Submitted by the IWG on hydrogen and fuel cell Informal document GRSP-71-09

vehicles, GTR13-Phase 2 (71st GRSP, 9-13 May 2022

agenda item 3)

Proposal for Amendments 1 to Global technical regulation

No. 13, Phase 2 (Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles)

Submitted by informal working group on hydrogen and fuel cell

vehicles, GTR13 Phase 2

The text reproduced below was prepared by the experts of the Informal Working Group
(IWG) on hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles (HFCV), UN Global Technical Regulation No. 13,
Phase 2 (GTR13-PH2) and proposes enhancement of the global harmonisation of the
technical requirements of compressed hydrogen storage systems and vehicles equipped with
them. The modifications to the existing text of the UN Global Technical Regulation No. 13
(ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13) are marked in bold for new or strikethrough for deleted
characters.
 I. Proposal
Table of contents, amend to read:

Contents
Page
I. Statement of technical rationale and justification ............................................................................
A. Introduction .............................................................................................................................
B. GTRgtr action plan ..................................................................................................................
C. Description of typical hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs).......................................
1. Vehicle description ..........................................................................................................
2. Hydrogen fuelling system ...............................................................................................
3. Hydrogen storage system ................................................................................................
4. Hydrogen fuel delivery system........................................................................................
5. Fuel cell system ..............................................................................................................
6. Electric propulsion and power management system .......................................................
D. Rationale for scope, definitions and applicability ....................................................................
1. Rationale for paragraph 2. (Scope)..................................................................................
2. Rationale for paragraphs 3.9. and 3.48. (Definitions of service life and date of removal
from service) ...................................................................................................................
3. Rationale for paragraph 4. (Applicability of requirements) ............................................
E. Rationale for paragraph 5. (Performance requirements) ..........................................................
1. Compressed hydrogen storage system requirements and safety needs ............................
2. Vehicle fuel system requirements and safety needs ........................................................
3. Electrical safety requirements and safety needs ..............................................................
F. Rationale for storage and fuel system test procedures ............................................................
1. Rationale for storage and fuel system integrity tests ......................................................
2. Rationale for paragraph 6.2. (Test procedures for compressed hydrogen
storage systems) .............................................................................................................
G. Optional requirements: vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage systems/rationale ..............
1. Background information for liquefied hydrogen storage systems ...................................
2. Rationale for liquefied hydrogen storage system design qualification requirements of
paragraph 7.2. ..................................................................................................................
3. Rationale for vehicle fuel system design qualification requirements (LH2) ....................
4. Rationale for test procedures for LHSSs ........................................................................
 5. Rationale for paragraph 7.5. (Test procedure for post-crash concentration
measurement for vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage systems (LHSSs)) ...............
H. National provisions for material compatibility (including hydrogen embrittlement) and
conformity of production .........................................................................................................
1. Material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement ......................................................
2. National requirements complimentary to GTRgtr requirements .....................................
I. Topics for the next phase in developing the GTRgtr for hydrogen-fuelled vehicles ...............
J. Existing Regulations, Directives, and International Standards ...............................................
1. Vehicle fuel system integrity ..........................................................................................
2. Storage system.................................................................................................................
3. Electric safety ..................................................................................................................
K. Benefits and Costs ...................................................................................................................
L. Interoperability Considerations……………………………………………………… ........
M. Materials Evaluation for Hydrogen Service………………………………………………….
N. Humid Gas Stress Corrosion Cracking………………………………………………………
O. Suggested Tolerances for the Qualification Requirements of the CHSS …………… .....

II. Text of the Regulation ......................................................................................................................

1. Purpose ....................................................................................................................................
2. Scope .......................................................................................................................................
3. Definitions ...............................................................................................................................
4. Applicability of requirements .................................................................................................
5. Performance requirements ......................................................................................................
5.1. Compressed hydrogen storage system.............................................................................
5.2. Vehicle fuel system ........................................................................................................
5.3. Electrical safety ...............................................................................................................
6. Test conditions and procedures ...............................................................................................
6.1. Compliance tests for fuel system integrity ......................................................................
6.2. Test procedures for compressed hydrogen storage..........................................................
6.3. Test procedures for electrical safety ...............................................................................
7. Vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage systems (LHSSs) ..................................................
7.1. LHSS optional requirements ...........................................................................................
7.2. LHSS design qualification requirements .........................................................................
7.3. LHSS fuel system integrity ............................................................................................
7.4. Test procedures for LHSS design qualification ..............................................................
7.5. Test procedures for LHSS fuel system integrity .............................................................

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 Part I, statement of technical rationale and justification, amend to read:

I. Statement of technical rationale and justification

A. Introduction

1. In the ongoing debate over the need to identify new sources of energy and to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, companies around the world have explored the use of various
alternative fuels, including compressed natural gas, liquefied propane gas and hydrogen.
Hydrogen has emerged as one of the most promising alternatives due to its vehicle emissions
being virtually zero. In the late 1990s, the European Community allocated resources to study
the issue under its European Integrated Hydrogen Project (EIHP) and forwarded the results,
two proposals for compressed gaseous and liquefied hydrogen, to the UNECE secretariat.
The follow-up project, EIHP2, initiated discussions about the possibility of a global technical
regulation for hydrogen-fuelled hydrogen fuelled vehicles. A few years later, the United
States of America outlined a vision for a global initiative, the International Partnership for
the Hydrogen Economy, and invited China, Japan, the Russian Federation, the European
Union and many other countries to participate in this effort.
2. For decades scientists, researchers and economists have pointed to hydrogen, in both
compressed gaseous and liquid forms, as a possible alternative to gasoline and diesel as a
vehicle fuel. Ensuring the safe use of hydrogen as a fuel is a critical element in successful
transitioning to a global hydrogen economy. By their nature, all fuels present an inherent
degree of danger due to their energy content. The safe use of hydrogen, particularly in the
compressed gaseous form, lies in preventing catastrophic failures involving a combination of
fuel, air and ignition sources as well as pressure and electrical hazards.
3. Governments have identified the development of regulations and standards as one of
the key requirements for commercialization of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles. Regulations and
standards will help overcome technological barriers to commercialization, facilitate
manufacturers’ investment in building hydrogen-fuelled vehicles and facilitate public
acceptance by providing a systematic and accurate means of assessing and communicating
the risk associated with the use of hydrogen vehicles, be it to the general public, consumer,
emergency response personnel or the insurance industry.
4. The development of this United Nations global technical regulation (GTRgtr) for
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicles occurred within the World Forum for Harmonization of
Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) of the Inland Transport Committee (ITC) of UNECE. The goals
of this global technical regulation (GTRgtr) are to develop and establish a GTRgtr for
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles that: (i) attains or exceeds the equivalent levels of safety of those
for conventional gasoline fuelled vehicles; and (ii) is performance-based and does not restrict
future technologies.
5. On 27 June 2013, the global technical regulation number 13, GTR 13,
(ECE/TRANS/180/Add. 13) was established under the sponsorship of Germany, Japan
and the United States of America. The GTR 13 applies to all hydrogen-fuelled vehicles
of Category 1-1 and 1-2, with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of 4,536 kilograms or less.
The GTR 13 consists of 3 main sections: high voltage system, hydrogen storage system
and hydrogen fuel system at vehicle level. The GTR provides provisions for in-use and
post-crash scenarios.
6. The representatives of Japan, Republic of Korea and the European Union
submitted a proposal authorizing the development of Phase 2 of United Nations Global
Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 13 by the informal working group on Hydrogen and

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 Fuel Cell Vehicles – Sub-group safety (HFCV-SGS) (ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2017/56 -
ECE/TRANS/WP.29/AC.3/49). This authorization was transmitted to the Working
Party on Passive Safety (GRSP) who advised that the Phase 2 should be started
immediately after the endorsement of this authorization by WP.29 and AC.3 at their
March 2017 sessions. The work of the IWG on HFCV-SGS Phase 2 is scheduled to be
completed by the end of calendar 2020. This mandate has been extended until December
2022 by WP.29 and AC.3. at their November 2020 and March 2022 sessions.

B. Scope of work for Phase 1 and Phase 2gtr action plan

Phase 1: GTR action plan

75. Given that hydrogen-fuelled vehicle technology is still emerging, the Executive
Committee of the 1998 Agreement (WP.29/AC.3) of WP.29 agreed that input from
researchers is a vital component of this effort. Using existing regulations and standards of
hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) and conventional vehicles as a guide, it is important
to investigate and consider: (1) the main differences between conventional vehicles and
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles in safety and environmental issues; and, (2) the technical
justification for requirements that would be applied to hydrogen-fuelled vehicles.
86. In June 2005, WP.29/AC.3 agreed to a proposal from Germany, Japan and United
States of America regarding how best to manage the development process for a GTRgtr on
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles (ECE/TRANS/WP.29/AC.3/17). Under the agreed-upon process,
AC.3 approved an action plan for developing a GTRgtr submitted by the co-sponsors. Two
subgroups were formed to address the safety and the environment aspects of the GTRgtr. The
informal working subgroup on safety for hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles (HFCV-SGS)
reported to the WP.29 subsidiary Working Party on Passive Safety (GRSP). HFCV-SGS was
chaired by Japan and the United States of America. The Chair for the group was designated
in the summer of 2007. The environmental subgroup (HFCV-SGE) was chaired by the
European Commission and reported to the WP.29 subsidiary Working Party on Pollution and
Energy (GRPE). In order to ensure communication between the subgroups and continuous
engagement with WP.29 and AC.3, the project manager (Germany) coordinated and managed
the various aspects of the work to ensure that the agreed action plan was implemented
properly and that milestones and timelines were set and met throughout the development of
the GTRgtr. The initial stage of the GTRgtr covered fuel cell (FC) and internal combustion
engine (ICE), compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) GTRgtr. At
a subsequent session of WP.29, the GTRgtr action plan was submitted and approved by AC.3
(ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2007/41).
97. In order to develop the GTRgtr in the context of evolving hydrogen technologies, the
trilateral group of co-sponsors proposes to develop the GTRgtr in two phases:
(a) Phase 1 (GTRgtr for hydrogen-fuelled vehicles):
Establish a GTRgtr by 2010 for hydrogen-fuelled vehicles based on a
combination of component-, subsystem-, and vehicle-level requirements. The
GTRgtr specifies that each Contracting Party will use its existing national crash
tests where vehicle crash tests are required, but and will use the agreed upon
maximum allowable level of hydrogen leakage as the crash test leakage
requirement. The new Japanese national regulation, any available research and
test data will be used as a basis for developing this first phase of the GTRgtr.
(b) Phase 2 (Assess future technologies and harmonize crash tests):

6
 Amend the GTRgtr to maintain its relevance with new findings based on new
research and the state of the technology beyond phase 1. Discuss how to
harmonize crash test requirements for HFCV regarding whole vehicle crash
testing for fuel system integrity.
108. The GTRgtr will consist of the following key elements:
(a) Component and subsystem level requirements (non-crash test based):
Evaluate the non-crash requirements by reviewing analyses and evaluations
conducted to justify the requirements. Add and subtract requirements or amend
test procedures as necessary, based on existing evaluations or on quick
evaluations that could be conducted by Contracting Parties and participants.
Avoid design specific requirements to the extent possible and do not include
provisions that are not technically justified. The main areas of focus are:
(i) Performance requirements for hydrogen storage systems, high-pressure
closures, pressure relief devices, and fuel lines;
(ii) Electrical isolation, safety and protection against electric shock (in use);
(iii) Performance and other requirements for subsystem integration in the
vehicle.
(b) Vehicle-level requirements:
Examine the risks posed by the different types of fuel systems in different crash
modes. Review and evaluate analyses and crash tests conducted to examine the
risks and identify appropriate mitigating measures for hydrogen-fuelled
vehicles. The main areas of focus are as follows:
(i) In-use and post-crash limits on hydrogen releases. Post-crash leakage
limits apply following execution of crash tests (front, side and rear) that
are specified in national requirements for crash safety testing in each
jurisdiction;
(ii) In-use and post-crash requirements for electrical isolation and
protection against electric shock. Post-crash electrical safety criteria
apply following execution of crash tests (front, side and rear) that are
specified in national requirements for crash safety testing in each
jurisdiction.
Phase 2: Scope of work
11. An extension of the mandate for the HFCV-SGS IWG, sponsored by the
European Union, Japan and Republic of Korea, shall tackle the development of the
remaining issues. Phase 2 activities should be started immediately after the endorsement
of this authorization by WP.29 and AC.3 at their March 2017 sessions.
12. The IWG will address the following items:
(a) Original items described in ECE/TRANS/WP.29/AC.3/17 shall be kept;
(b) Potential scope revision to address additional vehicle classes;
(c) Requirements for material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement;
(d) Requirements for the fuelling receptacle;
(e) Editorial or technical amendments on each requirement and test
procedure;

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 (f) Revisions based on the research results reported after completion of Phase
1 – specifically research related to hydrogen storage systems, fire test, and
post-crash safety;
(g) Revision to 200 per cent Nominal Working Pressure (NWP) or lower as
the minimum burst requirement;
(h) Revisions for the new types of containers such as conformable tanks.

C. Description of typical hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs)

1. Vehicle description
139. Hydrogen-fuelled Hydrogen fuelled vehicles can use either internal combustion
engine (ICEs) or fuel cells to provide power; however, hydrogen-fuelled vehicles are
typically powered by fuel cell power systems. Hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs)
have an electric drive-train powered by a fuel cell that generates electric power
electrochemically using hydrogen. In general, HFCVs are equipped with other advanced
technologies that increase efficiency, such as regenerative braking systems that capture the
kinetic energy lost during braking and store it in a battery or ultra-capacitors. While the
various HFCVs are likely to differ in the details of the systems and hardware/software
implementations, the following major systems are common to most HFCVs:
(a) Hydrogen fuelling system;
(b) Hydrogen storage system;
(c) Hydrogen fuel delivery system;
(d) Fuel cell system;
(e) Electric propulsion and power management system.
1410. A high-level schematic depicting the functional interactions of the major systems in a
hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicle (HFCV) is shown in Figure 1. During fuelling, hydrogen
is supplied to the vehicle through the fuelling receptacle and flows to the hydrogen storage
system. The hydrogen supplied to and stored within the hydrogen storage system can be
either compressed gaseous or liquefied hydrogen. When the vehicle is started, hydrogen gas
is released from the hydrogen storage system. Pressure regulators and other equipment within
the hydrogen delivery system reduce the pressure to the appropriate level for operation of the
fuel cell system. The hydrogen is electro-chemically combined with oxygen (from air) within
the fuel cell system to produce high-voltage electric power. That electric power is supplied
to the electric propulsion power management system where it is used to power electric drive
motors and/or charge batteries and ultra-capacitors.
Figure 1
Example of High-level Schematic of Key Systems in HFCVs

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 A. Hydrogen Fueling C. Hydrogen D. Fuel Cell System E. Electric Propulsion
Delivery Power Management
Fueling Exhaust
Receptacle Batteries
Cathode Anode Super/
Exhaust Exhaust Ultra
Capacitors
T/PRD Z Check
Valve Fuel Electric
Flow Cell Power
Shutoff Regulator Controller Management
Valve
Hydrogen
Storage Air Blower Drive Motor
Container Controller & Drive
Electric Motor
Braking
B. Hydrogen Storage

1511. Figures 2 to 4 illustrates a typical layouts of key components in the major systems of
a typical hydrogen fuel cell vehicle (HFCV). The fuelling receptacle is shown in a typical
position on the rear quarter panel of the vehicle passenger car, however, positioning may
vary depending on the vehicle type. As with gasoline containers, hydrogen storage
containers, whether compressed gas or liquefied hydrogen, are usually mounted transversely
in the rear of the vehicle passenger car, but could also be mounted differently, such as
lengthwise in the middle tunnel of the vehicle or on the roof in case of buses. Fuel cells and
ancillaries are usually located (as shown) under the passenger compartment or in the
traditional "engine compartment," along with the power management, drive motor controller,
and drive motors. Given the size and weight of traction batteries and ultra-capacitors, these
components are usually located in the vehicle to retain the desired weight balance for proper
handling of the vehicle.
1612. A tTypical arrangements of componentry of a hydrogen fuelled hydrogen-fuelled
vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage and powered by a fuel cell is shown in Figures
2, 3 and 4.
Figure 2
Example of a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle passenger car

Fueling
Receptacle

Hydrogen
Storage

Figure 3
Example of a hydrogen fuel cell bus

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 Figure 4
Example of a hydrogen fuel cell truck

2. Hydrogen fuelling system

1713. Either liquefied or compressed gas may be supplied to the vehicle at a fuelling station,
depending on the type of hydrogen storage system in the vehicle. At present, hydrogen is
most commonly dispensed to vehicles as a compressed gas that is dispensed at pressures up
to 125 per cent of the nominal working pressure (NWP) of the vehicle to compensate for
transient heating from adiabatic compression during fuelling.
1814. Regardless of the state of the hydrogen, the vehicles are fuelled through a special
fuelling nozzle on the fuel dispenser at the fuelling station that connects with the fuelling
receptacle on the vehicle to provide a "closed system" transfer of hydrogen to the vehicle.
The fuelling receptacle on the vehicle contains a check valve (or other device) that prevents
leakage of hydrogen out of the vehicle when the fuelling nozzle is disconnected.

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 3. Hydrogen storage system
1915. The hydrogen storage system consists of all components that form the primary high
pressure boundary for containment of stored hydrogen. The key functions of the hydrogen
storage system are to receive hydrogen during fuelling, contain the hydrogen until needed,
and then release the hydrogen to the fuel cell system for use in powering the vehicle. At
present, the most common method of storing and delivering hydrogen fuel on-board is in
compressed gas form. Hydrogen can also be stored as liquid (at cryogenic conditions). Each
of these types of hydrogen storage systems are described in the following sections.
2016. Additional types of hydrogen storage, such as cryo-compressed storage, may be
covered in future revisions of this GTRgtr once their development has matured. Cryo-
Compressed Hydrogen (CcH2) storage is a hybrid between liquid and compressed gas storage
which can be fuelled with both cryogenic-compressed and compressed hydrogen gas.

(a) Compressed hydrogen storage system

2117. Components of a typical compressed hydrogen storage system are shown in Figure
5 3. The system includes the container and all other components that form the "primary
pressure boundary" that prevents hydrogen from escaping the system. In this case, the
following components are part of the compressed hydrogen storage system:
(a) The container;
(b) The check valve;
(c) The shut-off valve;
(d) The thermally-activated pressure relief device (TPRD).
Figure 53
Typical compressed hydrogen storage system

Check
TPRD Valve

vent
Shut-off
Valve

Storage
Containment
Container
Vessel

2218. The hydrogen storage containers store the compressed hydrogen gas. A hydrogen
storage system may contain more than one container depending on the amount that needs to
be stored and the physical constraints of the particular vehicle. Hydrogen fuel has a low
energy density per unit volume. To overcome this limitation, compressed hydrogen storage
containers store the hydrogen at very high pressures. On current development vehicles (prior
to 2011), hydrogen has typically been stored at a nominal working pressure of 35 MPa or 70
MPa, with maximum fuelling pressures of 125 per cent of nominal working pressure (43.8
MPa or 87.5 MPa respectively). During the normal "fast fill" fuelling process, the pressure
inside the container(s) may rise to 25 per cent above the nominal working pressure as
adiabatic compression of the gas causes heating within the containers. As the temperature in

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 the container cools after fuelling, the pressure is reduced. By definition, the settled pressure
of the system will be equal to the nominal working pressure when the container is at 15 °C.
Different pressures (that are higher or lower or in between current selections) are possible in
the future as commercialization proceeds.
2319. Containers are currently constructed from composite materials in order to meet the
challenge of high pressure containment of hydrogen at a weight that is acceptable for
vehicular applications. Most high pressure hydrogen storage containers used in fuel cell
vehicles consist of two layers: an inner liner that prevents gas leakage/permeation (usually
made of metal or thermoplastic polymer), and an outer layer that provides structural integrity
(usually made of metal or thermoset resin-impregnated fibre-reinforced composite wrapped
over the gas-sealing inner liner).
24. A container may store hydrogen in a single chamber or multiple permanently
interconnected chambers. Closure should not occur between the permanently
interconnected chambers. Disassembly of a container should not be permitted and
should result in permanent removal from service of the container.
25. A container might have container attachments that are non-pressure bearing
parts which provide additional support and/or protection to the container.
2620. During fuelling, hydrogen enters the storage system through a check valve. The check
valve prevents back-flow of hydrogen into the fuelling line.
2721. An automated hydrogen shut-off valve prevents the out-flow of stored hydrogen when
the vehicle is not operating or when a fault is detected that requires isolation of the hydrogen
storage system.
2822. In the event of a fire, thermally activated pressure relief devices (TPRDs) provide a
controlled release of the gas from the compressed hydrogen storage containers before the
high temperatures in the fire weaken the containers and cause a hazardous rupture. TPRDs
are designed to vent the entire contents of the container rapidly. They do not reseat or allow
re-pressurization of the container. Storage containers and TPRDs that have been subjected to
a fire are expected to be removed from service and destroyed.

(b) Liquefied hydrogen storage system

2923. Since on-road vehicle experience with liquefied hydrogen storage systems is limited
and constrained to demonstration fleets, safety requirements have not been comprehensively
evaluated nor have test procedures been widely examined for feasibility and relevance to
known failure conditions. Therefore optional requirements and test procedures for vehicles
with liquefied hydrogen storage systems are presented in section G of this preamble and
paragraph 7. of the text of the regulation, respectively, for consideration by Contracting
Parties for possible adoption into their individual regulations. It is expected that these
requirements will be considered as requirements in a future GTRgtr that applies to vehicles
with liquefied hydrogen storage systems.

4. Hydrogen fuel delivery system

3024. The hydrogen fuel delivery system transfers hydrogen from the storage system to the
propulsion system at the proper pressure and temperature for the fuel cell (or ICE) to operate.
This is accomplished via a series of flow control valves, pressure regulators, filters, piping,
and heat exchangers. In vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage systems, both liquid and
gaseous hydrogen could be released from the storage system and then heated to the
appropriate temperature before delivery to the ICE or fuel cell system. Similarly, in vehicles
with compressed hydrogen storage systems, thermal conditioning of the gaseous hydrogen
may also be required, particularly in extremely cold, sub-freezing weather.

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 3125. The fuel delivery system shall reduce the pressure from levels in the hydrogen storage
system to values required by the fuel cell or ICE system. In the case of a 70 MPa NWP
compressed hydrogen storage system, for example, the pressure may have to be reduced from
as high as 87.5 MPa to less than 1 MPa at the inlet of the fuel cell system, and typically under
1.5 MPa at the inlet of an ICE system. This may require multiple stages of pressure regulation
to achieve accurate and stable control and over-pressure protection of down-stream
equipment in the event that a pressure regulator fails. Over-pressure protection of the fuel
delivery system may be accomplished by venting excess hydrogen gas through pressure relief
valves or by isolating the hydrogen gas supply (by closing the shut-off valve in the hydrogen
storage system) when a down-stream over-pressure condition is detected.

5. Fuel cell system

3226. The fuel cell system generates the electricity needed to operate the drive motors and
charge vehicle batteries and/or capacitors. There are several kinds of fuel cells, but Proton
Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells are the common type used in automobiles because
their lower temperature of operation allows shorter start up times. The PEM fuel cells electro-
chemically combine hydrogen and oxygen (in air) to generate electrical DC power. Fuel cells
are capable of continuous electrical generation when supplied with hydrogen and oxygen
(air), simultaneously generating electricity and water without producing carbon dioxide
(CO2) or other harmful emissions typical of gasoline-fuelled internal combustion engines
(ICEs).
3327. As shown in Figure 1, typical fuel cell systems include a blower to feed air to the fuel
cell stack. Approximately 50 to 70 per cent of the oxygen supplied to the fuel cell stack is
consumed within the cells. The remainder is exhausted from the system. Most of the
hydrogen that is supplied to the fuel cell system is consumed within the cells, but a small
excess is required to ensure that the fuel cells will not be damaged. The excess hydrogen is
either mixed with the exhaust to produce a non-flammable exhaust from the vehicle or
catalytically reacted.
3428. The fuel cell system also includes auxiliary components to remove waste heat. Most
fuel cell systems are cooled by a mixture of glycol and water. Pumps circulate the coolant
between the fuel cells and the radiator.
3529. The individual fuel cells are usually electrically connected in series in a stack such
that their combined voltage, the total stack voltage, is between 300 and 600 V DC. Since fuel
cell stacks operate at high voltage, all reactant and coolant connections (including the coolant
itself) to the fuel cell stack need to be adequately isolated from the conductive chassis of the
vehicle to prevent electrical shorts that could damage equipment or harm people if the
insulation is breeched.

6. Electric propulsion and power management system

3630. The electric power generated by the fuel cell system is used to drive electric motors
that propel the vehicle. As illustrated in Figure 2, many passenger fuel cell vehicles are front
wheel drive with the electric drive motor and drive-train located in the "engine compartment"
mounted transversely over the front axle; however, other configurations and rear-wheel drive
are also viable options. Larger Sport Utility Vehicle-type fuel cell vehicles may be all-wheel
drive with electric motors on the front and rear axles or with compact motors at each wheel.
3731. The "throttle position" is used by the drive motor controller(s) to determine the
amount of power to be sent to the drive wheels. Many fuel cell vehicles use batteries or ultra-
capacitors to supplement the output of the fuel cells. These vehicles may also recapture
energy during stopping through regenerative braking, which recharges the batteries or ultra-
capacitors and thereby maximizes efficiency.

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 3832. The drive motors may be either DC or AC. If the drive motors are AC, the drive motor
controller shall convert the DC power from the fuel cells, batteries, and ultra-capacitors to
AC. Conversely, if the vehicle has regenerative braking, the drive motor controller shall
convert the AC power generated in the drive motor back to DC so that the energy can be
stored in the batteries or ultra-capacitors.

D. Rationale for scope, definitions and applicability

1. Rationale for paragraph 2 (Scope)

3933. This GTRgtr applies to hydrogen storage systems having nominal working pressures
(NWP) of 70 MPa or less, with an associated maximum fuelling pressure of 125 per cent of
the nominal working pressure. Systems with NWP up to 70 MPa include storage systems
currently expected to be of commercial interest for vehicle applications. In the future, if there
is interest in qualifying systems to higher nominal working pressures, the test procedures for
qualification will be re-examined.
4034. This GTRgtr applies to fuel storage systems securely attached within a vehicle for
usage throughout the service life of the vehicle. It does not apply to storage systems intended
to be exchanged in vehicle fuelling. This GTRgtr does not apply to vehicles with storage
systems using chemical bonding of hydrogen; it applies to vehicles with storage by physical
containment of gaseous or liquid hydrogen.
4135. The hydrogen fuelling infrastructure established prior to 2010 applies to fuelling of
vehicles up to 70 MPa NWP. This GTRgtr does not address the requirements for the fuelling
station or the fuelling station/vehicle interface.
4236. This GTRgtr provides requirements for fuel system integrity in vehicle crash
conditions, but does not specify vehicle crash conditions. Contracting Parties to the 1998
Agreement are expected to execute crash conditions as specified in their national regulations.
For the case of heavy duty vehicles where crash tests are not available, various
Contracting Parties believe that a minimal level of safety by means of testing the fuel
system integrity would need to be introduced. In this regard, acceleration tests of gas
storage containers and their fixtures have been well established within several
regulations, such as UN Regulation No 67 on liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), UN
Regulation No 110 on compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG),
as well as European Union Regulation (EC) No 406/2010, implementing Regulation
(EC) No 79/2009 on hydrogen safety. In these acceleration tests, the storage system and
its fixture to the vehicle structures are subjected to accelerations according to the
vehicle category as established in UN Regulation No 67 on liquefied petroleum gases
(LPG), UN Regulation No 110 on compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural
gas (LNG) and UN Regulation No. 134 on hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles (HFCV). A
calculation method can be used instead of practical testing if its equivalence can be
demonstrated.
43. No consensus could be achieved on the acceleration test during phase 2 of the
Informal Working Group of GTR 13 as Contracting Parties did not agree on the goal
of the acceleration test or how it addressed a particular safety need. It was agreed,
however, to further investigate fuel system integrity in a subsequent phase 3, which
would allow for the collection of field data from OEMs and other relevant
parties. Phase 3 would also consider other fuel system integrity requirements such as a
side impact test.
44. Whereas phase 1 of the development of GTR 13 focused on passenger cars
(vehicle categories 1-1 and 1-2 with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of 4,536kg or less),
phase 2 aims to include heavy-duty vehicles (category 1-2 with GVM above 4,536kg and

14
 category 2) into the scope. This reflects the increasing demand for alternative fuel
technologies in commercial deployment. The use of compressed gaseous hydrogen
systems in commercial buses already has shown the feasibility, benefit as well as the
safety of the systems installed in the vehicle category 1-2 with GVM above 4,536 kg .
The inclusion of vehicle category 2 will promote the collection of data regarding the
applicability for these vehicles. For development of the requirements and test
procedures for heavy duty vehicles, typical natures for such vehicles like; various
configurations larger mass and dimensions, safety concept (e.g. availability of crash test
procedures, speed and other restrictions, etc.), longer service life and use cases should
be taken into account.

2. Rationale for paragraphs 3.9. and 3.48. (Definitions of service life and date of removal
from service)
4537. These definitions pertain to qualification of the compressed hydrogen storage system
for on-road service. The service life is the maximum time period for which service (usage) is
qualified and/or authorized. This document provides qualification criteria for liquid and
compressed hydrogen storage systems having a service life of 15 25 years or less (para. 5.1.).
The service life is specified by the manufacturer.
4638. The date of removal from service is the calendar date (month and year) specified for
removal from service. The date of removal from service may be set by a regulatory authority.
It is expected to be the date of release by the manufacturer for initial usage plus the service
life.

3. Rationale for paragraph 4 (Applicability of requirements)

4739. The performance requirements in paragraph 5. address the design qualification for on-
road service.
4840. It is expected that all Contracting Parties will recognize vehicles that meet the full
requirements of this GTRgtr as suitable for on-road service within their jurisdictions.
Contracting Parties with type approval systems may require, in addition, compliance with
their requirements for conformity of production, material qualification and hydrogen
embrittlement.
4941. It is also understood that any individual Contracting Party may also elect to develop
different requirements for additional vehicles to qualify for on-road service within its
jurisdiction. For example, vehicles qualified for on-road service using requirements of
this GTR including 11,000 hydraulic pressure cycles in paragraph 5.1.2. testing would
be recognized as suitable for on-road service in all Contracting Parties. An individual
Contracting Party might elect to qualify additional vehicles for service within its
individual jurisdiction using 7,500 pressure cycles for compressed hydrogen storage
(para. 5.1.1.2.).
(a) This GTRgtr requires the use of hydrogen gas in fire testing of compressed gas
storage (paragraph 6.2.5.). An individual Contracting Party might elect to
qualify vehicles for on-road service using either hydrogen or air as the test gas
in fire testing. In that case, those vehicles qualified using air could be qualified
for on-road service within the jurisdiction of that individual Contracting Party;
(b) Vehicles qualified for on-road service using requirements of this GTRgtr
including 11,000 hydraulic pressure cycles in paragraph 5.1.2. testing would
be recognized as suitable for on-road service in all Contracting Parties. An
individual Contracting Party might elect to qualify additional vehicles for
service within its individual jurisdiction using 5,500 or 7,500 pressure cycles
for compressed hydrogen storage (para. 5.1.1.2.).

15
E. Rationale for paragraph 5. (Performance requirements)

1. Compressed hydrogen storage system test requirements and safety needs

5042. The containment of the hydrogen within the compressed hydrogen storage system is
essential to successfully isolate the hydrogen from the surroundings and down-stream
systems. The storage system is defined to include all closure surfaces that provide primary
containment of high-pressure hydrogen storage. The definition provides for future advances
in design, materials and constructions that are expected to provide improvements in weight,
volume, conformability and other attributes.
51. Requirements for the CHSS and its primary closures are defined in para. 5.1.
The provision in para. 5.1.(b) allows for Contracting Parties to require that primary
closure devices be mounted directly on the container. If needed, manufacturers can
choose to locate additional TPRDs in alternative locations on the container. However,
any additional TPRDs should be connected directly to the containers by using supply
lines that have demonstrated mechanical integrity and durability as part of
qualification tests for the CHSS (para. 5.1.1 and para. 5.1.2).
5243. Performance test requirements for all compressed hydrogen storage systems in on-
road vehicle service are specified in paragraph 5.1. The performance-based requirements
address documented on-road stress factors and usages to assure robust qualification for
vehicle service. The qualification tests were developed to demonstrate capability to perform
critical functions throughout service including fuelling/defuelling, parking under extreme
conditions, and performance in fires without compromising the safe containment of the
hydrogen within the storage system. These criteria apply to qualification of storage systems
for use in new vehicle production.
5344. Conformity of Production with storage systems subjected to formal design
qualification testing: Manufacturers shall ensure that all production units comply with the
requirements of performance verification testing in paragraph 5.1.2. In addition,
manufacturers are expected to monitor the reliability, durability and residual strength of
representative production units throughout service life.
5445. Organization of requirements: paragraph 5.1. design qualification requirements for
compressed hydrogen storage system on-road service include:
5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics
5.1.2. Verification test for performance durability (hydraulic sequential tests)
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road performance (pneumatic sequential tests)
5.1.4. Verification test for service-terminating performance in fire
5546. Paragraph 5.1.1. establishes metrics used in the remainder of the performance
verification tests and in production quality control. Paragraphs. 5.1.2. and 5.1.3. are the
qualification tests that verify that the system can perform basic functions of fuelling,
defuelling and parking under extreme on-road conditions without leak or rupture through-out
the specified service life. Paragraph 5.1.4. provides confirmation that the system performs
safely under the service-terminating condition of fire.
5647. Comparable stringency with current national regulations for on-road service has been
addressed for EU regulations in an EU-sponsored evaluation of comparable stringency (C.
Visvikis (TRL CPR1187, 2011) "Hydrogen-powered vehicles: A comparison of the
European legislation and the draft UNECE global technical regulation"). It concludes:
"Overall, the work showed that there are fundamental differences between the European
legislation and the draft global technical regulation. There are insufficient tests or real-world
data to determine, with certainty, which is more stringent. There are aspects of a hydrogen

16
storage system and its installation that are regulated in Europe, but are not included in the
draft global technical regulation. However, the performance requirements in the global
regulation appear, on balance, to be more stringent than those in the European legislation.
The report adds: "... the penetration test is a potentially significant omission from the draft
global technical regulation. Hydrogen containers may be unlikely to experience gunfire
during their service, but there could be implications for security ... vandalism or terrorism."
57. Comparable stringency with current national regulations for on-road service was
assured through examination of the technical basis for requirements of individual contracting
parties with respect to on-road safety and subsequent recognition that the relevant expected
safety objective is achieved by the GTRgtr requirement. Two examples are noteworthy.
(a) First example: some national regulations have required that compressed
storage be subjected to 45,000 full-fill hydraulic cycles without rupture if no
intervening leak occurs;
(b) Second example: an overriding requirement for initial burst pressure
(> 225 per cent NWP for carbon fibre composite containers and > 350 per cent
NWP for glass fibre composite containers) has been used previously in some
places for lower pressure CNG containers. The basis for this type of burst
pressure requirement for new (unused) containers was examined. A credible
quantitative, data-driven basis for historical requirements linked to demands of
on-road service was not identified. Instead, modern engineering methods of
identifying stressful conditions of service from decades of experience with
real-world usage and designing qualification tests to replicate and compound
extremes of those conditions were used to force systems to demonstrate
capability to function and survive a lifetime’s exposure. However, a risk factor
that could be identified as not already addressed by other test requirements and
for which a burst pressure test would be relevant was the demonstration of
capability to resist burst from over-pressurization by a fuelling station through-
out service life. The more stringent test condition applies to containers at the
"end-of-life" (as simulated by extreme test conditions) rather than new
(unused) containers. Therefore, a residual (end-of-life) requirement of
exposure (without burst) to 180 per cent NWP for 4 minutes was adopted based
on the demonstrated equivalence of the probability for failure after 4 min at
180per cent NWP to failure after 10 hours at 150 per cent NWP (based on time
to failure data for "worst-case" glass composite strands). Maximum fuelling
station over-pressurization is taken as 150 per cent NWP. Experiments on
highly insulated containers have shown cool down from compressive heating
lasting on the order of 10 hours. An additional requirement corresponding to
minimum burst pressure of 200 per cent NWP for new, unused containers has
been under consideration as a screen for minimum new containers capability
with potential to complete the durability test sequence requiring burst pressure
above 180 per cent NWP considering < ±10 per cent variability in new
containers strength. The historical minimum, 225 per cent NWP has been
adopted in this document as a conservative placeholder without a quantitative
data-driven basis but instead using previous history in some Contracting
Parties with the expectation that additional consideration and data/analyses
will be available to support the 225 per cent NWP value or for reconsideration
of the minimum new containers burst requirement.
58. The historical minimum, 225 per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite
containers, had been adopted as a placeholder because of the lack of quantitative data
in GTR No. 13 Phase 1. In subsequent discussions of Phase 2, the capability of the
containers to achieve the end-of-life burst pressure of 180 per cent NWP, was verified

17
 based on the data of carbon-fibre composite containers for 70 MPa provided from
Japan, assuming that the variation of initial burst pressure is within BPO ±10 per cent.
As a result, it has been validated that the initial burst pressure shall be specified as 200
per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite containers.
5948. The requirement of paragraph 5.1.1.2. (baseline initial pressure cycle life) is
22,000 cycles. The 22,000 full-fill cycles correspond to well over 7 million vehicles
kilometres travelled in lifetime service (at 350-500 km travelled per full-fuelling). Since the
expected lifetime service is far less than 1 million km, the requirement for 22000 pressure
cycles was judged to provide substantial margin above extreme worst-case vehicle service.
Second, there are various provisions in national standards to assure sufficient strength to
survive exposures to static (parking) and cyclic (fuelling) pressure exposures with residual
strength. The capability to survive individual static and cyclic pressure exposures has
generally been evaluated by tests that are the equivalent of paragraphs 5.1.2.4., 5.1.2.5.
and 5.1.2.6., but with each performed on a separate new container. An overriding requirement
for initial burst pressure (>225 per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite containers and >350
per cent NWP for glass-fibre composite containers) was commonly used to indirectly account
for un-replicated factors such as the compounding of individually applied stresses and
chemical/physical impacts and ability to survive over-pressurizations in fuelling. The GTRgtr
requirements, however, provide for direct accounting for these factors with explicit
replication of the compounding of stresses and chemical/physical impacts and
over-pressurizations. Unlike conditions for other gaseous fuels, specifications for hydrogen
fuelling provide safeguards to limit potential over-pressurizations to extremes replicated in
container testing. In addition, the GTRgtr requirements assure residual strength for end-of-
life extreme over-pressurization with retained stability sufficient to assure capability to resist
burst at pressures near (within 20 per cent) of new container capability. All of the GTRgtr
requirements are explicitly derived using published data that clearly and quantitatively links
the test criteria to specified aspects of safe on-road performance. Thus, criteria providing
indirect inference of safe performance through-out service life and at end-of-life were
replaced with criteria providing direct verification of capability for safe performance at end-
of-life under compounded worst-case exposure conditions; hence, the result is added
stringency in assurance in capability for safe performance throughout service life. Examples
of (c) include the GTRgtr requirement for pressure cycle testing with hydrogen gas at extreme
temperatures (para. 5.1.3.2.) rather than ambient temperature only, permeation testing with
hydrogen gas at extreme temperature and at replicated end-of-life (para. 5.1.3.3.), end-of-life
residual strength (para. 5.1.2.7.) after compounded exposure to multiple stress factors (para.
5.1.2.), and localized and engulfing fire testing (para. 5.1.4.).
6049. The following sections (paras 5.1.1. to 5.1.4.) specify the rationale for the performance
requirements established in para. 5.1. for the integrity of the compressed hydrogen storage
system.

(a) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.1. verification tests for baseline metrics
6150. Verification tests for baseline metrics have several uses: (i) verify that systems
presented for design qualification (the qualification batch) are consistent in their properties
and are consistent with manufacturer’s records for production quality control; (ii) establish
the median initial burst pressure, which is used for performance verification testing
(paras. 5.1.2. and 5.1.3.) and can be used for production quality control (i.e. to assure
conformity of production with properties of the qualification batch), and (iii) verify that
requirements are met for the minimum burst pressure and number of pressure cycles before
leak.
6251. The baseline initial burst pressure requirements differ from the "end-of-life" burst
pressure requirements that conclude the test sequences in paragraphs 5.1.2. and 5.1.3. The

18
 baseline burst pressure pertains to a new, unused container and the "end-of-life" burst
pressure pertains to a container that has completed a series of performance tests
(paragraphs 5.1.2. or 5.1.3.) that replicate conditions of worst-case usage and environmental
exposure in a full service life. Since fatigue accumulates over usage and exposure conditions,
it is expected that the "end-of-life" burst pressure (i.e. burst strength) could be lower than that
of a new and unexposed container.

(i) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.1.1. baseline initial burst pressure

6352. Paragraph 5.1.1.1. establishes the midpoint initial burst pressure (BPO) and verifies
that initial burst pressures of systems in the qualification batch are within the range BPO ± 10
per cent. BPO is used as a reference point in performance verification (paras. 5.1.2.8. and
5.1.3.5.) and verification of consistency within the qualification batch. Paragraph 5.1.1.1.
verifies that BPO is greater than or equal to 225 per cent NWP or 350 per cent NWP (for glass
fibre composites), values tentatively selected without data-driven derivation but instead
based on historical usage and applied here as placeholders with the expectation that data or
analysis will be available for reconsideration of the topic in Phase 2 of the development of
this GTRgtr. For example, a 200 per cent minimum initial burst pressure requirement can be
supported by the data-driven performance-linked justification that a greater-than 180 per cent
NWP end-of-service burst requirement (linked to capability to survive the maximum fuelling
station over-pressurization) combined with a 20 per cent lifetime decline (maximum allowed)
from median initial burst strength is equivalent to a requirement for a median initial burst
strength of 225 per cent NWP, which corresponds to a minimum burst strength of 200per
cent NWP for the maximum allowed 10per cent variability in initial strength. The interval
between Phase I and Phase II provides opportunity for development of new data or analysis
pertaining to a 225 per cent NWP (or another per cent NWP) minimum prior to resolution of
the topic in Phase 2.
64. In Paragraph 5.1.1.1., the minimum initial burst pressure was specified as 225
per cent NWP for carbon fibre containers (and 350 per cent NWP for glass fibre
containers) as a historical placeholder in GTR Phase 1.
65. In subsequent discussions of Phase 2, Japan presented data from experiments
using carbon-fibre composite containers for 70 MPa, to support the minimum initial
burst pressure change from 225 per cent NWP to 200 per cent NWP for carbon fibre
containers only 1 (Tomioka, J. et al. (2019 September). "Influences of Hydraulic
Sequential Tests on the Burst Strength of Type-4 Compressed Hydrogen Containers."
2019 International Conference on Hydrogen Safety. Technical Paper ID 159.). Note, the
requirement for glass fibre containers remains unchanged at 350 per cent NWP.
Figure 6
Relationship between the initial burst pressure and end-of-life burst pressure
(estimated)

1 J. Tomioka, et al., "Influences of Hydraulic Sequential Tests on the Burst Strength of Type-4

Compressed Hydrogen Containers" in 2019 International Conference on Hydrogen Safety, 2019,

Technical Paper ID 159.

19
66. The relationship between the current initial burst pressure requirement and the
estimated end-of-life burst pressure requirement is shown in Figure 6. The Japanese
experiment showed that containers which met the BPO ±10 per cent requirement and
subjected to the hydraulic sequential tests, were able to meet end-of-life burst pressure
of at least 180 per cent NWP, even if the minimum initial burst pressure is reduced to
200 per cent NWP.
67. Verification method via the sequential hydraulic tests: The variation in initial
burst pressure and end-of-life burst pressure, as well as the average of degradation ratio
between the initial and the end-of-life burst pressure were investigated using test data
from carbon fibre containers (N ≥ 10). The containers were selected from a single batch
with known capability of greater than 225 per cent NWP initial burst pressure.
Figure 7
Results from verification test

Figure 8
BPO and BPEOL Distribution

20
 68. The test results are shown in Figure 7. The minimum value of the initial burst
pressure was greater than 225 per cent, and within the ±10 per cent of BPO requirement.
The end-of-life burst pressure, which takes into account the variation and degradation
ratio due to testing, was greater than 180 per cent NWP. It was also greater than 80 per
cent of BPO by a sufficient margin (Figure 8).
69. The results show that the minimum initial burst pressure of 225 per cent NWP
can be reduced to 200 per cent NWP while maintaining end-of-life burst pressure
(BPEOL) above 180 per cent NWP and 80 per cent of BPO requirements.
70. This conclusion applies to all containers based on an application of BPmin relative
to design NWP. There is currently no evidence that variability is dependent on NWP.
However, in Phase 2 discussions, another Contracting Party stated that the data to
change the initial burst pressure requirement of the containers for 35 MPa is not
sufficient. Therefore, the requirement value for the carbon-fibre composite containers
for 35 MPa was left at 225 per cent NWP as a CP option with the expectation that
additional data or analysis will become available in the future. While the minimum
initial burst pressure of 200 per cent NWP for the carbon fibre containers is considered
sufficient as a performance-based requirement for this GTR, the verification data are
based on the tests with containers selected from a single batch. The production quality
related to the variation between different production batches, etc. shall be recognized
as the responsibility of container manufacturers.
7153. In addition to being a performance requirement, it is expected that satisfaction of this
requirement will provide assurance to the testing facility of container stability before the
qualification testing specified in paras. 5.1.2., 5.1.3. and 5.1.4. is undertaken.

(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.1.2. baseline initial pressure cycle life
7254. The requirement specifies that three (3) randomly selected new containers are to be
hydraulically pressure cycled to 125 per cent NWP without rupture for 22,000 cycles or until
leak occurs. Leak may not occur within a specified number of pressure cycles (number of
cycles Cycles). The specification of number of cycles within the range 5,500 – 11,000 is the
responsibility of individual Contracting Parties. That is, the number of pressure cycles in
which no leakage may occur, number of cycles, cannot be greater than 11,000, and it could
be set by the Contracting Party at a lower number but not lower than 5,500 cycles for 15
years' service life. For service life of over 15 years but up to 25 years, the number of
pressure cycles in which no leakage may occur is 11,000. The rationale for the numerical
values used in this specification follows:

a. Rationale for "Leak before burst" aspect of baseline pressure cycle life requirements
7355. The baseline pressure cycle life requirement is designed to provide an initial check for
resistance to rupture due to the pressure cycling during on-road service. The baseline pressure
cycle test requires either (i) the occurrence of leakage (that is designed to result in vehicle

21
 shut down and subsequent repair or removal of the container from service (para. 5.2.1.4.3.))
before the occurrence of rupture, or (ii) the capability to sustain 22,000 full-fill hydraulic
pressure cycles without rupture or leakage.
7456. Regardless of the container failure mode, this requirement provides sufficient
protection for safe container use over the life of the vehicle. The minimum distance travelled
prior to a container leaking would depend on a number of factors including the number of
cycles chosen by the Contracting Party and the fill mileage for the vehicle. Regardless, the
minimum design of 5500 cycles before leak and using only 320 km (200 miles) per fill
provides over 1.6 million km (1 million miles) before the container would fail by leakage.
Worst case scenario would be failure by rupture in which case the container shall be capable
of withstanding 22,000 cycles. For vehicles with nominal on-road driving range of 480 km
(300 miles) per full fuelling, 22,000 full fill cycles corresponds to over 10 million km (6
million miles), which is beyond a realistic extreme of on-road vehicle lifetime range (see
discussion in para.5.1.1.2.2. below). Hence, either the container demonstrates the capability
to avoid failure (leak or rupture) from exposure to the pressure cycling in on-road service, or
leakage occurs before rupture and thereby prevents continued service that could potentially
lead to rupture.
7557. A greater number of pressure cycles, 22,000, is required for demonstration of
resistance to rupture (in the absence of intervening leak) compared to the number of cycles
required for demonstration of resistance to leak (between 5500 and 11,000) because the
higher severity of a rupture event suggests that the probability of that event per pressure cycle
should be lower than the probability of the less severe leak event. Risk = (probability of
event) x (severity of event).
(Note: cycling to a higher pressure than 125 per cent NWP could elicit failure in less testing
time, however, that could elicit failure modes that could not occur in real world service.)

b. Rationale for number of cycles, number of hydraulic pressure cycles in qualification

testing: number of cycles greater than or equal to 5,500 and less than or equal to 11,000
7658. The number of hydraulic test pressure cycles is to be specified by individual
Contracting Parties primarily because of differences in the expected worst-case lifetime
vehicle range (distance driven during vehicle service life) and worst-case fuelling frequency
in different jurisdictions. The differences in the anticipated maximum number of fuellings
are primarily associated with high usage commercial taxi applications, which can be
subjected to very different operating constraints in different regulatory jurisdictions. For
example:
(a) Vehicle fleet odometer data (including taxis): Sierra Research Report No.
SR2004-09-04 for the California Air Resource Board (2004) reported on
vehicle lifetime distance travelled by scrapped California vehicles, which all
showed lifetime distances travelled below 560,000 km (350,000 miles). Based
on these figures and 320 - 480 km (200 - 300 miles) driven per full fuelling,
the maximum number of lifetime empty-to-full fuellings can be estimated as
1,200 – 1,800;
(b) Vehicle fleet odometer data (including taxis): Transport Canada reported that
required emissions testing in British Columbia, Canada, in 2009 showed the 5
most extreme usage vehicles had odometer readings in the 800,000 – 1,000,000
km (500,000 – 600,000 miles) range. Using the reported model year for each
of these vehicles, this corresponds to less than 300 full fuellings per year, or
less than 1 full fuelling per day. Based on these figures and 320 - 480 km (200
- 300 miles) driven per full fuelling, the maximum number of empty-to-full
fuellings can be estimated as 1,650 – 3,100;

22
 (c) Taxi usage (Shifts/Day and Days/Week) data: The New York City (NYC)
taxicab fact book (Schaller Consulting, 2006) reports extreme usage of 320 km
(200 miles) in a shift and a maximum service life of 5 years. Less than 10 per
cent of vehicles remain in service as long as 5 years. The average mileage per
year is 72,000 for vehicles operating 2 shifts per day and 7 days per week.
There is no record of any vehicle remaining in high usage through-out the full
5 year service life. However, if a vehicle were projected to have fuelled as
often as 1.5 – 2 times per day and to have remained in service for the maximum
5-year New York City (NYC) taxi service life, the maximum number of
fuellings during the taxi service life would be 2,750 – 3,600;
(d) Taxi usage (Shifts/Day and Days/Week) data: Transport Canada reported a
survey of taxis operating in Toronto and Ottawa that showed common high
usage of 20 hours per day, 7 days per week with daily driving distances of 540
– 720 km (335 – 450 miles). Vehicle odometer readings were not reported. In
the extreme worst-case, it might be projected that if a vehicle could remain at
this high level of usage for 7 years (the maximum reported taxi service life);
then a maximum extreme driving distance of 1,400,000 – 1,900,000 km
(870,000 – 1,200,000 miles) is projected. Based on 320 – 480 km (200 - 300
miles) driven per full fuelling, the projected full-usage 15-year number of full
fuellings fuelings could be 2,900 – 6,000. Consistent with these extreme usage
projections, the minimum number of full pressure hydraulic qualification test
cycles for hydrogen storage systems is set at 5500. The upper limit on the
number of full-fill pressure cycles is set at 11,000, which corresponds to a
vehicle that remains in the high usage service of 2 full fuellings fuelings per
day for an entire service life of 15 years (expected lifetime vehicle mileage of
3.5 – 5.3 million km (2.2 – 3.3 million miles)).
7759. In establishing number of cycles, it was recognized that practical designs of some
storage system designs (such as composite wrap systems with metal liner interiors) might not
qualify for service at 70 MPa NWP if number of cycles is greater than 5,500. In establishing
cycles, it was recognized that if number of cycles is specified at 5,500, some Contracting
Parties may require usage constraints to assure actual fuellings do not exceed number of
cycles.
78. In Phase 2, data from various regions (Japan, Germany, United States)
supported the proposal to maintain 11,000 hydraulic test pressure cycles and 22,000
"leak before burst" cycles when service life is extended to 25 years for both light-duty
and heavy-duty vehicles.
(a) Japan – A database of Japanese legal inspection records as of July 2019
was analysed. This database contained 6,000 records for light-duty
vehicles and 21,000 records for heavy-duty vehicles (all fuel types). For
this GTR13 purpose, the focus was on the analysis of the records for
commercial vehicles, as these vehicles have a higher usage (consistent with
the rationale for Phase 1). The maximum lifetime miles travelled for each
vehicle were determined and by applying a range per fuelling of 320 km
for light-duty vehicles and 400 km for heavy-duty vehicles. Using the
above, the number of pressure cycles were calculated and are shown in
Table 1 below.
Table 1
Results of Japanese study

23
 Lifetime No. of fills Ref: GTR13 Phase 2
Max svc. Max lifetime
Vehicle Type ("pressure test Proposal
life miles travelled
cycles")
15 yrs -- -- 11,000
HD
20 yrs 3,500,000 km 8,450 11,000
Commercial
25 yrs 4,000,000 km 9,750 11,000
15 yrs -- -- 5,500, 7,500 or 11,000
LD
20 yrs 2,100,000 km 6,560 11,000
Commercial
25 yrs 2,400,000 km 7,440 11,000

While the details of this analysis can be found in the document "GTR13-
11-12b TF1 210927 Estimation of VMT TF1-JAMA.pdf"
(https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/140706658/GTR13-11-
12b%20TF1%20%20210927%20Estimation%20of%20VMT%20TF1-
JAMA.pdf?api=v2), a brief summary of the methodology is as follows:
(i) Records from periodic legal inspections were collected from
about 400,000 on-road vehicles. Heavy-duty vehicles were defined
according to Japanese categorization as those with greater than
10 number of seats and a loading capacity of greater than 1,250
kg (assuming the vehicle weight is greater than 3,500 kg).
(ii) The annual VMT (km/year) of each vehicle was calculated by the
taking the difference between the records of the current
inspection less the previous inspection. An average vehicle mile
travelled (VMT) per year (VMTyear) was calculated for the
vehicles of a certain age. A maximum VMT for each year for each
vehicle age was also calculated by adding three times the standard
deviation of the VMTyear to the average.
maxVMTyear = aveVMTyear + 3sigma*VMTyear
(iii) Finally, a maximum lifetime miles traveled (VMTlife) was
calculated by summing maxVMTyear over the years.

