,
the self makes it the case that the world contains a pattern of causal sequences
issuing in a particular bodily motion. A mental event (your deciding to stroll, for
instance) brings about a material event (your right leg’s moving), not by instigating a
sequence of events that culminates in your right leg’s moving, but by bringing it about
that a particular kind of causal pattern exists.

Consider a spider moving about on its web. Although the web is causally dependent
on the spider, it is a distinct substance in its own right, not identifiable with the
spider’s body or with a part of the spider. Moreover, the web affects the spider’s
movements, not by initiating them, but by “enabling” or “facilitating” them. The web,
we might say, makes it the case that the world contains motions of one sort rather
than another. In an analogous way, the self might be regarded as a product of
complex physical (and, Lowe thinks, social) processes, a product not identifiable with
its body or a part of its body. The self accounts for the character of bodily motions,
not by initiating causal chains, but by making it the case that those causal chains
have the particular shape they have.

I do not pretend that any of this is entirely clear or persuasive. My aim, however, has
not been to offer a brief on behalf of non-Cartesian dualism, but merely to propose it

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as an option worthy of serious consideration. (An alternative view of the same

territory is put forward in chapter six.) Given the tentative nature of our understanding
of minds and their relations to bodies, it would be unwise to dismiss such options
prematurely.

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Taking stock
In the chapters that follow, we shall return to many of the metaphysical themes
introduced here, refining our understanding of those themes and their bearing on
questions about minds and their relation to the material world. In the end, we may be
in a better position to assess the options open to us.

Thus far we have seen that dualism of the sort promoted by Descartes, a dualism of
substances, can be spelled out, transformed, and fine-tuned in a number of ways.
Descartes himself holds that minds—or selves—and bodies are utterly distinct kinds
of substance. Even so, mental and material substances can bear especially intimate
relations to one another. At the very least, mental and material substances interact
causally.

Descartes never fully explains how an unextended, non-spatial, thinking substance

could affect or be affected by an unthinking, extended substance. In one respect, of
course, there is only so much anyone can do to “explain” causal relations. And in this
respect, Descartes is no worse off than his latter-day materialist critics. In another
respect, however, Descartes’s picture apparently conflicts with our deeply-held belief
that the material world is “causally closed.” We are a long way from knowing whether
this belief is true, or even whether it is warranted. Even so, there is something
decidedly unsettling about accepting the Cartesian picture, if options are available
that do not oblige us to regard the world as bifurcated along mental-physical lines.

Parallelists and occasionalists accept Descartes’s dualism and resolve the problem of
causal interaction by denying that it occurs. The appearance of causal interaction
between mind and body is explained away by supposing, as proponents of
parallelism do, that sequences of events in the mental realm are perfectly correlated
with material event sequences, or that God wills into existence both mental events
and their material correlates.

Idealists agree with parallelists and occasionalists that observed causal interactions

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between minds and bodies are illusory. But idealists abandon the dualist premise that
the world contains both mental and material substances: all is mental. Indeed the
notion of objects existing independently of minds is deemed unintelligible.

We might try to preserve causal interaction between minds and bodies and still
maintain that minds and bodies are distinct substances, by rejecting the Cartesian
doctrine that mental substances lack material characteristics. Minds or selves
possess characteristics not possessed by bodies (they undergo experiences, for
instance). But minds can possess characteristics Descartes reserves for unthinking
substances. This common ground

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apparently leaves open the possibility of causal interaction between minds and
bodies.

A dualism of this stripe is left with a residual difficulty. As we noted above, modern
science has encouraged a commitment to the causal autonomy of the material world.
If mental substances causally intervene in material affairs, this would seem to require
us to abandon the idea that the material world is causally self-contained. This would
be so even if those mental substances possessed, in addition to mental
characteristics, physical characteristics.

Suppose, however, we reject the conception of mental causation implicit in the

Cartesian picture. Minds causally influence bodies, perhaps, but not by initiating
sequences of material events. Every event in such a sequence is caused by some
other material event. This is just the thesis of the causal autonomy of the material
world. It is consistent with causal autonomy, however, that minds “shape” causal
sequences—not by altering the directions of motion of elementary particles, as
Descartes supposed, but by constraining sequences in the way a spider’s web
constrains the motions of a spider.

