2020 International Conference on Smart Grids and Energy Systems (SGES)

Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Impacts of False Data

Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: An Overview
Ahmed S. Musleh Guo Chen Zhao Yang Dong
School of Electrical Engineering and School of Electrical Engineering and School of Electrical Engineering and
Telecommunications Telecommunications Telecommunications
University of New South Wales University of New South Wales University of New South Wales
CSIRO DATA61 Sydney, Australia Sydney, Australia
Sydney, Australia [email protected] [email protected]
[email protected]
Chen Wang Shiping Chen
CSIRO DATA61 CSIRO DATA61
Sydney, Australia Sydney, Australia
[email protected]
2020 International Conference on Smart Grids and Energy Systems (SGES) | 978-1-7281-8550-7/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE | DOI: 10.1109/SGES51519.2020.00021

[email protected]
Abstract—The wide range of vulnerabilities and impacts of have not considered providing an in-depth analysis of these
False data injection attack (FDIA) makes it the most challenging impacts and their causing vulnerabilities and threats. This
cyber-physical security threat in smart grids. This paper
manuscript provides an in-depth analysis of the FDIA in
provides a detailed analysis of the various vulnerabilities,
threats, and impacts of FDIA in smart grids. Our work smart grid. It starts by analysing the different vulnerabilities
considers the different layers and systems in the smart grids and access points in the smart grid systems, it illustrates the
ranging from the local to the wide area monitoring and control possible threats, and it provides an investigational analysis of
applications. This work supplies a good insight of FDIA which possible scenarios, and quantifications of the impacts of
inspires the research and development of defense mechanisms.
FDIA including real-time simulations and financial risks.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical security, false data injection The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows:
attacks (FDIA), smart grids. section 2 introduces a smart grid model with its different
vulnerabilities, section 3 discusses the threats of the FDIA
I. INTRODUCTION with the different access points, section 4 provides a full
Smart Grids’ security has been compromised massively analysis of the FDIA’s impacts at different systems, and the
with the broad incorporation of the information and concluding remarks are drawn in section 5.
communication technologies (ICT). Cyber-physical attacks
resulted in 362 power interruption between 2011 and 2014 as II. SMART GRIDS’ VULNERABILITIES TOWARDS FDIA
reported by the US Department of Energy [1]. Hackers took Smart grids represent a complicated connection of many
down 200MW of the grid capacity of Kiev in 2016 [2]. The systems that work together in harmonious manner. Figure 1
substantial impacts of these events steered the worldwide illustrates an overview of smart grids with its various
governments to acknowledge these evolving threats. The operations, control, measurements, communication, and
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) security systems. These systems could be divided according
released a three-volume report to outline the fundamental to the different layers such as the generation, transmission,
regulations for the smart grids’ cyber security in 2014 [3]. distribution, consumption, centralized monitoring and
Even though cyber-physical attacks differ massively, control, and markets operations. The applications along these
False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) do pose great challenge different layers vary in their nature greatly. While protection
for its wide impacts and its complexity to identify as and automatic voltage control have a response rate of
instructed by NIST [3]. This kind of attacks is relevant to the milliseconds to few seconds, some centralized and markets
various types of layers and systems in smart grids resulting in operations have an update rate of minuets, hours, and more
different risks associated with these attacks which could be than days. However, all these applications do complement
conceptualized as ܴ݅‫ ݇ݏ‬ൌ ܸ‫ݐܿܽ݌݉ܫ כ ݐܽ݁ݎ݄ܶ כ ݕݐ݈ܾ݅݅ܽݎ݈݁݊ݑ‬. each other via their interdependencies upon each other.
Thus, in order to evaluate the risks of FDIA in smart grids, These interdependencies are the reason for having many
we must first analyse the vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts communication links between the different layers. These are
associated with the FDIA applied at the different systems in realized via optical fibers, serial links, cellular, satellite,
smart grids. Zigbee, Wi-Fi, etc… [7]. To govern the regulations for
To further realize and understand the effect of FDIA in utilizing these different communication links in smart grids,
smart grids, numerous research endeavours have been made. several standards have been developed for defining the
An advanced review of the recent cyber-physical security communication protocols such as IEC 61850 for electrical
concerns in smart grids was presented in [4]. In a similar substations, IEC 61968 for distribution management [8],
generalized point of view, authors of [5] and [6] provided IEEE 1888.4 for home and residential quarters [9], IEC
summarized reviews of the FDIA types and detection 60870 for telecontrol messages [10], IEEE Std C37.118-2™-
approaches in smart grids with predicted futuristic challenges 2011 for phasor measurement units [11], IEEE 802.15.4g for
to be encountered in this field. Despite these studies provided smart metering utility networks [12], and IEC 62746 for
an interesting analysis of FDIA’s impacts in smart grids, they
This paper is partially supported by UNSW Digital Grid Futures Institute
Seed Grant.

