TSO-C112f

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Effective
Aircraft Certification Service
Date: {mm/dd/yy}
Washington, DC

Technical Standard Order

Subject: Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select
(ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment
1. PURPOSE. This technical standard order (TSO) is for manufacturers applying for a TSO
authorization (TSOA) or letter of TSO design approval (LODA). In it, we (the Federal Aviation
Administration, (FAA)) tell you what minimum performance standards (MPS) your Air Traffic
Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) airborne equipment must meet
for approval and identification with the applicable TSO marking.

2. APPLICABILITY. This TSO affects new applications submitted after its effective date.

a. TSO-C112e will also remain effective until 18 months after the effective date of an
amendment to Title 14, Code of Regulations (14 CFR) 91.225 and 91.227 to allow installation
and use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment
manufactured under TSO-C166c for compliance with those rules. After this date, we will no
longer accept applications for TSO-C112e.

Note: The end of effectivity of TSO-C112e is tied to the ADS-B Out rule change because an
ADS‑B transmitting capability compliant with TSO-C166c is required to be incorporated
into a transponder compliant with TSO-C112f.

b. ATCRBS/Mode S equipment approved under a previous TSOA may still be

manufactured under the provisions of its original approval.

3. REQUIREMENTS. New models of ATCRBS/Mode S equipment identified and

manufactured on or after the effective date of this TSO must meet the requirements in RTCA,
Inc. Document RTCA/DO-181F, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Air Traffic
Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment, Sections 2.1
and 2.2, dated December 17, 2020, as modified by Change 1, dated January 25, 2022 and
appendix B of this TSO.

a. Functionality. This TSO’s standards apply to equipment intended to be used in aircraft

to provide responses to air traffic control (ATC) ground-based Secondary Surveillance Radar
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(SSR) and Collision Avoidance System (CAS) interrogations. The ATCRBS/Mode S equipment
may also support additional features, as shown in RTCA/DO-181F, Section 1.4.4, as amended by
appendix A of this TSO.

b. Failure Condition Classifications.

(1) Failure of the function defined in paragraph 3.a of this TSO resulting in any of the
unannunciated failures listed in sections 3.b(1)(a) through 3.b.(1)(d) below is a
hazardous/severe-major failure condition.

a. Lack of responses to valid interrogations.

b. Replies sent with incorrect timing.

c. Replies sent with an incorrect altitude.

d. Transmission of incorrect information to a connected collision avoidance

system (CAS).

Note: The hazardous/severe-major failure condition classifications in paragraph 5.b(1)

are based on the following: failure to respond to valid interrogations could contribute to
a missing resolution advisory (RA) on another aircraft’s CAS; replies with incorrect
timing and/or incorrect altitude could contribute to a missing or incorrect RA on another
aircraft’s CAS; and incorrect information transmitted to an associated CAS could result
in a missing or incorrect RA on own aircraft. Refer to TSO-C219, Airborne Collision
Avoidance System (ACAS) Xa/Xo for the definitions of incorrect and missing RAs.

(2) Annunciated loss of the function defined in paragraph 3.a of this TSO is:

(a) Major for transponders with the CAS Compatibility feature.

(b) Minor for transponders without the CAS Compatibility feature.

(3) Design the system to at least these failure condition classifications.

c. Functional Qualification. Demonstrate the required functional performance under the

test conditions specified in RTCA/DO-181F, Sections 2.4 – 2.9, as modified by Change 1 and
appendix B of this TSO.

d. Environmental Qualification. Demonstrate the required performance under the test

conditions specified in RTCA/DO-181F, Section 2.3, as modified by Change 1, using standard
environmental conditions and test procedures appropriate for airborne equipment. You may use a
different standard environmental condition and test procedure than RTCA/DO-160G,
Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, dated December 8,
2010, provided the standard is appropriate for ATCRBS/Mode S airborne equipment.

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Note: The use of RTCA/DO-160D (with Changes 1 and 2 only, without Change 3
incorporated) or earlier versions is generally not considered appropriate, and will
require substantiation via the deviation process as discussed in paragraph 3.g of this
TSO.

e. Software Qualification. If the article includes software, develop the software according
to RTCA/DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,
dated December 13, 2011, including referenced supplements as applicable, to at least the
software level consistent with the failure condition classification defined in paragraph 3.b of this
TSO. Development to a lower development assurance level may be justified for certain cases and
accepted, but will lead to installation restrictions and must be documented in the installation and
limitations manual defined in paragraph 5.a of this TSO. For example, equipment intended only
for installation in aircraft certified under 14 CFR 23 Classes I – III (as defined in Advisory
Circular (AC) 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes, dated
November 17, 2011), may be designed to the appropriate development assurance level in
accordance with AC 23.1309-1E, Figure 2, provided installation is limited to aircraft of the
corresponding Figure 2 airplane class in accordance with paragraph 5.a(3) of this TSO.

Note: The “hazardous/severe-major” failure condition classification defined in

paragraph 3.b of this TSO equates to the “hazardous” failure condition category defined in
RTCA/DO-178C.

f. Electronic Hardware Qualification. If the article includes complex custom airborne

electronic hardware, then develop the component according to RTCA/DO-254, Design
Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, dated April 19, 2000, to at least the
design assurance level consistent with the failure condition classification defined in
paragraph 3.b of this TSO. For custom airborne electronic hardware determined to be simple,
RTCA/DO-254, Section 1.6 applies. Development to a lower design assurance level may be
justified for certain cases and accepted, but will lead to installation restrictions and must be
documented in the installation and limitations manual defined in paragraph 5.a of this TSO. For
example, equipment intended only for installation in aircraft certified under 14 CFR 23 Classes I
– III (as defined in AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23
Airplanes, dated November 17, 2011), may be designed to the appropriate development
assurance level in accordance with AC 23.1309-1E, Figure 2, provided installation is limited to
aircraft of the corresponding Figure 2 airplane class in accordance with paragraph 5.a(3) of this
TSO.

g. Deviations. We have provisions for using alternate or equivalent means of compliance

with the criteria in the MPS of this TSO. If you invoke these provisions, you must show that your
equipment maintains an equivalent level of safety. Apply for a deviation pursuant to
14 CFR 21.618.

