AL Notes 4th Sem
AL Notes 4th Sem
Constitution of India
The constitution of India is the supreme governing body. We observe that there are various
areas such as the fundamental rights, writs, directive principles of state policy, executive,
legislative and judiciary, position of members of union public commission, tribunals etc.,
which form the basis of rule-making.
Acts and Statutes
We see that there are various laws such as Companies Law, Contracts Act, Administrative
Tribunal Act, Ombudsman Act, Lokpal and Lokayukta Act which acts as a source of
legislation.
Ordinances
When the parliament is not in session, the executive branch under Article 123 and 213 is
given the permission to make the ordinances.
Rules
It is defined under the General Clause Act, 1897. It is the rule made in exercise of power
conferred by any enactment. It may be applicable to a particular individual or general public.
Regulations and circulars
It signifies the decisions, orders and Acts of the government are made known to public. In the
sphere of the administrative rule making, it means or it is related to the situation where power
is given to fix the date for the enforcement of an Act. This can also be related to the
exemptions from the rate fixing and prices.
Orders
It covers various types of legislative and quasi-judicial decisions. It may be specific or
general. Specific orders refer to the administrative actions. General administrative rule
making forms a part of such rule making source.
Directions
It is an expression of the administrative rule making under the authority of law or the rule
made thereunder. These may be mandatory or recommendatory.
By-Laws
Rules made by semi-governmental authorities established under the Acts of the legislature.
Schemes and Notifications
It refers to the situation where the law authorizes the administrative agencies to lay down a
framework within which the detailed administrative action is to proceed.
Judicial Decisions
The landmark judgements such as Puttaswamy case related to privacy, Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India related to right to travel abroad, Vishakha vs State of Rajasthan related to the
prevention of sexual harassment of women at workplace, MC Mehta vs Union of
India related to the control of the environmental pollution, PUCL vs UOI related to the rights
of workers who are working in mines form the basis of the establishment of the ‘tests’ which
may be used to clarify the scope of the provisions of the law and its interpretation. This
includes the ‘Right to Food’ as well.
According to Holland, constitutional law describes Administrative Law describes various organs
various organs at rest. of the government in motion.
Constitutional law deals with general principles related Administrative law deals with functions,
to the organs and organisation and powers of various organisation, powers, and duties of the
organs. administrative authorities.
1.2 Rule of law: origin, role of Indian judiciary, modern concept of rule of
law.
The British people strongly believed in the Divine Theory of State. The king was given the
power to govern the people by the Divine Authority (God). This theory propagates that,
“King can do no wrong, king is above law”. Parliamentary Democracy based on the principle
of equality rooted in Britain. All persons are governed by the same law and same set of rules
and regulations is called the Rule of Law.
The Rule of Law was first originated by Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice in England at the
time of King James I. Coke was the first person to criticise the maxims of Divine Concept.
He strongly believed that the King should also be under the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law
doctrine was later developed by A.V. Dicey in his book, “Introduction to the Law of
Constitution (1885The term Rule of Law thus, means the paramountcy of Law over
Government. The derivation of the phrase ‘ Rule of Law’ is from the French phrase ‘la
principe de legalite’ which implies principle of legality. By this phrase it refers to a
government based on principles of law and not of men. ).” The Rule of Law according to
Dicey means that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods
except for distinct breach of law and no man is above the law.
2. Supremacy of law :
The Rule of Law rejects all kinds of arbitrary and discretionary powers of the government or
public officials. It implies that a man may be punished for a breach of law but he can’t be
punished for anything else. An alleged offence is required to be proved before the ordinary
courts in accordance with the legal procedure.
Background
In 1975, National Emergency under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution was imposed by
President Fakruddin Ali, on the advice of the then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, on the
ground of internal disturbances. Fundamental Rights under Article 14, 20 and 22 of the
Constitution were suspended for the period of Emergency, by a Presidential Order under
Article 359(1). Scores of political leaders who could prove to be a political threat were
arrested without any trial. Many petitions were filed in various High Courts across the
country, which gave judgements in favour of the petitioners. The Central Government
approached the Supreme Court, which became this very case.
This case is also known as the Habeas Corpus case, as the said writ was asked in the form of
relief by the petitioners. The term literally means “to produce the body” and the writ orders
the directs law enforcement agencies to present an arrested person in front of the Court and
explain the reason behind their detention.
Judgement
The judgement was passed with the majority of 4:1. The Court held that no person can move
the High Court asking for any writ to enforce any fundamental right detained under MISA, as
a claim to the writ of Habeas corpus is an enforcement of Right to Life and Personal Liberty
under Article 21 which is barred by the Presidential Order.
The majority agreed with all the contentions made by the appellants. To justify the
suspension of Fundamental Rights the Court said, “In period of public danger or
apprehension the protective law which gives every man security and confidence in times of
tranquility has to give way to interests of the State.” It was also stated that “Liberty is itself
the gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited or abridged,” when the question about the
status of Article 21 was raised.
Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Raj Narain case (1975)
Facts Of The Case
In this case, an appeal was filed by the appellant against the decision of the Allahabad
High Court invalidating Smt. Indira Gandhi’s election on the ground of corrupt
practices. In the meantime, the Parliament passed the 39th Constitutional
Amendment, which introduced and added a new Article 392A to the Constitution of
India.
It was stated by this Article 392A that the election of the Prime Minister and the
Speaker cannot be challenged in any court n the country. It can be rather challenged
before a committee formed by the Parliament itself.
