Self-Strengthening Movement | SSM

The Self-Strengthening Movement was a 19th-century push to modernise China, particularly in the fields
of industry and defence. Foreign imperialism in China, its defeat in the Second Opium War (1860), the
humiliating Treaty of Tientsin and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) all exposed the dynasty’s military
and technological backwardness, particularly in comparison to European nations. These disasters
triggered the rise of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The advocates of Self-Strengthening were not
republican radicals or social reformers. They hoped to strengthen the nation by preserving Qing rule and
maintaining traditional Confucian values while embracing Western military and industrial practices. As
one writer explained, it was necessary to “learn barbarian [Western] methods to combat barbarian
threats”. To acquire this knowledge China had to actively engage with Western nations, examine
their trade and technology, encourage the study of Western languages and develop a diplomatic service
to connect with foreign governments.

Historical Context

The last Chinese Imperial Dynasty of the Qing ruled from the mid-17th century to the early 20th century.
Issues traditionally central around Chinese society, such as overpopulation, famine, bureaucratic
corruption and inefficiency, took a greater toll on the Qing State and the Chinese nation than ever
before. This, coupled with ethnic dissent between the ruling Manchus and the indigenous Han Chinese,
would further intensify China’s societal issues in a way never seen before. Furthermore, popular
sentiment against foreign aggression also expressed itself in the Boxer Rebellion, signifying
anti-imperialist and anti-western feelings. The staunchly conservative Qing court did not help China’s
woes: as foreign imperialist powers began to encroach on Chinese territory with their own interests in
mind, China found its aging technologies and society unable to cope with this pressure. Thus, Qing China
reflected a development of new socio-economic and ethnic tensions to a level never seen before.

China had previously boasted of a self-sufficient economic system that featured strong stability, which
laid solid economic foundation for the “seclusion policy”. In order for the protection of self-sufficient
economy as well as national defence, the Qing rulers implemented the policy which limited foreign
contact.

Deeply influenced by the Confucian value system, the Chinese traditionally believed in a square flat earth
in which China was Chung Kuo or the Middle Kingdom, the area on the earth upon which the shadow of
the sun fell. As a consequence of this, it was the area of the greatest glory, power and culture. The
regions surrounding it would constitute its dependencies and further, the other corners of the earth
would be inhabited by the Yi or “barbarians” (a term hotly debated upon for its translation.)

However, as the Western world caught up technologically, economically, and politically, this ancient
world order that China had basked in for millennia was slowly collapsing, replaced by a new, Western-led
imperialist order. The industrial revolution in Europe yielded great technological advances for the West,
and resulted in more effective systems of communication, transportation, war mongering and a greater
thirst for resources. As Western nations and westernizing nations including Japan began to pursue more
zealously the resources and material riches of East Asia, China found itself at the center of colonial
desire. The West, eager to enter the lucrative Chinese market, petitioned China for an opportunity to
engage in mutual trade.
However, as China denied the West this opportunity, tensions built up, culminating in the Opium Wars,
where the technological disparity between China and the West was unmistakably exposed. China
suffered from consecutive losses in wars. What the Qing Empire had gradually lost was not only its
territory but also the international status. In any case, the late Qing China was by no means a strong
entity, but a weak, “semi-colony” that frequently ceded territory and paid indemnities.

This new position of China in the world elicited a concerned response from the Qing court. Certain court
factions denied the existence of Chinese backwardness, instead resorting to traditionalism and
conservative Chinese thought as methods of preserving Qing control over China. However, other court
factions saw reform as essential in maintaining China’s control over its own affairs. Liberal-minded court
factions unanimously agreed that reform was crucial in preventing the collapse of the Qing polity; the
nature of this reform, however, was widely disputed. Some saw reform as a mere introduction of
Western technologies and their application to the Chinese military in the form of guns, artillery, steel
naval ships, and modern infantries to strengthen China’s military force and fend off foreign imperialist
interests. Others envisioned a grander plan of introducing Western industrial practices and instituting
many Western material characteristics, such as railways, postage systems, or roads in Chinese society. A
few radicals even pushed for modern westernization of the education system from traditional Confucian
studies and an abandonment of the 2000-year-old absolute monarchical system in favour of a
constitutional monarchy

The Policy of zinqiang

In 1861, a scholar by the name of Fen Gui-fen wrote a collection of essays on the modernization of China
covering topics such as government, finance, education and foreign relations. These would later be taken
up by military general, Zeng Guo-fan and also, supported by Prince Gong of the Qing household;
advocating a proposed policy of improving relations with Western countries and utilizing Western
technology to defend the traditional state. This policy would be called: zinqiang, to strengthen oneself or
self-strengthening.

