FILED

4/1/2022
J#
STATE BAR COURT
' CLERK'S OFFICE
Publlc Matter L03 ANGELES
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS AN GELES

In the Matter of ) Case No. SBC-20-C-3081 1-YDR

)
SEONG HWAN KIM, ) DECISION
)
State Bar No. 166604. )
)

Introduction

This disciplinary proceeding arises out of Respondent Seong Hwan Kim’s criminal

conviction for five misdemeanor Violations involving an August 2019 domestic violence

incident. Respondent pled no contest to violations of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a)

[inflicting injury upon a spouse resulting in traumatic condition], Penal Code section 245,

subdivision (a)(1) [assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm], Penal Code section 5 97,

subdivision (a) [animal cruelty], and Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b) [child

abuse/neglect] (two counts).

After having thoroughly reviewed the record, including the testimony and exhibits

admitted at trial, and evaluating the crimes for which Respondent was convicted, this couIt

concludes that the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s conviction involve moral

turpitude. In consideration of the nature and extent of Respondent’s misconduct, the absence of

any aggravating factors, and the substantial mitigation, the court recommends, among other

things, that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, stayed, and placed

on probation for two years subject to conditions, including a 60-day actual suspension.
 Significant Procedural History

The Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC) transmitted

evidence of Respondent’s conviction to the Review Department on November 24, 2020, and

evidence of finality of that conviction on June 8, 2021.

By order filed July 16, 2021, the Review Department referred this matter to the Hearing

Department to determine whether the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s

misdemeanor violations involved moral turpitude, or other misconduct warranting discipline, and

if so, to provide a recommendation as to the level of discipline to be imposed.

A Notice of Hearing on Conviction (NOH) was issued on July 20, 2021. Respondent

filed his response to the NOH on August 5, denying that the violations involved moral turpitude

or other misconduct warranting discipline.

The parties filed a Stipulation as to Facts (Stipulation) on November 16, 2021.1

A four-day trial was held on November 17-19 and December 14, 2021. OCTC was

represented by Senior Trial Counsel Robert Henderson and Deputy Trial Counsel Tiffany Uhri

Chu. Respondent was represented by David Clare, Esq. The parties filed their respective closing

argument briefs on January 5, 2022, and the case was submitted for decision that same day.

Jurisdiction

Respondent has been a California attorney since his admission on December 6, 1993.

Findings of Fact

The following findings of fact are based upon the Stipulation, trial testimony, and

documentary evidence received at trial.2

1
The parties also stipulated to the admission of a number of exhibits therein.
2
The court took several exhibits under submission: OCTC’s exhibits 24 and 27 and
Respondent’s exhibits 1025 and 1032. The court herein orders that OCTC’s exhibit 27 is
admitted. As to OCTC exhibit 24, the court denies admission of this exhibit as cumulative and
unduly prejudicial. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.104(F).) Furthermore, although the
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Record of Conviction

On September 17, 2019, the Los Angeles City Attorney filed a four-count misdemeanor

complaint against Respondent in Los Angeles County Superior Court. On January 13, 2020, the

Los Angeles City Attorney filed an amended misdemeanor complaint against Respondent, which

alleged 12 counts of wrongdoing, including the following violations of the Penal Code:

section 273.5, subdivision (a) [inflicting injury upon a spouse resulting in traumatic condition];

section 245, subdivision (a)(1) [assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm]; section 422,

subdivision (a) [threat to commit a crime resulting in bodily injury or death]; section 136.1,

subdivision (b)(2) [attempting to dissuade victim/witness of a crime from asserting a complaint];

section 647.6, subdivision (a)(1) [unlawfully annoying or molesting a child]; section 243.4,

subdivision (e)(1) [unlawful sexual touching of a child]; section 597, subdivision (a) [animal

cruelty] (three counts); and section 273a, subdivision (b) [child abuse/neglect] (three counts).

On October 6, 2020, Respondent entered a no contest plea to the following five

misdemeanor counts: one count of violating Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a) [inflicting

injury upon a spouse resulting in traumatic condition], one count of violating Penal Code

section 245, subdivision (a)(1) [assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm], one count of

violating Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a) [animal cruelty], and two counts of violating

Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b) [child abuse/neglect]. The remaining seven counts

were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement.

letters submitted to the criminal court by Respondent’s wife and daughters may have been
admissible in aggravation, they contain hearsay statements to which Respondent raised a timely
objection and neither Respondent’s wife nor daughters were available for cross-examination.
Finally, the information in the letters goes beyond the relevant time frame of the conviction
underlying this proceeding and raises facts and circumstances that arguably fall outside the scope
of this proceeding.
As to Respondent’s exhibits, exhibit 1025 is admitted, but the court denies admission of
Respondent’s exhibit 1032, as it is a partial transcript from confidential dependency court
proceedings and not relevant to the issues before this court.

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 The Los Angeles Superior Court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed

Respondent on 48 months of summary probation, subject to terms and conditions, including 60

days in the county jail; completion of a 52-week domestic violence batterers’ treatment program;

completion of a 52-week parenting program; payment of various fines, fees, restitution (in an

amount to be determined at a later hearing), and charitable contributions3; and compliance with

the criminal protective order (CPO).

Respondent is in compliance with his probation. Respondent filed proof of his $25,000

charitable contributions to Valley Family Center and NKLA Pet Adoption Center, with the court

on November 10, 2020.4 Respondent completed his 52-week domestic violence batterers’

treatment program on April 23, 2021, and also completed his 52-week parenting program on

September 23, 2021. Respondent remains on probation at this time.

Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Conviction

Background Facts

At the time of the domestic violence incident leading to Respondent’s conviction,

Respondent and his wife, Karolanne Asmus-Kim, had been married for approximately 12 years.

The August 2019 domestic violence incident was the first time during their 12-year marriage that

Respondent physically assaulted Ms. Asmus-Kim and there were no prior reported incidents of

domestic violence between Respondent and Ms. Asmus-Kim.