4. MARKING.

a. Mark at least one major component permanently and legibly with all of the information
in 14 CFR 45.15(b). The marking must also include the transponder’s functional level, minimum

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peak output power, and optional additional features in accordance with RTCA/DO-181F, Section
1.4.6 (Transponder Labeling), as modified by appendix A of this TSO. As a courtesy to operators
and repair stations, and with the permission of RTCA, Inc., we have included a modified copy of
Sections 1.4.3 through 1.4.6 in appendix A. Appendix A also contains a cross-reference to the
equipment marking in 14 CFR part 43 appendix F.

b. If the article includes software and/or airborne electronic hardware, then the article part
numbering scheme must identify the software and airborne electronic hardware configuration.
The part numbering scheme can use separate, unique part numbers for software, hardware, and
airborne electronic hardware.

c. You may use electronic part marking to identify software or airborne electronic
hardware components by embedding the identification within the hardware component itself
(using software) rather than marking it on the equipment nameplate. If electronic marking is
used, it must be readily accessible without the use of special tools or equipment.

5. APPLICATION DATA REQUIREMENTS. You must give the FAA aircraft certification
office (ACO) manager responsible for your facility a statement of conformance, as specified in
14 CFR 21.603(a)(1), and one copy each of the following technical data to support your design
and production approval. LODA applicants must submit the same data (excluding paragraph 5.g
of this TSO) through their civil aviation authority.

a. Manuals containing the following:

(1) Operating instructions and article limitations sufficient to describe the equipment’s
operational capability.

(2) Detailed description of any deviations.

(3) Installation procedures and limitations sufficient to ensure that the

ATCRBS/Mode S airborne equipment, when installed according to the installation or operational
procedures, still meets this TSO’s requirements. Limitations must identify any unique aspects of
the installation. The limitation must also include a note with the following statement: “This
article meets the minimum requirements of TSO-C112f. Installation of this article requires
separate approval.” The installation manual must also identify information security review and
mitigation strategies for any interface by which the equipment makes use of a non-trusted
connectivity where the installation could potentially have aircraft information security
vulnerabilities as described in RTCA/DO-181F, Section 1.9. RTCA/DO-326A, Airworthiness
Security Process Specification, dated August 6, 2014, and RTCA/DO-356A, Airworthiness
Security Methods and Considerations, dated June 21, 2018 provide guidance for analyzing the
threat of intentional unauthorized electronic interaction.

(4) For each unique configuration of software and airborne electronic hardware,
reference the following:

(a) Software part number, including revision and design assurance level,

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(b) Airborne electronic hardware part number including revision and design
assurance level, and

(c) Functional description.

(5) A summary of the test conditions used for environmental qualifications for each
component of the article. For example, a form as described in RTCA/DO-160G, Appendix A.

(6) Schematic drawings, wiring diagrams, and any other documentation necessary for
installation of the ATCRBS/Mode S airborne equipment.

(7) By-part-number list of replaceable components that makes up the ATCRBS/Mode S

airborne equipment. Include vendor part number cross-references, when applicable.

b. Instructions covering periodic maintenance, calibration, and repair, to ensure that the
ATCRBS/Mode S airborne equipment continues to meet the TSO approved design. Include
recommended inspection intervals and service life, as appropriate.

c. If the article includes software: a plan for software aspects of certification (PSAC),
software configuration index, and a software accomplishment summary.

d. If the article includes simple or complex custom airborne electronic hardware: a plan for
hardware aspects of certification (PHAC), a hardware verification plan, top-level drawing, and
hardware accomplishment summary (or similar document, as applicable).

e. A drawing depicting how the article will be marked with the information required by
paragraph 4 of this TSO.

f. Identify functionality or performance contained in the article not evaluated under

paragraph 3 of this TSO (defined as non-TSO functions). Non-TSO functions can be accepted in
parallel with the TSOA. For those non-TSO functions to be accepted, you must declare these
functions and include the following information with your TSO application:

(1) Description of the non-TSO function(s), such as performance specifications, failure

condition classifications, software, hardware, and environmental qualification levels. Include a
statement confirming that the non-TSO function(s) do not interfere with the article’s compliance
with the requirements of paragraph 3 of this TSO.

(2) Installation procedures and limitations sufficient to ensure that the non-TSO
function(s) meets the declared functions and performance specification(s) described in
paragraph 5.f.(1) of this TSO.

(3) Instructions for continued performance applicable to the non-TSO function(s)

described in paragraph 5.f.(1) of this TSO.

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(4) Interface requirements and applicable installation test procedures to ensure

compliance with the non-TSO function(s) performance data defined in paragraph 5.f.(1) of this
TSO.

(5) Test plans, analysis, and results, as appropriate, to verify that the performance of the
hosting TSO article is not affected by the non-TSO function(s).

(6) Test plans and analysis as appropriate, to verify that the function and performance
of the non-TSO function(s) are as described in paragraph 5.f.(1) of this TSO.

g. The quality manual required by 14 CFR 21.608, including functional test specifications.
The quality system must ensure that you will detect any change to the approved design that could
adversely affect compliance with the TSO MPS and reject the article accordingly. Applicants
who currently hold TSOAs must submit revisions to the existing quality manual as necessary
(not required for LODA applicants).

h. A description of your organization as required by 14 CFR 21.605.

i. Material and process specifications list.

j. A list of all drawings and processes (including revision level) that define the article’s
design.

k. Manufacturer’s TSO qualification report showing results of testing accomplished

according to paragraph 3.c of this TSO.

6. MANUFACTURER DATA REQUIREMENTS. Besides the data given directly to the

responsible ACO, have the following technical data available for review by the responsible
ACO:

Note: The following data for a LODA applicant may be made available for review
through its CAA. Refer to the applicable bilateral agreement for specific details
regarding access to this data.

a. Functional qualification specifications for qualifying each production article to ensure

compliance with this TSO.

b. Article calibration procedures.

c. Schematic drawings.

d. Wiring diagrams.

e. Material and process specifications.

f. The results of the environmental qualification tests conducted according to

paragraph 3.d of this TSO.

