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Practical
Forensic
Psychiatry
Edited by Tom Clark and
Dharjinder Singh Rooprai
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. While all reasonable
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accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publishers wish
to make clear that any views or opinions expressed in this book by individual editors, authors or contributors
are personal to them and do not necessarily reflect the views/opinions of the publishers. The information or
guidance contained in this book is intended for use by medical, scientific or health-care professionals and is
provided strictly as a supplement to the medical or other professional’s own judgement, their knowledge of
the patient’s medical history, relevant manufacturer’s instructions and the appropriate best practice guide-
lines. Because of the rapid advances in medical science, any information or advice on dosages, procedures
or diagnoses should be independently verified. The reader is strongly urged to consult the relevant national
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any of the drugs recommended in this book. This book does not indicate whether a particular treatment is
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fessional to make his or her own professional judgements, so as to advise and treat patients appropriately. The
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iv
Contributors
Rebekah Bourne MBChB MRCPsych DipMedEd
specialty registrar in forensic psychiatry, Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS
Foundation Trust; honorary clinical teacher to the Birmingham MRCPsych Course
Tom Clark MBChB LLM MRCPsych
consultant forensic psychiatrist, Reaside Clinic, Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS
Trust; honorary senior clinical lecturer in forensic psychiatry, University of Birmingham
training programme director for forensic psychiatry, West Midlands School of Psychiatry;
visiting forensic psychiatrist, HMP Birmingham
John Croft MBChB MRCPysch
consultant forensic psychiatrist, Ardenleigh Womens Forensic Mental health Service,
Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
Muthusamy Natarajan MBBS MRCPsych
consultant forensic psychiatrist, William Wake House, St Andrew’s Healthcare, Billing Road,
Northampton
Clare Oakley MBChB MRCPsych
clinical research worker, St Andrew’s Academic Centre, Institute of Psychiatry, King’s
College London
James Reed MBChB BMedSci LLM MRCPsych
locum consultant forensic psychiatrist, Reaside Clinic, Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health
NHS Foundation Trust
Dharjinder Singh Rooprai MBBS LLM MRCPsych
consultant forensic psychiatrist (forensic LD, ASD and ABI), Fromeside, Avon and Wiltshire
Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust, West of England Forensic Mental Health Service
Renarta Rowe MBChB MSc MRCPsych
consultant forensic psychiatrist, Reaside Clinic, Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS
Foundation Trust
Leela Sivaprasad MBBS DPM MRCPsych
consultant forensic psychiatrist, Reaside Clinic, Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS
Foundation Trust
Helen Whitworth MBChB MSc MRCPsych Cert MHS
clinical lecturer, Keele University, visiting lecturer, Coventry University; consultant forensic
psychiatrist, Hatherton Centre, South Staffordshire and Shropshire Healthcare NHS
Foundation Trust
v
Preface
We conceived this book with two broad aims in mind. Firstly, we wanted to present key fac-
tual information in a concise, readily retrievable format, with a relative absence of opinion
and debate. Of course the occasional opinion has crept in, and we think that the book is
more interesting and thought provoking for that, but it remains a densely factual book. Sec-
ondly, as a ‘jobbing’ consultant and, at the time, higher trainee respectively, we wanted to
provide practical guidance on the day-to-day tasks that a forensic psychiatrist is required to
deal with. This is particularly aimed at forensic trainees and psychiatrists working in other
fields, for whom forensic matters are so often relevant.
The book is unashamedly aimed at psychiatrists. While forensic psychiatric services are
necessarily multidisciplinary, we think that there is value in focusing on the role of the
psychiatrist, allowing a more pithy and direct approach, and enabling the role of the psy-
chiatrist to be set more clearly within its proper place as but one part of the team. At the
risk of appearing to try to eat our cake, we hope that those working in other disciplines and
in other types of mental health services will also find the information and clinical guidance
presented here useful. Most forensic patients used to be general psychiatric patients and
will be so again, and much of the interface between the criminal justice system and mental
health services is served by general rather than forensic psychiatry, and often by nurses
rather than doctors.
We are aware of gaps and areas of clinical practice that might have warranted more space
than we have been able to give. In particular we have not tried to cover the law in juris-
dictions other than England and Wales. More weighty and comprehensive textbooks are
available; our book is conceived more as a vade mecum. We have tried to point the reader
in the direction of further reading that might fill some of these gaps. Those references that
we consider to be particularly important are marked with an asterisk. Our view would be
that a higher trainee in forensic psychiatry should read all of these key references during the
course of their training, though it is by no means an exhaustive list.
Preparing a rather stylized yet multiple author book is a harder task than we imagined. We
are very grateful to our contributors, each chosen for their particular experience or know-
ledge in relation to some aspect or other of forensic clinical practice, for producing such val-
uable chapters while tolerating our editorial interference in the pursuit of a consistent style.
TC & DSR
vi
Abbreviations
AC approved clinician
ACCT assessment, care in custody and teamwork
ADOS Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule
AESOP Aetiology and Ethnicity of Schizophrenia and Other Psychoses
AMHP approved mental health professional
AOT assertive outreach team
ARA(I) actuarial risk assessment (instrument)
ASBO antisocial behaviour order
ASD autistic spectrum disorder
AUC area under the curve
AWOL absent without leave (from MHA detention) or absent without official leave
BCS British Crime Survey
BME black and minority ethnic
CAMHS Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services
CAMCOG Cambridge Cognitive Exam
CANFOR Camberwell Assessment of Needs – forensic version
CARATS counselling assessment referral advice and throughcare Service
CATIE Clinical Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness
CBT cognitive–behavioural therapy
CCRC Criminal Cases Review Commission
CIS-R Clinical Interview Schedule – Revised
CJA 2003 Criminal Justice Act 2003
CJA 2009 Coroners and Justice Act 2009
CJCSA 2000 Criminal Justice and Court Service Act 2000
CJS criminal justice system
CLDT community learning disability team
CMHT community mental health team
CPS Crown Prosecution Service
CoP Code of Practice to the Mental Health Act 1983
CPA care programme approach
CPIA Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1969
CPN community psychiatric nurse
CrimPR Criminal Procedure Rules
CSA childhood sexual abuse
CTO community treatment order
DCR discretionary conditional release
DH Department of Health
DHSS Department of Health and Society Security
DPP detention for public protection
vii
Abbreviations
viii
Abbreviations
ix
Abbreviations
x
1
The Development of
Forensic Psychiatric
Services
● Historical Background
Offenders with mental illness have always posed unique difficulties for the criminal justice
system and psychiatrists. Prior to the nineteenth century there were no specific facilities
for dealing with them, although in practice they were usually compulsorily committed to
hospital by the courts.
These were known collectively as ‘special hospitals’ and later ‘high secure services’. They
became part of the NHS in 1948 but remained geographically and professionally isolated
from general psychiatric services.
The final report (DHSS, 1975) was presented to Parliament in October 1975 and made
numerous recommendations:
• Reiterated the need for secure accommodation and noted that little progress had yet been made.
The Butler Report set the agenda for forensic psychiatry to be provided outside of custodial
settings and in purpose-built hospitals. Contemporaneously, some (Scott, 1974) argued that
it would be better to develop facilities within the prison system, rather than invest in new
provision which would inevitably leave prison health care as a poor relation.
The first RSU opened in Middlesbrough in 1980, followed by units in Devon, Trent and
Mersey in 1983:
• By 1990, 600 of the 1000 proposed had been opened.
Eventually RSUs became established, and regional forensic psychiatry services built up
around them, providing a broad range of services:
• Psychiatric input in prisons.
• Court liaison and diversion schemes.
• Providing management advice to general psychiatry.