Before embracing any of these views, however, we should do well to consider the
alternatives. This we shall do in the chapters that follow. The goal is not to promote a
single account of mind and matter, but rather to provide you the reader with the tools
to make an informed choice.

Suggested reading

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The Possibility of Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism as a Response
to Mind-Body Interactionism.
Abstract: The paper under consideration is an attempt to see how far E.J. Lowe’s Non-Cartesian Substance dualism
(NCSD) is able to account for the problem of mind-body interactionism. The paper begins with the exposition of
how NCSD is different from its cousin Cartesian dualism and how NCSD without subscribing to any kind of
property-dualism maintains distinction of mind and body as two distinct substances by virtue of their persistent
conditions but doesn’t make any necessary separation between mind and body. The paper takes into account how
Substance dualism and interactionism can go together without espousing any strict dichotomy between the
properties of mind and body (as mind shares certain physical properties with self) and how in between the two
extreme positions of Physicalism on one and Cartesian dualism on the other NCSD can maintain the causal closure
principle without making any kind of reduction of consciousness to the body. Also, to the question of certain special
properties (e.g., thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.) of self over body, though some haunt of falling prey to property
dualism is there but arguing special properties not as the only properties an attempt in defense of NCSD can be
made.

Key words: Dualism, Interactionism, NCSD, Cartesian-dualism, Property-dualism.

Comparing Non-Cartesian Substance dualism with Cartesian dualism

Cartesian dualism proceeds from a property dualism to substance dualism maintaining

consciousness and extension as two contradictory properties, which incapable of being inhered
by same substance, is inhered by two distinct, individual, independent substances mind and body
respectively. There is a dualism of mental and physical properties such that minds are
immaterial, thinking and unextended substances while bodies are extended, material and
unthinking substances. Although Cartesian dualism is in consonance with the Leibnizian
law, i.e., ‘the law of identity of indiscernibles’ where mind and body do not have exactly the
same set of properties and thus being two distinct ontological substances but this dualism
couldn’t give any sufficient account for how two disjoint substances having mutually exclusive
characteristics affect one-another causally? or how an aspatial mind devoid of any physical
characteristics is causally related to its own body or a physical body can cause a change in an
immaterial mind as such. Also, the provision of aspatial and non-physical mind being cause of
body violates the ‘causal-closure principle’ for which “any cause of a physical event must either
be located where that event is, or at least be related to it by a chain of events connecting the
location of the cause to the location of the effect”. [Lowe, 2006: 11]
On the other, we have Lowe’s Non-Cartesian Substance dualism which though espouses mind
as distinct from body but doesn’t make mind as something unextended and necessary separable
from body. It does not advocate the dichotomy of mental and physical properties but the different
persisting conditions of mind and body due to which they are regarded as distinct substances.
Nevertheless, the persisting conditions of mind may preclude some material characteristics but it
is not the case that mind possess no material characteristics and with this conception of mind
sharing physical properties, NCSD debunks any kind of property-dualism which was maintained
by Cartesian dualism.

Unlike Cartesian dualism, NCSD admits mind as a simple extended substance possessing
physical states among their modes and pertaining to the mind-body relation, an ‘embodiment
relation’ is given importance. Mind is not something that have disembodied existence and alien
to body rather sharing some physical properties of shape, size, mass and space, it is very much
embodied per se. Against the Cartesian dualism, where human beings are conceived as a
substantial union of mental but immaterial substance and material but non-mental substance,
Lowe’s NCSD conceives human persons themselves as psychological substances, rather than
being a queer hybrid of two radically alien substances. [Lowe, 2018: 170] It is not just the body
but the persons themselves occupy space and have properties of shape, size, mass, and spatial
location.

In case of NCSD, the Leibnizian law of ‘identity of indiscernibles’ comes up with limited
applicability as Lowe calls it self-sameness rather an identity and for Lowe on one hand, mind
and body are two distinct substances solely on the basis of their different persisting conditions,
on the other, to some extent they may be called identical (though in weak sense) as they share
some common properties.

Harmonizing Non-Cartesian Substance dualism with Interactionism

In the previous section we have seen the way NCSD is different from Cartesian dualism
particularly its endorsement of mind and body as two distinct substances not following from any
dichotomy of mental and physical properties rather on the basis of their different persisting
conditions. Here we will see that with NCSD, without creating any dichotomy between mental
and physical properties both substance dualism and interactionism can go together and the
difficulties faced by Cartesian dualism in order to account for the causal interaction between
mind and body can also be resolved through it.