Zinqiang was advocated by restoration officials first of all for reasons of domestic policy, to ensure the
imperial camp’s military superiority over the popular movements. In terms of scope, the reforms
envisioned Western-style modernization in a variety of fields: military and industrial technology,
intellectual and academic thoughts, reorganization of the military organizational and diplomatic system,
economic restructuring, and more.

However, in reality, the reforms were mainly limited to material matters, such as the improvement of
weaponry and transportation infrastructure, with few instances of actual intellectual and institutional
reform. It was thought that modern materials such as steamships, guns, and cannons would help provide
the Qing with the physical force necessary to repel foreign troops. The Qing establishment believed there
was no need for any alterations to be done to social and academic institutions; in fact, once any reform
activity began to threaten a traditional Chinese practice or philosophy that activity was promptly
terminated, treated as an attempt gone wrong. To further analyse the SSM, we may divide the course of
zinqiang into three major phases.

Phase 1

In the first phase especially, the sponsors of Self-Strengthening tended to be provincial leaders, who
initiated projects and reforms that benefited their region. Prominent examples include Zeng Guofan, Zuo
Zongtang and Li Hongzhang. With this, we may note the establishment of modern arsenals. Of these,
four prominent ones are noted below:

Jiangnan Arsenal: Set up at Shanghai in 1865 under the leadership of Zeng Guofan, this arsenal was
highly dependent on foreign (especially American) machinery and supervision. Guofan’s primary purpose
had been to build a ship yard, but several military campaigns going on at the time made the manufacture
of rifles a priority. By 1875, it was one of the largest arsenals in the world and growing steadily. It had
repair ships, mechanical engineering works, arms and ammunition factories, a translation department,
cartographers’ office and a language school.

Nanking Arsenal: Established by Li Hongzhang at Nangking itself, it made technologically superior

weapons. It was run at a smaller scale than Jiangnan with the help of a British supervisor. However, in
1870, the arsenal exploded killing two soldiers. This unpromising start and also, Li moving away to Zhili
prevented it from progressing as well as Jiangnan.

Fuzhou Arsenal: Founded in 1866 by Zuo Zongtang, it was kept under the charge of two French officers
who provided machinery and supervision. These officers and Zongtang had grand plans of making
steamships, arms and ammunition. However, the establishment soon became larger than planned and
the costs, higher than estimated. It was found that the cost of each ship made was several times more
than the price of foreign vessels brought to China.

Tientsin Arsenal: Fearing that the concentration of power in southern China would “arrogate too much
power” with the Chinese mandarins, Chong-huo, a Manchu dignitary opened an arsenal at Tientsin with
the help of an Englishman, Meadows as technical director. The arsenal made rifles as well as
ammunition, and it had a technical training department.

What may be noted from this phase of the SSM is that while the reforms were envisioned as radical,
transforming China into a strong modern military state – they in fact were limited in outcome. The main
hindrance remained that any genuine reform would require a change in the Chinese traditional value
system which was not the case at the time. It seemed there was also no economic gain coming from the
arsenals despite their absorption of huge capital investment. However, we do see the emergence of a
nascent independent Chinese working class and the strengthening of provincial power bases in China.

Phase 2

This is the phase from 1882 to 1885 when Li Hongzhang became very prominent. Li organised the
formation and development of Western-style military academies, the construction of fortifications
around Chinese ports and the overhaul of China’s northern fleet. He later oversaw the development of
capitalist enterprises, funded by private business interest but with some government involvement or
oversight. Some of these projects included railways, shipping infrastructure, coal mines, cloth mills and
the installation of telegraph lines and stations. From the 1880s Li was also instrumental in developing a
Chinese foreign policy and forging a stable and productive relationship with Western nations.