• Community follow-up in some cases.
The review proposed important guiding principles to underpin care of these patients:
• Patients should be cared for as far as possible in the community, rather than institutional settings.
• Conditions of security should be no greater than could be justified by the danger posed to
themselves or to others.
• Care should be provided as near as possible to the patient’s home or family.
The final report (Department of Health and Home Office, 1992) made nearly 300 recom-
mendations:
• Formal arrangements for cooperation between the various agencies involved (health, social care,
criminal justice) should be put in place.
• Specialized teams for dealing with mentally disordered offenders should be established, with a
broad multidisciplinary staff.
• The application of the care programme approach (CPA) to mentally disordered offenders, including
those released from prison and those returned to prison after hospital treatment.
• Effort should be made to address the over-representation of ethnic minorities among MDOs.
• A new national target of 1500 medium secure beds proposed, with expansion in training and
recruitment of forensic psychiatrists and related professions.
● Principles of Security
The Reed Report described three domains of security:
• Physical security:
– aspects of environment and building design that support containment and safety
– includes the secure perimeter, design and management of the entry point, locking of doors,
window design, alarm systems, etc.
• Relational security:
– the quality of the relationship between patient and carers, enabling a detailed and in-depth
knowledge of patients, their history, their reason for admission and progress to date
– allows early detection of alterations in presentation which might herald increased risk
– security and treatment closely linked.
• Procedural security:
– ‘The methodology or systems by which patients are managed and safe security maintained’
(Exworthy and Gunn, 2003)
– policies and practices governing patient movement and observation, such as maintaining a list
of contraband items, restricting access to potential weapons (‘sharps’), screening and approving
visitors, searching patients before and after leave, routine searches of wards for contraband items
– also includes higher level clinical and professional governance arrangements, major incident
planning, investigation of serious incidents, communication of lessons learned, etc.
The distinction between levels of security is shown in Table 1.1 and discussed further in
Kennedy (2002) and Crichton (2009).
4
Principles of Security
This inexorable shift in the direction of increased security should be seen in the context of
the changing socio-political climate, with increased risk-aversion, more punitive sentenc-
ing, and the political drive to increase rates of MHA detention for those deemed dangerous.
Reports, inquiries and managers tend to give greater emphasis to physical and procedural
than to relational security measures. Physical and procedural security measures are:
• conceptually simpler and more tangible
• easier to articulate and therefore recommend
• easier to achieve
• easier to measure, audit and demonstrate.
Increasing physical and procedural security risks less effective relational security, because:
• the range of environments in which the patient is managed is more limited
• there are fewer opportunities for therapeutic risk taking and testing out
• an over-emphasis on demonstrating readily auditable physical and procedural security reduces the
attention given to relational security.
Consequently, medium secure care environments have become more restrictive and less like
the community. The gap that must be bridged by rehabilitation has become wider.
• Low secure units, originally conceived as providing primarily long-term care, have begun to seek to
fill that rehabilitative gap.
• This forensic version of functionalization in itself has important implications for continuity of care
and relational security.
Patients are admitted to high security when they are considered to pose a ‘grave and im-
mediate danger’ to the public. This decision may be based on:
• having been charged with or convicted of a grave offence, including those with sadistic or sexual
motive
• the immediacy of risk to others if they were at large
• evidence of a capacity to coordinate an organized escape attempt, or engage in subversion of
staff.
Cases with a high national profile are also likely to be admitted to high security, on the
basis that an ‘abscond from hospital would seriously undermine confidence in the criminal
justice system’.
In previous years the high secure hospitals were subjected to much criticism, the prob-
lems perhaps resulting in part from the nature of the patient group and the professional and
managerial isolation from other parts of the NHS. In particular, at Ashworth Hospital:
• The Blom-Cooper Report in 1992 (Blom-Cooper et al., 1992) was highly critical of the culture and
abusive practices that were uncovered. It found evidence of systematic mistreatment and abuse of
patients, and failures of management throughout the organization.
• The Fallon Inquiry report in 1994 (Department of Health, 1994) identified severe shortcomings
in the running of the personality disorder service. Patients were discovered to have been dealing
in drugs, alcohol and pornography and security had been compromised to a large extent. There
was also evidence of widespread corruption. The report again strongly criticized the management
of the service and the hospital and recommended its complete closure, although this did not take
place.
Since then, the management of each high secure hospital has been brought into that of the
local NHS provider; the high secure services are managed as one part of a range of secure
services in that region. There has also been significant retraction in services since 2000
(Abbott et al., 2005):
• due to projections of reduced need for high secure care as a result of increased provision in medium
security
• high secure beds reduced from 1276 in 2000 to 879 in 2009 (Hansard, 2010)
• movement of patients into regional services for long-term care
• rehabilitation of patients through medium and low secure services where appropriate.
The Department of Health has issued a formal specification for medium secure services
(Department of Health, 2007):
7
The Development of Forensic Psychiatric Services
• Seven key domains – safety, clinical and cost-effectiveness, governance, patient focus, accessible
and responsive care, care environment and amenities, public health.
• For each domain a number of specific quality principles, with specified measures of performance
and evidence required.
• Used as a basis for the evaluation of quality of care provided in medium secure services.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists has established a ‘Quality Network for Foren-
sic Mental Health Services’ which provides a peer review process based on the Depart-
ment of Health standards (http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/quality/quality,accreditationaudit/
forensicmentalhealth.aspx)
Bed numbers have continued to increase and more specialized services developed:
• Provided by a mixture of NHS and independent sector providers.
• Specialized services for women, forensic CAMHS, older adults, autistic spectrum disorder (ASD),
etc.
National minimum standards for psychiatric intensive care units (PICUs) and low security
developed by the Department of Health (2002):
• Defined as services delivering ‘intensive, comprehensive and multidisciplinary treatment and care
by qualified staff for patients who demonstrate disturbed behaviour in the context of a serious
mental disorder and who require the provision of security’.
• Set standards for all aspects of the units including physical design and layout, service structure,
involvement of patients and carers, policies and procedures, clinical audit, etc.
• Envisioned to provide longer-term care (around 2 years) as compared with 8 weeks for PICUs.
Low secure services have evolved into a combination of active rehabilitation and long-term
facilities, providing
• a step-down from medium security into the community, allowing for extended community
rehabilitation
• long-term care for those in medium security who are unlikely to be successfully discharged into the
community due to the nature of their illness and ongoing risks
• a sideways move from PICUs for those who require longer-term care in such conditions.
Recent papers have suggested that a large expansion in low secure bed numbers is needed to
match the expansion in medium security and provide suitable pathways into the community
(Beer, 2008; O’Grady, 2008; Turner and Salter, 2008).
• No community service, all inpatients passing from secure care to general psychiatric teams for
community follow-up, either with or without an intervening period of general psychiatric inpatient
care.
• Parallel model, in which a distinct forensic community team carries care programme approach
(CPA) responsibility for a defined case load of patients. This provides the clearest demarcation of
roles and responsibilities.
• Integrated model, in which the forensic community team works within general psychiatric
community teams, supporting them in managing their ‘forensic’ patients:
– may reduce stigma associated with being a forensic patient
– encourages development of skills in general psychiatric teams (Whittle and Scally, 1998).
• Consultation and liaison models. Most forensic services provide this service to general psychiatric
colleagues either on a traditional medical referral basis, or in the form of a distinct and specifically
commissioned forensic liaison service:
– the development of such services was given renewed impetus by the Bradley Report (Department
of Health, 2009).
Up until 2011, the purchasers for most services were primary care trusts (PCTs). However,
most secure services were classed as specialist services:
• Regional Specialized Commissioning Teams, based within strategic health authorities (SHAs),
negotiated with all the purchasers within the region to commission a regional service.