VMTlife (km) = ∑ max𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦

Data for commercial vehicles were then separated and analysed

since commercial vehicles have higher mileage than personal
vehicles.
(iv) The number of lifetime refuellings were calculated by dividing
VMTlife by the fuelling interval. In Phase 1 of the GTR13, the
filling range of 320 km (200 mi.) was assumed for light-duty
vehicles. While production HFCVs have a much longer range
now, the same value was applied to LDV as to stay consistent with
the earlier methodology. For HDVs, a range of 400 km (250 mi.)
was determined to be reasonable, as HDVs typically have a larger
fuel capacity and therefore range. While it is difficult to get a
single data-based fuelling interval value for hydrogen fuel cell
HDVs, an assumption of 400 km (250 mi.) can be a sufficiently
conservative value.

24
 (v) Finally, a data filtration process was performed to ensure the data
set overcame limitations of the vehicle odometer (limited to 5 or
6 digits) and those records deemed as extreme outliers. In this
study, the threshold of maximum effective VMTyear was defined
to the maximum value of the sum of averaged VMTyear and 6
times standard deviation within the first 5 years of the vehicle
ages. The data shows that the VMTyear of a vehicle’s early years
in service are higher than later years so those that exceeded the
maximum effective VMTyear were removed. While these
maximum effective VMTyear can seem a near impossibility in the
Japanese market (1,000 km/day and 365,000 km/year), these
maximum values were maintained since only a few vehicles were
close to this maximum limit and thus their effects negligible.
(b) Germany – The most recent available mileage data from heavy duty semi-
trailer trucks were collected from the German Federal Motor Transport
Authority (KBA). The data examined are from inspection records from
2014 to 2018 of new semi-trailer trucks after one year of service. The data
shows that the average VMT over 20 or 25 years is lower than the average
of the first 3 years, which is consistent with industry practice for trucks to
be driven the most in the first few years of use. After examining the results
from the data, the highest annual VMT from new truck data was used for
this calculation as a very conservative value, rather than the average over
the actual service life. The assumptions are as follows:

• Trucks are driven the same number of miles each year over its
service life (115,017 km annually), representing an extreme usage
case.

• The average European truck driver works 9 hours per day.

• The maximum speed on German highways for trucks is 80 km/h.

• A fully-fuelled hydrogen truck has a conservative range of 500 km.

Using the above assumptions, a total range of 720 km per work day is
calculated, resulting in approximately 1.5 fuelling cycles a day. Since GTR
13 Phase 1 did not consider partial fuelling so this number was rounded
to 2. With the VMT rate expanded over 20 and 25 years, the number of
fuelling cycles were estimated as follows:
Table 2
Results of German study

Lifetime No/
Max lifetime of fills Ref: GTR13
Vehicle Type Max svc. life
miles travelled ("pressure test Phase 2 Proposal
cycles")
HD
Commercial 20 yrs 2,300,340 km 6,390 11,000
Semi-trailer 25 yrs 2,875,425 km 7,987 11,000
truck

25
 (c) United States – The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
published a study in 2021 which examined the end-of-life conditions of
compressed natural gas vehicle fuel tanks. The focus was to investigate the
structural integrity of CNG fuel tanks under nominal operating
conditions at the end of their service life to help manufacturers to "better
identify, understand, and mitigate safety risks and address barriers and
opportunities related to CNG storage onboard vehicles." A total of 60
Type II and Type IV CNG fuel tanks from transit buses used for 15 years
were obtained from the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority.
These tank designs had been qualified under ANSI CSA NGV2 but the
exact service history of each tank could not be obtained. Still, each tank
was estimated to have been cycled from 1,000 to 4,400 pounds per square
inch gauge (psig), 6 times per week for 15 years, resulting in an estimated
total of 4,680 fatigue cycles over its useful life.
Non-destructive evaluation (via modal acoustic emission, MAE) and
physical testing (per ANSI CSA NGV2) were performed on these tanks.
Twenty of the 60 tanks were burst-tested without being subjected to any
additional damage to establish a baseline understanding of the tank’s
structural integrity at EOL.
An additional 20 tanks were subjected to artificial notch and impact
damage followed by fatigue cycling and burst pressure testing to
understand structural durability. Another 20 tanks were subjected to
hydraulic fatigue cycling followed by a burst test to simulate continued
use of the tanks beyond their defined EOL.
The results of the structural integrity testing of the Type III and Type IV
CNG fuel tanks at the end of their defined useful life of 15 years suggests
the "potential opportunity of continued use of tanks", as all 60 tanks were
beyond their defined useful life of 15 years but seemed to be structurally
sound based on the results of the initial visual inspection and MAE
examination. The tanks maintained the required strength for burst
pressurization at the time of manufacture and did not experience any
significant strength degradation during their use in service as determined
by the burst pressurization test.
Even after additional hydraulic fatigue cycling, the tank integrity based
on the burst test "suggest the potential of additional service life for CNG
tanks beyond their defined end of life."
79. The current GTR13 requirement of 11,000 initial baseline cycles is already very
conservative for a tank with a service life of 15 years. Data from Japanese and German
trucks in service show that a 25-year VMT, and consequently the number of refuelling
cycles, are much lower than what is already in the GTR 13. Furthermore, the end-of-
life testing of CNG tanks designed to similar requirements at the GTR13 showed an
acceptable structural integrity even after further damage and cycling. For these
reasons, the Phase 2 group agreed that the current GTR13 requirements of 11,000
initial baseline cycles and 22,000 "leak without burst" cycles could be applied to an
extended service life of 25 years.

26
(b) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.2. Verification test for on-road performance durability
(hydraulic sequential tests)
8060. The verification test for on-road performance durability ensures the system is fully
capable of avoiding rupture under extreme conditions of usage that include extensive fuelling
frequency (perhaps associated with replacement of drive train components), physical damage
and harsh environmental conditions. These durability tests focus on structural resistance to
rupture. The additional attention to rupture resistance under harsh external conditions is
provided because (i) the severity of consequences from rupture is high, and (ii) rupture is not
mitigated by secondary factors (leaks are mitigated by onboard leak detection linked to
countermeasures). Since these extreme conditions are focused on structural stress and fatigue,
they are conducted hydraulically – which allows more repetitions of stress exposure in a
practical test time.

(i) Assumptions used in developing paragraph 5.1.2 test protocol.

8161. These assumptions include assumption Include:

(a) Extended and severe service worst-case = lifetime of most stressful empty-to-
full (125 per cent NWP at 85°C, 80 per cent NWP at -40°C) fuellings under
extended & severe usage; 10 service-station over-pressurization events;
(b) Sequential performance of tests replicates on-road experience where a single
container is subject to multiple extremes of different exposure conditions – it
is not realistic to expect that a container could only encounter one type of
exposure through the life of the vehicle;
(c) Severe usage: exposure to physical impacts
(i) Drop impact (para. 5.1.2.2.) – the risk is primarily an aftermarket risk
during vehicle repair where a new storage system, or an older system
removed during vehicle service, is dropped from a fork lift during
handling. The test procedure requires drops from several angles from a
maximum utility forklift height. The test is designed to demonstrate that
containers have the capability to survive representative pre-installation
drop impacts;
(ii) Surface damage (para. 5.1.2.3.) – cuts characteristic of wear from
mounting straps that can cause severe abrasion of protective coatings;
the composite overwrap. All metal containers are therefore exempt
from the surface flaw damage tests;
(iii) On-road impacts that degrade exterior structural strength and/or
penetrate protective coatings (e.g. flying stone chips) (para. 5.1.2.3.) –
simulated by pendulum impact.
(d) Severe usage: exposure to chemicals in the on-road environment
(para. 5.1.2.4.)
(i) Fluids include fluids used on vehicles (battery acid and washer fluid),
chemicals used on or near roadways (fertilizer nitrates and lye), and
fluids used in fuelling stations (methanol and gasoline);
(ii) The primary historical cause of rupture of high pressure vehicle
containers (CNG containers), other than fire and physical damage,
has been stress corrosion rupture – rupture occurring after a
combination of exposure to corrosive chemicals and pressurization;

27
 (iii) Stress corrosion rupture of on-road glass-composite wrapped
containers exposed to battery acid was replicated by the proposed test
protocol; other chemicals were added to the test protocol once the
generic risk of chemical exposure was recognized;
(iv) Penetration of coatings from impacts and expected on-road wear can
degrade the function of protective coatings — recognized as a
contributing risk factor for stress corrosion cracking (rupture);
capability to manage that risk is therefore required.
(v) The ambient temperature limits have been changed to 20 ± 15 °C
unless otherwise specified. The 20 ± 5 °C requirement is an
unnecessarily stringent test temperature range for the container
skin and fluid. The new limits allow skin and fluid temperatures
to rise to a reasonable temperature incapable of harming a robust
container or materially affecting test performance. Additionally,
these limits are consistent with those specified in ISO 554:1976
("Standard Atmospheres For Conditioning And/Or Testing –
Specifications").
(vi) Chemical exposure can be continued up to the last 10 cycles and
can be removed after the cycling is complete. Containers have
been shown to be unaffected after an additional few hours of
chemical exposure. This change makes the test less burdensome
without changing its severity.
(e) Extreme number of fuellings/defuellings
Rationale for number of cycles greater than 5,500 and less than
11,000 is provided in paras. 58-59 section E.1.(a).(ii).b of the
preamble.
(f) Extreme pressure conditions for fuelling/de-fuelling cycles (para. 5.1.2.4.)
(i) Fuelling station over-pressurization constrained by fuelling station
requirements to less than or equal to 150 per cent NWP. (This
requirement for fuelling stations shall be established within local
codes and/or regulations for fuelling stations.) is based on a
dispenser system designed to a MAWP of 137.5 per cent NWP
with pressure protection set to activate the highest permitted
value of 137.5 per cent and limit dispensing faults to no more than
150 per cent NWP. Local codes and/or regulations for fuelling
stations may lower the permitted value for pressure protection,
but 150 per cent is expected to be the worst case and, given
dispenser protections with the control system, expected to occur
only under multiple fault situations.);
(ii) Field data on the frequency of failures of high pressure fuelling
stations involving activation of pressure relief controls is not
available. Experience with CNG vehicles suggests overpressure by
fuelling stations has not contributed significant risk for container
rupture;
(iii) Assurance of capability to sustain multiple occurrences of over-
pressurization due to fuelling station failure is provided by the
requirement to demonstrate absence of leak in 10 exposures to 150
per cent NWP fuelling followed by long-term leak-free parking and
subsequent fuelling/de-fuelling.

28
(g) Extreme environmental conditions for fuelling/de-fuelling cycles
(para. 5.1.2.6.)
Weather records show temperatures less than or equal to -40 °C occur in
countries north of the 45th parallel; temperatures ~50 °C occur in desert
areas of lower latitude countries; each with frequency of sustained extreme
temperature ~5 per cent in areas with verifiable government records. Actual
data shows ~5 per cent of days have a minimum temperature less than -30 °C.
Therefore, sustained exposure to less than -30 °C is less than 5 per cent of
vehicle life since a daily minimum is not reached for a full 24 hr period Data
record examples (Environment Canada 1971-2000):
(i) www.climate.weatheroffice.ec.gc.ca/climate_normals/
results_e.html?Province=ONTper
cent20&StationName=&SearchType=&LocateBy=Province&Prox
imity=25&ProximityFrom=City&StationNumber=&IDType=MS
C&CityName=&ParkName=&LatitudeDegrees=&LatitudeMinute
s=&LongitudeDegrees=&LongitudeMinutes=&NormalsClass=A
&SelNormals=&StnId=4157& ;
(ii) www.climate.weatheroffice.ec.gc.ca/climate_normals/
results_e.html?Province=YT per cent20 per
cent20&StationName=&SearchType=&LocateBy=Province&Prox
imity=25&ProximityFrom=City&StationNumber=&IDType=MS
C&CityName=&ParkName=&LatitudeDegrees=&LatitudeMinute
s=&LongitudeDegrees=&LongitudeMinutes=&NormalsClass=A
&SelNormals=&StnId=1617&.
(h) Extended and severe usage:
High temperature full-fill parking up to 25 years (prolonged exposure to high
pressure) (para. 5.1.2.5) To avoid a performance test lasting for 25 years, a
time-accelerated performance test using increased pressure developed using
experimental material data on currently used metals and composites, and
selecting the worst-case for stress rupture susceptibility, which is glass fibre
reinforced composite. Use of laboratory data to establish the equivalence of
testing for stress rupture at 100 per cent NWP for 25 years and testing at 125
per cent NWP for 1000 hours (equal probability of failure from stress
rupture) is described in SAE Technical Paper 2009-01-0012 (Sloane,
"Rationale for Performance-based Validation Testing of Compressed
Hydrogen Storage," 2009). Laboratory data on high pressure container
composite strands – documentation of time-to-rupture as a function of static
stress without exposure to corrosives – is summarized in Aerospace Corp
Report No. ATR-92(2743)-1 (1991) and references therein.
(i) No formal data is available on parking duration per vehicle at
different fill conditions. Examples of expected lengthy full fill
occurrences include vehicles maintained by owners at near full fill
conditions, abandoned vehicles and collectors' vehicles. Therefore,
25 years at full fill is taken as the test requirement;
(ii) The testing is performed at +85 °C because some composites exhibit
a temperature-dependent fatigue rate (potentially associated with
resin oxidation) (J. Composite Materials 11, 79 (1977)). A
temperature of +85 °C is selected as the maximum potential exposure
because under-hood maximum temperatures of +82 °C have been
measured within a dark-coloured vehicle parked outside on asphalt in

29
 direct sunlight in 50 °C ambient conditions. Also, a compressed gas
container, painted black, with no cover, in the box of a black pickup
truck in direct sunlight in 49 °C had maximum / average measured
container skin surface temperatures of 87 °C (189 °F) / 70 °C
(159 °F);
(iii) On-road experience with CNG containers – there have not been
reports of any on-road stress rupture without exposure to corrosives
(stress corrosion cracking) or design anomaly (hoop wrap tensioned
for liner compression without autofrettage). Paragraph 5.1.2. testing
that includes chemical exposure test and 1,000 hours of static full
pressure exposure simulates these failure conditions.
(i) Residual proof pressure (para. 5.1.2.7.)
(i) Fuelling station over-pressurization constrained by fuelling station
requirements to less than or equal to 150 per cent NWP. (This
requirement for fuelling stations shall be established within local
codes/regulations for fuelling stations);
(ii) Laboratory data on static stress rupture used to define equivalent
probability of stress rupture of composite strands after 4 minutes at 180
per cent NWP as after 10 hours at 150 per cent NWP as the worst case
(SAE Technical Report 2009-01-0012). Fuelling stations are expected
to provide over-pressure protection up to 150 per cent NWP;
(iii) Testing at "end-of-life" provides assurance to sustain fuelling station
failure throughout service.
(j) Residual strength burst (para. 5.1.2.8.)
Requirement for a less than 20 per cent decline in burst pressure after 1000-hr
static pressure exposure is linked (in the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Technical Report 2009-01-0012) to assurance that requirement has
allowance for ±10 per cent manufacturing variability in assurance of 25 years
of rupture resistance at 100 per cent NWP.
(k) Rationale for not including a boss torque test requirement:
Note that damage to containers caused by maintenance errors is not included
because maintenance errors, such as applying excessive torque to the boss, are
addressed by maintenance training procedures and tools and fail safe designs.
Similarly, damage to containers caused by malicious and intentional tampering
is not included.

(c) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.3. verification test for expected on-road performance
(pneumatic sequential tests)
8262. The verification test for expected on-road performance requires the demonstration of
capability to perform essential safety functions under worst-case conditions of expected
exposures. "Expected" exposures (for a typical vehicle) include the fuel (hydrogen),
environmental conditions (such as often encountered temperature extremes), and normal
usage conditions (such as expected vehicle lifetime range, driving range per full fill, fuelling
conditions and frequency, and parking). Expected service requires sequential exposure to
parking and fuelling stresses since all vehicles encounter both uses and the capability to
survive their cumulative impact is required for the safe performance of all vehicles in
expected service.

30
8363. Pneumatic testing with hydrogen gas provides stress factors associated with rapid and
simultaneous interior pressure and temperature swings and infusion of hydrogen into
materials; therefore, pneumatic testing is focused on the container interior and strongly linked
to the initiation of leakage. Failure by leakage is marginally mitigated by secondary
protection – monitoring and vehicle shut down when warranted (below a conservative level
of flammability risk in a garage), which is expected to result in very timely repair before
leakage can develop further since the vehicle will be out of service. For the purposes of the
test protocol, a maximum allowable leakage rate has been defined in accordance with
5.1.3.3.(c).
84. The vehicle fuel storage system may contain more than one complete,
functionally independent compressed hydrogen storage systems as defined in
paragraph 3.8. Such a vehicle fuel storage system containing identical repeating
elements (i.e., two or more CHSSs consisting of containers of the same dimensions and
the same components), should be allowed to be qualified via a pneumatic sequential test
of a single CHSS.
85. Data used in developing para. 5.1.3. test protocol include:
(a) Proof pressure test (paragraph 5.1.3.1.) – routine production of pressure
containers includes a verifying, or proof, pressure test at the point of
production, which is 150 per cent NWP as industry practice, i.e. 20 per cent
above the maximum service pressure;
(b) Leak-free fuelling performance (para. 5.1.3.2.)
(i) Expected environmental conditions — weather records show
temperatures less than or equal to -40 °C occur in countries north of the
45-th parallel; temperatures ~50 °C occur in desert areas of lower
latitude countries; each with frequency of sustained extreme
temperature ~5 per cent in areas with verifiable government records.
Actual data shows ~5 per cent of days have a minimum temperature
below -30 °C. Therefore sustained exposure to below -30 °C is less than
5 per cent of vehicle life since a daily minimum is not reached for a full
24 hr period. Data record examples (Environment Canada 1971-2000):
a. www.climate.weatheroffice.ec.gc.ca/climate_
normals/results_e.html?Province=ONTper
cent20&StationName=&SearchType=&LocateBy=Province&P
roximity=25&ProximityFrom=City&StationNumber=&IDTyp
e=MSC&CityName=&ParkName=&LatitudeDegrees=&Latitu
deMinutes=&LongitudeDegrees=&LongitudeMinutes=&Norm
alsClass=A&SelNormals=&StnId=4157&;
b. www.climate.weatheroffice.ec.gc.ca/climate_
normals/results_e.html?Province=YTper cent20per
cent20&StationName=&SearchType=&LocateBy=Province&P
roximity=25&ProximityFrom=City&StationNumber=&IDTyp
e=MSC&CityName=&ParkName=&LatitudeDegrees=&Latitu
deMinutes=&LongitudeDegrees=&LongitudeMinutes=&Norm
alsClass=A&SelNormals=&StnId=1617&
(ii) Number of fuelling/defuelling cycles
a. The number of full fuellings required to demonstrate capability
for leak-free performance in expected service is taken to be 500.

31
 i. Expected vehicle lifetime range is taken to be 250,000
km (155,000 miles);
Figure 94
Vehicle age vs. average odometer

Source: Sierra Research Report No. SR2004-09-04, titled

"Review of the August 2004 Proposed CARB Regulations to
Control Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles: Cost
Effectiveness for the Vehicle Owner or Operator," and dated 22
September 2004.
ii. Expected vehicle range per full fuelling is taken to be
greater than or equal to 500 km (300 miles) (based on
2006-2007 market data of high volume passenger vehicle
manufacturers in Europe, Japan and North America);
iii. 500 cycles = 250,000 miles/500 miles-per-cycle ~
150,000 miles/300 miles-per-cycle;
iv. Some vehicles may have shorter driving ranges per full
fuelling, and may achieve more than 500 full fuellings if
no partial fuellings occur in the vehicle life.
Demonstrated capability to perform without leak in 500
full fuellings is intended to establish fundamental
suitability for on-road service leakage is subject to
secondary mitigation by detection and vehicle shut-down
before safety risk develops;
v. Since the stress of full fuellings exceeds the stress of
partial fuellings, the design verification test provides a
significant margin of additional robustness for
demonstration of leak-free fuelling/de-fuelling
capability.
b. Qualification requirement of 500 pneumatic pressure cycles is
conservative when considering failure experience:
i. On-road experience: 70 MPa hydrogen storage systems
have developed leaks in o-ring sealings during brief (less
than 50 full fuellings) on-road service of demonstration
prototype vehicles;
ii. On-road experience: 70 MPa hydrogen storage systems
have developed temporary (subsequently resealing) leaks
during brief (less than 50 full fuellings) on-road service
of demonstration prototype vehicles;

32
 iii. On-road experience: mechanical failures of CNG vehicle
storage associated with gas intrusion into wrap/liner and
interlaminate interfaces have developed after brief on-
road service (less than 50 full fuellings);
iv. On-road experience: failure of CNG vehicle storage due
to interior charge build-up and liner damage corona
discharge is not a failure mode because static charge is
carried into containers on particulate fuel impurities and
ISO 14687-2 (and SAE J2719) fuel requirements limit
particulates in hydrogen fuel – also, fuel cell power
systems are not tolerant of particulate impurities and such
impurities are expected to cause vehicles to be out of
service if inappropriate fuel is dispensed;
v. Test experience: mechanical failures of vehicle storage
systems associated with gas intrusion into wrap/liner and
interlaminate interfaces develop in ~50 full fuellings;
vi. Test experience: 70MPa hydrogen storage systems that
passed Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV2) test requirements have
failed during the test conditions of para. 5.1.3. in failure
modes that would be expected to occur in on-road service.
The Powertech report (McDougal, M., "SAE J2579
Validation Testing Program Powertech Final Report",
National Renewable Energy Laboratory Report No. SR-
5600-49867 (www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49867.pdf) cites
two failures of systems with containers that have
qualified for service: metal-lined composite container
valve leak and in-container solenoid leak, polymer-lined
composite container leak due to liner failure. The
polymer-lined composite container failure by leakage
was on a container that was qualified to American
National Standard Association and Canadian Standards
Association (ANSI/CSA) NGV2 modified for hydrogen.
The metal-lined composite failure of the container valve
was on a valve qualified to EIHP rev12b. Report
conclusion: "The test sequences in SAE TIR J2579 have
shown that containers with no known failures in service
either met the requirements of the tests, or fail for reasons
that are understood and are representative of future
service conditions"
(iii) Fuelling conditions
a. SAE J2601 establishes fuelling protocol — 3 minutes is fastest
empty-to-full fuelling (comparable to typical gasoline fuelling;
existing in installed state-of-art hydrogen fuelling stations); fuel
temperature for 70 MPa fast fuelling is ~ -40 °C;
b. Expected maximum thermal shock conditions are for a system
equilibrated at an environmental temperature of ~50 °C
subjected to -40 °C fuel, and for a system equilibrated at -40 °C
subjected to indoor private fuelling at approximately +20 °C;
c. Fuelling stresses are interspersed with parking stresses.;

33
 d. The ambient temperature for cold gas cycling is changed
from –40 °C to -25 °C. The -25 °C requirement is a more
realistic real-world operating condition for defuelling rates
required in the test. This rationale is already used for the hot
ambient gas cycling condition where +50 °C ambient
temperature is specified, yet components are rated to +85 °C.
A NHTSA study has shown test conditions at -40 °C yield the
same conclusions as if tested at -25 °C (McDougall, M., &
Stephens, D. (2013, August). "Cumulative fuel system life
cycle and durability testing of hydrogen containers."
(Report No. DOT HS 811 832). Washington, DC: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration). This change does
not compromise the safety intent of the test because in-tank
gas temperatures will reach -40 °C, and the extreme cold
condition inside the container is already tested in the
hydraulic pressure cycling conditions of +85 °C and -40 °C.
Additionally, this change also reduces of the burden for test
facilities due to component restriction of -40 °C
performance.
e. The gas temperature for cold gas cycling is changed from ≤ -
40 °C to fuelling specification window of -33 °C to -40 °C
within 30 seconds of fuelling initiation. This is aligned with
the fuelling protocols for T40 gas in SAE J2601 (Fuelling
Protocols for Light Duty Gaseous Hydrogen Surface
Vehicles).
f. Test procedures (para 6.2.3.6, 6.2.3.7) have been added for
extreme temperature cycles, including information for
temperature measurements in the environment and fluid.
No requirements have been changed, but detailed steps were
included to assist in understanding the execution of the test
and remain consistent with procedures detailed in
paragraph 6.2.3.
g. The filling profile has been changed from a constant 3-
minute pressure ramp rate to 87.5 MPa (± 1 MPa). For gas
cycles conducted at ambient temperatures of 20 °C and 50
°C, this rate could result in an unsafe storage system
condition where the states of charge exceed 100 per cent. For
gas cycles at ambient temperatures of -40 °C, the maximum
fill pressure of 56 MPa yields an overly conservative fill
condition. Instead, filling profiles in accordance with SAE
J2601 H70T40 non-communications will be used. Per SAE
J2601 (Dec 2016), these non-communication tables are D19
(2 – 4 kg), D25 (4 – 7 kg) and D31 (7 – 10 kg).
Furthermore, for ambient fuel temperatures, the
recommendation is to use SAE J2601/4 H70TA tables
(currently under development). Until SAE J2601/4 is
published, the ramp rate of ≤ 5 MPa/min is recommended.
(c) Leak-free parking at full fill (para. 5.1.3.3.)
(i) Leak and permeation are risk factors for fire hazards for parking in
confined spaces such as garages;

34
(ii) The leak/permeation limit is characterized by the many possible
combinations of vehicle and garages, and the associated test conditions.
The leak/permeation limit is defined to restrict the hydrogen
concentration from reaching 25 per cent Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL) by volume with worst credible conditions of a tight, very hot
(55 °C) garage having a low air exchange rate (0.03 volumetric air
exchanges per hour). The conservative 25 per cent LFL limit is
conventionally adopted as the maximum concentration to
accommodate concentration inhomogeneities and is equivalent to 1
per cent hydrogen concentration in air. Data for hydrogen dispersion
behaviour, garage and vehicle scenarios, including garage sizes, air
exchange rates and temperatures, and the calculation methodology are
found in the following reference prepared as part of the European EC
Network of Excellence (NoE) HySafe: P. Adams, A. Bengaouer, B.
Cariteau, V. Molkov, A.G. Venetsanos, "Allowable hydrogen
permeation rate from road vehicles", Int. Journal of Hydrogen Energy,
volume 36, issue 3, 2011 pp 2742-2749;
(iii) The ventilation in structures where hydrogen vehicles can be
parked is expected to be at or below 0.18 air changes per hour
under worst case conditions, but the exact design value is highly
dependent on the type and location of structures in which the
vehicles are parked. In the case of light-duty passenger vehicles, an
extremely low air exchange rate (of 0.03 volumetric air changes per
hour) has been measured in "tight" wood frame structures (with
plastic vapor barriers, weather-stripping on the doors, and no
vents) that are sheltered from wind and are very hot (55 °C) with
little daily temperature swings that can cause density-driven
infiltration. The resulting discharge limit for a light-duty vehicle is
150 mL/min (at 115 per cent NWP for full fill at 55°C) when the
vehicle fits into a garage of 30.4 m3. Since the discharge limit has
been found to be reasonably scalable depending on the vehicle size,
the scaling factor,
R = (Vwidth + 1) * (Vheight + 0.5) * (Vlength + 1)/ 30.4
where Vlength, Vwidth, and Vheight are the dimensions of the vehicle in
meters, allows calculation of the discharge limit for alternative
garage/vehicle combinations to those used to determine the 150
mL/min discharge limit cited above.
The resulting discharge limit measured at 55°C and 115 per cent NWP (full fill
at 55 °C) following specified pneumatic pressure cycling of the storage
system is scalable depending on the vehicle size around a nominal value
of 150 mL/min for a garage size of 30.4 m3. The scaling factor, R =
(Vwidth+1)*(Vheight+0.05)*(Vlength+1)/ 30.4, accommodates
alternative garage/vehicle combinations to those used in the derivation
of the rate, and accommodates small vehicles that could be parked in
smaller garages. These vehicle-level permeation requirements are
consistent with the proposals developed by the EU (NoE) HySafe (see
above reference). The permeation values measured for individual
storage container systems used in a vehicle would total to less than the
vehicle limit;

35
(iv) These vehicle-level leak/permeation requirements are consistent
with the proposals developed by the EU (NoE) HySafe (see above
reference). For ease of compliance testing, however, the discharge
requirement has been specified in terms of allowable
leak/permeation from each container in the storage system instead
of the total vehicle-level discharge limit (in iii above) to be
consistent with the proposals developed by the EU NoE HySafe. In
this case, the leak/permeation limit measured at 55 °C and 115 per
cent NWP is 46 mL/h/L-water-capacity for each container in the
storage system such that the vehicle discharge is not exceeded. The
use of this limit is applicable to light-duty vehicles that are smaller
or larger than the base described in iii above. If, for example, the
total water capacity of the light-duty vehicle storage system is 330
L (or less) and the garage size is 50 m3, then the 46 m L/h/L-water-
capacity requirement results in a steady-state hydrogen
concentration of no more than 1 per cent. This can be shown by
calculating the allowable discharge from the light-duty vehicle
based on the requirement of 46 mL/h/L per container volume
capacity (that is, 46 mL/h/L x 330 L / (60 min/hr) = 253 mL/min)
and showing that it is comparable to the allowable discharge based
on the garage size of 50 m3 with an air exchange rate of 0.03
volumetric air exchanges per hour (that is, 150 mL/min x 50 m3 /
30.4 m3 = 247 mL/min). Since both results are essentially the same,
the hydrogen concentration in the garage is not expected to exceed
1 per cent for light-duty vehicles with storage systems of 330L (or
less) in 50m3 garages; For ease of compliance testing, however, the
discharge requirement has been specified in terms of storage system
permeation instead of vehicle-level (iii) permeation as a means of
compliance is consistent with the proposals developed by the EU NoE
HySafe. In this case, the permeation limit measured at 55 °C and 115
per cent NWP is 46 mL/h/L-water-capacity of the storage system. If the
total water capacity of the vehicle storage system is less greater than
330 L and the garage size is no smaller than 50 m3, then the 46 m L/h/L-
water-capacity requirement results in a steady-state hydrogen
concentration of no more than 1 per cent. (An upper limit per storage
system of 46 mL/h/L (per container volume capacity) x 330L (system
volume capacity) / 60min/hr = 253 mL/min per storage system, which
comparable to that derived from the alternative approach 150 mL/min
x 50/30.4 = 247 mL/min (scaling factor R=1.645), which results in a 1
per cent concentration). This permeation specification has been adopted
under the assumption that storage capacity ~330L is not expected for
the vehicles within the scope of this gtr, so garages less than 50m3 can
be accommodated;
(v) The use of 46 mL/h/L-water-capacity requirement for storage
system containers is also conservatively scalable to heavy-duty
vehicles. Figure 10 shows the required volumetric air exchange rate
for the garage various vehicle size. Examples of current or
currently-planned vehicles are shown on the figure. Light-duty
vehicles which can possibly parked in tight, very hot garages (as
described above with down to 0.03 volumetric air changes per
hour) are expected to comply with the 25 per cent LFL hydrogen
limit over the possible vehicle size range. Most heavy-duty vehicles
also require 0.03 volumetric air exchanges (or less), even though

36
 heavy-duty vehicles not expected to be parked in such "tight"
garages as is the case with light-duty vehicles. Given that heavy-
duty vehicles are expected to be operated in more open (naturally-
ventilated) or mechanically-ventilated spaces, the 46 mL/h/L-
water-capacity requirement for storage system containers provides
reasonable margin in the event of mechanical ventilation failures,
for example, without needing to adopt a different requirement
from the limit already established for light-duty vehiclesThe
maximum pressure of a fully filled container at 55 °C is 115 per cent
NWP (equivalent state of charge to 125 per cent NWP at 85°C and 100
per cent NWP at 15 °C);

Figure 10
Required ventilation of space surrounding the vehicle

(viv) The maximum pressure of a fully filled container at 55 °C is 115

per cent NWP (equivalent state of charge to 125 per cent NWP at
85°C and 100 per cent NWP at 15 °C);A localized leak test is to be
conducted to ensure that external leakage cannot sustain a flame that
could weaken materials and subsequently cause loss of containment.
Per Technical Report 2008-01-0726 ("Flame Quenching Limits of
Hydrogen Leaks"), the lowest flow of H2 that can support a flame is
0.028 mg/sec per from a typical compression fitting and the lowest leak
possible from a miniature burner configuration is 0.005 mg/sec. Since
the miniature burner configuration is considered a conservative "worst
case", the maximum leakage criterion is selected as 0.005 mg/sec;
(vii) A localized leak test is to be conducted to ensure that external leakage
cannot sustain a flame that could weaken materials and subsequently

37
 cause loss of containment. Per Technical Report 2008-01-0726 ("Flame
Quenching Limits of Hydrogen Leaks"), the lowest flow of H2 that can
support a flame is 0.028 mg/sec per from a typical compression fitting
and the lowest leak possible from a miniature burner configuration is
0.005 mg/sec. Since the miniature burner configuration is considered a
conservative "worst case", the maximum leakage criterion is selected
as 0.005 mg/sec; Parking provides opportunity for hydrogen saturation
of interlaminate layers, wrap/liner interface, liner materials, junctures,
o-rings, and joinings – fuelling stresses are applied with and without
exposure to hydrogen saturation. Hydrogen saturation is marked by
permeation reaching steady-state rate;
(viii) Parking provides opportunity for hydrogen saturation of interlaminate
layers, wrap/liner interface, liner materials, junctures, o-rings, and
joinings – fuelling stresses are applied with and without exposure to
hydrogen saturation. Hydrogen saturation is marked by permeation
reaching steady-state rate;
(viiiix) By requiring qualification under the worst credible case
conditions of raised temperature, pressure cycling and equilibration
with hydrogen, the permeation verification removes uncertainty about
permeation/temperature dependence, and long term deterioration with
time and usage.
(d) Residual proof pressure (para. 5.1.3.4.)
(i) Fuelling station over-pressurization is constrained by fuelling station
requirements to pressurize at less than 150 per cent NWP. (This
requirement for fuelling stations shall be established within local
codes/regulations for fuelling stations.);
(ii) Laboratory data on static stress rupture was used to define equivalent
probability of stress rupture of composite strands. It showed the rupture
probability after 4 minutes at 180 per cent NWP to be equivalent for
after 10 hours at 150 per cent NWP in the worst case (SAE Technical
Report 2009-01-0012). Fuelling stations are expected to protect against
over-pressure over 150 per cent NWP;
(iii) Field data on the frequency of failures of high pressure fuelling stations
involving activation of pressure relief controls is not available. The
small number of 70 MPa fuelling stations currently available does not
support robust statistics.
(e) Residual strength burst (para. 5.1.3.5.)
Requirement for less than 20 per cent decline in burst pressure after lifetime
service is designed to ensure stability of structural components responsible for
rupture resistance; it is linked (in SAE Technical Report 2009-01-0012) to
assurance that requirement has allowance for 10 per cent manufacturing
variability in assurance of greater than 25 years of rupture resistance at 100 per
cent NWP in para. 5.1.2.5.
As regards container liners, it is suggested that attention should be paid for
deterioration of container liners. The container liner could be inspected after
burst. Then, the liner and liner/end boss interface could be inspected for
evidence of any deterioration, such as fatigue cracking, disbonding of plastics,
deterioration of seal, or damage from electrostatic discharge. The record of
findings should be shared with the container manufacturer.

38
 It is expected that regulatory agencies and manufacturers will monitor the
condition and performance of storage systems during service life as practical
and appropriate to continually verify that para. 5.1.3. performance
requirements capture on-road requirements. This advisory is meant to
encourage manufacturers and regulatory agencies to collect additional data.

(d) Rationale for paragraphs 5.1.4. and 6.2.5. verification test for service-terminating
performance in fire
8664. Verification of performance under service-terminating conditions is designed to
prevent rupture under severe conditions so severe that hydrogen containment cannot be
maintained. Fire is the only service-terminating condition accounted for in design
qualification.
8765. A comprehensive examination of CNG container in-service failures during the past
decade (SAE Technical Paper 2011-01-0251 (Scheffler, McClory et al., "Establishing
Localized Fire Test Methods and Progressing Safety Standards for FCVs and Hydrogen
Vehicles")) showed that, while somethe majority of fire incidents occurred on storage
systems that did not utilize properly designed thermally-activated pressure relief devices
(TPRDs), and the remainder the majority resulted when TPRDs did not respond to protect
the container due to the lack of adequate heat exposure on thebecause TPRDs were
improperly installed and did not sense the heat exposure even though the localized fire
was able to degrade the container wall and eventually cause the storage container to burst.
The localized fire exposure has not been addressed in previous regulations or industry
standards. The fire test method in para. 6.2.5. addresses both localized and engulfing fires.
8866. The fire test conditions of para. 6.2.5. were based on vehicle-level tests by the
Japanese Automobile Research Institute (JARI) and US manufacturers. A summary of data
is found in paper SAE Technical Paper 2011-01-0251. As part of preparing requirements
for this regulation, the paper and data were reviewed for the purpose of improving
reproducibility of fire results. Key findings are as follows:
(a) About 30 – 50 40 per cent of the vehicle laboratory fires investigated resulted
in conditions that could be categorized as a localized fire since the data
indicates that a composite compressed gas container could have been locally
degraded before conventional TPRDs on end bosses (away from the local fire
exposure) would have activated. (Note: A temperature of 300°C was selected
as the temperature where start of the localized fire condition could start as
thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA) indicates that composite container
materials begin begins to degrade rapidly at this temperature);
(b) While vehicle laboratory fires often lasted 30-60 minutes, the period of
localized fire degradation on the storage containers lasted less than 10 minutes;
(c) The average of the maximum temperature during the localized fire period was
less than 570°C with peak temperatures reaching approximately between
600 °C and 880 °C in some cases; As shown in Figure 11, peak temperatures
on the surface of cylinders used for the vehicle fire test reached 700 °C
during the localized fire stage. While this temperature is not as high as
temperature levels experienced later during engulfing fire stage of the
vehicle fire, they are adequate to cause serious material degradation while
also challenging the ability of the TPRDs to activate and vent the contents
of the container;
Figure 11
Cylinder temperatures during localized fire stage of vehicle fire tests

39
 (d) The rise in peak temperature near the end of the localized fire period often
signaled the transition to an engulfing fire condition;.
(e) As shown in Figure 12, peak temperatures on the surface of cylinders used
for the vehicle fire test reached 1,000 °C during the engulfing fire stage;
Figure 12
Cylinder temperatures during engulfing fire stage of vehicle fire tests

8967. Based upon the above findings, performance-based limits as shown in Figures 11
and 12, were defined to characterize the thermal exposure during the localized and
engulfing fire stages. The maximum cylinder surface temperature during the localized
fire stage for the side of the cylinder facing the fire was set to 50 °C above the highest
value that was experienced during the JARI vehicle fire tests to provide margin for
testing. A maximum limit for the engulfing stage was not necessary as the temperature
is naturally limited flame temperature. The minimum surface temperatures on the side
facing the flame was set to the lowest value in the range of data during the engulfing
fire stage but was limited to one standard below average during the localized fire stage
so that a challenging (but reasonable) thermal condition even though the full range of
data was significantly skewed.the temperature profile in para. 6.2.5. was adopted. The
selection of 600 °C as the minimum temperature for the localized fire hold period ensures
that the average temperature and time of localized fire test exposure are consistent with test
data. Thermocouples located 25 mm ± 10mm from the outside surface of the test article are
used to control the heat input and confirm that the required temperature profile is met. In
order to improve the response and controllability of the fire during testing (as well as

40
reproducibility of results), the use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and wind guards are
specified. Experience indicates the controllability of the LPG fire will be approximately
±100°C in outdoor situations, producing peak temperatures that also agree favourably with
test results.
90. Experience conducting container fire tests has found that the temperature on the
side of the cylinder opposing the intended fire exposure also needs to controlled to
minimize site-to-site test variations as differences in the length of flames during the fire
test can inadvertently lead to temperatures above the JARI vehicle fire test experience
on the side opposite the intended fire exposure and subsequently cause excessive
material degradation on the top of the container and, in some cases, premature response
of TPRD(s). For this reason, both the minimum and maximum allowable temperatures
for the engulfing fire stage were based on the range of data that occurred during the
vehicle fire tests, and the minimum and maximum temperatures during the localized
stage were limited to slightly less than one standard deviation from average to maintain
a challenging (but reasonable) thermal condition.
91. The temperature limits found on Figures 11 and 12 were also used to establish
the maximum and minimum allowable temperatures in Table 10 in Part II for the
development and checkout of burner used for fire testing. Since (as shown in Figure 13)
the container is mounted above the burner for fire testing, the bottom of the container
faces the fire and the top of the container is the side opposite the fire exposure, Table
10 in Part II defines criteria relative to the bottom and top of the container as this
terminology is consistent with container fire testing. Also, the maximum temperature
for the bottom of the cylinder was applied to thermocouple locations on both the bottom
centre and mid-height sides of the container as all these locations represent the thermal
exposure on the side facing the fire during the JARI vehicle fire tests.
Figure 13
Cylinder under-going fire testing

92. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was selected as the fuel for the test burner as it is
globally available and easily controllable to maintain the required thermal conditions
during the localized and engulfing fire stages. The use of LPG was deemed adequate to
reproduce the thermal conditions on the cylinder that occurred during the vehicle fire tests
in Figures 11 and 12 without concerns of carbon formation (i.e, coking) that could occur
with liquid fuels. Additionally, the relatively low H/C ratio of LPG at approximately 2.67

41
allows the flame to display flame radiation characteristics (from carbon combustion
products) more similar to petroleum fires (with a H/C of roughly 2.1) than natural gas, for
example, which has an H/C ratio of approximately 4.0.
93. The burner defined in paragraph 6.2.5.3. for localized and engulfing fire zones were
developed and verified to Table 10 in Part II so that setup and conduct of the container
fire tests by test laboratories could be performed in a straight-forward manner without
needing to conduct a burner development program. Use of a standardized burner
configuration is viewed as practical way of conducting fire testing that should reduce
variability in test results through commonality in hardware.
94. An example of the burner configuration is shown in Figures 14 and 15. The burner
can be assembled using commercially-available piping or tubing, fittings, and burner
nozzles. See Figure 16 and Table 3. Since the nozzles in Table 3 are fabricated to
commercial practices, it is necessary for the test laboratories to check that the nozzle is
within the specification in Table 8 in Part II by inspection or bench checking to ensure
uniformity of flow distribution and therefore heat release of the burner zones.
Figure 14
Prescribed Bunsen-type air pre-mix nozzles

Figure 15
Prescribed arrangement of air pre-mix burner nozzles

Figure 16
Burner Fuel Nozzles

42
Table 3
Definition of burner nozzles for the prescribed burner

Item Description
Nozzle Description Stainless Propane Gas Tip
for Jet Burner
Nozzle Manufacturer Thermova Ningbo,China
Brand Name OEM
Part Number ZZ15002
Nozzle Connection Screw-on 5/16-24 UNF Thread

95. The overall dimensional requirements of the burner zones are provided in
paragraph 6.2.5.3.2. The width (W) of both the localized and engulfing fire zones is fixed
to 500 ± 50mm regardless of the diameter/width of the container. The length of the
localized fire zone (LLOC) is also fixed to 250 ± 50mm for all fire tests. While the length
of the engulfing burner extension (LEXT) is defined as a maximum of 1,400 ± 50 mm,
flexibility is provided to use shorter burner a long as the burner extends beyond the
pre-test cylinder and the CHSS test article when positioned for CHSS fire test. Since
the engulfing burner zone is comprised of the localized burner zone and the engulfing
burner extension, the length of the engulfing burner zone (LENG) is the sum of LLOC and
LEXT.
96. The precise dimensions of the burner zones are influenced by the number of
burner nozzles along the length, the spacing of the nozzles along the length, and the
spacing of manifolds or rails along the width. For example, length of the localized
burner length (LLOC) can be either 200 mm long with 4 nozzles, 250 mm long with 5
nozzles, or 300 mm long with 6 nozzles for a constant nozzle spacing (SN) selected to be
the nominal value of 50 mm from Table 8 in Part II. Similarly, the length of the
extension of the engulfing burner (LEXT) can vary from 1,350 mm with 27 nozzles to
1,450 mm with 29 nozzles with the same nozzle spacing (SN) of 50 mm as with the
localized burner zone in the previous example.
97. The burner tube array in Figure 17 has a nozzle spacing of 50 mm, a localized
burner zone with 6 nozzles so the resultant length is 300 mm, and the extension of the
engulfing zone has 28 nozzles so the resultant length of the extension is 1.4 m, bringing
the total length of the engulfing burner to 1.7 m. Note that all lengths are within the
allowable tolerances in paragraph 6.2.5.3.2.1.

43
98. Figure 17 shows the boundaries of the localized burner zones and the engulfing
burner extension. The borderline shared by the localized burner zone and the engulfing
burner extension is established midway between the last row of nozzles in the localized
burner zone and the first row in the engulfing burner extension. This line serves as a
datum where the opposite end of the localized burner zone is located LLOC to the left
and the opposite end of the engulfing burner zone extension is located LEXT to the right.
The width (W) of both the burner zones spans the distance from the centre of the top
rail in the zone to the centre of the bottom rail.
Figure 17
Definition of burner zone borders

99. A pre-test cylinder (fabricated from a steel pipe with caps) is used for the pre-
test to confirm proper operation of the burner zones. The pre-test cylinder is similar to
cylinders used in JARI vehicle fire tests was required to ensure technical soundness of
the empirical process of thermal mapping the localized and engulfing burner zones and
then comparing the results to criteria based on the JARI vehicle fire tests. The pre-test
cylinder is instrumented in the same manner as the containers in the vehicle fire tests
and mounted above the burner in the same manner as the CHSS to be fire tested. See
Figure 18. After initial development testing by JARI, a round-robin test was conducted.
The thermal mapping was performed by stepping up the fuel flow rate over the expected
operating range of HRR/A for the burner. Results were then compared to the criteria
in Table 10 in Part II and used to define the allowable operating ranges and to select
the fuel settings for the localized and engulfing zones of the burner.
Figure 18
Pre-test cylinder mounted above burner for thermal mapping

44
100. Results of the thermal mapping of the localized burner are shown in Figures 19 –
22 based on available data from the round-robin testing. Values are based on 60-second
rolling averages of readings from the round-robin testing described above. The location of
the various temperature readings are given in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3. The figures show that
the test laboratories have found acceptable operation between 200 and 500 kW/m2 The
suggested setting for the localized fire test of 300 kW/m2 was established to provide a
challenging condition that was acceptable for most laboratories. Typical values in Table 4
for the localized fire stage are based on 60-second rolling averages of the data at 300
kW/m2 and are used for burner checkout to verify operation is as expected.

Table 4
Typical values of pre-test cylinder and burner monitor temperatures for localized
burner (at 300 kW/m2)
Parameter Target Temperature Based on 60-second
Rolling Averages

TBLOC 450 - 750 °C

TMFLOC and TMRLOC 200 - 600 °C

TULOC 80 - 265 °C

TBLOC25 600 - 900 °C

45
Figure 19
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on bottom during thermal mapping of localized burner

Figure 20
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on sides during thermal mapping of localized burner

46
Figure 21
Pre-test cylinder temperature on top during thermal mapping of localized burner

Figure 22
Temperature of burner monitor during thermal mapping of localized burner

47
101. Results of the thermal mapping of the engulfing burner are shown in Figures 23 -
26. As with the localized burner thermal mapping, values are based on 60-second rolling
averages of readings by test laboratories participating in the round-robin testing, and the
location of the various temperature readings are given in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3. The figures
show that the test laboratories have found acceptable operation between 400 and 1,000
kW/m2 The suggested setting for the localized fire test of 700 kW/m2 was established to
provide a challenging condition that was acceptable for most laboratories.
Table 5
Typical values for pre-test cylinder and burner monitor temperatures for engulfing
burners (at 700 kW/m2)
Parameter Typical Temperatures Based on 60-second
Rolling Averages
TBENG 600 - 950 °C
Average of 600 - 950 °C
TMFENG and TMRENG
TUENG 400 - 850 °C

TBENG25 800 – 1,050 °C

Figure 23
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on bottom (centre) during thermal mapping of engulfing
burner

48
49
Figure 24
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on sides during thermal mapping of engulfing burner

Figure 25
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on top during thermal mapping of engulfing burner

50
Figure 26
Temperatures of burner monitor during thermal mapping of engulfing burner

102. Thermal imaging of the container during the fire tests was also performed to ensure
that the prescribed burner delivers uniform thermal conditions over the targeted area of
fire exposure. See Figure 27.
Figure 27
Example of thermal imaging results for the prescribed burner configuration

103. Depending on whether the test is conducted indoors or outdoors and on the local
weather conditions if conducted outdoors, wind shielding may be required for the
intended thermal conditions for the fire tests. In order to ensure that wind shields do
not interfere with the drafting of the fire during the fire tests and cause variations in

51
results, the wind shields as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.2. need to be installed for pre-
test checkout of the burner and test setup as well as the actual fire test of the CHSS.
104. Prior to conducting the CHSS fire test, a pre-test checkout of the burner should
be performed to ensure that the burner and test equipment are in working order. As
with the thermal mapping described previously, a steel test container is necessary for
technical soundness to ensure that the empirical approach of comparing the checkout
results comply with criteria in Table 10 in Part II and is consistent with prior testing of
the burner as defined in Figures 19 through 26. Additionally, the use of a pre-test
cylinder for the checkout avoids possible degradation of container materials that can
effect results. After the checkout is satisfactorily completed, the pre-test cylinder shall
be removed and the CHSS test article shall be mounted for the CHSS fire test. The need
(or frequency) to repeat this pre-test checkout is based on the test agency's risk
assessment and processes and specific requirements of the Contracting Party having
jurisdiction for the test.
105. The CHSS fire test shall be performed with only hydrogen gas such that any
potential leakage that creates a jet flame greater than 0.5 m can be identified and
measured. The test should not be performed specifically using compressed air as the
elevated partial pressure of oxygen in the compressed air may lead to an unsafe
condition when the high-pressure air is combined with minor oil residue and other
contaminants.
106. The CHSS should be filled to 100 per cent state-of-charge (SOC) prior to CHSS
fire test but not to 100 per cent NWP because the pressure varies as a function of
temperature while SOC does not. The intent is to have the container fully charged (i.e.,
filled) at 100 per cent SOC.
10768. The proposed localized fire test set-up is The two-stage localized/engulfing fire test
defined in paragraph 6.2.5. was based on preliminary work done by Transport Canada and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the United States of
America and was originally intended to evaluate generic (non-vehicle specific) CHSSs
where only mitigation devices (such as thermal shields and barriers) and other non-
pressure bearing parts that are permanently attached to the containers are evaluated.
During initial use of the test method, nearly all testing was performed to verify the
acceptability of CHSSs generically for all vehicles, but, in order to accommodate
advanced configurations that require the consideration of vehicle-specific features to
accurately capture the characteristics of the vehicle fire, the CHSS fire test was
expanded to allow the qualification of CHSSs with vehicle-specific features in addition
to CHSSs for generic use in vehicles. When the vehicle manufacturer opts to use vehicle-
specific features, the fire exposure is established based on the direction on the specific
vehicle, and the CHSS is not rotated to create the worst case position as done for generic
qualification for all vehicles., but the approach was expanded to allow the storage system
to be qualified by either a generic installation test or a specific vehicle installation test.
Differences between the two methods are as follows:
(a) The generic (non-vehicle specific) allows the localized fire test to apply to
more than one vehicle but the mitigation devices (such as shields) need to be
permanently affixed to the storage system and shall protect the entire system,
not just the area exposed to the localized fire. The size for the generic localized
fire test was selected to be 250 mm ± 50 mm longitudinally with a width
covering the diameter of the container;
(b) The specific vehicle installation localized fire test would be customized to
align with the actual fire exposure area and would include protective features
from the vehicle. If the vehicle manufacturer elects to use the specific vehicle

52
 test approach, the direction and size of the localized fire exposure is adjusted
to account for vehicle features such as openings in adjacent sheet metal for
lightening holes and pass-throughs for wires and piping or holes formed by the
melting of materials in the path of the fire. If such openings or holes are small,
the size of the localized is reduced from the generic size to create a more
challenging (and realistic) test.
108. The two-stage localized/engulfing fire test in paragraph 6.2.5. begins with a
localized fire stage. After 10 minutes, the fire test progresses to the engulfing fire stage.
While the spread of the fire can, in fact, progress in all directions, the fire test focuses
on the most technically-relevant region, i.e. from the portion of the CHSS being
thermally-stressed during both the localized and engulfing stages toward the nearest
TPRD that is expected to sense the fire and vent the contents of the container prior to
potential rupture can be evaluated. By so doing, a single, standardized burner can be
used for the qualification test of the full range of CHSS expected within the scope of this
regulation. Situations expected to be encountered during fire testing are illustrated in
Figures 28 through 35. In cases where the widths/diameters of the CHSS are larger than
the burner, the burner needs to be placed on a diagonal relative to the CHSS) in order
that the test evaluate the spread of the fire in the technically-relevant direction (from
the localized zone) toward the nearest TPRD.
109. The length of the engulfing fire is extended by a maximum of 1.4 m from 250 mm
for the localized fire stage to a maximum of 1.65 m for the engulfing fire stage. The limit
of 1.65 m for the engulfing fire is based on existing regulations and experience in the
United States of America and Canada, and both this length and time for progression
for the localized and engulfing fire stages is supported by the JARI vehicle fire test data.
110. Examples of commonly-encountered situations are provided below based on the
above requirements for targeting the localized fire zone on the CHSS and positioning
the engulfing fire zone under the CHSS:
(a) Figures 28 through 30 address containers that are protected by a single
TPRD.
Figure 28 deals with, for example, a cylindrical container. The localized
burner is located under the end of the container that is opposite the TPRD
to maximize the distance from the TPRD (without extending beyond the
spherical head of the container). The engulfing burner extends to the left
(toward the TPRD) to the maximum allowable of 1,400 ± 50 mm. In case
1, the distance to the TPRD from the localized burner is less than the
maximum allowable extension of the engulfing burner so the engulfing
burner is allowed to extend beyond the container. Conversely, in Case 3,
the distance to the TPRD from the localized burner is greater than the
maximum allowable extension so the engulfing burner zone does not reach
under the TPRD.
The examples in Figure 28 depict a container assembly where the TPRD
along the axis of the cylinder so the extension of the engulfing burner is
also located along the axis as illustrated in Case 1 of Figure 29. If,
however, the vehicle manufacturer has opted to use a vehicle-specific
feature (as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.) where the nearest TPRD is
located on the side of the container (and not on the axis) and the diameter
of the cylinder is larger than the width of the burner, then, as illustrated
in Case 2 of Figure 29, the burner is turned so that the extension of the
engulfing burner is aimed toward the (nearest) TPRD.