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g. If the article includes software, the appropriate documentation defined in RTCA/DO-

178C, including all data supporting the applicable objectives in Annex A, Process Objectives
and Outputs by Software Level.

h. If the article includes complex custom airborne electronic hardware, the appropriate
hardware life-cycle data in combination with design assurance level, as defined in
RTCA/DO-254, Appendix A, Table A-1. For simple custom airborne electronic hardware, the
following data are required: test cases or procedures, test results, test coverage analysis, tool
assessment and qualification data, and configuration management records, including problem
reports.

i. If the article contains non-TSO function(s), you must also make items 6.a through 6.h of
this TSO available, as they pertain to the non-TSO function(s).

7. FURNISHED DATA REQUIREMENTS.

a. When furnishing one or more articles manufactured under this TSO to one entity (such
as an operator or repair station), provide one copy or online access to the data in paragraphs 5.a
and 5.b of this TSO. Add any other data needed for the proper installation, certification, use, or
continued compliance with the TSO, of the ATCRBS/Mode S airborne equipment.

b. If the article contains declared non-TSO function(s), include one copy of the data in
paragraphs 5.f.(1) through 5.f.(4) of this TSO.

c. If the article contains software, include one copy of the Open Problem Report (OPR)
summary.

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8. HOW TO GET REFERENCED DOCUMENTS.

a. Order RTCA documents from RTCA, Inc., 1150 18th Street NW, Suite 910,
Washington, DC 20036. Telephone: (202) 833-9339; fax: (202) 833-9434. You can also order
copies online at www.rtca.org.

b. Order copies of 14 CFR parts 21, 23, 25, 29, and 45 from the Superintendent of
Documents, Government Publishing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis, MO 63197-9000.
Telephone (202) 512- 1800, fax (202) 512-2104. You can also order copies online at
www.gpo.gov, or find an electronic version at the FAA’s online Dynamic Regulatory System
(DRS), https://drs.faa.gov.

c. You can find a current list of TSOs and advisory circulars at https://drs.faa.gov. You will
also find the TSO Index of Articles at the same site.

Patrick R. Mullen
Manager, Technical Innovation Policy Branch
Policy & Innovation Division
Aircraft Certification Service

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Appendix A. Mode S Transponder Marking Scheme and

14 CFR Part 43 Appendix F Cross-Reference

Purpose. This appendix describes the cross-reference for ATCRBS / Mode S equipment
markings into the classes referenced in 14 CFR Part 43, appendix F as of the date of this TSO 1.
In addition, the relevant portions of RTCA/DO-181F regarding labeling scheme (Sections 1.4.3
through 1.4.6) are repeated below in Table 2 as a courtesy to operators and repair stations. Text
added to modify RTCA DO-181F and Change 1 is underlined and highlighted. Text to be
removed is struck through.

Detailed Cross-Reference. The TSO-C112f marking scheme does not match the classes called
out in appendix F to part 43. This TSO marking is based on RTCA/DO-181F, Section 1.4.6
(Transponder Labeling), rather than the marking that had been defined previously in TSO-C112.

To assist operators in complying with part 43, the following table shows the relationship between
the TSO-C112f marking scheme and the part 43, appendix F requirement. Manufacturers of
TSO-C112f equipment are encouraged to include this cross-reference information in their
operating guide and maintenance instructions.

Table 1 –TSO-C112f marking and Part 43 Appendix F class:

ATC Mode S Transponder Equipment Part 43 Appendix F Class Reference

TSO-C112f Transponder1 marking: 14 CFR Part 432 Appendix F class:

Level 2, Class 1 Class 2A

Class 2B, with optional
Level 2, Class 2
1090 + 1 MHz reply frequency
Level 3, Class 1 Class 3A
Class 3B, with optional
Level 3, Class 2
1090 + 1 MHz reply frequency
Level 4, Class 1 Class 4
Class 4, except for RF peak output power and
Level 4, Class 2
suppression which should apply Class 3B
Level 5, Class 1 Class 4
Class 4, except for RF peak output power and
Level 5, Class 2
suppression which should apply Class 3B
1
Per RTCA/DO-181F, § 1.4.6 – with options noted in § 1.4.4
2
The Part 43 marking shown here originated in the original version of TSO-C112

1
14 CFR 43, Sec. F43.1, Appendix F ATC Transponder Tests and Inspections, Amendment No. 43-31, effective
date 08/18/1989.

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Table 2 – Excerpt from RTCA Document DO-181F

(Reprinted with the permission of RTCA, Inc.)

1.4.3 Mode S Transponder Levels

Mode S transponders provide for both ground-to-air and air-to-air surveillance.
The data link function of Mode S transponders provides for information transfer in both
directions between ground and air and between airborne units. Data link implementation
varies and depends on the amount of information to be exchanged.
Possible implementation configurations and additional transponder features are
summarized in the following paragraphs.

1.4.3.1 Level 1 Transponders

The Level 1 Transponder is no longer supported in these MOPS.

1.4.3.2 Level 2 Transponders

Level 2 Transponders provide the minimum capabilities of a Mode S Transponder. This
consists of the surveillance functions contained in §1.4.3.2.1 and a set of datalink
functions described in §1.4.3.2.2. A Level 2 transponder is classified as either a Level
2 or a Level 2 plus options according to the datalink functions it supports - Comm-A
and/or Air-Initiated Comm-B (AICB).
A Level 2 Transponder shall include surveillance functions defined in §1.4.3.2.1 and the
basic datalink functions defined in §1.4.3.2.2.1.
A Level 2 Transponder with Comm-A datalink capability shall include the surveillance
functions defined in §1.4.3.2.1 and the data link functions defined in §1.4.3.2.2.1 and
§1.4.3.2.2.2.
A Level 2 Transponder with Air-Initiated Comm-B (AICB) datalink capability shall
include the surveillance functions defined in §1.4.3.2.1 and the data link functions
defined in §1.4.3.2.2.1 and §1.4.3.2.2.3.