Although the Supreme Court validated the election of Indira Gandhi but declared the
39th Amendment to be unconstitutional as it violated the basic structure of the
constitution.
The 39th Amendment was made to validate with retrospective effect the election of
the then Prime Minister which was set aside by the Allahabad High Court.
Judgement
The clause of struck down by the Court on the ground that it violated free and fair
elections which was an essential feature that formed the Basic Structure of the Indian
Constitution. The exclusion of judicial review in election disputes in this manner
resulted in damaging the Basic Structure.
The Supreme Court held clause (4) of the Constitution 39th Amendment Act, 1975 as
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it was outright denial of the Right to
Equality enshrined in Article 14, It was held by the Court that these provision were
arbitrary and were calculated to damaged and destroy the Rule of Law.
Justice H.R. Khanna held, that the democracy is the Basic Structure of the
Constitution and it includes free and fair election which cannot be violated.
NHRC V. State of Arunachal Pradesh
Facts
A large number of Chakmas were displaced from erstwhile East Pakistan (Now
Bangladesh) by the Kaptai Hydel Power Project in 1964 and took shelter in Assam
and Tripura, most of them becoming citizens of India in due course of time. At the
request of the State Government, about 4,012 Chakmas were settled in parts of NEFA
(North-East Frontier Agency – now Arunachal Pradesh) with some land that had been
allotted to them in consultation with local tries. The relation between the citizens of
Arunachal Pradesh and Chakmas had deteriorated to such extents that there had been
complaints regarding attempts of forceful expulsion of the latter.
On September 9, 1994, the People’s Union for Civil Rights issued letters to the Chief
Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh, and the Home Secretary, Government of India bringing
the attention of the National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter mentioned as
NHRC) to the issue.
Issues Involved:
Whether ousting of a migrant tribe such as the Chakma violates Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
Whether the procedure followed for the registration and conferring of citizenship was
done by the book.
Judgement:
The petition was allowed, and the first and second respondents were directed by the Court, by
way of a writ of mandamus, as under-
The first respondent, the State of Arunachal Pradesh, shall ensure that the life and personal
liberty of each and every Chakma residing within the State shall be protected and any attempt
to forcibly evict or drive them out of the State by organised groups, such as the AAPSU, shall
be repelled, if necessary by requisitioning the service of para-military or police force, and if
additional forces are considered necessary to carry out this direction, the first respondent will
request the second respondent, the Union of India, to provide such additional force, and the
second respondent shall provide such additional force as is necessary to protect the lives and
liberty of the Chakmas. Except in accordance with law, the Chakmas shall not be evicted
from their homes and shall not be denied domestic life and comfort therein.
The application made for registration as citizen of India by the Chakma or Chakmas under
Section 5 of the Act, shall be entered in the register maintained for the purpose and shall be
forwarded by the Collector or the DC who receives them under the relevant rule, with or
without enquiry, as the case may be, to the Central Government for its consideration in
accordance with law; even returned applications shall be called back or fresh ones shall be
processed and forwarded to the Central Government for consideration.
While any application made for the registration as a citizen of India by the Chakmas under
Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, maybe pending consideration, the concerned person
or people shall not be evicted or be removed from their occupation by the first respondent,
State of Arunachal Pradesh, on the grounds that they are not the citizen of India until the
competent authority makes such decision.
Asif Hameed and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. (1989)
In this case, the Supreme Court opined that when any action of the state is challenged, the
court’s role is to assess the action in light of the law and determine whether the executive or
the legislature has operated within the limits set by the Constitution; if not, the court must
overturn the action. The court must do so while remaining within its self-imposed boundaries.
The court renders a decision based on the actions of a government branch. The court is not an
appellate authority when it exercises judicial review of administrative action. The
Constitution forbids the court from directing or advising the executive on policy concerns, or
from preaching on any issue that falls within the domain of the legislative or executive, as
long as these organs do not exceed their constitutional or statutory authority.
They shall be removed from their office only by an order made by the President on the
ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after an enquiry made by a judge of the
Supreme Court. They shall have the right to be informed of the charges against them and
shall be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Central Government may make rules
to regulate the procedure for the investigation of the charges against them.
Jurisdiction of Central Tribunal
Section 14 states that the Central Tribunal from the day of the appointment shall exercise all
the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to the following matters which were within
the jurisdiction of other courts (except the Supreme Court) before the enactment of this Act:
1. Recruitment of any civil service of Union or All India service or civil post under the
Union or civilian employees of defence services;
2. All service matters of the above-mentioned employees, and also of employees of any
local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India or any corporation or society owned or controlled by the
Government;
3. All service matters of such persons whose services have been placed by the State
Government or any local or other authority or any corporation at the disposal of the
Central Government.
A Court of law is a part of the traditional The administrative tribunal is an agency created by
judicial system. a statue endowed with judicial powers.
A Court of law is vested with general It deals with service matters and is vested with
jurisdiction over all the matters. limited jurisdiction to decide a particular issue.
It is strictly bound by all the rules of It is not bound by the rules of the Evidence Act
evidence and by the procedure of the Code and the CPC unless the statute which creates the
of Civil Procedure. tribunal imposes such an obligation.
It is presided over by an officer expert in the It is not mandatory in every case that the members
law. need to be trained and experts in law.
The decision of the court is objective in The decision is subjective i.e. at times it may
nature primarily based on the evidence and decide the matters taking into account the policy
materials produced before the court. and expediency.
It can decide the validity of legislation. It cannot decide the validity of legislation.