53
Figure 28
Placement of localized and engulfing fire zones with TPRD on one end of
cylinder

Figure 29
Top view showing extension of the engulfing fire zone toward the nearest
TPRD on a cylinder

Figure 30 deals with a container that projects a significant planar area

where the width/diameter is larger than the width of the burner. This
configuration, for example, is possible with conformable containers where
the vehicle manufacturer has opted to include vehicle-specific features (as
defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.) to install the CHSS under the floor of a
vehicle and the CHSS is oriented to evaluate fire exposure to the bottom
of the container based on a pool fire under the vehicle. For this case, the
localized burner is located in the corner opposite the TPRD in order to
maximize the distance from the TPRD and the localized burner zone
without extending beyond the corner. Since the engulfing fire zone extends

54
 on an angle toward the TPRD, the localized burner is allowed to rotate so
it aligns with the extension of the engulfing fire zone. The maximum
extension from the localized burner zone is 1,400 ± 50 mm, and the burner
can extend beyond the TPRD if the distance from the localized burner to
the TPRD is less than the maximum allowable extension.

Figure 30
Bottom view showing placement of localized and engulfing fire zones with
TPRD on one end of conformable container

(b) Figures 31 and 32 address containers that are protected by two TPRDs
(or sense points).
In contrast to Figure 28, Figure 31 deals with a typical cylindrical
container that is protected by TPRDs on both ends as opposed to only one
end. For this situation, the localized burner is located under the middle of
the cylindrical section to maximize the distance from both TPRDs, and the
engulfing burner can extend along the axis of the container in either
direction (since the TPRDs are equi-distant) to the maximum allowable
extension of 1,400 ± 50 mm. In case 1, the distance to either TPRD from
the localized burner is less than maximum allowable extension of the
engulfing burner from the centrally-located localized burner zone so the
engulfing burner is allowed to extend beyond the end of the container.
This case occurs when the container is less than (1.4 m + 0.25 m + 1.4 m
=) 3.05 m long. Conversely, in Case 3, the distance to the TPRDs from the
localized burner is greater than the maximum allowable extension so the
engulfing burner zone does not reach under a TPRD in the either
direction. This case occurs when the container is longer than 3.05m. Case
2 depicts a situation where the container length is exactly long enough
such that the maximum engulfing burner extension reaches the end of the
container. This case can occur when the cylinder is nominally 3.05 m long.

55
Figure 31
Placement of localized and engulfing fire zones with TPRDs on both ends of
cylinder

Like in Case 2 of Figure 29, Figure 32 deals with a container where the
width/diameter is greater that the width of the burner, and TPRDs are
located on either side of the cylinder on the walls. This situation can occur
by either rotation of the cylinder to the worst case position or as a result
of the vehicle manufacturer opting for test of a vehicle-specific protection
features. Since the distance to either of the TPRDs are equal, the burner
can be rotated toward either TPRD as the result should be equivalent.

Figure 32
Two equi-distant TPRDs located off -axis on the cylinder walls on either side

Like in Figure 30, Figure 33 deals with a container that projects a

significant planar area where the width/diameter is greater than the width
of the burner, and the container is protected by TPRDs on both ends of
one side. For this situation, the localized burner is located under the
middle of the opposite side, and the engulfing burner can extend in toward
either of the equi-distant TPRDs to the maximum allowable of 1,400 ± 50
mm. If the distance to the TPRD from the localized burner is less than the
engulfing burner extension, then the engulfing burner is allowed to extend

56
 beyond the container. Conversely, if the distance to the TPRD from the
localized burner is greater the maximum allowable extension, the burner
zone will not reach under the TPRD.
Figure 33
Bottom view showing placement of localized and engulfing fire zones with
TPRDs on both ends of conformable container

(c) If the container in the CHSS uses additional (or different locations of)
TPRDs or sense points for protection than addressed in items (a) and (b)
above, then the localized fire zone is located to maximize the distance to
any TPRD, and the engulfing fire zone extends from one end of the
localized zone toward the nearest TPRD up to the maximum engulfing
burner extension defined above.
The process is illustrated in Figure 34 for a cylinder with a TPRD on the
left end and a second TPRD part way along the length of the container.
The localized burner is located under right-side end of the container to
maximize the distance from the nearest TPRD (without extending beyond
the spherical head). The engulfing burner extends to the left (toward the
TPRDs) to the maximum allowable of nominally 1,400 ± 50 mm.
Additionally, as discussed in Item 1 above and illustrated in Case 2 of
Figure 29, the extension of the engulfing burner should be turned so that
the extension is aimed toward the nearest TPRD if the width/diameter of
the CHSS test article is larger the burner width.

Figure 34
Engulfing burner configuration when the localized fire zone is located on the
end of the container

57
 Another illustration of the process is shown in Figure 35 for a cylinder
protected by three TPRDs. In this case, the localized burner is located
under right-side end of the container to maximize the distance from the
nearest TPRD (without extending beyond the spherical head), and the
engulfing burner extends to the left (toward the TPRDs) to a maximum
allowable of 1,400 ± 50 mm. Additionally, since the nearest TPRD is not
located on the axis of the cylinder, the extension of the engulfing burner
should be rotated so that the extension is aimed toward the (nearest)
TPRD which is located on the cylinder wall when the cylinder diameter is
larger than the width of the burner. See Item 1 above and the Case 2 in
Figure 29.
Figure 35
Engulfing burner configuration when the localized fire zone is located at
maximum distance from multiple TPRDs

111. The test is completed after the CHSS vents and the pressure falls to less than 1
MPa within 1 hour for LDV’s CHSS or 2 hours for HDV’s CHSS without rupture of
the container. The time limits were conservatively set to account for long-lasting battery
and garage fires to provide adequate time for gaseous contents of the CHSS to be vented
when the container is thermally protected by coatings and shields. The value for the
minimum pressure was selected such that the risk of container rupture was minimal
due to stress rupture, and the values for the time-out of the test are based on vehicle test
data. In order to minimize the hazard, jet flames from venting through the container
walls or joints are permitted only as long as any jet flames do not exceed 0.5m. If venting
occurs though the TPRDs, the venting is required to be continuous, indicating that the
TPRD and/or the vent lines are not experiencing periodic flow blockages which could
interfere with proper venting in some situations.
112. If the CHSS fire test in paragraph 6.2.5.7. times out, then the CHSS fails the test.
The gaseous contents of the CHSS should be vented to eliminate the potential for high
energy gas releases during post-test handling, and the CHSS should be purged with
inert gas before ambient air is able to enter the container and potentially form a
flammable gas within the CHSS.
113. The following information is suggested to be provided by the test laboratory along
with the final determination of the result (PASS or FAIL) of the CHSS fire test based
on criteria in paragraph 5.1.4.:
(a) Diagrams and photographs showing the physical arrangement of the burner,
container assembly, and test setup;
(b) Fuel flow and HRR/A during the test;
(c) Temperature readings of the flame monitors (TBLOC25 and TBENG25) at 10-second
intervals and the 1-minute rolling averages of flame monitors (that validate or
invalidate the test result);

58
 (d) Pressure level within the container during the test;
(e) Ambient temperature and wind speed and direction if outdoor test;
(f) Time line of significant events leading to final determination of the result.

(e) Rationale for paragraphs 5.1.5. and 6.2.6. qualification tests for storage-system
hydrogen-flow closures
11469. The reliability and durability of hydrogen-flow closures is essential for the integrity
of the full storage system. The closures are partially qualified by their function in the system-
level performance tests (paragraph 5.1.). In addition, these closures are qualified individually
not only to assure exceptional reliability for these moving parts, but also to enable equivalent
components to be exchanged in a storage system without re-qualifying the entire storage
system. Closures that isolate high pressure hydrogen from the remainder of the fuel system
and the environment include:
(a) Thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD). A TPRD opens and
remains open when the system is exposed to fire;
(b) Check valve. A check valve prevents reverse flow in the vehicle fuelling line,
e.g. a non-return valve. Equivalent to a non-return valve;
(c) Shut-off valve. An automatic shut-off valve between the storage container and
the vehicle fuel delivery system defaults to the closed position when
unpowered.
11570. Test procedures for qualification of hydrogen-flow closures within the hydrogen
storage system were developed by the International Organization of Vehicle Manufacturers
(OICA) as outgrowths of discussions within CSA workgroups for TPRD1:2009
HPRD1:2021 and HGV3.1:2022 (as yet unpublished), and reports to those CSA workgroups
testing sponsored by US-DOE and performed at Powertech Laboratories to verify closure
test procedures under discussion within CSA. Differences between the requirements
established herein and the CSA documents derive primarily from differences in scope: CSA
requirements encompass all on road applications including heavy duty applications.

(i) Rationale for TPRD qualification requirements

11671. The qualification requirements verify that the device, once activated, will fully vent
the contents of the fuel container even at the end of the service life when the device has been
exposed to fuelling/defuelling pressure and temperature changes and environmental
exposures. The adequacy of flow rate for a given application is verified by the hydrogen
storage system fire test requirements (para. 5.1.4.).

(ii) Rationale for check valve qualification requirements

11772. These requirements are not intended to prevent the design and construction of
components (e.g. components having multiple functions) that are not specifically prescribed
in this standard, provided that such alternatives have been considered in testing the
components. In considering alternative designs or construction, the materials or methods used
shall be evaluated by the testing facility to ensure equivalent performance and reasonable
concepts of safety to that prescribed by this standard. In that case, the number of samples and
order of applicable tests shall be mutually agreed upon by the manufacturer and the testing
agency. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be conducted using hydrogen gas that
complies with SAE J2719 (Information report on the development of a hydrogen quality
guideline for fuel cell vehicles), or ISO 14687:2019 ISO 14687-2 (Hydrogen fuel-product
specification). The total number of operational cycles shall be 15,00011,000 (fuelling cycles)
for the check valve and 50,000 (duty cycles) for the automatic shut-off valve.

59
 11873. Fuel flow shut-off by an automatic shut-off valve mounted on a compressed hydrogen
storage container shall be fail-safe. The term "fail safe" refers to a device that reverts to a
safe mode or a safe complete shutdown for all reasonable failure modes.
11974. The electrical tests for the automatic shut-off valve mounted on the compressed
hydrogen storage containers (para. 6.2.6.2.7.) provide assurance of performance with:
(i) over temperature caused by an overvoltage condition, and (ii) potential failure of the
insulation between the component’s power conductor and the component casing. The
purpose of the pre-cooled hydrogen exposure test (para. 6.2.6.2.10.) is to verify that all
components in the flow path from the receptacle to the container that are exposed to precooled
hydrogen during fuelling can continue to operate safely.

(f) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.6. labelling

12075. The purpose of minimum labelling on the hydrogen storage containers is three-fold:
(i) to document the date when the system should be removed from service, (ii) to record
information needed to trace manufacturing conditions in event of on-road failure, and (iii) to
document NWP to ensure installation is consistent with the vehicle fuel system and fuelling
interface. Contracting Parties may specify additional labelling requirements. Since the
number of pressure cycles used in qualification under para. 5.1.1.2. may vary between
Contracting Parties, that number shall be marked on each container.

2. Vehicle fuel system requirements and safety needs

(a) In-Use Requirements

(i) Fuelling receptacle rationale for paragraphs 5.2.1.1.

12176. The vehicle fuelling receptacle should be designed to ensure that the fuelling pressure
is appropriate for the vehicle fuel storage system. Examples of receptacle designs can be
found in ISO 17268, SAE J2600 and SAE J2799. A label shall be affixed close to the fuelling
receptacle to inform the fueler/driver/owner of the type of fuel (liquid or gaseous hydrogen),
NWP and date for removal of storage containers from service. Contracting parties may
specify additional labelling requirements.

(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.2. overpressure protection for the low pressure system
12277. The hydrogen delivery system downstream of a pressure regulator is to be protected
against overpressure due to the possible failure of the pressure regulator.

(iii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.3. hydrogen discharge system

a. Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.3.1. pressure relief systems

12378. The vent line of storage system discharge systems (TPRDs and PRDs) should be
protected by a cap to prevent blockage by intrusion of objects such as dirt, stones, and
freezing water. Horizontal discharge, i.e. parallel to the road surface, should be avoided
in order to protect first responders, other road users and adjoining buildings from
potentially harmful ignited discharge directly. Vertical discharge direction should
consider potential releases in tunnel and underground car parking garages. In addition,
it is recommended to not direct the TPRD towards any exits of buses to avoid hindering
passengers from leaving the vehicle in case of a breakdown or accident.
124. With the exception of TPRDs activating due to a vehicle fire, there are no high
pressure exhausts expected from the CHSS. Gas exhausts from pressure regulating

60
 devices can be either high pressure or low pressure, but are generally of sufficiently
short duration, so the lengths of plumes can be short.
125. Low pressure releases may not ignite immediately at the exhaust point, so the
concept of dilution to below flammability is possible in many situations. Therefore, the
intent is to avoid is the exposure of flammable gases (fundamentally >100% LFL) to
ignition sources (such as hot surfaces above auto-ignition temperature and arcing-
sparking motors, electrical switches, etc.).

b. Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.3.2. vehicle exhaust systems

12679. In order to ensure that the exhaust discharge from the vehicle is non-hazardous, a
performance-based tests is designed to demonstrate that the discharge is non-ignitable. The
3 second rolling-average accommodates extremely short, non-hazardous transients up to 8
per cent without ignition. Tests of flowing discharges have shown that flame propagation
from the ignition source readily occurs above 10 per cent hydrogen, but does not propagate
below 8 per cent hydrogen (SAE Technical Report 2007-01-437, Corfu et al., "Development
of Safety Criteria for Potentially Flammable Discharges from Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles").
By limiting the hydrogen content of any instantaneous peak to 8 per cent, the hazard to people
near the point of discharge is controlled even if an ignition source is present. The time period
of the rolling-average is determined to ensure that the space around the vehicle remains non-
hazardous as the hydrogen from exhaust diffuses into the surroundings; this is the case of an
idling vehicle in a closed garage. In order to readily gain acceptance for this situation by
building officials and safety experts, it should be recognized that government/municipal
building codes and internationally-recognized standards such as International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60079 require that the space be less than 25 per cent LFL
(or 1 per cent hydrogen) by volume. The time limit for the rolling-average was determined
by assuming an extremely high hydrogen discharge rate that is equivalent to the input to a
100 kW fuel cell stack. The time was then calculated for this hydrogen discharge to fill the
nominal space occupied by a passenger vehicle (4.6m x 2.6m x 2.6m) to 25 per cent LFL.
The resultant time limit was conservatively estimated to be 8 seconds for a "rolling average,"
demonstrating that the 3-second rolling average used in this document is appropriate and
accommodates variations in garage and engine size. The standard ISO instrumentation
requirement is a factor of 6-10 less than the measured value. Therefore, during the test
procedure according to para. 6.1.4., the 3-second rolling average requires a sensor response
(90 per cent of reading) and recording rate of less than 300 milliseconds.

(iv). Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.4. protection against flammable conditions:

12780. Single Failure Conditions. Dangerous situations can occur if unintended leakage of
hydrogen reaches flammable concentrations.
(a) Any single failure downstream of the main hydrogen shut off valve shall not
result in any level of hydrogen concentration in air anywhere in the passenger
compartment;
(b) Protection against the occurrence of hydrogen in air in the enclosed or semi-
enclosed spaces within the vehicle that contain unprotected ignition sources is
important.
(i) Vehicles may achieve this objective by design (for example, where
spaces are vented to prevent increasing hydrogen concentrations);
(ii) The vehicle achieves this objective by detection of hydrogen
concentrations in air of 2 per cent ± 1.0 per cent or greater, then the
warning shall be provided. If the hydrogen concentration exceeds
3 per cent ± 1.0 per cent by volume in air in the enclosed or semi-

61
 enclosed spaces of the vehicle, the main shutoff valve shall be closed to
isolate the storage system.
(c) The actionable leak percentages were changed for paragraph 5.2.1.4.3.
(Protection against flammable conditions: single failure conditions) so
they do not overlap. Previous requirement was a warning level is from 1
to 3 per cent, whereas the valve closure level is 2 to 4 per cent, such that
overlap exists in the region between 2 and 3 per cent. The new language
(> 3.0 per cent issue warning, > 4.0 per cent close shut-off valve) eliminates
the overlap and adds clarity.

(v) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.5. fuel leakage

12881. Detectable leakage of the hydrogen fuelling line and delivery system is not
permitted.

(vi) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.6. visual signal/warning system

12982. A visual signal/warning system is to alert the driver when hydrogen leakage results in
concentration levels at or above 4 per cent by volume within the passenger compartment,
luggage compartment, and spaces with unprotected ignition sources within the vehicle. The
visual signal/warning system should also alert the driver in case of a malfunction of the
hydrogen detection system. Furthermore, the system shall be able to respond to either
scenario and instantly warn the driver. The shut-off signal shall be inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear view of the driver. There is no data available to suggest
that the warning function of the signal would be diminished if it is only visual. In case of a
detection system failure, the signal warning light should be yellow. In case of the emergency
shut-off of the valve, the signal warning light should be red.

(vii) Lower flammability limit (LFL)

13083. (Background for paragraph 3.34.): Lowest concentration of fuel in which a gas
mixture will sustain propagation of the combustion wave (flammable mixture) is
flammable. National and international standard bodies (such as National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) and IEC) recognize 4 per cent hydrogen by volume in air as the LFL
(US Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines Bulletin 503, 1952; Houf and Schefer,
"Predicting Radiative Heat Fluxes and Flammability Envelopes from Unintended Releases
of Hydrogen," International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 31, pp 136-151, 2007; NASA RD-
WSTF-0001, 1988). The LFL, which depends on the temperature, pressure, flame
propagation direction and presence of dilution gases, has been assessed using specific test
methods in a fully premixed quiescent mixture (e.g. American Society for Testing (ASTM)
E681-09(2015) E681-04). Hence, the definition of LFL is restricted to fully premixed
quiescent environments. Under realistic (non-quiescent) conditions flame propagation
is a function of the fluid dynamic environment, which always increases the apparent
LFL. While the LFL value of 4 per cent is appropriate for evaluating flammability in general
surroundings of vehicles or inside passenger compartments, this criterion may be overly
restrictive for flowing gas situations where ignition requires more than 4 per cent hydrogen
in many cases. Whether an ignition source at a given location can ignite the leaking gas plume
depends on the flow conditions and the type of ignition. At 4 per cent hydrogen in a stagnant
room-temperature mixture, combustion can only propagate in the upward direction. At
approximately 8 to 10 per cent hydrogen in the mixture, combustion can also be propagated
in the downward and horizontal directions and the mixture is readily combustible regardless
of location of ignition source. LFL is usually expressed as per cent (%) (volume fraction
of the fuel gas in the mixture). Coward, H.F. et al, "Limits of flammability of gases and
vapors," Bureau of Mines Bulletin 503; 1952, USA; Benz, F.J. et al, "Ignition and thermal

62
 hazards of selected aerospace fluids", RD-WSTF-0001, NASA Johnson Space Center White
Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, NM, USA, October 1988; Houf, W.G. et al, "Predicting
radiative heat fluxes and flammability envelopes from unintended releases of hydrogen,",
International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 32 pp136-141, 2007.

(viii) Recommended features for design of a hydrogen fuel system

13184. As any performance-based technical regulation cannot include testing requirements
for every possible scenario, this section is to provide manufacturers a list of items that they
should consider during the design of hydrogen fuelling systems with the intention to reduce
hydrogen leaks and provide a safe product:
(a) The hydrogen fuel system should function in a safe and proper manner and
be designed to minimize the potential for hydrogen leaks, (e.g. minimize line
connections to the extent possible);
(b) The hydrogen fuel system should reliably withstand the chemical, electrical,
mechanical and thermal service conditions that may be found during normal
vehicle operation;
(c) The materials used should be compatible with gaseous or liquid hydrogen,
as appropriate;
(d) The hydrogen fuel system should be installed such that it is protected against
damage under normal operating conditions;
(e) Rigid fuel lines should be secured such that they shall not be subjected to
critical vibration or other stresses;
(f) The hydrogen fuel system should protect against excess flow in the event of
a failure downstream;
(g) No component of the hydrogen fuel system, including any protective
materials that form part of such components, should project beyond the
outline of the vehicle or protective structure.

(b) Post crash requirements

(i) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.2.1. post-crash test leakage limit

13285. Allowable post-crash leakage in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 301 (for the United States of America) and Regulation Nos. 94 and 95 are within
6 per cent of each other for the 60 minute period after the crash. Since the values are quite
similar, the value in Regulation No. 94 of 30g/min was selected as a basis for the calculations
to establish the post-crash allowable hydrogen leakage for this GTRgtr.
13386. The criterion for post-crash hydrogen leakage is based on allowing an
equivalent release of combustion energy as permitted by gasoline vehicles. Using a lower
heating value of 120 MJ/kg for hydrogen and 42.7 MJ/kg for gasoline based on the US DOE
Transportation Data Book, the equivalent allowable leakage of hydrogen can be determined
as follows:

42.7 MJ/kg
WH = 30 g/min gasoline leakage x = 10.7 g/min hydrogen leakage
120 MJ/kg
42.7 MJ/kg
WH = 30 g/min gasoline leakage x = 10.7 g/min hydrogen leakage
120 MJ/kg

63
 For vehicles with either compressed hydrogen storage systems or liquefied hydrogen
storage systems. The total allowable loss of hydrogen is therefore 642g for the
60 minute period following the crash.
13487. The allowable hydrogen flow leakage can also be expressed in volumetric
terms at normal temperature (0°C) and pressure as follows:

10.7 g/min
VH = x 22.41 NL/mol = 118NL/min
2 (1.00794) g/mol
10.7 g/min
VH = x 22.41 NL/mol = 118NL/min
2 (1.00794) g/mol

for vehicles with either compressed or liquid hydrogen storage.

13588. As confirmation of the hydrogen leak rate, JARI conducted ignition tests of hydrogen
leaks ranging from 131 NL/min up to 1000 NL/min under a vehicle and inside the engine
compartment. Results showed that, while a loud noise can be expected from ignition of the
hydrogen, the sound pressure level and heat flux were not enough (even at a 1000 NL/min
leak rate) to damage the under floor area of the vehicle, release the vehicle hood, or injure a
person standing 1 m from the vehicle (SAE Technical Paper 2007-01-0428 "Diffusion and
Ignition Behavior on the Assumption of Hydrogen Leakage from a Hydrogen-Fuelled
Vehicle"). The container shall remain attached to the vehicle at a minimum of one attachment
point.

(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.2.2. post-crash concentration limit in enclosed spaces
13689. This test requirement has been established to ensure that hydrogen does not
accumulate in the passenger, luggage, or cargo compartments that could potentially pose a
post-crash hazard. The criteria was conservatively set to 4 per cent hydrogen by volume as
the value represents the lowest possible level at which combustion can occur (and the
combustion is extremely weak at this value). Since the test is conducted in parallel with the
post-crash leak test and therefore will extend for at least 60 minutes, there is no need to
provide margin on the criteria to manage dilution zones as there is sufficient time for the
hydrogen to diffuse throughout the compartment.

(iii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.2.3. container displacement.

13790. One of the crash safety regulations for vehicles with compressed gas fuel systems is
Canada’s Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (CMVSS) 301. Its characteristic provisions include
the fuel container installation requirement for prevention of displacement.

3. Electric safety requirements and safety needs

(a) Rationale for electric safety requirements

91. A failure of a high voltage system may cause an Electric Shock of a (human) body.
Such a shock will may happen with any source of electricity that causes a sufficient current
through the skin, muscles or hair. Typically, the expression is used to denote an unwanted
exposure to electricity, hence the effects are considered undesirable.
92. The minimum current a human can feel depends on the current type (AC or DC) and
frequency. A person can feel at least 1 mA (rms) of AC at 60 Hz, while at least 5 mA for DC.
The current may, if it is high enough, cause tissue damage or fibrillation which leads to
cardiac arrest. 60 mA of AC (rms, 60 Hz) or 300–500 mA of DC can cause fibrillation.

64
 93. A sustained electric shock from AC at 120 V, 60 Hz is an especially dangerous source
of ventricular fibrillation because it usually exceeds the let-go threshold, while not delivering
enough initial energy to propel the person away from the source. However, the potential
seriousness of the shock depends on paths through the body that the currents take.
94. If the voltage is less than 200 V, then the human skin is the main contributor to the
impedance of the body in the case of a macro-shock the passing of current between two
contact points on the skin. The characteristics of the skin are non-linear however. If the
voltage is above 450–600 V, then dielectric breakdown of the skin occurs. The protection
offered by the skin is lowered by perspiration, and this is accelerated if electricity causes
muscles to contract above the let-go threshold for a sustained period of time.

(b) In-Use requirements

95. "In-Use Requirements" are the specifications which have to be considered when the
fuel cell vehicle is engineered. These have to be fulfilled to avoid any electric hazard to
passengers of an electric vehicle.
96. The requirements are focusing on the electric power train operating on high voltage
as well as the high voltage components and systems which are galvanically connected.
97. To avoid electrical hazards it is requested that live parts (= conductive pat(s) intended
to be electrically energized in normal use) are protected against direct contact.
98. Protection against direct contact inside the passenger compartment has to be checked
by using a standardized Test Wire (IPXXD).
Figure 5
Standardized Test Wire

99. Outside the compartment a standardized Test Finger (IPXXB) has to be used to check
whether a contact with live parts is possible or not.
Figure 6
Standardized Test Finger

100. Furthermore exposed conductive parts (= parts which can be touched with the
standardized Test Finger and becomes electrically energized under isolation failure
conditions) have also to be protected against indirect contact. This means that e.g. conductive
barriers or enclosures have to be galvanically connected securely to the electrical chassis.

65
 101. Beside protection of direct and indirect contact isolation resistance is required for AC
(Alternating Current) and DC (Direct Current) systems. Isolation resistance measured against
the electrical chassis is a physical dimension describing which maximum current flowing
through the human body is not dangerous.
102. While DC systems are less harmful to the humans (see para. 5.4.1.) 100 Ω/Volt are
required. AC systems have to fulfill 500 Ω/Volt. For the DC systems an on-board isolation
resistance monitoring system is required which warns the driver when the resistance is below
100 Ω/Volt.
103. The isolation resistance requirements of 100 Ω/Volt for DC or 500 Ω/Volt for AC
allow maximum body currents of 10 mA and 2 mA respectively.

(c) Post-crash requirements

104. Post-Crash requirements are the specifications which have to be fulfilled by the
vehicles after the impact. They do not describe the way how the impact has to be conducted.
This is the responsibility of each Contracting Party. The requirements have to be fulfilled to
avoid any electric hazard to passengers of the vehicle.
105. The requirements are focusing on the electric power train operating on high voltage
as well as the high voltage components and systems which are galvanically connected.
106. After the impact of the vehicle the following three measures demonstrate that the
systems are safe. It means that the remaining "electricity level" of the high voltage systems
are no longer dangerous to the passengers of the vehicle.
(a) Absence of high Voltage
After the impact the voltage is equal or less than 30 VAC or 60 VDC
(b) Isolation Resistance
Isolation resistance measured against the electrical chassis is a physical dimension describing
which maximum current is not dangerous to the human being.
After the impact for AC systems measured against the electrical chassis the minimum
isolation resistance has to be 500 Ω/Volt and for DC systems 100 Ω/Volt.
The isolation resistance requirements of 100 Ω/Volt for DC or 500 Ω/Volt for AC allow
maximum body currents of 10 mA and 2 mA respectively.
(c) Physical protection
After the impact it should not be possible to touch live parts after the crash, tested with the
standardized Test Finger. Furthermore protection against indirect contact has also been
fulfilled.
By decision of the Contracting Parties of the 1998 Agreement a fourth measure is allowed
(d) Low Energy
After the impact the energy of the system has to be below 2.0 Joules.

F. Rationale for storage and fuel system test procedures

138107. Test procedures in para. 6. replicate on-road conditions for performance

requirements specified in para. 5. Most test procedures derive from test procedures specified
in historical national regulations and/or industry standards.

66
 1. Rationale for storage and fuel system integrity tests

(a) Rationale for paragraph 6.1.1. test procedure for post-crash leak test procedure for
compressed hydrogen storage systems
139108. The post-crash leak test is organized as follows:
6.1.1.1. Test procedure when the test gas is hydrogen
6.1.1.2. Test procedure when the test gas is helium
140109. The loss of fuel represents the allowable release for the entire compressed
hydrogen storage system on the vehicle. The post-crash release can be determined by
measuring the pressure loss of the compressed storage system over a time period of at least
60 minutes after the crash and then calculating the release rate of hydrogen based on the
measured pressure loss and the time period using the equation of state of the compressed gas
in the storage system. (See the SAE Technical Paper 2010-01-0133, "Development of the
Methodology for FCV Post-crash fuel leakage testing incorporated into SAE J2578.") In the
case of multiple hydrogen storage containers that are isolated from each other after crash, it
may be necessary to measure hydrogen loss individually (using the approach in para. 5.2.2.1.)
and then sum the individual values to determine the total release of hydrogen gas from the
storage system.
141110. The methodology can also be expanded to allow the use of a non-flammable
gas for crash testing. Helium has been selected as it, like hydrogen, has low molecular weight.
In order to determine the ratio of volumetric flows between helium and hydrogen releases
(and thus establish a required relationship between hydrogen and helium leakage, we assume
that leakage from the compressed hydrogen storage system can be described as choked flow
through an orifice where the orifice area (A) represents the total equivalent leakage area for
the post-crash system. In this case the equation for mass flow is given by:
W = C x Cd x A x (ρ x P)1/2
where Cd is the orifice discharge coefficient, A is the orifice area, P are the upstream
(stagnation) fluid density and pressure, and ρ and C are given by
ρ = Ru x T / M
and
C = γ /( (γ + 1)/2) (γ+1)/(γ-1)
where Ru is the universal gas constant and T, M, and γ are the temperature, molecular
weight, and ratio of specific heats (CV/CP) for the particular gas that is leaking. Since
Cd, A, Ru, T, and P are all constant for the situation of determining the relationship
between post-crash helium and hydrogen leakage, the following equation describes
the flow ratio on a mass basis.
WH2 / WHe = CH2 / CHe x (MH2 / MHe) ½
142111. Since we can determine the volumetric flow ratio by multiplying the mass flow
ratio by the ratio of molecular weights (M) at constant temperature and pressure conditions
are the same.
VH2 / VHe = CH2 / CHe x (MHe / MH2) 1/2
143112. Based on the above relationship, it is possible to determine that the ratio of the
volumetric flow (and therefore the ratio gas concentration by volume) between helium test
gas and hydrogen is approximately 75 per cent for the same leak passages from the storage
system. Thus, the post-crash hydrogen leakage can be determined by

67
 VH2 = VHe / 0.75
where VHe is the post-crash helium leakage (NL/min).

(b) Rationale for paragraph 6.1.2. (Test procedure for post-crash concentration test in
enclosed spaces for vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage systems)
144113. The test may be conducted by measuring hydrogen or by measuring the
corresponding depression in oxygen content. Sensors are to be located at significant locations
in the passenger, luggage, and cargo compartments. Since the test is conducted in parallel
with the post-crash leak test of the storage system and therefore will extend for at least 60
minutes, there is no need to provide margin on the criteria to manage dilution zones as there
is sufficient time for the hydrogen to diffuse throughout the compartment.
145114. In the case where the vehicle is not crashed with hydrogen and a leak test is
conducted with compressed helium, it is necessary to define a criteria for the helium content
that is equivalent to 4 per cent hydrogen by volume. Recognizing that the content of hydrogen
or helium in the compartment (by volume) is proportional to the volumetric flow of the
respective releases, it is possible to determine the allowable helium content by volume, XHe,
from the equation developed in paras. 108 132 to 112 136 of the preamble by multiplying the
hydrogen concentration criteria by 0.75. The criteria for helium concentration is therefore as
follows:
XHe = 4 per cent H2 by volume x 0.75 = 3.0 per cent by volume.
The criteria for helium concentration is therefore 3 per cent by volume in the
passenger, luggage, and cargo compartments if the crash test of a vehicle with a
compressed storage system is conducted with compressed helium instead of
compressed hydrogen.
146115. An example of hydrogen concentration measurement locations can be found in
the document "Examples of hydrogen concentration measurement points for testing" (OICA
report to SGS-3 based on Japanese Regulation Attachment 100).

2. Rationale for paragraph 6.2. (Test procedures for compressed hydrogen storage
systems)
147116. Most test procedures for hydrogen storage systems derive from test procedures
specified in historical national regulations and/or industry standards. Key differences are the
execution of tests in sequence (as opposed to historical execution of tests in parallel, each on
a separate new container), and slowing of the filling rate in burst testing to correspond to in-
service fuelling rates. In addition, hold times at burst pressure test points have been extended
to 4 minutes. These changes are designed to reduce the sensitivity of initial burst
measurements to the fuelling rate and to evaluate capability to sustain pressure. An evaluation
of the sufficiency and stringency of requirements in this GTRgtr document compared to
historical EU requirements is given in Transport Research Laboratory Project Report
RPN1742 "Hydrogen-Powered Vehicles: A Comparison of the European Legislation and the
draft UNECE global technical regulation" by C. Visvikis.
(a) Due to the various speeds that a hydraulic cycle may be performed, a
provision has been added for container manufacturers to specify a
pressure cycle profile (para. 6.2.3.2.). This will prevent the premature
failure of the container due to test conditions outside of the design
envelope while still maintaining the stringency of the tests.
(b) The drop test procedure has been streamlined such that only one
container will be dropped once. The container shall withstand the one
drop out of any impact orientations specified in the test procedure.

68
148117. Requirements for closures of the hydrogen storage system (TPRD, automatic
shut-off valve and check valve) have been developed by CSA (HGV3.1 and TPRD-1).
(a) Evaluations of cycling durability at 50,000 cycles (para. 6.2.6.2.3.) reflect
multiple pressure pulses against check valves during fuelling and multiple
operations of automatic shut-off valves between fuellings;
(b) Vibration tests (para. 6.2.6.2.8.) were designed to scan frequencies from 10 to
40 Hz because several component testing facilities reported that there can be
more than one resonant frequency. The frequency of 17 Hz used historically in
component vibration tests was established through demonstration of one
vehicle traveling over a variety of road surfaces, and it reflects the influence of
engine proximity. However, it is expected that the resonant frequency could
change based upon the component design and mounting provisions, so to
ensure the most severe condition is identified, a sweep to 40 Hz is required;
(c) The temperature sensitivity, Tlife = 9.1 x Tact0.503, specified in the
Accelerated Life Test (para. 6.2.6.1.2.) is based on D. Stephens (Battelle
Memorial Institute) "Rationale for Long-Term Test Temperature for
Thermally Activated PRDs.";
(d) Results of closure tests are to be recorded by the testing laboratory and made
available to the manufacturer. In the flow rate test, the flow rate is recorded as
the lowest measured value of the eight pressure relief devices tested in NL per
minute (0 °C and 1 atmosphere) corrected for hydrogen;
(e) The atmospheric exposure test (para. 6.2.6.2.6.) derives from two historical
tests. The oxygen ageing test was contained in CSA NGV3.1 and harmonized
with ISO CD 12619 Part 2 (hydrogen components) and ISO 15500 Part 2
(CNG components). The ozone resistance test drew the requirements and test
procedure from Regulation No. 110 requirement for CNG Components, and
has been added to both the hydrogen and CNG components documents at CSA.
(f) The order of the tests has been corrected in para. 6.2.6.1.1. to align with
para 5.1.5.1. requirements. Specifically, the bench-top activation test is
performed before the flow-rate test. Test requirements have also been
harmonized with ISO 19882 ("Gaseous hydrogen - thermally activated
pressure relief devices for compressed hydrogen vehicle fuel
Containers"). Finally, a summary table of pressure cycling conditions has
been added for clarity.
(g) The accelerated life test temperature has been defined (para. 6.2.6.1.2.).
The new equation addresses several gaps in the old one. For example, the
old equation produced results that did not balance units across both sides
and yielded different results with Celsius and Fahrenheit temperatures.
The new formula was derived from research on the actual creep
performance of eutectics and gives similar results to the old formula when
used in the range of temperatures that was typically used before, but gives
more realistic values at a broader range and with any input units.
(h) The salt corrosion resistance test (para. 6.2.6.1.4) has been updated per
ANSI HPRD 1 as this is a more representative automotive environment
test. The test is applied to both TPRD, check valve and shut-off valve.
(i) Use of sodium hydroxide and ammonium nitrate for the vehicle
environment test (para. 6.2.6.1.5.) has been eliminated. Sodium hydroxide
will react chemically and destroy aluminum (the main body material of
many PRDs) so it is a very difficult test if submerged (especially if

69
 conducted after sulfuric acid which affects anodized surfaces but does not
cause mechanical degradation). Instead, a spray method is allowed and
ethanol/gasoline testing is added, which is included in ANSI HPRD 1-2013
and ANSI HGV 3.1-2015 for vehicle crash scenarios, i.e. gasoline exposure
from other cars. The change is applied to shut-off and check valves. The
use of ethanol (E10) has replaced methanol (M5), as E10 is more
representative of fuels available on the roads today.
(j) The updated TPRD drop test procedure allows one TPRD to be dropped
in all six orientations, or alternatively, up to six separate TPRDs can be
used for the six drops. The options are not given to provide varying levels
of stringency, but as a more expedient way to conduct the test.
(k) Three TPRD units instead of two are required for the bench-top activation
test (para. 6.2.6.1.9) to match the number of units required for the flow
rate test. Furthermore, with the addition of the high pressure activation
and flow test of the three samples, there is no longer a need to test a single
sample at 100 per cent NWP.
(l) The atmospheric exposure test (para. 6.2.6.1.11) has been added for
TPRDs, as there was no provision for testing of hydrogen exposure for
non-metallic materials. The test is also harmonized with paragraph
6.2.6.2.6. for check valves and shut-off valves.
(l) The operational cycle definition in the extreme temperature cycling test
for check valve and shut-off valve (para. 6.2.6.2.3.) has been modified to
harmonize with CSA/ANSI HGV 3.1.

G. Optional requirements: vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage

systems / rationale

149118. Since hydrogen-fuelled hydrogen fuelled vehicles are in the early stages of
development and commercial deployment, testing and evaluation of test methods to qualify
vehicles for on-road service has been underway in recent years. However, liquefied hydrogen
storage systems (LHSS) have received considerably less evaluation than have compressed
gas storage systems. At the time of the development of this document, an LHSS vehicle has
been proposed by only one manufacturer, and on-road vehicle experience with LHSS is very
limited. The proposed LHSS requirements in this document have been discussed on a
technical basis, and while they seem reasonable, they have not been validated. Due to this
limited experience with LHSS vehicles, some Contracting Parties have requested more time
for testing and validation. Therefore, the requirements for LHSS have been presented in
section G as optional.

1. Background information for liquefied hydrogen storage systems

(a) Hydrogen gas has a low energy density per unit volume
150119. To overcome this disadvantage, the liquefied hydrogen storage system (LHSS)
maintains the hydrogen at cryogenic temperatures in a liquefied state.

(b) A typical liquefied hydrogen storage system (LHSS) is shown Figure 367
151120. Actual systems will differ in the type, number, configuration, and arrangement
of the functional constituents. Ultimately, the boundaries of the LHSS are defined by the
interfaces which can isolate the stored liquefied (and/or gaseous) hydrogen from the

70
 remainder of the fuel system and the environment. All components located within this
boundary are subject to the requirements defined in this Section while components outside
the boundary are subject to general requirements in Section 4. For example, the typical LHSS
shown in Figure 367 consists of the following regulatory elements:
(a) Liquefied hydrogen storage container(s);
(b) Shut off devices(s);
(c) A boil-off system;
(d) Pressure Relief Devices (PRDs);
(e) The interconnecting piping (if any) and fittings between the above
components.
Figure 367
Typical liquefied storage system

(c) During fuelling, liquefied hydrogen flows from the fuelling system to the storage
container(s)
152121. Hydrogen gas from the LHSS returns to the filling station during the fill
process so that the liquefied hydrogen can flow into liquefied hydrogen storage container(s)
without over pressurizing the system. Two shut-offs are provided on both the liquefied
hydrogen fill and hydrogen fill return line to prevent leakage in the event of single failures.

(d) Liquefied hydrogen is stored at cryogenic conditions

153122. In order to maintain the hydrogen in the liquid state, the container needs to be
well insulated, including use of a vacuum jacket that surrounds the storage container.
Generally accepted rules or standards (such as those listed in para. 7.) are advised for use in
the proper design of the storage container and the vacuum jacket.

(e) During longer parking times of the vehicle, heat transfer will induce a pressure rise
within the hydrogen storage container(s)
154123. A boil-off system limits heat leakage induced pressure rise in the hydrogen
storage container(s) to a pressure specified by the manufacturer. Hydrogen that is vented
from the LHSS may be processed or consumed in down-stream systems. Discharges from
the vehicle resulting from over-pressure venting should be addressed as part of allowable
leak/permeation from the overall vehicle.

71
(f) Malfunction
155124. In case of malfunction of the boil-off system, vacuum failure, or external fire,
the hydrogen storage container(s) are protected against overpressure by two independent
Pressure Relief Devices (PRDs) and the vacuum jacket(s) is protected by a vacuum jacket
pressure relief device.

(g) When hydrogen is released to the propulsion system, it flows from the LHSS through
the shut-off valve that is connected to the hydrogen fuel delivery system
156125. In the event that a fault is detected in the propulsion system or fuelling
receptacle, vehicle safety systems usually require the container shut-off valve to isolate the
hydrogen from the down-stream systems and the environment.

2. Rationale for liquefied hydrogen storage system design qualification requirements of

para 7.2.
157126. The containment of the hydrogen within the liquefied hydrogen storage system
is essential to successfully isolating the hydrogen from the surroundings and down-stream
systems. The system-level performance tests in para. 7.2. were developed to demonstrate a
sufficient safety level against rupture of the container and capability to perform critical
functions throughout service including pressure cycles during normal service, pressure
limitation under extreme conditions and faults, and in fires.
158127. Performance test requirements for all liquefied hydrogen storage systems in
on-road vehicle service are specified in paragraph 7.2. These criteria apply to qualification
of storage systems for use in new vehicle production.
159128. This section (specifies the rationale for the performance requirements
established in paragraph 7.2. for the integrity of the liquefied hydrogen storage system.
Manufacturers are expected to ensure that all production units comply with the requirements
of performance verification testing in paragraphs 7.2.1. to 7.2.4.

(a) Rationale for verification tests for baseline metrics for LHSSs paragraph 7.2.1.
160129. A proof pressure test and a baseline initial burst test are intended to
demonstrate the structural capability of the inner container.

(i) Rationale for proof pressure requirement in paragraphs 7.2.1.1. and 7.4.1.1.
161130. By design of the container and specification of the pressure limits during
regular operation and during fault management (as demonstrated in paragraphs 7.4.2.2. and
7.4.2.3.), the pressure in the inner container could rise to 110 per cent of the Maximum
Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) during fault management by the primary pressure
relief device and no higher than 150 per cent of MAWP even in "worst case" fault
management situations where the primary relief device has failed and the secondary pressure
relief device is required to activate and protect the system. The purpose of the proof test to
130 per cent MAWP is to demonstrate that the inner container stays below its yield strength
at that pressure.

(ii) Rationale for baseline initial burst pressure requirement paragraphs 7.2.1.2. and 7.4.1.2.
162131. By design (and as demonstrated in paragraph 5.2.3.3.), the pressure may rise
up to 150 per cent of the MAWP when the secondary (backup) pressure relief device(s) may
be required to activate. The burst test is intended to demonstrate margin against burst during
this "worst case" situation. The pressure test levels of either the Maximum Allowable
Working Pressure (in MPa) plus 0.1 MPa multiplied by 3.25, or the MAWP (in MPa) plus

72
 0.1 MPa multiplied by 1.5 and multiplied by Rm/Rp (where Rm is ultimate tensile strength
and Rp is minimum yield strength of the container material), are common values to provide
such margin for metallic liners.
163132. Additionally, the high burst test values (when combined with proper selection
of materials demonstrate that the stress levels are acceptably low such that cycle fatigue
issues are unlikely for metallic containers that have supporting design calculations. In the
case of non-metallic containers, an additional test is required in paragraph 7.4.1.2. to
demonstrate this capability as the calculation procedures have not yet been standardized for
these materials.

(b) Rationale for verification for expected on-road performance paragraph 7.2.2.

(i) Rationale for boil-off requirement paragraphs 7.2.2.1. and 7.4.2.1.

164133. During normal operation the boil-off management system shall limit the
pressure below MAWP. The most critical condition for the boil-off management system is a
parking period after a refuelling to maximum filling level in a liquefied hydrogen storage
system with a limited cool-down period of a maximum of 48 hours.

(ii) Rationale for hydrogen leak requirement paragraphs 7.2.2.2. and 7.4.2.2.
165134. The hydrogen discharge test shall be conducted during boil-off of the liquid
storage system. Manufacturers will typically elect to react all (or most) of the hydrogen that
leaves the container, but, in order to have a hydrogen discharge criteria that is comparable to
the values used for Compressed Hydrogen Storage Systems, it should count any hydrogen
that leaves the vehicle boil-off systems with other leakage, if any, to determine the total
hydrogen discharge from the vehicles.
166135. Having made this adjustment, the allowable hydrogen discharge from a vehicle
with liquefied hydrogen storage is the same as for a vehicle with compressed hydrogen
storage. According to the discussion in paragraphs 62 and 63 of section E.1.(c) of the
preamble, the total discharge from a vehicle with liquefied hydrogen may therefore be 150
mL/min for a garage size of 30.4 m3. As with compressed gas, the scaling factor,
[(Vwidth+1)*(Vheight+0.05)*(Vlength+1)/ 30.4], can be used to accommodate alternative
garage/vehicle combinations to those used in the derivation of the rate, and accommodates
small vehicles that could be parked in smaller garages.
167136. Prior to conducting this test, the primary pressure relief device is forced to
activate so that the ability of the primary relief device to re-close and meet required leakage
is confirmed.

(iii) Rationale for vacuum loss requirement paragraph 7.2.2.3. and test procedure of
paragraph 7.4.2.3.
168137. In order to prove the proper function of the pressure relief devices and
compliance with the allowed pressure limits of the liquefied hydrogen storage system as
described in section G.2.(b) of the preamble and verified in paragraph 7.2.2.3., a sudden
vacuum loss due to air inflow in the vacuum jacket is considered as the "worst case" failure
condition. In contrast to hydrogen inflow to the vacuum jacket, air inflow causes significantly
higher heat input to the inner container due to condensation of air at cold surfaces and
evaporation of air at warm surfaces within the vacuum jacket.
169138. The primary pressure relief device should be a re-closing type relief valve so
that hydrogen venting will cease when the effect of a fault subsides. These valves, by
globally-accepted design standards, are allowed a total pressure increase of 10 per cent
between the setpoint and full activation when including allowable tolerances of the setpoint

73
 setting itself. Since the relief valve should be set at or below the MAWP, the pressure during
a simulation of the fault that is managed by the primary pressure relief device should not
exceed 110 per cent of MAWP.
170139. The secondary pressure relief device(s) should not activate during the
simulation of a vacuum loss that is managed by the primary relief device as their activation
may cause unnecessary instability and unnecessary wear on the secondary devices. To prove
fail-safe operation of the pressure relief devices and the performance of the second pressure
relief device in accordance with the requirements in paragraphs 7.2.2.3. and 7.4.2.3., a second
test shall be conducted with the first pressure relief device blocked. In this case, either relief
valves or burst discs may be used, and the pressure is allowed to rise to as high as 136 per
cent MAWP (in case of a valve used as secondary relief device) or as high as 150 per cent
MAWP (in case of a burst disc used as secondary relief device) during the simulation of a
vacuum loss fault.

(c) Rationale for paragraph 7.2.3. verification test for service-terminating conditions.
171140. In addition to vacuum degradation or vacuum loss, fire also may cause
overpressure in liquefied hydrogen storage systems and thus proper operation of the pressure
relief devices have to be proven in a bonfire test.

(d) Rationale for verification of LHSS components: pressure relief device(s) and shut off
valves paragraph 7.2.4.

(i) Rationale for pressure relief device qualification requirements (LHSS) paragraph 7.2.4.1.
172141. The qualification requirements verify that the design shall be such that the
device(s) will limit the pressure of the fuel container to the specified values even at the end
of the service life when the device has been exposed to fuelling/de-fuelling pressure and
temperature changes and environmental exposures. The adequacy of flow rate for a given
application is verified by the hydrogen storage system bonfire test and vacuum loss test
requirements (paras. 7.2.3. and 7.4.3.).

(ii) Rationale for shut-off valve qualification requirements (LHSS) paragraph 7.2.4.2.
173142. These requirements are not intended to prevent the design and construction of
components (e.g. components having multiple functions) that are not specifically prescribed
in this standard, provided that such alternatives have been considered in testing the
components. In considering alternative designs or construction, the materials or methods used
shall be evaluated by the testing facility to ensure equivalent performance and reasonable
concepts of safety to that prescribed by this standard. In that case, the number of samples and
order of applicable tests shall be mutually agreed upon by the manufacturer and the testing
agency. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be conducted using pressurised gas such as
air or nitrogen containing at least 10 per cent helium (see EC Reg. 406/2010 p.52 4.1.1.). The
total number of operational cycles shall be 20,000 (duty cycles) for the automatic shut-off
valves.
174143. Fuel flow shut-off by an automatic shut-off valve mounted on a liquid
hydrogen storage container shall be fail safe. The term "fail safe" shall refer to a device’s
ability to revert to a safe mode or a safe complete shutdown for all reasonable failure modes.
175144. The electrical tests for the automatic shut-off valve mounted on the liquid
hydrogen storage containers provide assurance of performance with: (i) over temperature
caused by an overvoltage condition, and (ii) potential failure of the insulation between the
component’s power conductor and the component casing.

74
 3. Rationale for vehicle fuel system design qualification requirements (LH2)
176145. This section specifies requirements for the integrity of the hydrogen fuel
delivery system, which includes the liquefied hydrogen storage system, piping, joints, and
components in which hydrogen is present. These requirements are in addition to requirements
specified in paragraph 5.2., all of which apply to vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage
systems with the exception of paragraph 2.1.1. The fuelling receptacle label shall designate
liquid hydrogen as the fuel type. Test procedures are given in paragraph 7.5.

4. Rationale for test procedures for LHSSs

177146. Rationale for test procedures is included within rationale for performance
requirements in sections G.2.(a) and G.2.(b) of the preamble.

