PR-NET-OSM-014

RESPONSE TO SYSTEM FAULTS

OPERATIONAL SAFETY MANUAL - SECTION 2.4

Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks is a trading name of: Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution Limited Registered in Scotland No.
SC213459; Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission plc Registered in Scotland No. SC213461; Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution plc Registered in
Scotland No. SC213460; (all having their Registered Offices at Inveralmond House 200 Dunkeld Road Perth PH1 3AQ); and Southern Electric Power
Distribution plc Registered in England & Wales No. 04094290 having their Registered Office at No. 1 Forbury Place 43 Forbury Road Reading RG1 3JH
which are members of the SSE Group www.ssen.co.uk
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Name Title
Author N/A Distribution SHE Team
Checked by Peter Vujanic Head of SHE Distribution
Approved by Richard Gough Designated Engineer

CONTENTS
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 3
2 Scope .......................................................................................................................................... 3
3 References .................................................................................................................................. 3
4 Definitions.................................................................................................................................... 4
5 General Responsibilities ............................................................................................................. 4
6 Personal Protective Equipment ................................................................................................... 4
7 Red Alert Conditions ................................................................................................................... 5
8 Pre-Switching Actions ................................................................................................................. 5
9 Fault Level Reduction ................................................................................................................. 6
10 Re-energising from Source, Secondary or Pole-Mounted Circuit-Breaker ................................. 6
11 Manual Closing of Circuits Post Trip ........................................................................................... 7
12 Fault Switching ............................................................................................................................ 8
13 Network Automation .................................................................................................................... 9
14 Transient / Unknown Faults ........................................................................................................ 9
15 Busbar Faults ............................................................................................................................ 10
16 High Voltage Overhead Network Fuse Replacement ............................................................... 11
17 Disconnecting Known Live Faults ............................................................................................. 12
18 Removing Debris from Overhead Lines .................................................................................... 12
19 Manual Closing of Circuits Post Trip ......................................................................................... 13
20 Revision History ........................................................................................................................ 13

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1 Introduction
1.1 This Approved procedure covers fault Switching on all High Voltage (HV) Distribution
networks up to and including 132kV, controlled by SSEN-D’s Distribution Control Centres,
including out of area networks and third-party networks with a control contract.
1.2 It is designed to ensure a consistent approach and swift supply restoration, whilst
considering the safety of staff and the public alongside the integrity of the System.
1.3 There may be unusual situations that necessitate a different approach. When these arise,
the Control Engineer Shall decide what action to take, but Shall follow the principles of this
procedure.

2 Scope
2.1 The scope of this document applies to:
• Response to faults on the High Voltage Distribution System operated by SSEN-D
• Control and co-ordination of initial response to High Voltage faults to ensure the
safety of persons and the restoration of electricity supplies
2.2 The scope does not apply to:
• Response to faults on the Low Voltage System (see PR-NET-OSM-071
Management of Faults on the Low Voltage System - Operational Safety Manual
Section 10.6).
• Response to System emergencies (see PR-NET-OSM-019 Emergency Procedures -
Operational Safety Manual Section 2.9).
• The scope applies to SSEN-D employees, contractors and other third parties involved
who are engaged with responding to High Voltage System faults.

3 References
The documents detailed in Table 3.1 - Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks Documents, and
Table 3.2 - External Documents, should be used in conjunction with this document.

Table 3.1 - Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks Documents

Reference Title
PR-NET-OSM-006 SSEN Distribution Operational Safety Rules - Operational Safety Manual – Section 1.1
PR-NET-OSM-028 Switching Terminology and Approved Abbreviations - Operational Safety Manual -
Section 4.4
PR-NET-OSM-008 System Control Procedures - Operational Safety Manual – Section 2.1
PR-NET-OSM-019 Emergency Procedures - Operational Safety Manual - Section 2.9
Manual Reclosing of Circuits Post Trip, Sequence Operation and Lockout - Operational
PR-NET-OSM-020
Safety Manual – Section 2.10
Management of Neutral Faults on the Low Voltage System - Operational Safety Manual
PR-NET-OSM-071
- Section 10.6
PR-NET-EPR-011 Response to Network System Emergencies
WI-NET-PAC-019 Operation of 33kV Busbar Auto-Reclose Schemes
WI-NET-OSM-002 Personal Protective Equipment and Workwear for Live Environments
N/A SSEN SHE Handbook (Held in Safety, Health and Wellbeing SharePoint Site)

