Chapter-4 Defence Technology

The defence industry of India is a strategically important sector in India.[1] India has one of the
world’s largest military forces with a strength of over 14.4 lakh (1.44 million) active personnel. It
has the world’s largest volunteer military of over 51 lakh (5.1 million) personnel.[2] The total
budget sanctioned for the Indian military for the financial year 2021 is ₹4.78 lakh crore (US$67
billion).It has the third largest annual defence budget behind USA (US$732 b) and China (US$261
b). It is the second largest defence importer behind Saudi Arabia making up 9.2% of global arms
import. India has a domestic defence industry of which 80% is government owned. The public
sector includes DRDO and its 50 labs, 4 defence shipyards, 5 defence PSUs and 41 ordnance
factories. India has a new defence procurement, acquisition and manufacturing policy to reduce
imports and enhance domestic manufacturing.[5]

Post-independence, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was formed in
1958 for the military’s research and development under the control of the Ministry of Defence.

The Integrated Guided Missile Development

Programme
The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) was launched in 1982-83 by
the Indian Government which saw the projects of:

• Prithvi (Short range surface to surface missile)

• Trishul (short range surface to air missile)
• Aakash (Medium range surface to air missile)
• Nag (Third generation anti-tank missile)
• Agni-I (Agni missile was later separated from the IGMDP due to its strategic
importance)

The Prithvi-I is an Indian short-range ballistic missile with a range of 150 km. It is the first in a
lineage of indigenous land and sea-based missiles which includes the Prithvi-II, the ship-launched
Dhanush, and the Prithvi Air Defense interceptor. The Indian Army has withdrawn the Prithvi-I
from service and replaced it with the Prahaar missile.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
Prithvi II class is also a single-stage liquid-fueled missile having a maximum warhead mounting
capability of 500 kg, but with an extended range of 250 km (160 mi). It was developed with the
Indian Air Force being the primary user. It was first test-fired on 27 January 1996 and the
development stages were completed in 2004. This variant has been inducted into the army as well.
In a test, the missile was launched with an extended range of 350 km (220 mi) and had improved
navigation due to an inertial navigation system. The missile features measures to deceive anti-
ballistic missiles.

According to news sources the range is now increased to 350 km (220 mi) and the payload capacity
now ranges between 500 – 1000 kg. On June 2, India successfully test-fired its indigenous nuclear-
capable Prithvi-II missile

Prithvi III class is a two-stage SURFACE-to-SURFACE missile. The first stage is solid fueled with a
16 metric ton force (157 kN) thrust motor. The second stage is liquid-fueled. The missile can carry
a 1,000 kg warhead to a distance of 350 km (220 mi) and a 500 kg warhead to a distance of 600
km (370 mi) and a 250 kg warhead up to a distance of 750 km

Dhanush is a variant of the surface-to-surface or ship-to-ship Prithvi III missile, which has been
developed for the Indian Navy. It is capable of carrying both conventional as well as nuclear
warheads with pay-load capacity of 500 kg-1000 kg and can strike targets in the range of 350 km.

Range- 350km, naval variant of the Prithvi II

Trishul is the name of a short range surface-to-air missile developed by India as a part of the
Integrated Guided Missile Development Program. It has a range of 12 km and is fitted with a 5.5
kg warhead. Designed to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short range, the
system has been developed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short-range
surface-to-air missile on land.

Akash is a medium-range surface-to-air missile with an intercept range of 30 km.

Agni-I was developed under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) and
tested in 1989. After its success, Agni missile program was separated from the IGMDP upon
realizing its strategic importance. It was designated as a special program in India’s defence budget
and provided adequate funds for subsequent development. As of November 2019, the missiles in
the Agni series are being inducted into service.The family comprises the following
Agni -VI Agni -P Agni -V Agni -IV Agni -III Agni-II Agni -I Missile

Agni-VI Agni-1 Agni-V Agni-IV IGMDP IGMDP IGMDP Project

Prime

Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Strategic Type

Conventional Conventional
high high explosive-
Chapter-4

Conventi Conventi explosive- unitary,

Convention
onal, onal, unitary, penetration,
al,
Strategic Strategic thermoba thermoba penetration, cluster
thermobari
nuclear nuclear ric, ric, sub- munition, Warhead
c, strategic
weapon weapon strategic strategic munitions, incendiary,
nuclear
nuclear nuclear incendiary, thermobaric,
weapon
weapon weapon thermobaric, strategic
strategic nuclear
nuclear weapon
weapon
3,000 (10 Unknown 1,500 800– 2,500 820–2,000 1,000 Payload
MIRV) 1,000 (kg)

5,000-
11,000- 1,000– 3,500– 3,000– Range
8,000 2,000–3,500 700– 1200
12,000 2,000 4,000 5,000 (km)
(Speculated)

40X1.1 Unknown 17X2 20X1 17X2 20X1 15X1 Dimension

(m)

Four Two stage Three Two stage Two stage Two and half Single stage Fuel/
Stage solid Stage solid solid stage solid solid Stages
solid solid

Weight
Defence Technology

55,000 Unknown 50,000 17,000 44,000 26,000 22,000

(kg)

Under In trial 2019 2014 2011 2006 2009 In service

develop-
pment 10 >10 – <80 10 40 30-40 25 CEP (m)
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
Nuclear Command Authority
The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) of India is the authority responsible for command, control
and operational decisions regarding India’s nuclear weapons programme.

On 4 January 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) constituted the Political Council and
the Executive Council of the NCA. The Executive Council gives its opinion to the Political Council,
which authorises a nuclear attack when deemed necessary. While the Executive Council is chaired
by the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. This
mechanism was implemented to ensure that Indian nukes remain firmly in civilian control and that
there exists a sophisticated Command and Control (C2) mechanism to prevent their accidental or
unauthorised use.