Judgment
The judgment was delivered by the Constitution Bench of seven judges. The bench observed
that the judicial review is the most essential and basic structure of the Indian Constitution
similarly the jurisdiction conferred under the Article 32 on the Supreme Court and under the
Article 226 and 227 on the High Court is also a part of basic structure which cannot be
amended and altered as the decision given by the bench in the Kesavananda Bharati case. It
is also said that for securing the independence of the judiciary, the superior courts have been
given the power of judicial review. Though the Indian Parliament has the power and right to
amend the Constitution it cannot amend the basic structure of the Constitution. It was held
that Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 excludes the power of judicial
review of all the High Courts and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other Acts and
legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323A and 323B would be ultra vires of the
Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court as well as on the High Courts
is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution, thus, Clause 2(d) and Clause 3(d)
of Articles 323A and 323B of the Indian Constitution to the extent that they exclude the
jurisdiction of the high courts are unconstitutional. It was also held that there will be no
Constitution prohibition against the Tribunals in performing a supplemental role, they will
not be considered as the substitutes of the High Courts or the Supreme Courts.
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India
Facts of the case
The President of India on 4th April 2021 promulgated an Ordinance, on the recommendations
of the Central Government, while exercising its powers under Article 123 of the Indian
Constitution because, even though the bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha in Budget Session,
2021, no debate and discussion could follow the same and hence the said law was introduced
as an ordinance.g
The Ordinance titled, the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service)
Ordinance, 2021, which per se, called for amendments in as many as nine statutes- The
Copyright Act, 1957; The Airports Authority of India Act, 1994; The Trade Marks Act,
1999; The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration & Protection Act), 1999; The
Patents Act, 1970; The Control of National Highways (Land & Traffic Act, 2002; to replace
the existing tribunals with High Courts, established under each of these statutes, citing poor
adjudication of disputes coupled with delay in dispensing justice; along with questioning the
‘judicial independence’ of such tribunals, claimed to be working under the influence of the
executive by many Advocate Bar Associations since quite long.
The President of India on 4th April 2021 promulgated an Ordinance, on the recommendations
of the Central Government, while exercising its powers under Article 123 of the Indian
Constitution because, even though the bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha in Budget Session,
2021, no debate and discussion could follow the same and hence the said law was introduced
as an ordinance. Moreover, it amended the provisions of the Finance Act, 2017 in order to
make the Central Government responsible for making rules regarding the appointments,
salaries, tenures of the members of tribunals, and their appointment shall be made by a
Search-Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice of India or any Supreme Court
Judge nominated by him. Sections 184 and 186 of the Finance Act were amended by Sections
12 and 13 of the Ordinance, respectively, limiting the maximum age of appointment of a
chairman or a member of any tribunal to 50 years, i.e., no person over the age of 50 years is
eligible for appointment to the tribunals for any position. It also fixed the members’ term at
four years or the attainment of 70 years for the Chairperson and 67 years for any other
member, whichever is earlier, and limiting their salaries.
Hence, the Madras Bar Association approached the Supreme Court in order to declare the
Sections 12 and 13 of the Ordinance ultra vires Articles 14, 21, 50 of the Indian Constitution
and the Principles of Judicial Independence and Separation of Powers, which happen to be
integral to the basic structures of the Indian Constitution.
Findings of the court
A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising of Justices L Nageswara Rao, S
Ravindra Bhat, and Hemant Gupta, on 14th July 2021 struck certain provisions of the
Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021
unconstitutional, which fixed the term of the members of the Tribunals to 4 years, by a 2:1
majority.
Justices L Nageswara Rao and S Ravindra Bhat, in their majority judgment, opined that this
specific clause in the Ordinance violated the past directions of the Supreme Court wherein the
terms of all such chairmen and members of Tribunals was fixed to be five years. In his
dissenting judgment, Justice Hemant Gupta was of the opinion that laws could not be struck
down merely because they are not in accordance with the precedents of the Apex Court.
With regard to the appointments made by the Search-Selection Committee, the Apex Court
issued a direction mandating that all such appointments must be made within three months of
receiving the recommendation, instead of the earlier discretionary provision, with only one
name to be suggested for every post, instead of two.
MODULE 2
Since Congress was itself a delegate, how can it delegate its power. The framers of the
American Constitution were imbued with the political theories propagated by John Locke and
Montesquieu. John Locke has said: "The legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws
to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it
cannot pass it over to others."
According to Locke "the legislature neither must, nor can, transfer the power of making laws
to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have. "Montesquieu had
developed this doctrine of separation of powers.
The framers of the American Constitution adopted the doctrine in its full force as seen in the
provisions of the US Constitution: Art. 1, section 1. All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in the Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.
Art. 2, section 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.
Art. 3, section 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress many, from time to time, ordain and
establish.
Alongside this doctrine of separation of powers the American constitutional law had negated
doctrine of separation of powers.
The second and weightiest part is made by the King in Parliament and consists of what we
call Acts of Parliament. The third and bulkiest part is made by such persons or bodies as the
King in Parliament entrusts with legislative power." As observed by Sir Cecil Carr, "the truth
is that if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be
unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which modern public opinion requires." In
England, the practice of delegating legislative power has certainly been facilitated by the
close fusion of the legislative and executive power resulting from the development the
cabinet system of government in England.
Position in India
Pre Independence: In Queen v. Burah, only Conditional Legislation has been validated by
the Privy Council and therefore delegated legislation is not permitted as per its reasoning.