Respondent and Ms. Asmus-Kim have two daughters in common: K.K., approximately

12 years old at the time, and L.K., approximately 9 years old at the time.5 Neither Ms. Asmus-

Kim nor the children testified during this proceeding so the facts and circumstances surrounding

3
Respondent was ordered to make two $25,000 charitable contributions on or before
November 11, 2020, to recipients that were vetted and approved by the Los Angeles City
Attorney’s office.
4
The restitution hearing was taken off calendar this date.
5
As both children are minors, the court refers to each by her initials only.

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Respondent’s conviction have been gleaned from the Stipulation, Respondent’s testimony, and

other relevant and admissible evidence.

The August 2019 Domestic Violence Incident

While at their shared home, on August 26, 2019, Respondent and Ms. Asmus-Kim

argued about getting a divorce. Subsequently, Ms. Asmus-Kim went to sleep upstairs in her bed.

However, in the early morning hours of the following day, Respondent awoke Ms. Asmus-Kim

to continue the argument. Respondent was extremely intoxicated and has limited recall of the

details of the incident, so the court finds his testimony about what occurred to be generally

unreliable. (See Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (c).)

After Respondent and Ms. Asmus-Kim went downstairs, Respondent verbally berated

Ms. Asmus-Kim over the next four hours. Respondent threatened Ms. Asmus-Kim during the

verbal altercation, causing her to be in fear for her safety. At one point, when Ms. Asmus-Kim

turned to walk away from Respondent, he grabbed her arm and pushed her on the couch, where

he used bodily force to pin her down with the weight of his body. Ms. Asmus-Kim did not lose

consciousness, but the assault caused her to urinate on herself and she suffered swelling on her

left wrist and a two-inch scratch on her neck.

K.K. awoke to the sound of her mother screaming. When K.K. went downstairs, she saw

Respondent holding her mother down on the couch. K.K. yelled for Respondent to get off of her

mother. Ms. Asmus-Kim was eventually able to free herself and tried to get her cellphone in an

attempt to call the police, but Respondent grabbed her cellphone and threw it out of reach.

Fearful of what she had witnessed, K.K. ran upstairs and hid in the closet, where she called 911.

L.K slept through the entire incident.

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 Multiple squad cars responded to Respondent’s home.6 Officer Daisy Arzate, one of the

responding police officers, prepared pages two and three of the arrest report. Officer Arzate was

credible and clear in her recollection of the events of that date. (See Evid. Code, § 780,

subds. (a)-(d) and (f).) Officer Arzate observed that Ms. Asmus-Kim was shaking, crying,

fearful, nervous, and apologetic. Officer Arzate took photos of Ms. Asmus-Kim’s injuries and

the area of the home where the assault took place.7 Ms. Asmus-Kim’s physical injuries were not

serious and required no more than usual first aid treatment. Ms. Asmus-Kim requested and

received an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) that prohibited any contact by Respondent.

Respondent does not recall receiving a copy of the EPO.8

6
Several of the responding officers were wearing activated body cameras which recorded
their arrival, entry, conversations, interviews, and departure from Respondent’s home. Certain
police officer activated cameras also captured footage of Respondent’s arrest, transport to the
police station, and booking. Exhibits 5 through 11 were identified by OCTC as the audio and
video recordings of the police officer body camera footage taken on August 27, 2019.
By order filed November 19, 2021, this court excluded all exhibits that contained visual
depictions or identifying information of the minor children as violative of their privacy rights.
This included the police officer body camera footage offered in exhibits 7 and 9.
On December 14, 2021, the last day of trial, OCTC identified and sought to introduce
additional police officer body camera footage – exhibits 5, 6, 8, 10, 11. The court denied
admission of exhibit 5, consistent with its prior order, as it contained K.K.’s facial and other
views. As to exhibits 6, 8, 10, and 11, the court herein denies admission of those exhibits as
OCTC was unable to authenticate the footage. OCTC called four police officers to testify –
Angelica Lopez, Alina Gheta, Ralph Barone, and Daisy Arzate – none of whom were able to
determine which police officer’s body camera shot the footage.
On December 29, 2021, after the conclusion of trial but prior to the case being submitted,
OCTC submitted “updated” redacted copies of exhibits 1, 2, 4-11, 17, and 18. However, this
court previously excluded exhibits 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 17, and 18, and OCTC did not appropriately seek
reconsideration, and the court has now denied admission of exhibits 6, 8, 10, and 11, so those are
not part of the record in this case. But, having previously admitted exhibit 4 into evidence, the
court accepts the redacted copy of exhibit 4 and orders that the original unredacted exhibit be
maintained under seal in accordance with rule 5.12 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
7
Several photos taken at the scene reflect a reddish substance on the floor in the vicinity
of the area of the assault. The reddish substance was wine that splashed on the floor from a
bottle that was knocked over when Respondent grabbed Ms. Asmus-Kim’s cellphone.
8
The EPO was not introduced into evidence.

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 No weapons were identified as having been used during the incident and no knife or other

weapon was found at the scene.9 Nor was there any suggestion that the family dog had been

attacked or injured by Respondent.10 There were also no visible injuries observed on the

children. However, Respondent’s actions caused K.K. and L.K. to suffer unjustifiable mental

suffering and endangered their health and safety. Since the children were present during the

incident, the police notified the Department of Children and Family Services.

Events Subsequent to the August 2019 Domestic Violence Incident

While incarcerated, Respondent attempted to contact Ms. Asmus-Kim numerous times to

ask her to bail him out, but she did not respond. Shortly after, Ms. Asmus-Kim filed for divorce.

