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ISSN: 2379-3252
Vol. XVI No. 1 June 1999
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NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 55
The Reconstruction of Eastern Kentucky
Rear Coal Truck Crashes
by Roy Cratvford, P.E. (NA FE 475F)
Introduction
This paper proposes a method for reconstructing a certain type of collinear,
front-to-rear vehicle crash, Eastern Kentucky single-unit coal truck underrides.
The crashes discussed are those in which a following vehicle gains rapidly from
a long initial distance on a leading slowly moving vehicle that is not sufficiently
conspicuous for crash avoidance. The results of these analyses provide insight
into the details of what occurs in these types of crashes, show that inattention
andfor speeding by the victims are not necessarily causes of the crashes, and can
support or refute independent human factors evidence.
Discussion
The author has performed reconstructions of several Eastern Kentucky
crashes that occurred because of slow speed and insufficient rear conspicuity of
vehicles on high-speed highways, usually at night and/or sometimes in difficult
sight conditions. The ttvcks involved are usually black or another dark color,
are coated with mud and dust, and have only two tail lamps that are spaced just
eighteen inches apart. See Figure 1. It is likely that the close spacing of the tail
lamps causes some following motorists to mistake them for vehicles with tail
lamps of normal spacing but three or four times farther away. When these lamps
become covered with the mud and dust that is common to dirt and gravel
Eastern Kentucky coal mine haul roads, there can be very little if any practical
rear conspicuity. These crashes typically involve overloaded coal trucks travel-
ing up and down the steep hills of this region of the country.
Many people envision these types of crashes as occurring when an assumed
inattentive driver suddenly sees a truck in his or her path, hits the brakes too
late, and slides into and strikes the truck. They are usually surprised to learn that
while this sequence happens in only a few seconds, the vehicles involved are
initially widely separated and cover significant distances between the beginning
of perception of the following driver and impact.
Analysis
In the author's experience, inattention is always listed as a causative factor
in these crashes, and speed is often listed as well. Inattention is expected
Roy Raymond Cmwford, P.E., P.O. Box 929, Whitesburg, Kentucky 41 858-7474
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Originally published in the Journal of the NAFE volume indicated on the cover page. ISSN: 2379-3252
PAGE 56 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F
1:i~urr I
This truck has only two renr ln~iipsi11ic1 no reflectors or irllcctive 1;lpc.
Its tail lamps resenible one side of [lie lomabi ma bile alljacent to it. E \ ~ with
I
some remainiog dnylight, it begins to blend inlo the background.
I'ipt~rc2
The rcur of an Eas~cr~iKeotocky si~lglul l i l i l coi~l ruck. I t Ilits rno itl~ntilicitlionor
clea~.;tncclamps and no rctleclors. Its 1111-n,runoi~lg.and hrakc 1;lmps arc cnmhined and
locatc~lsix feel or more ror\\.arJ of and on~lctihc renr o l thc dump body. Thcse lamps
arc sp:iced only 1 X apan and. on this truck. one is hrokell Or conipletely ohsct~rcd.
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NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 57
because many people cannot believe that a driver could fail to see son~ethingas
large as a truck, misunderstanding the difference between seeing and perceiving
as a hazard. Speeding is listed whenever there is some evidence of high speed
with the understanding that high speed reduces available perception, reaction,
and avoidance maneuvering times and distances. However, the author argucs
that in these cases neither of these factor is necessarily causative.
Studies have shown that when trucks travel at speeds well below the flow
of traffic, crash rates rise dramatically, and unlike most Eastern Kentucky coal
trucks, the trucks studied had proper rear conspicuity. See Figure 2. The author
has never had a case in which one vehicle closed rapidly on another from a
large distance and struck it from behind when the lead vehicle was traveling at
a normal speed nor a case in which this has happened to a vchicle encountering
another with the proper level of rear conspicuity. He knows of no similar cases
in his area involving any types of trucks other than coal trucks.