The administration of civil and criminal justice of a territory can be vested in the hands of
those officers who were appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor from time to time.
The Privy Council has stated that it is better to take help from the subordinate agency in
framing the rules and regulations that are going to be the part of the law and giving another
body the essential legislative features that has only given to the Legislature through the
Constitution. He also stated about the essential legislative function that included in
determining the legislation policy.
In King v. Benori Lal Sharma, Condition legislative was again applied by the Privy Council,
the same as in the case of Queen v. Burah. In this case the validity of the Emergency
Ordinance given by Governor-General of India was challenged inter alia. It was challenged
on the ground that he is taking the power of the Provincial Government. He was setting up
special criminal courts for particular kind of offences but for the settling of any court, power
has been given only to the Provincial Government. The judicial committee held that this is
not delegated legislation. Privy Council also held that it is an example of an uncommon
legislative power by which the local application of the provision of State determined by the
local administrative body when it is necessary.
Post independence- he Delhi Laws Act, 1912, giving power to the Government to extend to
Delhi and Ajmer-Marwar with such restrictions and modifications as it thought fit any law in
force in any other part of India, was held intra vires-As regards constitution of the delegation
of legislative powers the Indian Legislature cannot be in the same position as the prominent
British Parliament and how far delegation is permissible has got to be ascertained in India as
a matter of construction from the express provisions of the Indian Constitution. It cannot be
said that an unlimited right of delegation is inherent in the legislature power itself. This is not
warranted by the provisions of the Constitution and the legitimacy of delegation depends
entirely upon its being used as an ancillary measure which the legislature considers to be
necessary for the purpose of exercising its legislative powers effectively and completely. The
legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions which consist in
declaring the legislative policy and laying down the standard which is to be enacted into a
rule of law, and what can be delegated in the task of subordinate legislation which by its very
nature is ancillary to the statute which delegates the power to make it. Provided the legislative
policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard laid down the courts cannot and
should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in
determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.
2.3 parliamentary control and procedural control of Delegated legislation
The underlying object of parliamentary control is to keep watch over the rule-making: -
authorities and also to provide an opportunity to criticize them if there is abuse of power on
their part. Parliament has control in that the enabling or parent Act passed by Parliament sets
out the framework or parameters within which delegated legislation is made. In India, the
question of control on rule-making power engaged the attention of the Parliament.
Every delegate is subject to the authority and control of the principal and the exercise of
delegated power can always be directed, corrected or cancelled by the principal. Hence
parliamentary control over delegated legislation should be a living continuity as a
constitutional remedy. The fact is that due to the broad delegation of legislative powers and
the generalised standard of control also being broad, judicial control has shrunk, raising the
desirability and the necessity of parliamentary control.
In a parliamentary democracy it is the function of the legislature to legislate. If it seeks to
delegate its legislative power to the executive because of some reasons, it is not only the right
of the Legislature, but also its obligation, as principal, to see how its agent i.e. the Executive
carries out the agency entrusted to it. Since it is the legislature which grants legislative power
to the administration, it is primarily its responsibility to ensure the proper exercise of
delegated legislative power, to supervise and control the actual exercise of this power, and
ensure the danger of its objectionable, abusive and unwarranted use by the administration.
In U.S.A., the control of the Congress over delegated legislation is highly limited because
neither is the technique of “laying” extensively used nor is there any Congressional
Committee to scrutinise it. This is due to the constitutional structurization in that country in
which it is considered only the duty of courts to review the legality of administrative rule-
making.
Non-application of Mind:
Delegated legislation can also be struck down by the judiciary if it is observed that the
delegatee has not made an application of their mind in delegating the powers to the relevant
facts and situations while taking the decisions.
Judgment: K.N. Wanchu, Justice of the Supreme Court at that time, dealing with the power
of delegated legislation under Article 312 of the Indian Constitution. As the case has been
very serious the appellant can be removed or compulsorily dismissed from the post by the
Central Government and therefore Central Government has instituted enquiry against him.
There is nothing mentioned in Article 312 of the Indian Constitution that takes away the
power of delegation.
Sikkim v. Surendra Sharma(op)
Facts: After Sikkim became the State of the Union of India, the Directorate of Survey and
Settlement of Government of Sikkim created and advertised for certain temporary posts. Like
other people, the respondent has also applied for the post. They got selected and were
appointed in different capacities. After the survey work got completed some of the employees
got terminated from the job. In 1982, some of the employees, who were �not locals�, filed
a writ petition in the High Court of Sikkim challenging the decision of the Government
asking why it has fired the employees from the service on the ground that they were not
locals.
Judgment: The judge held that the termination of the employees solely on the ground that he
is not local is impermissible under Article 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. It was held
that all rules and legislations created under the power which is granted under sub-clause (k)
of the Article 371F constituted subordinate legislation. This article was added to the
Constitution through the 36th Constitutional Amendment.
Lachmi Narain v. UOI
Facts
In Lachmi Narain v. UOI, the validity of Section 2 of Union Territories (Laws) Act, 1950 and
Section 6 of Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 was to be determined. The issue was that
whether notification issued by Central Government in purported exercise of its powers under
Section 2 ultra vires of Central Government.