According to NCSD, human beings are amalgamation of two different substances namely, the
mental and physical such that though they have different persisting conditions but they are
related to each other like a whole is related to the part. The manner in which a whole shares
property with its part in the same way, mind do share some physical properties like, shape, size
and spatial location with the body and it is through these common properties both self and body
come in causal contact with each other. Self or the mind is not any unextended or spurious entity
(as conceived in Cartesian entity) rather it has spatial location which becomes a ground for its
embodiment. The relationship of mind and body can be understood through the analogy of
relation between boat and collection of planks. The way boat and planks are not identical, but are
intimately related to each other and though they have different persisting conditions but they are
integrally related, in the same way, both mind and body are intimately related with each other in
spite of their being different persisting conditions.

Self as an agency can’t exercise its free will without having a body, also, without embodiment it
will be difficult to ascertain the distinction between two kinds of mental activities. Moreover, in
the instances pain or hurt, the association of pain with body rather than mind reveals self’s
relation with body as something inevitable. It is through certain physical characteristics which is
there to self because of its very embodied nature, self perceives and acts through the body, as for
instance, an act of choice (which is attributable to self) can causally explain the bodily
movement.

For NCSD, since there is no such sacrosanct distinction between the mental and physical
properties as self do shares some physical properties with body and both of them are distinct but
not mutually exclusive, therefore, the causal interaction of mind and body do not posit any threat
to substance dualism and both the causal interaction and substance dualism can go together.

NCSD- Avoiding the two extremes

In this section we will come across how NCSD is less extreme and more plausible doctrine amid
the two extremes of Physicalism and Cartesian dualism where former reduces all conscious
mental states to brain states and later keeps a strict dichotomy in terms of both property and
substance. We can see NCSD avoids both the extremes as by maintaining mind and body as
distinct but not separable entities and without reducing any conscious mental kind to physical
kind maintaining the causal-closure principle at the same time.

As against the physicalism it can be argued that it is not certain on which point or whether it is
all or some part upon which conscious thoughts and feelings depend and also self being a simple
substance has unity which can’t be possessed by brain states which lacks such unity and has
innumerable material parts. Moreover, the failure of Cartesian dualism to account for causal
interaction of mind and body and its very violation of causal-closure principle can be one of the
strongest reasons against this kind of dualism. As according to the causal-closure principle, ‘any
cause of a physical event must either be located where that event is, or at least be related to it by
a chain of events connecting the location of the cause to the location of the effect and no chain of
causation can lead backwards from a purely physical effect to antecedent causes some of which
are non-physical in character.’ [Lowe, 2006: 11]

Now with NCSD, neither any dichotomy is created between mental and physical properties nor
self is being conceived as any spurious entity separate from body but in NCSD there is an
embodied self which though distinct with body but necessary separable and is related like whole-
part relation with the body. Self shares some physical properties with the body and it is these
common physical properties which makes the causal interaction between the mind and body
possible. With NCSD, there isn’t any violation of causal-closure principle because on one hand,
the self shares the same spatial location with the body and on the other the physical properties of
self act as cause of the physical effect in the causal interaction of the self.

E.J. Lowe’s NCSD- how far is it tenable?

Lowe’s Non-Cartesian Substance dualism which is positioned in between the two extremes of
Physicalism and Cartesian dualism and does offer viable explanations to account for the causal
interaction of mind and body, is also liable to several objections like to what extent NCSD can
sustain without maintaining any property dualism? It seems that while arguing for unique
features of self (like thought, intention, desires, etc.) over body falling to the same prey of
property dualism which earlier being criticized by NCSD is there. Also, how a psychological
entity possesses material properties and what common properties do body share with the
psychological entity also remains unaccounted. But arguments in order to defend NCSD can be
deliberated as in order to argue against the first question one can bring P.F. Strawson’s position
where he accepts self neither as physical nor psychological but neutral in character. As Lowe
also argues that his view comes closer Strawson though he refrains from using the term dualism
in his book ‘Individuals’. [Lowe, 2006: 5, citing Strawson] Also, it can be argued that unique
properties are not the only properties of self and those physical properties like space, shape, size,
etc. are ample enough to ground for causal interaction and also save it from falling to property
dualism. Moreover, persons should not be seen as distinctive mental and biological entities rather
they should be seen as whole being- an embodied self without any separation form a holistic
viewpoint.