On or about September 16, 2019, a report was made alleging inappropriate interactions

between Respondent and his children, and an investigation ensued.11 During the investigation, it

was revealed that Respondent would, on occasion, discipline his daughters with “huggy time” – a

time when he would chase, catch, and then hug and embrace his daughters tightly. Respondent

considered “huggy time” to be a form of punishment. His daughters disliked “huggy time,”

which was usually done in the presence of their mother, friends, and/or relatives, while all were

dressed in full-clothing. Although there were times when Respondent performed “huggy time”

9
In a follow-up report, a couple of days after the incident, a police officer spoke with
Ms. Asmus-Kim again, and she stated for the first time that Respondent had picked up a kitchen
knife and thrown it in her direction during the incident. This is the only mention of a weapon in
any of the police records introduced into evidence.
10
Respondent testified in these proceedings that he believes the animal cruelty charges
may have been the result of him having whipped his belt at or near the dogs during the incident.
There is no other information in the record about the facts and circumstances surrounding the
animal cruelty charges.
11
Ms. Asmus-Kim informed the police, at that time, that she had a domestic violence
restraining order against Respondent that would be expiring on September 18, 2019, and she was
concerned about his visitation with the children after the order expired.

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while he was wearing only his underwear, there is no credible evidence of any contact or

interaction of a sexual nature between Respondent and his daughters.12

Conclusions of Law

In attorney disciplinary proceedings, “the record of [an attorney's] conviction [is]

conclusive evidence of guilt of the crime of which he or she has been convicted.” (Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 6101, subd. (a); In re Gross (1983) 33 Cal.3d 561, 567.) In other words, an attorney’s

conviction is conclusive proof that the attorney committed all of the acts necessary to constitute

the crime of which he or she was convicted. (Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 110.)

In addition, a “hearing judge may not reach conclusions, even if based on evidence found to be

credible, that are inconsistent with the conclusive effect of respondent’s conviction.” (In the

Matter of Respondent O (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 581, 588.)

Here, Respondent is conclusively presumed to have completed all of the acts necessary

for each violation of which he was convicted, described as follows:

• A violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), requires finding that a

person inflicted physical injury upon one’s spouse resulting in a traumatic condition

(i.e., a wound or other bodily injury, whether minor or serious).

• A violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), requires finding that a

person committed an assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm.13

12
Dismissed counts six, alleging a violation of Penal Code section 647.6,
subdivision (a)(1) [unlawfully annoying or molesting a child] and seven, alleging a violation of
Penal Code section 243.4 [unlawful sexual touching of a child], of the amended misdemeanor
complaint, were charged based on forensic interviews of L.K. and K.K. by Jenny Matthews, held
on October 7, 2019 – almost two months after the assault. In its November 19, 2021 order the
court granted Respondent’s motion in limine #2 to exclude the testimony of Jenny Matthews and
exhibits 17 and 18 as improper and uncorroborated hearsay evidence. (See Rules Proc. of State
Bar, rule 5.104(D).)
13
Respondent reasonably believed that he pled no contest to a charge of assault by means
likely to cause great bodily injury (Penal Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), not assault with a deadly
weapon. In fact, Deputy City Attorney Peter Hsu testified under penalty of perjury that there
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 • A violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (a), requires finding that a person

acted maliciously and intentionally to maim, mutilate, torture, or wound a living

animal.

• A violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b), requires finding that, under

circumstances or conditions not likely to produce great bodily harm or death, a person

willfully inflicted, caused, or permitted any child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain

or mental suffering or willfully caused or permitted a child’s person or health to be

injured or the child to be placed in a situation where the child’s person or health was

endangered while having care and custody of that child.

None of the above violations constitute moral turpitude per se. And, since Respondent’s

offenses do not involve moral turpitude per se, this court must first determine whether there is

clear and convincing evidence14 that the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s

conviction involved moral turpitude.

The term moral turpitude “cannot be defined with precision.” (Baker v. State Bar (1989)

49 Cal.3d 804, 815, fn. 3.) It has consistently been described as any “act of baseness, vileness or

depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in

general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.

was no weapon involved and the count was supposed to be amended. This is corroborated by a
September 9, 2020 email exchange with Respondent’s criminal defense counsel, wherein
Mr. Hsu confirmed the parties’ understanding of the plea agreement, in relevant part, as follows:
“1. Counts:[¶]…PG [plead guilty] count 2 amended PC 245(a)(4) (dismiss knife).” (Exh. 1033.)
While the court acknowledges the discrepancy between what Respondent was convicted of and
what the parties believed Respondent had pled to, Respondent is conclusively presumed to have
committed an assault with a deadly weapon. Nevertheless, whether Respondent committed an
assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by other means likely to cause great bodily
injury does not significantly alter this court’s determination as to whether the facts and
circumstances of Respondent’s misconduct involved moral turpitude, discussed post.
14
Clear and convincing evidence leaves no substantial doubt and is sufficiently strong to
command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. (Conservatorship of Wendland
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 552.)

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[Citation.]” (In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 97.) “It is measured by the morals of the day

[citation] and may vary according to the community or the times. [Citation.]” (In the Matter of

Anderson (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 208, 214.)

The California Supreme Court has further explained that “[c]riminal conduct not

committed in the practice of law or against a client reveals moral turpitude if it shows a

deficiency in any character trait necessary for the practice of law (such as trustworthiness,

honesty, fairness, candor, and fidelity to fiduciary duties) or if it involves such a serious breach

of a duty owed to another or to society, or such a flagrant disrespect for the law or for societal

norms, that knowledge of the attorney’s conduct would be likely to undermine public confidence

in and respect for the legal profession.” (In re Lesansky (2001) 25 Cal.4th 11, 16.)

The facts and circumstances of Respondent’s conviction involve moral turpitude

In determining whether Respondent’s conduct involved moral turpitude the court must

look to all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. (See In the Matter of Miller (Review

Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 110, 115 [“wide ambit of facts surrounding the

commission of a crime is appropriate to consider in a conviction referral proceeding”]; In the

Matter of Oheb (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 920, 935 [in reviewing

circumstances, court not restricted to examining elements of crime, but may look to whole course

of respondent’s conduct that reflects on fitness to practice law].)