The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), sometimes called Strategic Nuclear Command, forms part
of India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). It is responsible for the management and
administration of the country’s tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile.[

The directives of the NCA are to be operationalised by the Strategic Forces Command under the
control of a Commander-in-Chief of the rank of Air Marshal (or its equivalent) in charge of the
management and administration of the tactical and strategic nuclear forces.

The Defence Planning Committee was notified by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in April 2018,
the National Security Adviser (NSA) was appointed as the chairperson of the committee, with the
chairperson, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of the Army Staff,
Chief of the Air Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff, and expenditure secretaries of Ministry of Finance
being its members and the chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) being its member-
secretary,[2][3][4] the NSA was also given the mandate to co-opt members as they see fit.

According to the notification issued by Indian Government the DPC will have several mandates
namely to

1. Prepare a draft National Security Strategy.

2. Develop a capability development plan.
3. Work on defence diplomacy issues.
4. Improving defence manufacturing ecosystem in India

Defence Space Agency The Defence Space Agency (DSA) is a tri-service agency of the Indian
Armed Forces. Headquartered in Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. The agency is tasked with operating
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
the space-warfare and Satellite Intelligence[6] assets of India. The DSA draws personnel from all
three branches of the Armed Forces.

The Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces (CDS) is the head of the military staff of
the Indian Armed Forces and the chief executive of the Department of Military Affairs. As the
highest-ranking serving officer in the Indian Armed Forces, the CDS is the commanding officer and
chairperson of the Joint Commanders and Staff Committee – making him the chief military adviser
to the government of India and the Ministry of Defence. As the professional head of the armed
forces, the Chief of Defence Staff is also aided by the newly formed office of Vice Chief of Defence
Staff, the nation’s second highest ranking military officer, and the three chiefs of staff of the army,
navy and air force, who are the leaders of each respective branch. The first and current CDS is
General Bipin Rawat, who took office on 1 January 2020

The CDS is a four-star officer selected from among the serving officers of the Indian Armed Forces.
While being “first among equals” among the service chiefs, the CDS is a single-point military
advisor to the defence minister.[4].The CDS is assisted by a deputy, the Vice Chief of the Defence
Staff. The CDS heads the Department of Military Affairs under the Ministry of Defence, as its
secretary. Apart from heading the DMA, the CDS is the Permanent Chairperson of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee

Chief of Defence Staff is a critical position in today’s era of hybrid warfare, and will help increase
coordination, tri-service effectiveness and integrate overall combat capabilities of Indian armed
forces.[6] The Defence Secretary, a civil servant, remains as the main defence adviser, whilst the
CDS has been sanctioned the role of being the main military adviser, acting as the single-point
military adviser to the government and Defence Minister.[a][7] India was the only large democracy
which did not have a single point military advisor; with all P5 countries having one.

Nuclear Command Authority

The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) of India is the authority responsible for command, control
and operational decisions regarding India’s nuclear weapons programme.

On 4 January 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) constituted the Political Council and
the Executive Council of the NCA. The Executive Council gives its opinion to the Political Council,
which authorises a nuclear attack when deemed necessary. While the Executive Council is chaired
by the National Security Advisor (NSA), the Political Council is chaired by the Prime Minister. This
mechanism was implemented to ensure that Indian nukes remain firmly in civilian control and that
there exists a sophisticated Command and Control (C2) mechanism to prevent their accidental or
unauthorised use.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), sometimes called Strategic Nuclear Command, forms part
of India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). It is responsible for the management and
administration of the country’s tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile.[

The directives of the NCA are to be operationalised by the Strategic Forces Command under the
control of a Commander-in-Chief of the rank of Air Marshal (or its equivalent) in charge of the
management and administration of the tactical and strategic nuclear forces.

The Defence Planning Committee was notified by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in April 2018,
the National Security Adviser (NSA) was appointed as the chairperson of the committee, with the
chairperson, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff, Chief of the Army Staff,
Chief of the Air Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff, and expenditure secretaries of Ministry of Finance
being its members and the chief of the Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) being its member-
secretary,[2][3][4] the NSA was also given the mandate to co-opt members as they see fit.

According to the notification issued by Indian Government the DPC will have several mandates
namely to

1. Prepare a draft National Security Strategy.

2. Develop a capability development plan.
3. Work on defence diplomacy issues.
4. Improving defence manufacturing ecosystem in India

Defence Space Agency The Defence Space Agency (DSA) is a tri-service agency of the Indian
Armed Forces. Headquartered in Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. The agency is tasked with operating
the space-warfare and Satellite Intelligence[6] assets of India. The DSA draws personnel from all
three branches of the Armed Forces.

The Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces (CDS) is the head of the military staff of
the Indian Armed Forces and the chief executive of the Department of Military Affairs. As the
highest-ranking serving officer in the Indian Armed Forces, the CDS is the commanding officer and
chairperson of the Joint Commanders and Staff Committee – making him the chief military adviser
to the government of India and the Ministry of Defence. As the professional head of the armed
forces, the Chief of Defence Staff is also aided by the newly formed office of Vice Chief of Defence
Staff, the nation’s second highest ranking military officer, and the three chiefs of staff of the army,
navy and air force, who are the leaders of each respective branch. The first and current CDS is
General Bipin Rawat, who took office on 1 January 2020
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
The CDS is a four-star officer selected from among the serving officers of the Indian Armed Forces.
While being “first among equals” among the service chiefs, the CDS is a single-point military
advisor to the defence minister.[4].The CDS is assisted by a deputy, the Vice Chief of the Defence
Staff. The CDS heads the Department of Military Affairs under the Ministry of Defence, as its
secretary. Apart from heading the DMA, the CDS is the Permanent Chairperson of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee

Chief of Defence Staff is a critical position in today’s era of hybrid warfare, and will help increase
coordination, tri-service effectiveness and integrate overall combat capabilities of Indian armed
forces.[6] The Defence Secretary, a civil servant, remains as the main defence adviser, whilst the
CDS has been sanctioned the role of being the main military adviser, acting as the single-point
military adviser to the government and Defence Minister.[a][7] India was the only large democracy
which did not have a single point military advisor; with all P5 countries having one.