• This means that the provider does not have to negotiate with a series of different purchasers at
once.
• In most cases the ‘preferred provider’ is the NHS service, but where necessary due to capacity
issues or a particular clinical need, the commissioning teams also negotiate and agree contracts
with independent sector providers.
• The commissioning team has a responsibility to ensure that the services provided to the patients of
that region is of high quality.
Some particularly specialist services, were commissioned nationally due to the relatively
small demand and high complexity:
• The National Commissioning Group (NCG) was responsible for this (http://www.ncg.nhs.uk).
• Mostly complex medical and surgical problems (pancreas transplants, amyloidosis, etc.).
• Secure forensic mental health services for young people (otherwise known as forensic CAMHS) were
commissioned on this basis by the NCG.
The regional NHS service usually provides a ‘gate-keeping’ service to the commissioning
team, carrying out clinical assessments of the needs of patients referred for secure care.
Where the NHS service either lacks capacity, or cannot address some particular need, an
alternative independent provider is sought. Historically, independent sector placements
tended to be more expensive than the NHS, but this difference has declined in recent years.
NHS services continue, generally, to provide a more comprehensive service than inde-
pendent providers, who tend to concentrate just on inpatient care. For some, the establish-
ment of the independent sector as providing a major contribution to forensic psychiatric
services in the UK is a matter of political or economic concern. See Murphy and Sugarman
(2010) and Pollock (2010).
References
Abbott P, Davenport S, Davies S, Nimmagadda SR, O’Halloran A, Tattan T. (2005) Potential effects of
retractions of the high-security hospitals. Psychiatric Bulletin 29, 403–6
BBC. (2008) Today Program, ‘Mental Health Care Escapes “horrifying”’, 9 September 2008
Beer D. (2008) Psychiatric intensive care and low secure units: where are we now? Psychiatric Bulletin
32(12), 441–3
Blom-Cooper L, Brown M, Dolan R, Murphy E. (1992) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into com-
plaints about Ashworth Hospital. Cmnd 202. London: HMSO
Bowden P. (1996) Graham Young (1947–90); the St Albans poisoner: his life and times. Criminal
Behaviour and Mental Health 6, 17–24
Coid J, Nadji K, Gault S, Cook A, Jarman B. (2001) Medium secure forensic psychiatry services. Com-
parison of seven English health regions. British Journal of Psychiatry 178, 55–61
*Crichton JHM. (2009) Defining high, medium, and low security in forensic mental healthcare: the
development of the Matrix of Security in Scotland. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology
20(3), 333–53
Department of Health. (1994) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Personality Disorder Unit,
Ashworth Special Hospital (The Fallon Inquiry). London: The Stationery Office
Department of Health. (2002) Mental Health Policy Implementation Guide. National Minimum
Standards for General Adult Services in Psychiatric Intensive Care Units (PICU) and Low Secure
Environments. London: Department of Health
*Department of Health. (2007) Best Practice Guidance: Specification for adult medium-secure serv-
ices. London: Department of Health
Department of Health. (2009) The Bradley Report: Lord Bradley’s review of people with mental
health problems or learning disabilities in the Criminal Justice System. London: Department of
Health
10
Commissioning Arrangements and the Independent Sector
Department of Health. (2010) Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS. London: The Stationery
Office
*Department of Health and the Home Office. (1992) Review of Health and Social Services for Men-
tally Disordered Offenders and Others Requiring Similar Services (The Reed Report). Cm 2088.
London: HMSO
Department of Health and Social Security. (1974) Revised Report of the Working Party of Security in
NHS Psychiatric Hospitals (Glancy Report). London: HMSO
Department of Health and Social Security. (1975) Report of the Committee of Mentally Abnormal
Offenders (Butler Report). London: HMSO
Exworthy T, Gunn J. (2003) Taking another tilt at high security hospitals. British Journal of Psychiatry
182, 469–71
Gradillas V, Williams A, Walsh E, Fahy T. (2007) Do forensic inpatient units pose a risk to local com-
munities? Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 18(2), 261–5
Hansard. (2010) HC vol 505 col 1046W, 10 February 2010
Home Office and DHSS. (1974) Interim Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders
(Butler Report). London: HMSO
Kennedy HG. (2002) Therapeutic uses of security: mapping forensic mental health services by strati-
fying risk. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 8, 433–43
Ministry of Health. (1961) Special Hospitals: Report of a Working Party (Emery Report). London:
Ministry of Health.
Ministry of Health. (1964) Report of the Working Party on the Organisation of the Prison Medical
Service (Gwynne Report). London: Ministry of Health.
Murphy E, Sugarman P. (2010) Should mental health services fear the independent sector: no. British
Medical Journal 341, 5385
O’Grady J. (2008) Time to talk. Commentary on … forensic psychiatry and general psychiatry. Psy-
chiatric Bulletin 32(1), 6–7
Pollock A. (2010) Should mental health services fear the independent sector: yes. British Medical
Journal 341, c5382
Rutherford M, Duggan S. (2007) ‘Forensic Factfile 2007’: Forensic Mental Health Services: Facts and
figures on current provision. Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. Available at: http://www.centre-
formentalhealth.org.uk/publications/forensic.aspx?ID=526
Scott P. (1974) Solutions to the problem of the dangerous offender. British Medical Journal 4(5495),
640–1
Snowden P. (1985) A survey of the Regional Secure Unit Programme. British Journal of Psychiatry
147, 499–507
Tilt R, Perry B, Martin C. (2000) Report of the Review of Security at the High Security Hospitals.
London: Department of Health.
Turner T, Salter M. (2008) Forensic psychiatry and general psychiatry: re-examining the relationship.
Psychiatric Bulletin 32(1), 2–6.
Whittle M, Scally M. (1998) Model of forensic community care. Psychiatric Bulletin 22, 748–50
11
2
Entry into
Secure Care
Mental health problems are common, and offending is common:
• In 2006, 15% of people (24% of males, 6% of females) between 10 and 52 years had at least
one conviction.
• Of males born in 1973, 29% had been convicted before the age of 30 (Ministry of Justice, 2010a).
Overlap is inevitable.
There is no agreed definition of a ‘forensic patient’, the specialty having developed prag-
matically, driven by clinicians and public policy, rather than from a cohesive body of research,
a treatment approach or a defining pathology. Movement between forensic and general psy-
chiatric services is fluid, and often dependent on local provision and organization:
• Assertive outreach team (AOT) patients have many criminogenic needs in terms of socio-economic
disadvantage, substance misuse and a history of offending (Priebe et al., 2003).
• In a small European study Hodgins et al. (2006) found no difference between discharged forensic
and general psychiatric patients on HCR-20 or PCL-R scores. A history of serious physical violence
towards others, including violent crimes and physical violence which had not resulted in legal
sanction, seemed to distinguish the forensic group.
● Sources of Referrals
Referrals to forensic services may be:
• for diversion from the criminal justice system (CJS) (prisons, courts, police stations)
• to consider movement between levels of security:
– up, usually from general psychiatric wards
– down, from high security or medium security, or
– sideways between services to address some specific need
• for ‘gate-keeping’ assessments for specialist services within or outside of the NHS
• for a second opinion on diagnosis/risk/management.
Admission rates to high and medium secure hospitals demonstrate a linear correlation with
levels of socio-economic deprivation in patients’ catchment areas of origin (Coid, 1998):
• So demands on urban forensic services will be higher.