5. Rationale for paragraph 7.5. (Test procedure for post-crash concentration

measurement for vehicles with liquefied hydrogen storage systems (LHSSs))
178147. As with vehicles with compressed storage systems, direct measurement of
hydrogen or the corresponding depression in oxygen content is possible.
179148. In the case where liquefied nitrogen is used for the crash, the concentration of
helium in the passenger, luggage, and cargo compartments may be measured during the
helium leak test which is conducted after the crash. It is possible to establish a helium
concentration criteria which is equivalent to 4 per cent hydrogen concentration by volume,
but the relationship needs to be adjusted for the difference in temperature of the gas between
the operating LHSS and the temperature during the helium leak test in addition to accounting
for differences in physical properties. The liquefied hydrogen is stored (and will leak) at
cryogenic storage temperatures (-253°C or 20K), but the system is approximately room
temperature (20°C or 293K) for the leak test. In this case, the equations given in section F1(a)
may used to express the ratio of helium and hydrogen mass flows is as:
WHe/WH2 = CHe/CH2 ˣ (M He / M H2)1/2 ˣ (T H2 / T He)1/2

and the ratio of helium and hydrogen volumetric flows as:

VHe / VH2 = CHe / CH2 ˣ (M H2 / M He)1/2 ˣ (T He / T H2)1/2

where terms are as defined in A 5.2.1.1. Aapplying the volumetric flow ratio as defined above
to account for a system that operates at cryogenic storage conditions but is leak tested at room
temperature to the requirement that there be no greater than 4 per cent by volume of hydrogen
in the actual vehicle, yields a value of approximately 0.8 per cent by volume of helium as the
allowable value for the LHSS post-crash test based on the leakage of gas from the LHSS.

(a) Rationale for paragraph 7.5.1. post-crash leak test – liquefied hydrogen storage
systems (LHSSs)
180149. The purpose of the test is to confirm that the leakage from vehicles with LHSSs
following the crash test. During the crash test, the LHSS is filled with either liquefied
hydrogen (LH2) to the maximum quantity or liquefied nitrogen (LN2) to the equivalence of
the maximum fill level of hydrogen by weight (which is about 8 per cent of the maximum
liquefied hydrogen volume in the LHSS) depending which fluid is planned for the crash test.
The LN2 fill of about 8 per cent is required to simulate the fuel weight for the crash test, and
slightly more liquefied nitrogen is added to accommodate system cooling and venting prior
to the test. Visual detection of unacceptable post-crash leakage as defined in paragraph
7.5.1.1. may be feasible if the LHSS can be visually inspected after the crash. When using
standard leak-test fluid, the bubble size is expected to be approximately 1.5 mm in diameter.
For a localized rate of 0.005 mg/sec (216 Nml/hr), the resultant allowable rate of bubble

75
generation is about 2030 bubbles per minute. Even if much larger bubbles are formed, the
leak should be readily detectable. For example, the allowable bubble rate for 6 mm bubbles
would be approximately 32 bubbles per minute, thus producing a very conservative criteria
if all the joints and vulnerable parts are accessible for post-crash inspection.
181150. If the bubble test is not possible or desired, an overall leakage test may be
conducted to produce a more objective result. In this case, the leakage criteria is the same as
that developed for vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage systems. Specifically, the
allowable hydrogen leakage from the LHSS is 118 NL/min or 10.7 g/min. The state of flow
leaking from the LHSS may be gaseous, liquid, or a two-phase mixture of both. The leakage
is expected to be in the gaseous state as the piping and shutoff valves downstream of the
container are more vulnerable to crash damage than the highly insulated, double-walled
LHSS container. None-the-less, the post-crash tests prescribed in this document can detect
very small leak sites and thus demonstrate the acceptability even if the leakage in the liquid
state. It is not necessary to address the possibility of a two-phase leak as the flow rate will be
less than that what can occur in the liquid state.
182151. The post-crash leak test in paragraph 7.5.1.2.1. is conducted with pressurized
helium. Conduct of this test not only confirms that LHSS leakage is acceptable but also
allows the post-crash helium concentration test as described in paras. 113143. to 115145.
section F.1.(b) of the preamble to be performed at the same time. The helium leak test is
conducted at room temperature with the LHSS pressurized with helium to normal operating
pressure. The pressure level should be below the activation pressure of the pressure regulators
and the PRDs. It is expected that the helium test pressure can be conducted at approximately
80 per cent of the MAWP.
Leakage of hydrogen in the liquid state of an operating system is given by:
Wl = Cd x A x (2 x ρl x ΔPl)1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-1
where Wl is the mass flow, Cd is the discharge coefficient, A is the area of the hole, ρ
is the density, and ΔPl is the pressure drop between the operating system and
atmosphere. This equation is for incompressible fluids such as fluids in the liquid
state. Use of this equation is very conservative for this situation as a portion of the
fluid often flashes (that is, changes to a gaseous state) as the fluid passes through the
leakage hole, causing a reduction in density and therefore a reduction in the mass flow.
The leakage of helium gas during the leak test is given by:
WHe = C x Cd x A x (ρHe x PHe)1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-2
where Cd and A are as defined above, ρ and P are the upstream (stagnation) fluid
density and pressure in the LHSS. C is given by:
C = γ /( (γ + 1)/2) (γ+1)/(γ-1) Equation A.7.5.1-3
where γ is the ratio of specific heats for the helium gas that is leaking.
Since Cd and A are constants with the same values for both liquid hydrogen leaking
from the operating LHSS and helium gas during the leak test, the ratio of helium to
liquid hydrogen leakage can be calculated by
WHe / Wl = CHe x (ρHe / ρl) 1/2 x (PHe /(2 x ΔPl)) 1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-4
based on combining Equations A.7.5.1-1 and A.7.5.1-2. Equation A.7.5.1-4 can be
used to calculate the helium mass flow at the beginning of the pressure test, but the
pressure will fall during the pressure test where as the pressure of the operating LHSS
will remain approximately constant until all the liquid has been vented.

76
183152. In order to accurately determine the allowable reduction in pressure during the
leak test, the change in helium flow with pressure needs to be accounted for. Since the density
of helium (ρHe) varies with pressure, the mass flow of helium during the pressure test will
also vary linearly with pressure as given by:
Wt = Pt x (WHe / PHe) Equation A.7.5.1-5
where Wt and Pt are the helium mass flow and pressure during the pressure test and
WHe and PHe are the initial values of leak test.
Starting with the ideal gas law,
Pt V=Mt x Rg x T Equation A.7.5.1-6
where Pt is the test pressure, V is the volume of the LHSS, Mt is mass of the LHSS,
Rg is the helium gas constant on a mass basis, and T is the temperature of the LHSS.
Differentiating Equation 6 with time leads to
∂Pt/∂t = Rg x T / V x ∂Mt/∂t Equation A.7.5.1-7
where ∂Pt/∂t is the change in pressure during the helium pressure test. Since the
change in mass within the LHSS (∂Mt/∂t) is equal to the helium mass flow during the
test period (Wt), Equation 5 for Wt can be substituted into Equation 7. After re-
arranging terms, the equation becomes
∂Pt/ Pt = Rg x T / V x (WHe / PHe) x ∂t = (WHe / MHe) x ∂t Equation A.7.5.1-8
where MHe is the initial mass of helium in the LHSS for the pressure test.
Integrating the above differential equation results in expressions for the allowable
pressure at the end of the helium leak test and the corresponding allowable pressure
loss over the test period. The expressions are:
Pallowable = PHe x exp (-WHe / MHe x tperiod) Equation A.7.5.1-9
and
ΔPallowable = PHe x (1 - exp (-WHe / MHe x tperiod)) Equation A.7.5.1-10
where tperiod is the period of the test.
184153. Use of the above equations can be best illustrated by providing an example for
a typical passenger vehicle with a 100 litre (L) volume LHSS. Per ground rule, the basic
safety parameters are established to be the same as that for the compressed hydrogen storage
System. Specifically, the period of the leak test is 60 minutes and the average H2 leakage
shall be equivalent to 10.7 g/min. Using these parameters for the example yields the
following:
Post-crash test period (tperiod) = 60 minutes
Allowable Liquid H2 Leakage (Wl) = 10.7 g/min = 118 NL/min of gas after flashing
MAWP = 6 atm (gauge) = 7 atm (absolute)
Selected Helium Test Pressure (PHe) below Pressure Regulator Setpoints = 5.8 atm
(absolute)
Ratio of specific heat (k) for helium = 1.66
C for helium = 0.725 from Equation A.7.5.1-3
Helium density at initial test pressure = 0.956 g/L
Density of liquefied hydrogen = 71.0 g/L

77
 Liquid hydrogen leakage pressure drop (ΔPl) = 5.8 atm – 1 atm = 4.8 atm
Mass ratio of helium to liquid H2 leakage (WHe / Wl) = 0.0654
Allowable initial helium leakage (WHe) = 0.70 g/min = 3.92 NL/min
Initial mass of helium in the LHSS for the test (MHe) = 95.6 g from
Equation A.7.5.1-6
Allowable reduction in helium pressure (ΔPallowable) = 2.06 atm from
Equation A.7.5.1-10
185154. The above example illustrates how the equations can be used to determine the
reduction in helium pressure over the 60 minutes test period for the leak test. The calculations
were repeated over the likely range of container volume (from 50L to 500L) and typical
container pressure ratings (from 6 atm to 9atm gauge) in order to understand the sensitivity
of the allowable pressure drop to key parameters. See Figure 378. Since the allowable
pressure drop are above 0.5 atm (typically substantially above 0.5 atm) for all likely container
sizes, it was decided to adopt a simple criterion of 0.5 atm for all containers with a storage
capacity greater than 200 litres in order to simplify the execution of the leak test and the
determination of criteria for the passing the test. Similarly, a criterion of 2 atm was adopted
for containers less than or equal to 100 litres, and a criterion of 1 atm for containers greater
than 100 litres and less than or equal to 200 litres.
Figure 378
Allowable pressure loss during the LHSS leak test
5
4.5
Allowable Pressure Loss (atm)

4
3.5
3
2.5
2.0 atm if <100L 6 atm
2 (gauge)
1.5 9 atm
1.0 atm if >100L and =200L (gauge)
1
0.5 0.5 atm if >200L
0
0 200 400 600

Container Capacity (L)

186155. While the methodology results in straight-forward test method with an

objective result from a commonly-used type of test, it should be noted that the criterion is
very conservative in that the methodology assumes liquid leakage rather than the more likely
gaseous leakage from the piping and valves downstream of the LHSS container. For example,
the ratio of hydrogen gas leakage can be determined using Equation A.7.5.1-2 and the
resulting ratio of allowable helium gas leakage to hydrogen gas leakage is a factor of 5.14
higher than that calculated assuming liquefied hydrogen leaks.

H. National provisions for material compatibility (including hydrogen

embrittlement) and conformity of production

1. Material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement

187156. The SGS subgroup recognized the importance of requirements for material
compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement and started the work in these items. Compliance

78
 with material qualification requirements ensures that manufacturers consistently use
materials that are appropriately qualified for hydrogen storage service and that meet the
design specifications of the manufacturers. However, due to time constraint and other policy
and technical issues, agreement was not reached during Phase 1. Therefore, the SGS working
group recommended that Contracting Parties continue using their national provisions on
material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement and recommended that requirements for
these topics be deferred to Phase 2 of the GTRgtr activity.
188. In Phase 2, material compatibility experts from national laboratories and
academia aimed to standardize materials selection methods for high-pressure hydrogen
service. The goal was to develop a performance-based test metrics consistent with the
requirements of HFCVs. The result is a set of tests and requirements for fatigue life and
tensile testing (SSRT) which are documented in Section M. Additionally, experts from
Japan recognized that some aluminum alloys show stress corrosion cracking in humid
gas conditions (HG-SCC). As such, the Japanese experts developed a test method for
evaluating materials with higher HG-SCC susceptibility, which is included in Section
N. To further expand the available materials for use in high pressure hydrogen use in
the future, both these sets of tests aim to evaluate the safety of the materials to hydrogen
embrittlement and to HG-SCC.

2. National requirements complimentary to GTRgtr requirements

189157. The qualification performance requirements (paragraph 5.) provide
qualification requirements for on-road service for hydrogen storage systems. The goal of
harmonization of requirements as embodied in the United Nations Global Technical
Regulations provides the opportunity to develop vehicles that can be deployed throughout
Contracting Parties to achieve uniformity of compliance, and thereby, deployment globally.
Therefore, Type Approval requirements are not expected beyond requirements that address
conformity of production and associated verification of material properties (including
requirements for material acceptability with respect to hydrogen embrittlement).

I. Topics for the next phase in developing the GTRgtr for hydrogen-
fuelled vehicles

190158. Since hydrogen-fuelled hydrogen fuelled vehicles and fuel cell technologies
are in early stages of development of commercial deployment, it is expected that revisions to
these requirements may be suggested by an extended time of on-road experience and
technical evaluations. It is further expected that with additional experience or additional time
for fuller technical consideration, the requirements presented as optional requirements in this
document (LHSS Section G of the preamble) s could be adopted as requirements with
appropriate modifications.
191. Focus topics for Phase 32 are expected to include:
(a) Potential scope revision to address additional vehicle classes;
(b) Potential harmonization of crash test specifications;
(a) Requirements for material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement;
(b) Requirements for the fuelling receptacle;
(c) Evaluation of performance-based test for long-term stress rupture proposed in
Phase 1;

79
 (d) Consideration of research results reported after completion of Phase 12 –
specifically research related to electrical safety, hydrogen storage systems, and
post-crash safety;
(e) Consideration of 200 per cent NWP or lower as the minimum burst
requirement; Review CP options to achieve further harmonization;
(h) Consider Safety guard system for the case of isolation resistance breakdown
(f) Fuel system integrity requirements (careful examination of
acceleration/sled test for all categories and side impact test for HDV as
proposed by EC and Korea, respectively.)
(g) Review of Section 7 Vehicles with a liquefied hydrogen storage system.
(h) Improvements of the fire test procedures (Results of the round robin tests, container
withstand criteria, etc.);
(i) Improvements of the test procedures (Station risk assessment issues, remote TPRD,
etc.).

192. The following test procedure will be considered for long-term stress rupture:
(a) Three containers made from the new material (e.g. a composite fibre reinforced
polymer) shall be burst; the burst pressures shall be within ±10 per cent of the
midpoint, BPo, of the intended application. Then,
(i) Three containers shall be held at > 80 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within 100 hrs; the time to rupture shall be
recorded;
(ii) Three containers shall be held at > 75 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within 1000hrs; the time to rupture shall be
recorded;
(iii) Three containers shall be held at > 70 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within one year;
(iv) The test shall be discontinued after one year. Each container that has
not ruptured within the one year test period undergoes a burst test, and
the burst pressure is recorded.
(b) The container diameter shall be > 50 per cent of the diameter of intended
application and of comparable construction. The tank may have a filling (to
reduce interior volume) if >99 per cent of the interior surface area remains
exposed;
(c) Containers constructed of carbon fibre composites and/or metal alloys are
excused from this test;
(d) Containers constructed of glass fibre composites that have an initial burst
pressure > 350 per cent NWP are excused from this test, in which case BPmin
= 350 per cent NWP shall be applied in paragraph 5.1.1.1. (Baseline Initial
Burst Pressure);
(e) There are carbon fibre containers that use glass fibre as the protective layer,
and some of these containers contribute about 2 per cent of rise in burst
pressure. In this case, it shall be demonstrated, by calculation, etc., that the
pressure double the maximum filling pressure or above can be ensured by
carbon fibre excluding glass fibre. If it can be demonstrated that the rise in
burst pressure due to the glass fibre protective layer is 2 per cent or below and

80
 if the burst pressure is 225 per cent NWP x 1.02 = 230 per cent NWP or more,
the said calculation may be omitted.

J. Existing Regulations, Directives, and International Standards

193. The existing national regulations and standards as well as international

standards related to this GTR are listed below:

1. Vehicle fuel system integrity

(a) National regulations and directives

(a) European Union – Regulation 79/2009 – Type-approval of hydrogen-powered motor
vehicles General Safety Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 item A17 hydrogen safety
(refers to UN Regulation No 134) and item A18 hydrogen system material
qualification (refers to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/535);
(b) European Union – Regulation 406/2010 – implementing EC Regulation 79/2009
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/535, Annex XIV "Hydrogen
system material compatibility and fuelling receptacle";
(c) Japan – Safety Regulation Article 17 and Attachment 17 – Technical Standard for
Fuel Leakage in Collision;
(d) Japan – Attachment 100 – Technical Standard For Fuel Systems Of Motor Vehicle
Fueled By Compressed Hydrogen Gas;
(e) Canada – Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (CMVSS) 301.1 – Fuel System Integrity;
(f) Canada – Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (CMVSS) 301.2 – CNG Vehicles;
(g) Korea – Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Article 17 and Article 91 – Fuel System
Integrity;
(h) United States –Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 301 - Fuel
System Integrity;
(i) United States – FMVSS No. 303 (1995) – CNG Vehicles. Fuel System Integrity of
Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles.
(j) China – GB/T 24548-2009 Fuel cell electric vehicles – terminology;
(k) China – GB/T 24549-2009 Fuel cell electric vehicles – safety requirements;
(l) China – GB/T 24554-2009 Fuel cell engine – performance – test methods.

(b) National and International standards.

(a) ISO 17268:2020 Gaseous hydrogen land vehicle refuelling connection devices 17268
– Compressed hydrogen surface vehicle refuelling connection devices;
(b) ISO 23273:2013 Fuel cell road vehicles — Safety specifications — Protection
against hydrogen hazards for vehicles fuelled with compressed hydrogen;
ISO 23273-1 – Fuel cell road vehicles – Safety specifications – Part 1: Vehicle
functional safety;
(c) ISO 14687:2019 Hydrogen fuel quality — Product specification; ISO 23273-2 –
Fuel cell road vehicles – Safety specifications – Part 2: Protection against hydrogen
hazards for vehicles fuelled with compressed hydrogen;

81
(d) ISO 19880-8:2019 Gaseous hydrogen — Fuelling stations — Part 8: Fuel quality
control; ISO 14687-2 – Hydrogen Fuel – Product Specification – Part 2: Proton
exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell applications for road vehicles;
(e) ISO 19880-1:2020 Gaseous hydrogen — Fuelling stations — Part 1: General
requirements;
(f) ISO 19881:2018 Gaseous hydrogen — Land vehicle fuel containers;
(g) ISO 19882:2018 Gaseous hydrogen —Hydrogen – Thermally activated pressure
relief devices for compressed hydrogen vehicle fuel containers;
(e) SAE J2578 – General Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety;
(h) SAE J2578_201408 – Recommended Practice for General Fuel Cell Vehicle
Safety;
(f) SAE J2600 – Compressed Hydrogen Surface Vehicle Fuelling Connection Devices;
(i) SAE J2600_201510 – Compressed Hydrogen Surface Vehicle Fuelling
Connection Devices;
(g) SAE J2601 – Fuelling Protocols for Light Duty Gaseous Hydrogen Surface Vehicles;
(j) SAE J2601_202005 – Fuelling Protocols for Light Duty Gaseous Hydrogen
Surface Vehicles;
(h) SAE J2799 – Hydrogen Quality Guideline for Fuel Cell Vehicles.
(k) SAE J2799_201912 – Hydrogen Surface Vehicle to Station Communications
Hardware and Software;
(l) SAE J2719_202003 – Hydrogen Fuel Quality for Fuel Cell Vehicles;
(m) China – GB/T 24548-2009 Fuel cell electric vehicles – terminology;
(n) China – GB/T 24549-2020 Fuel cell electric vehicles – safety requirements;
(o) China – GB/T 24554-2009 Performance test methods for fuel cell engines;
(p) China – GB/T 26779-2021 Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicle refueling
receptacle;
(q) China – GB/T 26990-2011 Fuel cell electric vehicles - Onboard hydrogen system
– Specifications
(r) China – GB/T 26991-2011 Fuel cell electric vehicles - Maximum Speed - Test
Method;
(s) China – GB/T 29123-2012 Specifications for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in
demonstration;
(t) China – GB/T 29124-2012 Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles facilities for demonstration
specifications;
(u) China – GB/T 29126-2012 Fuel cell electric vehicles - Onboard hydrogen system
- Test methods;
(v) China – GB/T 34425-2017 Fuel cell electric vehicles - Hydrogen refuelling nozzle;
(w) China – GB/T 34593-2017 Test methods of hydrogen emission for fuel cell
engine;
(x) China – GB/T 35154-2018 Test methods of hydrogen emission for fuel cell
electric vehicles;

82
 (y) China – GB/T 35178-2017 Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles-Hydrogen Consumption -
Test Methods;
(z) China – GB/T 36288-2018 Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Safety Requirement of Fuel
Cell Stack;
(aa) China – GB/T 39132-2020 Fuel cell electric vehicle engineering approval
evaluation program;
(ab) China – QC/T816-2009 Specification of mobile hydrogen refueling vehicles.

2. Storage system

(a) National regulations and directives:

(a) China – Regulation on Safety Supervision for Special Equipment; (merged to
TSG23-2021)
(b) China – TSG23-2021 Regulation on Safety Technology Supervision for Gas
Cylinder;
(c) Japan – JARI S001(2004) Technical Standard for Containers of Compressed
Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Devices;
(d) Japan – JARI S002(2004) Technical Standard for Components of Compressed
Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Devices;
(e) Japan – KHK 0128(2010) Technical Standard for Compressed Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel
Containers with Maximum Filling Pressure up to 70MPa;
(f) Japan – JARI S003(2018) Technical Standard for Seamless Containers of
Compressed Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Devices;
(g) Japan - Attachment 11 to Circular Notice on Operation of Functionality
Standards under the Regulation on Safety of Containers "Interpretation of
Technical Standards for International Compressed Hydrogen Container for
Automobile Fuel System";
(h) Japan - Attachment 12 to Circular Notice on Operation of Functionality
Standards under the Regulation on Safety of Containers "Interpretation of
Technical Standards for International Compressed Hydrogen Component for
Automobile Fuel System";
(if) Korea – High Pressure Gas Safety Control Law;
(j) Korea – Public Notice on Safety Standard on Fuel Storage Systems for Motor
Vehicles
(kg) United States – FMVSS 304 (2022) – Compressed Natural Gas Fuel Container
Integrity;
(lh) European Union – Regulation 406/2010 implementing EC Regulation 79/2009;
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/535, Annex XIV "Hydrogen
system material compatibility and fuelling receptacle".
(i) China – QC/T 816-2209 Hydrogen supplying and refuelling vehicles –specifications.

(b) National and International standards:

(a) CSA B51:19 – Boiler, Pressure Vessel, And Pressure Piping Code CSA B51 Part
2 – High-pressure cylinders for the on-board storage of natural gas and hydrogen as
fuels for automotive vehicles;

83
 (b) CSA ANSI HGV 2:21 – Compressed Hydrogen Gas Vehicle Fuel Containers;
(c) CSA ANSI NGV 2:19 – Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle Fuel Containers CSA
NGV2-2000 – Basic Requirements for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) Fuel
Containers;
(d) CSA ANSI HPRD 1-2013 (R2018) – Thermally Activated Pressure Relief Devices
For Compressed Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Containers CSA TPRD-1-2009 –
Pressure Relief Devices For Compressed Hydrogen Vehicle Fuel Containers;
(e) CSA ANSI HGV 3.1-2015 (R2019) – Fuel System Component for Hydrogen Gas
Power Vehicles CSA HGV 3.1-2011 – Fuel System Component for Hydrogen Gas
Power Vehicles (Draft) ;
(f) ISO 13985:2006 – Liquid Hydrogen – Land Vehicle Fuel Tanks;
(g) ISO 15869:2009 – Gaseous Hydrogen and Hydrogen Blends – Land Vehicle Fuel
Tanks (Technical Specification);
(h) ISO 19881:2018 Gaseous Hydrogen — Land Vehicle Fuel Containers;
(i) SAE J2579_201806 – Standard for Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and Other
Hydrogen Vehicles;SAE J2579 – Fuel Systems in Fuel Cell and Other Hydrogen
Vehicles.
(j) China – QC/T 816-2009 Hydrogen supplying and refuelling vehicles –
specifications.

3. Electric safety

(a) National regulations and directives:

(a) Canada – CMVSS 305 – Electric Powered Vehicles: Electrolyte Spillage and
Electrical Shock Protection;
(b) ECE – Regulation 100 - Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of Battery
Electric Vehicles with Regard to Specific Requirements for the Construction and
Functional Safety;
(c) Japan – Attachment 101 – Technical Standard for Protection of Occupants against
High Voltage in Fuel Cell Vehicles;
(d) Japan – Attachment 110 – Technical Standard for Protection of Occupants against
High Voltage in Electric Vehicles and Hybrid Electric Vehicles;
(e) Japan – Attachment 111 – Technical Standard for Protection of Occupants against
High Voltage after Collision in Electric Vehicles and Hybrid Electric Vehicles;
(f) Korea – Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Article 18-2 – High Voltage System;
(g) Korea – Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Article 91-4 – Electrolyte Spillage and
Electric Shock Protection;
(h) United States – FMVSS 305 - Electric-Powered Vehicles: Electrolyte Spillage and
Electrical Shock Protection.

(b) National and International Industry standards:

(a) ISO 23273-3 – Fuel cell road vehicles — Safety specifications – Part 3: Protection of
persons against electric shock;

84
 (b) SAE J1766 – Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicle Battery Systems Crash Integrity
Testing;
(c) SAE J2578 – General Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety.

K. Benefits and Costs

194159. At this time, the GTRgtr does not attempt to quantify costs and benefits for this
first stage. While the goal of the GTRgtr is to enable increased market penetration of HFCVs,
the resulting rates and degrees of penetration are not currently known or estimatable.
Therefore, a quantitative cost-benefit analysis was not possible.
195160. Some costs are anticipated from greater market penetration of HFCVs. For
example, building the infrastructure required to make HFCVs a viable alternative to
conventional vehicles will entail significant investment costs for the private and public
sectors, depending on the country. Especially in the early years of HFCV sales, individual
purchasers of HFCVs are also likely to face greater costs than purchasers of conventional
gasoline or diesel vehicles, the same goes for manufacturers of new HFCVs (However, costs
incurred by HFCV purchasers and manufacturers would essentially be voluntary, as market
choice would not be affected).
196161. While some costs are expected, the contracting parties believe that the benefits
of GTRgtr are likely to greatly outweigh costs. Widespread use of HFCVs, with the
establishment of the necessary infrastructure for fuelling, is anticipated to reduce the number
of gasoline and diesel vehicles on the road, which should reduce worldwide consumption of
fossil fuels 2. Perhaps most notably, the reduction in greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant
emissions (such as NO2, SO2, and particulate matter) associated with the widespread use of
HFCVs is anticipated to result in significant societal benefits over time by alleviating climate
change and health impact costs. The GTRgtr may also lead to decreases in fuelling costs for
the operators of HFCVs, as hydrogen production is potentially unlimited and expected to
become more cost-effective than petroleum production for conventional vehicles.
Furthermore, decreased demand for petroleum is likely to lead to energy and national security
benefits for those countries with widespread HFCV use, as reliance on foreign oil supplies
decreases 3. Additionally, although not attributable to this GTRgtr, the GTRgtr may create
benefits in terms of facilitating OEM compliance with applicable fuel economy and
greenhouse gas emission standards by promoting a wider production and use of HFCVs.
197162. The contracting parties have also not been able to estimate net employment
impacts of the GTRgtr. The new market for innovative design and technologies associated
with HFCVs may create significant employment benefits for those countries with ties to
HFCV production. On the other hand, employment losses associated with the lower
production of conventional vehicles could offset those gains. The building and retrofitting of
infrastructure needed to support hydrogen production and storage is likely to generate net
additions to the job market in the foreseeable future.
L. Interoperability Considerations

2 Potential renewable sources of hydrogen include electrolysis, high-temperature water splitting,

thermochemical conversion of biomass, photolytic and fermentative micro-organism systems and
photo-electrical systems. See http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/production.html (last accessed August
24, 2011).
3 The renewable sources of hydrogen described in Footnote [1] are all capable of domestic production.
Natural gas, nuclear energy, and coal may be other domestic sources. Available from
www.hydrogen.energy.gov/production.html (last accessed August 24, 2011).

85
1. Principal Interoperability Elements
198. Hydrogen-fuelled vehicle safety depends on hydrogen dispenser operation and
hydrogen fuelling station (HFS) controls during the vehicle fuelling process. It is thus
important to highlight the considerations critical for understanding and taking into
account interoperability between the HFS and a hydrogen-fuelled vehicle.
199. Figure 38 below describes an example of the key components of the fuelling
station dispenser including the hydrogen-fuelled vehicle high pressure hydrogen
system, comprising amongst others, the receptacle and compressed hydrogen storage
systems (CHSS) with sensors as well as pressure relief device(s). The CHSS has a
thermally activated pressure relief device(s) to protect against overpressure due to a
fire. On the station side, there is an automated dispensing control system (e.g. through
a Programmable Logic Controller) for performing the fuelling (using an acceptable
fuelling protocol such as SAE J2601), as well as fault detection and management
procedures. The station also has an over pressure protection device such as a pressure
relief device(s) or equivalent to protect against over pressurization of the dispenser and
the vehicle.
Figure 38
Example of the fuelling station dispenser key components including the vehicle high
pressure hydrogen system

200. The dispenser at a public fuelling station for light duty vehicles is typically
designed with separate nozzles to fuel vehicles to 35 MPa and/ or 70 MPa nominal
working pressures. The station fuelling nozzle may contain a communications receiver
and the vehicle may contain a communications transmitter (such as SAE J2799). The
vehicle IrDA communications system may use the SAE J2799 protocol to transmit the
measured temperature and pressure of the compressed hydrogen storage system on the
vehicle to the hydrogen dispenser. The station dispenser controller may use this data
for the control system to manage the fuelling process.
201. A detailed guidance on general requirements for a hydrogen fuelling station
(HFS) interoperability with a GTR 13 compliant hydrogen-fuelled vehicle can be found
in ISO 17268:2020 or SAE J2600_201510 on vehicle refuelling connection devices and
ISO 19880-1:2020 on gaseous hydrogen fuelling stations. It is assumed that during

86
 fuelling an ISO-complaint HFS and a GTR 13 compliant hydrogen-fuelled vehicle are
capable to follow the same fuelling protocol.
2. Description of SAE J2601
202. SAE J2601 defines the protocols and process limits for hydrogen fuelling of light
duty vehicles, which meet the requirements of the GTR 13.
203. The fuelling protocols in SAE J2601 are based on a set of boundary and initial
conditions, which reflect CHSSs of current light duty vehicles and associated fuel
delivery components in the vehicle and filling station that affect the fill.
204. SAE J2601 defines fuelling protocols based on either a look-up table approach
utilizing a fixed pressure ramp rate, or a formula based approach utilizing a dynamic
pressure ramp rate continuously calculated throughout the fill. The table-based
protocol provides a fixed end-of-fill pressure target, whereas the formula-based
protocol calculates the end-of-fill pressure target continuously. Both protocols allow for
fuelling with communications or without communications. For fuelling with
communications, SAE J2601 is used in conjunction with SAE J2799.
205. For hydrogen stations intended for the fuelling of heavy-duty vehicles, SAE
J2601-2 is available.
3. Use of Vehicle-to-Station Communication
206. The use of vehicle-to-station communication enhances the fuelling process by
providing information about the CHSS being fuelled, which the dispenser would not
otherwise know, such as the CHSS nominal working pressure (e.g. H70, H35), the CHSS
volume, the CHSS gas pressure, and the CHSS gas temperature. It also provides a
fuelling command signal, which informs the dispenser if it is "ok to fill" or if the fill
should be aborted. Although these data provide an additional layer of safety, they are
not used for primary control of the fuelling process, as a reliability requirement has not
been established for the vehicle data measurements and for the communication link. In
SAE J2601, the data communicated to the station may be used for secondary
confirmation of the CHSS nominal working pressure, for determining the CHSS
volume, and for determining when to end the fill based on a target SOC of 95 to 100 per
cent. The data communicated does not influence the pressure ramp rate the dispenser
utilizes – the pressure ramp rate is the same for communication fuelling and for non-
communication fuelling for a given CHSS volume.
207. SAE J2799 utilizes one-way communication and provides error-checking that
can identify faults with the data transfer. If a sufficient error in communication is
detected, or if communication is lost, the dispenser control shall either switch to the
non-com fuelling protocol or stop fuelling.
4. Validation of the Fuelling Protocol and Vehicle-to-Station Communication
208. It is important that the fuelling station be validated that it is correctly applying
the fuelling protocol and vehicle-to-station communications. This validation can be
conducted through the use of Factory Acceptance Tests, through the use of Site
Acceptance Tests, or a combination of both. For validation of fuelling stations
employing SAE J2601 and SAE J2799, an approved validation standard, such as CSA
HGV 4.3, HYSUT-G 0003 or the "CEP hydrogen fuelling validation test protocol",
should be used.
209. Validation of the fuelling protocol is intended to test that the dispenser is:
(a) Applying the control parameters correctly
(b) Responding to process limit violations correctly

87
 (c) Able to meet a certain level of fuelling performance (i.e. completing fills
without exceeding process limits and achieving an acceptable ending SOC in the
CHSS.
210. Validation of the vehicle-to-station communications is intended to test that the
dispenser:
(a) Receives and interprets the communicated data correctly
(b) Responds correctly to data values which are outside the allowed bounds
(c) Responds correctly to bad data packets
(d) Responds properly to data which should terminate the fill:
(i) An "abort" command
(ii) CHSS gas temperature equal to or greater than 85 °C
(iii) CHSS SOC ≥ 100 per cent
M. Materials Evaluation for Hydrogen Service
1. Introduction
211. The performance requirements (paragraph 5) demonstrate capability of the
hydrogen storage system to perform critical functions throughout the service life on the
vehicle platform. Due to practical limitations, the performance testing does not include
hydrogen pressure cycling to end of life. Since materials show degradation of fatigue
performance in gaseous hydrogen environments, there remains a potential gap in
evaluating the fatigue performance of materials subject to large number of stress cycles
(> 500) in gaseous hydrogen. The materials evaluation for hydrogen service was
developed to screen materials for fatigue performance in gaseous hydrogen
environments specifically in the context of vehicle applications and their anticipated
service life.
212. The structural properties of metals are known to be degraded with concurrent
exposure to gaseous hydrogen. In general, the tensile strength of metals is not changed
in gaseous hydrogen, but ductility, fracture and fatigue properties are negatively
impacted. For the types of components and service on vehicles, hydrogen-assisted
fatigue and fracture are of principal concern. Whereas the performance requirements
in paragraph 5 capture relevant failure modes for the hydrogen storage system
onboard vehicles, the fatigue performance of materials in gaseous hydrogen service
may not be completely assessed by the pneumatic testing requirements. In this section,
a test method is described to screen metals for sufficient fatigue life performance in
gaseous hydrogen at relevant applied stresses and worst-case environmental
conditions. The test evaluation metrics are specified to assure the materials of
construction are appropriate for the limited fatigue life of the hydrogen storage system
on-board vehicles.
2. Rationale for materials definition (paragraph 219)
213. To ensure that the tested material represents the material used in production,
the material must be defined by a materials specification. The materials specification
can be a public-domain specification or a proprietary product specification. The
specification must specify compositional ranges as well as minimum tensile properties
(yield strength (Sy), tensile strength (Su) and tensile elongation (El)). Allowable design
stresses are often determined from the specified minimum strength properties of the
material, while the elongation provides a qualitative assessment of damage tolerance.
Verification that the material meets the materials definition can be based on the mill

88
 certification or based on testing by (or contracted for) the user. Verification tests are
performed in laboratory air. For the purposes of this performance-based approach, the
materials are assumed to sufficiently insensitive to materials variables, such as
composition.
214. Joining practice must be controlled through a welding procedure specification
(WPS), which includes specifying the same requirements as the materials definition
(especially the mechanical properties, although the values may be different: Sy(w),
Su(w) and El(w)). This requirement ensures that the properties of the joined material
are known and the minimum requirements are specified. The joined structure should
be evaluated in gaseous hydrogen in the same way as the base materials with test
specimens extracted from the joined structure whenever possible (or a representative
test piece, also defined by the WPS) to ensure that joint meets the specified
requirements. The mechanical properties of a metallurgical joint depend on the
welding procedure and the configuration of the test specimens extracted from the joint.
The effects of hydrogen on the joint also depend on the materials, welding procedure
and welding conditions.
3. Rationale for environmental test condition (paragraph 223)
215. Rationale for gas purity. Small amounts of gas impurities (especially oxygen) can
have significant effects on properties measured in gaseous hydrogen. Oxygen (and
other species) can adsorb on the specimen surfaces and prevent hydrogen from
penetrating the test specimen on the time scale of the test. While the effects of impurities
have not been widely studied for tensile and fatigue life tests, fatigue crack growth
testing shows unambiguous effects of oxygen on measured fatigue crack growth rates
(B.P. Somerday, P. Sofronis, K.A. Nibur, C. San Marchi, and R. Kirchheim,
"Elucidating the variables affecting accelerated fatigue crack growth of steels in
hydrogen gas with low oxygen concentrations", Acta Mater 61 (2013) 6153–6170). To
minimize the influence of purities, the test volume must be effectively purged to ensure
that air is removed from the test environment. It is generally observed that the test
environment and the sampled gas are not as "clean" as the source gas. Therefore, the
test gas must be measured periodically to ensure that the adequate purging processes
are maintained. Verification of the quality of the test gas shall be measured at least once
every 12 months, consistent with standard practice for verification of transducers in
test systems. Allowance for additional impurities (relative to the source gas) are made
in Table 6, since purging can never remove all of the oxygen and water. The
requirements in Table 6 are consistent with the requirements in the CSA CHMC1
standard (Test Methods for Evaluating Material Compatibility in Compressed
Hydrogen Applications).
216. Rationale for test pressure. The minimum test pressure shall be 1.25 x NWP to
ensure that pressure effects are captured and representative of maximum service
pressure during normal operation. Testing at higher pressure (> 1.25 NWP) can be
used – for example, data from tests at pressure of 100 MPa can be used to qualify
materials in a system with NWP of 70 MPa, since the test pressure must be ≥ 87.5 MPa.
While proof testing may be performed at pressure up to 1.5 x NWP and off-normal
conditions could also expose materials to pressure up to 1.5 x NWP, the difference in
hydrogen effects between 1.25 x NWP and 1.5 x NWP will generally be insignificant (H.
Kobayashi, T. Yamada, H. Kobayashi, S. Matsuoka, "Criteria for selecting materials
to be used for hydrogen refueling station equipment", PVP2016-64033, Proceedings of
the ASME 2016 Pressure Vessels and Piping Division Conference, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, 17-21 July 2016). Therefore, for consistency with normal operating
conditions and the fatigue testing, the test pressure for SSRT testing is specified at 1.25
x NWP.

89
 217. Rationale for test temperature. The environmental temperature range for the
vehicle is generally considered to be 233 K to 358 K (-40 ˚C to +85 ˚C). Some materials
show a degradation of tensile ductility near this lower temperature bound; typically, a
minimum in tensile ductility is reported approximately in the range of 200 – 220 K (S.
Fukuyama, D. Sun, L. Zhang, M. Wen and K. Yokogawa, "Effect of temperature on
hydrogen environment embrittlement of type 316 series austenitic stainless steels at low
temperature", J. Japan Inst. Met. 67 (2003) 456-459; and L. Zhang, M. Wen, M. Imade,
S. Fukuyama, K. Yokogawa, "Effect if nickel equivalent on hydrogen gas
embrittlement of austenitic stainless steels based on type 316 at low temperatures",
Acta Metall. 56 (2008) 3414-342). Therefore, the SSRT test is specified conservatively
at this lower bound (228 ± 5 K). Unlike tensile testing, fatigue properties are generally
unaffected or improved at low temperature (J. Schijve, Fatigue of Structures and
Materials, 2nd ed., Springer, 2009). This trend has been demonstrated for testing in
gaseous hydrogen as well (T. Iijima, H. Enoki, J. Yamabe, B. An, "Effect of high-
pressure gaseous hydrogen on fatigue properties of SUS304 and SUS316 austenitic
stainless steel", PVP2018-84267, Proceedings of the ASME 2018 Pressure Vessels and
Piping Division Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, 15-20 July 2018); this study also
shows fatigue life in gaseous hydrogen is improved at elevated temperature up to 80 ˚C.
Therefore, fatigue testing is specified at room temperature (293 ± 5 K).
4. Rationale for testing requirements (paragraph 223)
218. Rationale for notched specimen methodology (option 1). The notched specimen
methodology evaluates a stress cycle commensurate with a full refuelling cycle. The
notch evaluates the sensitivity of the material to a stress concentration in the presence
of hydrogen, which also provides additional conservativism relative to absence of a
stress riser. The maximum stress in the applied load cycle (Smax = 1/3 of the tensile
strength) is consistent with typical design limitations for pressure systems (e.g., ASME
B31.12), whereas the minimum nominal stress is 10 per cent of this value (R = 0.1). The
resulting load cycle is tension-tension, consistent with nominal stresses in pressure
systems. The acceptance criteria for the notched specimen methodology (> 100,000
cycles) is intended to demonstrate that the fatigue life of the material at relatively high
stress significantly exceeds the design life for the vehicle application.
219. Rationale for smooth specimen methodology (option 2). The smooth specimen
methodology requires evaluation of two properties: fatigue life and tensile yield
strength. The fatigue life evaluates a tension-compression stress cycle, where the
maximum nominal stress is 1/3 of the material’s tensile strength (Smax = 1/3 of the tensile
strength), consistent with typical design limitations for pressure systems (e.g., ASME
B31.12). The stress cycle is fully reversed, meaning Smin = -Smax (R = -1), which is not
consistent with the tensile stresses in pressure systems, but provides conservatism in
the test results, since the stress cycle is greater than would typically be observed in
pressure service. The acceptance criteria for the smooth specimen methodology (>
200,000 cycles) intends to demonstrate no degradation in the fatigue limit in high-
pressure hydrogen gas. The SSRT test verifies the general observation that the yield
strength is not reduced in hydrogen. The measured ductility in hydrogen, however, can
be sensitive to strain rate, thus a limit on the strain rate is imposed. The recommended
strain rate from the CSA CHMC1 standard is 1 x 10-5 s-1, while a strain rate of ≤ 5 x 10-
s is recommended in Ref. (H. Kobayashi, T. Yamada, H. Kobayashi, S. Matsuoka,
5 -1

"Criteria for selecting materials to be used for hydrogen refueling station equipment",
PVP2016-64033, Proceedings of the ASME 2016 Pressure Vessels and Piping Division
Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 17-21 July 2016) and adopted here.
5. Test Procedure
220. Materials definition.

90
 (a) The material under consideration shall be defined by a materials
specification – the specification can be a nationally-recognized standard
or a company-defined specification. The materials specification shall
include requirements for the following:
(i) allowable compositional ranges;
(ii) specified minimum tensile yield strength (Sy);
(iii) specified minimum tensile strength (Su); and,
(iv) specified minimum tensile elongation (El).
(b) The material should be tested in the final product form whenever
possible. When the component geometry precludes extraction of test
specimens, the material may be tested in the semi-finished product form
with mechanical properties that are nominally equivalent to the
mechanical properties of the component.
(c) Either the materials manufacturer’s certification or equivalent testing
performed in air at room temperature may be used to verify that the
material meets the specification. The measured tensile strength is
denoted S* (average value from at least two tests at room temperature in
air or from the mill certification) and is used to define the maximum
stress for fatigue testing.
(d) Welds and metallurgically-bonded materials
(i) When materials are welded (or metallurgically-bonded) and the
joint is exposed to gaseous hydrogen, weld specimens shall be tested
in conjunction with the base materials for hydrogen compatibility;
(ii) Welds and metallurgically-bonded materials shall be defined by a
welding procedure specification (WPS) that defines the joining
procedure as well as the composition and specified minimum tensile
requirements (Sy, Su and El) of the joined structure (e.g., weld
metal);
(iii) Test specimens should be extracted from the joined structure
whenever possible. Representative joints can be prepared, if test
specimens cannot be extracted from the joined structure;
(iv) Weld test specimens shall be measured in gaseous hydrogen and
shall satisfy the requirements of the WPS as well as the testing
requirements in paragraph 221.
221. Environmental test conditions
(a) Gas purity
(i) The purity of the gaseous hydrogen from the testing chamber
(referred to as the sampled gas) shall be verified to satisfy the
requirements of applicable fuelling standards or the values in Table
6;
(ii) If three consecutive tests of the sampled gas meet the oxygen and
water vapor requirements in Table 6, the gas may be sampled
periodically at an interval not exceeding 12 months. If the sampled
gas does not meet the requirements, the test system is modified, the
purging procedures are changed, or the gas sampling interval
exceeds 12 months, three consecutive gas samples shall be evaluated

91
 to demonstrate that the test system and procedures meet the
requirements of Table 6.
Table 6
Gaseous hydrogen purity requirements in parts per million by volume (except where
noted)

Species Source gas requirements Sampled gas requirements

H2 99.999 % min –

O2 ≤1 <2

H2O ≤ 3.5 < 10

CO + CO2 ≤2 –

(b) Pressure
(i) Testing in gaseous hydrogen shall be performed at a minimum
hydrogen pressure of 1.25 x NWP.
(c) Temperature
(i) The specimen temperature for fatigue life testing in hydrogen shall
be 293 ± 5 K;
(ii) The specimen temperature for slow strain rate tensile (SSRT) test
in hydrogen shall be 228 ± 5 K.
222. Testing requirements
(a) The requirements for either the notched specimen methodology (option
1) or the smooth specimen methodology (option 2) shall be satisfied. It is
not necessary to satisfy both the notched and smooth methods.
(b) Notched specimen methodology (option 1)
(i) Notched bar specimens shall be used with an elastic concentration
factor (Kt) of greater than or equal to 3. A minimum of three
specimens shall be tested in the environmental conditions described
in paragraph 220.
a. Force-controlled fatigue life tests shall be performed with a
constant load cycle in accordance with internationally-
recognized standards. The stress at maximum load during
fatigue cycling shall be greater than or equal to 1/3 of S* (the
average tensile strength measured at room temperature in
air). The stress is defined as the load divided by the net-section
stress (i.e., minimum initial cross sectional area of the
specimen). The load ratio (R) shall be 0.1, where R = Smin/Smax
(Smin is the minimum net-section stress and Smax is the
maximum net-section stress;
b. The frequency shall be 1 Hz or lower.
(ii) Requirement for notched specimen methodology:

92
 a. For notched-specimen fatigue testing, the number of applied
cycles (N) shall be greater than 105 cycles for each tested
specimen.
(c) Smooth specimen methodology (option 2)
(i) Smooth fatigue specimens shall be used in accordance with
internationally-recognized standards. A minimum of three
specimens shall be tested in the environmental conditions described
in paragraph 220.
a. Force-controlled fatigue life tests shall be performed with a
constant load cycle in accordance with internationally-
recognized standards. The stress at maximum load during
fatigue cycling shall be greater than or equal to 1/3 of S* (the
average tensile strength measured at room temperature in
air). The stress is defined as the load divided by the net-section
stress (i.e., minimum initial cross sectional area of the
specimen). The load ratio (R) shall be -1 (fully reversed
tension-compression load cycle), where R = Smin/Smax (Smin is
the minimum net-section stress and Smax is the maximum net-
section stress;
b. The frequency shall be 1 Hz or lower.
(ii) Slow strain rate tensile (SSRT) test specimens shall be used in
accordance with internationally-recognized standards. A minimum
of three specimens shall be tested in the environmental conditions
described in paragraph 220.
a. Displacement during the test shall be measured on the
specimen over a conventional gauge length (≥ 12 mm and 3-5
times the diameter of the specimen). Normally, this is an
extensometer attached directly to the specimen, but other
equivalent methods are acceptable. The measured strain rate
(between the yield force and the maximum force) shall be ≤ 5
x 10-5 s-1.
(iii) Requirements for smooth specimen methodology:
For smooth-specimen fatigue testing, the number of applied cycles
(N) shall be greater than 2 x 105 cycles for each tested specimen.
For SSRT testing, the measured yield strength shall be greater than
80 per cent of the yield strength measured in air at the temperature
defined in paragraph 220.
223. Summary of requirements
(a) Table 7 summarizes the test requirements for the two testing options:
notched method (option 1) and smooth method (option 2) respectively.
Table 7
Summary of tests and requirements for hydrogen compatibility of materials
Notched method Smooth method
(option 1) (option 2)
Fatigu Test H2 pressure = 125% NWP H2 pressure = 125% NWP
e life condition
s Temperature = 293 ± 5 K Temperature = 293 ± 5 K

93
 Notched method Smooth method
(option 1) (option 2)
Net section stress ≥ 1/3 S* Net section stress ≥ 1/3 S*
Frequency = 1 Hz Frequency = 1 Hz
Number 3 3
of tests
Require N > 105 N > 2x105
ments
for each
test
SSRT Not required H2 pressure = 125% NWP
Test
Temperature = 228 ± 5 K
condition
Displacement rate ≤ 5 x
s
10-5 s-1
Number 3
of tests
Require Yield strength > 0.80 yield
ments strength in air at same
for each temperature
test

N. Humid Gas Stress Corrosion Cracking Testing for Aluminum Alloys

1. Introduction
224. Compressed hydrogen storage and containment systems must be compatible
with gaseous hydrogen over the entire applicable pressure and temperature ranges.
Hydrogen embrittlement is a major problem for materials used in these systems.
Aluminum alloys show good hydrogen embrittlement resistance and are possible
materials for this system. However, some types of aluminum alloys show stress
corrosion cracking (SCC) in humid gas conditions. The difference between the
mechanisms of anodic dissolution type (SCC) and humid gas SCC (HG-SCC) is shown
in Figure 39.
Figure 39
Mechanisms of SCC in a Humid Gas Environment

94
 225. The vessel is generally exposed to humid conditions on the outside and also is in
contact with water as an impurity in hydrogen gas on the inside. Therefore, this type of
SCC occurs both outside and inside of containers under the presence of water. The
crack growth test by constant load or constant displacement method is intended to
demonstrate that the materials show adequate SCC resistance for anticipated service
conditions.
226. Historically, this kind of cracking was observed in scuba diving containers. Seven
accidents of the aluminum 6351 alloy scuba containers that appear to be caused by HG-
SCC occurred in the USA, Australia, and New Zealand. As a result, the aluminum 6351
material was discontinued for scuba containers and the material was changed to
aluminum 6061 alloy.
227. HG-SCC susceptibility depends on the chemical composition and the heat
treatment condition of the material. Both the 6351 alloy and 6082 alloy, whose chemical
composition is similar to 6351, failed the HG-SCC test specified in HPIS E103:2018
(which is modified from ISO 7866).
228. On the other hand, aluminum 6061 alloy passed this HG-SCC test in HPIS
E103:2018. (G. Itoh, A. Kurumada, S. Aoshima and T. Ogawa, "Effect of alloying
composition on humid-gas stress corrosion cracking behavior in Al-Mg-Si alloys",
Proceedings of the 59th conference of metallurgists, COM2020, ISBM:978-1-926872-
47-6). Materials with higher HG-SCC susceptibility can be identified by using this test.
To further expand the available materials for use in high pressure hydrogen use in the
future, the safety of the material to HG-SCC can be evaluated using this test.
2. Rationale for Materials Definition
229. This section defines the material for the testing.
Materials definition: Materials for this test are aluminum alloys. In general, materials
should be defined by a materials specification, which specifies compositional ranges and
specifies minimum tensile properties yield strength (Sy), tensile strength (Su) and
tensile elongation (El). Allowable design stresses are often determined from the
specified minimum strength properties of the material, while the elongation provides a
qualitative assessment of damage tolerance. Verification that the material meets the
materials definition can be based on the mill certification or based on testing by (or

95
 contracted for) the user. Verification tests are performed in laboratory air. For the
purposes of this performance-based approach, the materials are assumed to sufficiently
insensitive to materials variables, such as composition.
3. Rationale for Environmental Test Conditions and Duration
230. This section defines the environmental conditions for the testing.
(a) Test temperature (paragraph 236(a)): The environmental temperature range for
the vehicle is generally considered to be 233 K to 358 K (-40 ˚C to +85 ˚C). While
susceptibility for SCC at cold temperature is low, the test temperature shall be at room
temperature.
(b) Atmosphere and humidity (paragraph 236(b)): SCC propagates by atomic
hydrogen which is generated by the reaction of water and aluminum on fresh metallic
surfaces as shown in Figure 39. Therefore, the humidity shall be higher than 85 per cent
during the test period. SCC does not occur in dry conditions, and 85 per cent of
humidity is required for this test. If the dew condensation water exists on the specimen,
then preferential corrosion will occur during the test.
(C) Test period (paragraph 236(c)): The test period is 90 days in accordance with
B6.6 of ISO 7886:2012.
4. Rationale for Testing Requirements
231. Test specimen (paragraphs 237(a), (b)). Specimens for this test were cut from the
wrought aluminum alloy products (plate, extruded and forged products), It is
recommended that compact specimens (CS), or single edge bend (SE) specimens be used
for this test. The geometry of the compact specimen and single edge bend specimen are
shown in ISO7539-6:2011and ASTM E399-20a.
Net width W and thickness B shall be measured within an accuracy of 0.1 per cent of W
along a line existing within 10per cent of W from the crack plane.
The face of specimen shall be processed to make the crack detectable and its length
measurable.
232. Fatigue pre-crack (paragraph 237(c)). Fatigue pre-crack shall be introduced at
room temperature in the atmospheric condition. Effective crack length a including the
fatigue pre-crack shall fulfill the following equation for small scale yielding as specified
in B.5 of ISO 7866:2012.

a, (W-a) ≧ 1270(K1APP/σ 0.2)

2

Where:
a: effective crack length (distance between fatigue pre-crack tip and load axis (mm))
W: specimen actual net width (mm)
K1APP: stress intensity factor of a crack when a load was applied to the specimen (MPa
√ m)

233. Applied load and measurement (paragraphs 237(d),(e)). Both constant load
condition and constant displacement condition are permitted in this test. A constant
load condition is preferable to a constant displacement condition in this test. However,
there appears to be no difference in both condition when cracks do not propagate.
If the monitored load is less than 95 per cent if applied load P, the test specimen should
be rejected without waiting for the final qualification of materials. Studies by Japanese

96
 academic researchers show that the crack length extension by HG-SCC exceeds 0.16
mm when the threshold load decreases to less than 95 per cent of applied load P.
234. Acceptance Criterion (paragraph 239). The crack extension by HG-SCC is
examined to determine if it exceeds 0.16 mm within the 90-day test period. This value
means that crack growth rate is less than 2 x 10-11m/s and is lower than general SCC
criteria of 10-10 m/s.
5. Test procedure
235. Materials definition
(a) The materials are wrought aluminium alloy products.
(b) The material under consideration shall be defined by a materials
specification – the specification can be a nationally-recognized standard
or a company-defined specification. The materials specification shall
include requirements for the following:
(i) Allowable compositional ranges
(ii) Specified minimum yield strength, Sy
(iii) Specified minimum tensile strength, Su
(iv) Specified minimum tensile elongation, El
(c) Either the materials manufacturer’s certification or equivalent testing
performed in air at room temperature may be used to verify that the
material meets the specification. The measured 0.2 per cent proof stress is
denoted σ0.2 (average value from two specimens measured at room
temperature in accordance with the procedures given in ISO 6892-1:2019)
and is used for introducing fatigue pre-crack.
236. Environmental test conditions and duration
(a) Temperature: 298 ± 5 K for the entire duration of the test.
(b) Atmosphere and humidity: no generation of dew in air measuring 85 per
cent of higher in relative humidity for the entire duration of the test.
(c) Test period: 90 days (in accordance with B6.6 of ISO 7866:2012).
237. Testing requirements
(a) Test specimen: One of the specimen geometries, or a combination of them,
shall be used for test:
(i) Compact specimen of ISO 7539-6:2011;
(ii) Single edge bend specimen (SE specimen or cantilever bend
specimen of ISO 7539-6:2011);
(iii) Double-cantilever-beam specimen (DCB specimen) of ISO 7539-
6:2011;
(iv) Modified wedge-opening-load-specimen (modified WOL specimen)
of ISO 7539-6:2011;
(v) C-shaped specimen of ISO 7539-6:2011.
(b) Specimen orientation: the orientation of specimen sampling shall be the
Y-X orientation. Other orientation may be added when necessary.