See Figure 3 for an example of a reconsttuction of an Eastern Kentucky
rear coal truck crash. In this set of calculations, the inputs necessary from the
reconstructionist are listed under the heading Assumptions. These include coef-
ficient of friction, grade, closing speed of the vehicles at impact, braking dis-
tance, if any, leading vehicle speed, and perception and reaction times of the
following driver. The values of these inputs are gathered by standard tnethods
outside the scope of this paper.
These types of reconstructions must be calculated in reverse chronological
order from impact to the beginning of perception. There are four sections of
results on the spreadsheet. The first section describes the scenario at impact, at
which a time of zero has been assigned in this case and the rear of the leading
vehicle and the front of the trailing vehicle are at the same point in space.
These calculations can be performed with a leading vehicle accelerating or
decelerating, but the leading vehicle speed in this example is assumed to be
constant throughout the scenario, so it is the same as originally input for all
four sections.
Following vehicle speed is the suni of the leading vehicle and closing
speeds based on the simplifying assumption that because of the ovenvhcln~ing
difference in masses between the vehicles, usually about a 40:l ratio, and the
lack of permanent crush damage to the coal truck, the truck is treated as a mov-
ing barrier. Because truck delta-v's are usually less than one mile per hour in
these crashes, their drivers often state that thcy did not fecl any impact and wcre
not aware there had been a crash until they were notified by someone else who
saw the wrecked victim vehicle behind the coal truck involved.
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Originally published in the Journal of the NAFE volume indicated on the cover page. ISSN: 2379-3252
PAGE 58 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F
Figure 3
The second results section yields the products of calculations of the time
and distance between impact and the beginning of braking by the victim vehi-
cle, if any. It is not uncommon for there to be no skid marks at all. The point in
time, the speed of the following vehicle, and the locations of both vehicles and
the separation distance between them at the initiation of braking are all calcu-
lilted using standard equations.
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NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 59
The third results section yields the products of calculations of the time and
distance during physical reaction of the following vehicle driver. The time is
simply the previous time plus the reaction time used by the reconstructionist. In
this example, the speeds of both vehicles are assumed to be unchanged before
and until initiation of braking by the following vehicle driver, so they are the
same in this and the fourth results sections. The distances covered during this
time interval are added to the previous distances from impact, and the locations
of both vehicles are calculated using standard methods. Finally, the separation
distance is again the difference between these two figures.
The fourth and final results section is calculated in the same manner as rhe
third. Total time is perception time added to the previous rinic. All distances and
locations are again calculated by standard methods.
In this example, the entire crash sequence occurs in less than 3- 112 seconds.
At the initiation of braking, the vehicles are only separated by 23 feet and the
following vehicle is still traveling at its full initial speed of 56 mph.
A key result of this analysis is the final figure in section four, the separa-
tion between vehicles. Since, for example, rear truck lights are required to be
visible for at least five hundred feet under normal conditions, and in practice
can be perceived much farther away than this, such a result indicates either that
the tluck's rear conspicuity was grossly insufficient, as is the case in most if not
all Eastern Kentucky crashes; that environmental conditions made traveling
even at normal speeds by the following vehicle unsafe and an unusually slow
speeds by the truck even more unsafe; that there was some problem with the
following vehicle that hampered its driver's sight distance; that the following
driver was extremely inattentive; that the trailing vehicle was traveling at a very
high speed; or a combination of these factors. It is typical for the separation dis-
tance at the beginning of perception in these crashes to be between 175 and 250
feet, much less than the legally required 500 feet.