Notes:
1. The definition of Level 2 in previous MOPS versions included both Comm-A and
AICB capabilities.
2. Level 2 transponders may optionally support Comm-A and/or Air Initiated
Comm-B. Level 2 transponder options are summarized in §2.2.19.1.
3. The ground-air-ground data link capability comprises a multitude of services and
can be implemented according to the number and kind of services available,
depending on the mission requirements of the aircraft. Protocols provide a means
of reporting to the ground the specifics of each individual installation.
4. Requirements for Elementary Surveillance (ELS) and Enhanced Surveillance
(EHS) compliant transponders are included in this document (§2.2.24 and
§2.2.25). Specific data registers and content appropriate for these capabilities
are provided.

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1.4.3.2.1 Surveillance Function

The Level 2 Transponder supports the surveillance functions of both ATCRBS and
Mode S ground sensors and the surveillance functions of airborne interrogators. The
transponder also supports replying to an airborne interrogator thereby making its
presence known.
Level 2 Transponders shall have the following surveillance capabilities prescribed for:

a. Mode A Code (sometimes referred to as a 4096 identity code) and Mode C

pressure-altitude reporting,
b. Mode S-Only All-Call transactions,
c. Addressed surveillance altitude and identity transactions,
d. Lockout protocols including Surveillance Identifier (SI) code,
e. Basic data protocols,
f. Air-to-air service and squitter transactions, and
g. Acquisition squitter.

Note: These capabilities permit SSR surveillance based on pressure-altitude reporting

and the Mode A Code. In an SSR Mode S environment, technical performance
relative to a Mode A/C transponder is improved because of Mode S selective
aircraft interrogation.

1.4.3.2.2 Datalink Function

1.4.3.2.2.1 Basic Datalink Function

In addition to the surveillance capabilities contained in §1.4.3.2.1, Level 2 Transponders
shall also support:

a. Air-to-ground data downlink, Ground-initiated Comm-B (GICB) data

extraction (§2.2.19.1.12.1, §2.2.19.1.12.2, §2.2.19.1.12.3),
b. Comm-B broadcast (§2.2.19.1.12.5),
c. Data link capability reporting (§2.2.19.1.12.6),
d. Aircraft identification reporting (§2.2.19.1.13),
e. CAS crosslink capability (§2.2.19.1.18),
f. Overlay Command Capability (§2.2.19.1.12.1, §2.2.19.1.12.2, §2.2.19.1.12.6.2).

Notes:
1. These Datalink functions enable data exchange between aircraft and ground
systems.
2. As a minimum, Level 2 Transponders support generation of long replies that
enable interrogators to extract data registers from the aircraft.

1.4.3.2.2.2 Additional Comm-A Datalink Capability

In addition to supporting the basic datalink function (§1.4.3.2.2.1), a Level 2
Transponder with Comm-A capability shall also support receipt of Ground-to-air uplink

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data via long interrogations. The relevant requirements for transponders that support the
Comm-A capability are identified in §2.2.19.1 per Table 2-2.

1.4.3.2.2.3 Additional Air-Initiated Comm-B Datalink Capability

In addition to supporting the basic datalink function (§1.4.3.2.2.1), a Level 2
Transponder with Air-Initiated Comm-B (AICB) capability shall also support Air-to-
ground downlink including multisite protocols to manage data extraction by multiple
ground interrogators. The relevant requirements for transponders that support the AICB
capability are identified in §2.2.19.1 per Table 2-2.

1.4.3.3 Level 3 Transponders (Uplink ELM Capability)

The Level 3 transponder includes the capabilities of the Level 2 Transponder and both
the Comm-A and AICB optional datalink capabilities. In addition, the Level 3
transponder supports reception of ELMs from the ground. ELMs are received in the
Comm-C format and consist of a burst of uplink transmissions that need not be replied
to individually but are acknowledged in a reply containing a summary of the received
interrogations.
Level 3 Transponders shall have the capabilities of §1.4.3.2, including §1.4.3.2.2.2 and
§1.4.3.2.2.3, and also those prescribed for ground-to-air Extended Length Message
(ELM) communications.
Note: Level 3 permits extended length data link communications from ground-to-air
and thus may provide retrieval from ground-based data banks and receipt of
other air traffic services which are not available with Level 2 transponders.

1.4.3.4 Level 4 Transponders (Full ELM Capability)

In addition to all the capabilities of a Level 3 Transponder, the Level 4 Transponder can
generate ELMs for transmittal to the ground by using the Comm-D format.
Level 4 transponders shall have the capabilities of §1.4.3.3 and also those prescribed for
air-to-ground extended length message (ELM) communications.
Note: Level 4 permits extended length data link communications from air to ground
and thus may provide access from the ground to airborne data sources and the
transmission of other data required by air traffic services which are not
available with Level 2 transponders.

1.4.3.5 Level 5 Transponders (Enhanced Data Link Protocol Capability)

In addition to the full ELM capability, the Level 5 Transponder can support the enhanced
data link protocols. The protocols provide for increased data link capacity by permitting
data link transactions with more than one Mode S interrogator at a time without the need
for multisite coordination. These protocols are fully conformant to the data link
transponder protocols description of §2.2.19.1 to §2.2.20.2.1 (the standard protocols)
and are therefore compatible with interrogators that are not equipped for the enhanced
protocol.
Level 5 transponders shall have the capabilities of §1.4.3.4 and also those prescribed for
enhanced Comm-B and extended length message (ELM) communications.
Note: Level 5 permits Comm-B and extended length data link communications with
multiple interrogators without requiring the use of multisite reservations. The

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Level 5 Transponder has a higher minimum data link capacity than the other
transponder levels.

1.4.4 Additional/Specific Features

Some transponder installations may support additional/specific features:

• CAS Compatibility –CAS compatible transponders (see §2.2.22).

• Antenna Diversity – Diversity transponders include two RF channels to support

installations with two antennas. Transponders implementing diversity comply with
the requirements of §2.2.12.

• Extended Squitter – Extended squitter transponders (see §2.2.23). The

requirements for Extended Squitter message formats and information content are
contained in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and
Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B) (RTCA DO-260C / EUROCAE
ED-102B or latest version).

• Hijack Mode Capability – Transponders implementing the Hijack mode will

adhere to the requirements contained in Appendix D.