A new feature of the second phase was the new profit-oriented and non-military merchant operated
enterprises in railways, mining, postal system, etc. This perhaps came with a shift in aims. Along with
self-strengthening (militarily), China was now looking to accumulate wealth and become an economic
force as well. Yet, we must not forget that these remained government controlled, even as the
government kept its grip on strategic industries and academies such as the Tientsin Naval Academy.
By 1885, we see the rise of the industrial working class, numbering up to 40,000 by then. The emergence
of the bourgeoisie and Chinese capitalist class may be also noted as gentry, land owners and
compradores began to take financial interests in modern enterprises. Chinese attitudes towards
education also broadened as many students were sent abroad (esp. Britain, France, Germany and USA)
for technical training and expertise. However, many conservative sections also were wary of the foreign
influence on the students going abroad.

Phase 3

Between the years 1885 to 1895, military and naval building continued with the dual goals of
self-strengthening and enriching the nation. Two new types of industries and mercantile enterprises
emerged: joint government and merchant enterprises, where merchants had a say in the working of the
industry as well as incipient private enterprises. However, these private concerns could not prosper
much due to excessive bureaucratic interference and control. Most of these went bankrupt or were
taken over by the government.

However, the failure of the last two phases may be noted in that they operated on the flawed premise
that economic and military modernisation could be achieved without significant political or social
reform. China incurred heavy losses in the Sino-French Wars in 1884-85 as well as in the Sino-Japanese
Wars of 1894-95. Despite their efforts, the three-decade-long Self-Strengthening Movement was
generally unsuccessful. Significant figures in the Qing government were sceptical about the movement
and gave it inadequate attention or resources. Xenophobes in the bureaucracy wanted nothing to do
with Western methods, so some whipped up opposition to Self-Strengthening. Another significant factor
in the failure of Self-Strengthening was China’s decentralised government and the weak authority of the
Qing in some regions.

The majority of successful Self-Strengthening projects were managed and funded by provincial
governments or private business interests. A consequence of this was that new military developments –
reformed armies, military installations, munitions plants, naval vessels and so on – were often loyal to, if
not controlled provincial interests. This provincialism provided little or no benefit to the Qing regime or
the national interest. It also contributed to disunity and warlordism after 1916, as local warlords seized
control of these military assets.

Assessment of the SSM

● The Self-Strengthening Movement was a campaign for economic and military reform in China,
inspired by the nation’s military weakness in the mid-19th century.
● The Self-Strengthening Movement began in the 1860s and sought to acquire and utilise Western
methods. “Learn barbarian methods to combat barbarian threats” was one of its mottos.
● The movement produced some successful capitalist and military reforms, though most of these
were provincially rather than nationally based. It failed to strengthen Qing rule or military power,
as suggested by subsequent defeats in two wars.
● Self-Strengthening failed due to a lack of Qing support, the decentralised nature of
government and its narrow focus. Qing leaders wanted military and economic modernisation but
without accompanying social or political reforms.
● Neglect of agriculture & handicraft industries – lack of popular participation
● Not much progress in modernization of education
Conclusion

The Self-Strengthening Movement and its supporters envisioned a reborn China, a China that could
interact with the West on its own terms. Yet, rather than envisioning a China that would adapt to a new
world order as one among many sovereign states, the reformists envisioned a China that would return to
its former position in the world as a hegemon, with all other foreign entities mere vassals and
“barbarians”. Through the emulation of the West and the adoption of Western ways, the Qing hoped to
one day take up again this role. Such a hope never manifested itself. The Qing Empire would succumb to
foreign conflicts, internal rebellions, famines, Han nationalism, and foreign spheres of interest infringing
on its sovereignty. Whether or not the Self-strengthening Movement could ever have saved the Qing as
an entity, the Qing’s inability to adapt and assimilate itself into a new world order was both a cause of
the Dynasty’s demise and a result of its conservative mindset. The Self-strengthening Movement was
certainly a victim of such a mindset.