Most patients entering secure care are diverted from a custodial setting:
• Coid and Kahtan (2001) described a sample of 2608 admissions to 7 regional secure units (RSUs)
between 1988 and 1994. The pre-admission locations were:
12
Diversion from CJS
Table 2.1 Some factors relevant to deciding the appropriate level of security (adapted from
Department of Health, 2007; Kennedy, 2002)
High secure Medium secure Low secure/psychiatric intensive
care unit (PICU)
Grave offence, especially Serious offence or past failed History of non-violent offending
sadistic or sexual placements at lower level behaviour
Immediate danger to others if Danger to others would be less immediate
in community
Risk is predominantly to others Mix of risk to others/challenging
behaviour/deliberate self-harm
Significant capacity to Significant risk of escape or Low risk of absconding
coordinate outside help for an absconding, or
escape attempt or absconding Pre-sentence for serious charge
would undermine confidence
in the criminal justice system
Unpredictable relationship Recovery likely to be prolonged, Acute illness, likely to respond
between risk and mental state some risks remain even when well promptly to treatment
Previously unmanageable in Previously unmanageable in low Previously unmanageable on open
medium security security/PICU ward
Subsequently:
• The Reed Report (Department of Health and Home Office, 1992):
– recommended nationwide provision of court diversion schemes
– recommended alternative community provisions for mentally disordered offenders
– led to an increase in the number of prisoner transfers to hospital.
13
Entry into Secure Care
14
Diversion from CJS
Deciding on whether a patient (1) should be admitted and (2) if no to what level of security are complex
clinical judgements with no simple determining factors:
• therefore your opinion should be circumspect, open-minded and, where appropriate, should specify the
circumstances in which you would want to review the case.
• The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prison Health (2006) concluded that ‘a fundamental shift in
thinking’ was required to decriminalize the mentally ill, transferring their care from the CJS to health.
• The Bradley Report (Department of Health, 2009) recommended nationwide provision of court
diversion schemes and the establishment of Criminal Justice Mental Health Teams (CJMHTs) to:
– ensure continuity of care for individuals in contact with CJS
– identify and divert mentally disordered offenders (MDOs) as early as possible.
• The policy drive of the 2010 Coalition Government to reduce overcrowding in prisons was often
justified by the need to divert the mentally disordered out of the CJS.
The evidence is that the ‘organizational embedding’ of diversion and liaison schemes is
often poor, leading to doubts about the sustainability of individual schemes (Pakes and
Winstone, 2010).
There has sometimes been a tendency to dichotomize the ill and the criminals, such
that psychiatric treatment and prosecution are seen as mutually exclusive. This is discussed
further in relation to prosecuting inpatient violence in Chapter 16.
• Always remember that diversion does not require the discontinuation of criminal proceedings.
• Very often both treatment and prosecution should proceed in parallel.
Diversion in practice
An MDO may be diverted from:
• the police station (at the point of arrest)
• the magistrates’ court
• prison.
15
Entry into Secure Care
Diversion from the police station is discussed in Chapter 16. Most such cases will not re-
quire secure care and will be admitted to PICUs or open wards.
Although they are often conflated, diversion should be distinguished from liaison:
• Diversion schemes require the active participation of at least one psychiatrist (and an approval
mental health professional [AMHP] for civil detention)
• Liaison schemes are often nurse-led and aim to:
– identify offenders who require diversion, and
– liaise with secondary mental health providers who will undertake diversion.
16
Diversion from CJS
Prison transfers
The provision of mental health care in prisons is discussed in Chapter 19. Despite the great
improvements in prison health care over the last 10 years, prisoners with severe mental ill-
ness generally require to be transferred out to a hospital setting.
• According to the Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health (2009) 97% of restricted transferred prisoners
are admitted to medium or high security.
• The increased frequency of transfers reported by Hotopf et al. (2000) may have been due to:
– increasing size of the prison population
– more psychiatrists visiting prisons
– limited availability making it is easier to coordinate admissions to secure beds from prison than
court (Birmingham, 2001).
• 42 prisoners per quarter waited more than 3 months for transfer from prison to hospital in England
in 2006 (Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2009).
• A pilot study investigating the feasibility of a 14-day transfer standard (Royal College of
Psychiatrists, 2010) found:
– the mean waiting time for transfer was 29 days; the median was 18 days.
• An observational study at HMP Brixton (Forrester et al., 2009) found:
– mean wait of 102 days
– 20% were referred, assessed and transferred within a month.
• In R (on the application of TF) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 1457, the Court of
Appeal held, in relation to a young offender with personality disorder, that:
if the decision is being taken … right at the end of sentence … a decision to direct transfer
cannot simply be taken on the grounds that a convicted person will be a danger to the
public if released … but can only be taken on the grounds that his medical condition & its
treatability … justify the decision.
• In response to this judgment, the Mental Health Unit will turn down requests for transfers late in
sentence unless there is good evidence that hospital treatment will be of benefit to the prisoner and
there are good reasons why transfer could not have been achieved earlier in sentence (e.g. recent
deterioration in a patient’s condition or recent onset of serious mental illness).
17
Entry into Secure Care
Duration of 28 days, renewable on the evidence of the RC, up to maximum of 12 weeks. Not
subject to consent to treatment, so there is no power to treat compulsorily.
Maximum initial duration of 12 weeks, renewable for 28-day periods, on the evidence of the
RC, to maximum of 1 year. Subject to consent to treatment.
A restriction order under s41 may or may not be added. Once it has been made, an unre-
stricted hospital order operates much as a section 3, except that there is no right of appeal to
the first tier tribunal in the first 6 months and the nearest relative has no power to discharge.
• It may be renewed for 6 months in the first instance, and then annually.
A hospital direction cannot be given without a limitation direction, which has much the
same effect as a restriction order under s41.
For both s37 and s45A, if it appears not practicable for them to be admitted to the
specified hospital, the Secretary of State may vary the hospital to which they will be
admitted.
If a restriction direction is made, it ends automatically on the day that the patient would
have been entitled to be released from custody:
• If the patient remains detained under a ‘notional s37’, which operates in the same way as an s3,
the patient may still be liable to detention in hospital under s47 of the MHA. This is equivalent to
being detained under s37 of the Act and is known as a ‘notional s37 hospital order’.
A restriction direction (s49) must be made in the case of a remand prisoner, and may be
made for civil or immigration detainees.
The transfer direction ends automatically when the case is disposed of by the court
• If there is concern that an s48 patient may be released by the court, they may be made subject to
an s3 concurrently and prophylactically.
A magistrates’ court may not make a restriction order, but it may commit a case to Crown
court where it is of the opinion that a restriction order should be made (s43 of the MHA
1983). The criteria for making a restriction order are considered in Chapter 20, in the con-
text of providing oral evidence.
The effect of the restriction order is that:
• the Part 2 rules relating to duration, renewal and expiration of the authority to detain do not apply
• provisions relating to SCT do not apply
• there are no nearest relatives powers
• leave of absence, transfer or discharge may only be granted by the RC or the hospital managers
with the consent of the Secretary of State
• the RC must provide at least annual reports to the Secretary of State.
Limitation direction
A limitation direction (under s45A) is different from a restriction order in three respects:
21
Entry into Secure Care
• It ends when the patient would have been entitled to be released from prison (the hospital
direction may continue).
• While a limitation direction is in force, the offender may be removed to prison (criteria as for
remission of s47/48 – see Chapter 5).
• While a limitation direction is in force, discharge by the tribunal requires the consent of the
Secretary of State.
Section s35 s36 s37 s37/41 s45A s47 s47/49 s48 s48/49
Number 119 19 392 565 3 74 433 4 341
Use of part 3 of the MHA has been increasing in recent years, as shown in Figures 2.1 and
2.2.