• Elementary Surveillance – elementary surveillance transponders will have the

capabilities prescribed for elementary surveillance operation (see §2.2.24).

• Enhanced Surveillance – enhanced surveillance transponders will have the

capabilities prescribed for enhanced surveillance operation (see §2.2.25).

• Basic Dataflash – transponders implementing Basic Dataflash will adhere to the

requirements provided in §2.2.27.

• Level 2 with Comm-A – Level 2 transponders which optionally support the

Comm-A capability as defined in §1.4.3.2.2.2.

• Level 2 with AICB – Level 2 transponders which optionally support the AICB
capability as defined in §1.4.3.2.2.3.

• Interrogation/Reply Monitor (IRM) – IRM transponders will have the

capabilities prescribed for IRM operation in Appendix F.

• Phase Overlay of Mode S Replies – transponders that support Phase Overlay of

Mode S Replies adhere to the requirements contained in §2.2.3.1.1, §2.2.4.3, and
§2.2.28.

• Interval Management Report – transponders that support the ADS-B Flight-deck

Interval Management application adhere to the requirements contained in
§2.2.29.1.

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These additional features and corresponding identification codes are summarized in

Table 1-1.
Table 1-1: Transponder Optional Additional Features

Additional Features ID Code

CAS Compatibility a
AICB Capability b
Comm-A Capability c
Antenna Diversity d
Extended Squitter e
Hijack Mode Capability h
Elementary Surveillance (only) l
Interrogation/Reply Monitor m
Enhanced Surveillance (including Elementary Surveillance) n
Phase Overlay of Mode S Replies o
Interval Management Report r
Basic Dataflash t

1.4.5 Minimum Output Power Level Designation

Two minimum peak output power levels are supported by this version of these MOPS,
125 watts (21.0 dBW), which is designated as Class 1 equipment, and 70 watts (18.5
dBW), which is designated as Class 2 equipment. For more information on output power
levels, see §2.2.3.2.
Class 1 equipment is intended for use in aircraft that operate at altitudes above 15000 ft,
or have a maximum cruising true airspeed in excess of 175 kt (324 km/h).
Class 2 equipment may be used in aircraft that operate at altitudes not exceeding 15000
ft, and have a maximum cruising true airspeed not exceeding 175 kt (of km/h).

1.4.6 Transponder Labeling

Each transponder shall be clearly labeled with its actual functional level, minimum peak
output power, and its optional additional features. The label shall contain the word
“Level” followed by one digit between 1 and 5. (see §1.4.3.1 through §1.4.3.5), followed
by the ID Codes for the incorporated optional additional features as shown in Table 1-
1, followed by the transponders’ minimum peak output power designation as “Class 1”
or “Class 2” (see §1.4.5).
Example 1 – For a Level 2 transponder that incorporates Extended Squitter and
Elementary Surveillance with a minimum peak output power of 70 watts (18.5 dBW):
the transponder would be labeled “Level 2el, Class 2.”
Example 2 – For a Level 2 transponder that incorporates CAS compatibility, antenna
diversity, Extended Squitter and Enhanced Surveillance with a minimum peak output
power of 125 watts (21.0 dBW), the transponder would be labeled “Level 2aden,
Class 1.”
The label should be clearly visible when the transponder is mounted on the aircraft. In
the case of a change of transponder level or capability, the label must be changed
appropriately.

A-6
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

Note: For transponders where “Level” or “additional features” might be changed

through an approved software update, a means to display the labeling
electronically would meet the above intent.

A-7
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

Appendix B. FAA Modifications to RTCA/DO-181F

Purpose. This appendix lists FAA modifications to RTCA/DO-181F, Minimum Operational

Performance Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select
(ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment. Text added to modify RTCA/DO-181F is underlined
and highlighted. Text to be removed is struck through. Due to the extensive modifications,
Section 2.5.4.32.2 is included as a complete change. Excerpts from RTCA/DO-181F are
reprinted with the permission of RTCA, Inc.

2.2.22.1.2.2.3 Data Link Capability Codes in MB for Systems Loaded Directly by CAS
The following guidance applies to all “loaded directly by CAS” (as defined in §2.2.22.f)
transponder/CAS systems.
In this system, the CAS unit will directly provide the data necessary to set all of the CAS
related bits in the Data Link Capability Report (Bit # 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 69, 70, 71, & 72
or MB Bit # 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 37, 38, 39, & 40). The transponder shall set the bits in the
Data Link Capability Report as provided by the CAS, except when a failure is detected as
specified in §2.2.22.2.3. None of the other bits in this register are to be affected by the
loading of these bits by CAS.

2.2.22.2.3 CAS Failure Data Handling

When a CAS failure is detected, the transponder shall perform the following:
• Set RI (see §2.2.22.1.5) to ZERO.
• Set SL (see §2.2.14.4.38) to ZERO.
• Set BDS 1,0 bits 11-14, 16, 37-40 to ZERO.
• Set BDS 0,F and 3,2 through 3,F to ZERO
• Set BDS E,5 and E,6 to ZERO
• Set BDS 3,0 and 3,1 to zero when the RAT field (§2.2.22.1.2.1.3) is ZERO.
Notes:
1. Ways in which the transponder detects a CAS failure include, but are not limited to:
(a) non-operational CAS (§2.2.22.1.5); (b) a failure of the CAS/transponder interface
(§2.2.22.2.2). The reception of RI=0 with SL=1 indicates that the CAS is in standby
and is not considered to be a failure condition.
2. A CAS failure during an active RA will trigger RA termination (RAT=1). The frozen
RA report will be retained while RAT=1 and set to ZERO upon RAT expiration.

2.2.26.3 Update Rate

a. The maximum update interval at which a data field in a Register will be reloaded
with valid data is defined for each register in Table B-2-1 in Appendix B.
b. The transponder will load valid data into the related transponder Register as soon
as it becomes available at the Mode S Specific Services Entity.
c. The time between availability of data that causes a change in a data field of a
Register and the time that the change is made to the Register will be less than the
maximum update interval specified in Table B-2-1 in Appendix B.