Cruise missiles vs Ballistic missiles

A cruise missile either locates its target or has a preset target. It navigates using a guidance system
— such as inertial or beyond visual range satellite GPS guidance — and comprises a payload and
aircraft propulsion system.Cruise missiles can be launched from land, sea or air for land attacks
and anti-shipping purposes, and can travel at subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic speeds.Since
they stay relatively close to the surface of the earth, they cannot be detected easily by anti-missile
systems, and are designed to carry large payloads with high precision.

Ballistic missiles, meanwhile, are launched directly into the upper layers of the earth’s
atmosphere.They travel outside the atmosphere, where the warhead detaches from the missile
and falls towards a predetermined target.They are rocket-propelled self-guided weapons systems
which can carry conventional or nuclear munitions. They can be launched from aircraft, ships and
submarines, and land.

India’s Nuclear Triad

• Nuclear Triad means the capability of delivering nuclear weapons by aircraft, land
based ballistic missiles and submarine launched missiles.
• India declared that its nuclear triad is operational after indigenous Ship Submersible
Ballistic
• Nuclear (SSBN) INS Arihant achieved a milestone by conducting its first deterrence
patrol.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• India has put in place a robust nuclear command and control structure, effective
safety assurance architecture and strict political control, under its Nuclear
Command Authority.

Significance

• INS Arihant, which is equipped with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles completed a

nearly month-long nuclear deterrence patrol.
• INS Arihant will enable India to assert its rights on water, besides land and air.
• It now joins a small group of countries — the United States, Russia, China, France
and the United Kingdom — that have this capability.
• Arihant’s successful nuclear deterrence patrol signifies India’s attainment of
complete mastery over all the highly complex systems and procedures.
• India’s nuclear deterrence 20 years after the country went nuclear is now secure as
it rests on a triad of land, air and undersea vectors.
• The success of INS Arihant enhances India’s security needs. Given India’s ‘No -First-
Use’ (NFU) in launching nuclear weapons, the SSBN is the most dependable platform
for a second-strike.
• SSBNs are designed to prowl the deep ocean waters and carry nuclear weapons.
• Because they are powered by nuclear reactors, these submarines can stay
underwater indefinitely without the adversary detecting it.
• The other two platforms — land-based and air-launched are far easier to detect.

Landmark Development

• It demonstrates that India, apart from its capability to deliver nuclear weapons both
from land and
• from air, can now also do so from under water.
• It provides the ultimate credibility to nuclear deterrence.
• It sends out an unambiguous message that nuclear blackmail will not work.
• The nuclear deterrence patrol signifies India having come off age as a mature
nuclear-armed state.
• This exercise is testimony to India’s technological prowess.
• It shows a high degree of engineering skill and workmanship with substantial
indigenous component
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
INS Arihant

• The Arihant is the lead ship of India’s Arihant class of nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines.
• These will form a potent and formidable weapons system which will ensure national
security.
• Arihant is India’s first indigenously designed and built nuclear -powered submarine.
• Arihant is armed with K-15 Sagarika missiles with a range of 750 km.
• It will carry the longer 3,500 km range K-4 missiles being developed by the Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
• This is the longest in the Navy’s fleet of submarines.
• The second submarine in the series, Arighat is now undergoing sea trials after which
it will be inducted into service.

INS Arighat is an upgraded variant of the Arihant-class submarine.It is the second nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine being built by India. under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV)
project to build nuclear submarines at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam.

In March 2019, India and Russia signed a deal for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear
submarine to India for 10 years. The new vessel, called the Chakra-III, will be delivered to the
Indian Navy by 2025.

The Arihant-class (Sanskrit, for Slayer of Enemies) is a class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines being built for the Indian Navy. They were developed under the ₹90,000 crore (US$13
billion) Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project to design and build nuclear-powered
submarines.[1] These vessels are classified as ‘strategic strike nuclear submarines’ by India

The Indian Navy currently operates fourteen diesel powered submarines and two nuclear powered
submarines. India’s submarine fleet is based at two locations: Visakhapatnam on the east coast and
Mumbai on the west coast. [1]

Capabilities at a Glance

• Total Submarines in Fleet: 16

• Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBNs): 1
• Nuclear-Powered attack submarines (SSNs): 1
• Diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs): 14
• Air-independent propulsion (AIP) enabled: 0

History
While India discussed the potential of nuclear-powered submarines as early as the 1960s, it didn’t
begin the development of its Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) submarine program until 1983.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
(source) The ATV is a part of India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, which is one of the three legs of
India’s triad of airborne, naval, and land-based platforms as a minimum nuclear deterrent (MND).
IModernization and Current Capabilities

India’s nuclear-powered submarine program is under the management and operations (M&O) of
the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Department of Atomic Energy
(DAE), and the Indian Navy at Visakhapatnam.India took steps to operationalize its nuclear triad
by commissioning its first ATV submarine, the INS Arihant, in August 2016.

India is currently constructing two new submarine bases. The first is Karwar, located 500
kilometers south of Mumbai. [18] The second is a secret naval base called the INS Varsha. This
base is on the east coast near Kakinada and will have underground pens for the submarines. [19]

Ship Biographies
Sindhughosh-Class (Type 877EM)
India possesses nine Sindhughosh-class diesel-electric attack submarines. These Kilo-class units
act as the mainstay of India’s submarine fleet. They can remain submerged for about 45 days
without surfacing. Their weapons systems are capable of firing torpedoes and anti-ship missiles.