The inattention issue is dealt with first; see Figure 4. The second exanlple
uses the same assutnptions as the first example but with perception time
increased to yield an initial separation between the vehicles of the niininiurn
500 feet that would be expected if the conspicuity required by law under normal
conditions was being met. The perception time required is almost 10 seconds,
an unreasonably long time to expect someone to be inattentive when driving a
motor vehicle. Since sight distances are usually ample in these crashes, this is
often considered proof of gross inattention. However, the argument can be ~nade
that ample sight distance proves the opposite: that drivers cannot properly guide
vehicles along the roadway, often around curves, and keep them centered in
their lanes for this much time and distance while being so inattentive as to not
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PAGE 60 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F
be able to see trucks even in their peripheral vision until it is too late to avoid a
crash. In other words, that atnple sight distance exists in these crashes is not
proof of inattention by the victim but of insufficient rear conspicuity and the
danger of violating the expectations of drivers by vehicles traveling much
slower than the tlow of traffic. Even in cases where there are two climbing
lanes, one providing a way to pass the slow-moving truck, victim vehicles have
remained in the rightmost lane, indicating they did not perceive the truck in
time. This example shows that gross inattention is not only not necessary but
also very unlikely to be a causative factor in this type of crash.
Figure 4
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NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 61
It is the author's expectation that in most if not all of these cases glare from
oncoming vehicles is vely likely a contributing factor, although unfortunately
rarely provable. The driver who caused the glare will ordinal.ily never know that
his or her passing by was a factor, the truck driver may not remember or wish
to acknowledge the oncoming vehicle, and the victim(s) are usually killed or
have brain damage that causes them to be unable to remember the crash or the
events leading up to it. An oncotning vehicle would also cause the following
driver in these situations to dim his or her headlights, greatly reducing the dis-
tance at which those headlights can illuminate another vehicle.
It is also reasonable to expect that in some cases the victim driver looks
away from the highway for at least a brief amount of time just before or upon
entering a point in time and space in regard to the perception, reaction, and
braking and/or steering time and distance necessary to avoid a crash and, by the
time he or she looks back, it is too late to do so. This does not necessarily mean
that the driver was negligently inattentive. He or she may merely be doing one
of the many minor tasks that all drivers perform such as changing a radio sta-
tion, talking with a passenger, looking in a mirror, reading a billboard, or light-
ing a cigarette.
For example, consider a coal truck that is perceivable at only 300 feet. A
following driver may take his or her eyes off the highway for two seconds
beginning at a separation distance of 400 feet, and look back too late to avoid a
crash. If the driver is able to perceive a properly conspicuous vehicle at the 500
feet or more that is required by law and traveling at a normal speed, he or she
will have enough notice to either complete the task quickly enough that a prob-
lem is avoided or wait until the situation is dealt with before performing it. The
drivers who become victims of underride crashes may in many cases be the
ones who have the misfortune to initiate one of' these tasks just before or upon
entering the minimu111distance required to avoid such a crash. If glare from an
oncoming vehicle occurs at the same time and/or there arc environmental prob-
lems with sight such as fog, rain, or snow, the danger of the situation rises dra-
matically.
See Figure 5. To consider the possibility of high speed by the following
vehicle being a contributing factor, the third example again shows most of the
original factors but with a braking distance that yields a very high initial fol-
lowing vehicle speed and a leading vehicle that is perceivable for the required
500 feet. Closing speed is set to zero to represent the following vehicle coming
as close as possible to the leading vehicle without striking it. These calculations
show that in this example 500 feet is a sufficient sight distance to allow even
most speeding following drivers to perceive the danger, react by braking or
steering, and avoid crashes with ample time. In this case any speed less than 99
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Originally published in the Journal of the NAFE volume indicated on the cover page. ISSN: 2379-3252
PAGE 62 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F
n between vehicles
Figure 5
mph would allow the following vehicle to come to a stop without striking the
lead vehicle. These last two examples point up the critical need for proper rear
conspicuity, especially when a vehicle is traveling below the speed of the flow
of traffic.
The Underride Protection Issue
The results of these crashes are oficn made much worse when the lead
vehicle is a singe-unit truck with a dump body designed with a large rear over-
hang and either no or insufficient rear underride protection. See Figure 6.