B-1
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

d. If a data field cannot be updated with valid data within twice the specified
maximum update interval defined for the Register or 2.6 seconds (whichever is the
greater), then Status Bit (if specified) of the field will be set to ZERO (0)
(INVALID) and that data field will be ZEROed.

2.5.4.30 Procedure #30: Sensitivity Level Operation (§2.2.22.1.5)

This test verifies that the transponder receives sensitivity level information from the CAS
unit and correctly reports this information in outgoing DF=0, 16 replies.
Note: When the following tests are performed with a RTCA DO-185A (or later)
transponder/CAS interface, bit=48 of the Data Link Capability Report must be set
consistent with the RI field specified for the test (see §2.2.22.1.2.2).
a. Send a status = "Active CAS with resolution capability" and a sensitivity level=6
to the transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Interrogate the transponder with a UF=0 and a UF=16 non-acquisition
interrogation.
Show that the transponder correctly reports the CAS status and sensitivity level in
the RI and SL fields respectively.
b. Not used.
c. Not used.
d. Send a sensitivity level=4 to the transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Interrogate the transponder with a UF=0 and a UF=16 non-acquisition
interrogation.
Show that the transponder correctly reports the CAS status and sensitivity level in
the RI and SL fields respectively.
e. Send a status = "CAS with resolution capability inhibited" and a sensitivity level=2
to the transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Interrogate the transponder with a UF=0 and a UF=16 non-acquisition
interrogation.
Show that the transponder correctly reports the CAS status and sensitivity level in
the RI and SL fields respectively.
f. Send a status = "No operating CAS" and a sensitivity level=1 to the transponder
via the transponder/CAS interface.
Interrogate the transponder with a UF=0 and a UF=16 non-acquisition
interrogation.
Show that the transponder correctly reports the CAS status and sensitivity level in
the RI and SL fields respectively (RI=0, SL=1).
g. Send a status = "Active CAS of junior status with resolution capability or Passive
CAS with resolution capability" and a sensitivity level=3 to the transponder via the
transponder/CAS interface.
Interrogate the transponder with a UF=0 and a UF=16 non-acquisition
interrogation.

B-2
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

Show that the transponder correctly reports the CAS status and sensitivity level in
the RI and SL fields respectively.

2.5.4.32.1 Procedure #32: Transmission of CAS Capability Information to a Mode S Sensor

(§2.2.22.g, §2.2.22.1.2.2, §2.2.22.1.2.2.1, and §2.2.22.1.2.2.2) and to other CAS Aircraft
(§2.2.22.1.5) for a Transponder Operating with an FAA TSO-C119a Compatible CAS
a. Enable the transponder only (i.e., establish the state where the transponder/CAS
interface is not operational).
b. Interrogate the transponder with a non-acquisition UF=0 interrogation.
Show that the transponder replies with the correct capability information in the DF=0
reply (i.e., RI=0).
c. Interrogate the transponder with the following four interrogations:
UF=4 with RR=17 and DI≠7;
UF=5 with RR=17 and DI≠7;
UF=20 with RR=17, DI=7, and RRS=0;
UF=21 with RR=17, DI=7, and RRS=0.
Show, in each of the four cases, that the transponder replies with the correct capability
information in the DF=20, 21 replies (i.e., BDS1=1, BDS2=0, bit 48=0, and bits 69,
70, 71, and 72 = 0000).
d. Repeat the procedures in steps b and c above for each of the following 16 cases:
(1) CAS reports “Any CAS with resolution capability inhibited” (RI=2) to the
transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Show that the transponder replies with RI=2 in the DF=0 reply.
Show that the transponder replies with bit 48=1 and bits 69, 70, 71, and
72=‘0000’ in the DF=20, 21 replies.
(2) CAS reports “Active CAS with resolution capability” (RI=3) to the
transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Show that the transponder replies with RI=3 in the DF=0 reply.
Show that the transponder replies with bit 48=1 and bits 69, 70, 71, and
72=‘0100’ in the DF=20, 21 replies.
(3) Not Used.
(4)-(16) CAS reports RI=0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 to the
transponder via the transponder/CAS interface.
Show that for each case, the transponder replies with RI=0 in the DF=0
reply.
Show that for each case, the transponder replies with bit 48=0 and bits 69,
70, 71, and 72 = ‘0000’ in the DF=20, 21 replies.

B-3
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

2.5.4.32.2 Procedure #32: Transmission of CAS Capability Information to a Mode S Sensor

(§2.2.22.g, §2.2.22.1.2.2, §2.2.22.1.2.2.1, and §2.2.22.1.2.2.3) and to other CAS Aircraft
(§2.2.22.1.5) for a Transponder Capable of Being Loaded Directly by CAS
a. Enable the transponder only (i.e., establish the state where the transponder/CAS
interface is not operational).
b. Interrogate the transponder with a non-acquisition UF=0 interrogation.
Show that the transponder replies with the correct capability information in the DF=0
reply (i.e., RI=0).
c. Interrogate the transponder with the following four interrogations:
UF=4 with RR=17 and DI≠7;
UF=5 with RR=17 and DI≠7;
UF=20 with RR=17, DI=7, and RRS=0;
UF=21 with RR=17, DI=7, and RRS=0.
Show, in each of the four cases, that the transponder replies with the correct capability
information in the DF=20, 21 replies (i.e., BDS1=1, BDS2=0, bits 43 – 46 = 0000, bit
48=0, and bits 69 – 72 = 0000).
d. Establish the transponder/CAS interface. Repeat the procedures in Steps “b” and “c”
above for each of the following cases. For each case use the following values for
validating that the CAS version is correctly reported in the Data Link Capability
Report:
DO-185A TCAS: Bits 43 – 46: 0000, Bits 71, 72: 10
DO-185B / ED-143 TCAS: Bits 43 – 46: 0000, Bits 71, 72: 01
DO-385 / ED-256 ACAS Xa: Bits 43 – 46: 0001, Bits 71, 72: 11
DO-386 / ED-275 ACAS Xu: Bits 43 – 46: 0010, Bits 71, 72: 11