978-1-7281-8550-7/20/$31.00 ©2020 IEEE 77

DOI 10.1109/SGES51519.2020.00021
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 Figure 1. An overview of smart grid architecture with focus on communication and security aspects. Summarized from [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
[21] [22] [23]. Note that centralized monitoring and control and economic and market operations are separate domains and are combined in the figure for they
share almost the same communication and security aspects.
customer energy management and demand response systems access methods to the grid from the various devices and links
[13]. at the various layer of smart grids. In categorizing the
With these different layers and communications links, different access methodologies applicable to smart grids, four
security and protection of the data flow becomes a huge main categories are realized as follows [16]:
concern. Thus, several security measures are employed ƒ Device Access: This is possible when the adversary can
within these different layers such as cyclic redundancy check, reach to the specific device to be attacked. In this case, the
access authentication, encryption, firewalls, virtual private adversary has the privilege of analysing the structure and
networks, antivirus, intrusion detection system, data loss the technical design of the device and tempering with its
prevention, etc... To govern the regulations for utilizing these data eventually. This can be done via micro-probing,
different security measures in smart grids, several standards circuit bonding, exposed busses, or flash memory
have been developed such as IEC 62351 for power systems tempering.
data communication security [8], IEEE Std C37.240™-2014 ƒ Proximity Access: The need for this access methodology
for cybersecurity requirements within substation automation is to be in a proximity to the device to be attacked. Unlike
[14], IEEE 1686-2013 for intelligent electronic devices cyber the direct device access, there is no need to touch the
security capabilities [14], and IEEE P2900.1 for smart home device with this methodology. Techniques involved in
security systems and services [15]. this access methodology may include the use of
Even though several security measures have been Electromagnetic waves, and GPS spoofing.
adopted, many cyber-physical attacks, and specifically FDIA, ƒ Link Access: This access methodology includes all the
have been witnessed in the past few years [1]. Although these possible intrusions via the various communication links
smart grids’ systems operate at a different level, rating, and utilized with smart grids. This could occur by
at remote spaces, they all have a crucial role to the operation manipulating wired or wireless communication links
of the smart grids. Therefore, a FDIA at any of them can which is known to be the easier option.
positively compromises the overall operation of the smart ƒ Network Access: This access methodology is the most
grid. Thus, several research efforts have been conducted common and most severe for with this access, the
towards finding proper solutions for the FDIA. This starts by adversary can manipulate tremendous amount of data at
analysing the possible threats and impacts. the system level and not just at the device or the
communication link attacked. Techniques involved in this
III. FDIA’S THREATS IN SMART GRIDS access methodology may include fake access points and
To further identify the possible threats associated with the DNS spoofing.
FDIA in smart grids, it is a must to firstly identify the possible

78

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 7 8 9
FDIAs in Smart Grids Area 1
3
Area 2
1 5 6 10 11

Access Methods Possible Threats G1 ѐ Y Y ѐ G3

Dev ice Acc ess Protection Systems Tie-Line
2 L1 L2 4
Low

Mic ro-probing Relays Malfunction Generator

Circuit Bonding Unnecessary Tripping G2 ѐ Y Protective Device Y ѐ G4
Transformer
Exposed Busses Unresponsive Breakers
Flash Memory ...
... Tie-line Speed Speed Valves Voltage
Contr ol Systems Automatic Field
Po wer ref. Turbine setpo int
Generation Voltage Excitation Voltage
Pr oximity A ccess Fa lse Control Actions Governor
Severity