Conclusion

To conclude, it can be seen that E.J. Lowe’s Non-Cartesian Substance dualism views human
beings not as distinctive mental and biological entities rather they are seen as amalgamation of
both biological and experiencing self which are related in the same manner a part is related with
the whole. Though they are distinct by virtue of their distinctive persisting conditions but are not
necessarily separable and hence a dualism is maintained without falling to Cartesian trap. Also,
there is no dichotomy of properties maintained between them as self shares some common
property with the body and with such common property a plausible explanation for mind-body
interactionism can be given. There is no doubt that there must have some other criticisms against
NCSD as every theory comes up with certain limitations but so far as the problem of interaction
of mind and body is concerned, NCSD avoiding the two extremes of Physicalism and Cartesian
dualism gives us more plausible and systematic explanation to us.

Bibliography
 Lowe, E. J. (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental
Causation. Erkenntnis (1975-), 65(1), pp. 5–23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27667849
 Lowe, E. J. (2018). “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism”. In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J.
L. Menuge (Eds.). The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (1st ed., pp. 168-182).
Hoboken, USA: Willey Blackwell
 https://iep.utm.edu/lowe-ej/ accessed on 10/12/2021.
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Lowe’s defence of NCSD

Name – Saumya Keshari

Abstract: Substance dualism in the philosophy of mind is, naturally enough, commonly
thought of on a Cartesian model, according to which it is a dualism of two radically different
kinds of substance, one the ‘body’ (purely material) and the other the ‘mind’ (wholly
immaterial in nature). This view is subject to many familiar difficulties. However, the almost
universal rejection of Cartesian substance dualism has blinded many philosophers to the
possibility of formulating other and more plausible versions of substance dualism. Non-
Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD), as it may most perspicuously be called, is a dualism
not of minds and bodies, but of persons — or, more generally, of subjects of experience —
and their ‘organized’ bodies. This is an ontological distinction that is chiefly motivated not by
some fanciful notion that there could be disembodied persons — although NCSD does not
rule out that possibility — but by much more solid considerations which require us to
distinguish between the identityconditions of persons and their bodies. Much of the intuitive
appeal of Cartesian dualism is retained and explained by NCSD, without any of the former's
counterintuitive features and metaphysical difficulties. NCSD is, however, still a non-
materialist position, because it is incompatible even with very weak forms of non-reductive
physicalism. In this paper, I will be discussing about Non-Cartesian substance dualism, how
it is different from cartesian dualism? the basis of its distinction, certain objections and
finally, its importance.

Keywords: NCSD, Cartesian Dualism, Identity, Substance dualism, Property dualism

 Introduction: NCSD
Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from
their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as 'substances'
in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their
bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence.
According to Lowe, Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or
selves - that is to say, self-conscious subjects of experience and agents of intentional actions -
are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies, such as their
brains or central nervous systems. It regards persons as substances in their own right, in the
sense of 'substance' in which this denotes a persisting entity and bearer of properties which
does not depend for its identity on anything other than itself. However, NCSD does not
maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being
capable of disembodied existence. It allows, indeed, that persons are themselves physical
beings, in the sense that they genuinely possess physical characteristics, such as shape,
height, and weight. An early proponent of this sort of view was Strawson, although he
himself would almost certainly want to resist using the term 'dualist' in this context.

 How NCSD is different from Cartesian’s substance dualism?