Judgement
The Court stated that ‘we are of opinion that the impugned notification, dated December 7,
1957, purporting to substitute the words “such previous notice as it considers reasonable” for
the words “not less than three months’ notice” in Section 6(2) of the Bengal Act, is beyond
the powers of the Central Government, conferred on it by Section 2 of the Union Territories
(Laws) Act, 1951.’ In consequence, the notifications, dated April 1, 1958, September 19,
1959, June 29. 1966 and July 31, 1970, in so far as they withdrew the exemptions from tax in
the case of durries, pure silk, country liquor, Kirana articles, etc. without complying with the
mandatory requirement of not less than three months’ notice enjoined by Section 6(2) of the
Bengal Act, are also invalid and ineffective.
As the result, Court allowed these appeals, set aside the judgment of the appellate bench of
the High Court, and declare the notification dated December 7, 1959, and the subsequent
notifications in so far as they withdrew the exemptions from tax mentioned above, to be
unconstitutional.
MODULE 3
3.1 Meaning, Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, Limits on exercise of
Judicial review.
Meaning of Judicial Review
Judicial Review can be understood as a form of court proceeding, usually in the
Administrative Court where the lawfulness of a decision or action is reviewed by the judge.
Where there is no effective means of challenge, judicial review is available. The concern
behind Judicial Review is that whether the law has been correctly applied with and right
procedures have been followed.
General limitations
Frequent interference by the court has a negative effect on the local public
Repeated court interventions can undermine the confidence of people in the integrity, quality,
and efficiency of the government.
Lack of the capability to overrule administrative decisions
The court lacks the ability to repudiate the decisions taken by the administrative authorities.
If a review of an administrative ruling is authorized, the decision of the court would be
substituted, thus regarded to be a shortcoming due to inadequate knowledge.
Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint
There is quite a discourse on whether there should be a line drawn between judicial activism
and judicial self-restraint.
Doctrine of Strict Necessity
The doctrine of strict necessity states that the court must rule on constitutional matters only if
strict necessity requires it to do so. Thus, constitutional questions will not be determined in a
wider manner than required.
Implied limitations on the exercise of the power of judicial review
Locus Standi
Considering the principle of ‘locus standi’, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can
only be filed by the individual(s) whose fundamental or legal rights have been violated,
however, relaxation has been given by the courts via the formation of the concept of Public
Interest Litigation (PIL). Thus, if a decision which is contemplated to be patently bad is
challenged, the courts ought not to protest in evaluating the act on the grounds of locus
standi.
Res Judicata
As per the principle of res judicata, there should be finality to binding verdicts of the court of
competent jurisdiction and no party should be irked with the same litigation a second time.
Thus, if a petition has been filed in a court that gets dismissed, the same petition cannot be
filed in the same court on the exact foundation.
Unreasonable delay
The remedies granted under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution must be sought within a
reasonable time unless the reason for the delay is persuasive and acceptable. Due to this
limitation, the court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction in matters of parties who have
come to seek justice after a reasonable delay and are guilty of laches.
Regardless, a point must be noted that there is no fixed period for laches, thus, every case will
be decided based on the facts and contentions of the party(ies) to the case.
Issues
By limiting access, or completely refusing access to trade unions to employees, certain
individuals affected were not able to rely on certain employment legislative provisions or be
represented by a Union.
Decision/Outcome
Appeal dismissed; while the decision was justiciable, it was reasonable to prevent British
Intelligence employees from joining trade unions in the interests of national security
Tata Cellular v. Union of India
In Tata Cellular v Union of India, Government of India issued invitations to all the mobile
operators to establish networks in the four metro cities. Evaluation Committee which was
supposed to evaluate the tenders under Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), had
Director General of Telecommunication in it. His son’s tender was selected at the end of the
evaluation process. In this case, Supreme Court rejected the violation of ‘Nemo judex in
causa sua’ as without Director General of Communication no tender can be selected and
evaluation is not possible. There was no choice of substitution and hence the decision was not
liable to be struck down. In this case Supreme Court applied the Doctrine of Necessity
liberally.
Also, it was observed that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of
contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism[1].
The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a
necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or
quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application
of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but
must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.
3.2 & 3.3 Abuse of discretion and Judicial review , grounds of judicial
review.
Discretion in layman's language means choosing from amongst the various available or
provided alternatives without reference to any predetermined criterion, no matter how
fanciful that choice may be. Discretion when qualified by the word, 'administrative has
somewhat different overtones. Discretion in this sense means choosing from amongst the
various available alternatives but with reference to the rules of reason and justice and not
according to personal whims. Such exercise is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal
and reasonable.
According to K.C. Davis, "Discretion implies power to make a choice between alternative
courses of action".
"Discretion" means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the
authorities that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not
according to private opinion according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague
and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, in which an
honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confme himself.
Need of Discretion and its Relationship with Rule of Law
In any intensive form of government, the government cannot function without the exercise of
some discretion by the officials because it is impossible to lay down a rule for every
conceivable eventuality in the complex art of modern government. In modern times, apart
from routine governmental functions relating to welfare of the people under various statutes,
rules, regulations etc., the steady multiplications of all kinds, as well as the increasing
complexity of carrying out such modern government's functions of vast public utilities, viz.,
industries, hospitals, educational institutions and many other social services, or the
administration of government contracts, licences and permits, loans to business, land
acquisition and so on, led to the development of new type of public institutions and
accordingly the range of law enforcement also increased tremendously covering the whole
public and private sector S through the government administration.' But it is equally true that
absolute discretion gives birth to a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any
of the other inventions. Therefore, a reasonable exercise of discretion is need of the hour.