97
(c) Fatigue pre-crack shall be introduced in accordance with class 6 of ISO
7539-6:2018.
(d) A load is applied under constant load or constant displacement conditions.
(i) For the constant load condition, it is necessary to use a testing
machine capable of load accuracy control within ±1 per cent of the
load applied, as defined in 7.6.3 of ISO 7539-6:2011.
(ii) For the constant displacement condition, the sensitivity of the
displacement gauge shall be not less than 20 mV/mm as to minimize
the excess amplification of small signals. The linearity of the gauge
is such that the deviation from the true displacements shall not
exceed 3μm (0.003 mm) for smaller displacements up to 0.5 mm and
not exceed 1 per cent of recorded values for larger displacements.
These conditions are in accordance with 7.5.3 of ISO 7539-6:2011.
(iii) The load is the value of 𝑲𝑲𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 obtained by the following equation
from B.6.2 of ISO 7866:2012.
𝑲𝑲𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 = 𝟎𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝝈𝝈𝟎𝟎.𝟐𝟐
(e) Measurement of load: For constant displacement condition, the load shall
be measured by one of the following methods after the 90-day test period.
(i) When the load is not monitored:
(1) At the end of the test, the crack mouth opening displacement is
measured before removal of the load.
(2) The load is removed.
(3) The load is reapplied until the crack mouth opening
displacement attains the value in (1) with a load measuring
instrument.
(ii) When the load is monitored, the load at the end of the test is
measured. It is also acceptable to calculate the load value from the
values of elastic strain measured between the start and the end of
the test.
(f) Fatigue post-cracking and breaking shall be introduced as follows:
(i) For a constant load condition, a fatigue post-crack is introduced
until the post-crack length is extended to 1 mm or more by applying
a fatigue load equivalent to a stress intensity factor not exceeding
0.6 times the value of KI obtained by loading.
(ii) For a constant displacement condition, after the load measurement
is performed per (e) above, the load is removed and a fatigue post-
crack is introduced until the post-crack length is extended to 1 mm
or more by applying a fatigue load equivalent to a stress intensity
factor not exceeding 0.6 times the value of KI obtained in (e) above.
After the introduction of a fatigue post-crack the specimen shall be broken
open. If it is possible to identify the HG-SCC fracture surface, the
specimen may be broken by a method other than the introduction of a
fatigue post-crack
(g) Measurement of crack length: After breaking of the specimen, the
following aspects of crack length shall be measured using a scanning

98
 electron microscope (SEM) or other measuring instruments with an
accuracy within ±0.01 mm:
(i) effective crack length including the fatigue pre-crack, apre;
(ii) effective crack length up to the tip of the HG-SCC crack, ascc;
Three measurements shall be taken from the direction perpendicular to
the broken surface at 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the
specimen thickness, and the average value of the measurements at these 3
points is selected as the effective crack length of apre or ascc.
238. Validity of test
(a) Fatigue pre-crack: Of the apre values measured at locations of 25 per cent,
50 per cent and 75 per cent of the specimen thickness, it shall be verified
that the difference between the largest and smallest values does not exceed
5per cent of net specimen width W.
(b) Small scale yielding and plane strain condition: It shall be verified that a,
(W-a) and B (specimen thickness) satisfy the following equation as
specified in B6.7 of ISO 7866:2012:

a, (W-a), B ≧ 1270 (KI /σ 0.2)

2

Where a, (W-a) and KI are as follows:

(i) For constant load condition: a = ascc
(W-a) = (W- ascc)
KI = KIAPP
(ii) For constant displacement condition: a = apre
(W-a) = (W- apre)
KI = KIAPP
(c) If the test conditions in (a) and (b) above are not satisfied, the test is
invalid.
239. Acceptance Criterion
240. The applicability of materials shall be judged as follows:
(a) The crack extension (ascc - apre) by HG-SCC in paragraph 243. is examined
to determine if it exceeds 0.16 mm.
(b) The actual applied value of KIAPP, defined as KIA, is calculated by using apre
and the load applied according to paragraph 237.(d)(i) for constant-load
condition and paragraph 237.(d)(ii) for constant-displacement condition.
(c) The validity of materials is judged as per Table 8 below.
Table 8
Qualification of materials

Case Crack extension KIA versus KIAPP Judgment*

I (ascc – apre) ≦ 0.16 mm KIA ≧ KIAPP Pass

II KIA < KIAPP Invalid

99
 Case Crack extension KIA versus KIAPP Judgment*

III (ascc – apre) > 0.16 mm KIA ≦ KIAPP Fail

IV KIA > KIAPP Invalid

Material shall be judged as follows:

Pass: Materials that satisfy this requirement are judged to have applicable resistance to HG-
SCC for compressed hydrogen containers as specified in B.7.3 of ISO 7866:2012.
Fail: Materials are judged to be failed for application for compressed hydrogen containers.
Invalid: Materials cannot be judged in these conditions.
In case II, another test is recommended if KIA equals to KIAPP or is in some degree
greater than KIAPP.
In case IV, where KIA is considerably greater than KIAPP, another test is recommended
because materials may pass if KIA is a little greater than KIAPP.
(d) A minimum of three valid specimens shall meet the "passed" judgment in
this test.
241. Summary of Tests and Requirements
Table 9
Summary of Test Conditions and Requirements

Load Constant load or Constant displacement

Temperature 298 ± 5K

Atmosphere and humidity: Air (85% or higher in relative humidity)

Number of specimens 3 (valid)

Test period 90 days

Criteria (ascc – apre) ≦ 0.16 mm

KIA ≧ KIAPP

O. Suggested Tolerances for the Qualification Requirements of the CHSS

1. Introduction
242. This tolerance table was developed by a subgroup consisting of OEMs,
component manufacturers and test laboratories and is based on what is reasonable
from a testing perspective while still meeting the intention of the test and preserving
repeatability of the tests between different laboratories.
243. This tolerance table does not supersede any requests for more stringent
tolerances by the manufacturer. It is strictly optional and to be used as a guideline.
244. Test parameter tolerances shall be as specified in the test procedures in section
6. In cases of open-ended test parameter tolerances (eg. ≥ or ≤), the tolerances below the
maximum and above the minimum may be chosen by the test laboratory or
recommended by the manufacturer.

100
245. In lieu of manufacturer guidance, optional tolerances are provided in Table 10.
This is to provide flexibility to the manufacturer to test to more severe conditions if
desired.
246. For example, in paragraph 6.2.3.5, the static hold pressure is specified as ≥125
per cent NWP. In this case, there is a minimum but no maximum. The test lab may
specify a maximum pressure. Using the table as a guideline in the absence of
manufacturer guidelines, the tolerance of 5 per cent NWP in the table could be applied,
which results in a maximum of 130 per cent NWP.
Similarly, one of the leak test temperatures in paragraph 6.2.6.1.8(c) is specified as ≤ -
40°C. There is no defined minimum, which allows the test lab the flexibility to choose a
minimum. The optional tolerance in the table is 3°C, resulting in an optional minimum
of -43°C.
247. In some cases, the test parameter is a specific target value. In this case, the table
specifies an optional ± tolerance. For example, the horizontal drop height in paragraph
6.2.3.2 is targeted at 1.8m. The tolerances in both directions may be chosen by the test
lab. The optional tolerance in the table is ±0.02m.
Table 10
Optional tolerances for test parameters

Optional
Section Test Parameter Value Unit
Tolerance

Pressure

6.2.2
≥ or ≤ various per per cent
6.2.3 Target pressure 5
cent NWP NWP
6.2.6

≥ 100 per cent per cent

6.2.4 Target pressure 5
SOC SOC

6.2.4
Initial pneumatic
6.2.6.1.1 ≤ 2 MPa 1 MPa
pressure
6.2.6.1.3 (c)

6.2.6.1.11 (a) Atmospheric exposure

2 MPa +0.2/-0 MPa
6.2.6.2.6 (a) pressure

Post-chatter flow cycle ≤ 60 per cent per cent

6.2.6.2.3 (b) (i) 60
pressure NWP NWP

Temperature

6.2.3
Temperature ≥ or ≤ various °C 10 °C
6.2.4

6.2.6.1.1
6.2.6.1.3 (a) (c) (d) Temperature cycling / ≥ 85°C
pressure cycling 5 °C
6.2.6.2.3 (a) (i) extreme temperatures ≤ -40°C
6.2.6.2.3 (a) (iii)

101
 Optional
Section Test Parameter Value Unit
Tolerance

6.2.6.1.8 ≥ 85°C
Leak test temperature 3 °C
6.2.6.2.2 ≤ -40°C

6.2.6.1.11 (a) Atmospheric exposure

70°C ±1 °C
6.2.6.2.6 (a) temperature

Humidity

6.2.3.6 (c) per cent

Hot phase humidity ≥ 80 per cent RH 20
6.2.4 RH

6.2.6.1.4 Dry-off apparatus per cent

≤ 30 per cent RH 30
6.2.6.2.4 humidity RH

6.2.6.1.4 Humid stage cycle per cent

100 per cent RH +0/-20
6.2.6.2.4 humidity RH

6.2.6.1.4 Dry stage cycle per cent

≤ 30 per cent RH 30
6.2.6.2.4 humidity RH

Time

Proof pressure test hold

6.2.3.1 ≥ 30 seconds 30 s
time
Residual proof pressure
6.2.3.1 ≥ 4 minutes 1 min
test hold time

6.2.3.3 (b) Pendulum impact pre-

conditioning time a minimum of 12
72 h
Permeation test pre- hours
6.2.4.2
conditioning time
Chemical exposure
6.2.3.4 at least 48 hours 2 h
conditioning time
High temperature static
6.2.3.5 at least 1000 hours 72 h
pressure test time

6.2.6.1.3 (a) Thermal cycle time

6.2.6.1.3 (c) Pressure cycle at least two hours 72 h
conditioning time

6.2.6.1.4 Accelerated corrosion

cycle time
6.2.6.2.4
Fluid exposure time 24 hours +2/-0 h
6.2.6.1.5 (a)
6.2.6.2.5 (a)

6.2.6.1.7 (b) Vibration time 30 minutes +1/-0 min

102
 Optional
Section Test Parameter Value Unit
Tolerance
6.2.6.2.8

6.2.6.1.7 (b) Frequency range sweep

10 minutes +1/-0 min
6.2.6.2.8 time

6.2.6.1.8 Leak test conditioning

at least one hour 24 h
6.2.6.2.2 time

6.2.6.1.8 Leak test immersion

at least one minute 2 min
6.2.6.2.2 time

Bench top activation at least two

6.2.6.1.9 (b) 8 h
conditioning time minutes

6.2.6.1.11 (a) Atmospheric exposure

at least 96 hours 2 h
6.2.6.2.6 (a) time

Hydrostatic pressure at least three

6.2.6.2.1 (a) 1 min
hold time minutes

6.2.6.2.3 (b) (i) Chatter flow time at least 24 hours 1 h

6.2.6.2.7 (a) (i) 1st test hold time at least one hour 30 min

6.2.6.2.7 (a) (ii) 2nd test hold time at least one minute 5 s

Insulation resistance
6.2.6.2.7 (b) test voltage application at least 2 seconds 1 s
time

6.2.6.1.6 Ammonia-air exposure

at least 10 days 2 h
6.2.6.2.9 time

Rates

greater than or
equal to the ramp
6.2.4.1 (b) Fuelling ramp rate rates given in the 7 MPa/min
SAEJ2601_202005
fuelling tables
greater than or
equal to the
-0/+100% g/s or
6.2.4.1 (d) De-fuelling rate intended vehicle’s
of the rate NL/min
maximum fuel-
demand rate
greater than or
equal to the -0/+100% g/s or
6.2.4.1 (d) De-fuelling rate
maintenance de- of the rate NL/min
fuelling rate

Voltage

103
 Optional
Section Test Parameter Value Unit
Tolerance
≥ 1.5 times rated 0.5
6.2.6.2.7 (a) (i) 1st test voltage V
voltage

≥ 2 times rated 0.5

6.2.6.2.7 (a) (ii) 2nd test voltage V
voltage
Insulation resistance
6.2.6.2.7 (b) 1000 V DC ±10 V
test voltage

Distance

6.2.3.2 (a) (i) Horizontal drop height 1.8 m ±0.02 m

calculated drop
6.2.3.2 (a) (ii) (iii) Vertical drop height ±0.02 m
height

45° angle centre of

6.2.3.2 (a) (iv) ≤ 1.8 m 0.04 m
gravity height

6.2.3.3 (a) Cut 1 depth at least 0.75 mm 0.5 mm

6.2.3.3 (a) Cut 1 length at least 200 mm 5 mm

6.2.3.3 (a) Cut 2 depth at least 1.25 mm 0.5 mm

6.2.3.3 (a) Cut 2 length at least 25 mm 1 mm

Pendulum impact area
6.2.3.3 (b) 100 mm ±10 mm
diameters
Pendulum impactor
6.2.3.3 (b) 3 mm ±1 mm
edge radius

6.2.6.1.7 (a) Drop height ≥2m 0.05 m

Concentration

sulphuric acid in water 19 per cent (by

6.2.3.4 (a) ±1 %
solution volume)
sodium hydroxide in 25 per cent (by
6.2.3.4 (b) ±1 %
water solution weight)
methanol in gasoline 5 per cent (by
6.2.3.4 (c) ±1 %
solution volume)
ammonium nitrate in 28 per cent (by
6.2.3.4 (d) ±1 %
water solution weight)
methyl alcohol in water 50 per cent (by
6.2.3.4 (e) ±1 %
solution volume)

6.2.6.1.4 (a) Sodium chloride

0.9% by mass n/a n/a
6.2.6.2.4 (a) content

Calcium chloride
6.2.6.1.4 (b) 0.1% by mass n/a n/a
content

104
 Optional
Section Test Parameter Value Unit
Tolerance
6.2.6.2.4 (b)

6.2.6.1.4 (c) Sodium bicarbonate

0.075% by mass n/a n/a
6.2.6.2.4 (c) content

6.2.6.1.5 (a) (i)

Sulphuric acid solution 19% by volume ±1 %
6.2.6.2.5 (a) (i)

6.2.6.1.5 (a) (ii) Ethanol/gasoline

10% by volume ±1 %
6.2.6.2.5 (a) (ii) solution

6.2.6.1.5 (a) (iii)

Methyl alcohol solution 50% by volume ±1 %
6.2.6.2.5 (a) (iiii)

6.2.6.1.6 At least 20ml per

Ammonia sample
litre of chamber 2 ml/L
6.2.6.2.9 concentration
volume

Other

6.2.3.2 (a) (iv) 45° drop angle 45° ±5 °

Pendulum impact
6.2.3.3 (b) ≥ 30 J 5 J
energy

6.2.6.1.6
Specific gravity 0.94 ±0.01 unitless
6.2.6.2.9

105
 Part II, Text of the Regulation, amend to read:

II. Text of the Regulation

1. Purpose
This regulation specifies safety-related performance requirements for
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles. The purpose of this regulation is to minimize
human harm that may occur as a result of fire, burst or explosion related to the
vehicle fuel system and/or from electric shock caused by the vehicle’s high
voltage system.

2. Scope
2.1. This regulation applies to all hydrogen-fuelled hydrogen fuelled vehicles of
Categories 1 and 2 with a maximum design speed exceeding 25 km/h
Category 1-1 and 1-2, with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of 4,536 kilograms or
less.
2.2. Contracting Parties may exclude the following vehicles from the
application of this regulation:
(a) A vehicle with four or more wheels whose unladen mass is not more
than 350 kg, not including the mass of traction batteries, whose
maximum design speed is not more than 45 km/h, and whose engine
cylinder capacity and maximum continuous rated power do not
exceed 50 cm3 for spark (positive) ignition engines and 4 kW for
electric motors respectively; and
(b) A vehicle with four or more wheels, other than that classified under
(a) above, whose unladen mass is not more than 450 kg (or 650 kg
for vehicles intended for carrying goods), not including the mass of
traction batteries and whose maximum continuous rated power
does not exceed 15 kW.

3. Definitions
For the purpose of this regulation, the following definitions shall apply:
3.1. (vacant)"Active driving possible mode" is the vehicle mode when application
of pressure to the accelerator pedal (or activation of an equivalent control) or
release of the brake system causes the electric power train to move the vehicle.
3.2. (vacant)"Automatic disconnect" is a device that, when triggered, conductively
separates the electrical energy sources from the rest of the high voltage circuit
of the electrical power train.
3.3. "Burst disc Burst-disc" is the non-reclosing operating part of a pressure relief
device which, when installed in the device, is designed to burst at a
predetermined pressure to permit the discharge of compressed hydrogen.
3.4. "Check valve" is a non-return valve that prevents reverse flow in the vehicle
fuel line.

106
3.5. "Hydrogen concentration Concentration of hydrogen" is the percentage of the
hydrogen moles (or molecules) within the mixture of hydrogen and air
(Equivalent to the partial volume of hydrogen gas).
3.6. "Container" (for hydrogen storage) is the pressure-bearing component on the
vehicle within the hydrogen storage system that stores the primary volume of
hydrogen fuel in a single chamber or in multiple permanently
interconnected chambers.
3.7. "Container Attachments" are non-pressure bearing parts attached to the
container that provide additional support and/or protection to the
container and that may be only temporarily removed for maintenance
and/or inspection only with the use of tools. "Conductive connection" is the
connection using contactors to an external power supply when the rechargeable
energy storage system (REESS) is charged.
3.8. "Compressed hydrogen storage system (CHSS)" is a system designed to
store compressed hydrogen fuel for a hydrogen-fuelled vehicle, composed
of a container, container attachments (if any), and all primary closure
devices required to isolate the stored hydrogen from the remainder of the
fuel system and the environment. "Coupling system" for charging the
rechargeable energy storage system (REESS) is the electrical circuit used for
charging the REESS from an external electric power supply including the
vehicle inlet.
3.9. "Date of removal from service" is the date (month and year) specified for
removal from service.
3.10. "Date of manufacture" (of a compressed hydrogen container) is the date
(month and year) of the proof pressure test or final inspection test carried out
by the container manufacturer during manufacture.
3.11. (vacant)"Direct contact" indicates the contact of persons with high voltage
live parts.
3.12. "Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces" indicates the special volumes within the
vehicle (or the vehicle outline across openings) that are external to the
hydrogen system (storage system, fuel cell system and fuel flow management
system) and its housings (if any) where hydrogen may accumulate (and thereby
pose a hazard), as it may occur in the passenger compartment, luggage
compartment, cargo compartment and space under the hood.
3.13. (vacant)"Enclosure" is the part enclosing the internal units and providing
protection against any direct contact.
3.14. (vacant)"Electric energy conversion system" is a system (e.g. fuel cell) that
generates and provides electrical power for vehicle propulsion.
3.15. "Electric power train" is the electrical circuit which may include the traction
motor(s), and may also include the REESS, the electrical power conversion
system, the electronic converters, the traction motors, the associated wiring
harness and connectors and the coupling system for charging the REESS.
3.16. (vacant)"Electrical chassis" is a set of conductive parts electrically linked
together, whose electrical potential is taken as reference.
3.17. (vacant)"Electrical circuit" is an assembly of connected high voltage live parts
that is designed to be electrically energized in normal operation.

107
3.18. (vacant)"Electrical isolation" is the electrical resistance between a vehicle
high voltage bus source and any vehicle conductive structure.
3.19. (vacant)"Electrical protection barrier" is the part providing protection against
direct contact with live parts from any direction of access.
3.20. (vacant)"Electronic converter" is a device capable of controlling and/or
converting electric power for propulsion.
3.21. (vacant)"Exhaust point of discharge" is the geometric centre of the area where
fuel cell purged gas is discharged from the vehicle.
3.22. (vacant)"Exposed conductive part" is the conductive part that can be touched
under the provisions of the IPXXB protection degree and becomes electrically
energized under isolation failure conditions. This includes parts under a cover
that can be removed without using tools.
3.23. (vacant)"External electric power supply" is an alternating current (AC) or
direct current (DC) that provides electric power outside of the vehicle.
3.24. "Fuel cell system" is a system containing the fuel cell stack(s), air processing
system, fuel flow control system, exhaust system, thermal management system
and water management system.
3.25. "Fuelling receptacle" is the equipment to which a fuelling station nozzle
attaches to the vehicle and through which fuel is transferred to the vehicle. The
fuelling receptacle is used as an alternative to a fuelling port.
3.26. "High voltage" is the classification of an electric component or circuit, if its
maximum working voltage is greater than 60 V and less than or equal to
1500 V of direct current (DC), or greater than 30 V and less than or equal to
1000 V of alternating current (AC).
3.27. "High Voltage Bus" is the electrical circuit, including the coupling system, for
charging the REESS that operates on high voltage.
3.28. "Hydrogen-fuelled vehicle" indicates any motor vehicle that uses compressed
gaseous or liquefied hydrogen as a fuel to propel the vehicle, including fuel
cell and internal combustion engine vehicles. Hydrogen fuel for passenger the
vehicles is specified in ISO 14687:2019-2 and SAE J2719_202003.
3.29. (vacant)"Hydrogen storage system" indicates a pressurized container, pressure
relief devices (PRDs) and shut off device that isolate the stored hydrogen from
the remainder of the fuel system and the environment.
3.30. (vacant)"Indirect contact" is the contact of persons with exposed conductive
parts.
3.31. (vacant)"Live parts" is the conductive part intended to be electrically
energized in normal use.
3.32. "Luggage compartment" is the space in the vehicle for luggage and/or goods
accommodation, bounded by the roof, hood, floor, side walls, as well as by the
electrical barrier and enclosure provided for protecting the power train from
direct contact with live parts, being separated from the passenger compartment
by the front bulkhead or the rear bulkhead.
3.33. "Liquefied hydrogen storage system" indicates liquefied hydrogen storage
container(s) PRDs, shut off device, a boil-off system and the interconnection
piping (if any) and fittings between the above components.

108
3.34. "Lower flammability limit (LFL)" is the lowest concentration of fuel at which
a gaseous fuel mixture is flammable at normal temperature and pressure.
The lower flammability limit for hydrogen gas in air is conservatively 4 per
cent by volume based on quiescent environment (para. 123 in Part I83 of
the Preamble).
3.35. "Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP)" is the highest gauge
pressure to which a pressure container or hydrogen storage system is permitted
to operate under normal operating conditions.
3.36. "Maximum fuelling pressure (MFP)" is the maximum pressure applied to
compressed hydrogen storage system during fuelling. The maximum fuelling
pressure is 125 per cent of the Nominal Working Pressure.
3.37. "Nominal working pressure (NWP)" is the gauge pressure that characterizes
typical operation of a system. For compressed hydrogen storage system gas
containers, NWP is the settled pressure of compressed gas in fully fuelled
container or storage system at a uniform temperature of 15 °C.
3.38. (vacant)"On-board isolation resistance monitoring system" is the device that
monitors isolation resistance between the high voltage buses and the electrical
chassis.
3.39. (vacant)"Open type traction battery" is a type of battery requiring liquid and
generating hydrogen gas that is released into the atmosphere.
3.40. "Passenger compartment (for electric safety assessment)" is the space for
occupant accommodation, bounded by the roof, floor, side walls, doors,
outside glazing, front bulkhead and rear bulkhead or rear gate -, as well as by
the electrical barriers and enclosures provided for protecting the occupants
from direct contact with live parts.
3.41. "Pressure relief device (PRD)" is a device that, when activated under specified
performance conditions, is used to release hydrogen from a pressurized system
and thereby prevent failure of the system.
3.42. "Pressure relief valve" is a pressure relief device that opens at a preset pressure
level and can re-close.
3.43. (vacant)"Protection degree IPXXB" indicates protection from contact with
high voltage live parts provided by either an electrical barrier or an enclosure;
it is tested using a Jointed Test Finger (IPXXB), as described in paragraph
6.3.3.
3.44. (vacant)"Protection degree IPXXD" indicates protection from contact with
high voltage live parts provided by either an electrical barrier or an enclosure
and tested using a Test Wire (IPXXD), as described in paragraph 6.3.3.
3.45. "Rechargeable electrical energy storage system (REESS)" is the rechargeable
energy storage system that provides electric energy for electrical propulsion.
3.46. "Rupture" orand "burst" both mean to come apart suddenly and violently,
break open or fly into pieces due to the force of internal pressure.
3.47. (vacant)"Service disconnect" is the device for deactivation of an electrical
circuit when conducting checks and services of the REESS, fuel cell stack, etc.
3.48. "Service life" (of a compressed hydrogen container) indicates the time frame
during which service (usage) is authorized.

109
3.49. "Shut-off valve" is a valve between the storage container and the vehicle fuel
system that must default can be automatically activated; this valve defaults to
the "closed" position when not connected to a power source.
3.50. "Single failure" is a failure caused by a single event, including any
consequential failures resulting from this failure.
3.51. "Specific Heat Release Rate (HRR/A)" is the heat release from a fire per
unit area of the burner where the heat release is based on the rate of fuel
being combusted multiplied by the lower heating value (LHV) of the fuel.
The LHV (sometimes called the Net Heating Value) is appropriate for the
characterization of vehicle fires since the product water from combustion
remains a vapour. The LHV is approximately 46 MJ/kg but needs to be
determined at each site based on the actual LPG composition. "Solid
insulator" is the insulating coating of wiring harnesses provided in order to
cover and prevent the high voltage live parts from any direct contact. This
includes covers for insulating the high voltage live parts of connectors and
varnish or paint for the purpose of insulation.
3.52. "State of charge (SOC)" means the density ratio of hydrogen in the CHSS
between the actual CHSS condition and that at NWP with the CHSS
equilibrated to 15 °C. SOC is expressed as a percentage using the formula:

The density of hydrogen at different pressure and temperature are listed

in the Table 1 below.
Table 1
Compressed Hydrogen Density (g/l)

3.5352. "Thermally-activated pressure relief device (TPRD)" is a non- reclosing PRD

that is activated by temperature to open and release hydrogen gas.
3.53. "Type approval" indicates a certification of a recognised body stating that
prototype or pre-production samples of a specific vehicle, vehicle system or
vehicle system component meet the relevant specified performance standards,
and that the final production versions also comply, as long as conformity of
production is confirmed.

110
3.54. "Vehicle fuel system" is an assembly of components used to store or supply
hydrogen fuel to a fuel cell (FC) or internal combustion engine (ICE).
3.55. "Working voltage" is the highest value of an electrical circuit voltage root mean
square (rms), specified by the manufacturer or determined by measurement,
which may occur between any conductive parts in open circuit conditions or
under normal operating condition. If the electrical circuit is divided by galvanic
isolation, the working voltage is defined for each divided circuit, respectively.

4. Applicability of requirements
4.1. The requirements of paragraph 5. (using test conditions and procedures in
paragraph 6.) apply to all compressed hydrogen-fuelled hydrogen fuelled
vehicles with the following two vehicle mass classes, where applicable:
(a) LDV: Vehicles of Category 1-1 and vehicles of Categories 1-2 and 2
with GVM not exceeding the mass threshold.
(b) HDV: Vehicles of Categories 1-2 and 2 with GVM exceeding the mass
threshold.
Each Contracting Party may determine the mass threshold from the
values of either 3,500 kg or 4,536 kg for application in its national or
regional regulation. 4
In paragraph 5. and paragraph 6., where the differences of the applicable
provisions for LHV and HDV are specified with these abbreviations.
4.2. Each Contracting Party may contracting party under the UN 1998
Agreement shall maintain its existing national crash tests (frontal, side, rear
and rollover) and shall use the limit values of section paragraph 5.2.2. for
compliance.
4.3. The requirements of Global technical regulation No. 20 of paragraph 5.3.
apply to all hydrogen-fuelled vehicles using equipped with electric power
train containing high voltage bus.

5. Performance requirements
5.1. Compressed hydrogen storage system
This section specifies the requirements for the integrity of the compressed
hydrogen storage system.
(a) The primary closure devices shall include the following functions,
which may be combined:
(i) TPRD;
(ii) Check valve; and
(iii) Shut-off valve

4 For the application of this global technical regulation to UN Regulations, 3,500 kg shall be
used as the mass threshold so that LDV covers categories M1, M2 with GVM not exceeding
3,500 kg and N1 while HDV covers categories M2 with GVM exceeding 3,500 kg, M3, N2 and
N3.

111
 (b) Each Contracting Party may, at its discretion, require that the
primary closure devices shall be mounted directly on or within each
container.
(c) The CHSS shall meet the performance test requirements
summarized in Table 2. The corresponding test procedures are specified
in paragraph 6.
The hydrogen storage system consists of the high pressure storage container and primary
closure devices for openings into the high pressure storage container. Figure 1
shows a typical compressed hydrogen storage system consisting of a
pressurized container, three closure devices and their fittings. The closure
devices include:
(a) A TPRD;
(b) A check valve that prevents reverse flow to the fill line; and
(c) An automatic shut-off valve that can close to prevent flow from the container
to the fuel cell or ICE engine. Any shut-off valve, and TPRD that form the
primary closure of flow from the storage container shall be mounted directly
on or within each container. At least one component with a check valve
function shall be mounted directly on or within each container.
Figure 1
Typical compressed hydrogen storage system

Check
TPRD Valve

vent
Shut-off
Valve

Storage
Containment
Container
Vessel

The hydrogen storage system shall meet the performance test requirements specified in this
paragraph. The qualification requirements for on-road service are:
5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics
5.1.2. Verification test for performance durability (hydraulic sequential tests)
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road system performance (pneumatic
sequential tests)
5.1.4. Verification test for service terminating system performance in Fire
5.1.5. Verification test for performance durability of primary closures.
The test elements within these performance requirements are summarized in Table 1. The
corresponding test procedures are specified in paragraph 6.
Table 21

112
Overview of performance qualification test requirements

Requirement section Test article

Container or container plus container

5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics
attachments, as applicable
5.1.2. Verification test for performance Container or container plus container
durability attachments, as applicable
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road
CHSS
performance
5.1.4. Verification test for service
CHSS
terminating performance in fire

5.1.5. Verification test for closure durability Primary closure devices

All new compressed hydrogen storage systems produced for on-road vehicle service shall
have a NWP of 70 MPa or less. and a service life of 15 years or less, and be capable of
satisfying the requirements of paragraph 5.1.
The service life of the CHSS shall be determined by the manufacturer, who shall
establish the date of removal from service taking account of the performance
requirements applied in the respective market.

5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics

5.1.1.1. Baseline initial burst pressure
5.1.1.2. Baseline initial pressure cycle life
5.1.2. Verification test for performance durability (sequential hydraulic tests)
5.1.2.1. Proof pressure test
5.1.2.2. Drop (impact) test
5.1.2.3. Surface damage
5.1.2.4. Chemical exposure and ambient temperature pressure cycling tests
5.1.2.5. High temperature static pressure test
5.1.2.6. Extreme temperature pressure cycling
5.1.2.7. Residual proof pressure test
5.1.2.8. Residual strength Burst Test
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road performance (sequential pneumatic tests)
5.1.3.1. Proof pressure test
5.1.3.2. Ambient and extreme temperature gas pressure cycling test (pneumatic)
5.1.3.3. Extreme temperature static gas pressure leak/permeation test (pneumatic)
5.1.3.4. Residual proof pressure test
5.1.3.5. Residual strength burst test (hydraulic)
5.1.4. Verification test for service terminating performance in fire
5.1.5. Verification test for closure durability

113
5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics
5.1.1.1. Baseline initial burst pressure
Three (3) new containers randomly selected from the design qualification
batch of at least 10 containers, are hydraulically pressurized until burst in
accordance with paragraph (para. 6.2.2.1. test procedure). The container
attachments, if any, shall also be included in this test, unless the
manufacturer can demonstrate that the container attachments do not
affect the test results and are not affected by the test procedure. The
manufacturer shall supply documentation (measurements and statistical
analyses) that establish the midpoint burst pressure of new storage containers,
BPO.
All containers tested shall have a burst pressure within ±10 per cent of BPO
and greater than or equal to a minimum BPmin of 225200 per cent NWP.
However, a Contracting Party, at its discretion, may apply 225 per cent
NWP for containers of 35 MPa or less, instead of 200 per cent NWP.
In addition, containers Containers having glass-fibre composite as a primary
constituent shall to have a minimum burst pressure greater than 350 per cent
NWP.
5.1.1.2. Baseline initial pressure cycle life
Three (3) new containers randomly selected from the design qualification
batch are hydraulically pressure cycled at 20(±5)°C to 125 per cent NWP
without rupture for 22,000 cycles or until a leak occurs (para. in accordance
with paragraph 6.2.2.2. test procedure). The container attachments, if any,
shall also be included in this test, unless the manufacturer can
demonstrate that the container attachments do not affect the test results
and are not affected by the test procedure. Leakage shall not occur within a
number of Cycles, where the number of Cycles is set individually by each
Contracting Party at 5,500, 7,500 or 11,000 cycles for a 15-year service life.
light-duty vehicles, at the Contracting Parties’ discretion and 11,000
cycles for heavy-duty vehicles.
5.1.2. Verification tests for performance durability (Hydraulic sequential tests)
If all three pressure cycle life measurements made in para. 5.1.1.2. are greater
than 11,000 cycles, or if they are all within ±25 per cent of each other, then
only one (1) container is tested in para. 5.1.2. Otherwise, three (3) containers
are tested in para. 5.1.2.
Unless otherwise specified, the tests in paragraph 5.1.2 shall be conducted
on the container equipped with its container attachments (if any) that
represents the CHSS without the primary closures.
A hydrogen storage The container shall not leak during the following sequence
of tests, which are applied in series to a single system and which are illustrated
in Figure 12. At least one system randomly selected from the design
qualification batch shall be tested to demonstrate the performance capability.
Specifics of applicable test procedures for the hydrogen storage system are
provided in para. 6.2.3.
Figure 12
Verification test for performance durability (hydraulic)

114
 BPO
<20%
burst
180%NWP
Pressure 

(4 min)
chemical
exposure 150% NWP
125%NWP
Chemicals

80%NWP

time
Proof Pressure

Damage
Drop

60% #Cycles 1000 hr

15C-25C 10 +85C 20% #Cycles
48 hr cycles +85C, 95%RH
15-25C 20% #Cycles
-40C

Residual
Strength

5.1.2.1. Proof pressure test

A storage The container is pressurized to 150 per cent NWP and held for 30
sec (para. in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 6.2.3.1.
test procedure). The container attachments, if any, shall also be included in
this test, unless the manufacturer can demonstrate that the container
attachments do not affect the test results. and are not affected by the test
procedure. A storage The container that has undergone a proof pressure test
in manufacture is exempt from this test.
5.1.2.2. Drop (impact) test
The storage container with its container attachments (if any) is dropped at
several impact angles (para. once in one of the impact orientations specified
in paragraph 6.2.3.2. test procedure).

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5.1.2.3. Surface damage test
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable) is
subjected to surface damage (para. specified in paragraph 6.2.3.3. test
procedure).
All-metal containers are exempt from the surface flaw generation portion
of testing.
5.1.2.4. Chemical exposure and ambient-temperature pressure cycling test
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable) is
exposed to chemicals found in the on-road environment and pressure cycled to
125 per cent NWP at 20° (±5)°C for 60 per cent number of Cycles pressure
cycles (para. in accordance with paragraph 6.2.3.4. test procedure).
Chemical exposure is discontinued before the last 10 cycles, which are
conducted to 150 per cent NWP.
5.1.2.5. High temperature static pressure test.
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable) is
pressurized to 125 per cent NWP at ≥85°C for 1,000 hr (para. in accordance
with paragraph 6.2.3.5. test procedure).
5.1.2.6. Extreme temperature pressure cycling test
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable) is
pressure cycled at ≤ -40°C to 80 per cent NWP for 20 per cent number of
Cycles and at ≥ +85°C and 95 per cent relative humidity to 125 per cent NWP
for 20 per cent number of Cycles (para. in accordance with paragraph
6.2.3.6. test procedure).
5.1.2.7. Hydraulic rResidual proof pressure test.
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable) is
pressurized to 180 per cent NWP and held 4 minutes without burst (para. in
accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 6.2.3.1. test
procedure).
5.1.2.8. Residual strength burst strength test
The storage container with its container attachments (if applicable)
undergoes a hydraulic burst test. to verify that tThe burst pressure measured
in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph 6.2.2.1. shall be
is at least 80 per cent of the baseline initial burst pressure (BPO) determined
provided by the manufacturer in para. 5.1.1.1. (para. 6.2.2.1. test procedure).
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road performance (Pneumatic sequential
tests)
A hydrogen storage system CHSS shall undergo not leak during the following
sequence of tests, which are illustrated in Figure 23. Specifics of applicable
test procedures for the CHSS hydrogen storage system are provided in
paragraph 6.2.4.
The CHSS shall not leak and the primary closure devices shall maintain
functionality during the test.

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Figure 23
Verification test for expected on-road performance (pneumatic/hydraulic)

Pressure

BPO <20%
Burst
180%NWP
4 min
150%NWP
100%SOC

Time
Proof Pressure

+55°C + 55°

Leak / Permeation
Leak / Permeation

5% cy -25°C 5% cy +50°C
5% cy +50°C 5% cy -25°C
40% cy 15-25°C 40% cy 15-25°C

> >

BPO
<20%
Burst
180%NWP
4 min
Pressure 

125%NWP
115%NWP
80%NWP

time
a b c b a
150% +55 C o
+55 C o
NWP
Leak / Permeation
Leak / Permeation

5% cy -40Ca 5% cy +50C
Proof Pressure

5% cy +50Cb 5% cy -40C
> 30 hrs
> 30 hrs

40%cy 15-25Cc 40%cy 15-25C

a Fuel/defuel cycles @-40 o C with initial system equilibration @ -40 o C, 5 cycles with +20 o C fuel; 5 cycles with <-35 o C fuel
b Fuel/defuel cycles @+50 o C with initial system equilibration @+50 o C, 5 cycles with <-35 o C fuel
c Fuel/defuel cycles @15-25 o C with service (maintenance) defuel rate, 50 cycles

5.1.3.1. Proof pressure test

A system The container of a CHSS is pressurized in accordance with the
procedure specified in paragraph to 150 per cent NWP for 30 seconds (para.
6.2.3.1. test procedure). The container attachments, if any, shall also be
included in this test, unless the manufacturer can demonstrate that the
container attachments do not affect the test results and are not affected by

117
 the test procedure. A storage The container that has undergone a proof
pressure test in manufacture is exempt from this test.
5.1.3.2. Ambient and extreme temperature gas pressure cycling test (pneumatic)
The system CHSS is pressure cycled in accordance with paragraph using
hydrogen gas for 500 cycles (para. 6.2.4.1. test procedure).
(a) The pressure cycles are divided into two groups: Half of the cycles
(250) are performed before exposure to static pressure (para. 5.1.3.3.)
and the remaining half of the cycles (250) are performed after the initial
exposure to static pressure (para. 5.1.3.3.) as illustrated in Figure 3;
(b) The first group of pressure cycling, 25 cycles are performed to 80 per
cent NWP at ≤ -40 °C, then 25 cycles to 125 per cent NWP at ≥ + 50 °C
and 95 per cent relative humidity, and the remaining 200 cycles to 125
per cent NWP at 20 (±5)°C;
The second group of pressure cycling, 25 cycles are performed to
125 per cent NWP at ≥ + 50 °C and 95 per cent relative humidity, then
25 cycles to 80 per cent NWP at ≤ -40 °C, and the remaining 200 cycles
to 125 per cent NWP at 20(±5)°C.
(c) The hydrogen gas fuel temperature is ≤ - 40 °C;
(d) During the first group of 250 pressure cycles, five cycles are performed
with fuel having a temperature of + 20(±5)°C after temperature
equilibration of the system at ≤ - 40°C; five cycles are performed with
fuel having a temperature of ≤ - 40°C; and five cycles are performed
with fuel having a temperature of ≤ - 40°C after temperature
equilibration of the system at ≥ 50°C and 95 per cent relative humidity;
(e) Fifty pressure cycles are performed using a de-fuelling rate greater than
or equal to the maintenance de-fuelling rate.
5.1.3.3. Extreme temperature static gas pressure leak/permeation test (pneumatic).
The test shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 6.2.4.2. and
6.2.4.3.
(a) The test is performed after each group of 250 pneumatic pressure cycles
in paragraph 5.1.3.2.;
(b) The maximum allowable hydrogen discharge from the CHSS
compressed hydrogen storage system is 46 mL/h/L water capacity of
the CHSS. storage system. (para. 6.2.4.2. test procedure) ;
(c) If the measured permeation rate is greater than 0.005 mg/sec
(3.6 Nml/min), a localized leak test is performed to ensure no Any
single point of localized external leakage measured in accordance
with paragraph 6.2.4.3. shall not exceed is greater than 0.005 mg/sec
(3.6 Nml/min) (para. 6.2.4.3. test procedure).
5.1.3.4. Residual proof pressure test (hydraulic)
The storage container with its container attachments (if any), as specified,
is pressurized in accordance with the procedure specified in paragraph to
180 per cent NWP and held 4 minutes without burst (para. 6.2.3.1. test
procedure).
5.1.3.5. Residual strength burst test (hydraulic)

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 The storage container with its container attachments (if any), as specified,
undergoes a hydraulic burst. to verify that tThe burst pressure is within 20 per
cent of the baseline burst pressure measured in accordance with the
procedure specified in paragraph 6.2.2.1. shall be at least 80 per cent of
the BPO provided by the manufacturer determined in para. 5.1.1.1. (para.
6.2.2.1. test procedure).
5.1.4. Verification test for service terminating performance in fire
The CHSS shall undergo the two-stage localized/engulfing fire test
specified in paragraph 6.2.5.
The CHSS is filled to 100 per cent state-of-charge (SOC) with compressed
hydrogen as the test gas. However, Contracting Parties under the 1998
Agreement may choose to use compressed air as an alternative test gas for
certification of a container for use only within their countries or regions.
The CHSS shall vent to less than 1 MPa within 1 hour for LDV or within
2 hours for HDV. If venting occurs from TPRD(s), the venting shall be
continuous. The container shall not rupture during the CHSS fire test.
Except for discharges from the exhausts of TPRD vents, any leakage,
permeation, or venting from the CHSS, including through the container
walls or joints, other components, and fittings, shall not result in jet
flames greater than 0.5m.
If the CHSS pressure has not fallen below 1 MPa when the time limit
defined above is reached, then the CHSS fire test is terminated and the
CHSS fails the fire test (even if rupture did not occur).
This section describes the fire test with compressed hydrogen as the test gas.
Containers tested with hydrogen gas shall be accepted by all Contracting
Parties. However, Contracting Parties under the 1998 Agreement may choose
to use compressed air as an alternative test gas for certification of a
container for use only within their countries or regions.
A hydrogen storage system is pressurized to NWP and exposed to fire
(para. 6.2.5.1. test procedure). A temperature-activated pressure relief device
shall release the contained gases in a controlled manner without rupture.
5.1.5. Verification test for performance durability of primary closures
Manufacturers shall maintain records that confirm that closures that isolate the
high pressure hydrogen storage system The primary closure devices of the
CHSS that perform the functions of TPRD, check valve and shut-off valve
as prescribed in paragraph 5.1.shown in Figure 1) shall comply with the
requirements described in the remainder of this paragraphSection.
[The entire CHSS storage system does not have to be re-qualified (para. 5.1.)
if these primary closure devices components (components in Figure 1
excluding the storage container) are exchanged for equivalent closure
components having comparable function, fittings, materials, strength and
dimensions, and qualified for performance using the same qualification tests
as the original components. However, a change in TPRD hardware, its position
of installation or venting lines requires re-qualification with the fire test
according to para. 5.1.4.]

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5.1.5.1. TPRD qualification requirements
Design qualification testing shall be conducted on finished pressure relief
devices which are representative of normal production. The TPRD shall meet
the following performance qualification requirements:
(a) Pressure cycling test (para. 6.2.6.1.1.);
(b) Accelerated life test (para. 6.2.6.1.2.);
(c) Temperature cycling test (para. 6.2.6.1.3.);
(d) Salt corrosion resistance test (para. 6.2.6.1.4.);
(e) Vehicle environment test (para. 6.2.6.1.5.);
(f) Stress corrosion cracking test (para. 6.2.6.1.6.);
(g) Drop and vibration test (para. 6.2.6.1.7.);
(h) Leak test (para. 6.2.6.1.8.);
(i) Bench top activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.);
(j) Flow rate test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.);.
(k) Atmospheric exposure test (para. 6.2.6.1.11.).
5.1.5.2. Check valve and automatic shut-off valve qualification on requirements
Design qualification testing shall be conducted on finished check valves and
shut-off valves which are representative of normal production. The valve units
shall meet the following performance qualification requirements:
(a) Hydrostatic strength test (para. 6.2.6.2.1.);
(b) Leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.);
(c) Extreme temperature pressure cycling test (para. 6.2.6.2.3.);
(d) Salt corrosion resistance test (para. 6.2.6.2.4.);
(e) Vehicle environment test (para. 6.2.6.2.5.);
(f) Atmospheric exposure test (para. 6.2.6.2.6.);
(g) Electrical tests (para. 6.2.6.2.7.);
(h) Vibration test (para. 6.2.6.2.8.);
(i) Stress corrosion cracking test (para. 6.2.6.2.9.);
(j) Pre-cooled hydrogen exposure test (para. 6.2.6.2.10.).
5.1.6. Labelling
A label shall be permanently affixed on each container or container
attachments with at least the following information: name of the
manufacturer, serial number, date of manufacture, NWP, type of fuel, and date
of removal from service as well as. Each container shall also be marked with
the number of cycles used in the testing programme as per para. 5.1.1.2. Any
label affixed to the container in compliance with this section paragraph shall
remain in place and be legible for the duration of the manufacturer’s
recommended service life for the container.

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 Each Contracting Party may, at its discretion, introduce the maximum
length of the service life such that the date of removal from service shall not
be more than 1525 years after the date of manufacture.

5.2. Vehicle fuel system

This section specifies requirements for the integrity of the hydrogen fuel
delivery vehicle fuel system, which includes the CHSS hydrogen storage
system, piping, joints, and components in which hydrogen is present.
5.2.1. In-use fuel system integrity
5.2.1.1. Fuelling receptacle requirements
5.2.1.1.1. A compressed hydrogen fuelling receptacle shall prevent reverse flow to the
atmosphere. Test procedure is in accordance with the leak test specified in
paragraph 6.2.6.2.2. visual inspection.
5.2.1.1.2. Fuelling receptacle label A label shall be affixed close to the fuelling
receptacle; for instance, inside a refilling hatch, showing the following
information: fuel type (e.g. "CHG" for gaseous hydrogen), NWP, MFP, date
of removal from service of containers.
5.2.1.1.3. The fuelling receptacle shall be mounted on the vehicle to ensure positive
locking of the fuelling nozzle. The receptacle shall be protected from
tampering and the ingress of dirt and water (e.g. installed in a compartment
which can be locked). Test procedure is by visual inspection.
5.2.1.1.4. The fuelling receptacle shall not be mounted within the external energy
absorbing elements of the vehicle (e.g. bumper) and shall not be installed in
the passenger compartment, luggage compartment and other places where
hydrogen gas could accumulate and where ventilation is not sufficient. Test
procedure is by visual inspection.
5.2.1.2. Over-pressure protection for the low pressure system (para. 6.1.6. test
procedure)
The hydrogen system downstream of a pressure regulator shall be protected
against overpressure due to the possible failure of the pressure regulator. The
set pressure of the overpressure protection device shall be lower than or equal
to the maximum allowable working pressure for the appropriate section of the
hydrogen system.
5.2.1.3. Hydrogen discharge systems

5.2.1.3.1. Pressure relief systems (para. 6.1.6. test procedure)

(a) Storage system TPRDs. The outlet of the vent line, if present, for
hydrogen gas discharge from TPRD(s) of the CHSS storage system
shall be protected from ingress of dirt and water by a cap;
(b) Storage system TPRDs. The hydrogen gas discharge from TPRD(s) of
the CHSS storage system shall not be directed such that the hydrogen
exhaust does not impinge upon:
(i) Into enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces;
(ii) Into or towards any vehicle wheel housing;
(iii) Towards hydrogen gas containers;

121
 (iv) Forward from the vehicle, or horizontally (parallel to road) from
the back or sides of the vehicle; the vehicle’s REESS.
(c) Other pressure relief devices (such as a burst disk) may be used outside
the hydrogen storage system. The hydrogen gas discharge from other
pressure relief devices shall not be directed:
(i) Towards exposed electrical terminals, exposed electrical
switches or other ignition sources;
(ii) Into or towards the vehicle passenger or cargo compartments;
(iii) Into or towards any vehicle wheel housing;
(iv) Towards hydrogen gas containers;
5.2.1.3.2. Vehicle Exhaust System (para. 6.1.4. test procedure)
At the vehicle exhaust system’s point of discharge, the hydrogen concentration
level shall:
(a) Not exceed 4.0 per cent average by volume during any moving three-
second time interval during normal operation including start-up and
shutdown;
(b) And not exceed 8.0 per cent at any time (para. 6.1.4. test procedure).
5.2.1.4. Protection against flammable conditions: single failure conditions
5.2.1.4.1. Hydrogen gas discharge, leakage and/or permeation from the hydrogen
storage vehicle fuel system shall not directly vent into the passenger, or
luggage, or cargo compartments, or to any enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces
within the vehicle that contains unprotected ignition sources.
5.2.1.4.2. Any single failure downstream of the main hydrogen shut off valve shall not
result in any level of a hydrogen concentration in anywhere in the passenger
compartment according to test procedure para. 6.1.3.2.
5.2.1.4.3. If, during operation, a single failure results in a hydrogen concentration
exceeding 2 ± 1.03.0 per cent by volume in air in the enclosed or semi-enclosed
spaces of the vehicle, then a warning shall be provided (para. 5.2.1.6.). If the
hydrogen concentration exceeds 3 ± 1.04.0 per cent by volume in the air in the
enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces of the vehicle, the main shutoff valve shall
be closed to isolate the storage system. (para. 6.1.3. test procedure).
5.2.1.5. Fuel system leakage
The hydrogen fuelling line (e.g. piping, joint, etc.) and the hydrogen system(s)
downstream of the main shut off valve(s) shall not leak. Compliance shall be
verified at NWP (para. 6.1.5. test procedure).
5.2.1.6. Tell-tale signal warning to driver
The warning shall be given by a visual signal or display text with the following
properties:
(a) Visible to the driver while in the driver's designated seating position
with the driver's seat belt fastened;
(b) Yellow in colour if the detection system malfunctions (e.g. circuit
disconnection, short-circuit, sensor fault) and shall be red in
compliance with section para. 5.2.1.4.3;

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 (c) When illuminated, shall be visible to the driver under both daylight and
night time driving conditions;
(d) Remains illuminated when 2 ± 1.0 > 3.0 per cent concentration or
detection system malfunction) exists and the ignition locking system is
in the "On" ("Run") position or the propulsion system is activated.
5.2.2. Post-crash fuel system integrity
Each Contracting Party may maintain its existing national crash tests
(frontal, side, rear and rollover) and shall use the limit values of
paragraphs 5.2.2.1. to 5.2.2.3.
5.2.2.1. Fuel leakage limit
The volumetric flow of hydrogen gas leakage shall not exceed an average of
118 NL per minute for the time interval, Δt, as determined in accordance
with paragraphs 6.1.1.1. or 6.1.1.2. for 60 minutes after the crash (para. 6.1.1.
test procedures).
5.2.2.2. Concentration limit in enclosed spaces
Hydrogen gas leakage shall not result in a hydrogen concentration in the air
greater than 3 ± 1.0 4.0 per cent by volume in the passenger, and luggage and
cargo compartments (para. 6.1.2. test procedures). The requirement is satisfied
if it is confirmed that the shut-off valve of the storage system has closed within
5 seconds of the crash and no leakage from the storage system.
5.2.2.3. Container displacement
The storage container(s) shall remain attached to the vehicle at a minimum of
one attachment point.
5.3. Electrical safety
5.3.1. Electrical Safety requirements - in-use
5.3.1.1. General
Paragraph 5.3.1. applies to the electric power train of fuel cell vehicles
equipped with one or more traction motor(s) operated by electric power and
not permanently connected to the grid, as well as their high voltage
components and systems which are conductively connected to the high voltage
bus of the electric power train.
5.3.1.2. Requirements for protection against electric shock
5.3.1.2.1. Protection against electric shock
These electrical safety requirements apply to high voltage buses under
conditions where they are not connected to external high voltage power
supplies.
5.3.1.2.2. Protection against direct contact
The protection against direct contact with live parts shall comply with
paragraphs 5.3.1.2.2.1. and 5.3.1.2.2.2. These protections (solid insulator,
electrical protection barrier, enclosure, etc.) shall not be opened, disassembled
or removed without the use of tools.
5.3.1.2.2.1. For protection of live parts inside the passenger compartment or luggage
compartment, the protection degree IPXXD shall be provided.