Frequency Con troller ref. Controller

EM Waves Stability Issues
GPS Spoofing ... Real-Time Profits/
Forecast Current
... Ahead LMP Real- Lo sses LC DR Trip
Centralized C ontr. & Op. LMP
Bidding/ Time Frequency Breaker
Link Access Fa lse Topologies Financial Trading ALSS
Trading
Settlements
Wir ed False State Estima tion
Wireless Fa lse Load Shedding Figure 3. Single line diagram of the system under test with the various
... ... operation and control loops considered (AGC, AVC, Protection, LMP)
High

Network Acc ess Economic & Markets Op.

Fake Access Point Economic L osses
DNS Spoofing Energy Theft
... ...

Figure 2. FDIA in smart grids: Access methods and possible threats

Similarly, in categorizing the different threats possibilities
associated with the different FDIA in smart grids, four main
threat themes are realized:
ƒ Protection Systems: Possible threats may include relays
malfunction, unnecessary tripping, unresponsive (a)

breakers, cascading outages, etc…

ƒ Control Systems: Possible threats may include falsified
control actions, stability issues, physical damages of the
devices, etc…
ƒ Centralized Control and Operations: Possible threats may
include falsified grid topologies, falsified state estimation,
falsified load shedding, line overloads, etc…
ƒ Economic and Markets Operations: Possible threats may (b)
include economic losses, energy theft, etc… Figure 4. AGC system response (a) frequency deviation and (b) tie-line
power deviation
It must be noted that all these threats may cause economical
losses which may be a main reason for conducting FDIA in through the various communication links, the vulnerability to
smart grids. The different access methods and the threat FDIA is at the highest. Automatic generation control (AGC)
possibilities are illustrated in Figure 2. is a main application in this category. With AGC, the wide
area measurements (power and frequency) are collected from
IV. MAIN FDIA’S IMPACTS IN SMART GRIDS the various parts of the grid and are used as a feedback to
To study the impacts of FDIA in smart grids, the standard maintain the desired settings of the frequency and the tie-line
two area power system is considered with several key power within the acceptable bounds [17].
operations and control applications at the different systems in In this system, the deviation of the frequency ο‫ܨ‬௧௜௘ ൌ
smart grids. To assess the impact of the FDIA on these ‫ܨ‬௧௜௘Ǥ௥௘௙ െ ‫ܨ‬௧௜௘ and the deviation in the tie-line power
different applications, real time simulations were conducted exchange οܲ௧௜௘ ൌ ܲ௧௜௘Ǥ௥௘௙ െ ܲ௧௜௘ are supposed to be
using Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS). The power grid maintained at zero with ‫ܨ‬௧௜௘Ǥ௥௘௙ ൌ ͸Ͳ‫ ݖܪ‬and ܲ௧௜௘Ǥ௥௘௙ ൌ
considered includes 4 generating units (20kV, 2,819MW, ͵ͷͲ‫ܹܯ‬. In the normal operation of the AGC, when the
798MVAr), 4 transformers (20kV/230kV, ¨-Y), 8 loading of the grid is disturbed at 10s with an increase of
transmission lines, 11 busses, 2 capacitor banks (550MVAr), 100MW, AGC is triggered to return the deviations to zero.
and 2 dynamic loads (2,734MW, 200MVAr) [17]. The full This is illustrated in Figure 4 as the true response in ο‫ܨ‬௧௜௘ in
single line diagram of the grid along with the different control (a) and in οܲ௧௜௘ in (b). To illustrate the impact of the FDIA
loops considered are illustrated in the Figure 3. on the operation of the AGC, three FDIA are considered:
A. Centralized Operations and Control: AGC ƒ Step Attack: This attack changes the measurement signal
by a constant amount.
In this kind of operations and control, wide area
ƒ Pulses Attack: This attack changes the measurement
measurements are collected from the grid in order to monitor
signal by a constant amount and frequency.
the states of the grid, optimize the operations of the grid, and
ƒ Ramp Attack: This attack changes the measurement signal
provide the necessary data for the economic and markets
with gradual increase/decrease with time.
operations. With the collection of the of the massive wide
area measurements form the different levels of the smart grids