Shishumar-Class (Type 209/1500)

India operates four Shishumar-class vessels designed by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW)
in Germany.. They can remain submerged for about 50 days without surfacing. Their weapons
systems are capable of firing torpedoes. All four of the Shishumar-class vessels have undergone
refits since they were commissioned. [21]

Chakra-Class
INS Chakra II is a Russian Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. It is operated by Indian
Navy on a lease for 10 years. It was formally commissioned into service in India in April 2012 and
is expected to be returned to Russia in 2022.

Arihant-Class
India is expected to build between three to six nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) under its ATV Program. They can remain submerged for about 50 days without surfacing.
Their weapons systems are capable of firing torpedoes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
However, the next ships in the class, after INS Arihant are expected to be larger and more powerful
in terms of both firepower and nuclear power.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
Kalvari-Class
India is expected to build six Kalvari-class diesel-electric attack submarines under its Project-75
program. The first vessel in this class was commissioned in 2017. The Kalvari class is based on the
French Scorpène-class submarines. Their weapons systems are capable of firing torpedoes and
anti-ship missiles.

About Project 75I:

Under Project 75I India will purchase 6 next generation diesel submarines with Air Independent
Propulsion System (AIP) technology for the Indian Navy by 2022.

Conventional diesel-electric submarines have to surface every few days to get oxygen to recharge
their batteries. With AIP systems, they can stay submerged for much longer periods.Project 75-I
will have both vertical launched BrahMos for the sea & land targets and tube-launched torpedoes
for anti-submarine warfare

INS Vikrant
• INS Vikrant (IAC-I) is the first aircraft carrier built in India and the first Vikrant-class
aircraft carrier built by Cochin Shipyard (CSL) in Kochi, Kerala for the Indian Navy.
The motto of the ship is Jayema Sam Yudhi Sprdhah which is taken from Rig Ved a
and is translated as “I defeat those who fight against me”.
• The carrier is 262 m long, 62 m at the widest part and with a depth of 30 m minus
the superstructure. There are 14 decks in all, including five in the superstructure.
• It features a Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery(STOBAR) configuration with a
ski-jump. The deck is designed to enable aircraft such as the MiG -29K to operate
from the carrier. It is expected to carry an air group of up to thirty aircraft, which
will include up to 24–26 fixed-wing combat aircraft, primarily the Mikoyan MiG-29K
.
• The naval variant of the HAL Tejas was rejected by the navy on Dec 2, 2016 for
being overweight. Besides carrying 10 Kamov Ka-31 or Westland Sea King The Ka-
31 will fulfill the airborne early warning (AEW) role and the Sea King will provide
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.
• Vikrant is powered by four General Electric LM2500+gas turbines on two shafts,
generating over 80 megawatts (110,000 hp) of power. The gearboxes for the carriers
were designed and supplied by Elecon Engineering.
• Once operational, Vikrant is going to sport a gender -sensitive living environment
and infrastructure, with provision to accommodate eight women officers. The ship
will then accommodate 1,645 personnel in all, including 196 officers.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• For now the Navy has only one carrier, INS Vikramaditya , contracted from Russia
under a $2.3-billion deal and inducted into service in November 2013.INS Viraat
was recently retired from service after cumulatively serving the British and Indian
Navies for over 50 years. In that line, when the new INS Vikrant joins the Navy
sometime after 2020, it would be the fourth aircraft carrier to defend India’s shores.
Each of these carriers has grown in size, capability and sophistication adding more
teeth to Navy’s power projection.
• The first Vikrant displaced 20,000 tonnes and operated a mix of Westland Sea Kings,
HAL Chetak and Sea Harrier jets. Viraat displaced 28,500 tonnes andVikramaditya
displaces 45,400 tonnes. The new Vikrant will displace 40,000 tonnes.

Significance for India

An aircraft carrier is a command platform epitomising ‘dominance’ over a large area, ‘control’ over
vast expanses of the ocean and all aspects of maritime strength. It makes India only the fifth
country after the US, Russia, Britain and France to have such capabilities of developing indigenous
aircraft carriers.

• In support of Land Battles

During the 1971 operations for liberation of Bangladesh, the aircraft onboard INS Vikrant was
employed very successfully to strike strategic targets deep inside the erstwhile East Pakistan. It is
important to note that as long as much of India’s land boundary (stretching from north-west to
north-east) remains disputed, the potential of a border conflict, and thereby the likelihood of such
a need, will persist. Thus the new Aircraft carrier would give strategic advantage to India in case
of future conflicts.

• Security of Sea-Lines of Communication

In the event of a military conflict, a carrier is the only naval asset that can provide a comprehensive
protection to merchant shipping carrying strategic commodities to India. The Indian naval chief
recently expressed apprehensions on the future vulnerability of energy imports through the Strait
of Hormuz due to China’s strategic “foothold” in Pakistan’s Gwadar port.

Like Gwadar, many other locations (“pearls”) in the Indian Ocean littoral dispersed along the arterial
shipping routes bear a similar potential. Owing to the ongoing diversification of energy sources
away from the Persian Gulf area, these distant Security of Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
and thereby Aircraft carriers are also assuming strategic significance for India.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• Maintaining Influence in IOR:

India’s security is directly linked to and closely enmeshed with that of the Indian Ocean and the
adjoining littoral region (IOR)—the area of its primary strategic interest. The Chinese “pearls” in the
Indian Ocean, besides addressing Beijing’s strategic vulnerability in terms of its energy imports, is
likely to be aimed at “displacing” India’s influence in the IOR.

A possible Chinese politico-military intervention in the region will seriously impinge on India’s
security. In that sense, an aircraft carrier like Vikrant can bestow on India a capability to maintain
its influence in these waters and achieve a strategic “dissuasion” against any inimical extra-regional
power.

• Safeguarding Vital Interests Overseas:

Carrier aviation will enable India to safeguard its strategic interests overseas, not only in the IOR
but also beyond. India’s economic/ strategic stakes are conspicuously increasing in Afro-Asian
states, many of which are plagued by political, socio-economic and ethnic instabilities.