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Lowe, as we have seen above, holds that a substance is an individual or a bearer of properties.
In the case of mental properties (such as pain and desire), this bearer is the subject of
experience. As well as this subject of experience, there also exists a physical body—a
substance that is the bearer of physical properties. However, the persons are to be identified
with the subject of experience rather than the biological organism. So, the two distinct
substances exist (the person and the body), but they are not identical with each other,
‘a human person is not identical with his or her “organized body” nor with any part of
it’.[1][2]
Indeed, for Lowe, the non-identity of the self with its body or any part of it implies that the
self is a simple, non-composite substance.[3]As Substances can be made up of substances.
The billiard ball, the tree, and someone’s ear, are made up of bits arranged in particular ways,
and these bits are themselves substances. So, Simple substances can be distinguished from
complex substances. Complex substances have simple substances as parts. Simple
substances, in contrast, lack parts. Therefore, Lowe is right about this: the self is a simple
substance distinct from the body and from any substantial part of the body. But we also have
a particular height and mass. These characteristics are, in addition to being characteristics of
our body, characteristics of us, our self. This is where Lowe and Descartes part company.
According to Descartes, selves, but not bodies, possess mental characteristics; bodies, but not
selves, possess material characteristics.
If the self is simple, then it can possess only characteristics capable of possession by a simple
substance and so, being a particular height or having a particular mass does not imply
substantial complexity.Because selves, on a view of this sort, are not regarded as immaterial
substances, the Cartesian problem of causal interaction between selves and material
substances does not arise. Therefore, Lowe contends that the model of mental causation
inherited from Descartes is inappropriate. The Cartesian picture, Lowe thinks, includes a
distortion.
Famously, Descartes’ dualism additionally held that a person cannot be identified with the
person’s brain or body as the person can only be the bearer of mental properties, and not
physical properties. Lowe is clear that his version of dualism is not committed to this
additional claim. Instead, Lowe rejects the idea that persons can only have mental properties:
this sort of non-Cartesian substance dualist may maintain that I [a person] possess certain
physical properties in virtue of possessing a body that possesses those properties: that, for
instance, I have a certain shape and size for this reason, and that for this reason I have a
certain velocity when my body moves.[4]
This, though, is not to say that every physical property of the body is also possessed by the
person, as otherwise the view would collapse into the view that the person is the body.
[1]Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, pp. 95-96.

[2]Lowe, Subjects of Experience, chap.-2.

[3]Corcoran (ed.), ‘Identity, composition and the self’, in Soul, Body and Survival, pp. 139-58.

[4]Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 95.

Thus, there are two distinct substances, a subject of experience (a person) and the physical
body that the person possesses, and, contra Descartes, the person can be the bearer of

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psychological and physical properties. This has an important consequence that Lowe does
hold that persons are not necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being
capable of disembodied existence. This is because Lowe thinks that it is part of the essence of
what it is to be a human that we have bodies. If there were just disembodied minds, then that
would not be a human.
Therefore, Lowe’s non-Cartesian substance dualism is a form of interactionist dualism—he is
committed to the claim that at least some mental events cause changes in the physical world.

 Non-cartesian substance dualism: the basis of distinction

Cartesian dualism includes a number of components. First, minds and material bodies are
taken to be distinct substances. Second, minds and material bodies are assumed to interact
causally. This interaction goes in both directions: mental events cause and are caused by
material events. There is, however, a third component of the Cartesian view. Mental and
material substances are distinguished by unique attributes. Minds are thinking substances,
bodies are extended substances. No material body thinks, no mind is spatially extended.
Lowe begins his approach with some foundational definitions in the philosophy of mind. The
term dualism picks out two main kinds: substance dualism and property dualism. Substance
dualism holds that mental substances and physical substances are fundamental, ontologically
distinct kinds of substance, wherein substance denotes a bearer of properties: “By a mental
substance, then, is meant a bearer of mental or psychological properties, while by a physical
substance is meant a bearer of physical properties”. [5]Generally speaking, then, substances
are fundamental bearers of properties. Property dualism holds that mental properties and
physical properties are fundamental, ontologically distinct kinds of property, wherein the
former can refer to such familiar examples as pain and desire, and the latter can refer to such
ordinary examples as mass and velocity. The logical upshot is that substance dualism entails
property dualism, but the inverse relation wouldn’t follow.[6]
While substance dualists have much in common, they disagree over whether a mental
substance can possess both mental properties and certain physical properties. For example,
Rene Descartes, held that mental substance is not extended in space. By denying the property
of spatial extension to mental substance, Descartes famously confronted the bogey of mental
causation, the dreaded problem of how an unextended thinking thing (Res Cogitans) could
causally interact with an extended thing (Res Extensa), as well as the pairing problem.
But not every advocate of substance dualism is committed to denying spatial extension to
mental substance. For example, Lowe’s non–Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) is not a
dualism of wholly incorporeal minds and bodies but a dualism of persons and their organized
bodies, wherein persons—though distinct from their organized bodies—are the bearers of
both mental properties and certain physical properties, including shape, height, spatial
location, and velocity—in virtue of possessing bodies that possess those properties. As Lowe
observes,
[5]Antonietti, Corradini, Lowe (eds), Psycho–Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach, p.167.