Here, Respondent was convicted of five violations of the law stemming from a single

domestic violence incident. Albeit isolated, his criminal conduct – involving a violent assault on

his wife, endangering and inflicting unjustifiable mental suffering upon his children, and harm to

one of his pets – constituted a breach of his duties owed to his wife, children, and pet, and

displayed disrespect for the law and societal norms, such that it would be likely to undermine

public confidence in and respect for the legal profession.

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 Notably, Respondent’s physical assault upon Ms. Asmus-Kim took place after a

prolonged, four-hour verbal altercation and only after she attempted to walk away from the

situation. Instead of allowing Ms. Asmus-Kim to leave, Respondent escalated the situation by

grabbing Ms. Asmus-Kim and preventing her from leaving by pinning her down with the force

of his body, inflicting physical injury upon Ms. Asmus-Kim and causing her to fear for her life

and urinate on herself. Hearing her mother scream, K.K. was awakened, saw and heard what

was happening, and yelled at Respondent to get off of her mother. However, even his daughter’s

plea did not cause Respondent to stop. And, when Ms. Asmus-Kim finally did break free and

attempted to call 911 for help, Respondent sought to prevent her from doing so by grabbing her

phone and throwing it away from her. His 12-year-old daughter was in so much fear that she

retreated upstairs, hid in her closet, and called 911 herself. Respondent’s daughters were

particularly vulnerable to suffering mental and emotional trauma arising from this incident,

especially given their ages and his oldest daughter’s first-hand experience in witnessing the

incident.

In sum, Respondent’s conduct was unprovoked, violent behavior and demonstrated a lack

of respect for the law and the safety of others – thereby meeting the definition of moral turpitude.

(See In the Matter of Smart (Review Dept. 2020) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 713, 723 [finding that

the attorney’s refusal to let the victim leave and separately the act of pinning her down giving her

cause for fear constituted criminal misconduct involving moral turpitude].)

Aggravation and Mitigation15

OCTC bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing

evidence. (Std. 1.5.) Conversely, Respondent bears the burden of proving mitigating

circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.6.)

15
All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title
IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

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Aggravation

The court finds the following with regard to aggravating circumstances.16

Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b).)

Although the present matter involves five violations of the law, the court does not find

aggravation for multiple acts of wrongdoing given that the underlying wrongdoing stems from a

singular domestic violence incident. (See In the Matter of Shalant (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal.

State Bar Ct. Rptr. 829, 839 [no aggravation for multiple acts of misconduct when it involved

two counts arising from single transaction with client].)

Lack of Candor (Std. 1.5(l).)

OCTC argues that this court should find that Respondent’s testimony was dishonest and

lacked candor because he claimed that no knife was involved in the assault, denied hitting any

dogs, denied hitting or threatening Ms. Asmus-Kim, and denied having previously perpetrated

domestic violence on Ms. Asmus-Kim. While Respondent disputes some of the facts

surrounding his conviction, he does not dispute the violations of which he was convicted, with

the exception of his reasonable and corroborated understanding that he pled to an amended count

two, which did not include mention of a knife. Moreover, although this court found

Respondent’s testimony regarding the domestic violence incident generally unreliable due to his

inebriated state at the time and limited recall of the events, this does not equate to a finding that

his testimony was dishonest or lacked candor. (See generally, In the Matter of Duxbury (Review

Dept. 1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 61, 67 [distinction between lack of credibility and

dishonesty in finding lack of candor as aggravation].) On this record, the court does not find by

clear and convincing evidence that Respondent’s testimony was dishonest or lacking in candor.

16
The court declines to find aggravation for indifference (std. 1.5(k)). Instead, the court
finds that Respondent was sincere and credible in testifying that he has remorse for his actions
and took full responsibility for his wrongdoing, discussed post.

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 Significant Harm (Std. 1.5(j).)

OCTC argues that the physical and emotional harm caused to Respondent’s wife,

daughters, and pet warrants aggravation under standard 1.5(j). This court disagrees.

As to Ms. Asmus-Kim’s physical injuries, the evidence indicates that her injuries were

not serious and required no more than usual first aid treatment. And while Respondent’s conduct

reasonably may have caused Ms. Asmus-Kim significant emotional harm, she did not testify; so,

this court does not have clear and convincing evidence of specific, cognizable, and significant

emotional harm. (See In the Matter of Jensen (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at

p. 290 [to support aggravation, OCTC must prove specific, cognizable, and significant harm,

directly attributable to respondent’s actions].) The fact that Ms. Asmus-Kim filed for divorce the

day after the assault is not evidence of significant harm nor can it be directly attributable to

Respondent’s actions, especially considering that the parties were discussing divorce prior to

Respondent’s misconduct herein.

As to Respondent’s daughters, the fact that he was convicted of having caused the

children unjustifiable mental suffering does not in and of itself establish specific, cognizable, and

significant harm. Finally, as to Respondent’s dog, there is no evidence before this court as to the

basis for the animal cruelty charge, let alone the specific harm caused by Respondent’s conduct.

Moreover, with the exception of the evidence that Ms. Asmus-Kim filed for divorce after

the assault, all of the evidence OCTC asserts in support of aggravation for significant harm was

considered as part of this court’s culpability findings. Accordingly, the court declines to find an

additional aggravating factor of significant harm. (In the Matter of Duxbury, supra, 4 Cal. State

Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 68 [where factual findings used to find culpability, it is improper to again

consider in aggravation].)

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 High Vulnerability of Victim (Std. 1.5(n).)

OCTC has not pointed to any specific facts in support of a finding that Ms. Asmus-Kim

was a highly vulnerable victim. And, although the court agrees that Respondent’s minor children

and dog were vulnerable victims, the court will not give this finding additional weight under

standard 1.5(n) because this was considered in the court’s finding of culpability and moral

turpitude. (See, e.g., In the Matter of Jensen, supra, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 290.)