Besides, many Indian citizens are working in these countries, and past events have amply
demonstrated how their lives and property can be jeopardised. New Delhi will need to safeguard
these interests in conjunction with the host nations. When the operational situation warrants, it
may be preferable to carry out precision air-strikes to “soften” the target before inserting ground
forces, since to do otherwise may lead to avoidable casualties.

• Security of Island Territories:

Integral naval aviation is essential for defence of India’s far-flung island territories, particularly the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N) that lie more than 1,000 km from the Indian mainland. These
islands are also extremely vulnerable due to their geographical spread, and the fact that most of
these are uninhabited.

The possibility of foreign military occupation or claim may be unlikely in the foreseeable future,
but cannot be ruled out altogether. The take-over of the Falklands Islands by Argentina was also
considered a remote possibility until it actually occurred in 1982. By all indicators, high-value
naval/air assets are unlikely to be based in the A&N Islands. This makes the aircraft carrier
indispensable, even as a deterrent.

• Non-military Missions:

Although the concept of a carrier is essentially centered on its military role, such a platform would
substantially increase India’s operational options to respond to a natural disaster in the regional
seas or littoral. While it has begun inducting large sealift platforms with integral helicopters like
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
the INS Jalashwa Landing Platform Dock (LPD), a disaster of a large magnitude may necessitate
the employment of a carrier.

Akin to a floating city, a carrier like Vikrant can provide virtually unlimited sealift, substantial airlift
and all conceivable essential services ranging from freshwater to electric supply, and medical to
engineering expertise. There is an effort to further enhance the usefulness of a carrier for such
roles, such as by incorporating a modular concept. It incorporates modular spaces/containers
carrying specialized personnel, engineering equipment, medical facilities, etc., which can be rapidly
deployed for specific missions.

INS Vikramaditya
• Vikramaditya was acquired from Russia for $2.3 billion.
• It was commissioned into the Navy in November 2013 without the crucial air -
defence systems. They are now being installed during the “guaranteed refit”, in
addition to scheduled maintenance, by the original equipment manufacturer.
• It is a modified Kiev-class aircraft carrier. She has been renamed in honour of
Vikramaditya, a legendary 1st century BCE emperor of Ujjain, India.
• The Israeli-supplied Barak-1 point defence missile system and the Russian-origin
AK-630 close-in weapon system, borrowed from a to-be-decommissioned Godavari-
class ship, are installed on Vikramaditya.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology

The carrier was originally scheduled to receive a long-range surface-to-air missile system under
joint development with Israel. But delay in its development resulted in the carrier being inducted
without its own air-defence cover.

Anti Ballistic Missile Defence System

India’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) program, which began development two decades ago, is
reported to be ready for deployment in a configuration for India’s national capital territory, with
future phases to fine-tune and expand capabilities. At present, the BMD system includes the endo-
atmospheric Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor and the exo-atmospheric Prithvi Air
Defence (PAD) systems.

Key facts

• The AAD is part of the two-layered Ballistic Missile Defence system developed by
the DRDO, the research and development wing of the Defence Ministry, with the
Hyderabad-based Research Centre Imarat (RCI).
• The endo-atmospheric missile is capable of intercepting incoming targets at an
altitude of 15 to 25 kms.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• The interceptor is a 7.5-metre long single stage solid rocket propelled guided missile
equipped with a navigation system, a hi-tech computer and an electro-mechanical
activator.
• The second level of the system is the endo-atmosphere AAD missile.
• The interceptor missile has its own mobile launcher, secure data link for
interception, independent tracking and homing capabilities and sophisticated radars.

NASAMS
NASAMS-II is an air defence system designed to target aircraft and cruise missiles, the BMD
system targets incoming ballistic missiles.

NASAMS-II based ‘Integrated Air Defence Weapon System’ for the Delhi region, even though it
isn’t strictly an anti-missile system. A steep dollar price tag — nearly double the $1 billion budgeted
by India for the procurement — has slowed progress.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
S400
It is a modern long-range surface-to-air missile (MLRSAM) system developed by Russia which will
be delivered to India by 2025

• Missile system integrates a multifunction radar, autonomous detection and

targeting systems, anti- aircraft missile systems, launchers, and command and
control centre. It can provide a layered defence as it is capable of firing three types
of missiles
• S-400 Trimuf can engage all types of aerial targets such as aircraft, ballistic and
cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which are within the range of
400km, at an altitude of up to 30km

THAAD
• The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or simply abbreviated as THAAD, is a
missile defence system that is designed to intercept and destroy short and medium -
range ballistic missiles in their final flight phase.
• First proposed in 1987 and then finally deployed in 2008, the THAAD cannot be
used as a form of attack against an enemy.
• Its role, by use of a powerful radar, is to simply track and destroy missiles before
they are launched.

Iron Dome
Chapter-4 Defence Technology

What is Iron Dome?

Deployed in 2011, it is a short-range, ground-to-air, air defence system that includes a radar and
Tamir interceptor missiles that track and neutralise any rockets or missiles aimed at Israeli targets.

It is used for countering rockets, artillery & mortars (C-RAM) as well as aircraft, helicopters and
unmanned aerial vehicles.Its success rate is over 90%.

How does it work, and what makes it so effective?

The Iron Dome has three main systems that work together to provide a shield over the area where
it is deployed, handling multiple threats.

It has a detection and tracking radar to spot any incoming threats, a battle management and
weapon control system (BMC), and a missile firing unit.

It is capable of being used in all weather conditions, including during the day and night
Chapter-4 Defence Technology

Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises

Indian Armed Forces conducts/participates in various bilateral and multilateral military exercises with
foreign countries. The details of such exercise include the following:

Sl.
Country Exercise
No.