The rate of increase in the prevalence of detained restricted patients has been greater
than in new admissions, implying that restricted patients are staying in hospital for longer.
In the calendar year 2008:
• there were 1501 new restricted admissions to hospital, of which 110 (7%) were to high secure
hospital
• these included 442 under s47, 484 under s48, 343 under s37/41, 2 under s45A, and 190 recalled
patients.
600
s37 (no s41)
s37/41
500 s47
s48
Number of detentions
400
300
200
100
0
2003–4 2004–5 2005–6 2006–7 2007–8 2008–9
Figure 2.1 Numbers of detentions under part 3 per year (data from the NHS Information Centre,
2009)
22
Mental Health Act Statistics
4500
No. of restricted patients in hospital
4000
No. of new restricted admissions
3500
Number of patients
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Figure 2.2 Restricted patients detained in hospital (Ministry of Justice, 2010b)
References
All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prison Health. (2006) The Mental Health Problem in UK HM Pris-
ons. London: House of Commons. Available at: http://nacro.org.uk/data/files/nacro-2006110801-
352.pdf
Birmingham L. (2001) Diversion from custody. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 7,198–207
Coid JW. (1998) Socio-economic deprivation and admission rates to secure forensic services Psychi-
atric Bulletin 22, 294–7
Coid J, Kahtan N. (2001) Medium secure forensic psychiatry services; comparison of seven English
health regions. British Journal of Psychiatry 178, 55–61
*Department of Health. (2007) Procedure for Transferring Prisoners to and from Hospital under Sec-
tions 47 & 48 of the Mental Health Act (1983). Available at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_
dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_081262.pdf
Department of Health. (2009) The Bradley Report: Lord Bradley’s review of people with mental
health problems or learning disabilities in the Criminal Justice System. London: Department of
Health
Department of Health and the Home Office. (1992) Review of Health and Social Services for Men-
tally Disordered Offenders and Others Requiring Similar Services (Reed Report). London: HMSO
Forrester A, Henderson C, Wilson S, Cumming I, Spyrou M, Parrott J. (2009) A suitable waiting room?
Hospital transfer outcomes & delays from two London prisons. Psychiatric Bulletin B, 409–12
Hodgins S, Muller-Isberner R, Allaire J-F. (2006) Attempting to understand the increase in numbers of
forensic beds in Europe: a multi-site study of patients in forensic and general psychiatric services.
International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 5(2), 173–84
Hotopf M, Wall S, Buchanan A, Wessely S, Churchill R. (2000) Changing patterns in the use of the
Mental Health Act 1983 in England, 1984–1996. British Journal of Psychiatry 176, 479–84
James D. (1999) Court diversion at 10 years: can it work, does it work and has it a future? Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry 10, 507–24
James DV, Hamilton LW. (1992) Setting up psychiatric liaison schemes to magistrates’ courts: prob-
lems and practicalities. Medicine Science & the Law 32,167–76
23
Entry into Secure Care
James D, Farnham F, Moorey H, Lloyd H, Hill K, Blizard R, Barnes TRE. (2002) Outcomes of Psychiatric
Admissions through the Courts. Home Office RDS Occasional paper 79. London: Home Office
Jamieson E, Butwell M, Taylor P, Leese M. (2000) Trends in special (high secure) hospitals: referrals
and admissions. British Journal of Psychiatry, 176, 253–9
Joseph P. (1994) Psychiatric assessment at the magistrates’ court: early intervention is needed in the
remand process. British Journal of Psychiatry 164, 722–4
Joseph P, Potter M. (1990) Mentally disordered homeless offenders – diversion from custody. Health
Trends 22, 51–3
Joseph P, Potter M. (1993) Diversion from custody II: effect on hospital and prison resources. British
Journal of Psychiatry 162, 330–4
Kennedy HG. (2002) Therapeutic uses of security: mapping forensic mental health services by strati-
fying risk. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 8, 433–43
Kingham M, Corfe M. (2005) Experiences of a mixed court diversion and liaison scheme. Psychiatric
Bulletin 29, 137–40
Ministry of Justice. (2010a) Conviction Histories of Offenders between the Ages of 10 and 52. Avail-
able at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/criminal-histories-bulletin.pdf
Ministry of Justice. (2010b) Statistics of Mentally Disordered Offenders 2008 England and Wales.
Available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/mentally-disordered-offenders.htm
NHS Information Centre. (2009) In-patients Formally Detained in Hospitals under the Mental Health
Act 1983 and Patients Subject to Supervised Community Treatment: 1998–99 to 2008–09. Avail-
able at: http://www.ic.nhs.uk
Pakes F, Winstone J. (2010) A site visit of 101 mental health liaison and diversion schemes in Eng-
land. Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 21(6), 873–86
Priebe S, Fakhoury W, Watts J, Bebbington P, Burns T, Johnson S, et al. (2003) Assertive outreach
teams in London: patient characteristics and outcomes. British Journal of Psychiatry 183, 148–54
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2010) Briefing Note: Consultation on Clinicians’ Experiences of Prison
Transfers. London: RCPsych.
Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health. (2009) Diversion: a better way for criminal justice & mental
health. Available at: http://www.centreformentalhealth.org.uk/criminal_justice/a_better_way.
aspx
24
3
Treatment and
Outcomes in Secure Care
The principles of providing psychiatric treatment in secure hospitals are no different from
providing psychiatric treatment in general psychiatric services.
Differences in emphasis in forensic services include:
• the patients tend to have a multiplicity of interdependent needs
• a greater awareness of risk of harm to others
• a greater prominence of legal issues, with more external restrictions on the patient
• inpatient treatment tends to be longer term, including both acute treatment and prolonged
rehabilitation
• progress is made in small graduated steps, with testing out at each one
• an emphasis on continuity of care rather than functionalization of care
• greater availability of psychological treatment
• more prominent security, which has a complex relationship with therapy
• greater need to work with other agencies (particularly MAPPA agencies and the Ministry of Justice),
which demands an acute sensitivity to confidentiality and medical ethics
• staff may require different forms of support because of the complexities of:
– the patients
– combining both a therapeutic and a custodian role.
BME populations are over-represented in secure services (Rutherford and Duggan, 2007):
The distribution of legal classification among all restricted patients prior to the Mental
Health Act (MHA) 2007 was (Rutherford and Duggan, 2007):
25
Treatment and Outcomes in Secure Care
It is often argued that these figures underestimate the rate of personality disorder (PD),
because many of those detained for mental illness will have co-morbid PDs.
Structured and standardized assessments of need (or measures of outcome) sometimes
used in forensic services include:
• Camberwell Assessment of Needs – forensic version (CANFOR – Thomas et al., 2003):
– the forensic version of the Cambridge Assessment of Needs
– separate staff and patient ratings in 25 domains
• Health of the Nation Outcome Scores (HoNOS) secure:
– required as part of the minimum data set for services
– quick and easy to use, but uncertain validity and reliability (Dickens et al., 2007)
• Recovery-Star (see http://www.mhpf.org.uk):
– 10 domains are rated collaboratively by patient and a professional.
In 2007, a similar picture was found in a cross-sectional survey of the inpatient population
at Reaside Clinic medium secure unit (MSU), Birmingham. Of 80 male patients:
• the mean age was 37 years (range 21–71)
• 65% were admitted from prison, 15% from community, 10% from another secure setting,
10% from a general psychiatric setting
• most were subject to MHA detention:
– 56% were detained under s37/41
– 14% under a civil section
– 4% s37
– 12.5% s47/49
– 6.3% s48/49
• index offences included:
– 25% homicide/attempted murder
– 29% wounding
– 20% assault
– 10% sexual offence
– 7.5% arson
• most suffered from a severe mental illness:
– 86% schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder
– 5% bipolar affective disorder
26
The Multidisciplinary Team
There is a group of patients in medium security who require secure care for consider-
ably longer than the original expectation of up to 2 years (see Chapter 1). Jacques et al.