Mitigation

The court finds the following with regard to mitigating circumstances.

No Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.6(a).)

Respondent was admitted to practice in 1993 and has no prior record of discipline. Given

that Respondent’s misconduct occurred in 2019, he had 26 years of unblemished practice prior to

the misconduct herein. Although serious, Respondent’s misconduct appears to be aberrational

and unlikely to recur, especially in light of his psychologist’s conclusion that “he demonstrates

the ability to control his anger and does not exhibit any signs of propensity toward violence.”

(Exh. 1016, p. 2.) Therefore, Respondent’s lack of prior discipline between 1993 and 2019

warrants substantial mitigation. (See Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1029 [long

discipline-free practice is most relevant where misconduct is aberrational and unlikely to recur].)

Candor and Cooperation (Std. 1.6(e).)

Respondent entered into a detailed stipulation as to facts and admission of documents

which conserved court time and resources. Although Respondent did not stipulate to culpability,

the stipulation to critical facts and the admission of documents containing statements from Ms.

Asmus-Kim and Respondent’s children, which supported the moral turpitude finding, merits

moderate weight in mitigation. (See In the Matter of Johnson (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State

Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190 [more extensive mitigation for admission of culpability and facts]; see

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also Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [mitigation credit given for entering

into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

Remorse and Recognition of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.6(g).)

Prompt objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of

wrongdoing are a mitigating factor. Significantly, Respondent took affirmative and timely steps

to enroll and meaningfully participate in treatment programs, shortly after the incident and prior

to his sentencing in criminal court.

Respondent initially enrolled in a domestic violence program at Family Harmony on

September 18, 2019, and attended 11 sessions of counseling before transferring to the 52-week

domestic violence batterers’ treatment program through California Diversion Programs on

June 1, 2020. Respondent’s completion report from California Diversion Programs indicates that

he expressed and recognized personal responsibility and was able to verbalize specific examples

of non-violent ways to express his emotions in the future. (Exh. 1002.)

Respondent also promptly engaged himself in parent therapy, completing 15 sessions

with two other doctors by April 28, 2020, which is when he began sessions with Angela Bissada,

Psy.D, the licensed psychologist with whom he completed the remaining 37 sessions.

Respondent successfully completed his treatment goals – parent education, promotion of

appropriate problem-solving skills, and appropriate management and regulation of emotions – as

of September 23, 2021. Through his therapy with Dr. Bissada, Respondent engaged in active

self-reflection and explored how his childhood experiences may have affected him as an adult.17

Dr. Bissada observed that Respondent “demonstrates deep insight and has frequently and

consistently expressed guilt [and] remorse and has taken responsibility for his inappropriate and

harmful actions.” (Exh. 1016, p. 2.)

17
Respondent was raised in a household where it was not uncommon for his parents to be
physically abusive toward each other and toward him and his siblings.

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 Finally, because his criminal misconduct was committed while he was under the

influence of alcohol, Respondent took it upon himself to enroll in and complete a 12-week

alcohol and drug program from May through August 2020. As part of the program, Respondent

attended 12 group sessions, 2 individual sessions, and 12 self-help meetings.

This court also observed Respondent’s sincere expressions of remorse throughout this

disciplinary proceeding and appreciates his willingness to rehabilitate himself to avoid similar

misconduct in the future. The court accords substantial weight to Respondent’s remorse and

recognition of his wrongdoing, particularly as demonstrated by his voluntary engagement in

rehabilitative programs prior to any court orders. (See Hipolito v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d

621, 627, fn. 2 [favorable consideration given for “taking steps to repair the damage done and to

prevent its recurrence”]; see also Calaway v. State Bar (1986) 41 Cal.3d 743, 748 [“deeds speak

louder than self-serving protestations”].)

Good Character (Std. 1.6(f).)

Respondent presented evidence of good moral character from four live witnesses,

including three attorneys and a neighbor, and declarations from twelve other individuals,

including two judges and eight attorneys, each of whom have known Respondent for many years.

The testimony and declarations of the judges and attorneys are given serious consideration

because attorneys and judges have a “strong interest in maintaining the honest administration of

justice.” (See In the Matter of Brown (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309, 319.)

Respondent’s witnesses represented a wide range of professions in the legal and general

communities.18 (In the Matter of Hagen (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 153.)

The witnesses were also generally aware of the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, having each

18
In addition to the 13 legal professionals who attested or testified as to Respondent’s
good moral character, Respondent’s witnesses included a managing partner of an investment
company, a Los Angeles Police Department detective, and the director of an investment group.

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been provided with a statement by Respondent admitting to having verbally and physically

assaulted his wife, causing her physical and emotional damage, and admitting that his oldest

daughter witnessed a part of the attack.19 The witnesses generally described Respondent as a

highly competent, effective attorney who is honorable and trustworthy and represents his clients

with integrity. Most of the character witnesses commented that Respondent candidly discussed,

accepted responsibility for, and expressed remorse for the deplorable assault he perpetrated on

his wife and the negative effects that it had on his children.

Collectively, the court assigns Respondent’s good character evidence substantial weight

in mitigation. (In the Matter of Davis (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 576, 591–

592 [significant mitigation for good character for three witnesses who had long-standing

familiarity with attorney and broad knowledge of good character, work habits, and professional

skills].)

Community Service and Pro Bono Legal Work

Respondent argues that he has engaged in extensive pro bono work for the legal

community, such as authoring three journal articles and six intellectual property law blog posts

from 2018 to 2020, participating in ten speaking engagements between 2006 and 2021 (primarily

on trade secret issues), and being a contributing author on a 2014 legal treatise “Trade Secret

Litigation and Protection In California” and its 2017 supplement. Yet, upon questioning,

Respondent acknowledged that partners in international firms are expected to participate in these

activities, which are geared towards enhancing a partner’s reputation in the legal community and

developing a larger client base. Respondent did not provide evidence of any pro bono legal

representation. While the court recognizes Respondent’s actions in service to the legal

community in an educational capacity, this does not demonstrate the kind of “zeal in undertaking

19
Respondent also provided each with a copy of the Review Department’s July 16, 2021
Order, which listed the five violations of which he was convicted.