This is because rule of law does not permit unlimited exercise of administrative discretion in
all governmental policy matters or actions. The equality, liberty, property and reputation of
citizens should not be affected by arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or wide discretionary
powers conferred by law on public officials. Rule of law requires that the degree of discretion
should be restricted by law and therefore, judiciary has evolved certain principles for
controlling the exercise of discretionary power. Judicial review of administrative action
ensure restraint of the misuse or abuse of discretion so conferred.
In India, Judicial review of administrative discretion is exercised in the following two ways:
(i) control at the stage of delegation of discretion.
(ii) control at the stage of the exercise of discretion.
Some Instances of Administrative Discretion:
(a) Administrative Discretion and Article 14 of the Constitution.
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws.
If a statute does not disclose a definite policy or the objective, subject to which the
administrative power is to be exercised, then the statute may be held to be discriminatory.
(b) Administrative Discretion and Article 19 of the Constitution.
Article 19(1)(a) to (g) of the Constitution provides to all citizens the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably, to form association, move freely
throughout the territory of India reside and settle in any part of India and to practice and carry
on any trade occupation, business or profession. However, these are not absolute; Articles
19(2) to 19(6) lay down various grounds on which Legislature can impose reasonable
restrictions. Some of the grounds are-restrictions in the interest of security of state, public
order, friendly relationship with foreign state, decency and morality, defamation, contempt of
court etc. Thus, all individual rights are subject to some limitations, however, the restrictions
imposed upon the exercise of fundamental freedoms are subject to judicial review.
(II) Control at the Stage of Exercise of Discretion
The Courts in India have developed various formulations to control the exercise of
administrative discretion which can be grouped under three broad heads:
(a) That the authority has not exercised its discretion properly-"abuse of discretion".
(b) That the authority is deemed not to have exercised its discretion at all-"non application of
mind".
(c) That the authority has not followed "the principles of natural Justice."
Tests
'Proportionality' involves a Balancing test which keeps a check on the excessive or
arbitrary punishments or encroachment upon the rights and Necessity test which takes
into account other less restrictive alternates.
Subsequently, some more rules of natural justice are in the process of development e.g., that
the administrative authority should give reasons for its decisions, particularly when the
decisions affect rights and liabilities of the citizens.
It must, however, be made clear that the rules of natural justice are flexible, and are not a
straitjacket formula. In exceptional cases not only can they be modified but even excluded
altogether. Natural justice is not an unruly horse. If fairness is shown, there can be no
complaint of breach of natural justice.
Facts: Bar Council of Gujarat passed a resolution on 16 November, 1971 referring several
complaints against different advocates including the one against the appellant to the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council The Disciplinary Committee suspended him from
practice for a period of one year. It was appealed before Supreme Court.
Decision: Supreme Court held that in forwarding a case to the Disciplinary Committee, the
Council cannot act mechanically, it must apply its mind to find out whether there is any
reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of misconduct. Only when the Bar
Council has a reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct, a disciplinary
committee is to be entrusted with inquiry against the concerned advocate.
Ranjit Singh v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 461
Facts: The petitioner, Ranjit Singh had been carrying on the business of manufacturing guns
for a number of years. His quota to manufacture guns was reduced from 30 to 10 guns a
month. The justification given was that the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 envisaged a
monopoly of the Central Government for manufacturing arms and ammunitions while
permitting existing manufacturers in the private sector to continue to carry on their business
on a limited scale. This resulted in considerable hardship to the petitioner in view of the
financial liability and the establishment expenses suffered pursuant to installation of the
machinery. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution praying
restoration of the original quota.
Issue: Was the justification given by the Government has any ratio arbitrary when the basis?
Decision: The Court held the order of Government to be bad. Government had not taken into
account relevant considerations in making the order like, production capacity of the factory,
the quality of produced, economic viability of the unit, administrative policy pertaining
contribution to ac maintenance of law and order Court further held that any curtailment of
quota must necessarily proceed on the basis of reason and relevance. Since Government had
le out these relevant considerations, its action is arbitrary. Accordingly, the writ petition is
allowed and Union of India is directed to reconsider th manufacturing quota fixed in the case
of each petitioner after allowing reasonable period of the respective petitioners to set forth
their case o 3(2) and section the merits, with such supporting written material as they may
choose 1946, the Stat place before it.
Facts: The State Transport Authority Madras invited applications for the grant of two stage
carriage permits to run as an express service on the route Madras to Chidambaram. 107
applications were received which were examined by the Authority. Later on the Authority
found that the Provincial Transport (P) Ltd., Madras was the most suitable amongst the
applicants and granted one permit to it. As it found no other applicant suitable, it refused to
grant the second permit to any of them. The appeals were filed before the Tribunal and one of
the appellants Syed Yakub was granted the second permit. The order was challenged before
the High Court at Madras through a writ petition. The Single Judge of High Court who heard
the petition held that the Tribunal in granting second permit had overlooked material
considerations and allowed considerations not germane to the questions which vitiated its
order. This order was challenged by applicant before a Division Bench of the same High
Court, which confirmed the order of learned Single Judge. It is against this order that the
appellant has come before the Apex Court by special leave.
Issue: The question which was to be decided was the limits of jurisdiction of the High Court
in issuing a writ of Certiorari while dealing with orders passed by the appropriate authority.