1 Australia Ex AUSTRA HIND, Ex AUSINDEX, EX PITCH BLACK

Ex SAMPRITI, IN-BN CORPAT, IN-BN BILAT, IN-BN SF

2 Bangladesh
EXERCISE, TABLE TOP EX, SAMVEDNA

Brazil &
3 South IBSAMAR
Africa

4 China Ex HAND IN HAND

5 Egypt Ex CYCLONE

6 France Ex SHAKTI, Ex VARUNA, GARUDA

Ex GARUDA SHAKTI, IND-INDO CORPAT

7 Indonesia IND-INDO BILAT

8 Israel Ex BLUE FLAG

9 Japan Ex DHARMA GUARDIAN, Ex JIMEX

10 Kazakhstan Ex KAZIND

11 Kyrgyzstan Ex KHANJAR

12 Malaysia Ex HARIMAU SHAKTI, Ex IN-RMN BILAT, HOP EX

13 Maldives Ex EKUVERIN, EX EKATHA

14 Mongolia Ex NOMADIC ELEPHANT

Chapter-4 Defence Technology
15 Myanmar Ex IMBEX, IMCOR, IN-MN BILAT, TABLE TOP EX

16 Nepal Ex SURYA KIRAN

17 Oman Ex AL NAGAH, NASEEM-AL-BAHR, Ex EASTERN BRIDGE

18 Qatar ZA’IR AL BAHR

19 Russia EX INDRA, EX AVIAINDRA

20 Seychelles Ex LAMITIYE

21 Singapore SIMBEX, JOINT MILITARY TRAINING

22 Sri Lanka Ex MITRA SHAKTI, SLINEX, IN-SLN SF Ex, SAMVEDNA

23 Thailand Ex MAITREE, INDO-THAI CORPAT, Ex SIAM BHARAT

24 UAE DESERT EAGLE

25 UK Ex AJEY WARRIOR, KONKAN, INDRADHANUSH

Ex YUDHABHAYAS, Ex VAJRA PRAHAR, SPITTING

26 USA COBRA, SANGAM (IN-USN EOD Ex), RED FLAG, Ex COPE
INDIA

27 Uzbekistan Ex DUSTLIK

28 Vietnam VINBAX, IN-VPN BILAT

29 Multilateral BIMSTEC

30 Multilateral AFINDEX

31 Multilateral MEDEX

31 Multilateral SCO – PEACE MISSION

Chapter-4 Defence Technology
Defence Indigenization
NEED FOR DEFENCE INDIGENISATION
1. For self reliance

2.To reduce dependency on foreign player and ensure security of nation

3.To conserve or reduce Balance of Payment deficit

4.To promote employment and also exports

5.To reduce cost of production to India and thereby reduce fiscal deficit. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2019, India became the third-largest
defence spender in the world

Challenges
1.Lack of Defence Manufacturing base in India

2.Primarily driven by Government ordnance factories and poor private participation

The public sector (DPSUs/OFs) by far has enjoyed the preferred categorization, particularly for big
ticket purchases, when considering the Indian route, despite its poor track record as regards time
and cost overruns, inefficiencies and poor financial performance. The defence industry per-se
being a capital intensive industry with high risks on investments leaves very few private players in
the arena. DPSUs, on the other hand, have not done much to promote proficient business practices
by involving the industry and Micro, Small,and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The report of the
33rd StandingCommittee on Defence – Indigenization of Defence Production: PublicPrivate
Partnership was highly critical of the steps taken by the government to promote indigenisation

3.High costs and involved and lack of assured market

4.Poor technological transfer by foreign companies

5.Lack of Data

Assessment of Degree of Indigenisation: As of today, no scientific system is in place to assess the

extent/ level of indigenisation achieved by defence production entities in the country. As a matter
of fact, statistical information on the extent of indigenisation available in the open domain fails to
reflect the true picture as some of the data does not include the quantum of import content utilised
in products manufactured by DPSUs/OFs
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
6.Bureaucratic delay and licensing issues:there is still no eas of doing business in defence industry.:
Investment in the defence sector is subject to compliance with the licensing requirements
stipulated by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP)

MEASURES TAKEN:
1. FDI increased to 74%

2. Strategic partnership model

3. Defence procurement policy and New defence Acquisition Procedure

4. Import ban on 101 defence items

5. Institutional reforms like Defence Acquisition council to counter corruption and Chief of
Defence Staff to bring harmony in needs of defence, Defence planning committee etc which can
look at procurement suggestions

6. Defence Innovation hubs-for innovation and Defence Industrial Corridors-to link defence
investment zones

New Defence Acquisition Procedure of 2020

The aim of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP), erstwhile Defence Procurement Procedure
(DPP), is to ensure timely acquisition of military equipment, systems and platforms as required by
the Armed Forces in terms of performance, capabilities and quality standards, through optimum
utilisation of allocated budgetary resources. While enabling the same, DAP will provide for the
highest degree of probity, public accountability, transparency, fair competition and level-playing
field.

Highlights of the new policy:

1) Reservations for Indigenous firms:

The policy reserves several procurement categories for indigenous firms.DAP 2020 defines an
“Indian vendor” as a company that is owned and controlled by resident Indian citizens, with foreign
direct investment (FDI) not more than 49 per cent.

2) New Buy (Global–Manufacture in India) category:

This stipulates indigenisation of at least 50 per cent of the overall contract value of a foreign
purchase bought with the intention of subsequently building it in India with technology transfer.

3) Greater indigenous content:

Chapter-4 Defence Technology
It promotes greater indigenous content in arms and equipment of the military procures, including
equipment manufactured in India under licence. In most acquisition categories, DAP-2020
stipulates 10 per cent higher indigenisation than DPP 2016.

4) Import embargo list:

The “import embargo list” of 101 items that the government promulgated last month has been
specifically incorporated into DAP 2020. (An embargo is a government order that restricts
commerce with a specified country or the exchange of specific goods.)

5) Offset liability:

The government has decided not to have an offset clause in procurement of defence equipment
if the deal is done through inter-government agreement (IGA), government-to-government or an
ab initio single vendor.The offset clause requires a foreign vendor to invest a part of the contract
value in India.