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pro bono work” that has been previously recognized by the court as constituting substantial

mitigation. (Compare Rose v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 646, 665–666 [substantial mitigation

for extensive civic and charitable service, handling numerous pro bono actions seeking to

advance the rights of handicapped people, lecturing for Continuing Education of the Bar

program, serving as a guest lecturer at a law school, and receiving a certificate for outstanding

contributions from that law school].)

In addition to the above, Respondent contends that he also participated in the Christian

Outreach in Action project, which involved serving food to homeless individuals in Long Beach.

Respondent, however, did not provide clear and convincing evidence as to when or how much

time he devoted to this community service.

Considering all of the above, this court affords Respondent limited weight in mitigation

for community service and pro bono work, supported only by his own testimony. (See In the

Matter of Shalant, supra, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 840; In the Matter of Bach, (Review

Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631, 647-648.)

Lack of Client Harm (Std. 1.6(c).)

While it is true that Respondent misconduct did not harm any client, the court accords

this factor minimal weight in mitigation. (See In the Matter of Burns (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal.

State Bar Ct. Rptr 406, 413 [lack of client harm is relevant in the context of a criminal

conviction].)

Discussion

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to

protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest

possible professional standards for attorneys. (Chadwick v. State Bar, supra, 49 Cal.3d. at

p. 111; Cooper v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d. at p. 1025; Std. 1.1.)

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 In determining the level of discipline, the court looks to both the standards and decisional

law for guidance. (Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d. 1085, 1090; Snyder v. State Bar

(1990) 49 Cal.3d. 1302, 1310-1311.) The purpose of the standards is to promote consistent and

uniform application of disciplinary measures and they are entitled to great weight. (In re

Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91.) While they are not mandatory, the court may deviate from

the standards only when there is a compelling, well-defined reason to do so. (Bates v. State Bar

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1056, 1061, fn. 2; Aronin v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 276, 291.) If

aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in

balance with each other. (Std. 1.7.)

As discussed above, the court finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding

Respondent’s misdemeanor conviction involved moral turpitude. Therefore, standard 2.15(b) is

applicable. Standard 2.15(b) provides that, “[D]isbarment or actual suspension is the presumed

sanction for final conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.”

OCTC argues that discipline to consist of not less than a two-year actual suspension with

a standard 1.2(c)(1) requirement, or alternatively disbarment, is appropriate.20 Respondent

argues that no actual suspension is necessary to achieve the goals of attorney discipline.

Respondent’s misconduct underlying his criminal conviction is appalling and incredibly

serious and the recommended discipline should reflect that. Yet, the court recognizes that this is

20
OCTC cites only to In the Matter of Smart, supra, 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 713 in
support of this recommendation. Smart was convicted of felony violations of Penal Code
section 245, subdivision (a) [assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury] and Penal
Code section 246.3, subdivision (a) [discharging a firearm with gross negligence] under facts and
circumstances that were found to involve moral turpitude. As such, the presumptive sanction
was disbarment under the standard applicable to felony convictions involving moral turpitude,
not actual suspension to disbarment as is called for here. Setting aside the fact that Respondent
was not convicted of a felony, the facts and circumstances in the present matter vary in
significant ways from those in Smart, in that Respondent has substantially more mitigation, does
not have a history of assaultive behavior, and the misconduct did not involve a gun, let alone the
gratuitous firing of a gun placing innocent bystanders at risk of serious harm or even death.

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Respondent’s first criminal conviction and, fortunately, his conduct did not cause significant

harm. While in no way excusing his behavior, the court acknowledges that Respondent and his

wife were going through marital difficulties and Respondent was under the influence of alcohol

at the time of the incident. Respondent was also cooperative with the police and has not

exhibited any dishonesty, either during the investigation into his criminal misconduct or during

this proceeding. Moreover, Respondent has exhibited commendable behavior since the incident,

including promptly engaging himself in rehabilitative programs prior to any criminal court order,

voluntarily participating in alcohol treatment, continuing his positive contributions to the legal

community, and timely complying with all of the conditions of his probation.

Respondent’s six factors in mitigation carry great weight in the absence of any

aggravation. Significantly, as corroborated by his character witnesses, Respondent’s sincere

remorse and recognition of wrongdoing combined with his lack of a prior record of discipline

over a substantial period of time demonstrates that his misconduct is aberrational and lessens the

need for a lengthy suspension or a requirement that he demonstrate his rehabilitation in the

interests of protecting the public, the courts, and the legal profession. Nevertheless,

Respondent’s misconduct was not minor and did in fact cause harm; so, a deviation from the

applicable standard is not appropriate. Instead, mindful of the reprehensibility of Respondent’s

misconduct in balance with the substantial mitigation and lack of any aggravation, the court finds

that a period of actual suspension at the low end of the applicable standard is adequate to achieve

the goals of attorney discipline and will impress upon Respondent the seriousness of his actions.

In addition to the standards, the court also looks to comparable case law for guidance.

There is a dearth of published attorney disciplinary matters involving misdemeanor domestic

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violence-related convictions that were found to involve moral turpitude,21 so the court looks to

analogous cases arising out of other misdemeanor violations that were found to involve moral

turpitude. While recognizing that driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and domestic

violence are very different crimes viewed through different lenses, the court finds some guidance

in In the Matter of Caplin (Review Dept. 2020) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 768, where the attorney

was disciplined for a single misdemeanor conviction involving moral turpitude.