Observation and Decision: The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court
to issue a writ of Certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not
entitled to act as an appellate Court. The Imitation necessarily means that finding of facts
reached by the Tribunal as a result of appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or
questioned n writ An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected
by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave Certiorari can be issued if it is shown than
in arriving at such a finding, may appear to be. With regard to finding of fact by a Tribunal, a
writ of Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material idence or had
erroneously admitted an inadmissible evidence, which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on 'no evidence', that would be regarded as an error of
law which can be corrected by Certiorari.
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander RaiQ. 3 (AIR 2003 SC 3044)
Facts: What is the impact of the amendment in Section 115 of the C.P.C. brought in by Act
46 of 1999 w.e.f. 01.07.2002, on the power and jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain
petitions seeking a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution or invoking the
power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution as against similar orders, acts
or proceedings of the courts subordinate to the High Courts, against which earlier the remedy
of filing civil revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. was available to the person aggrieved.
Issue: Is an aggrieved person completely deprived of the remedy of judical review, if he has
lost at the hands of the original court and the appellate court though a case of gross failure of
justice having been occasioned?
Observation and Decision: The Supreme Court observed as follows:
(1) The curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court does not take away the
Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari against a civil Court
nor has the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution been taken away or whittled down. The power exists, unhindered by the
amendments in Section 115 CPC, and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self-
discipline and practice which are well settled.
(2) There is broad general difference between the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and
to exercise supervising jurisdiction under Article 227.
Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani (AIR 1989 SC 1607)
Facts and Issue: In this case, the issue was whether the writ of Mandamus can be issued
against any individual or private body?
Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru, a public trust, runs a science college at Ahmedabad. The college
initially had temporary affiliation (under Gujarat University Act 1949) which later from June
15, 1973 onwards became permanently affiliated under the said Act. The teachers of
affiliated college were paid in the pay scale recommended by the U.G.C. There arose a
dispute as to the pay scale, between the Teacher Association and the University and the
dispute was arbitrated by the Chancellor and an award was made. The State Government and
University accepted the award and the University issued the directions to the affiliated
colleges to pay their teachers in terms therein but the appellant instead of implementing the
award served the notice on its teachers of termination of the surplus and approached the
University for permission to remove them. The permission being refused, the Trust decided
to close down the College and the affiliation of the College was surrendered and the College
was closed down. The teachers filed the writ petition before the High Court praying for the
following relief. To issue the writ of Mandamus directing the trust to pay them arrears of
salaries, P.F., gratuity and closure compensation legitimately due to them.The Trust
contended that since it is not a statutory body, it is not subject to writ jurisdiction of the High
Court. The High Court rejected this contention and directed the trust to make payments to the
petitioners. The trust approached the Supreme Court.
Decision: The Supreme Court observed that in the present case, there is no plea for specific
performance of the contractual service. The respondent employees are not asking for
Mandamus to put them back into the college. They were claiming only the terminal benefits
and arrears. The issue is whether the Trust can be enforced to pay by a writ of Mandamus?
If the rights are purely of a private character, no Mandamus can be issued. If the management
of the college is a private body with no public duty, Mandamus will not lie. These are the two
exceptions to Mandamus. But if these are absent and the party has no other equally
convenient remedy Mandamus cannot be denied. The appellant trust was managing the
affiliated college to which public money was paid as government aid. Public money paid as
the government aid plays a major role in control, maintenance and working of educational
institutions. The aided institutions like government institutions discharge 'public function' by
imparting education to students. They are subject to rules and regulations of the affiliating
university. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is of public character. There is a legal
right-duty relationship between the staff and the management and thus Mandamus can't be
refused.
The true principle of promissory estoppel is where one party has by his words or conduct
made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations
or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted
upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the
other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled
to go back upon it. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel that the promisee acting in reliance of the promise, should suffer any
detriment. The only thing necessary is that the promisee should have altered his position in
reliance of the promise.
Evolution of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
Promissory estoppel is a relatively new development. In order to trace the evolution of the
doctrine in England, we need to refer to some of the English decisions. The early cases did
not speak of this doctrine as estoppel. They spoke of it as 'raising equity'. Lord Cairns stated
the doctrine in its earliest form in the following words in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway
Company, [1877] 2 A.C. 43
In India, there are two stages in the evolution of the application of this doctrine; pre-Anglo
Afghan case and post- Anglo Afghan case. Prior to this case, the position was that promissory
estoppel did not apply against the Government. But the position altered with this case. In
Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies , the Government of India announced certain
concessions with regard to the import of certain raw materials in order to encourage export of
woolen garments to Afghanistan. Subsequently, only partial concessions and not full
concessions were extended as announced. The Supreme Court held that the Government was
estopped by its promise. Thereafter the courts have applied the doctrine of promissory
estoppel even against the Government.
Essential characteristics to make promise binding on Government
The following are the essentials to make any promise binding on the Government:
1. The State makes the promise within the ambit of law.
2. There is an intention to enter into a legal relationship.
3. The other party must do an act in furtherance of that promise or is forbidden to do
anything.
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
MEANING
Legitimate Expectation means that a person may have a reasonable expectation of being
treated in a certain way by administrative authorities owing to some consistent practice in the
past or an express promise made by the concerned authority. According to this doctrine, a
public authority can be made accountable in lieu of a legitimate expectation. Thus, the
doctrine of Legitimate Expectation pertains to the relationship between an individual and a
public authority.
"What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a
benefit, relief or remedy that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The
term 'established practice' refers to a regular, consistent predictable and certain conduct,
process or activity of the decision-making authority. The expectation should be legitimate,
that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or
random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation.
Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It is a concept fashioned by courts, for judicial
review of administrative action. It is procedural in character based on the requirement of a
higher degree of fairness in administrative action, as a consequence of the promise made, or
practice established. In short, a person can be said to have a 'legitimate expectation' of a
particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an authority, either expressly
or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of the authority gives room for such
expectation in the normal course."1
Therefore, it can be said that this doctrine is a form of a check on the administrative
authority. When a representation has been made, the doctrine of legitimate expectation
imposes, in essence, a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all
relevant factors relating to such legitimate expectation.2 It also adds a duty on the public
authority not to act in a way to defeat the legitimate expectation without having some reason
of public policy to justify its doing so.3
WHO CAN INVOKE THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION?
The doctrine of legitimate expectation, based on established practice, can be invoked only by
someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an authority, on which such
established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a recognized legal relationship
with the authority.4 A total stranger unconnected with the authority or a person who had no
previous dealings with the authority and who has not entered into any transaction or
negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely
on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly.5
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION MAY ARISE:
a. if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or
b. because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably
expect to continue;
c. such an expectation must be reasonable.6
Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair
decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate
in the context is a question of fact in each case.7 Whenever the question arises, it is to be
determined not according to the claimant's perception but in the larger public interest wherein
other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the
legitimate expectation of the claimant.8 A bona fide decision of the public authority reached
in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial
scrutiny.9
EXPECTATION DOES NOT MEAN
The expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a
hope nor does it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and
sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to
be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assert-able expectation and a mere
disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral
obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation.10
Therefore, legitimacy of an expectation can only be inferred if it is based on the sanction of
law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural system.
JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
This doctrine first found its mention in the case of State of Kerala vs. Madhavan Pillai. 11 In
this case the government had issued a sanction to the respondents to open a new aided school
and to upgrade the existing ones. However, after 15 days, a direction was issued to keep the
sanction in abeyance. This action was challenged on the ground that the same violated the
principles of natural justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sanction order created
legitimate expectations in the respondents which was violated by the second order as the
same was without following the principles of natural justice which is sufficient to vitiate the
administrative order.
This doctrine was applied in another case12 where the government had issued a notification
notifying the areas where slum scheme would be introduced. However, the notification was
subsequently amended, and some areas earlier included were left out. The court held that
when a notification is made rescinding the earlier notifications without hearing the affected
parties, it is clear violation of the principle of natural justice.13 The earlier notification had
raised legitimate expectation in the people living in an area which has been subsequently left
out and hence legitimate expectation cannot be denied without a fair hearing.
In GNCT of Delhi v. Naresh Kumar14, the Delhi High Court summarized the legal position
with regard to legitimate expectation as follows:
Firstly, mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen may not by itself be a
distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weightage to it may
render the decision arbitrary.
Secondly, legitimate expectation may arise if (a) there is an express promise given by
a public authority; or (b) because of acceptance of a regular practice, a claimant can
reasonably expect it to continue; and (c) such expectation may be reasonable.
Thirdly, for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of administrative authority
must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which he had in
the past been permitted, by the decision maker, to enjoy and which he can legitimately
expect to be permitted to continue, until some rational grounds for withdrawing it
have been communicated to him.
Fourthly, if the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation, it
should afford him an opportunity to make a representation in the matter.
Fifthly, the doctrine of legitimate expectation permits the court to find out if the
change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation, is
irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made.
In the case of Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.15,
wherein a new criterion of allotment was given by the memorandum impugned therein, prior
to which priority in the matter of allotment to Group Housing Societies had all along been
made with reference to the date of registration. The court held that since prior to the new
guidelines contained in the memorandum of January 20, 1990, the principle of allotment had
always been on the basis of date of registration and not the date of approval of the list of
members, the Group Housing Societies were entitled to legitimate expectation of following
consistent past practice in the matter of allotment, even though they may not have any legal
right in private law to receive such treatment.
TYPES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
Legitimate expectation that a person may have is broadly classified into two categories,
namely:
1. Procedural Legitimate Expectation- This type of legitimate expectation shows the
existence of some previous right which the claimant claims to possess as a result of an
express promise or action by the public body which has generated the expectation. Where an
individual has procedural protection like right to fair hearing or consultation before any
decision is made affecting that individual then only the court will provide with procedural
protection. Fairness means that the expectation of hearing or other procedural protection be
fulfilled. Where the individual has an expectation of a benefit of substantive nature will be
granted or if it is already granted and is received by the applicant and will be continued, then
fairness dictates that expectation of the benefit should give the claimant entitlement to argue
for its fulfilment. In cases like this the decision making authority just merely has to hear what
the individual expects to be continued and need not give substantive benefit. There have been
many questions raised whether a legitimate expectation can give rise to substantives
protection? In India mostly procedural legitimate expectation would generally mean an
individual has a right to certain procedure and right to fair hearing as per the principles of
natural justice.
2. Substantive Legitimate Expectation- This type of legitimate expectation concerns around
the applicant seeking a picky benefit or product. The claim to such benefit will be founded on
the governmental action which has raised the existence of the relevant expectation. Some
legal academicians believe that this type of legitimate expectation will build trust and reliance
of the citizens in the actions of the government so far as the principle of equality is involved
and also that the government will uphold the rule of law. Mere following of the promised
procedure is enough for protecting the procedural expectation, while substantive expectations
are, protected procedurally, e.g., by giving an opportunity to the person who is going to be
affected to make a representation before such expectation is ruined.