[6]Lowe, E. J. 2010, Substance Dualism: A Non–Cartesian Approach, In Koons, R. and Bealer G. (eds), pp.
439– 461.

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“According to non–Cartesian substance dualism, it is I, and not my body nor any part of it,
who am the bearer of mental properties, just as Descartes maintained. However, unlike
Descartes, the non–Cartesian substance dualist does not make the further claim that I am not
the bearer of any physical properties whatsoever.”[7]
But, Bearing some physical properties does not entail bearing all physical properties. NCSD
maintains that there are some physical properties that a person cannot possess without pain of
contradiction, such as being entirely composed of bodily parts. Being entirely composed of
bodily parts is a property exemplified by organized bodies alone, presumably not by persons.
These distinct observations about persons and their organized bodies, Lowe argues, preclude
their identity.
By NCSD, Lowe means a position which holds, with Descartes, that the self is distinct from
the body or any part of it, but does not insist either that the self is separable from anything
bodily or that it is spatially unextended. It allows, that is, that the self may not be able to exist
without a body and that it may be extended in space, thus possessing spatial properties such
as shape, size, and spatial location. It may also allow - indeed, Lowe thinks that it should
insist - that the self is simple, or not composed of parts.
According to Lowe, “one way to think of the self-body relation, i.e. ‘the relation of
embodiment’, according to NCSD is by analogy with the relation between a bronze statue
and the lump of bronze composing it at any given time. The statue and the lump are, very
plausibly, not identical, because each could continue to exist in the absence of the other. For
example, the lump could survive squashing into a thin disc, but the statue could not, whereas
the statue could survive the replacement of one of its arms, but would then be composed of a
different lump of matter. Even so, the statue clearly does need to be composed of something
material: it could not exist in an entirely 'disembodied' state. Of course, if the self really is
simple, as I believe, then this analogy is imperfect, but it still suffices to let us see how two
individual 'substances' may be distinct - that is, non-identical - and yet be so intimately
related that they exactly coincide spatially at a given time and necessarily share, at that time,
many of their physical properties, such as their shape, size, and mass”. [8]
It can also be said in favour of NCSD, (that why should it be preferred to Descartes's version
of substance dualism?), that, it may be urged that NCSD is a less extreme and intuitively
more plausible doctrine - less extreme because it is not committed to the possibility of
disembodied existence and more plausible because it respects our intuition that we ourselves,
not just our bodies, occupy space and have properties of shape, size, mass, and spatial
location.
Simply put, E. J. Lowe thinks that we’re mental substances (subjects) with mental properties
(such as thoughts) and that we also have physical properties (such as spatial location) due to
our possession of bodies (physical substances). Here, Lowe’s theory contrasts with
Descartes’ substance dualism of bodies and wholly incorporeal minds, because according to
Descartes, selves, but not bodies, possess mental characteristics; bodies, but not selves,
possess material characteristics. Because selves, on a view of NCSD’s sort, are not regarded
as necessarily separable immaterial substances, the Cartesian problem of causal interaction
between selves and material substances does not arise.
[7]Antonietti, Corradini, Lowe (eds), Psycho–Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach, p.169.

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[8]Lowe, Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation, p. 5.

Lowe contends that we can abandon the Cartesian model of mental causation, and replace it
with a model reminiscent of one proposed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The self affects
the material world, although not by initiating causal chains. Indeed, in one important respect
(and excluding uncaused events), nothing in the world initiates a causal chain. Rather, to put
it somewhat (and perhaps unavoidably) mysteriously, the self makes it the case that the world
contains a pattern of causal sequences issuing in a particular bodily motion. A mental event
(deciding to stroll, for instance) brings about a material event (right leg’s moving), not by
instigating a sequence of events that culminates in your right leg’s moving, but by bringing it
about that a particular kind of causal pattern exists.
Further, Bodies and selves have very different persistence conditions, so self is not identical
with body. Similar considerations lead to the conclusion that self is not identical with any part
of body, brain, for instance.
In sum, we’ve observed:
1. that NCSD is not compatible with non–reductive physicalism,
2. that it counters Cartesian substance dualism by maintaining that persons possess not
only mental properties but also certain physical properties such as spatiality, thereby
opening the theoretical door for the possibility of explaining how persons can interact
with their bodies without Descartes’ causal issues.
Therefore, the non-Cartesian substance dualism is as an option worthy of serious
consideration. Given the tentative nature of our understanding of minds and their relations to
bodies, it would be wise to opt such optionsmaturely.