6) In decreasing order of priority, the priority of categories will be as follows: –

(a) Buy (Indian – Indigenously Designed Developed and Manufactured) i.e. Buy (Indian-IDDM).

(b) Buy (Indian).

(c) Buy and Make (Indian).

(d) Buy (Global – Manufacture in India).

(e) Buy (Global).

7) Allows leasing of military platforms

Conclusion
One of the key focus areas of the DAP 2020 was to implement ‘Ease of Doing Business’ with
emphasis on simplification, delegation and making the procurement process industry friendly.

The Indian Government has also announced plans to spend USD 130 billion on military
modernization in the next 5 years. Changes to the FDI Policy and the DAP 2020 will provide the
necessary impetus to the Foreign OEMs to include Indian companies into their global supply chain
which is expected to further boost exports.

INDIAN AIR FORCE

History of Indian Air Force
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• IAF was effective right from the first campaign which was in 1948 where Pakistan
intruded into J&K. The IAF played a very critical role.
• In 1962 Indo-China war air power was not used. So the loss was ours.
• In 1965 Indo-Pakistan war air power was used with little less coordination, but they
played an effective role.
• In 1971 India had complete air superiority because we have 12 to 14 F 86
Sabre’s which made a difference. In East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) there are many
tributaries of small rivers. Crossing these rivers was a problematic area. This was
overcome by the IAF, providing a huge amount of helicopter support.
• In 1999 Kargil war, there was effective use of air power. This was first time in the
history of air power that weaponry was delivered from high altitudes and with
accuracy. No other air force in the world had done before which was a tremendous
achievement for IAF.

The importance of Air Force

• Air power today is the most lethal component of the 3 services. The flexibility and
mobility, the precision of striking the targets which are 1000s of miles away very
accurately.
• From 1999 to 2016, new technologies have emerged, evolved and changed. It is not
the air force but the air space we are looking at.
• We always discuss about the number of squadrons saying we must have 42 or 44
squadrons. The fact is we have 33 at present. We are going to retire about 11
squadrons of MIG-21 and MIG-27 by 2022. These aircraft have to be replaced. The
36 Rafale air craft takes 70 months to come in. Engineers, pilots, and technicians
have to be trained for it. Considering all these we need to think of a balance force.

Need to modernize:

• To derivate from threat perception in future days.

• Doctrine which has now become two front war policy.
• Net centric warfare.
• Aerospace kind of IAF to handle space assets in a required manner.
• Force multipliers that is air to air refuelers.
• To protect the airspace in a high manner.

Concerns:
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• The induction rate in the air force has been slow.
• MIG 21 is accident prone as mentioned.
• Cost of making aircrafts indigenously has proved to be costly.
• The concern for the military in general, for the country and for the political
leadership is to manage the two fronts. The immediate threat is from the western
front i.e., Pakistan. The medium or the long term would be china. It is very important
to make the threat assessment and based on that is to counter the threat.
• There is a lack of collaboration between PSUs and the private sector wrt airforce.
• For Pakistan it will have to be complete air superiority which means the IAF must
be prepared to carry counter air operations and effective air defence operations.
• The expenditure diverted is not enough and is a concern.
• For the Chinese threat, it should be the missiles. It will not be platform based like
fighter aircraft, because they have the technology. For this the force levels have to
be different. We need an integrated air and missile defence system, ballistic missile
defence system. It will be a different formulation of the threat assessment for the
two neighbours.
• Today technology is power. We should have a smaller number but high technology
which is very effective for its objectives rather than having quantities. Certainly we
need quantities, but the overwhelming factor should be technology.
• Order outflow is a concern.
• CAG’s Audit Report of2019 on ‘Capital Acquisition in Indian Air Force’ revealed the
following findings:
o Volume I consisting of seven chapters discusses the systematic issues in the
acquisition process. It includes details of ten acquisition contracts.
o Volume-II consists of audit findings relating to the acquisition of Medium
Multi Role Combat Aircraft through an Inter Government Agreement (IGA)
with the Government of France. This includes examination of the pricing.
o To acquire the right product at the right price, it is essential that
the qualitative requirements (Air Staff Qualitative Requirements in the IAF-
ASQRs) truly reflect the users functional need. This helps in generation of
maximum possible competition and technical and price evaluation is done
objectively.
o Audit noted that IAF did not define the ASQRs properly. As a result none of
the vendors could fully meet the ASQRs. ASQRs were changed repeatedly
during the procurement process.
o Audit noted that the vendor response to solicitation of offers was low, which
restricted competition. Number of vendors who responded to the Request
For Proposal (RFP) was far less than the number of vendors who were invited
to bid.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
o Defence Ministry faced difficulties in realistically estimating the Benchmark
price, making it difficult to establish the reasonability of price. This also
caused delay in price evaluation and contract negotiations.
o There were severe delays at various stages of the acquisition process.
Against three years envisaged in Defence Procurement Process, four cases
took more than three years and seven cases took more than five years to
reach the contract conclusion stage.
o Delays in acquisition were essentially due to a complex and multi -level
approval process, where objections could be raised at any stage.

The issues being faced by IAF with respect to maintaining numerical

adequacy are:

• Even if the Air Force gets the sanctioned 42 squadrons, India’s strength would be
“less than the combined strength of our two adversaries.
• IAF fleet strength has been plagued by poor decision-making, poor acquisition
strategy and shoddy quality control and contract delivery.
• It is stymied by serious constraints on India’s defence budget, the meagre
achievements of the country’s domestic development organisations and India’s
inability to reconcile the need for self-sufficiency in defence production with the
necessity of maintaining technological superiority over rivals
• The IAF had also ordered 43 Tejas jet fighters with another 83 planned for the Mark
1A version. However, though there is a value in procuring them to encourage
domestic R&D, these aircraft are simply not capable of combat flying. The present
version of the Tejas is an excellent aircraft as a Lead-in fighter trainer (LIFT), but
the IAF doesn’t set much store by this concept, unlike most advanced air forces.
• For example it has yet to get 25 Su-30MKI that were to be delivered by 2017
by HAL. Upgrades, such as that of 47 Mirage 2000s have also been delayed.
Likewise none of the 61 Jaguars which were to have been upgraded have yet joined
service.
• The LCA, is, of course, a story of its own marked by delays and performance
problems. In addition, in the last 10 years, 90 combat aircraft have crashed.

Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas

• Tejas is a single-engine lightweight multirole fighter jet. It is the smallest and

lightest in its class of contemporary supersonic combat aircraft.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• It will replace the country’s aging MiG-21 fighters.
• It is manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
• LCA Tejas has a limited reach of a little over 400-km. It will be mainly used
for close air-to-ground operations.
• The first squadron of indigenously designed and manufactured Light Combat
Aircraft (LCA) Tejas was inducted into Indian Air Force (IAF). The first
squadron of LCA Tejas has been named as ‘Flying Daggers’
• LCA Tejas is not the first indigenous fighter to be inducted into the IAF. In
1967, IAF had formed the first operational squadron with the indigenous
HF24 Marut fighter

The HAL Tejas Mark 2, or Medium Weight Fighter (MWF),[2] is an Indian single-engine, canard
delta wing, Multirole combat aircraft designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) in
collaboration with Aircraft Research and Design Centre (ARDC)[3] of Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited (HAL) for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

It is a further development of the HAL Tejas, with an elongated airframe, close coupled canards,
new sensors, and a more powerful engine. The Tejas Mark 2 is being designed and developed to
replace multiple strike fighters of IAF viz, SEPECAT Jaguar, Dassault Mirage 2000 and MiG-29.]
The first flight of Tejas Mark 2 is expected to be in 2023 with series production to begin by 2026

RAFALE Aircraft
The Rafale is a twin-jet fighter aircraft able to operate from both an aircraft carrier and a shore
base. The fully versatile Rafale is able to carry out all combat aviation missions: air superiority and
air defense, close air support, in-depth strikes, reconnaissance, anti-ship strikes and nuclear
deterrence.

The controversy of the Rafale deal

• Lack of Transparency:
o The present deal as direct government-to-government agreement, as against
the earlier open tender, is criticised.
o Cost breakdown of Rafale in the original bid under UPA and in the 36 aircraft
in the government-to-government deal under NDA are not in the public
domain.
o The Government’s refusal to share the price details which was ‘Classified
information’, citing the Security Agreement provisions.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
o This was as per the Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) between the
Governments of India and France.
• Accountability to Parliament:
o The government is duty-bound to share the full pricing details with the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) and the Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) of Parliament.
• Pricing Issues:
o The price for 126 aircraft that was quoted nearly a decade ago, was never
finalised, and no contract was signed or executed.
o The basic price of each Rafale aircraft was said to be around Rs 670 crore.
o At the time of its signing, the 36-aircraft deal was said to be worth around
Rs 59,000 crore (€ 7.878 billion).
o Breakup given by Top defence officials: the basic cost of the 36 aircraft was
€ 3.402 billion (approximately Rs 670 crore per aircraft), the weaponry was
for € 710 million, spare parts for € 1,800 million, weather and terrain
compatibility fits for € 1,700 million, and performance based logistics
support for € 353 million.

• Transfer of Technology:
o The offset proposal supports the ‘Make In India’ initiative of the Indian
Government through Article 12 of the IGA.
o The current deal states that Dassault will facilitate the implementation of
‘Make In India’ by the industrial supplier notably through offsets for 50%
value of the supply protocol.
o The absence of transfer of technology (ToT) component is raised as an issue.
o Also, no role is guaranteed for any Indian public sector company, including
HAL.
o Some India-specific enhancements that were part of the earlier deal do not
figure in the 2016 deal
• Conflict of Interest:
o The bypassing of procedures, the excessive interest of the Prime Minister’s
Office in the deal and the changes made by the government in the terms of
the deal and even in the Defence Procurement Policy itself cannot be
explained without reference to the offset factor.
o The offset deal granted to private MNC without any competition has raised
eyebrows about lack of transparent bidding.
o This has increased the suspection of possible chances of Nepotism.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
CAG’s report on Rafale deal:
The CAG report concludes that the 2016 agreement is slightly better in terms of both pricing and
delivery than the 2007 deal.

The concerns of the CAG’s findings:

• The 2.86% gain in the aircraft price claimed by the CAG is at variance with the taller
claims made by the government.
• The question of 50% offsets in the deal, which has been at the centre of a major
controversy due to involvement of Indian MNC, has not been dealt by the CAG in
this report.
• The CAG report is unhappy about the defence ministry’s repeated demand not to
discuss specific prices in the Rafale deal, as not disclosing price was presented as
part of the agreement between India and France on the planes.
• The original issue of bringing down the total acquisition from 126 to 36 aircraft was
not given much attention.
• There is also no answer to the question why the offer of a lower price made by the
manufacturers of another shortlisted aircraft, the Eurofighter, was neither
considered nor used to bargain for a better price.
Chapter-4 Defence Technology
• The CAG’s assessment of savings in India Specific Enhancements (ISE) to be around
17% is also not properly documented and needs deeper examinations.
• The CAG report makes it clear that the Air Force’s inability to specify its
requirements clearly was to blame, in large part, for the delay.
• It stresses on the fact that the defence acquisition processes in India require reforms
and streamlining.

Conclusion:
The report comes amidst varied revelations about possible lapses and deviations in the Rafale deal.
The CAG report is less likely to bring closure to the controversy over the deal as it does not clarify
all the doubts about the deal. There is a need to deliberate the report in the Parliament in its
forthcoming sessions and bring in the required transparency about the deal.