(2010) found that 21% of men in their medium secure service had been in hospital for
more than 5 years and separated them into two groups based on needs identified by the
CANFOR:
• Chronic challenging behaviour, treatment-resistant mental illness and considerable daily support
needs.
• A more able group who were dependent on the hospital.
The patient sits at the centre of a complex arrangement of multiple agencies (Figure 3.1):
• These agencies have differing agendas and approaches, which commonly overlap but occasionally
conflict.
• This is particularly important in forensic services because of the practical and ethical complexities of
the therapy/risk dynamic.
• The MDT as a whole, and the RC in particular, must be able to manage the interagency dynamics in
a properly balanced way, and bearing in mind issues of confidentiality.
• For the patient, their detention and the associated parameters of restriction are often paramount.
So the patient tends to see the RC as being ‘in charge’.
• As yet there has not been a wholesale expansion of the RC role to other disciplines following the
MHA 2007. Forensic services tend to be relatively conservative, so, if this change happens, it is likely
to happen gradually.
Core roles of the forensic psychiatrist (variously delegated to juniors) in an inpatient setting
include:
• providing leadership to the MDT, and accepting responsibility for the governance of team
functioning
• holding overall responsibility for each patient’s detention, care and treatment
• assessing psychopathology, using appropriate medical investigations and arriving at diagnoses
• deciding on pharmacological and other medical interventions
• ensuring that the physical health needs of patients are addressed
• carrying out the statutory functions required by the MHA:
– renewal of detention
– consent to treatment
– providing evidence to courts or tribunals
– reporting to the MoJ on restricted patients.
Clinical MDT
Patient Ward
advocacy nursing
services staff
Voluntary The
sector
agencies
patient MoJ
CJS,
Statutory
probation,
agencies
Carers police
(e.g. LA)
&
families
Figure 3.1 Agencies working with patients in secure services (CJS = criminal justice system, LA = local
authority, MDT = multidisciplinary team, MoJ = Ministry of Justice)
28
The Multidisciplinary Team
Box 3.1 The psychiatrist, the patient and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
Traditionally, forensic services have tended to adopt a paternalistic approach, founded on a predominantly
medical model of treating illness and the authority of clinicians:
• In some cases this fosters dependence on the part of patients, and it is sometimes through a
dependent relationship that risk is effectively managed.
• Reducing offending was often a welcome consequence of establishing mental health, rather than an
end in its own right.
More recently risk reduction has come to occupy equal billing in the prioritized aims of forensic clinicians,
leading to a more explicit focus on criminogenic needs themselves.
• Interestingly criminal justice system (CJS) offending behaviour programmes (OBPs) have begun to
recognize and emphasize the importance of collaboration with the offender in risk reduction, adopting
engagement strategies from health.
The MoJ carries a yet more explicit authority than the clinicians, creating a complex triangle of care/control.
• For the clinician, it is sometimes useful to locate the controlling aspect of the therapeutic relationship in
the MoJ, enabling the development of a collaboration with the patient to satisfy the MoJ.
• The risk of this approach lies in disingenuously, or seemingly, denying the clinician’s custodian/public
protection/authoritarian role, leading to the patient feeling cheated or let down when it reappears.
In recent years, the patient advocacy movement and a trend in emphasis away from curing illness to
enhancing strengths, well-being and self-acceptance have begun to change the way in which forensic
services work with their patients.
• This improves the degree to which forensic services are patient-centred, and benefits are likely.
• There may be costs too, because some patients have done well with a traditional forensic approach.
• Mezey et al. (2010) describe some of the obstacles to embracing a recovery approach in forensic
services.
• the primacy of risk, requiring formulation, management and therapeutic risk taking.
While all clinical teams work differently, in principle effective team functioning can be
maintained by:
• regular multidisciplinary meetings and good communication within teams
• engaging in debate and discussion within the team, while presenting a coherent team approach to
patients and carers
• respecting individual team members’ roles
• involving the team in most decisions – few issues cannot wait until the next team meeting
• developing an agreed formulation of the patient’s engagement with the team
• ensuring effective intra-discipline support
• consciously acknowledging the challenges of MDT working in secure environments
• regular team awaydays/practice development days, perhaps with external facilitation
• acknowledging problems relating to particular patients and accessing psychotherapeutic
supervision or assessment to understand the psychopathology/dynamics further.
They consider that many of the disadvantages of depots may be construed as perception
problems:
• stigmatizing and disempowering/coercive:
– there is no intrinsic reason why this should be so
• reduced patient acceptability:
– often an individual matter – some patients prefer depots; many do not
• potential for increased side effects:
– specific side effects may include pain and local inflammation at the injection site
– otherwise there is little evidence for greater side effects with depots, when comparing like drugs
– improved pharmacodynamics may lead to a better side-effect profile for depots
• dose changes are more gradual, reducing the ability to respond promptly to side effects or patient
choice.
● Treating Aggression
The literature on the pharmacological treatment of violence is small and the evidence is
conflicting. A Cochrane Review of the use of antiepileptics in treating aggression and asso-
ciated impulsivity (Huban et al., 2010) identified 14 studies involving 672 subjects:
33
Treatment and Outcomes in Secure Care
• The subjects differed between studies, and there were both positive and negative findings.
• No firm conclusions could be drawn on effectiveness.
Recent structured reviews (Volavka and Citrome, 2008; Topiwala and Fazel, 2011) of the
available evidence for treating aggression in patients with schizophrenia have reached the
following conclusions:
• There is good evidence that clozapine reduces levels of aggression, and that this effect is
independent of impact on psychotic symptoms.
• Otherwise, there is no convincing evidence that any specific antipsychotic confers added benefit in
comparison to the others.
• The evidence on mood stabilizers is inconsistent:
– controlled studies do not support efficacy of valproate
– carbamazepine may reduce agitation, but little anti-aggression effect
– no evidence to support the use of lithium or lamotrigine.
• There is limited evidence for the use of adjunctive beta blockers, but they may not be well tolerated.
Psychiatrists must accept responsibility for the physical health of their patients, but the evi-
dence suggests that dedicated primary care services offer benefits within long-term inpatient
settings (Cormac et al., 2004). Practice, supported by policy, should address (Royal College
of Psychiatrists, 2009):
• schedules for physical monitoring, with reference to prescribed medication and other risk factors:
– including especially weight/body mass index (BMI), blood pressure (BP), smoking status, lipids,
random/fasting glucose, electrocardiogram (ECG)
• health promotion and education
• encouragement of healthy exercise
• diet and nutrition
• weight management
• infectious diseases and sexual health
• addictions and alcohol use:
– including particularly tobacco use, secure units increasingly becoming smoke-free environments.
– managing the environment to reduce stimulation, consider use of designated room for ‘time
out’; this should not routinely be the seclusion room
– discussing issues in calm manner, aiming to develop rapport while maintaining an awareness of
cues and body language.
• Interventions for continued management:
– rapid tranquillization (see National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005, and local
policies)
– seclusion
– physical intervention.
There is little empirical evidence that seclusion or any other form of physical intervention
is more effective than the other. The relative use of different types of intervention varies
greatly internationally, due to cultural and historical practice issues rather than an evi-
dence base. Bowers et al. (2005) compared methods of containment of disturbed behaviour
between the UK, Greece and Italy, and showed more use of seclusion in the UK, and more
use of physical restraints on the Continent.