79

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 1.1

Machine Voltage (pu)

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6 True Response 10% 1Hz Pulses Attack

10% Step Attack Ramp Attack
0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (s)
(a) (a)
1
Machine Power (pu)

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2 True Response 10% 1Hz Pulses Attack

10% Step Attack Ramp Attack
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time (s)
(b) (b)
Figure 5. AVC system response (a) machine voltage and (b) machine Figure 6. Protection systems response (a) LCDR and (b) ALSS
power
10% variations), the machine power of the pulses attack is
These three types of FDIA are applied on the tie-line power severely oscillating with a magnitude of 0.4pu. similarly, the
measurements at 10s. With the presence of these FDIA, ο‫ܨ‬௧௜௘ ramp attack is the most catastrophic one where the system
and οܲ௧௜௘ deviate from the desired zero. While οܲ௧௜௘ for the goes into instability within §0.3 seconds as illustrated in
10% step attack and the 10% 0.1Hz pulses attack might be Figure 5 (a) and (b). Even though this FDIA is applied
considered to be within the acceptable range, ο‫ܨ‬௧௜௘ of these locally, its effect degrades the overall stability of the grid
two attacks deviates beyond 0.01pu which breaches most of when affecting one of the main units in the grid as in this
the countries’ frequency grid code (within 1% deviation). The example.
ramp attack is the most catastrophic one where the system
goes into instability within у3 seconds as illustrated in Figure C. Protection Systems: LCDR, ALSS
4 (a) and (b). This illustrates how a simple FDIA on a single Protection systems have no tolerance to FDIA like control
measurement signal can drag the whole grid into instability. systems as these are very sensitive to any crossing of the
allowable operation settings. While these systems vary
B. Control Systems: AVC widely, two main protection schemes relay upon
Unlike centralized operations and control, local area communication and network systems for the data
control systems relay on the measurements collected locally transmission. These are the Line Current Differential Relay
at the substation to provide the necessary control actions. (LCDR) and the Automatic Load Shedding System (ALSS).
However, they also depend on the reference setpoints LCDR is a protection device that monitors the change
provided by the centralized operations and control between the currents at the terminals of the transmission line.
applications. In this section, the impacts of the FDIA are Any mismatch between the sending end and the receiving end
assessed when applied at the local measurements’ signals. of the line currents shall trigger the relay and open the circuit
The main difference here is the response rate of the system. breakers [18]. ALSS is a protection scheme that disconnects
While centralized operations and control applications have the loads in the system when the frequency of them deviate
response rate of few seconds in average, local area control from the system reference frequency [19]. The effect FDIA
systems are much faster with a response rate averaged at one on these kinds of protection schemes could be disastrous if
second or less. This means that the effects of FDIA on these planned adequately by targeting major lines and loads in the
systems are noted much faster. Automatic Voltage Control system. Figure 6 (a) illustrates busses #6,8,10 voltages in pu
(AVC) is considered here where it is used to maintain the when the LCDR of line 5-6 is triggered due to FDIA in the
generator’s voltage at the reference value by modifying the current measurements at 0.1s. Figure 6 (b) illustrates Busses
field voltage of the machine via the excitation controller [17]. #6,8,10 voltages in pu when the ALSS of load 1 is triggered
In this system, the terminal voltage of generator 1 is supposed due to FDIA in the frequency measurements at 0.1s. Since
to be maintained at 1.03pu. In the normal operating condition, these trips disconnect major balancing unit and load, the
when the loading of the grid is disturbed at 1s with an increase system is unable to maintain the stable operation and
of 100MW, AVC is triggered to maintain the voltage at collapses within 0.3s for LCDR and 0.2s for ALSS as
1.03pu. This is illustrated in Figure 5 as the true response in illustrated in the Figure 6.
the machine voltage in (a) and in the machine power in (b).
To illustrate the impact of the FDIA on the operation of the D. Economic and Market Operations: LMP
AVC, the same three FDIA are considered. While the One of the main concerns of FDIA is its impact on the
machine voltage for the 10% step attack and the 10% 1Hz economics and market operation of the power grid. Even
pulses attack might be within the acceptable range (within though the previously discussed impacts are associated with