 Objections
E.J. Lowe's non-Cartesian substance dualism and his proposed solutions to the problem of
mental causation have generated significant debate and criticism within the philosophical
community. Here are some of the criticisms and objections that have been raised against
Lowe's position:
1. Psychophysical Laws Critique: Critics argue that Lowe's reliance on psychophysical
laws to explain the interaction between mental and physical substances is problematic.
They contend that these laws are often seen as ad hoc explanations, lacking a clear
and empirically supported foundation. Skeptics question the existence and nature of
such laws, as they seem to be introduced solely to bridge the gap between the mental
and the physical.
2. Explanatory Gap Challenge: Lowe's theory faces the "explanatory gap" challenge,
which is a common problem for dualist theories. Critics argue that even if Lowe's
theory allows for the causal influence of mental events on physical events, it fails to
provide a satisfactory account of how this causation occurs. The nature of the
interaction between mental and physical substances remains mysterious.
3. Occam's Razor: Some critics invoke Occam's razor, arguing that Lowe's theory
introduces unnecessary complexity by positing two distinct substances (mental and
physical) and psychophysical laws. They suggest that a more parsimonious approach,

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such as a monist or materialist account, might be preferable unless dualism can

provide a compelling justification for its added complexity.
4. Epiphenomenalism Challenge: While Lowe's theory attempts to avoid
epiphenomenalism by allowing for mental causation, critics still question whether
mental events genuinely have causal efficacy or if they are merely epiphenomenal
byproducts of physical processes. Some argue that the mental may be rendered
causally impotent in Lowe's framework.
5. Lack of Empirical Evidence: Critics may contend that Lowe's non-Cartesian
substance dualism lacks empirical support or testability. The existence of mental
substances and psychophysical laws might be difficult to verify through empirical
means, which raises concerns about the empirical adequacy of the theory.
6. Naturalistic Objections: From a naturalistic perspective, Lowe's dualism may face
objections because it posits non-physical mental substances. Critics argue that this is
at odds with a naturalistic worldview that seeks to explain phenomena in terms of
physical processes and entities, without invoking non-physical substances.
7. Interaction Problem: Despite Lowe's efforts to address the interaction problem, some
critics maintain that his theory still does not provide a satisfying solution. They argue
that the dualist framework itself is problematic and raises questions about how two
fundamentally different kinds of substances can interact in a coherent and intelligible
manner.
It's important to note that these criticisms do not necessarily invalidate Lowe's non-Cartesian
substance dualism, but they highlight the challenges and objections that philosophers have
raised regarding this approach. Philosophical debates surrounding the mind-body problem
and the nature of mental causation are ongoing, and different scholars may have varying
perspectives on the adequacy of dualist theories like Lowe's in addressing these complex
issues.

 Conclusion
NCSD may be defended on a number of grounds, one of which is that it is better equipped
than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of
mental causation. Cartesian dualism, by insisting that the self or soul, as a purely mental
substance, possesses no physical characteristics and hence lacks spatial location, is apparently
faced with a difficulty of explaining how any soul is causally related to its 'own' body in
particular, as Jaegwon Kim has recently urged.Physicalism, on the other hand, seems ill-
equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation,
because it effectively reduces all such causation to 'blind' physical causation at a neuro
logical level. NCSD, recognizing as it does both the physical aspects of the self and the
autonomous nature of mental causation, is well positioned to avoid both of these failings.

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References:

 Lowe, E. J. “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation.”

Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 65, No. 1, Prospects for Dualism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
(2006), pp. 5-23. Accessed: 06-03-2016.
 Heil, John. “PHILOSOPHY OF MIND A contemporary introduction”. London and New York,
2000.
 Lowe, E. J. “Substance Dualism: A Non‐Cartesian Approach.” Pages 439–462, Published:
March 2010.
 Miller, J. T. M. “Edward Jonathan Lowe (1950-2014).” https://iep.utm.edu/lowe-ej/.
 JONES, MOSTYN and ERIC LAROCK. “From Murphy’s Christian Physicalism to Lowe’s
Dualism.” 2021 TheoLogica.

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