NICE guidelines (2005) recommend that teams should work with patients to prepare
advance directives of preferences for interventions in the event of violent or disturbed
behaviour. This practice is widely used in intensive care units in all levels of security.
Seclusion
There is no definitive international definition of seclusion. For example:
• the UK MHA CoP (Department of Health, 2008) defines seclusion as:
– ‘The supervised confinement of a patient in a room, which may be locked. Its sole aim is to
contain severely disturbed behaviour which is likely to cause harm to others’
• mental health legislation of the Australian State of Victoria uses:
– ‘sole confinement of a person at any hour of the day or night in a room of which the doors and
windows are locked from the outside’.
Seclusion areas should be specially built and designed to be a safe and secure, low-stimulus
environment. However, seclusion is not defined by the area in which it occurs. If a patient
is confined elsewhere, their bedroom, for example, this is still seclusion.
Each unit will have its own policies and procedures regarding the seclusion of patients.
Generally these will include the following factors:
• The decision to seclude a patient should be made by a senior clinician or the professional in charge
of the ward.
• There should be a regular review of the need for seclusion to continue, including regular
multidisciplinary review.
• There should be a suitably trained professional within sight of the seclusion room at all times.
Ching et al. (2010) discuss the negative aspects of seclusion, which should be seen as a meas-
ure of last resort. They describe a successful strategy to reduce the use of seclusion within a
forensic service.
Physical intervention
All physical interventions should be seen as a last resort, to be avoided if possible and de-
escalation techniques should be used continuously throughout a period of restraint. Such
interventions carry a risk of injury to patient and to staff.
35
Treatment and Outcomes in Secure Care
Manual holding
• The most commonly used method in the UK.
• Requires specific training and uses a team approach, each individual having a particular
responsibility, one person having responsibility for protecting the patient’s head and neck.
There have been incidents of patient deaths occurring while in restraint, the most well-
known case being that of David Bennett, who was manually restrained for over half an hour
in the prone position. NICE guidelines state that during physical restraint at no time should
pressure be applied to the patient’s neck, thorax, back, abdomen or pelvic area. They also
recommend that cardiopulmonary resuscitation equipment be available within 3 minutes of
the setting where these interventions are being used.
Mechanical restraints
Restraints such as body belts, straps or straitjackets are rarely used in the UK but are more
widely used in other countries (including continental Europe and the USA). There are
some circumstances where mechanical restraints are used in this country:
• Handcuffs are used routinely by prisons, including when transferring prisoners to hospital. Use
of handcuffs has become more common in secure psychiatric hospitals in recent years, for
transporting high-risk patients to attend court or general hospitals.
– There is no clinical evidence base to support this, and handcuffs may be extremely stigmatizing,
particularly in a general health-care setting.
• The use of some mechanical restraints in high secure hospitals. This is generally for short periods, at
times of extremely disturbed behaviour when transferring patients from one care area to another.
• The use of mechanical restraints in prisons. Again these are used for short periods of time when
other interventions would not be appropriate.
Individual assessment, formulation and treatment remain crucial for effective clinical care
and risk management because:
• group interventions cannot provide sufficient responsivity, to take account of the patient’s
individual needs, particularly the idiosyncratic effects of psychosis
• it is necessary to engage difficult-to-engage patients, and sometimes this is best done individually
36
Psychological Treatment in Secure Care
• relapse prevention plans and risk management plans are necessarily individual
• confidentiality issues may obstruct group work for some.
The approach used in individual treatment is flexible, and may be determined by both pro-
fessional and patient factors.
Group-based interventions may be:
• traditionally delivered psychoeducation or CBT-based interventions, targeting mental health needs,
such as:
– mental health awareness
– problematic substance use
– hearing voices
– recovering from psychosis
• interventions targeting criminogenic needs, often based on accredited offending behaviour
programmes, such as:
– reasoning and rehabilitation
– anger management
– fire setting groups
– sex offender treatment programmes.
Howells et al. (2004) discuss the application of the ‘What Works’ principles (Risk, Needs,
Responsivity) to psychiatric settings. The recently developing literature about group-based
interventions in forensic settings is nevertheless limited:
• It has not yet moved beyond parochial descriptions of individual interventions in single units.
• Such interventions generally have high face validity.
• Demonstrating positive outcomes consequent to a particular intervention that is delivered within
the context of a much wider care package in a secure setting is a considerable challenge (see, for
example, Swain et al., 2010).
Forensic psychotherapy
Psychotherapy within secure settings and prisons has a long history, and is established in:
• high security, where treatment for PD is also established
• the small number of MSUs which specifically provide treatment for those with PD
• a few prisons, notably HMP Gendon (see Chapter 18)
• some outpatient services, notably the Portman Clinic, London.
Current provision within mental illness-focused MSUs is limited and variable. McGauley
and Humphrey (2003) describe the role of forensic psychotherapy in secure units:
• Direct clinical work:
– providing assessments to inform understanding of the patient
– providing treatment, individual or group.
• Supervisory work:
– either of other professionals doing direct clinical work, or
37
Treatment and Outcomes in Secure Care
Through reflective practice groups, supervisory work may particularly seek to improve staff’s
awareness of the unconscious dynamics among the triad of:
• the patient
• the staff
• the institution.
For further reading see Cordess and Cox (1998) and, particularly, Bartlett and McGauley
(2009).
Section 48 patients are not normally granted s17 leave. For s47 patients:
• UCL will usually only be considered within 2 years of their parole eligibility date (PED), or once they
have served half their custodial sentence, whichever is the later.
• ONL will be considered within 3 months of their PED.
• For life sentenced prisoners, ECL will be considered on its merits, and UCL may be considered within
3 years of the tariff date.
38
Outcomes of Treatment in Secure Care
Box 3.2 Liaising with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in relation to leave
Each type of leave requires a separate application:
• The responsible clinician (RC) must apply using a standardized form available on the MoJ website.
• The MoJ aims to respond to leave requests within 3 weeks.
Leave is usually granted at the discretion of the RC, with a report required after 3 months:
• The RC may decide upon the duration and destination of each leave.
• Occasionally restrictions will be added, relating to restriction zones, for example.
• It is usual for the next stage of leave not to be considered until such a report has been made.
A small naturalistic study suggested that clinical leave decisions are often based on implicit shared
knowledge which may not be voiced, and may be less focused on risk than on humanity (Lyall and Bartlett,
2010):
• The risk of absconding should be considered explicitly in terms of both likelihood and likely cost.
Remember that the presence of a nursing escort does not prevent a determined absconder. The escort
can only:
• try to dissuade the patient from absconding
• try to keep an absconding patient in sight
• raise the alarm promptly.
The MoJ should always be informed immediately if changes are made to leave status at a clinical level.
Where the RC has rescinded leave, the MoJ will inform the RC if further permission is required to reinstate
it.
For restricted patients, rates of reoffending within 2 years of first discharge are (Ministry of
Justice, 2010):
• all offences 7%
• sexual or violent offence 2%
• grave offence 1%:
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What were the citizens doing while Henry III and his dear wife
ruined the bridge by confiscating her revenues? Did they believe that
everybody’s affair was nobody’s business, and that they would be
asked to mend the bridge if they drew attention to her condition? As
to Edward I, he kept his hand away from his own pocket, and
personated charity that for ever begs. “Each for Himself” was a
policy that suited Edward; and his orders to the clergy proved that
he knew it to be a policy which his loyal subjects followed as a habit.