(1) CAS reports (RI=2) and reports bit 48=1, bit 69=1 and bit 70=0 in its Data Link
Capability Report information to the transponder via the transponder/CAS
interface.
Show that the transponder replies with RI=2 in the DF=0 reply.
Show that the transponder replies with bits 43 – 46, 71 and 72 reporting the
correct CAS version, bit 48=1, bit 69=1 and bit 70=0 in the DF=20, 21 replies.
(2) CAS reports (RI=3) and reports bit 48=1, bit 69=0 and bit 70=1 in its Data Link
Capability Report information to the transponder via the transponder/CAS
interface.
Show that the transponder replies with RI=3 in the DF=0 reply.
Show that the transponder replies with bits 43 – 46, 71 and 72 reporting the
correct CAS version, bit 48=1, bit 69=0 and bit 70=1 in the DF=20, 21 replies.
(3) CAS reports RI=0 and reports bit 48=0, bit 69=1, and bit 70=0 in its Data Link
Capability Report information to the transponder via the transponder/CAS
interface.

B-4
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

Show that the transponder replies with RI=0 in the DF=0 reply.
Show that the transponder replies with bits 43 – 46, 71 and 72 reporting the
correct CAS version, bit 48=0, bit 69=1 and bit 70=0 in the DF=20, 21 replies.

2.5.4.33.1 Procedure #33: CAS or transponder/CAS Interface Failure During Transmission of

RA Report and Data Link Capability Report to a Mode S Sensor (§2.2.22.1.2.1.3 and
§2.2.22.1.2.2.3) for a Transponder Operating with an RTCA DO-185A/B or RTCA
DO-385 compatible CAS
For each of the CAS versions use the following values to validate that the CAS version is
correctly reported in the Data Link Capability Report:
DO-185A TCAS: Bits 43 – 46: 0000 , Bits 71, 72: 10
DO-185B TCAS: Bits 43 – 46: 0000 , Bits 71, 72: 01
DO-385 ACAS Xa: Bits 43 – 46: 0001 , Bits 71, 72: 11

a. Send the following content for the RA report to the transponder via the
transponder/CAS interface once per second for 5 seconds.
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAI Bits 60 – 88
48 010101010101010101 0 11001100110011001100110011001
During the 5th second, cause the CAS unit to report a CAS failure to the transponder
(i.e., RI=0 and SL=1).
Interrogate the transponder once per second during the 5 seconds described above and
for an additional 25 seconds (30 seconds total) with UF=4 interrogations with RR=19,
DI=7, and RRS=0 and with UF=4 interrogations with RR=19, DI=7, and RRS=1.
Show that in the DF=20 RA report replies:
For the first 23 ±1 seconds, the ‘TCAS bit’ is set in the DR field. Thereafter, it is
cleared.
For the first 5 seconds, the RA Report has the following content:
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 Same as input 0 Same as input

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 0

For the next 18 ±1 seconds, the content is:

BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 Same as input 1 Same as input

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 0

B-5
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

For the remaining 7 ±1 seconds, the values are:

BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 000000000000000000 0 00000000000000000000000000000

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 0

b. Repeat the steps in step “a”, except during the 5th second, cause the transponder to
recognize a failure on the transponder/CAS interface (i.e., disconnect or otherwise
interrupt the interface). The results should be the same as in step “a”.
c. Send “Active CAS with resolution capability” (RI=3), CA operational = 1, no hybrid
surveillance capability, and the CAS version to the transponder via the
transponder/CAS interface for 5 seconds.
During the 5th second, cause the transponder to recognize a failure on the
transponder/CAS interface (i.e., disconnect or otherwise interrupt the interface) CAS
unit to report a CAS failure to the transponder.
Interrogate the transponder once per second for 30 seconds with UF=4 interrogations
with RR=17, DI 7 and RRS=0.
Show that in the DF=20 Data Capability Report replies:
For the first 5 seconds, bits 43, 44, 45, 46, 71 and 72 indicate the correct CAS
version, bit 48=1, bit 69=0, and bit 70=1.
For the next 25 seconds, bits 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 69, 70, 71, and 72 all = 0 bits 43 –
46, 71 and 72 indicate the correct CAS version, bit 48=0, bit 69=0 and bit 70=1.
d. Repeat steps a., b. and c., this time using the following content as input:
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAI Bits 60 – 88
48 101010101010101010 0 00110011001100110011001100110
The results should be the same as in test steps a., b. and c.

2.5.4.33.2 Procedure #33: CAS or transponder/CAS Interface Failure During Transmission of

RA Report and Data Link Capability Report to a Mode S Sensor (§2.2.22.1.2.1.3 and
§2.2.22.1.2.2.3) for a Transponder Operating with an RTCA DO-386 Compatible
ACAS Xu
a. Send the following content for the RA report to the transponder via the
transponder/CAS interface once per second for 5 seconds:
Part 1 of RA report: Content for BDS register 3016
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAI Bits 60 – 88
48 010101010101010101 0 11001100110011001100110011001
Part 2 of RA report: Content for BDS register 3116

B-6
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 000111000111000111000111000111000111000111000111

During the 5th second, cause the CAS unit to report a CAS failure to the transponder
(i.e., RI=0 and SL=1).
Interrogate the transponder once per second during the 5 seconds described above and
for an additional 25 seconds (30 seconds total) with UF=4 interrogations with RR=19,
DI=7, and RRS=0 and with UF=4 interrogations with RR=19, DI=7, and RRS=1.
Show that in the DF=20 RA report replies:
For the first 23 ±1 seconds, the ‘TCAS bit’ is set in the DR field. Thereafter, it is
cleared.
For the first 5 seconds, the RA Report has the following content:
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 Same as input 0 Same as input

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 Same as input

For the next 18 ±1 seconds, the content is:

BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 Same as input 1 Same as input

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 Same as input

For the remaining 7 ±1 seconds, the values are:

BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAT Bits 60 – 88
48 000000000000000000 0 00000000000000000000000000000

BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

b. Repeat the steps in step “a”, except during the 5th second, cause the transponder to
recognize a failure on the transponder/CAS interface (i.e., disconnect or otherwise
interrupt the interface). The results should be the same as in step “a”.
c. Send “Active CAS with resolution capability” (RI=3), CA operational = 1, no hybrid
surveillance capability, and CAS of ACAS Xu version 1 to the transponder via the
transponder/CAS interface for 5 seconds.