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5.3.1.2.2.2. For protection of live parts in areas other than the passenger compartment or
luggage compartment, the protection degree IPXXB shall be satisfied.
5.3.1.2.2.3. Connectors
Connectors (including vehicle inlet) are deemed to meet this requirement if:
(a) They comply with paragraphs 5.3.1.2.2.1. and 5.3.1.2.2.2. when
separated without the use of tools; or
(b) They are located underneath the floor and are provided with a locking
mechanism; or
(c) They are provided with a locking mechanism and other components
shall be removed with the use of tools in order to separate the connector;
or
(d) The voltage of the live parts becomes equal or below DC 60V or equal
or below AC 30V (rms) within 1 second after the connector is separated.
5.3.1.2.2.4. Service disconnect
For a service disconnect which can be opened, disassembled or removed
without tools, it is acceptable if protection degree IPXXB is satisfied when it
is opened, disassembled or removed without tools.
5.3.1.2.2.5. Marking
5.3.1.2.2.5.1. The symbol shown in Figure 4 shall appear on or near the REESS. The symbol
background shall be yellow, the bordering and the arrow shall be black.
Figure 4
Marking of high voltage equipment

5.3.1.2.2.5.2. The symbol shall be visible on enclosures and electrical protection barriers,
which, when removed, expose live parts of high voltage circuits. This
provision is optional to any connectors for high voltage buses. This provision
shall not apply to any of the following cases
(a) Where electrical protection barriers or enclosures cannot be physically
accessed, opened, or removed; unless other vehicle components are
removed with the use of tools;
(b) Where electrical protection barriers or enclosures are located
underneath the vehicle floor.
5.3.1.2.2.5.3. Cables for high voltage buses which are not located within enclosures shall be
identified by having an outer covering with the colour orange.
5.3.1.2.3. Protection against indirect contact
5.3.1.2.3.1. For protection against electric shock which could arise from indirect contact,
the exposed conductive parts, such as the conductive electrical protection
barrier and enclosure, shall be conductively connected and secured to the

124
 electrical chassis with electrical wire or ground cable, by welding, or by
connection using bolts, etc. so that no dangerous potentials are produced.
5.3.1.2.3.2. The resistance between all exposed conductive parts and the electrical chassis
shall be lower than 0.1 ohm when there is current flow of at least
0.2 amperes. Demonstrated by using one of the test procedures described in
para. 6.3.4.
This requirement is satisfied if the galvanic connection has been established
by welding. In case of doubts a measurement shall be made.
5.3.1.2.3.3. In the case of motor vehicles which are connected to the grounded external
electric power supply through the conductive connection, a device to enable
the conductive connection of the electrical chassis to the earth ground shall be
provided.
The device shall enable connection to the earth ground before exterior voltage
is applied to the vehicle and retain the connection until after the exterior
voltage is removed from the vehicle.
Compliance to this requirement may be demonstrated either by using the
connector specified by the car manufacturer, or by analysis (e.g. visual
inspection, drawings etc.).
5.3.1.2.4. Isolation resistance monitoring system
5.3.1.2.4.1. In fuel cell vehicles, DC high voltage buses shall have an on-board isolation
resistance monitoring system together with a warning to the driver if the
isolation resistance drops below the minimum required value of 100 ohms/volt.
The function of the on-board isolation resistance monitoring system shall be
confirmed as described in para. 6.3.2.
The isolation resistance between the high voltage bus of the coupling system
for charging the REESS, which is not energized in conditions other than that
during the charging of the REESS, and the electrical chassis need not to be
monitored.
5.3.1.2.4.2. Electric power train consisting of separate DC or AC buses
If AC high voltage buses and DC high voltage buses are conductively isolated
from each other, isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the
electrical chassis shall have a minimum value of 100 ohms/volt of the working
voltage for DC buses, and a minimum value of 500 ohms/volt of the working
voltage for AC buses.
The measurement shall be conducted according to para. 6.3.1.
5.3.1.2.4.3. Electric power train consisting of combined DC- and AC-buses
If AC high voltage buses and DC high voltage buses are galvanically
connected, isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the electrical
chassis shall have a minimum value of 500 Ω/volt of the working voltage.
However, if all AC high voltage buses are protected by one of the two
following measures, isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the
electrical chassis shall have a minimum value of 100 ohms/volt of the working
voltage.
(a) Double or more layers of solid insulators, electrical protection barriers
or enclosures that meet the requirement in paragraph 5.3.1.2.3.
independently, for example wiring harness;

125
 (b) Mechanically robust protections that have sufficient durability over
vehicle service life such as motor housings, electronic converter cases
or connectors.
5.3.1.2.4.4. Isolation resistance requirement for the coupling system for charging the
REESS.
For the vehicle inlet intended to be conductively connected to the grounded
external AC power supply and the electrical circuit that is conductively
connected to the vehicle inlet during charging the REESS, the isolation
resistance between the high voltage bus and the electrical chassis shall be at
least 1M ohms when the charger coupler is disconnected. During the
measurement, the REESS may be disconnected. The measurement shall be
conducted according to para. 6.3.1.
5.3.1.3. Functional safety
At least a momentary indication shall be given to the driver when the vehicle
is in "active driving possible mode''.
However, this provision does not apply under conditions where an internal
combustion engine provides directly or indirectly the vehicle´s propulsion
power upon start up.
When leaving the vehicle, the driver shall be informed by a signal (e.g. optical
or audible signal) if the vehicle is still in the active driving possible mode.
If the on-board REESS can be externally charged, vehicle movement by its
own propulsion system shall be impossible as long as the connector of the
external electric power supply is physically connected to the vehicle inlet.
This requirement shall be demonstrated by using the connector specified by
the car manufacturer.
The state of the drive direction control unit shall be identified to the driver.
5.3.2. Electric safety requirements – post-crash
5.3.2.1. General
Fuel cell vehicles equipped with electric power train shall comply with the
requirements of paragraphs 5.3.2.2. to 5.3.2.4. This can be met by a separate
impact test provided that the electrical components do not influence the
occupant protection performance of the vehicle type as defined in the impact
regulation. In case of this condition the requirements of paras. 5.3.2.2. to
5.3.2.4. shall be checked in accordance with the methods set out in para. 6.3.5.
5.3.2.2. Protection against electric shock
After the impact at least one of the three criteria specified in
paragraphs 5.3.2.2.1. to 5.3.2.2.3. shall be met.
If the vehicle has an automatic disconnect function, or device(s) that
conductively divide the electric power train circuit during driving condition, at
least one of the following criteria shall apply to the disconnected circuit or to
each divided circuit individually after the disconnect function is activated.
However criteria defined in para. 5.3.2.2.2. shall not apply if more than a single
potential of a part of the high voltage bus is not protected under the conditions
of protection degree IPXXB.

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 In the case that the test is performed under the condition that part(s) of the high
voltage system are not energized, the protection against electric shock shall be
proved by either para. 5.3.2.2.2. or para. 5.3.2.2.3. for the relevant part(s).
5.3.2.2.1. Absence of high voltage
The voltages Vb, V1 and V2 of the high voltage buses shall be equal or less
than 30 VAC or 60 VDC within 60 seconds after the impact as specified in
para. 6.3.5. and para. 6.3.5.2.2.
5.3.2.2.2. Isolation resistance
The criteria specified in the paragraphs 5.3.2.2.2.1. and 5.3.2.2.2.2. below shall
be met.
The measurement shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph 6.3.5.2.3.
of paragraph 6.3.5.
5.3.2.2.2.1. Electrical power train consisting of separate DC- and AC-buses
If the AC high voltage buses and the DC high voltage buses are conductively
isolated from each other, isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and
the electrical chassis (Ri, as defined in paragraph 6.3.5.2.3.) shall have a
minimum value of 100 Ω/volt of the working voltage for DC buses, and a
minimum value of 500 Ω/volt of the working voltage for AC buses.
5.3.2.2.2.2. Electrical power train consisting of combined DC- and AC-buses
If the AC high voltage buses and the DC high voltage buses are conductively
connected they shall meet one of the following requirements:
(a) Isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the electrical
chassis (Ri, as defined in paragraph 6.3.5.2.3.) shall have a minimum
value of 500 Ω/volt of the working voltage;
(b) Isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the electrical
chassis (Ri, as defined in paragraph 6.3.5.2.3.) shall have a minimum
value of 100 Ω/volt of the working voltage and the AC bus meets the
physical protection as described in para. 5.3.2.2.3. ;
(c) Isolation resistance between the high voltage bus and the electrical
chassis (Ri, as defined in paragraph 6.3.5.2.3.) shall have a minimum
value of 100 Ω/volt of the working voltage and the AC bus meets the
absence of high voltage as described in para. 5.3.2.2.1.
5.3.2.2.3. Physical protection
Individual Contracting Parties may elect to adopt the physical protection. For
protection against direct contact with high voltage live parts, the protection
degree IPXXB shall be provided.
In addition, for protection against electric shock which could arise from
indirect contact, the resistance between all exposed conductive parts and
electrical chassis shall be lower than 0.1 ohm when there is current flow of at
least 0.2 amperes.
This requirement is satisfied if the galvanic connection has been established
by welding. In case of doubts a measurement shall be made.
5.3.2.3. Electrolyte spillage

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 In the period from the impact until 30 minutes after no electrolyte from the
REESS shall spill into the passenger compartment and no more than 7 per cent
of electrolyte shall spill from the REESS outside the passenger compartment.
The manufacturer shall demonstrate compliance in accordance with paragraph
6.3.5.2.6.
5.3.2.4. REESS retention
REESS located inside the passenger compartment shall remain in the location
in which they are installed and REESS components shall remain inside REESS
boundaries.
No part of any REESS that is located outside the passenger compartment for
electric safety assessment shall enter the passenger compartment during or
after the impact test.
The manufacturer shall demonstrate compliance in accordance with paragraph
6.3.5.2.7.

6. Test conditions and procedures

6.1. Compliance tests for fuel system integrity
6.1.1. Post-crash compressed hydrogen storage system leak test
The crash tests used to evaluate post-crash hydrogen leakage are those already
applied in the jurisdictions of each Contracting Party. contracting party.
Prior to conducting the crash test, instrumentation is installed in the hydrogen
storage system CHSS to perform the required pressure and temperature
measurements if the standard vehicle does not already have instrumentation
with the required accuracy.
The CHSS storage system is then purged, if necessary, following manufacturer
directions to remove impurities from the container before filling the CHSS
storage system with compressed hydrogen or helium gas. Since the storage
system pressure varies with temperature, the targeted fill pressure is a function
of the temperature. The target pressure shall be determined from the following
equation:
Ptarget = NWP x (273 + To) / 288
where NWP is the nominal working pressure (MPa), To is the ambient
temperature to which the storage system is expected to settle, and Ptarget is the
targeted fill pressure after the temperature settles.
The container is filled to a minimum of 95 per cent of the targeted fill pressure
and allowed to settle (stabilize) prior to conducting the crash test.
The main stop valve and shut-off valves for hydrogen gas, located in the
downstream hydrogen gas piping, are in the normal driving condition kept
open immediately prior to the impact.
6.1.1.1. Post-crash leak test - compressed hydrogen storage system filled with
compressed hydrogen
The hydrogen gas pressure, P0 (MPa), and temperature, T0 (°C), is measured
immediately before the impact and then at a time interval, Δt (min), after the
impact. The time interval, Δt, starts when the vehicle comes to rest after the

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 impact and continues for at least 60 minutes. The time interval, Δt, is increased
if necessary in order to accommodate measurement accuracy for a storage
system with a large volume operating up to 70MPa; in that case, Δt can be
calculated from the following equation:
Δt = VCHSS x NWP /1000 x ((-0.027 x NWP +4) x Rs – 0.21) -1.7 x Rs
where Rs = Ps / NWP, Ps is the pressure range of the pressure sensor (MPa),
NWP is the Nominal Working Pressure (MPa), VCHSS is the volume of the
CHSS compressed hydrogen storage system (L), and Δt is the time interval
(min). If the calculated value of Δt is less than 60 minutes, Δt is set to 60
minutes.
The initial mass of hydrogen in the CHSS storage system can be calculated as
follows:
Po’ = Po x 288 / (273 + T0)
ρo’ = –0.0027 x (P0’)2 + 0.75 x P0’ + 0.57891.07
Mo = ρo’ x VCHSS
Correspondingly, the final mass of hydrogen in the CHSS storage system, Mf,
at the end of the time interval, Δt, can be calculated as follows:
Pf’ = Pf x 288 / (273 + Tf)
ρf’ = –0.0027 x (Pf’)2 + 0.75 x Pf’ + 0.57891.07
Mf = ρf’ x VCHSS
where Pf is the measured final pressure (MPa) at the end of the time interval,
and Tf is the measured final temperature (°C).
The average hydrogen flow rate over the time interval (that shall be less than
the criteria in para. 5.2.2.1.) is therefore
VH2 = (Mf-Mo) / Δt x 22.41 / 2.016 x (Ptarget /Po)
where VH2 is the average volumetric flow rate (NL/min) over the time interval
and the term (Ptarget /Po) is used to compensate for differences between the
measured initial pressure, Po, and the targeted fill pressure Ptarget.
6.1.1.2. Post-crash leak test - Ccompressed hydrogen storage system filled with
compressed helium
The helium gas pressure, P0 (MPa), and temperature T0 (°C), are measured
immediately before the impact and then at a predetermined time interval after
the impact. The time interval, Δt, starts when the vehicle comes to rest after
the impact and continues for at least 60 minutes.
The time interval, Δt, shall be increased if necessary in order to accommodate
measurement accuracy for a storage system CHSS with a large volume
operating up to 70MPa; in that case, Δt can be calculated from the following
equation:
Δt = VCHSS x NWP /1000 x ((-0.028 x NWP +5.5) x Rs – 0.3) – 2.6 x Rs
where Rs = Ps / NWP, Ps is the pressure range of the pressure sensor (MPa),
NWP is the Nominal Working Pressure (MPa), VCHSS is the volume of the
compressed storage system CHSS (L), and Δt is the time interval (min). If the
value of Δt is less than 60 minutes, Δt is set to 60 minutes.

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 The initial mass of hydrogen helium in the storage system CHSS is calculated
as follows:
Po’ = Po x 288 / (273 + T0)
ρo’ = –0.0043 x (P0’)2 + 1.53 x P0’ + 1.49
Mo = ρo’ x VCHSS
The final mass of hydrogen helium in the storage system CHSS at the end of
the time interval, Δt, is calculated as follows:
Pf’ = Pf x 288 / (273 + Tf)
ρf’ = –0.0043 x (Pf’)2 + 1.53 x Pf’ + 1.49
Mf = ρf’ x VCHSS
where Pf is the measured final pressure (MPa) at the end of the time interval,
and Tf is the measured final temperature (°C).
The average helium flow rate over the time interval is therefore
VHe = (Mf-Mo) / Δt x 22.41 / 4.003 x (Po/ Ptarget / P0)

where VHe is the average volumetric flow rate (NL/min) over the time interval
and the term Po/ Ptarget / P0 is used to compensate for differences between the
measured initial pressure (Po) and the targeted fill pressure (Ptarget).
Conversion of the average volumetric flow of helium to the average hydrogen
flow is done with the following expression:
VH2 = VHe / 0.75
where VH2 is the corresponding average volumetric flow of hydrogen (that
shall be less than the criteria in para. 5.2.2.1. to pass).
6.1.2. Post-crash concentration test for enclosed spaces
The measurements are recorded in the crash test that evaluates potential
hydrogen (or helium) leakage (para. 6.1.1. test procedure).
Sensors are selected to measure either the build-up of the hydrogen or helium
gas or the reduction in oxygen (due to displacement of air by leaking
hydrogen/helium).
Sensors are calibrated to traceable references to ensure an accuracy of ±5 per
cent at the targeted criteria of 4.0 per cent hydrogen or 3.0 per cent helium by
volume in air, and a full scale measurement capability of at least 25 per cent
above the target criteria. The sensor shall be capable of a 90 per cent response
to a full scale change in concentration within 10 seconds.
Prior to the crash impact, the sensors are located in the passenger, and luggage,
and cargo compartments of the vehicle as follows:
(a) At a distance within 250 mm of the headliner above the driver’s seat or
near the top centre the passenger compartment;
(b) At a distance within 250 mm of the floor in front of the rear (or rear
most) seat in the passenger compartment;
(c) At a distance within 100 mm of the top of luggage and cargo
compartments within the vehicle that are not directly affected by the
particular crash impact to be conducted.

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 The sensors are securely mounted on the vehicle structure or seats and
protected for the planned crash test from debris, air bag exhaust gas and
projectiles. The measurements following the crash are recorded by instruments
located within the vehicle or by remote transmission.
The vehicle may be located either outdoors in an area protected from the wind
and possible solar effects or indoors in a space that is large enough or ventilated
to prevent the build-up of hydrogen to more than 10 per cent of the targeted
criteria in the passenger, and luggage, and cargo compartments.
Post-crash data collection in enclosed spaces commences when the vehicle
comes to a rest. Data from the sensors are collected at least every 5 seconds
and continue for a period of 60 minutes after the test. A first-order lag (time
constant) up to a maximum of 5 seconds may be applied to the measurements
to provide "smoothing" and filter the effects of spurious data points.
The filtered readings from each sensor shall be below the targeted criteria of
3±1.0 4.0 per cent for hydrogen or and 2.25 ± 0.75 3.0 per cent for helium at
all times throughout the 60 minutes post-crash test period.
6.1.3. Compliance test for single failure conditions
For requirement 5.2.1.4.2 test procedure 6.1.3.2 shall be executed.
For requirement 5.2.1.4.3 Eeither test procedure of para. 6.1.3.1. or para.
6.1.3.2. shall be executed:
6.1.3.1. Test procedure for vehicle equipped with hydrogen gas leakage detectors

6.1.3.1.1. Test condition

6.1.3.1.1.1 Test vehicle: The propulsion system of the test vehicle is started, warmed up
to its normal operating temperature, and left operating for the test duration. If
the vehicle is not a fuel cell vehicle, it is warmed up and kept idling. If the test
vehicle has a system to stop idling automatically, measures are taken so as to
prevent the engine from stopping.
6.1.3.1.1.2. Test gas: Two mixtures of air and hydrogen gas: 2 ± 1.0 > 3.0 per cent
concentration (or less) of hydrogen in the air to verify function of the warning,
and 3±1.0 > 4.0 per cent concentration (or less) of hydrogen in the air to verify
function of the shut-down. The proper concentrations are selected based on the
recommendation (or the detector specification) by the manufacturer.
6.1.3.1.2. Test method
6.1.3.1.2.1. Preparation for the test: The test is conducted without any influence of wind.
(a) A test gas induction hose is attached to the hydrogen gas leakage
detector;
(b) The hydrogen leak detector is enclosed with a cover to make gas stay
around hydrogen leak detector.
6.1.3.1.2.2. Execution of the test
(a) Test gas is blown to the hydrogen gas leakage detector;
(b) Proper function of the warning system is confirmed when tested with
the gas to verify function of the warning;
(c) The main shut-off valve is confirmed to be closed when tested with the
gas to verify function of the shut-down. For example, the monitoring of

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 the electric power to the shut-off valve or of the sound of the shut-off
valve activation may be used to confirm the operation of the main shut-
off valve of the hydrogen supply.
6.1.3.2. Test procedure for integrity of enclosed spaces and detection systems.
6.1.3.2.1. Preparation:
6.1.3.2.1.1. The test is conducted without any influence of wind.
6.1.3.2.1.2. Special attention is paid to the test environment as during the test flammable
mixtures of hydrogen and air may occur.
6.1.3.2.1.3. Prior to the test the vehicle is prepared to simulate allow remotely controllable
hydrogen releases from the hydrogen system. Hydrogen releases may be
demonstrated by using an external fuel supply without modification of the
test vehicle fuel lines. The number, location and flow capacity of the release
points downstream of the main hydrogen shutoff valve are defined by the
vehicle manufacturer taking worst case leakage scenarios under a single
failure condition into account. As a minimum, the total flow of all remotely
controlled releases shall be adequate to trigger demonstration of the automatic
"warning" and hydrogen shut-off functions.
6.1.3.2.1.4. For the purpose of the test, a hydrogen concentration detector is installed where
hydrogen gas may accumulate most in the passenger compartment (e.g. near
the headliner) when testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.2. and hydrogen
concentration detectors are installed in enclosed or semi enclosed volumes on
the vehicle where hydrogen can accumulate from the simulated hydrogen
releases when testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3. (see
para. 6.1.3.2.1.3.).
6.1.3.2.2. Procedure:
6.1.3.2.2.1. Vehicle doors, windows and other covers are closed.
6.1.3.2.2.2. The propulsion system is started, allowed to warm up to its normal operating
temperature and left operating at idle for the test duration.
6.1.3.2.2.3. A leak is simulated using the remote controllable function.
6.1.3.2.2.4. The hydrogen concentration is measured continuously until the concentration
does not rise for 3 minutes. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3.,
the simulated leak is then increased using the remote controllable function until
the main hydrogen shutoff valve is closed and the tell-tale warning signal is
activated. The monitoring of the electric power to the shut-off valve or of the
sound of the shut-off valve activation may be used to confirm the operation of
the main shut-off valve of the hydrogen supply.
6.1.3.2.2.5. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.2., the test is successfully
completed if the hydrogen concentration in the passenger compartment does
not exceed 1.0 per cent. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3., the
test is successfully completed if the tell-tale warning and shut-off function are
executed at (or below) the levels specified in para. 5.2.1.4.3.; otherwise, the
test is failed and the system is not qualified for vehicle service.
6.1.4. Compliance test for the vehicle exhaust system
6.1.4.1. The power system of the test vehicle (e.g. fuel cell stack or engine) is warmed
up to its normal operating temperature.

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6.1.4.2. The measuring device is warmed up before use to its normal operating
temperature.
6.1.4.3. The measuring section of the measuring device is placed on along the centre
line of the exhaust gas flow within 100mm of where the exhaust is released
to the atmosphere within 100 mm from the exhaust gas outlet external to the
vehicle.

6.1.4.4. The exhaust hydrogen concentration is continuously measured during the

following steps:
(a) The power system is shut down;
(b) Upon completion of the shut-down process, the power system is
immediately started;
(c) After completion of the start-up process as defined by the
manufacturer a lapse of one minute, the power system is turned off
and measurement continues until the power system shut-down
procedure is completed.
6.1.4.5. The measurement device shall: have a measurement response time of less than
300 milliseconds
(a) Have a measurement response-time (t0 - t90) of less than 2 seconds,
where t0 is the moment of hydrogen concentration switching, and
t90 is the time when 90% of the final indication is reached;
(b) Have a resolution time of less than 300 milliseconds (sampling rate
of >3.33 Hz).
6.1.5. Compliance test for fuel line leakage
6.1.5.1. The power system of the test vehicle (e.g. fuel cell stack or engine) is warmed
up and operating at its normal operating temperature with the operating
pressure applied to fuel lines.
6.1.5.2. Hydrogen leakage is evaluated at accessible sections of the fuel lines from the
high-pressure section to the fuel cell stack (or the engine), using a gas leak
detector or a leak detecting liquid, such as soap solution.
6.1.5.3. Hydrogen leak detection is performed primarily at joints
6.1.5.4. When a gas leak detector is used, detection is performed by operating the leak
detector for at least 10 seconds at locations as close to fuel lines as possible.
6.1.5.5. When a leak detecting liquid is used, hydrogen gas leak detection is performed
immediately after applying the liquid. In addition, visual checks are performed
a few minutes after the application of liquid in order to check for bubbles
caused by trace leaks.
6.1.6. Installation verification
The system is visually inspected for compliance.

6.2. Test procedures for compressed hydrogen storage system

6.2.1. Test procedures for qualification requirements of CHSS compressed hydrogen
storage are organized as follows:

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 Section Paragraphs 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 contain is the test procedures for baseline
performance metrics (requirement of para. 5.1.1.) and performance
durability (requirement of para. 5.1.2)
Paragraph 6.2.3 contains is the test procedures for performance durability
(requirement of para. 5.1.2.)
Paragraph 6.2.4 contains is the test procedures for expected on-road
performance (requirement of para. 5.1.3.)
Paragraph 6.2.5 contains is the test procedures for service terminating
performance in Fire (requirement of para. 5.1.4.)
Paragraph 6.2.6 contains is the test procedures for performance durability of
primary closures (requirement of para. 5.1.5.)
Unless otherwise specified, the ambient temperature for all tests shall be
20 ± 15 °C.
Unless otherwise specified data sampling for pressure cycling shall be at
least 1 Hz.
Unless otherwise specified, the acceptable tolerances of the open ended test
parameters may be recommended by the manufacturer. In lieu of
accepting manufacturer guidance, suggested tolerances are provided in
Section O.
6.2.2. Test procedures for baseline performance metrics (requirement of para. 5.1.1.)
6.2.2.1. Burst test (hydraulic)
The burst test is conducted at ambient temperature 20 ± 15 (±5)°C using a
hydraulic non-corrosive fluid. The rate of pressurization is less than or equal
to ≤ 1.4 MPa/s for pressures higher than 150 per cent of the nominal working
pressure. If the rate exceeds 0.35 MPa/s at pressures higher than 150 per cent
NWP, then either the container is placed in series between the pressure source
and the pressure measurement device, or the time at the pressure above a target
burst pressure exceeds 5 seconds. The burst pressure of the container shall be
recorded.
6.2.2.2. Ambient pPressure cycling test (hydraulic)
The test is performed in accordance with the following procedure and the test
parameters specified in Table 3:
(a) The containertest article is filled with a hydraulic non-corrosive fluid;
(b) The containertest article and fluid are stabilized at the temperature
specified in Table 3 the specified temperature and relative humidity at
the start of testing.; t The environment, fuelling hydraulic fluid and the
surface of the test article container skin are maintained at the specified
temperature for the duration of the testingcycling. The container test
article temperature may vary from the environmental temperature
during testingcycling;
(c) The container test article is pressure cycled between 2 (± 1) MPa and
the target pressures specified in Table 3; 2 (±1) MPa and the ≥ 125 per
cent NWP target pressure at a rate not exceeding 10 cycles per minute
for the specified number of cycles;

134
 (d) The temperature of the hydraulic fluid within entering the container is
shall be maintained and monitored at the specified temperature and
monitored as close as possible to the container inlet; the specified
temperature.
Note: The container manufacturer may specify a hydraulic pressure cycle
profile that will prevent premature failure of the container due to
test conditions outside of the container design envelope.
Table 3
Pressure cycles and conditions

Purpose Number of cycles Target Pressure Temperature Rate

Environment:
Baseline initial
22,000 or until ≥ 125 per cent 20 ± 15 °C ≤ 10 cycles
pressure cycle life
leak occurs NWP Hydraulic fluid: per minute
(para. 5.1.1.2.)
20 ± 15 °C

6.2.3. Test procedures for performance durability (requirement of para. 5.1.2.)

6.2.3.1. Proof pressure test
The system CHSS or container with its container attachments (if
applicable), as specified, is pressurized smoothly and continually with a non-
corrosive hydraulic fluid or gas until the target test pressure level is reached
and then held for the duration specified in Table 4. specified time.
Table 4
Target pressure and holding duration of proof pressure test

Purpose Target pressure Holding duration

(Initial) proof pressure test ≥ 150 per cent NWP ≥ 30 seconds

(para. 5.1.2.1. and 5.1.3.1.)

Residual proof pressure test ≥ 180 per cent NWP ≥ 4 minutes

(para. 5.1.2.7. and 5.1.3.4.)

6.2.3.2. Drop (impact) test (unpressurized)

The storage container and its container attachments (if any) is drop tested at
ambient temperature without internal pressurization or attached valves. The
surface onto which the containers are test article is dropped shall be a smooth,
horizontal concrete pad or other flooring type with equivalent hardness. No
attempt shall be made to prevent the test article from bouncing or falling
over during a drop test, but the test article shall be prevented from falling
over during the vertical drop test.
(a) The test article orientation of the container being dropped (per
requirement of para. 5.1.2.2.) is determined as follows: One or more
additional container(s) shall be dropped in any one of the following
four orientations: each of the orientations described below. The drop

135
 orientations may be executed with a single container or as many as four
containers may be used to accomplish the four drop orientations.
(ia) Dropped once fFrom a horizontal position with the bottom
1.8 m above the surface onto which it is dropped. In case of
non-axisymmetric container, the shut off valve interface
location and its centre of gravity as well as the longest axis
passing through the container shall be horizontally aligned;
(iib) Dropped once onto the end of the container fFrom a vertical
position with the shut off valve interface location ported end
upward, with a drop height calculated based on a potential
energy of not less than 488 J., with the height of the lower end
no greater than 1.8 m; In no case shall the height of the lower
end be less than 0.1m or greater than 1.8m. In case of non-
axisymmetric container, the shut off valve interface
location and its centre of gravity shall be vertically aligned;
(iiic) Dropped once onto the end of the container fFrom a vertical
position with the shut off valve interface location ported end
downward, with a drop height calculated based on a potential
energy of not less than 488 J., with the height of the lower end
no greater than 1.8 m; In no case shall the height of the lower
end be less than 0.1m or greater than 1.8m. If the container
is symmetrical (identical ported ends), this drop orientation is
not required. In case of non-axisymmetric container, the
shut off valve interface location and its centre of gravity
shall be vertically aligned;
(ivd) Dropped once at From a 45° angle from the vertical orientation
with the shut off valve interface location a ported end
downward with its centre of gravity ≤ 1.8 m above the ground.
However, if the bottom is closer to the ground than 0.6 m, the
drop angle shall be changed to maintain a minimum height of
0.6 m and a centre of gravity of ≤ 1.8 m above the ground. In
case of non-axisymmetric container, the line passing the
shut off valve interface location end and its centre of
gravity shall be 45° angled from vertical orientation and the
shut off valve interface location shall become the lowest.
The four drop orientations are illustrated below.
Figure 35
Drop orientations

45o

No. 1 N o. 2 No. 3*

No. 4
1.8m

> 488J > 0.6m

< 1.8 m
center of gravity

136
No attempt shall be made to prevent the bouncing of containers, but the
containers may be prevented from falling over during the vertical drop test
described in b) above.
If more than one container is used to execute all three drop specifications, then
those containers shall undergo pressure cycling according to para. 6.2.2.2. until
either leakage or 22,000 cycles without leakage have occurred. Leakage shall
not occur within number of Cycles (5,500, 7,500 or 11,000).
The orientation of the container being dropped per requirement para. 5.1.2.2.
shall be identified as follows:
(a) If a single container was subjected to all four drop orientations, then the
container being dropped per requirement of para. 5.1.2.2. shall be
dropped in all four orientations;
(b) If more than one container is used to execute the four drop orientations,
and if all containers reach 22,000 cycles without leakage, then the
orientation of the container being dropped per requirement para.
5.1.2.2. is the 45o orientation (iv), and that container shall then undergo
further testing as specified in paragraph 5.1.2. ;

137
 (c) If more than one container is used to execute the four drop orientations
and if any container does not reach 22,000 cycles without leakage, then
the new container shall be subjected to the drop orientation(s) that
resulted in the lowest number of cycles to leakage and then will undergo
further testing as specified in paragraph 5.1.2.
6.2.3.3. Surface damage test (unpressurized)
The surface damage tests and the chemical exposure tests (paragraph
6.2.3.4.) shall be conducted on the surface of the pressure bearing chamber
of the container as long as it is accessible regardless of the existence of the
container attachments.
If the container attachments can be removed in accordance with the
process specified by the manufacturer, then the container attachments
shall be removed, and the tests shall be conducted on the surface of the
pressure bearing chamber of the container.
Otherwise, the tests shall be conducted on the surface of the container
attachments as indicated in Figure 4.
Figure 4
Surface damage flow chart

The test proceeds in the following sequence:

(a) Surface flaw generation: A saw cut at least 0.75mm deep and 200mm
long is made on the surface specified above.
If the container is to be affixed to the vehicle by compressing its
composite surface, then a second cut at least 1.25 mm deep and 25
mm long is applied at the end of the container which is opposite to
the location of the first cut; Two longitudinal saw cuts are made on
the bottom outer surface of the unpressurized horizontal storage
container along the cylindrical zone close to but not in the shoulder area.
The first cut is at least 1.25 mm deep and 25 mm long toward the valve
end of the container. The second cut is at least 0.75 mm deep and
200 mm long toward the end of the container opposite the valve;

138
 (b) Pendulum impacts: A surface of the test article opposite to the
surface specified above or a surface of a different chamber, in the
case of a container with multiple permanently interconnected
chambers, The upper section of the horizontal storage container is
divided into five distinct (not overlapping) areas 100 mm in diameter
each (see Figure 56). After Immediately following a minimum of 12
hours preconditioning at ≤ – 40 °C in an environmental chamber, the
centre of each of the five areas sustains the impact of a pendulum having
a pyramid with equilateral faces and square base, the summit and edges
being rounded to a radius of 3 mm. The centre of impact of the
pendulum coincides with the centre of gravity of the pyramid. The
energy of the pendulum at the moment of impact with each of the five
marked areas on the container is ≥ 30 J. The container test article is
secured in place during pendulum impacts and not under pressure.
Figure 56
Side view of tank

“Side” View of Tank

6.2.3.4. Chemical exposure and ambient temperature pressure cycling test

Each of the 5 areas of the unpressurized container (with container
attachments, if applicable) preconditioned by pendulum impact (paragraph
6.2.3.3.(b)6.4.2.5.2.) is exposed to one of five solutions:
(a) 19 per cent (by volume) sulphuric acid in water (battery acid);
(b) 25 per cent (by weight) sodium hydroxide in water;
(c) 5 per cent (by volume) methanol in gasoline (fluids in fuelling stations);
(d) 28 per cent (by weight) ammonium nitrate in water (urea solution); and
(e) 50 per cent (by volume) methyl alcohol in water (windshield washer
fluid).
The test article container is oriented with the fluid exposure areas on top. A
pad of glass wool approximately 0.5 mm thick and 100 mm in diameter is

139
 placed on each of the five preconditioned areas. A sufficient amount of the test
fluid is applied to the glass wool sufficient to ensure that the pad is wetted
across its surface and through its thickness for the duration of the test. A plastic
covering may be applied over the glass wool to prevent evaporation.
The exposure of the test article container with the glass wool is maintained
for at least 48 hrs with the test article container held at ≥ 125 per cent NWP
(applied hydraulically) and ambient temperature20 ± 15 (±5) °C before the
test article container is subjected to further testing.
Pressure cycling is in accordance with Table 5 is performed to the specified
target pressures according to in paragraph 6.2.2.2. at 20 (±5)°C for the
specified numbers of cycles. The glass wool pads are removed and the
container surface is rinsed with water after the final 10 cycles to specified final
target pressure cycling is are conductedcompleted.
Table 5
Pressure cycles and conditions

Purpose Number of cycles Target Pressure Temperature Rate

60 per cent the
specified
Chemical exposure number of
≥ 125 per cent Environment:
and ambient cycles
NWP 20 ± 15 °C
temperature determined in ≤ 10 cycles
pressure cycling test paragraph Hydraulic fluid: per minute
5.1.1.2. 20 ± 15 °C
(para. 5.1.2.4.)
of which the ≥ 150 per cent
last 10 cycles NWP

6.2.3.5. Static pressure test (hydraulic)

The test article storage system is pressurized to ≥ 125 per cent NWP the target
pressure in a temperature-controlled chamber at ≥ 85 °C for at least 1,000 hr.
The temperature of the chamber and the non-corrosive fuelling fluid is held at
surface of the test article are maintained at the target temperature within
±5°C for the specified duration.
6.2.3.6. Extreme temperature pressure cycling test (hydraulic)
The test is performed in accordance with the following procedure and the
test parameters specified in Table 6:
(a) The test article is filled with a hydraulic fluid for each test;
(b) The test article and fluid are stabilized at the temperature and
relative humidity specified in Table 6 at the start of each test. The
environment, hydraulic fluid and the surface of the test article are
maintained at the specified temperature for the duration of the
cycling. The test article temperature may vary from the
environmental temperature during cycling;
(c) The test article is pressure cycled between 2 ± 1 MPa and the target
pressures specified in Table 6;

140
 (d) The temperature of the hydraulic fluid entering the container shall
be maintained at the specified temperature and monitored as close
as possible to the container inlet.
Note: It is recommended that the container is kept at greater than
atmospheric pressure for the duration of the testing and is only
depressurized once stabilized to ambient temperature.
Table 6
Pressure cycles and conditions

Purpose Number of cycles Target Pressure Temperature Rate

Environment:
Extreme temperature 20 per cent the
≤ -40 °C at the
pressure cycling test specified
start of each test
(para. 5.1.2.6.) number of
≥ 80 per cent Hydraulic fluid ≤ 10 cycles
cycles
(b) Extreme cold NWP and surface: per minute
determined in
test paragraph ≤ -40 °C for
5.1.1.2. duration of the
cycling

Environment:
20 per cent the ≥ 85 °C and ≥ 80
specified per cent relative
number of humidity
(c) Extreme hot ≥ 125 per cent ≤ 10 cycles
cycles Hydraulic fluid &
test NWP per minute
determined in surface:
paragraph ≥ 85 °C for
5.1.1.2. duration of the
cycling

6.2.4. Test procedures for expected on-road performance (para. 5.1.3.)

(Pneumatic test procedures are provided; hydraulic test elements are described
in para. 6.3.2.)
Test sequence and parameters of the ambient and extreme temperature
gas pressure cycling test are specified in Table 7.
Table 7
Ambient and extreme temperature gas pressure cycling test parameters
No. of Ambient Initial CHSS Fuel Delivery Initial Target Pressure
cycles Conditions Equilibration Temperature Pressure
5 ≤ -25°C ≤ -25°C 20 ± 5°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
5 ≤ -25°C ≤ -25°C -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
15 ≤ -25°C N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
5 ≥ 50°C, ≥ 80 per ≥ 50°C, ≥ 80 per -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
cent RH cent RH
20 ≥ 50°C, ≥ 80 per N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
cent RH
200 20°C ± 5°C N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
1st 55°C to 60°C 55°C to 60°C N/A N/A ≥ 100 per cent SOC
permeation

141
25 ≥ 50°C, ≥ 80 per N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
cent RH
25 ≤ -25°C N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
200 20 ± 5°C N/A -33°C to -40°C ≤ 2 MPa ≥ 100 per cent SOC
2nd 55°C to 60°C 55°C to 60°C N/A N/A ≥ 100 per cent SOC
permeation

6.2.4.1. Gas pressure cycling test (pneumatic)

(a) The CHSS is pressure cycled using hydrogen gas for a total of 500
cycles, which are divided into two groups of 250 cycles at the test
parameters specified in Table 7;
(b) The ramp rate shall be greater than or equal to the ramp rates
given in the SAE J2601_202005 fuelling tables (communications, no
top-off), or other applicable fuelling protocol, according to the size
of the CHSS under test. If the required ambient temperature is not
available in the table, the closest ramp rate value or a linearly
interpolated value shall be used;
(c) The de-fuelling rate shall be greater than or equal to the intended
vehicle’s maximum fuel-demand rate. Out of the 500 pressure
cycles, any fifty pressure cycles are performed using a de-fuelling
rate greater than or equal to the maintenance de-fuelling rate;
(d) The specified temperature and relative humidity is maintained
within the test environment throughout each pressure cycle. When
required in the test specification, the CHSS temperature is
stabilized at the external environmental temperature between
pressure cycles. The CHSS is pressure cycled between ≤ 2 MPa and
≥ 125 per cent SOC. If system controls that are active in vehicle
service prevent the pressure from dropping below a specified
pressure, the test cycles shall not go below that specified pressure;
(e) The fuel delivery temperature is controlled to the specified
temperature and shall be achieved within 30 seconds of fuelling
initiation. However, the pressure ramp rate shall be decreased if
the gas temperature in the container exceeds 85 °C the maximum
allowable internal temperature as specified by the manufacturer. If
devices and/or controls are used in the intended vehicle application
to prevent an extreme internal temperature, the test may be
conducted with these devices and/or controls (or equivalent
measures);
(f) The maximum allowable leak rate from the CHSS from a single
point is in accordance with paragraph 6.2.4.3(b).
At the onset of testing, the storage system is stabilized at the specified
temperature, relative humidity and fuel level for at least 24 hrs. The specified
temperature and relative humidity is maintained within the test environment
throughout the remainder of the test. (When required in the test specification,
the system temperature is stabilized at the external environmental temperature
between pressure cycles.) The storage system is pressure cycled between less
than 2(+0/-1) MPa and the specified maximum pressure (±1MPa). If system
controls that are active in vehicle service prevent the pressure from dropping
below a specified pressure, the test cycles shall not go below that specified

142
 pressure. The fill rate is controlled to a constant 3-minute pressure ramp rate,
but with the fuel flow not to exceed 60 g/s; the temperature of the hydrogen
fuel dispensed to the container is controlled to the specified temperature.
However, the pressure ramp rate should be decreased if the gas temperature in
the container exceeds +85°C. The defuelling rate is controlled to greater than
or equal to the intended vehicle’s maximum fuel-demand rate. The specified
number of pressure cycles is conducted. If devices and/or controls are used in
the intended vehicle application to prevent an extreme internal temperature,
the test may be conducted with these devices and/or controls (or equivalent
measures).
6.2.4.2. Gas permeation test (pneumatic)
This test is performed after each group of 250 pneumatic pressure cycles
conducted in accordance with paragraph 6.2.4.1 Table 7.
A storage system The CHSS is fully filled with hydrogen gas to ≥ 100 per
cent SOC at 115 per cent NWP (full fill density equivalent to 100 per
cent NWP at +15 °C is 113 per cent NWP at +55 °C) and soaked for a
minimum of 12 hours at 55 °C to 60 °C held at ≥ +55 °C in a sealed
environmental chamber container prior to the start of the test. The test
shall continue until the measured permeation reaches a steady state based
on at least 3 consecutive rates separated by at least 12 hours being within
±10 per cent of the previous rate, or 500 hours, whichever occurs first.
steady-state permeation or 30 hours, whichever is longer. The total steady-state
discharge rate due to leakage and permeation from the storage system is
measured.
6.2.4.3. Localized gas leak test (pneumatic)
A bubble test may be used to fulfil this requirement. The following procedure
is used when conducting the bubble test:
(a) The exhaust of the shutoff valve (and other internal connections to
hydrogen systems) shall be capped for this test (as the test is focused at
on external leakage).
At the discretion of the manufacturer or test laboratory tester, the
test article may be immersed in the leak-test fluid or leak-test fluid
applied to the test article when resting in open air. Bubbles can vary
greatly in size, depending on conditions. The tester estimates the gas
leakage based on the size and rate of bubble formation.
(b) Note: For a localized rate of 0.005 mg/sec (3.6 NmL/min), the resultant
allowable rate of bubble generation is about 2,030 bubbles per minute
for a typical bubble size of 1.5 mm in diameter. Even if much larger
bubbles are formed, the leak shall should be readily detectable. For an
unusually large bubble size of 6 mm in diameter, the allowable bubble
rate would be approximately 32 bubbles per minute.
6.2.5. Test procedures for two-stage localized/engulfing fire test service
terminating performance in fire (para. 5.1.4.)
Fire test
The hydrogen container assembly consists of the compressed hydrogen storage
system with additional relevant features, including the venting system (such as
the vent line and vent line covering) and any shielding affixed directly to the

143
 container (such as thermal wraps of the container(s) and/or coverings/barriers
over the TPRD(s)).
Either one of the following two methods are used to identify the position of the
system over the initial (localized) fire source:
The test consists of two stages: a localized fire stage followed by an
engulfing stage as described in Figure 6.
Figure 6
Temperature profile of fire test

Localized Fire Exposure Engulfing Fire

Min
Temp

800o C
Localized Area
600o C Engulfing Region Outside
Localized Area (burner
ramp rate)
300o C
Ignite
Main
Burner

0 1 3 10 12 Minutes

The CHSS test article to be evaluated is defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.

Test conditions and wind shielding requirements for conducting the fire
test are defined in paragraph 6.2.5.2.
The fuel supply and burner for the fire test are defined in paragraph
6.2.5.3.
A pre-test checkout of the burner is defined in paragraph 6.2.5.4. to ensure
that the burner is operating within the established thermal criteria prior
to the CHSS fire test.
Final preparations for the CHSS fire test are defined in paragraphs
6.2.5.5. and 6.2.5.6., and the test procedure for the CHSS fire test under
two-stage localized/engulfing fire is defined in paragraph 6.2.5.7.
6.2.5.1. CHSS test article
In addition to the container and primary closure devices such as shut-off
valve(s), check valve(s), and TPRD(s) required to isolate the system, the
CHSS test article shall include container attachments (if any) such as gas
housings or barriers that could impede TPRD response. Vent lines shall
be connected to TPRDs to direct TPRD exhausts in a manner
representative of the configuration in the vehicle.
At the option of the manufacturer, the CHSS test article may include
vehicle-specific structural framing, shields and panels, and/or other

144
 protective features intended to protect the CHSS from fire exposures
consistent with the fire threats on the CHSS as installed in the specific
vehicle. Method 1: Qualification for a generic (non-Specific) vehicle
installation
If a vehicle installation configuration is not specified (and the qualification of
the system is not limited to a specific vehicle installation configuration) then
the localized fire exposure area is the area on the test article farthest from the
TPRD(s). The test article, as specified above, only includes thermal shielding
or other mitigation devices affixed directly to the container that are used in all
vehicle applications. Venting system(s) (such as the vent line and vent line
covering) and/or coverings/barriers over the TPRD(s) are included in the
container assembly if they are anticipated for use in any application. If a system
is tested without representative components, retesting of that system is required
if a vehicle application specifies the use of these type of components.
6.2.5.2. Test conditions and wind shielding
Testing can be conducted either indoors or outdoors.
Ambient temperature and wind speed and direction shall be measured and
recorded if testing conducted outdoors.
Outdoor testing shall not be conducted when precipitation (i.e., rain, snow,
sleet, etc.) is occurring unless the test area with the test article and burner
is protected such that the precipitation does not adversely affect the test
result.
Wind shielding such as are walls, fencing, and/or enclosures shall be used
for the fire tests at sites susceptible to wind effects during the tests (pre-
test checkout and CHSS fire test). The wind shielding shall provide at
least 0.5 m separation between the CHSS test article (or pre-test cylinder)
and the wind shields such that the fire can freely draft and that the length
of jet flames (if any) from the CHSS test article can be confirmed.
Openings (or other provisions) shall be provided in wind shielding to allow
fresh air to enter the test area and for the combustion products to be
exhausted. The adequacy of wind shielding shall be verified by compliance
to Table 10 during a pre-test check-out prior to the CHSS fire test.
NOTE: Rupture of container during the fire test is likely to result in blast
waves and the rapid expulsion of container materials and
attachments as well as the hydrogen contents.
These effects can result in uncontrolled movement of the CHSS
test article and secondary explosions due to the build-up of high
pressure, flammable gas mixtures within the test area and wind
shielding (if used).
Countermeasures to these effects need to be addressed and
implemented as part of locating the test site relative to other
equipment and designing and constructing wind shielding (if
used) and test support structure to prevent severe injury to
personnel and unacceptable property damage.
6.2.5.3. Burner definition
In order to conduct the two stage localized/engulfing fire test, the burner
is divided into two zones:

145
 (a) The localized burner zone operates by itself during the localized
fire stage.
(b) The engulfing burner extension simulates the spread of the fire
from the localized burner zone to the remainder of the burner. The
engulfing burner zone is comprised of both the localized burner
zone and the engulfing fire extension.
6.2.5.3.1. Fuel supply and burner control
The localized and engulfing burners shall be LPG-fired.
The LPG burner fuel flow to both the localized burner zone and engulfing
burner extension shall be measured to set burner fuel flows to the specific
heat release rates (HRR/As) defined in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.2.
The measured fuel flow(s) shall be recorded throughout the tests on a 1-
second basis.
6.2.5.3.2. Burner configuration
6.2.5.3.2.1. The length of the localized burner zone (LLOC) is 250 ± 50 mm.
The length of the engulfing burner extension (LEXT) shall be a maximum
of 1,400 ± 50 mm. A burner with the specified maximum extension can be
used for all fire tests. Engulfing burner extensions shorter than the
maximum are acceptable as long the burner extends beyond of the CHSS
test article when positioned for the CHSS firefire test.
The total length of the engulfing burner zone (LENG) is the sum LLOC and
LEXT. The maximum value is 1,650 ± 100 mm based on the specifications
above.
The width (W) of both the localized and engulfing burner zones shall be
500 ± 50 mm regardless of container width/ diameter.
The burner nozzle configuration and installation on the manifolds (or
"rails") shall be consistent with Table 8. The number of nozzles (NLOC and
NEXT) on the rails of the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner
extension and the nozzle spacing (SN) shall be selected such that the
resultant lengths of the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner
extension (LLOC and LEXT) meet requirements defined above. Similarly, the
number of rails (NR) and rail spacing (SR) shall be selected such that the
width of the burners meets requirements defined above.
NOTES:
(a) The resultant lengths of the localized burner zone and the engulfing
burner extension are determined by;
LLOC = NLOC x SN
and
LEXT = NEXT x SN
based on selected values for the number of nozzles (NLOC and NEXT
in the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner extension,
respectively) and the nozzle spacing (SN).
Similarly, the resultant width (W) of the burners is determined by;
W = (NR – 1) x SR
based on selected values for number of rails (NR) and rail spacing
(SR).