Hence the “pious exhortations,” with indulgences also, we may rest
assured. The whole story is pitifully ironic. London had no other
bridge over the Thames, yet the people looked on while a king and
his wife played the part of bridge wreckers. Some protest there must
have been, for London Bridge—a great street of timber houses—was
more populous than many a village; and the tenants, like other
Englishmen of those days, had no wish to be plunged into cold
water. According to Stow’s “Annals,” five arches fell, so many houses
also were lost, perhaps with their inmates.
M. Jusserand believes that during the Middle Ages our English
highways fared no better than London Bridge. His verdict runs thus:
“Though there were roads, though property was burdened with
obligatory services for their upkeep, though laws every now and
again recalled their obligations to the possessors of the soil, though
from time to time the private interest of lords and of monks, in
addition to the public interest, suggested and directed repairs, yet
the fate of a traveller in a fall of snow or in a thaw was very
precarious. The Church might well have pity on the wayfarer; and
him she specified, together with the sick and the captive, among
those unfortunates whom she recommended to the daily prayers of
pious souls.”
There is a great deal of evidence to justify this verdict, but
evidence in history depends on its choice; and in Thorold Rogers
there are other facts that leave England with some efficient
mediæval roads, along which horsemen could travel rapidly. Perhaps
Rogers may have set too much store by his data; but when we study
all the evidence, when we balance it carefully, and visualise all its
pictures of well-tested negligence and crime, one thing is beyond all
doubt: that the social rule, “Each for All, yet Each for Himself,” was a
national catastrophe. Its first principle had a very precarious life,
though incessant compulsion tried to drive it home to the people’s
fear of revengeful laws; whereas the second principle—“Each for
Himself”—was so popular as a creed that even the divine mysteries
beyond death were assailed by egoists, who thought they could buy
a place in heaven by giving lands and goods to the Church, no
matter what harm they had done in a brief life upon earth. Study
Erasmus in his wayfaring letters, and you will breathe the
atmosphere of the Middle Ages.
III
CUSTOM AND CONVENTION
Yet a pontist must be exceedingly careful when his tramps through
any period bring him in touch with ethical problems. He should try to
live on the highways of history, not in order to pass judgments on
vice and on crime, but because he wants to see clearly, under the
form of visual conception, why social concord and equity have never
fared well, even the best forms of civilization being only half-
educated barbarisms that allow their strife to be drilled by a vast
number of active laws. These phases of compulsion go on
increasing, yet they fail to resolve into harmony those rapacious
egotisms that compete against each other in the body social like
microbes in living tissues. As soon as a pontist understands his
wayfaring through history, as soon as he feels at home in the
general atmosphere of the human drama, he is glad to be a realist;
then nothing that societies do or have done seems unexampled and
inexplicable. To him, for example, the infanticide practised age after
age by savage tribesmen is not more terrible than the death of
babies in the slums of civilized towns, or than the degradation
brought before his mind by the alert philanthropy that saves little
English children from cruelties. To him, again, the slaughter on a
great battlefield is not more woeful than the annual sacrifice of lives
in street accidents, and railway smashes, and mine disasters, and
sea tragedies; as well as in games and sports, in nursing the sick,
and in all trades and professions. He is not scared by the fact that
the sum of human life is war, but he is scared by the primordial
customs and conventions that make the incessant war infinitely less
humane than it could be and ought to be. So a pontist in his attitude
to history is a sociologist, and not an abstract moralist. Each body
social and its systems of circulation are to him what patients are to
medical students in a hospital; he has to learn to be attentive to all
disease and to make his diagnoses thoughtfully. Even then frequent
mistakes will occur. One thing he must regard as his clinical
thermometer: it is the truth that civilizations in their intercourse with
right and wrong have been governed by habits and customs and
conventions, which have caused most men to be other men; so that
most human actions, whether studied in old history or in the current
routine of living, are mere quotations from other human actions,
instead of being like original ideas in a well-ordered composition. In
other words, the ordinary human brain has tried to be automatic, as
if to be in harmony with the rest of the vital organs.
Now the architecture of bridges, like that of huts and houses and
cottages, never fails to keep before our minds the awful slowness of
each reluctant advance from custom to custom, and from convention
to convention. I have no words to describe the terror that comes to
me when I find in daily use a type or species of bridge so aboriginal
in its poor workmanship that a forerunner not only similar to it, but
as rudely effective, may well have been employed by the earliest
Flint Men, whose delight in imitation was stimulated by all the
bridges which Nature had created. Even more, at this moment in
England, and even in busy Lancashire, where to-day’s machinery
abounds, there are primitive bridges which are not even primitively
structural; bridges which need in their making not more thought
than is given to a difficult sneeze when we are troubled by a cold (p.
60). When I look at them and think of the myriads of generations
which in different parts of the world have used bridges akin to these,
I am so awed with fear that I feel like a baby Gulliver in a new
Brobdingnag where everlasting conventions are impersonated by
brainless giants whose bodies are too vast for my eyes to focus.
Often, too, I say to myself: “In the presence of this dreadful
conservatism, this inept mimicry that endures unruffled by a thought
for many thousands of years, you are as futile as a single microbe
would be on a field of battle. Or imagine that the microbe is in
Westminster Abbey, and that it has a blurred sense that makes it
dimly conscious of all the many historic things there gathered
together; then you have a figure of yourself in your relation to the
mingled good and bad in history. For the Abbey shows in its
architecture that convention, though a bane to ordinary minds, is the
grammar of progress to the rare men of genius who from time to
time shake the world free from its bondage to fixed customs and
routines, and compel it to move on to other routines and customs,
where it will dawdle until other geniuses come out of the dark and
find in new mother-ideas a compulsive force that works a new
liberation.”
old bridge over the clain, near poitiers
IV
CONTROVERSIES
Students are tested and judged by their attitude to controversies.
Common sense should keep them from partisanship; and when they
feel tempted to look on as mere spectators, they should remember
that crowds at boxing matches are very apt to form wrong opinions.
It is better by far to laugh at both sides by caricaturing the weak
points of a discussion. In a few days a student will learn which side
is the more difficult to caricature, and this knowledge will help him
to sift all rubbish from a controversy and to form a judgment of his
own on facts and on inferences. As Sir Thomas Browne said, a man
should be something that all men are not, and individual in
somewhat beside his person and his name.
The bridges at Albi and Espalion have caused some men to break
old friendships over a simple question, namely: “When were pointed
arches used for the first time in French bridges? At what date were
they brought from the East?” As the pointed arch was copied by
Europeans, not invented by them, the precise date of the mimicry
ought not to excite a pontist; it is a thing for antiquaries to be
flurried about. If the question ran in another form: “Was the pointed
arch in French bridges an independent discovery?” then a battle and
some exploded reputations would be worth while. But no such
hypothesis has been put forward by either side in a warm dispute.
One party declares that as early as the time of Charlemagne,
towards the end of the eighth century, or the beginning of the ninth
(768-814), a French builder seems to have played the part of the
sedulous ape to Eastern architecture, cribbing the pointed arch, and
using it without much skill in the bridge of Espalion, whose
construction (as documents prove incontestably) was ordered by
Charlemagne himself. In this bald statement there is no challenge,
no provocation; it is nothing more than a conjecture supported by a
documented fact.
If Charlemagne had been a weak ruler, like Louis the Indolent, it
would be fair to suppose that his commands were neglected more
often than obeyed; then we could not accept his character as a fact
of greater value in a controversy than a command of his mentioned
in authentic documents. Let us say that the Black Prince or his father
ordered a bridge to be built at a given place; we have documents to
prove this, and at the place named in the documents a very old
bridge is extant. Should we not read these documents by the light of
the reputation won by the Black Prince or by his father? Myself, I
should say at once, “His orders were obeyed.” And so, too, in the
case of Charlemagne. I accept his character as a guarantee that he