Caplin was convicted of a misdemeanor DUI with an enhancement for an excessive

blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.15 percent. The Review Department found that the

facts and circumstances of Caplin’s conviction revealed moral turpitude by his seven deceitful

interactions with police officers, wherein he concealed that he was the driver of the vehicle and

promoted a false narrative involving another named individual as the driver. (Id. at p. 776.) In

addition to the obvious dishonesty, the Review Department found that Caplin’s actions of driving

while significantly impaired and causing property damage “exhibits contempt for the law and

public safety and reflects poorly on Caplin’s judgment and the legal profession.” (Id. at pp. 776-

777.) Taking into consideration the fact that this misdemeanor offense was Caplin’s first, and no

person was physically injured as a result of his actions – along with the absence of any factors in

aggravation and Caplin’s mitigation for good character, remorse, cooperation, and restitution –

21
The published decisions involving misdemeanor domestic violence-related convictions
were decided decades ago, at a time when public attention was not as focused on the seriousness
of domestic violence, and these cases were generally found not to involve moral turpitude, which
often resulted in relatively low levels of discipline for aggravated serious misconduct. (See, e.g.,
In re Hickey (1990) 50 Cal.3d 571 [facts and circumstances of misdemeanor conviction of
carrying concealed weapon, involving repeated acts of violence toward wife and others, did not
involve moral turpitude; additional culpability for improper withdrawal in client matter; 30-day
actual suspension]; In the Matter of Stewart (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 52
[facts and circumstances of misdemeanor battery on a police officer responding to domestic
dispute involving a child did not involve moral turpitude; aggravated by indifference and prior
record of discipline; 60-day actual suspension].)

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the Review Department recommended discipline at the lowest end of the range of the applicable

standard, to consist of a 30-day actual suspension. (Id. at pp. 779-780.)

Like Caplin, the facts and circumstances of Respondent’s misdemeanor conviction

involved moral turpitude. And while not exhibiting dishonesty, Respondent’s misconduct

similarly exhibited contempt for the law and the safety of others (i.e., his wife, children, and

dog), and reflected poorly on his judgement and the legal profession. Like Caplin, this is

Respondent’s first offense, there are no factors in aggravation, and Respondent has demonstrated

numerous factors deserving of considerable weight in mitigation; but, unlike Caplin,

Respondent’s misconduct was violent and caused harm to persons, not just property damage, in

that Respondent inflicted physical injury upon Ms. Asmus-Kim and unjustifiable mental

suffering upon his children. Accordingly, despite the similarities and Respondent’s additional

substantial mitigation for lack of a prior record, the court finds that Respondent’s misconduct is

more serious than the first-time DUI in Caplin and merits a greater level of discipline.

As the Supreme Court has stated, “[w]here an attorney’s criminal act involves actual

physical harm to a particular individual, the necessary showing of mitigating circumstances

increases accordingly.” (In re Nevill (1985) 39 Cal.3d 729, 735.) In consideration of the

standards and relevant case law, while bearing in mind the seriousness of domestic violence, the

public perception of this issue, and this court’s responsibility to maintain the highest possible

professional standards for attorneys and preserve the integrity of the legal profession, the court

finds that a 60-day actual suspension is appropriate and will serve the purposes of attorney

discipline.22

22
Although this is lower than the level of discipline imposed in In re Otto (1989) 48
Cal.3d 970, where the court found the attorney’s conviction for similar violations did not involve
moral turpitude and imposed a six-month actual suspension, the decision in Otto does not discuss
any of the details of the misconduct nor does it reference any aggravating or mitigating factors.
In the absence of such information, comparison of Otto to the instant case is not appropriate.

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 Recommendations

It is recommended that Seong Hwan Kim, State Bar Number 166604, be suspended from

the practice of law for one year, that execution of that suspension be stayed, and that he be

placed on probation for two years with the following conditions:

1. Actual Suspension. Seong Hwan Kim must be suspended from the practice of law for the
first 60 days of the period of his probation.

2. Review Rules of Professional Conduct. Within 30 days after the effective date of the
Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Seong Hwan Kim must (1) read the
California Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules of Professional Conduct) and Business and
Professions Code sections 6067, 6068, and 6103 through 6126, and (2) provide a declaration,
under penalty of perjury, attesting to his compliance with this requirement, to the State Bar’s
Office of Probation in Los Angeles (Office of Probation) with Seong Hwan Kim’s first
quarterly report.

3. Comply with State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and Probation Conditions.
Seong Hwan Kim must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation.

4. Maintain Valid Official State Bar Record Address and Other Required Contact
Information. Within 30 days after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing
discipline in this matter, Seong Hwan Kim must make certain that the State Bar Attorney
Regulation and Consumer Resources Office (ARCR) has his current office address, email
address, and telephone number. If he does not maintain an office, he must provide the
mailing address, email address, and telephone number to be used for State Bar purposes.
Seong Hwan Kim must report, in writing, any change in the above information to ARCR,
within 10 days after such change, in the manner required by that office.

5. Meet and Cooperate with Office of Probation. Within 15 days after the effective date of
the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter, Seong Hwan Kim must schedule
a meeting with his assigned probation case specialist to discuss the terms and conditions of
his discipline and, within 30 days after the effective date of the court’s order, must participate
in such meeting. Unless otherwise instructed by the Office of Probation, Seong Hwan Kim
may meet with the probation case specialist in person or by telephone. During the probation
period, Seong Hwan Kim must promptly meet with representatives of the Office of Probation
as requested by it and, subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, must fully, promptly,
and truthfully answer any inquiries by it and provide to it any other information requested by
it.

6. State Bar Court Retains Jurisdiction/Appear Before and Cooperate with State Bar
Court. During Seong Hwan Kim’s probation period, the State Bar Court retains jurisdiction
over him to address issues concerning compliance with probation conditions. During this
period, Seong Hwan Kim must appear before the State Bar Court as required by the court or
by the Office of Probation after written notice mailed to his official State Bar record address,

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 as provided above. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Seong Hwan Kim must
fully, promptly, and truthfully answer any inquiries by the court and must provide any other
information the court requests.