B-7
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

During the 5th second, cause the transponder to recognize a failure on the
transponder/CAS interface (i.e., disconnect or otherwise interrupt the interface) CAS
unit to report a CAS failure to the transponder.
Interrogate the transponder once per second for 30 seconds with UF=4 interrogations
with RR=17 and DI 7.
Show that in the DF=20 Data Capability Report replies:
For the first 5 seconds, bits 43, 44, 45, and 46 are 0010, bit 48=1, and bits 69, 70,
71, and 72=1111.
For the next 25 seconds, bits 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 69, 70, 71, and 72 all = 0 bits 43 –
46=0010, bit 48=0, and bits 69 – 72=1111.
d. Repeat steps a., b. and c., this time using the following content as input:
Part 1 of RA report: Content for BDS register 3016
BDS Bits 41 – 58 RAI Bits 60 – 88
48 101010101010101010 0 00110011001100110011001100110
Part 2 of RA report: Content for BDS register 3116
BDS Bits 41 – 88
49 111000111000111000111000111000111000111000111000

The results should be the same as in test steps a., b. and c.

2.8 Generic Register XX Test Procedures (§2.2.26)

Introduction:
The following general test procedure is intended to provide guidelines for minimal
verification that newly implemented GICB registers are properly being serviced. These
test procedures are not intended for Extended Squitter registers; tests for Extended Squitter
are included in RTCA/DO-260C and Change 1.

2.8.1 Purpose and Definition (§2.2.26.1)

Note: In the following subsections, “ddd” means the decimal equivalent to XX16. For
instance, for 4016, “ddd” = 6410 = 64.
For any newly added given Register XX16, refer to Appendix B, Table B-3-ddd for
appropriate format and definition of the Register.
2.8.2 Data Requirement (§2.2.26.2)
a. Ensure that no data is being provided to the transponder that could be used to fill any
field in the Register XX16 that is being tested.
b. Interrogate the transponder using GICB protocols as specified in §2.2.19.1.12.3 (refers
to §2.2.19.1.12.1 and §2.2.19.1.12.2).
Note 1: See §2.7.7.1.a and b as example interrogations used to extract Register 6016.
c. Verify that the transponder replies with a DF=20 reply with all externally provided
data in Bits 33 through 88 (bits 1 through 56 of the “MB” field) set to ALL ZERO (0).
Note 2: Some registers are required to fill bits 1 through 8 with the Register Number,

B-8
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

e.g., XX16. In such cases, bits 1 through 8 of the “MB” field will contain the
Register number XX16 and the remaining bits (9 through 56) of the “MB”
field will be set to ZERO (0).

2.8.2.1 Data Field “y” (§2.2.26.2.1)

a. Via an appropriate interface, provide the transponder with appropriate valid data for
each parameter “y” in Register XX16 that is to be tested.
b. Interrogate the transponder using GICB protocols as specified described in
§2.2.19.1.12.3 (refers to §2.2.19.1.12.1 and §2.2.19.1.12.2).
Note: See §2.7.7.1.a and b as example interrogations used to extract Register 6016.
c. For each “y” parameter, verify that the transponder replies with an “MB” field having:
(1). Each “y” parameter encoded in the proper register location
(2). Each “y” parameter encoded in two’s complement arithmetic unless otherwise
specified.
(3). Each “y” parameter value properly rounded to preserve accuracy of ±½ LSB.
(4). Status bit for each applicable “y” parameter set to ONE (1) if data is valid and
set to ZERO (0) if data is invalid.

2.8.3 Update Rate (§2.2.26.3)

Change the data provided to the transponder and repeat the interrogation given in §2.8.2.1.b
as necessary to complete the following steps:
a. For each “y” parameter, verify that the data changes to the appropriate value required
in §2.8.2.1.c within the maximum update interval time specified in Appendix B, Table
B-2-1 for the given Register XX16 being tested.
b. If the appropriate value required in “a” above cannot be realized within twice the
maximum update interval time specified or 2 2.6 seconds (whichever is greater), verify
that the parameter “y” subfield and its associated status bit is set to ALL ZERO (0).

2.8.4 Service Reporting (§2.2.26.4)

Change the data provided to the transponder and repeat the interrogation given in §2.8.2.1.b
as necessary to complete the following steps:
a. Verify that the servicing of Register XX16 during the power-on cycle of the transponder
is properly reported in Registers 1816 through 1C16 as required in Appendix B, Table
B-3-24 to Table B-3-28.
b. Verify that the real-time (not just since power-on) servicing of Register XX16 is
properly reported in Register 1716 (see Appendix B, Table B-3-23) if such reporting is
required for Register XX16.
c. Verify that an appropriate Comm–B Broadcast is initiated if a change to Register XX16
forces a change to Register 1016.
Note: See §2.7.7.2.b.(2) as an example of validating presence of the Broadcast using
Register 6016.
d. Extract the Broadcast and verify that the contents of Register 1016 have been changed
in accordance with the change action affecting Register XX16 under test.

B-9
TSO-C112f mm/dd/yy

Note: See §2.7.7.2.g as an example of validating the Broadcast using Register 6016
as the register forcing the change to Register 1016.

2.8.5 Register XX16 – Repeat §2.8.1 through §2.8.4 using Extended Data Source Extraction
with “DI” = 3 (§2.2.26)
Note: The following procedure uses XY to define the register as opposed to XX used in
§2.8.
Repeat all of §2.8.1 through §2.8.4 using the following interrogation.

REGISTER XY16 GICB EXTRACTION

EXTENDED DATA SOURCE INTERROGATION SETUP USING DI=3
1 ---- 5 6 ---- 8 9 --- 13 14 - 16 17 -- 22 23 24 – 27 28 – 32
“SD”
“UF” “PC” “RR” “DI” “SIS” “LSS” “RRS” Not Assigned
= = = = = = = =
4 0 16 + X 3 1 1 Y 0
(1X HEX) (Y HEX)

B-10