80

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 38
V. CONCLUSION
36 FDIA from 13:00 to 14:00 Different types of vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts
34
have been analysed in this manuscript including centralized
32
operations and control systems, control systems, protection
30

28
systems, and market operations. A common result of
26
deregulating the grid stability is noted along with serious
Ahead LMP Bus#7 Real-Time LMP Bus#7
24 Ahead LMP Bus#9 Real-Time LMP Bus#9 economic losses. It must be noted that the impacts in this
00:00 05:00 10:00 15:00 20:00 manuscript are merely samples of the different infinite
Time (Hours)
Figure 7. Locational Marginal Pricing at buses 7 and 9 (ahead and real-time) possibilities of FDIA in smart grid. This shall trigger the
alarm to researching innovative detection techniques to
economic losses for sure, yet they are not planned for pure overcome these different threats.
economic purposes. The truth is that the majority of FDIA are
being applied for economic agenda as money matters the REFERENCES
most. In deregulated electrical energy markets, nodal pricing
(also known as the Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP)) of [1] S. Toppa, “The National Power Grid Is Under Almost Continuous
the electric energy in the grid is determined by the Regional Attack, Report Says,” Time.com, 25 March 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://bit.ly/1FH246I. [Accessed 29 March 2019].
Transmission Organizations (RTO) such the Independent
[2] J. Condliffe, “Ukraine's Power Grid Gets Hacked Again, a Worrying
System Operators (ISO) New England in UK, and the
Sign for Infrastructure Attacks,” MIT Technology Review, 2016.
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) in Australia.
[3] “Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity,” National Institute of
LMP at a node in the network is the marginal cost to the RTO Standards and Technology, 2014.
of delivering an additional unit of energy to that node. LMP- [4] C.-C. Suna, A. Hahna and C.-C. Liu, “Cyber security of a power grid:
based electricity trading involves two main steps: 1) State-of-the-art,” International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy
finalizing of the bidding and the financial settlement based on Systems, vol. 99, pp. 45-56, 2018.
the forecasted LMP, and 2) real time LMP based trading. The [5] Z. ElMrabet, N. Kaabouch, H. ElGhazi and H. ElGhazi, “Cyber-
revenue resulted from this trading is calculated as security in smart grid: Survey and challenges,” Computers &
Electrical Engineering, vol. 67, pp. 469-482, 2018.
ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬ሺ̈́ሻ ൌ ‫ܲܯܮ‬ሺ̈́Ȁ‫݄ܹܯ‬ሻ ‫ݕ݃ݎ݁݊ܧ כ‬ሺ‫݄ܹܯ‬ሻ. While the
[6] A. S. Musleh, G. Chen and Z. Y. Dong, “A Survey on the Detection
forecasted and real-time supplies and demands are closely
Algorithms for False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids,” IEEE
equal, still some variations do exist (especially with Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 2218 - 2234, 2020.
renewable energy resources). However, these small [7] M. Faheem, S. B. H. Shah, R. A. Butt, B. Raza, M. Anwar, M. Ashraf,
variations mean lots of profits/losses for the wholesale M. Njadi and V. C. Gungor, “Smart grid communication and
retailers. While the market operations are performed via the information technologies in the perspective of Industry 4.0:
Market Management System (MMS), all the supporting grid Opportunities and challenges,” Computer Science Review, vol. 30, pp.
1-30, 2018.
measurements are being supplied via the Energy
[8] “Core IEC Standards for Smart Grids,” International Electrotechnical
Management System (EMS). FDIA applied on the power Commission (IEC), 2019. [Online]. Available:
flow data supplied to the MMS represents a real threat [20]. https://www.iec.ch/smartgrid/standards/. [Accessed 3 June 2019].
The main reasons for the LMP differences in the grid are [9] “IEEE 1888.4-2016 - IEEE Standard for Green Smart Home and
the transmission congestion and the generation cost between Residential Quarter Control Network Protocol,” IEEE Standards
and at the different nodes. Thus, with no transmission Association, 16 June 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1888_4-2016.html. [Accessed 3
congestion and generation cost differences, LMP shall be the June 2019].
same at all the nodes in the grid. In Figure 7, it is assumed
[10] “IEC 60870-5:2018 SER,” International Electrotechnical
that the ahead bidding of LMP at buses 7 and 9 are 30$/MWh Commission, 20 February 2018. [Online]. Available:
and 33$/MWh, respectively during the peak period. This https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/3755. [Accessed 2 June 2019].
change is assumed to be from the energy transmitted from [11] “C37.118.2-2011 - IEEE Standard for Synchrophasor Data Transfer
area 1 to area 2. Under normal conditions, the real time LMP for Power Systems,” IEEE Standards Association, 2011.
would be the same or very close to the forecasted LMP. FDIA [12] “IEEE 802.15.4g-2012 - IEEE Standard for Smart Metering Utility
on the power flow measurements used for the real time LMP Networks,” IEEE Standards Association , 29 March 2012. [Online].
Available: https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_15_4g-2012.html.
resulting in increasing the LMP price at bus 9 to be slightly [Accessed 3 June 2019].
above 36$/MWh from 13:00 to 14:00. Thus, the attacker buys [13] “IEC 62746-10-1:2018,” International Electrotechnical Commission,
with the forecasted LMP price of 33$/MWh to sell later with 19 November 2018. [Online]. Available:
the real time LMP price of 36$/MWh. Given a bidding https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/26267. [Accessed 3 June 2019].
interval of 1 hour with a total energy demand of 2000MWh [14] “IEEE Standards Activities in the Smart Grid Space (ICT,” IEEE
during this period, this FDIA results in a total economic loss Standards Association, 2018.
of $6,000 in a single hour. The same scenario is applicable [15] “P2900 - Standard for Smart Home Security: Overview and
Architecture,” IEEE Standards Association, 15 June 2017. [Online].
when ahead LMP is manipulated to reduce the price when the
Available: https://standards.ieee.org/project/2900.html. [Accessed 2
attacker is buying or increase it when the attacker is selling. June 2019].