7. Quarterly and Final Reports.

a. Deadlines for Reports. Seong Hwan Kim must submit written quarterly reports to
the Office of Probation no later than each January 10 (covering October 1 through
December 31 of the prior year), April 10 (covering January 1 through March 31), July
10 (covering April 1 through June 30), and October 10 (covering July 1 through
September 30) within the period of probation. If the first report would cover less than
30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date and cover the extended
deadline. In addition to all quarterly reports, Seong Hwan Kim must submit a final
report no earlier than 10 days before the last day of the probation period and no later
than the last day of the probation period.

b. Contents of Reports. Seong Hwan Kim must answer, under penalty of perjury, all
inquiries contained in the quarterly report form provided by the Office of Probation,
including stating whether he has complied with the State Bar Act and the Rules of
Professional Conduct during the applicable quarter or period. All reports must be:
(1) submitted on the form provided by the Office of Probation; (2) signed and dated
after the completion of the period for which the report is being submitted (except for
the final report); (3) filled out completely and signed under penalty of perjury; and
(4) submitted to the Office of Probation on or before each report’s due date.

c. Submission of Reports. All reports must be submitted by: (1) fax or email to the
Office of Probation; (2) personal delivery to the Office of Probation; (3) certified mail,
return receipt requested, to the Office of Probation (postmarked on or before the due
date); or (4) other tracked-service provider, such as Federal Express or United Parcel
Service, etc. (physically delivered to such provider on or before the due date).

d. Proof of Compliance. Seong Hwan Kim is directed to maintain proof of compliance

with the above requirements for each such report for a minimum of one year after
either the period of probation or the period of actual suspension has ended, whichever
is longer. Seong Hwan Kim is required to present such proof upon request by the
State Bar, the Office of Probation, or the State Bar Court.

8. State Bar Ethics School. Within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court
order imposing discipline in this matter, Seong Hwan Kim must submit to the Office of
Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar Ethics School and passage of
the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and he will not receive MCLE credit for
attending this session. If he provides satisfactory evidence of completion of the Ethics
School after the date of this Decision but before the effective date of the Supreme Court’s
order in this matter, Seong Hwan Kim will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence
toward his duty to comply with this condition.

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9. Commencement of Probation/Compliance with Probation Conditions. The period of
probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing
discipline in this matter. At the expiration of the probation period, if Seong Hwan Kim has
complied with all conditions of probation, the period of stayed suspension will be satisfied
and that suspension will be terminated.

10. Criminal Probation. Seong Hwan Kim must comply with all probation conditions imposed
in the underlying criminal matter and must report such compliance under penalty of perjury
in all quarterly and final reports submitted to the Office of Probation covering any portion of
the period of the criminal probation. In each quarterly and final report, if Seong Hwan Kim
has an assigned criminal probation officer, he must provide the name and current contact
information for that criminal probation officer. If the criminal probation was successfully
completed during the period covered by a quarterly or final report, that fact must be reported
by Seong Hwan Kim in such report and satisfactory evidence of such fact must be provided
with it. If, at any time before or during the period of probation, Seong Hwan Kim’s criminal
probation is revoked, he is sanctioned by the criminal court, or his status is otherwise
changed due to any alleged violation of the criminal probation conditions by him, Seong
Hwan Kim must submit the criminal court records regarding any such action with his next
quarterly or final report.

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination

It is further recommended that Seong Hwan Kim be ordered to take and pass the

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination administered by the National Conference of

Bar Examiners within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing

discipline in this matter and to provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar’s

Office of Probation within the same period. Failure to do so may result in suspension. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b).) If Seong Hwan Kim provides satisfactory evidence of the taking

and passage of the above examination after the date of this Decision but before the effective date

of the Supreme Court’s order in this matter, he will nonetheless receive credit for such evidence

toward his duty to comply with this requirement.

Monetary Sanctions

It is further recommended that Seong Hwan Kim be ordered to pay monetary sanctions to

the State Bar of California Client Security Fund in the amount of $2,500 in accordance with

Business and Professions Code section 6086.13 and rule 5.137 of the Rules of Procedure of the

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State Bar. Monetary sanctions are enforceable as a money judgment and may be collected by the

State Bar through any means permitted by law. Monetary sanctions must be paid in fiill as a

condition of reinstatement or return to active status, unless time for payment is extended

pursuant to rule 5.137 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.

Reasons for the amount of monetary sanctions recommended include the seriousness of

Respondent’s misconduct, which evidenced moral turpitude and caused harm to his Wife and

children; and the guidelines set forth in rule 5.137 for monetary sanctions in matters

recommending actual suspension. (Rule 5.137(E)(2)(a) [up to $2,500 for actual suspension].)

Costs

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with

Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in

Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment, and may be collected

by the State Bar through any means permitted by law. Unless the time for payment of discipline

costs is extended pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 6086.10, costs assessed against an

attorney who is actually suspended or disbarred must be paid as a condition of reinstatement or

return to active status.

Dated: Apri1 1, 2022

MW
YVET’TE D. ROLAND
Judge of the State Bar Court

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 CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

(Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.27.1 .)

I, the undersigned, certify that I am a Court Specialist of the State Bar Court. I am over the age
of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, on
April 1, 2022, I transmitted a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

by electronic service to DAVID A. CLARE at the following electronic service address as defined
in rule 5.4(29) and as provided in rule 5.26.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar:

[email protected]

by electronic service to TIFFANY F. UHRI CHU at the following electronic service address as
defined in rule 5.4(29) and as provided in rule 5.26.1 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar:

[email protected]. gov

The above document(s) was/were served electronically. My electronic service address is

[email protected]. gov and my business address is
845 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, CA 90017

I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the information
above is true and correct.

Date: April 1, 2022

g e ;us He andez
Court Specialist
State Bar Court