146
 (b) See the rationale in Section E of Part I for relevant examples of
possible variations in the burner array.
(c) As illustrated in Figure 8 below, the nozzles on the third and fourth
rails aim toward the centre of the burner to form a "hot zone" in
this targeted area. See also Figures 14 and 15 in Part I.
Table 8
Definition of burner nozzles for the prescribed burner
Item Description
Nozzle type LPG fuel nozzle with air pre-mix
- LPG orifice in nozzle 1.0 ± 0.1 mm ID
- Air ports in nozzle Four (4) holes, 6.4 mm ± 0.6 mm ID
- Fuel/Air mixing tube in nozzle 10 ± 1 mm ID
Number of rails 6
Centre-to-centre spacing of rails 100 ± 10 mm

Centre-to-centre nozzle spacing along the 50 ± 5 mm

rails

6.2.5.3.2.2. The values for LLOC, LEXT, and W defined above shall be used for
calculating HRR/As for the localized burner zone and engulfing burner
extension.
The borders of the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner
extension shall be defined using LLOC, LEXT, and W so that test articles can
be properly located and oriented for CHSS fire test. The borderline
between the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner extension is
located mid-way between the nozzles of the two zones and used as a datum
for locating the outside borders at distances LLOC and LEXT away from the
datum towards the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner
extension, respectively. The centres of the outside rails of the burner
zone(s) define the remaining two borders.
NOTE: Figure 17 in Part 1 shows an illustration of borderlines.
6.2.5.4. Pre-test checkout of burner
The purpose of the pre-test checkout is to verify that the localized and
engulfing burner zones are operating as expected and that the test setup
including wind shields are functional and capable of delivering repeatable
results prior to conducting the CHSS fire tests.
6.2.5.4.1. Pre-test checkout frequency
This pre-test shall be performed at least once prior to conducting CHSS
fire tests. If the burner and test setup is modified then the pre-test
checkout shall be repeated before the CHSS fire test.
6.2.5.4.2. Pre-test cylinder definition

147
 A 320mm diameter pre-test cylinder (fabricated from 300 mm/12 inch
Schedule 40 NPS steel pipe with end caps) shall be used for the burner pre-
test.
The cylindrical length of the pre-test cylinder shall be at least 800mm, and
the overall length shall be equal or longer than the CHSS test article (up
to maximum engulfing burner length in paragraph 6.2.5.3.2.1.).
6.2.5.4.3. Instrumentation and data processing for pre-test check-out
6.2.5.4.3.1. The pre-test cylinder shall be instrumented to ensure that the burner and
test setup will produce temperature levels consistent with performance-
based requirements of the localized and engulfing fire zones. The location
of the instrumentation shall be adjusted along the cylindrical section of
the pre-test cylinder to be consistent with the targeted localized and
engulfing fire zones of the CHSS test article. One set of instrumentation
on the cylindrical section shall be centrally located within the localized
zone, and the other two sets spread out over the remaining length of the
engulfing fire zone (outside the localized fire zone).
As an example of the process, Figure 7 illustrates a common situation
where a container is protected by a TPRD on one end (i.e., the left end) so
the localized fire zone is located on the right-end end. The surface
temperatures are measured on the top, middle, and bottom of the pre-test
cylinder in three locations along the length of the cylinder. The location
on the right end of the cylindrical section is centrally-located in the
targeted localized zone, and the other two locations are in the centre and
left ends of the targeted engulfing fire zones along the cylindrical section.
Figure 7
Example of Placement of Instrumentation on the Pre-test cylinder

Temperature measurements on the pre-test cylinder shall be performed

by ɸ3.2 mm (or less) K-type sheath thermocouples that are located within
a 5 mm gap from the pipe surface that are held on the surface by straps
or other mechanical attachments. Temperature measurements shown in
Figure 7 are defined as follows:
(a) TBR, TBC, and TBL are temperature measurements on the bottom
surface of the pre-test cylinder that are directly exposed to the
burner flame.
(b) TMRF, TMCF, TMLF, TMRR, TMCR, and TMLR are
temperature measurements on the surface of the pre-test cylinder
at mid-height. These temperatures are used for data collection only
during the pre-test verification and calibration of the localized and
engulfing fires.

148
 (c) TUR, TUC, and TUL are temperature measurements on the top
surface of the pre-test cylinder that are opposite the side directly
exposed to the burner flame.
Additional thermocouples may be located at TPRD sensing points or any
other locations for optional diagnostic purposes.
6.2.5.4.3.2. Thermocouples shall also be located 25 ± 5 mm below the pre-test cylinder
along the length of the cylinder for the purpose of developing reference
temperature levels during the pre-test checkout that can be subsequently
used for monitoring the burner during the CHSS fire test. Three (3)
thermocouples (TBR25, TBC25, and TBL25) shall correspond to pre-test
cylinder instrumentation as shown in Figure 7. Thermocouples used to
back up or supplement TBR25, TBC25, and TBL25 may also be added
along the centre line of the burner. See paragraph 6.2.5.6. for
requirements for positioning thermocouples for burner monitoring
during the CHSS fire test.
The thermocouples used for burner monitoring shall be unshielded (i.e.,
unprotected by metal wells) ɸ3.2 mm (or less) K-type sheath
thermocouples. Given the need to maintain the distance from the steel
container within ± 5 mm, these thermocouples shall be mechanically
supported to prevent movement or drooping. If testing of CHSSs with
large width/diameters is contemplated, then mounting shall maintain the
distance between the CHSS and the burner monitors as the spacing
between the burner and CHSS is adjusted in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.5.
6.2.5.4.3.3. Thermocouple readings shall be recorded at least once a second and
then used to calculate the following parameters:
(a) TBLOC is the bottom surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder
based on TBR;
(b) TMFLOC are the surface temperatures of the front side of the pre-
test cylinder based on TMRF;
(c) TMRLOC is the surface temperatures of the rear side of pre-test
cylinder based on TMRR;
(d) TULOC is the top surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder based
on TUR;
(e) TBLOC25 is the burner monitor below the pre-test cylinder (and
subsequently below the CHSS test article in paragraph 6.2.5.6.)
based on TBR25. Thermocouples used to back up or supplement
TBR25 may also be included in the calculation of the average
temperature of the burner monitors in the localized fire zone. Any
thermocouple measurement that has been compromised or failed
(or is not located within the localized fire zone) shall be disregarded
from the calculation of average temperature of the burner monitor.
(f) TBENG is the bottom surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder
based on the average of TBR, TBC, or TBL within the engulfing
fire zone.
(g) TMFENG is the surface temperature of the front side of the pre-test
cylinder based on the average of TMLF, TMCF, and TMRF within
the engulfing fire zone.

149
 (h) TMRENG is the surface temperatures of the rear side of the pre-test
cylinder based on the average of TMLR, TMCR, and TMRR within
the engulfing fire zone.
(i) TUENG is the top surface temperature of the pre-test cyinder based
on the average of TUR, TUC, or TUL within the engulfing fire zone.
(j) TBENG25 is the burner monitor below the pre-test cylinder (and
subsequently below the CHSS test article in paragraph 6.2.5.6.)
based on the average of the three required thermocouples (TBR25,
TBC25, or TBL25 for the pre-test checkout) within the engulfing
fire zone. Thermocouples used to back up or supplement TBR25,
TBC25, or TBL25 may also be in included in the calculation of
average temperature of the burner monitor in the engulfing fire
zone. Any thermocouple measurement that has been compromised
or failed (or is not located within the engulfing fire zone) shall be
disregarded from the calculation of average temperature in the
engulfing fire zone.
6.2.5.4.4. Mounting of the pre-test cylinder
The pre-test cylinder used for the pre-test checkout shall be mounted at a
height of 100 ± 5 mm above the burner and located over the burner such
that nozzles from the two centrally-located manifolds are pointing toward
the bottom centre of the steel container.
NOTE: See the diagrams in Figure 8 and Figure 9 for examples of the
mounting and the photograph in Figure 13 in Part I for the
mounting of a pre-test cylinder for the pre-test checkout.
Figure 8
Side view of mounting of the pre-test cylinder for pre-test checkout

Figure 9
End view of mounting of the pre-test cylinder relative to the burner

150
6.2.5.4.5. Pre-test checkout process
6.2.5.4.5.1. Prior to pre-test checkout of the burner, wind shieldings shall be installed
in accordance with paragraph 6.2.5.2.
6.2.5.4.5.2. The burner shall, at a minimum, be operated at fuel flow setpoints that
match the settings intended for the localized and engulfing burners during
the CHSS fire test. Suggested settings for the burners are provided in
Table 9; however, any setting within the allowable ranges of HRR/A in
Table 9 may be selected.
NOTE: During the engulfing fire stage, both the localized burner and the
engulfing burner extension need to be set to the intended HRR/A
for uniform heat release from the engulfing burner.
Table 9
Allowable range of operation and the suggested settings for the prescribed burner

Fire Stage Allowable Range of Suggested Setting of

Specific Heat Release Rate Specific Heat Release Rate
(HRR/A) (HRR/A)
Localized Burner 200 - 500 kW/m2 300 kW/m2

Engulfing Burner 400 - 1000 kW/m2 700 kW/m2

6.2.5.4.5.3. The 60-second rolling averages of individual temperature readings in the

localized fire zone (i.e., TBLOC, TMFLOC, TMRLOC, and TULOC) and the
engulfing fire zone (i.e., TBR, TBC, TBL, TMRF, TMCF, TML, TMRR,
TMCR, TMLR, TUR, TUC, and TUL) shall be in accordance with Table
10 at the HRR/A settings selected for the CHSS fire test in paragraph
6.2.5.7.
Table 10
Criteria for acceptance of localized and engulfing burners using alternative burner
configurations

151
 Fire Stage Allowable Allowable Allowable
Temperature Range Temperature Range Temperature Range
on Bottom of Pre-test on Sides of Pre-test on Top of Pre-test
cylinder cylinder cylinder
Localized 450 °C < TBLOC < TMFLOC < 750 °C TULOC < 300 °C
Burner 750 °C and
TMRLOC < 750 °C
Engulfing TBENG > 600 °C TUENG > 100 °C
Burner and
TUENG < TBENG
when
TUENG > 750 °C

6.2.5.4.5.4. Additionally, the allowable limits for the burner monitors during
subsequent CHSS fire test shall be established based on test results at the
expected localized and engulfing burner settings during the pre-test
checkout:
(a) The minimum value for the burner monitor during the localized
fire stage (TminLOC25) shall be calculated by subtracting 50 °C from
the 60-second rolling average of TBLOC25. If the resultant minimum
values exceed 600 °C, the minimum value is set to 600 °C for the
localized fire stage.
(b) The minimum value for the burner monitor during the engulfing
fire stage (TminENG25) shall be calculated by subtracting 50 °C from
the 60-second rolling average of TBENGC25. If the resultant
minimum values exceed 800 °C, the minimum value is set to 800 °C
for the engulfing fire stage.
If the above requirements are satisfactorily met, then the burner setup is
typically ready for CHSS fire test.
6.2.5.4.5.5. If results are not satisfactory, then the source of the variation in burner
performance shall be identified and corrected and then re-tested until the
requirements for pre-test verification are met. Adjustment of the height
is permissible to achieve acceptable operation within the allowable
operating ranges as defined in Tables 8 and 9.
When the width/diameter of the CHSS test article is larger than the width
of the burner and the shape of the bottom of the CHSS test article (for
example, a flat horizontal plane as illustrated for CHSS in Figures 30 and
33 in part I) impedes the burner exhaust from readily flowing up and
around the CHSS test article during the CHSS fire test, then the burner
air flow can be restricted and the burner monitors may not be able to
achieve the required minimum temperatures during the localized and/or
engulfing fire stages of the CHSS fire test. If the CHSS test article is
expected to impede the burner flow (or if the burner monitors did not
achieve the required temperatures during the CHSS fire test), then the
following additional pre-test is required to determine the appropriate
height for mounting the CHSS test article above the burner such that
required temperatures are achieved:

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 (a) A pre-test plate (made of steel) with approximately the length and
width/diameter of the CHSS test article is mounted above the
burner to simulate the bottom on the CHSS test article at an initial
height of 100 mm.
(b) Burner monitors as defined in 6.2.5.4.3.2. are located 25 ± 5 mm
below the surface.
(c) The burners are operated in the localized and engulfing modes (at
the HRR/As established above) and the temperatures of the burner
monitors are measured.
(d) If the burner monitors for both the localized and engulfing fire
stages do not meet the minimum criteria (defined in paragraph
6.2.5.4.5.4.), then the height of the pre-test plate above the burner
shall be increased by 50 mm and the process in steps 2 and 3 are
repeated until a satisfactory height if achieved.
NOTE: Satisfactory results are expected at heights of 200 – 250 mm.
If the burner monitors meet the minimum criteria (defined above) for
both the localized and engulfing fire stages, then the required height for
locating the CHSS test article above the burner has been determined and
the pre-test is complete.
6.2.5.5. Mounting of the CHSS test article above the burner
After the pre-test checkout(s) have been satisfactorily completed, the
CHSS test article shall be mounted above the burner.
6.2.5.5.1. Height and location of the CHSS test article above the burner
The CHSS test article shall be mounted at the same height above the
burner as for the pre-test checkout in paragraph 6.2.5.4. and located over
the burner such that nozzles on the two centrally-located manifolds (or
"rails") are pointing toward the targeted region on the bottom (i.e., the
lowest elevation) of the CHSS test article. See Figures 10 and 11 for
examples of the mounting of cylindrical and conformable containers,
respectively.
Figure 10
Position the bottom of the cylindrical container relative to the burner

Figure 11

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Position the bottom of the conformable container relative to the burner

6.2.5.5.2. Targeting of the localized and engulfing burner zones on the CHSS
Localized fire shall be targeted on the CHSS test article to challenge the
ability of the TPRDs to sense the fire and respond in order to protect the
container. This requirement is met as follows:
(a) For CHSS where the manufacturer has not opted to include
vehicle-specific features (as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.), the
CHSS test article shall be rotated relative to the localized burner to
minimize the ability to TPRDs to sense the fire and respond.
Shields, panels, wraps, structural elements, and other features
added to the container shall be considered when establishing the
worst case orientation relative to the localized fire as parts and
features intended to protect sections of the container but can
(inadvertently) leave other potions or joints/seams vulnerable to
attack and/or hinder the ability of TPRDs to respond.
For CHSS where the manufacturer has opted to include vehicle-
specific features (as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.), the CHSS test
article is oriented relative to the localized burner to provide the
worst case fire exposure identified for the specific vehicle.
(b) The localized burner shall be located under the CHSS test article
such that the distance from localized fire zone to the nearest TPRD
sense point(s) is maximized.
The engulfing fire zone shall extend in one direction from the localized fire
zone toward the nearest TPRD (or sense point). The engulfing burner can
extend beyond the TPRD(s) if the distance from the localized burner is
less than the maximum allowable extension of the engulfing burner as
defined above (i.e., 1,400 ± 50 mm).
NOTE: Examples of commonly-encountered situations for targeting the
localized fire zone on the CHSS test article and positioning the
engulfing fire zone under the CHSS test article are provided in
the rationale (in Part I Section E(d)).
6.2.5.6. Instrumentation and connections to the CHSS test article
6.2.5.6.1. The definition and mounting of the thermocouples for burner monitoring
are analogous to paragraph 6.2.5.4.3.2. for the pre-test checkout. See
Figures 10 and 11 for examples of the mounting below cylindrical and
conformable containers, respectively.
At least one thermocouple for burner monitoring shall be located in the
localized fire exposure of the CHSS test article, and two thermocouples
shall be located in the extension of the engulfing fire exposure on the CHSS
test article. Additional thermocouples may be added to back up or

154
 supplement burner monitoring along the centre line of the localized and
engulfing burners.
6.2.5.6.2. The calculation of the burner monitor temperatures (TBLOC25 and
TBENG25) are analogous to the process in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3.3. for the pre-
test checkout.
Additional thermocouples may be located at TPRD sensing points or any
other locations for optional diagnostic purposes.
A fluid line shall be connected to the CHSS prior to test to allow fill and
vent of the CHSS as defined within the test procedure.
Shut-off(s) valves shall be installed on the line as required to isolate the
CHSS contents during the test and perform required fill and vent
procedures prior to or after the test.
A pressure transmitter shall also be installed on the line such that the
pressure of contents within the CHSS can be remotely monitored during
the test. The accuracy of the transmitter shall be at least ±1 per cent of full
scale and ±10 per cent at 1 MPa.
6.2.5.7. The CHSS fire test procedure
6.2.5.7.1. Prior to conducting the CHSS fire test, the CHSS shall be filled with
compressed hydrogen gas to ≥ 100 per cent of state-of-charge (SOC).
6.2.5.7.2. The first stage of the CHSS fire test is initiated by starting the fuel flow to
the localized burner and igniting the burner:
(a) After ignition is confirmed, the fuel flow is set to the value that
matches the desired specific heat release rate (HRR/A) for the
localized burner in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.3., and the test time is set to
0 minutes.
(b) As shown in Figure 6 in paragraph 6.2.5., the 10-second rolling
average of the burner monitor in the localized fire zone (TBLOC25)
shall be at least 300 °C within 1 minute of ignition and for the next
2 minutes.
Within 3 minutes of start, the 60-second rolling average of the
localized burner monitor (TBLOC25) shall be greater than TminLOC25
as determined in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.4. If TBLOC25 does not achieve
the required temperature within 3 minutes, the test is terminated.
NOTES:
(i) Monitoring of the 60-second rolling average of the localized
burner monitor (TBLOC25) is not required after the above
criteria are met as the burner monitor readings may be
compromised by expansion or falling of materials from the
CHSS test article during subsequent CHSS fire test.
(ii) The temperature outside the region of the localized fire
exposure is not specified during these initial 10 minutes from
the time of ignition.
(iii) If the test is terminated because TBLOC25 did not achieve
required temperature within the required time,
requirements in 6.2.5.2. for providing wind shielding and

155
 paragraph 6.2.5.4.5. for adjusting the burner operation and
setup should be considered prior to re-test.
6.2.5.7.3. After 10 minutes from start of test, the second stage is initiated by starting
fuel flow to the engulfing burner extension and igniting the burner:
(a) After ignition is confirmed, the fuel flowrates to both the localized
and engulfing fire extension are set to the value that matches the
desired specific heat release (HRR/A) for the engulfing burner
stage in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.3.
(b) Within 2 minutes of the start of ignition of the engulfing burner (ie,
within 12 minutes from start of test), the 60-second rolling average
of the engulfing burner monitor (TBENG25) shall be equal or greater
than TminENG25 as determined in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.4.
NOTES:
(i) Monitoring of the 60-second rolling average of the engulfing
burner monitor (TBENG25) is not required after the above
criteria are met as the burner monitor readings may be
compromised by expansion or falling of materials from the
CHSS test article during subsequent CHSS fire test.
(ii) If the test is terminated because TBENG25 did not achieve
required temperature within the required time,
requirements in paragraph 6.2.5.2. for providing wind
shielding and paragraph 6.2.5.4.5. for adjusting the burner
operation and setup should be considered prior to re-test.
Method 2: Qualification for a specific vehicle installation
If a specific vehicle installation configuration is specified and the qualification
of the system is limited to that specific vehicle installation configuration, then
the test setup may also include other vehicle components in addition to the
hydrogen storage system. These vehicle components (such as shielding or
barriers, which are permanently attached to the vehicle’s structure by means of
welding or bolts and not affixed to the storage system) shall be included in the
test setup in the vehicle-installed configuration relative to the hydrogen storage
system. This localized fire test is conducted on the worst case localized fire
exposure areas based on the four fire orientations: fires originating from the
direction of the passenger compartment, cargo/luggage compartment, wheel
wells or ground-pooled gasoline.
The container may be subjected to engulfing fire without any shielding
components, as described in paragraph 6.2.5.2.
The following test requirements apply whether Method 1 or 2 (above) is used:
(a) The container assembly is filled with compressed hydrogen gas at
100 per cent of NWP. The container assembly is positioned horizontally
approximately 100 mm above the fire source. (Note: as stated in
para. 5.1.4., contracting parties under the 1998 Agreement may choose
to use compressed air as an alternative test gas for certification of the
container for use in their countries or regions.) ;
Localized portion of the fire test
(b) The localized fire exposure area is located on the test article furthest
from the TPRD(s). If Method 2 is selected and more vulnerable areas

156
 are identified for a specific vehicle installation configuration, the more
vulnerable area that is furthest from the TPRD(s) is positioned directly
over the initial fire source;
(c) The fire source consists of LPG burners configured to produce a
uniform minimum temperature on the test article measured with a
minimum 5 thermocouples covering the length of the test article up to
1.65 m maximum (at least 2 thermocouples within the localized fire
area, and at least 3 thermocouples equally spaced and no more than 0.5
m apart in the remaining area) located 25 mm ± 10mm from the outside
surface of the test article along its longitudinal axis. At the option of the
manufacturer or testing facility, additional thermocouples may be
located at TPRD sensing points or any other locations for optional
diagnostic purposes;
(d) Wind shields are applied to ensure uniform heating;
(e) The fire source initiates within a 250 mm ±50 mm longitudinal expanse
positioned under the localized exposure area of the test article. The
width of the fire source encompasses the entire diameter (width) of the
storage system. If Method 2 is selected, the length and width shall be
reduced, if necessary, to account for vehicle-specific features;
(f) As shown in Figure 7 the temperature of the thermocouples in the
localized fire area has increased continuously to at least 300 °C within
1 minute of ignition, to at least 600 °C within 3 minutes of ignition, and
a temperature of at least 600 °C is maintained for the next 7 minutes.
The temperature in the localized fire area shall not exceed 900 °C
during this period. Compliance to the thermal requirements begins 1
minute after entering the period with minimum and maximum limits
and is based on a 1-minute rolling average of each thermocouple in the
region of interest. (Note: The temperature outside the region of the
initial fire source is not specified during these initial 10 minutes from
the time of ignition.).

157
Figure 711
Temperature profile of fire test

Localized Fire Exposure Engulfing Fire

Min
Temp

800o C
Localized Area
600o C Engulfing Region Outside
Localized Area (burner
ramp rate)
300o C
Ignite
Main
Burner

0 1 3 10 12 Minutes

Engulfing portion of the fire test

Within the next 2-minute interval, the temperature along the entire surface of
the test article shall be increased to at least 800 °C and the fire source is
extended to produce a uniform temperature along the entire length up to 1.65
meters and the entire width of the test article (engulfing fire). The minimum
temperature is held at 800°C, and the maximum temperature shall not exceed
1100 °C. Compliance to thermal requirements begins 1 minute after entering
the period with constant minimum and maximum limits and is based on a 1-
minute rolling average of each thermocouple.
The test article is held at temperature (engulfing fire condition) until the system
vents through the TPRD and the pressure falls to less than 1 MPa. The venting
shall be continuous (without interruption), and the storage system shall not
rupture. An additional release through leakage (not including release through
the TPRD) that results in a flame with length greater than 0.5 m beyond the
perimeter of the applied flame shall not occur.

158
Table 2
Summary of fire test protocol

Engulfing fire region

Localized fire region Time period (Outside the localized fire region)

Action Ignite Burners 0-1 minute No Burner Operation

Minimum temperature Not specified Not specified

Maximum temperature Less than 900oC Not specified

Action Increase temperature and 1-3 minutes No Burner Operation

stabilize fire for start of
localized fire exposure

Minimum temperature Greater than 300oC Not specified

Maximum temperature Less than 900oC Not specified

Action Localized fire exposure 3-10 minutes No Burner Operation

continues

Minimum temperature 1-minute rolling average Not specified

greater than 600oC

Maximum temperature 1-minute rolling average Not specified

less than 900oC

Action Increase temperature 10-11 minutes Main Burner Ignited at 10 minutes

Minimum Temperature 1-minute rolling average Not specified

greater than 600oC

Maximum temperature 1-minute rolling average Less than 1,100oC

less than 1,100oC

Action Increase temperature and 11-12 minutes Increase temperature and stabilize
stabilize fire for start of fire for start of engulfing fire
engulfing fire exposure exposure

Minimum temperature 1-minute rolling average Greater than 300oC

greater than 600oC

Maximum temperature 1 minute rolling average Less than 1,100oC

less than 1,100oC

Action Engulfing fire exposure 12 minutes - end Engulfing fire exposure continues
continues of test

Minimum temperature 1-minute rolling average 1-minute rolling average greater

greater than 800oC than 800oC

Maximum temperature 1 minute rolling average 1-minute rolling average less than
less than 1,100oC 1,100oC

159
6.2.5.7.4. Minor movement of the CHSS test article and subsequent repositioning
of the CHSS test article relative to the burners is allowed when TPRD(s)
activate.
The fire test continues until either;
(a) the CHSS vents and the pressure falls to less than 1 MPa or
(b) a total test of 1 hour from start of test is reached for CHSS in LDV
or 2 hours for CHSS in HDV.
When the test is completed, the burner fuel flow shall be shut off within 1
minute, and the CHSS shall be depressurized (if not already near ambient
pressure) and then purged with inert gas for safe post-test handling.
NOTE: Suggestions are provided in Part I Section E(d) for technical data
and information to be provided with CHSS fire test report.
Documenting results of the fire test
The arrangement of the fire is recorded in sufficient detail to ensure the rate of
heat input to the test article is reproducible. The results include the elapsed
time from ignition of the fire to the start of venting through the TPRD(s), and
the maximum pressure and time of evacuation until a pressure of less than
1 MPa is reached. Thermocouple temperatures and container pressure are
recorded at intervals of every 10 sec or less during the test. Any failure to
maintain specified minimum temperature requirements based on the 1-minute
rolling averages invalidates the test result. Any failure to maintain specified
maximum temperature requirements based on the 1-minute rolling averages
invalidates the test result only if the test article failed during the test.
6.2.5.2. Engulfing fire test:
The test unit is the compressed hydrogen storage system. The storage system
is filled with compressed hydrogen gas at 100 per cent NWP. The container is
positioned horizontally with the container bottom approximately 100 mm
above the fire source. Metallic shielding is used to prevent direct flame
impingement on container valves, fittings, and/or pressure relief devices. The
metallic shielding is not in direct contact with the specified fire protection
system (pressure relief devices or container valve).
A uniform fire source of 1.65 m length provides direct flame impingement on
the container surface across its entire diameter. The test shall continue until the
container fully vents (until the container pressure falls below 0.7 MPa (100
psi)). Any failure or inconsistency of the fire source during a test shall
invalidate the result.
Flame temperatures shall be monitored by at least three thermocouples
suspended in the flame approximately 25 mm below the bottom of the
container. Thermocouples may be attached to steel cubes up to 25 mm on a
side. Thermocouple temperature and the container pressure shall be recorded
every 30 seconds during the test.
Within five minutes after the fire is ignited, an average flame temperature of
not less than 590°C (as determined by the average of the two thermocouples
recording the highest temperatures over a 60 second interval) is attained and
maintained for the duration of the test.
If the container is less than 1.65 m in length, the centre of the container shall
be positioned over the centre of the fire source. If the container is greater than

160
 1.65 m in length, then if the container is fitted with a pressure relief device at
one end, the fire source shall commence at the opposite end of the container.
If the container is greater than 1.65 m in length and is fitted with pressure relief
devices at both ends, or at more than one location along the length of the
container, the centre of the fire source shall be centred midway between the
pressure relief devices that are separated by the greatest horizontal distance.
The container shall vent through a pressure relief device without bursting.
6.2.6. Test Procedures for performance durability of primary closures (para. 5.1.5.
requirement).
Testing is performed with either hydrogen or non-reactive gas as specified
in the following paragraphs:
Hydrogen gas shall be compliant with ISO 14687:2019, SAE
J2719_202003, or meet the following specifications:
(a) Hydrogen fuel index: ≥ 99.97%
(b) Total non-hydrogen gases: ≤ 300 µmol/mol
(c) Water: ≤ 5 µmol/mol
(d) Particle concentrations: ≤ 1 mg/kg
The leak test gas shall be hydrogen, helium, or a non-reactive gas mixture
containing a detectable amount of helium or hydrogen gas.
All tests are performed at ambient temperature of 20 ± 5 °C unless
otherwise specified.
6.2.6.1. Compressed hydrogen storage TPRD qualification performance tests.
Testing is performed with hydrogen gas having gas quality compliant with
ISO 14687-2/SAE J2719. All tests are performed at ambient temperature 20 ±
(±5)°C unless otherwise specified. The TPRD qualification performance tests
are specified as follows: The TPRD qualification performance tests are
specified as follows:
6.2.6.1.1. Pressure cycling test.
Five TPRD units undergo 15,000 11,000 internal pressure cycles with
hydrogen gas according to Table 11. having gas quality compliant with ISO
14687-2/SAE J2719. At a sample temperature of ≥ 85 °C, the first 10
pressure cycles shall be from ≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 150 per cent NWP, followed by
2,240 pressure cycles from ≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 125 per cent NWP, followed by
10,000 pressure cycles at a sample temperature of 20 ± 5°C from ≤ 2 MPa
to ≥ 125 per cent NWP, followed by a final 2,750 pressure cycles at a
sample temperature of ≤ −40 °C from ≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 80 per cent NWP. The
first five pressure cycles are between 2 (±1)MPa and 150 per cent NWP
(±1MPa); the remaining cycles are between 2 (±1)MPa and 125 per cent NWP
(±1MPa). The first 1500 pressure cycles are conducted at a TPRD temperature
of 85 °C or higher. The remaining cycles are conducted at a TPRD temperature
of 55 (±5) °C. The maximum pressure cycling rate is ten cycles per minute.
Following this test, the pressure relief device shall comply with the
requirements of leak test the Leak Test (para. 6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation
test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.) and Fflow Rrate Ttest (para. 6.2.6.1.10.) and the Bench
Top Activation Test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.). See Table 11 below for a summary of
the pressure cycles.

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Table 11
Pressure cycling conditions

Pressure cycles to per cent NWP No. of cycles Sample temperature for cycling

≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 150 per cent NWP First 10 ≥ 85 °C

≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 125 per cent NWP Next 2, 240 ≥ 85 °C

≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 125 per cent NWP Next 10,000 20 °C

≤ 2 MPa to ≥ 80 per cent NWP Next 2,750 ≤ -40 °C

Note: All cycles are conducted at a rate of ≤ 10 cycles per minute.

6.2.6.1.2. Accelerated life test.

Eight TPRD units undergo testing; three at the manufacturer’s specified
activation temperature, Tact Tact, and five at an accelerated life temperature.
The Accelerated Life test temperature is TL, given in °C by the expression:
,
−1
0.502 0.498
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = � + � − 𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽 + 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

Where β = 273.15, TME is 85 °C, and Tf is the manufacturer's specified

activation temperature. Tlife = 9.1 x Tact0.503. The TPRD is placed in an
oven or liquid bath with the temperature held constant (±1 °C). The hydrogen
gas pressure on the TPRD inlet is ≥ 125 per cent NWP (±1MPa). The pressure
supply may be located outside the controlled temperature oven or bath. Each
device is pressuredpressurized individually or through a manifold system. If
a manifold system is used, each pressure connection may include includes a
check valve to prevent pressure depletion of the system when one specimen
fails. The three TPRDs tested at Tacttact shall activate in less than ten10 hours.
The five TPRDs tested at TL shall not activate in less than 500 hours and shall
meet the requirements of paragraph 6.2.6.1.8. (leak test).
6.2.6.1.3. Temperature cycling test
(a) An unpressurized TPRD is placed in a liquid bath maintained at ≤ -40°C
or lower for at least two hours. The TPRD is transferred to a liquid bath
maintained at ≥ 85 °C or higher within five minutes, and maintained at
that temperature at least two hours. The TPRD is transferred to a liquid
bath maintained at ≤ -40 °C or lower within five minutes;
(b) Step (a) is repeated until 15 thermal cycles have been achieved;
(c) With the TPRD conditioned for at least a minimum of two hours in the
≤ -40 °C or lower liquid bath, the internal pressure of the TPRD is
pressure cycled with hydrogen gas between ≤ 2 MPa (+1/-0MPa) and
≥ 80 per cent NWP (+2/-0MPa) for 100 cycles while the liquid bath is
maintained at ≤ – 40 °C or lower;
(d) Following the thermal and pressure cycling, the pressure relief device
shall comply with the requirements of leak test the Leak Test (para.
6.2.6.1.8.), except that the leak test Leak Test shall be conducted at ≤ -
40 °C (+5/-0°C). After the leak testLeak Test, the TPRD shall comply

162
 with the requirements of the Bench Top Activation Test bench top
activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.) and then the Flow Rate Test flow rate
test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.).
6.2.6.1.4. Salt corrosion resistance test
Accelerated cyclic corrosion shall be performed in accordance with the
following procedure:
(a) Three TPRDs shall be exposed to an accelerated laboratory
corrosion test, under a combination of cyclic conditions (salt
solution, various temperatures, humidity, and ambient
environment). The test method is comprised of 1 per cent
(approximate) complex salt mist applications coupled with high
temperature, high humidity and high temperature dry off. One test
cycle is equal to 24 hours, as illustrated in Figure 12.
(b) The apparatus used for this test shall consist of a fog/environmental
chamber, suitable water supply conforming to ASTM D1193-
06(2018) Type IV, provisions for heating the chamber, and the
necessary means of controlling temperature between 22 °C and
62 °C. The apparatus shall include provisions for a supply of
suitably conditioned compressed air and one or more nozzles for
fog generation. The nozzle or nozzles used for the generation of the
fog shall be directed or baffled to minimize any direct impingement
on the test samples.
(c) The apparatus shall consist of the chamber design as defined in ISO
6270-2:2017. During "wet-bottom" generated humidity cycles, the
proper wetness shall be confirmed by visual inspection of visible
water droplets on the samples.
(d) Steam generated humidity may be used provided the source of
water used in generating the steam is free of corrosion inhibitors.
During steam generated humidity cycles, the testing agency must
confirm that visible water droplets are found on the samples to
verify proper wetness.
(e) The apparatus for the dry off stage shall have the ability to obtain
and maintain the following environmental conditions:
temperature: 60 ± 2 °C and humidity: ≤ 30 per cent RH. The
apparatus shall also have sufficient air circulation to prevent
temperature stratification, and also allow thorough drying of the
test samples.
(f) The force/impingement from this salt application shall not remove
corrosion or damage the coatings/paints system of test samples.

163
Figure 12
Accelerated cyclic corrosion conditions

(g) The complex salt solution in percent by mass shall be as specified

below:
(i) Sodium Chloride (NaCl): 0.9 per cent
(ii) Calcium Chloride (CaCl2): 0.1 per cent
(iii) Sodium Bicarbonate (NaHCO3): 0.075 per cent
Sodium Chloride must be reagent grade or food grade. Calcium
Chloride must be reagent grade. Sodium Bicarbonate must be
reagent grade or food grade (e.g., Baking Soda or comparable
product is acceptable). Water must meet ASTM D1193-06(2018)
Type IV requirements.
NOTE: Either CaCl2 or NaHCO3 material must be dissolved
separately in water and added to the solution of the other materials.
If all solid materials are added dry, an insoluble precipitate may
result.
(h) The TPRD shall be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommended procedure and exposed to the cyclic corrosion test
method illustrated in the flow diagram (Figure 12).
(i) Repeat the cycle daily until 100 cycles of exposure have been
completed. For each salt mist application, the solution shall be
sprayed as an atomized mist, using the spray apparatus to mist the

164
 components until all areas are thoroughly wet / dripping. Suitable
application techniques include using a plastic bottle, or a siphon
spray powered by oil-free regulated air to spray the test samples.
The quantity of spray applied shall be sufficient to visibly rinse
away salt accumulation left from previous sprays. A total of four
salt mist applications shall be applied during the ambient stage.
Salt mist is not applied during any other stage of the test. The first
salt mist application occurs at the beginning of the ambient stage.
Each subsequent salt mist application shall be applied
approximately ninety minutes after the previous application in
order to allow adequate time for test sample to dry.
(i) Humidity ramp times between the ambient and wet condition, and
between the wet and dry conditions, can have a significant effect on
test acceleration (this is because corrosion rates are highest during
these transition periods). The time from ambient to the wet
condition shall be 60 ± 5 minutes and the transition time between
wet and dry conditions shall be 180 ± 10 minutes.
(j) Immediately after the corrosion test, the sample is rinsed with fresh
tap water and allowed to dry before evaluating.
(k) The TPRD shall then comply with the requirements of leak test
(para. 6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.) and
flow rate test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.).
Two TPRD units are tested. Any non-permanent outlet caps are removed. Each
TPRD unit is installed in a test fixture in accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommended procedure so that external exposure is consistent with realistic
installation. Each unit is exposed for 500 hours to a salt spray (fog) test as
specified in ASTM B117 (Standard Practice for Operating Salt Spray (Fog)
Apparatus) except that in the test of one unit, the pH of the salt solution shall
be adjusted to 4.0 ± 0.2 by the addition of sulphuric acid and nitric acid in a
2:1 ratio, and in the test of the other unit, the pH of the salt solution shall be
adjusted to 10.0 ± 0.2 by the addition of sodium hydroxide. The temperature
within the fog chamber is maintained at 30-35°C).
Following these tests, each pressure relief device shall comply with the
requirements of the leak test (para. 6.2.6.1.8.), Flow Rate Test
(para. 6.2.6.1.10.) and bench top activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.).
6.2.6.1.5. Vehicle environment test
Resistance to degradation by external exposure to automotive fluids is
determined by the following test:
(a) The inlet and outlet connections of the TPRD are connected or capped
in accordance with the manufacturers installation instructions. The
external surfaces of the TPRD are exposed for 24 hours at ambient
temperature 20 (±5) °C to each of the following fluids:
(i) Sulphuric acid - 19 per cent solution by volume in water;
(ii) Ethanol/gasoline – 10 per cent/90 per cent concentration of
E10 fuel; and Sodium hydroxide - 25 per cent solution by
weight in water;
(iii) Ammonium nitrate - 28 per cent by weight in water; and

165
 (iv) Windshield washer fluid (50 per cent by volume methyl alcohol
and water).
The fluids are replenished as needed to ensure complete exposure for
the duration of the test. A distinct test is performed with each of the
fluids. One component may TPRD shall be used for exposure to all of
the fluids in sequence.
(b) After exposure to each fluid, the TPRD component is wiped off and
rinsed with water;
(c) The TPRD component shall not show signs of physical degradation that
could impair the function of the component, specifically: cracking,
softening, or swelling. Cosmetic changes such as pitting or staining are
not failures. At the conclusion of all exposures, the TPRD unit(s) shall
comply with the requirements of the leak test Leak Test (para.
6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.) and flow rate
test Flow Rate Test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.) and Bench Top Activation test
(para. 6.2.6.1.9.).
6.2.6.1.6. Stress corrosion cracking test.
This test shall only be applicable to TPRDs containing copper alloys
exposed to the outside environment. This test can be performed if the
testing agency does not know whether copper alloys are present.
For TPRDs containing components made of a copper-based alloy (e.g. brass),
one TPRD unit is tested. All copper alloy components exposed to the
atmosphere shall be degreased and then continuously exposed for at least ten
days to a moist ammonia-air mixture maintained in a glass chamber having a
glass cover.
Aqueous ammonia having a specific gravity of 0.94 is maintained at the bottom
of the glass chamber below the sample at a concentration of at least 20 ml per
litre of chamber volume. The sample is positioned 35 ± 5 (±5) mm above the
aqueous ammonia solution and supported in an inert tray. The moist ammonia-
air mixture is maintained at atmospheric pressure at 35 ± 5 (±5) °C. Copper-
based alloy components shall not exhibit cracking or delaminating due to this
test.
6.2.6.1.7. Drop and vibration test
(a) Six TPRD units representative of their final assembled form are
dropped from a height of ≥2 m without restricting its motion as a
result of gravity, at ambient temperature (20 ± 5oC) onto a smooth
concrete surface. Each sample The TPRD is allowed to bounce on the
concrete surface after the initial impact.
Up to six separate units may be used such that all six of the major
axes are covered (i.e. one direction drop per sample, covering the
opposing directions of 3 orthogonal axes: vertical, lateral and
longitudinal). Compliance testing can be performed in any of these
six orientations. At the manufacturer’s discretion, one unit may be
dropped in all six orientations.
After each drop, the sample shall be examined for visible damage.
Any of the six dropped orientations that do not have exterior
damage that indicates that the part is unsuitable for use (i.e. threads

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 damaged sufficiently that part is rendered unusable), shall proceed
to step (b).
Note: any samples with damage from the drop that results in the
TPRD not being able to be installed (i.e. thread damage) shall not
proceed to step (b) and shall not be considered a failure of this test;
One unit is dropped in six orientations (opposing directions of 3
orthogonal axes: vertical, lateral and longitudinal). If each of the six
dropped samples does not show visible exterior damage that indicates
that the part is unsuitable for use, it shall proceed to step (b);
(b) Each of the six TPRD units dropped in step (a) that did not have visible
damage and one additional unit not subjected to a drop are mounted in
a test fixture in accordance with manufacturer’s installation instructions
and vibrated 30 minutes along each of the three orthogonal axes
(vertical, lateral and longitudinal) at the most severe resonant frequency
for each axis.
The most severe resonant frequencies are determined using an
acceleration of 1.5 g and sweeping through a sinusoidal frequency range
of 10 to 500 Hz within in 10 minutes. The resonance frequency is
identified by a pronounced increase in vibration amplitude. If the
resonance frequency is not found in this range, the test shall be
conducted at 40 Hz.
Following this test, each sample shall not show visible exterior damage
that indicates that the part is unsuitable for use. It shall subsequently
comply with the requirements of leak test the Leak Test (para.
6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation test (para. 6.2.6.1.9.) and flow rate
test Flow Rate Test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.) and Bench Top Activation Test
(para. 6.2.6.1.9.).
6.2.6.1.8. Leak test
A This test applies to one TPRD that has not undergone previous design
qualification tests and additional units as specified in other tests in para.
6.2.6.1. The leak test is performed at ambient, high and low temperatures.
The unit shall be thermally conditioned at each of the required test
temperatures and held pressurized to ≥2 MPa for at least one hour to
ensure thermal stability before testing. The TRPD is pressurized with leak
test gas at the inlet. testing is tested at ambient, high and low temperatures
without being subjected to other design qualification tests. The unit is held for
one hour at each temperature and test pressure before testing. The three
temperature required test conditions are:
(a) Ambient temperature: condition the unit at 20 ± ambient
temperature (±5) °C; test at 2 MPa ± 0.5 MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-
2MPa) and ≥ 150 125 per cent NWP (+2/-0MPa) ;
(b) High temperature: condition the unit at ≥ 85 °C or higher; test at 2 MPa
± 0.5 MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-2MPa) and ≥ 150 125 per cent NWP
(+2/-0MPa) ;
(c) Low temperature: condition the unit at ≤ -40°C or lower; test at 2 MPa
± 0.5 MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-2MPa) and ≥ 100 per cent NWP (+2/-
0MPa).

167
 Additional units undergo leak testing as specified in other tests in para. 6.2.6.1.
with uninterrupted exposure at the temperature specified in those tests.
At all specified test temperatures, the unit is conditioned for one minute by
immersion in a temperature controlled fluid (or equivalent method). If no
bubbles are observed for the specified time period, the sample passes the test.
If bubbles are detected, the leak rate is measured by an appropriate method.
Following conditioning at each of the specified test temperatures, the unit
is observed for leakage while immersed in a temperature-controlled fluid
(or equivalent method) for at least one minute at each of the test pressures
listed above. If no bubbles are observed for the specified time period, the
sample passes the test. If bubbles are detected, the leak rate is measured.
The total hydrogen leak rate shall be less than 10 NmL/hr.
6.2.6.1.9. Bench top activation test
Three Two new TPRD units are tested without being subjected to other design
qualification tests in order to establish a baseline time for activation, which is
defined as the averaged activation time of these three units. Five additional
pre-tested units (pre-tested according to paras. 6.2.6.1.1., 6.2.6.1.3., 6.2.6.1.4.,
6.2.6.1.5. and or 6.2.6.1.7.) undergo bench top activation testing as specified
in other tests in para. 6.2.6.1.
(a) The test setup consists of either an oven or chimney which is capable
of controlling air temperature and flow to achieve 600 ± 10 (±10)°C in
the air surrounding the TPRD. The TPRD unit is not exposed directly
to flame. The TPRD unit is mounted in a fixture according to the
manufacturer’s installation instructions; the test configuration is to be
documented;
(b) A thermocouple is placed in the oven or chimney to monitor the
temperature. The temperature shall remain remains within the
acceptable range for at least two minutes prior to running the test;
(c) Prior to insertion, the TPRD unit is pressurized to 25 per cent NWP
or 2 MPa, whichever is less 2 ± 0.5 MPa; The pressurized TPRD unit
is inserted into the oven or chimney, and the time for the device to
activate is recorded. Prior to insertion into the oven or chimney, one
new (not pre-tested) TPRD unit is pressurized to no more than 25 per
cent NWP (the pre-tested); TPRD units are pressurized to no more than
25 per cent NWP; and one new (not pre-tested) TPRD unit is
pressurized to 100 per cent NWP;
(d) The pressurized TPRD unit is inserted into the oven or chimney,
and the time for the device to activate is recorded;
(ed) TPRD units previously subjected to other tests in para. 6.2.6.1. shall
activate within a period no more than two minutes longer than the
baseline activation time of the new TPRD unit that was pressurized to
up to 25 per cent NWP;
(fe) The maximum difference in the activation time of the three two TPRD
units that had not undergone previous testing shall be no more than two
2 minutes.
6.2.6.1.10. Flow rate test
(a) Eight TPRD units are tested for flow capacity. The eight units consist
of three new TPRD units and one TPRD TRPD unit from each of the

168
 following previous tests: paras. 6.2.6.1.1., 6.2.6.1.3., 6.2.6.1.4.,
6.2.6.1.5. and 6.2.6.1.7. ;
(b) Each TPRD unit is activated according to para. 6.2.6.1.9. After
activation and without cleaning, removal of parts, or reconditioning,
each TPRD unit is subjected to a flow test using hydrogen, air or an
inert gas;
(c) Flow rate testing is conducted with an gas inlet pressure of 2 ± 0.5
(±0.5) MPa. The outlet is at ambient pressure. The inlet temperature and
pressure and flow rate are recorded;
(d) Flow rate is measured with accuracy within ±2 per cent. The lowest
measured value of the eight pressure relief devices shall not be less than
90 per cent of the highest flow value.
6.2.6.1.11. Atmospheric exposure test
The atmospheric exposure test applies to qualification of TPRDs if the
component has non-metallic materials exposed to the atmosphere during
normal operating conditions.
(a) All non-metallic materials that provide a fuel containing seal, and
that are exposed to the atmosphere, for which a satisfactory
declaration of properties is not submitted by the applicant, shall not
crack or show visible evidence of deterioration after exposure to
oxygen for at least 96 hours at ≥ 70 °C and 2 ± 0.5 MPa in
accordance with ISO 188:2011 or ASTM D572-04(2019);
(b) All elastomers that are exposed to the atmosphere shall
demonstrate resistance to ozone by one or more of the following:
(i) Specification of elastomer compounds with established
resistance to ozone;
(ii) Component testing in accordance with ISO 1431-1:2012,
ASTM D1149-18, or equivalent test methods;
(iii) The test piece shall be stressed to 20 per cent elongation,
exposed to air at 40 °C with an ozone concentration of 50 parts
per hundred million for 120 hours. The non-metallic materials
in the test piece shall not crack or show visible evidence of
deterioration after exposure to ozone.
6.2.6.2. Compressed hydrogen storage qualification performance tests for check valve
and shut-off valve.
Testing is performed with hydrogen gas having gas quality compliant with
ISO 14687-2/SAE J2719. All tests are performed at ambient temperature 20 ±
(±5)°C unless otherwise specified. The TPRD qualification performance tests
are specified as follows: The check valve and shut-off valve qualification
performance tests are specified as follows:
6.2.6.2.1. Hydrostatic strength test
The outlet opening in components is plugged and valve seats or internal blocks
are made to assume the open position. One unit is tested without being
subjected to other design qualification tests in order to establish a baseline

169
 burst pressure., Other units are tested as specified in subsequent tests of
para. 6.2.6.2.
(a) A hydrostatic pressure of ≥ 250 per cent NWP (+2/-0 MPa) is applied
to the inlet of the component for at least three minutes. The component
is examined to ensure that rupture has not occurred;
(b) The hydrostatic pressure is then increased at a rate of less than or equal
to ≤ 1.4 MPa/sec until component failure. The hydrostatic pressure at
failure is recorded. The failure pressure of previously tested units shall
be no less than ≥ 80 per cent of the failure pressure of the baseline,
unless the hydrostatic pressure exceeds 400 per cent NWP.
6.2.6.2.2. Leak test
This test applies to one unit that has not undergone previous design
qualification tests and additional units as specified in other tests in para.
6.2.6.2. The leak test is performed at ambient, high and low temperatures.
The unit shall be thermally conditioned at each of the required test
temperatures and held pressurized to ≥ 2 MPa for at least one hour to
ensure thermal stability before testing. The outlet opening is plugged with
the appropriate mating connection and pressurized leak test gas is applied
to the inlet. The required test conditions are:
One unit that has not undergone previous testing is tested at ambient, high and
low temperatures without being subjected to other design qualification tests.
The three temperature test conditions are:
(a) Ambient temperature: condition the unit at 20 ± 5 (±5) °C; test at 2
±0.5 MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-2 MPa) and ≥ 150 125 per cent NWP
(+2/-0 MPa) ;
(b) High temperature: condition the unit at ≥ 85 °C or higher ; test at 2 ±0.5
MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-2 MPa) and ≥ 150 125 per cent NWP (+2/-
0 MPa) ;
(c) Low temperature: condition the unit at ≤ -40°C or lower; test at 2 ±0.5
MPa 5 per cent NWP (+0/-2 MPa) and ≥ 100 per cent NWP (+2/-0
MPa).
Following conditioning at each of the specified test temperatures, the unit
is observed for leakage while immersed in a temperature-controlled fluid
(or equivalent method) for at least one minute at each of the test pressures
listed above. If no bubbles are observed for the specified time period, the
sample passes the test. If bubbles are detected, the leak rate is measured.
The leak rate shall not exceed 10 Nml/hr of hydrogen gas.
Additional units undergo leak testing as specified in other tests in para. 6.2.6.2.
with uninterrupted exposure at the temperatures specified in those tests.
The outlet opening is plugged with the appropriate mating connection and
pressurized hydrogen is applied to the inlet. At all specified test temperatures,
the unit is conditioned for one minute by immersion in a temperature controlled
fluid (or equivalent method). If no bubbles are observed for the specified time
period, the sample passes the test. If bubbles are detected, the leak rate is
measured by an appropriate method. The leak rate shall not exceed 10 Nml/hr
of hydrogen gas.
6.2.6.2.3. Extreme temperature pressure cycling test

170
The total number of operational cycles is 15,000 for the check valve and
50,000 for the shut-off valve. The valve unit is installed in a test fixture
corresponding to the manufacturer’s specifications for installation.
(a) The operation of the unit is continuously repeated using hydrogen
or non-reactive gas at all specified temperatures and pressures as
follows:
(i) Ambient temperature cycling. The unit undergoes 90 per
cent of the total operational cycles at ≥ 100 per cent NWP
with the part stabilized at ambient temperature;
(ii) High temperature cycling. The unit then undergoes 5 per
cent of the total operational cycles at ≥125 per cent NWP
with the part stabilized at ≥85°C;
(iii) Low temperature cycling. The unit then undergoes 5 per
cent of the total operational cycles at ≥ 80 per cent NWP with
the part stabilized at ≤ -40°C.
(b) The operational cycle requirements shall be as follows:

171
 (i) Check Valve: A check valve shall be capable of withstanding
15,000 cycles of operation, and at least 24 hours of chatter
flow when submitted to the following test procedure.
The check valve shall be connected to a test fixture. The
required test pressure is applied in six pulses to the inlet of
the check valve with the outlet closed. The pressure shall
then be vented from the check valve inlet. Failure of the
check valve to reseat and prevent backflow shall constitute
failure of the check valve. The pressure shall then be lowered
on the check valve outlet side to ≤ 60 per cent of NWP prior
to the next cycle.
Following the operation cycles, the check valve shall be
subjected to at least 24 hours of chatter flow at a flow rate
that causes the most chatter (valve flutter).
At the completion of the test, the check valve shall comply
with leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.) and hydrostatic strength test
(para. 6.2.6.2.1.).
(ii) Shut-off valve: A shut-off valve shall be capable of
withstanding 50,000 cycles of operation when submitted to
the following test procedure.
The shut-off valve shall be mounted into a suitable test
fixture. Each cycle shall consist of filling through the inlet
port to the required test pressure. The shut-off valve shall
then be opened (energized) and the pressure in the
valve/fixture reduced to 50 percent of the filling test
pressure. The shut-off valve shall then be closed (de-
energized) prior to the next filling cycle.
Following the operation cycles, the shut-off valve shall be
subjected to at least 24 hours of chatter flow at a flow rate
that is within normal operating conditions that causes
chatter (valve flutter), only if the shut-off valve is functioning
as a check valve during fuelling.
Note: If no chatter is induced during normal flow rates, this
test is not required.
At the completion of the test the shut-off valve shall comply
with leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.) and hydrostatic strength test
(para. 6.2.6.2.1.).
(a) The total number of operational cycles is 11,000 for the check valve
and 50000 for the shut-off valve. The valve unit are installed in a test
fixture corresponding to the manufacturer’s specifications for
installation. The operation of the unit is continuously repeated using
hydrogen gas at all specified pressures.