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Originally published in the Journal of the NAFE volume indicated on the cover page. ISSN: 2379-3252
NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 63
Figure 6
Because none of the occupant protection systems of a vehicle - such as air
bags, seat belts, collapsing steering columns, and crumple zones - are able to
perform as intended when the top of a vehicle is sheared off before the front of
the vehicle strikes anything solid, front-seat victims characteristically suffer
massive head and chest trauma, usually death, and often decapitation. Injuries
are horrific when there are no underride guards because the heads of victims are
directly struck by the unprotected tailboards of trucks, sonlething that would not
happen if occupant space intrusion were prevented by safe guards. This is how
the actress Jayne Mansfield was killed in 1967.
To be able to haul 40 tons or more over the safe lirnit, Eastern Kentucky
single-unit coal trucks typically have sear overhangs that create underride zones
of six feet or more about four feet above the ground when the truck is unloaded.
The overweight, conspicuity, and underside protection regulations that would
prevent these crashes are not enforced, and as a result, these have been well
over twenty such crashes in Eastern Kentucky causing over a dozen deaths.
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PAGE 64 JUNE 1999 NAFE 475F
The argument is often made that closing speeds at impact were so high that
the victim(s) would have been killed by sudden deceleration alone even had
underside guards been in place. This opinion presumes underride guards that are
rigid and have insufficient energy absorbing abilities. That a victim would have
been killed by delta-v upon striking an underride guard is a probability in some
cases, especially if the guard were not sufficiently energy absorbing and/or
when restraints were not used. However, this has been claimed even when
frontal crush damage to the victim vehicle indicated an easily survivable delta-
v and one of the two front-seat occupants survived the crash.
When it is not possible to make a sul'l'iciently accurate estimation of clos-
ing speed in a case in which at least one of the occupants survived the crash, the
highest delta-v the occupant(s) could be expected to survive may be used to cal-
culate a worst-case scenario.
After some public attention was given to the underride guard problem after
a crash in early 1994, nearly all single-unit coal trucks in Eastern Kentucky had
underride guards installed. However, most of the ones presently being used are
so flimsily designed and constructed thi~tthey collapse with relatively little
effect upon impact. Crash tests have shown that minimally compliant guards
cannot protect most victims, especially when the victims are in the newer,
smaller vehicles with sloping hoods.
Safe underride guards should be full width, mounted flush with the rear of
the vehicle, constructed as low to the ground as possible, and be energy-absorb-
ing. Guards that are less than full width and not mounted flush with the rear
allow people to be killed when the driver of the following vehicle swerves at the
last moment, a common maneuver, causing part of his or her vehicle to pass
under an unprotected rear corner of the truck.
Underride guards should be able to stop an automobile with a closing speed
of at least 40 mph, over as long a time interval as possible, and without any intru-
sion into the occupant compartment. As of the beginning of 1998, improved
underride protection is required on newly built trailers, but existing trailers as
well as all single-unit trucks are unfortunately exempt from these regulations.
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Originally published in the Journal of the NAFE volume indicated on the cover page. ISSN: 2379-3252
NAFE 475F COAL TRUCK CRASH PAGE 65
Conclusions
The evidence in this paper debunks some of the mylhs surrounding rcar
vehicle crashes, namely that inattention and specd are always rhe causes o f
these tragedies. It also shows that even if such crashes are thc faulr of followinf
driven, their injuries and dcarhs could he frc;~tlyreduced by propcrly-designctI
and -manufactured undcrridc goards.
The only lights on Illis 11'11ck:II'C spilcctl I S ' q u r 1 anil ~ O V C I ' C C\ ~v i l l ~I I I I I ~
The hiogcd i~ndcn'idcgi~olrlis inli~ii~nnlly compli;~nl.
A typical Eostcrn Kcnlocky single Itnit coal tnlck.
These t~ucksopcratc at around 120,000 pounds gl.oss wcighl