81

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
 [16] C. Konstantinou and M. Maniatakos, “Hardware-Layer Intelligence
Collection for Smart Grid Embedded Systems,” Journal of Hardware
and Systems Security, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 132–146, 2019.
[17] P. Kundur, Power system stability and control, McGraw-hill, 1994.
[18] H. Miller, J. Burger, N. Fischer and B. Kasztenny, “Modern line
current differential protection solutions,” in 63rd Annual Conference
for Protective Relay Engineers, 2010.
[19] A. Derviškadiü, Y. Zuo, G. Frigo and M. Paolone, “Under Frequency
Load Shedding based on PMU Estimates of Frequency and ROCOF,”
in IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe
(ISGT-Europe), 2018.
[20] G. Liang, S. R. Weller, F. Luo, J. Zhao and Z. Y. Dong, “Generalized
FDIA-Based Cyber Topology Attack With Application to the
Australian Electricity Market Trading Mechanism,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 3820 - 3829, 2018.
[21] A. S. Musleh, A. Al-Durra and M. A. Khousa, “Measurement and
Sensing Devices for Smart Grid,” in Communication, Control and
Security Challenges for the Smart Grid, IET, 2017, pp. 93-126.
[22] “NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability
Standards, Release 3.0,” National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2014.
[23] M. Paparo, “Roadmap for Standards and Grid Cyber Security,”
Energy Networks Australia, 2018.

82

Authorized licensed use limited to: University of New South Wales. Downloaded on June 05,2024 at 05:10:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.