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 An operational cycle shall be defined as follows:
(i) A check valve is connected to a test fixture and 100 per cent
NWP (+2/-0MPa) is applied in six step pulses to the check valve
inlet with the outlet closed. The pressure is then vented from the
check valve inlet. The pressure is lowered on the check valve
outlet side to less than 60 per cent NWP prior to the next cycle;
(ii) A shut-off valve is connected to a test fixture and pressure is
applied continuously to the both the inlet and outlet sides.
An operational cycle consists of one full operation and reset.
(b) Testing is performed on a unit stabilized at the following temperatures:
(i) Ambient temperature cycling. The unit undergoes operational
(open/closed) cycles at 125 per cent NWP (+2/-0 MPa) through
90 per cent of the total cycles with the part stabilized at 20
(±5) °C. At the completion of the ambient temperature
operational cycles, the unit shall comply with the ambient
temperature leak test specified in para. 6.2.6.2.2. ;
(ii) High temperature cycling. The unit then undergoes operational
cycles at 125 per cent NWP (+2/-0 MPa) through 5 per cent of
the total operational cycles with the part stabilized at 85°C or
higher. At the completion of the 85oC cycles, the unit shall
comply with the high temperature (85 °C) leak test specified in
para. 6.2.6.2.2. ;
(iii) Low temperature cycling. The unit then undergoes operational
cycles at 100 per cent NWP (+2/-0 MPa) through 5 per cent of
the total cycles with the part stabilized at -40°C or lower. At the
completion of the -40 °C operational cycles, the unit shall
comply with the low temperature (-40 °C) leak test specified in
para. 6.2.6.2.2.
(c) Check valve chatter flow test: Following 11,000 operational cycles and
leak tests in para. 6.2.6.2.3.(b), the check valve is subjected to 24 hours
of chatter flow at a flow rate that causes the most chatter (valve flutter).
At the completion of the test the check valve shall comply with the
ambient temperature leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.) and the strength test
(para. 6.2.6.2.1.).
6.2.6.2.4. Salt corrosion resistance test
Accelerated cyclic corrosion shall be performed in accordance with the
following procedure:
(a) Three component samples shall be exposed to an accelerated
laboratory corrosion test, under a combination of cyclic conditions
(salt solution, various temperatures, humidity, and ambient
environment). The test method is comprised of 1 per cent
(approximate) complex salt mist applications coupled with high
temperature, high humidity and high temperature dry off. One test
cycle is equal to 24 hours, as illustrated in Figure 13.
(b) The apparatus used for this test shall consist of a fog/environmental
chamber, suitable water supply conforming to ASTM D1193-
06(2018) Type IV, provisions for heating the chamber, and the

173
 necessary means of controlling temperature between 22 °C and
62 °C. The apparatus shall include provisions for a supply of
suitably conditioned compressed air and one or more nozzles for
fog generation. The nozzle or nozzles used for the generation of the
fog shall be directed or baffled to minimize any direct impingement
on the test samples.
(c) The apparatus shall consist of the chamber design as defined in ISO
6270-2:2017. During "wet-bottom" generated humidity cycles, the
testing agency must confirm that visible water droplets are found
on the samples to verify proper wetness.
(d) Steam generated humidity may be used provided the source of
water used in generating the steam is free of corrosion inhibitors.
During steam generated humidity cycles, the proper wetness shall
be confirmed by visual inspection of visible water droplets on the
samples.
(e) The apparatus for the dry off stage shall have the ability to obtain
and maintain the following environmental conditions:
temperature: 60 ± 2 °C and humidity: ≤ 30 percent RH. The
apparatus shall also have sufficient air circulation to prevent
temperature stratification, and also allow thorough drying of the
test samples.
(f) The force/impingement from this salt application shall not remove
corrosion or damage the coatings/paints system of test samples.
Figure 13
Accelerated cyclic corrosion conditions

174
 (g) The complex salt solution in percent by mass shall be as specified
below:
(i) Sodium Chloride (NaCl): 0.9 per cent
(ii) Calcium Chloride (CaCl2): 0.1 per cent
(iii) Sodium Bicarbonate (NaHCO3): 0.075 per cent
Sodium Chloride must be reagent grade or food grade. Calcium
Chloride must be reagent grade. Sodium Bicarbonate must be
reagent or food grade (e.g., Baking Soda or comparable product is
acceptable). Water must meet ASTM D1193-06(2018) Type IV
requirements.
NOTE: Either CaCl2 or NaHCO3 material must be dissolved
separately in water and added to the solution of the other materials.
If all solid materials are added dry, an insoluble precipitate may
result.
(h) The component samples shall be installed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommended procedure and exposed to the cyclic
corrosion test method illustrated in the flow diagram (Figure 13).
(i) Repeat the cycle daily until 100 cycles of exposure have been
completed. For each salt mist application, the solution shall be
sprayed as an atomized mist, using the spray apparatus to mist the
components until all areas are thoroughly wet / dripping. Suitable
application techniques include using a plastic bottle, or a siphon
spray powered by oil-free regulated air to spray the test samples.
The quantity of spray applied shall be sufficient to visibly rinse
away salt accumulation left from previous sprays. A total of four
salt mist applications shall be applied during the ambient stage.
Salt mist is not applied during any other stage of the test. The first
salt mist application occurs at the beginning of the ambient stage.
Each subsequent salt mist application shall be applied
approximately ninety minutes after the previous application in
order to allow adequate time for test sample to dry.
(j) Humidity ramp times between the ambient and wet condition, and
between the wet and dry conditions, can have a significant effect on
test acceleration (this is because corrosion rates are highest during
these transition periods). The time from ambient to the wet
condition shall be 60 ± 5 minutes and the transition time between
wet and dry conditions shall be 180 ± 10 minutes.
The component is supported in its normally installed position and exposed for 500 hours to
a salt spray (fog) test as specified in ASTM B117 (standard practice for
operating salt spray (fog) apparatus). The temperature within the fog chamber
is maintained at 30-35 °C). The saline solution consists of 5 per cent sodium
chloride and 95 per cent distilled water, by weight.
(k) Immediately after the corrosion test, the sample is rinsed with fresh tap
water and allowed to dry before evaluating.
(l) The tested samples shall then be subjected to leak test (para.
6.2.6.2.2.) and hydrostatic strength test (para. 6.2.6.2.1.)

175
 gently cleaned of salt deposits, examined for distortion, and then shall comply
with the requirements of:
(a) The component must now shall not show signs of physical degradation
that could impair the function of the component, specifically: cracking,
softening or swelling. Cosmetic changes such as pitting or staining are
not failures;
(b) The ambient temperature leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.);
(c) The hydrostatic strength test (para. 6.2.6.2.1.).
6.2.6.2.5. Vehicle environment test
Resistance to degradation by exposure to automotive fluids is determined by
the following test.
(a) The inlet and outlet connections of the valve unit are connected or
capped in accordance with the manufacturers installation instructions.
The external surfaces of the valve unit are exposed for at least 24 hours
at ambient temperature 20 ± 5 (±5) °C to each of the following fluids:
(i) Sulphuric acid -19 per cent solution by volume in water;
(ii) Sodium hydroxide - 25 per cent solution by weight in water;
Ethanol/gasoline – 10 per cent/90 per cent concentration of
E10 fuel; and
(iii) Ammonium nitrate – 28 per cent by weight in water; and
(iv) Windshield washer fluid (50 per cent by volume methyl alcohol
and water).
The fluids are replenished as needed to ensure complete exposure for
the duration of the test. A distinct test is performed with each of the
fluids. One component may be used for exposure to all of the fluids in
sequence.
(b) After exposure to each chemical, the component is wiped off and rinsed
with water;
(c) The component shall not show signs of physical degradation that could
impair the function of the component, specifically: cracking, softening,
or swelling. Cosmetic changes such as pitting or staining are not failures.
At the conclusion of all exposures, the unit(s) shall comply with the
requirements of ambient temperature leakage leak test (para. 6.2.6.2.2.)
and hydrostatic strength test (para. 6.2.6.2.1.).
6.2.6.2.6. Atmospheric exposure test
The atmospheric exposure test applies to qualification of check valve and
automatic shut-off valves if the component has non-metallic materials exposed
to the atmosphere during normal operating conditions.
(a) All non-metallic materials that provide a fuel containing seal, and that
are exposed to the atmosphere, for which a satisfactory declaration of
properties is not submitted by the applicant, shall not crack or show
visible evidence of deterioration after exposure to oxygen for at least
96 hours at ≥ 70°C at and 2 ± 0.5 MPa in accordance with ISO
188:2011 or ASTM D572-04(2019) ASTM D572 (standard test
method for rubber- deterioration by heat and oxygen) ;

176
 (b) All elastomers shall demonstrate resistance to ozone by one or more of
the following:
(i) Specification of elastomer compounds with established
resistance to ozone;
(ii) Component testing in accordance with ISO 1431-1:2012,
ASTM D1149-18ISO 1431/1, ASTM D1149, or equivalent test
methods;.
(iii) The test piece, shall be stressed to 20 per cent elongation,
exposed to air at 40 °C with an ozone concentration of 50
parts per hundred million during 120 h. The non-metallic
materials in the test piece shall not crack or show visible
evidence of deterioration after exposure to ozone.
6.2.6.2.7. Electrical Tests
The electrical tests apply to qualification of the automatic shut-off valve; they
do not apply to qualification of check valves.
(a) Abnormal voltage test. The solenoid valve is connected to a variable
DC voltage source. The solenoid valve is operated as follows:
(i) An equilibrium (steady state temperature) hold is established for
at least one hour at ≥ 1.5 times the rated voltage;
(ii) The voltage is increased to ≥ 2 two times the rated voltage or
60 volts, whichever is less, and held for at least one minute;
(iii) Any failure shall not result in external valve leakage in
accordance with para. 6.2.6.2.2, open valve or other unsafe
conditions such as smoke, fire or melting.
The minimum opening voltage at NWP and room temperature shall be
less than or equal to 9 V for a 12 V system and less than or equal to
18 V for a 24 V system.
(b) Insulation resistance test. 1,000 V D.C. is applied between the power
conductor and the component casing for at least two seconds. The
minimum allowable resistance for that component is 240 kΩ.
6.2.6.2.8. Vibration test
The valve unit is pressurized to its ≥ 100 per cent NWP (+2/-0MPa) with
hydrogen, helium, or blends of a minimum 5 per cent hydrogen with
nitrogen, sealed at both ends, and vibrated for 30 minutes along each of the
three orthogonal axes (vertical, lateral and longitudinal) at the most severe
resonant frequencies. The most severe resonant frequencies are determined by
acceleration of 1.5 g with a sweep time of 10 minutes within a sinusoidal
frequency range of 10 to 40500 Hz. If the resonance frequency is not found in
this range the test is conducted at 40Hz. Following this test, each sample shall
not show visible exterior damage that indicates that the performance of the part
is compromised. At the completion of the test, the unit shall comply with the
requirements of the ambient temperature leak test specified in para. 6.2.6.2.2.
and hydrostatic strength test specified in para. 6.2.6.2.1.
6.2.6.2.9. Stress corrosion cracking test

177
 This test shall only be applicable to valve units containing copper alloys
exposed to the outside environment. This test can be performed if the
testing agency does not know whether copper alloys are present.
For the valve units containing components made of a copper-based alloy (e.g.
brass), one valve unit is tested. The valve unit is disassembled, all copper-based
alloy components are degreased and then the valve unit is reassembled before
it is continuously exposed for at least 10 ten days to a moist ammonia-air
mixture maintained in a glass chamber having a glass cover.
Aqueous ammonia having a specific gravity of 0.94 is maintained at the bottom
of the glass chamber below the sample at a concentration of at least 20 ml per
litre of chamber volume. The sample is positioned 35 ± 5 (±5) mm above the
aqueous ammonia solution and supported in an inert tray. The moist ammonia-
air mixture is maintained at atmospheric pressure at 35 ± 5 (±5) ºC. Copper-
based alloy components shall not exhibit cracking or delaminating due to this
test.
6.2.6.2.10. Pre-cooled hydrogen exposure test
The valve unit is subjected to pre-cooled hydrogen gas at -40 ºC or lower at a
flow rate of 30 g/s at external temperature of 20 (±5) ºC for a minimum of three
minutes. The unit is de-pressurized and re-pressurized after a two minute hold
period. This test is repeated ten times. This test procedure is then repeated for
an additional ten cycles, except that the hold period is increased to 15 minutes.
The unit shall then comply with the requirements of the ambient temperature
leak test specified in para. 6.2.6.2.2.
6.3. Test procedures for electrical safety (para. 5.3.)
6.3.1. Isolation resistance measurement method
6.3.1.1. General
The isolation resistance for each high voltage bus of the vehicle is measured
or shall be determined by calculating the measurement values of each part or
component unit of a high voltage bus (hereinafter referred to as the "divided
measurement").
6.3.1.2. Measurement method
The isolation resistance measurement is conducted by selecting an appropriate
measurement method from among those listed in paras. 6.3.1.2.1. to 6.3.1.2.2.,
depending on the electrical charge of the live parts or the isolation resistance.
The range of the electrical circuit to be measured is clarified in advance, using
electrical circuit diagrams.
Moreover, modifications necessary for measuring the isolation resistance may
be carried out, such as removal of the cover in order to reach the live parts,
drawing of measurement lines and change in software.
In cases where the measured values are not stable due to the operation of the
on-board isolation resistance monitoring system, necessary modifications for
conducting the measurement may be carried out by stopping the operation of
the device concerned or by removing it. Furthermore, when the device is
removed, a set of drawings will be used to prove that the isolation resistance
between the live parts and the electrical chassis remains unchanged.

178
 Utmost care shall be exercised to avoid short circuit and electric shock since
this confirmation might require direct operations of the high-voltage circuit.
6.3.1.2.1. Measurement method using DC voltage from off-vehicle sources
6.3.1.2.1.1. Measurement instrument
An isolation resistance test instrument capable of applying a DC voltage higher
than the working voltage of the high voltage bus is used.
6.3.1.2.1.2. Measurement method
An insulator resistance test instrument is connected between the live parts and
the electrical chassis. The isolation resistance is subsequently measured by
applying a DC voltage at least half of the working voltage of the high voltage
bus.
If the system has several voltage ranges (e.g. because of boost converter) in
conductive connected circuit and some of the components cannot withstand
the working voltage of the entire circuit, the isolation resistance between those
components and the electrical chassis can be measured separately by applying
their own working voltage with those components disconnected.
6.3.1.2.2. Measurement method using the vehicle’s own REESS as DC voltage source
6.3.1.2.2.1. Test vehicle conditions
The high voltage-bus is energized by the vehicle’s own REESS and/or energy
conversion system and the voltage level of the REESS and/or energy
conversion system throughout the test shall be at least the nominal operating
voltage as specified by the vehicle manufacturer.
6.3.1.2.2.2. Measurement instrument
The voltmeter used in this test shall measure DC values and has an internal
resistance of at least 10 MΩ.
6.3.1.2.2.3. Measurement method
6.3.1.2.2.3.1. First step
The voltage is measured as shown in Figure 9 and the high voltage Bus voltage
(Vb) is recorded. Vb shall be equal to or greater than the nominal operating
voltage of the REESS and/or energy conversion system as specified by the
vehicle manufacturer.
Figure 8
Measurement of Vb, V1, V2

179
 Electrical Chassis

Energy Conversion
System Assembly V2 REESS Assembly

High Voltage Bus

+ +

Energy
Conversion Traction System REESS
System Vb

- -

V1

Electrical Chassis

6.3.1.2.2.3.2. Second step

The voltage (V1) between the negative side of the high voltage bus and the
electrical chassis is measured and recorded (see Figure 8).
6.3.1.2.2.3.3. Third step
The voltage (V2) between the positive side of the high voltage bus and the
electrical chassis is measured and recorded (see Figure 8).
6.3.1.2.2.3.4. Fourth step
If V1 is greater than or equal to V2, a standard known resistance (Ro) is
inserted between the negative side of the high voltage bus and the electrical
chassis. With Ro installed, the voltage (V1’) between the negative side of the
high voltage bus and the electrical chassis is measured (see Figure 9).
The electrical isolation (Ri) is calculated according to the following formula:
Ri = Ro*(Vb/V1’ – Vb/V1) or Ri = Ro*Vb*(1/V1’ – 1/V1)
The resulting Ri, which is the electrical isolation resistance value (in Ω), is
divided by the working voltage of the high voltage bus in volt (V):
Ri Ω / V = Ri Ω / Working voltage (V)
Figure 9
Measurement of V1´

180
 Electrical Chassis

Energy Conversion
System Assembly REESS Assembly

High Voltage Bus

+ +

Energy
Traction System REESS
Conversion
Vb
System
- -

V1´ R0

Electrical Chassis

If V2 is greater than V1, a standard known resistance (Ro) is inserted between

the positive side of the high voltage bus and the electrical chassis. With Ro
installed, the voltage (V2’) between the positive side of the high voltage bus
and the electrical chassis is measured (see Figure 10). The electrical isolation
(Ri) is calculated according to the formula shown below. This electrical
isolation value (in ohms) is divided by the nominal operating voltage of the
high voltage bus (in volts). The electrical isolation (Ri) is calculated according
to the following formula:
Ri = Ro*(Vb/V2’ – Vb/V2) or Ri = Ro*Vb*(1/V2’ – 1/V2)
The resulting Ri, which is the electrical isolation resistance value (in Ω), is
divided by the working voltage of the high voltage bus in volts (V).
Ri Ω / V = Ri Ω / Working voltage
Figure 10
Measurement of V2

181
 Electrical Chassis

Energy Conversion R0
System Assembly REESS Assembly
V2'
High Voltage Bus

+ +

Energy
Conversion Traction System REESS
System
- -

Electrical Chassis

6.3.1.2.2.3.5. Fifth step

The electrical isolation value Ri (in ohms) divided by the working voltage of
the high voltage bus (in volts) results in the isolation resistance (in ohms/volt).
(Note 1: The standard known resistance Ro (in ohms) is the value of the minimum
required isolation resistance (in ohms/V) multiplied by the working voltage of the
vehicle plus/minus 20 per cent (in volts). Ro is not required to be precisely this
value since the equations are valid for any Ro; however, a Ro value in this range
should provide good resolution for the voltage measurements.)
6.3.2. Confirmation Method for Functions of On-board Isolation Resistance
Monitoring System
The function of the on-board isolation resistance monitoring system is
confirmed by the following method or a method equivalent to it.
A resistor is inserted that does not cause the isolation resistance between the
terminal being monitored and the electrical chassis to drop below the minimum
required isolation resistance value. The warning signal shall be activated.
6.3.3. Protection against direct contacts of parts under voltage
6.3.3.1. Access probes
Access probes to verify the protection of persons against access to live parts
are given in Table 3.
6.3.3.2. Test conditions
The access probe is pushed against any openings of the enclosure with the force
specified in Table 3. If it partly or fully penetrates, it is placed in every possible
position, but in no case shall the stop face fully penetrate through the opening.
Internal electrical protection barriers are considered part of the enclosure.
A low-voltage supply (of not less than 40 V and not more than 50 V) in series
with a suitable lamp is connected, if necessary, between the probe and live
parts inside the electrical protection barrier or enclosure.

182
 The signal-circuit method is also applied to the moving live parts of high
voltage equipment.
Internal moving parts may be operated slowly, where this is possible.
6.3.3.3. Acceptance conditions
The access probe shall not touch live parts.
If this requirement is verified by a signal circuit between the probe and live
parts, the lamp shall not light.
In the case of the test for IPXXB, the jointed test finger may penetrate to its 80
mm length, but the stop face (diameter 50 mm x 20 mm) shall not pass through
the opening. Starting from the straight position, both joints of the test finger are
successively bent through an angle of up to 90 degree with respect to the axis of
the adjoining section of the finger and are placed in every possible position.
In case of the tests for IPXXD, the access probe may penetrate to its full length,
but the stop face shall not fully penetrate through the opening.
Table 3
Access probes for the tests for protection of persons against access to hazardous parts

Figure 11
Jointed Test Fingers

183
Material: metal, except where otherwise specified
Linear dimensions in millimetres
Tolerances on dimensions without specific tolerance:
on angles, 0/10'
on linear dimensions:
up to 25 mm: 0/-0.05
over 25 mm: ±0.2
Both joints shall permit movement in the same plane and the same direction through an angle
of 90° with a 0 to +10° tolerance.

184
6.3.4. Test Method for Measuring Electric Resistance
Test method using a resistance tester.
The resistance tester is connected to the measuring points (typically, electrical
chassis and electro conductive enclosure/electrical protection barrier) and the
resistance is measured using a resistance tester that meets the specification that
follows;
Resistance tester: Measurement current at least 0.2 A
Resolution 0.01 Ω or less
The resistance R shall be less than 0.1 ohm.
Test method using D.C. power supply, voltmeter and ammeter.
Example of the test method using D.C. power supply, voltmeter and ammeter
is shown below.
Figure 12
Connection to Barrier/Enclosure
I
A Barrier/Enclosure
D.C.
Power V V
R
Supply
Electrical Chassis
Connection to
Electrical Chassis

Test Procedure
The D.C. power supply, voltmeter and ammeter are connected to the measuring points
(Typically, electrical chassis and electro conductive enclosure/electrical protection barrier).
The voltage of the D.C. power supply is adjusted so that the current flow becomes more than
0.2 A.
The current "I " and the voltage "V " are measured.
The resistance "R " is calculated according to the following formula:
R=V/I
The resistance R shall be less than 0.1 ohm.

185
Note: If lead wires are used for voltage and current measurement, each lead wire shall be
independently connected to the electrical protection barrier/enclosure/electrical chassis.
Terminal can be common for voltage measurement and current measurement.

Barrier/Enclosure/
Electrical chassis Lead Wires

Lead wires shall be independent for current

measurement and voltage measurement. Terminal can
Bolt be common.

Terminal

6.3.5. Test Conditions and Test Procedure regarding Post Crash

6.3.5.1. Test Conditions
6.3.5.1.1. General
The test conditions specified in paragraphs 6.3.5.1.2 to 6.3.5.1.4. are used.
Where a range is specified, the vehicle shall be capable of meeting the
requirements at all points within the range.
6.3.5.1.2. Electrical power train adjustment
6.3.5.1.2.1. The REESS may be at any state of charge, which allows the normal operation
of the power train as recommended by the manufacturer.
6.3.5.1.2.2. The electrical power train shall be energized with or without the operation of
the original electrical energy sources (e.g. engine-generator, REESS or electric
energy conversion system), however:
6.3.5.1.2.2.1. It is permissible to perform the test with all or parts of the electrical power train
not being energized insofar as there is no negative influence on the test result.
For parts of the electrical power train not energized, the protection against
electric shock shall be proved by either physical protection or isolation
resistance and appropriate additional evidence.
6.3.5.1.2.2.2. If the power train is not energized and an automatic disconnect is provided, it
is permissible to perform the test with the automatic disconnect being
triggered. In this case it shall be demonstrated that the automatic disconnect
would have operated during the impact test. This includes the automatic
activation signal as well as the conductive separation considering the
conditions as seen during the impact.
6.3.5.1.3. Contracting parties may allow modifications to the fuel system so that an
appropriate amount of fuel can be used to run the engine or the electrical energy
conversion system.
6.3.5.1.4. The vehicle conditions other than specified in paras. 6.3.5.1.1. to 6.3.5.1.3. are
in the crash test protocols of the contracting parties.
6.3.5.2. Test Procedures for the protection of the occupants of vehicles operating on
electrical power from high voltage and electrolyte spillage

186
 This section describes test procedures to demonstrate compliance with the
electrical safety requirements of para. 5.3.2.
Before the vehicle impact test conducted, the high voltage bus voltage (Vb)
(see Figure 13) is measured and recorded to confirm that it is within the
operating voltage of the vehicle as specified by the vehicle manufacturer.
6.3.5.2.1. Test setup and equipment
If a high voltage disconnect function is used, measurements are taken from
both sides of the device performing the disconnect function.
However, if the high voltage disconnect is integral to the REESS or the energy
conversion system and the high-voltage bus of the REESS or the energy
conversion system is protected according to protection degree IPXXB
following the impact test, measurements may only be taken between the device
performing the disconnect function and electrical loads.
The voltmeter used in this test measures DC values and have an internal
resistance of at least 10 MΩ.
6.3.5.2.2. The following instructions may be used if voltage is measured.
After the impact test, determine the high voltage bus voltages (Vb, V1, V2)
(see figure 13).
The voltage measurement is made not earlier than 5 seconds, but not later than
60 seconds after the impact.
This procedure is not applicable if the test is performed under the condition
where the electric power train is not energized.
Figure 13
Measurement of Vb, V1, V2

Energy Conversion
REESS Assembly
System Assembly V2
High Voltage Bus

+ +

Energy
Traction System REESS
Conversion Vb
System

- -

V1

Electrical Chassis

187
6.3.5.2.3. Isolation resistance
See para. 6.3.1.2. "Measurement method"
All measurements for calculating voltage(s) and electrical isolation are made
after a minimum of 5 seconds after the impact.
For example, megohmmeter or oscilloscope measurements are an appropriate
alternative to the procedure described above for measuring isolation resistance.
In this case it may be necessary to deactivate the on-board isolation resistance
monitoring system.
6.3.5.2.4. Physical Protection
Following the vehicle crash test, any parts surrounding the high voltage
components are opened, disassembled or removed without the use of tools. All
remaining surrounding parts shall be considered part of the physical protection.
The jointed test finger described in para. 6.3.3. is inserted into any gaps or
openings of the physical protection with a test force of 10 N ± 10 per cent for
electrical safety assessment. If partial or full penetration into the physical
protection by the Jointed Test Finger occurs, the Jointed Test Finger shall be
placed in every position as specified below.
Starting from the straight position, both joints of the test finger are rotated
progressively through an angle of up to 90 degrees with respect to the axis of
the adjoining section of the finger and are placed in every possible position.
Internal electrical protection barriers are considered part of the enclosure
If appropriate, a low-voltage supply (of not less than 40 V and not more than
50 V) in series with a suitable lamp is connected between the Jointed Test
Finger and high voltage live parts inside the electrical protection barrier or
enclosure
6.3.5.2.5. Acceptance conditions
The requirements of para. 5.3.2.2.3. are met if the jointed test finger described
in para. 6.3.3. is unable to contact high voltage live parts.
If necessary a mirror or a fibrescope may be used in order to inspect whether
the jointed test finger touches the high voltage buses.
If this requirement is verified by a signal circuit between the jointed test finger
and high voltage live parts, the lamp shall not light.
6.3.5.2.6. Electrolyte spillage
Appropriate coating shall be applied, if necessary, to the physical protection in
order to confirm any electrolyte leakage from the REESS after the impact test.
Unless the manufacturer provides the means to differentiate among the leakage
of different liquids, all liquid leakage is considered as an electrolyte.
6.3.5.2.7. REESS retention
Compliance shall be determined by visual inspection

188
7. Vehicles with a liquefied hydrogen storage system
(LHSSs)
7.1. LHSS optional requirements
As described in paras. 23. and 118. of the preamble, individual Contracting
Parties may elect to adopt the GTRgtr with or without the LHSS requirements
in para. 7.
Para. 7. is organized as follows:
Para. 7.2. LHSS design qualification requirements
Para. 7.3. LHSS fuel system integrity
Para. 7.4. Test procedures for LHSS design qualification
Para. 7.5. Test procedures for LHSS fuel system integrity
7.2. LHSS design qualification requirements
This Section specifies the requirements for the integrity of a liquefied hydrogen
storage system.
The hydrogen storage system qualifies for the performance test requirements
specified in this Section. All liquefied hydrogen storage systems produced for
on-road vehicle service shall be capable of satisfying requirements of para. 7.2.
The manufacturer shall specify a maximum allowable working pressure
(MAWP) for the inner container.
The test elements within these performance requirements are summarized in
Table 124.
These criteria apply to qualification of storage systems for use in new vehicle
production. They do not apply to re-qualification of any single produced
system for use beyond its expected useful service or re-qualification after a
potentially significant damaging event.
Table 124
Overview of performance qualification requirements
Para. 7.2.1. Verification of baseline metrics
7.2.1.1. Proof pressure
7.2.1.2. Baseline initial burst pressure, performed on the inner container
7.2.1.3. Baseline Pressure cycle life
Para. 7.2.2. Verification of expected on-road performance
Para. 7.2.2.1. Boil-off
Para. 7.2.2.2. Leak
Para. 7.2.2.3. Vacuum loss
Para. 7.2.3. Verification for service terminating performance: bonfire

Para. 7.2.4. Verification of components

189
7.2.1. Verification of baseline metrics
7.2.1.1. Proof pressure
A system is pressurized to a pressure ptest ptest ≥ 1.3 (MAWP ± 0.1 MPa) in
accordance with test procedure para. 7.4.1.1. without visible deformation,
degradation of container pressure, or detectable leakage.
7.2.1.2. Baseline initial burst pressure
The burst test is performed per the test procedure in para. 7.4.1.2. on one
sample of the inner container that is not integrated in its outer jacket and not
insulated.
The burst pressure shall be at least equal to the burst pressure used for the
mechanical calculations. For steel containers that is either:
(a) Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) (in MPa) plus
0.1 MPa multiplied by 3.25;
or
(b) Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) (in MPa) plus
0.1 MPa multiplied by 1.5 and multiplied by Rm/Rp, where Rm is the
minimum ultimate tensile strength of the container material and Rp
(minimum yield strength) is 1.0 for austenitic steels and Rp is 0.2 for
other steels.
7.2.1.3. Baseline pressure cycle life
When using metallic containers and/or metallic vacuum jackets, the
manufacturer shall either provide a calculation in order to demonstrate that the
container is designed according to current regional legislation or accepted
standards (e.g. in US the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, in Europe
EN 1251-1 and EN 1251-2 and in all other countries an applicable regulation
for the design of metallic pressure containers), or define and perform suitable
tests (including para. 7.4.1.3.) that prove the same level of safety compared to
a design supported by calculation according to accepted standards.
For non-metallic containers and/or vacuum jackets, in addition to para. 7.4.1.3.
testing, suitable tests shall be designed by the manufacturer to prove the same
level of safety compared to a metallic container.
7.2.2. Verification for expected on-road performance
7.2.2.1. Boil-off
The boil-off test is performed on a liquefied hydrogen storage system equipped
with all components as described in para. G.1.(b). of the preamble (Figure 367
in section G of Part Ithe preamble). The test is performed on a system filled
with liquid hydrogen per the test procedure in para. 7.4.2.1. and shall
demonstrate that the boil-off system limits the pressure in the inner storage
container to below the maximum allowable working pressure.
7.2.2.2. Leak
After the boil-off test in para. 7.2.2.1., the system is kept at boil-off pressure
and the total discharge rate due to leakage shall be measured per the test
procedure in para. 7.4.2.2.. The maximum allowable discharge from the
hydrogen storage system is R*150 NmL/min where

190
 R = (Vwidth+1)*(Vheight+0.5)*(Vlength+1)/30.4 and Vwidth, Vheight,
Vlength are the vehicle width, height, length (m), respectively.]
7.2.2.3. Vacuum loss
The vacuum loss test is performed on a liquefied hydrogen storage system
equipped with all components as described in para. G.1.(b). of the preamble
(and Figure 367) in Part Iof the preamble). The test is performed on a system
filled with liquid hydrogen per the test procedure in para. 7.4.2.3. and shall
demonstrate that both primary and secondary pressure relief devices limit the
pressure to the values specified in para. 7.4.2.3. in case vacuum pressure is lost.
7.2.3. Verification of service-terminating conditions: bonfire
At least one system shall demonstrate the working of the pressure relief devices
and the absence of rupture under the following service-terminating conditions.
Specifics of test procedures are provided in para. 7.4.3.
A hydrogen storage system is filled to half-full liquid level and exposed to fire
in accordance with test procedure of para. 7.4.3. The pressure relief device(s)
shall release the contained gas in a controlled manner without rupture.
For steel containers the test is passed when the requirements relating to the
pressure limits for the pressure relief devices as described in para. 7.4.3. are
fulfilled. For other container materials, an equivalent level of safety shall be
demonstrated.
7.2.4. Verification of components
The entire storage system does not have to be re-qualified (para. 7.2.) if
container shut-off devices and pressure relief devices (components in Figure
36 in Part I4 7 of the preamble excluding the storage container) are exchanged
for equivalent components having comparable function, fittings, and
dimensions, and qualified for performance using the same qualification (paras.
7.2.4.1. and 7.2.4.2.) as the original components.
7.2.4.1. Pressure relief devices qualification requirements
Design qualification testing shall be conducted on finished pressure relief
devices which are representative of normal production. The pressure relief
devices shall meet the following performance qualification requirements:
(a) Pressure test (para. 7.4.4.1. test procedure) ;
(b) External leakage test (para. 7.4.4.2. test procedure) ;
(c) Operational test (para. 7.4.4.4. test procedure) ;
(d) Corrosion resistance test (para. 7.4.4.4. test procedure) ;
(e) Temperature cycle test (para. 7.4.4.8. test procedure).
7.2.4.2. Shut-off valves qualification requirements
Design qualification testing shall be conducted on finished shut-off valves (in
Figure 36 in Part I 7 of the preamble named shut-off devices) which are
representative for normal production. The valve shall meet the following
performance qualification requirements:
(a) Pressure test (para. 7.4.4.1. test procedure) ;
(b) External leakage Test (para. 7.4.4.2. test procedure) ;

191
 (c) Endurance test (para. 7.4.4.3. test procedure) ;
(d) Corrosion resistance test (para. 7.4.4.5. test procedure) ;
(e) Resistance to dry-heat test (para. 7.4.4.6. test procedure) ;
(f) Ozone ageing test (para. 7.4.4.7. test procedure) ;
(g) Temperature cycle test (para. 7.4.4.8. test procedure) ;
(h) Flex line cycle test (para. 7.4.4.9. test procedure).
7.2.5. Labelling
A label shall be permanently affixed on each container with at least the
following information: Name of the Manufacturer, Serial Number, Date of
Manufacture, MAWP, Type of Fuel. Any label affixed to the container in
compliance with this section shall remain in place. Contracting parties may
specify additional labelling requirements.
7.3. LHSS fuel system integrity
This section specifies requirements for the integrity of the hydrogen fuel
delivery system, which includes the liquefied hydrogen storage system, piping,
joints, and components in which hydrogen is present. These requirements are
in addition to requirements specified in para. 5.2., all of which apply to vehicles
with liquefied hydrogen storage systems with the exception of para. 5.2.1.1.
The fuelling receptacle label shall designate liquid hydrogen as the fuel type.
Test procedures are given in para. 7.5.
7.3.1. Flammable materials used in the vehicle shall be protected from liquefied air
that may condense on elements of the fuel system.
7.3.2. The insulation of the components shall prevent liquefaction of the air in contact
with the outer surfaces, unless a system is provided for collecting and
vaporizing the liquefied air. The materials of the components nearby shall be
compatible with an atmosphere enriched with oxygen.
7.4. Test procedures for LHSS design qualification
7.4.1. Verification tests for Baseline metrics
7.4.1.1. Proof pressure test
The inner container and the pipe work situated between the inner container and
the outer jacket shall withstand an inner pressure test at room temperature
according to the following requirements.
The test pressure ptest is defined by the manufacturer and shall fulfil the
following requirements:
ptest ≥ 1.3 (MAWP ± 0.1 MPa)
(a) For metallic containers, either ptest is equal to or greater than the
maximum pressure of the inner container during fault management (as
determined in para. 7.4.2.3.) or the manufacturer proves by calculation
that at the maximum pressure of the inner container during fault
management no yield occurs;
(b) For non-metallic containers, ptest is equal to or greater than the
maximum pressure of the inner container during fault management (as
determined in para. 7.4.2.3.).

192
 The test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) The test is conducted on the inner storage container and the
interconnecting pipes between inner storage container and vacuum
jacket before the outer jacket is mounted;
(b) The test is either conducted hydraulically with water or a glycol/water
mixture, or alternatively with gas. The container is pressurized to test
pressure ptest at an even rate and kept at that pressure for at least
10 minutes;
(c) The test is done at ambient temperature. In the case of using gas to
pressurize the container, the pressurization is done in a way that the
container temperature stays at or around ambient temperature.
The test is passed successfully if, during the first 10 minutes after applying the
proof pressure, no visible permanent deformation, no visible degradation in the
container pressure and no visible leakage are detectable.
7.4.1.2. Baseline initial burst pressure
The test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) The test is conducted on the inner container at ambient temperature;
(b) The test is conducted hydraulically with water or a water/glycol
mixture;
(c) The pressure is increased at a constant rate, not exceeding 0.5 MPa/min
until burst or leakage of the container occurs;
(d) When MAWP is reached there is a wait period of at least ten minutes at
constant pressure, during which time the deformation of the container
can be checked;
(e) The pressure is recorded or written during the entire test.
For steel inner containers, the test is passed successfully if at least one of the
two passing criteria described in para. 57.2.1.2. is fulfilled. For inner containers
made out of an aluminium alloy or other material, a passing criterion shall be
defined which guarantees at least the same level of safety compared to steel
inner containers.
7.4.1.3. Baseline pressure cycle life
Containers and/or vacuum jackets are pressure cycled with a number of cycles
at least three times the number of possible full pressure cycles (from the lowest
to highest operating pressure) for an expected on-road performance. The
number of pressure cycles is defined by the manufacturer under consideration
of operating pressure range, size of the storage and, respectively, maximum
number of refuellings and maximum number of pressure cycles under extreme
usage and storage conditions. Pressure cycling is conducted between
atmospheric pressure and MAWP at liquid nitrogen temperatures, e.g. by
filling the container with liquid nitrogen to certain level and alternately
pressurizing and depressurizing it with (pre-cooled) gaseous nitrogen or
helium.

193
7.4.2. Verification for expected on-road performance
7.4.2.1. Boil-off test
The test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) For pre-conditioning, the container is fuelled with liquid hydrogen to
the specified maximum filling level. Hydrogen is subsequently
extracted until it meets half filling level, and the system is allowed to
completely cool down for at least 24 hours and a maximum of 48 hours;
(b) The container is filled to the specified maximum filling level;
(c) The container is pressurized until boil-off pressure is reached;
(d) The test lasts for at least another 48 hours after boil-off started and is
not terminated before the pressure stabilizes. Pressure stabilization has
occurred when the average pressure does not increase over a two hour
period.
The pressure of the inner container is recorded or written during the entire test.
The test is passed successfully if the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) The pressure stabilizes and stays below MAWP during the whole test;
(b) The pressure relief devices are not allowed to open during the whole
test.
The pressure of the inner container shall be recorded or written during the
entire test. The test is passed when the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) The pressure shall stabilize and stay below MAWP during the whole
test;
(b) The pressure relief devices are not allowed to open during the whole
test.
7.4.2.2. Leak test
The test shall be is conducted according to the procedure described in
para. 7.4.4.2.
7.4.2.3. Vacuum loss test
The first part of the test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) The vacuum loss test is conducted with a completely cooled-down
container (according to the procedure in para. 7.4.2.1.);
(b) The container is filled with liquid hydrogen to the specified maximum
filling level;
(c) The vacuum enclosure is flooded with air at an even rate to
atmospheric pressure;
(d) The test is terminated when the first pressure relief device does not
open any more.
The pressure of the inner container and the vacuum jacket is recorded or
written during the entire test. The opening pressure of the first safety device is
recorded or written. The first part of test is passed if the following requirements
are fulfilled:

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 (a) The first pressure relief device opens below or at MAWP and limit the
pressure to not more than 110 per cent of the MAWP;
(b) The first pressure relief device does not open at pressure above MAWP;
(c) The secondary pressure relief device does not open during the entire
test.
After passing the first part, the test shall be repeated subsequently to re-
generation of the vacuum and cool-down of the container as described above.
(a) The vacuum is re-generated to a value specified by the manufacturer.
The vacuum shall be maintained at least 24 hours. The vacuum pump
may stay connected until the time directly before the start of the vacuum
loss;
(b) The second part of the vacuum loss test is conducted with a completely
cooled-down container (according to the procedure in para. 7.4.2.1.);
(c) The container is filled to the specified maximum filling level;
(d) The line downstream the first safety pressure relief device is blocked
and the vacuum enclosure is flooded with air at an even rate to
atmospheric pressure;
(e) The test is terminated when the second pressure relief device does not
open any more.
The pressure of the inner container and the vacuum jacket is recorded or
written during the entire test. For steel containers the second part of the test is
passed if the second secondary pressure relief device does not open below 110
per cent of the set pressure of the first pressure safety relief device and limits
the pressure in the container to a maximum 136 per cent of the MAWP if a
safety valve is used, or, 150 per cent of the MAWP if a burst disk is used as
the second secondary pressure safety relief device. For other container
materials, an equivalent level of safety shall be demonstrated.
7.4.3. Verification test for service-terminating performance due to fire
The tested liquefied hydrogen storage system shall be representative of the
design and the manufacturing of the type to be homologated. Its manufacturing
shall be completely finished and it shall be mounted with all its equipment.
The first part of the test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) The bonfire test is conducted with a completely cooled-down container
(according to the procedure in para. 7.4.2.1.);
(b) The container contained during the previous 24 hours a volume of
liquid hydrogen at least equal to half of the water volume of the inner
container;
(c) The container is filled with liquid hydrogen so that the quantity of liquid
hydrogen measured by the mass measurement system is half of the
maximum allowed quantity that may be contained in the inner
container;
(d) A fire burns 0.1 m underneath the container. The length and the width
of the fire exceed the plan dimensions of the container by 0.1 m. The
temperature of the fire is at least 590 ºC. The fire shall continue to burn
for the duration of the test;

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 (e) The pressure of the container at the beginning of the test is between 0
MPa and 0.01 MPa at the boiling point of hydrogen in the inner
container;
(f) The test shall continue until the storage pressure decreases to or below
the pressure at the beginning of the test, or alternatively in case the first
PRD is a re-closing type, the test shall continue until the safety device
has opened for a second time;
(g) The test conditions and the maximum pressure reached within the
container during the test are recorded in a test certificate signed by the
manufacturer and the technical service.
The test is passed if the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) The secondary pressure relief device is not operated below 110 per cent
of the set pressure of the primary pressure relief device;
(b) The container shall not burst and the pressure inside the inner container
shall not exceed the permissible fault range of the inner container.
The permissible fault range for steel containers is as follows:
(a) If a safety valve is used as secondary pressure relief device, the pressure
inside the container does not exceed 136 per cent of the MAWP of the
inner container;
(b) If a burst disk is used outside the vacuum area as secondary pressure
relief device, the pressure inside the container is limited to 150 per cent
of the MAWP of the inner container;
(c) If a burst disk is used inside the vacuum area as secondary pressure
relief device, the pressure inside the container is limited to 150 per cent
of the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure plus 0.1 MPa (MAWP
± 0.1 MPa) of the inner container.
For other materials, an equivalent level of safety shall be demonstrated.
7.4.4. Component Verification Tests
Testing shall be performed with hydrogen gas having gas quality compliant
with ISO 14687:2019/SAE J2719_202003ISO 14687-2/SAE J2719. All tests
shall be performed at ambient temperature 20 (±5) °C unless otherwise
specified. The TPRD qualification performance tests are specified as follows:

7.4.4.1. Pressure test

A hydrogen containing component shall withstand without any visible
evidence of leak or deformation a test pressure of 150 per cent MAWP with
the outlets of the high pressure part plugged. The pressure shall subsequently
be increased from 150 per cent to 300 per cent MAWP. The component shall
not show any visible evidence of rupture or cracks.
The pressure supply system shall be equipped with a positive shut-off valve
and a pressure gauge having a pressure range of not less than 150 per cent and
no more than 200 per cent of the test pressure; the accuracy of the gauge shall
be 1 per cent of the pressure range.
For components requiring a leakage test, this test shall be performed prior to
the pressure test.

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7.4.4.2. External leakage test
A component shall be free from leakage through stem or body seals or other
joints, and shall not show evidence of porosity in casting when tested as
described in para. 7.4.4.3.3. at any gas pressure between zero and its MAWP.
The test shall be performed on the same equipment at the following conditions:
(a) At ambient temperature;
(b) At the minimum operating temperature or at liquid nitrogen
temperature after sufficient conditioning time at this temperature to
ensure thermal stability;
(c) At the maximum operating temperature after sufficient conditioning
time at this temperature to ensure thermal stability.
During this test, the equipment under test shall be connected to a source of gas
pressure. A positive shut-off valve and a pressure gauge having a pressure
range of not less than 150 per cent and not more than 200 per cent of the test
pressure shall be installed in the pressure supply piping; the accuracy of the
gauge shall be 1 per cent of the pressure range. The pressure gauge shall be
installed between the positive shut-off valve and the sample under test.
Throughout the test, the sample shall be tested for leakage, with a surface
active agent without formation of bubbles or measured with a leakage rate less
than 216 Nml/hour.
7.4.4.3. Endurance test
7.4.4.3.1. A component shall be capable of conforming to the applicable leakage test
requirements of paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9., after being subjected to 20,000
operation cycles.
7.4.4.3.2. The appropriate tests for external leakage and seat leakage, as described in
paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. shall be carried out immediately following the
endurance test.
7.4.4.3.3. The shut-off valve shall be securely connected to a pressurized source of dry
air or nitrogen and subjected to 20,000 operation cycles. A cycle shall consist
of one opening and one closing of the component within a period of not less
than 10 ± 2 seconds.
7.4.4.3.4. The component shall be operated through 96 per cent of the number of
specified cycles at ambient temperature and at the MAWP of the component.
During the off cycle the downstream pressure of the test fixture shall be
allowed to decay to 50 per cent of the MAWP of the component.
7.4.4.3.5. The component shall be operated through 2 per cent of the total cycles at the
maximum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) after sufficient
conditioning time at this temperature to ensure thermal stability and at MAWP.
The component shall comply with paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. at the appropriate
maximum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) at the completion of the
high temperature cycles.
7.4.4.3.6. The component shall be operated through 2 per cent of the total cycles at the
minimum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) but not less than the
temperature of liquid nitrogen after sufficient conditioning time at this
temperature to ensure thermal stability and at the MAWP of the component.
The component shall comply with paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. at the appropriate

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 minimum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) at the completion of the low
temperature cycles.
7.4.4.4. Operational test
The operational test shall be carried out in accordance with EN 13648-1 or EN
13648 2. The specific requirements of the standard are applicable.
7.4.4.5. Corrosion resistance test
Metallic hydrogen components shall comply with the leakage tests referred to
paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. after being submitted to 144 hours salt spray test
according to ISO 9227 with all connections closed.
A copper or brass hydrogen containing component shall comply with the
leakage tests referred to paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. and after being submitted
to 24 hours immersion in ammonia according to ISO 6957 with all connections
closed.
7.4.4.6. Resistance to dry-heat test
The test shall be carried out in compliance with ISO 188. The test piece shall
be exposed to air at a temperature equal to the maximum operating temperature
for 168 hours. The change in tensile strength shall not exceed ±25 per cent.
The change in ultimate elongation shall not exceed the following values:
Maximum increase 10 per cent,
Maximum decrease 30 per cent.
7.4.4.7. Ozone ageing Test
The test shall be in compliance with ISO 1431-1. The test piece, which shall
be stressed to 20 per cent elongation, shall be exposed to air at +40 °C with an
ozone concentration of 50 parts per hundred million during 120 hours.
No cracking of the test piece is allowed.
7.4.4.8. Temperature cycle test
A non-metallic part containing hydrogen shall comply with the leakage tests
referred to in paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. after having been submitted to a 96
hours temperature cycle from the minimum operating temperature up to the
maximum operating temperature with a cycle time of 120 minutes, under
MAWP.
7.4.4.9. Flex line cycle test
Any flexible fuel line shall be capable of conforming to the applicable
leakage test requirements referred to in para. 7.4.4.2., after being subjected to
6,000 pressure cycles.
The pressure shall change from atmospheric pressure to the MAWP of the
container within less than five seconds, and after a time of at least five seconds,
shall decrease to atmospheric pressure within less than five seconds.
The appropriate test for external leakage, as referred to in para. 7.4.4.2., shall
be carried out immediately following the endurance test.

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7.5. Test procedures for LHSS fuel system integrity
7.5.1. Post-crash leak test for the liquefied hydrogen storage systems
Prior to the vehicle crash test, the following steps are taken to prepare the
liquefied hydrogen storage system (LHSS):
(a) If the vehicle does not already have the following capabilities as part of
the standard vehicle, and tests in para. 6.1.1. are to be performed; the
following shall be installed before the test:
(i) LHSS pressure sensor. The pressure sensor shall have a full
scale of reading of at least 150 per cent of MAWP, an accuracy
of at least 1 per cent of full scale, and capable of reading values
of at least 10 kPa;
(ii) LHSS temperature sensor. The temperature sensor shall be
capable of measuring cryogenic temperatures expected before
crash. The sensor is located on an outlet, as near as possible to
the container;
(iii) Fill and drain ports. The ability to add and remove both liquefied
and gaseous contents of the LHSS before and after the crash test
shall be provided.
(b) The LHSS is purged with at least 5 volumes of nitrogen gas;
(c) The LHSS is filled with nitrogen to the equivalence of the maximum
fill level of hydrogen by weight;
(d) After fill, the (nitrogen) gas vent is to be closed, and the container
allowed to equilibrate;
(e) The leak-tightness of the LHSS is confirmed.
After the LHSS pressure and temperature sensors indicate that the system has
cooled and equilibrated, the vehicle shall be crashed per state or regional
regulation. Following the crash, there shall be no visible leak of cold nitrogen
gas or liquid for a period of at least 1 hour after the crash. Additionally, the
operability of the pressure controls or PRDs shall be proven to ensure that the
LHSS is protected against burst after the crash. If the LHSS vacuum has not
been compromised by the crash, nitrogen gas may be added to the LHSS via
the fill / drain port until pressure controls and/or PRDs are activated. In the
case of re-closing pressure controls or PRDs, activation and re-closing for at
least 2 cycles shall be demonstrated. Exhaust from the venting of the pressure
controls or the PRDs shall not be vented to the passenger, luggage, or cargo
compartments during these post-crash tests.
Following confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are
still functional, a leak test shall be conducted on the LHSS using the procedures
in either para. 6.1.1.1. or para. 6.1.1.2.
Either test procedure para. 7.5.1.1. or the alternative test procedure
para. 7.5.1.2. (consisting of paras. 7.5.1.2.1. and 7.5.1.2.2.) may be undertaken
to satisfy test procedure para. 7.5.1.
7.5.1.1. Post-crash leak test for the liquefied hydrogen storage systems (LHSSs)
The following test would replace both the leak test in para. 7.5.1.2.1. and gas
concentration measurements as defined in para. 7.5.1.2.2. Following
confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are still

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 functional; the leak tightness of the LHSS may be proven by detecting all
possible leaking parts with a sniff sensor of a calibrated Helium leak test device
used in sniff modus. The test can be performed as an alternative if the following
pre-conditions are fulfilled:
(a) No possible leaking part shall be below the liquid nitrogen level on the
storage container;
(b) All possible leaking parts are pressurized with helium gas when the
LHSS is pressurized;
(c) Required covers and/or body panels and parts can be removed to gain
access to all potential leak sites.
Prior to the test the manufacturer shall provide a list of all possible leaking
parts of the LHSS. Possible leaking parts are:
(a) Any connectors between pipes and between pipes and the container;
(b) Any welding of pipes and components downstream the container;
(c) Valves;
(d) Flexible lines;
(e) Sensors.
Prior to the leak test overpressure in the LHSS should shall be released to
atmospheric pressure and afterwards the LHSS should shall be pressurized
with helium to at least the operating pressure but well below the normal
pressure control setting (so the pressure regulators do not activate during the
test period). The test is passed if the total leakage amount (i.e. the sum of all
detected leakage points) is less than 216 Nml/hr.
7.5.1.2. Alternative post-crash tests for the liquefied hydrogen storage systems
Both tests of paras. 7.5.1.2.1. and 7.5.1.2.2. are conducted under the test
procedure of para. 7.5.1.2.
7.5.1.2.1. Alternative post-crash leak test
Following confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are
still functional, the following test may be conducted to measure the post-
crash leakage. The concentration test in para. 6.1.1.1. shall be conducted in
parallel for the 60 minute test period if the hydrogen concentration has not
already been directly measured following the vehicle crash.
The container shall be vented to atmospheric pressure and the liquefied
contents of the container shall be removed and the container shall be heated up
to ambient temperature. The heat-up could be done, e.g. by purging the
container sufficient times with warm nitrogen or increasing the vacuum
pressure.
If the pressure control set point is less than 90 per cent of the MAWP, the
pressure control shall be disabled so that it does not activate and vent gas
during the leak test.
The container shall then be purged with helium by either:
(a) Flowing at least 5 volumes through the container;
or

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 (b) Pressurizing and de-pressurizing the container the LHSS at least 5
times.
The LHSS shall then be filled with helium to 80 per cent of the MAWP of the
container or to within 10 per cent of the primary relief valve setting, whichever
results in the lower pressure, and held for a period of 60 minutes. The measured
pressure loss over the 60 minute test period shall be less than less than or equal
to the following criterion based on the liquid capacity of the LHSS:
(a) 2 atm allowable loss for 100L systems or less;
(b) 1 atm allowable loss for systems greater than 100L and less than or
equal to 200L; and
(c) 0.5 atm allowable for systems greater than 200L.
7.5.1.2.2. Post-crash enclosed spaces test
The measurements shall be recorded in the crash test that evaluates potential
liquid hydrogen leakage in test procedure para. 7.5.1.2.1. if the LHSS contains
hydrogen for the crash test or during the helium leak test in test procedure para.
6.1.2.
Select sensors to measure the build-up of hydrogen or helium (depending
which gas is contained within the Liquefied Hydrogen Storage Systems
(LHSSs) for the crash test. Sensors may measure either measure the
hydrogen/helium content of the atmosphere within the compartments or
measure the reduction in oxygen (due to displacement of air by leaking
hydrogen/helium).
The sensors shall be calibrated to traceable references, have an accuracy of 5 per
cent of reading at the targeted criteria of 4 per cent hydrogen (for a test with
liquefied hydrogen) or 0.8 per cent helium by volume in the air (for a test at room
temperature with helium), and a full scale measurement capability of at least 25
per cent above the target criteria. The sensor shall be capable of a 90 per cent
response to a full scale change in concentration within 10 seconds.
The installation in vehicles with LHSSs shall meet the same requirements as
for vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage systems in para. 6.1.2. Data
from the sensors shall be collected at least every 5 seconds and continue for a
period of 60 minutes after the vehicle comes to a rest if post-crash hydrogen is
being measured or after the initiation of the helium leak test if helium build-up
is being measured. Up to a 5 second rolling average may be applied to the
measurements to provide "smoothing" and filter effects of spurious data points.
The rolling average of each sensor shall be below the targeted criteria of 4 per
cent hydrogen (for a test with liquefied hydrogen) or 0.8 per cent helium by
volume in the air (for a test at room temperature with helium) at all times
throughout the 60 minute post-crash test period.

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