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Table 3.2 - External Documents

Reference Title
ENA SHEC06 Post Trip Reclosing of HV Electrical Distribution Circuits

4 Definitions
4.1 The words printed in bold text within this document are either headings or definitions.
Definitions used within this Approved Procedure are defined within the list presented
immediately below, or within section 2 of the Operational Safety Rules.
4.2 North, East, West, South Aid Consortium (NEWSAC)
Electricity industry agreement which governs the ‘loan’ of employees from Networks
Operators (NOs) to other NOs during a System Emergency.
4.3 Operational Safety Rules (OSR)
The SSEN-D Distribution set of rules, as read with related documents and procedures, that
provide generic safe systems of work on the System therefore ensuring the health and
safety of all who are liable to be affected by any Danger that might arise from the System.
4.4 Operator
The Authorised Person permitted to carry out Switching on the System

5 General Responsibilities
5.1 All work must be done be in compliance with SSEN-D Safety, Health and Environmental
Policy and procedures, including OSR.
5.2 Persons who are required to operate and undertake work on the System, Shall have a
thorough understanding of the work and ensure that on-site risks are suitably assessed and
that appropriate control measures are put in place before, during and immediately after all
activities.
5.3 The procedures and instructions in this Approved procedure Shall only be carried out by
suitably trained and authorised persons.
5.4 Persons Shall ensure that at all times during the work (or associated testing) General
Safety arrangements are maintained and that other work areas are not adversely affected
by the activities for which they are responsible.

6 Personal Protective Equipment

6.1 Persons who are required to work or undertake Switching duties on the System Shall wear
suitably approved Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Furthermore, where warning labels
or signs identify the existence of a particular hazard, additional and appropriate PPE Shall
be worn.
6.2 As a minimum, PPE Shall meet the requirements of WI-NET-OSM-002.
6.3 When carrying out Switching, Approved insulated gloves Shall be worn by the Operator
before operating any of the following Apparatus:
• Test equipment, test leads, test prods

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• Structure mounted equipment

• Overhead line Apparatus
• When applying portable Earthing
6.4 The insulated gloves Shall only be removed following the completion of the operation and
when the Operator has moved away from the operating position.
6.5 Insulated gloves Shall be inspected before use to ensure they are within date and
undamaged. Where concern exist, the gloves Shall be replaced before any operation is
carried out.

7 Red Alert Conditions

7.1 A Red Alert is normally issued during (or sometimes after) a major event that significantly
impacts the Distribution System (> 100 High Voltage faults / loss of > 20,000 customers).
Under these circumstances, actions Shall be in accordance with the Approved procedures:
• PR-NET-OSM-019 Emergency Procedures - Operational Safety Manual - Section 2.9
• PR-NET-EPR-011 Response to System Emergencies
7.2 Mobilisation Shall involve all available SSEN-D resource from within the affected Licence
area and may also require the transfer of staff from the other Licence areas, as well as the
utilisation of all appropriate staff across SSEN-D, external contracting resource and a
request for staff from other Distribution Network Operators via the NEWSAC Agreement.
7.3 Large one-off events, can fall into this category and usually involve implementing pre-written
contingency plans. For these situations, typically in excess of 100 linesmen/tree
cutters/managers, should be moved into the affected Licence area.

8 Pre-Switching Actions
8.1 Control Engineers Shall access the Outage Management System (OMS) for information
and updating of incidents / calls and for NaFIRS (National Fault and Interruption Reporting
Scheme) reporting in accordance with PR-NET-OSM-008 System Control Procedures -
Operational Safety Manual Section 2.1.
8.2 Before carrying out any restoration Switching on a faulted circuit, the Control Engineer
Shall:
• Take all practicable steps to contact anyone known to be working on or adjoining the
faulty circuit
• Check that those persons are not involved and warn them to stay clear of the circuit
until the fault has been identified and Isolated
• Check if any damage calls have been received that relate to the faulty circuit
• Check for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) protection alarms or
operations which provide an indication of the nature or location of the fault
• Where applicable, identify the remaining fault breaking capacity of the source circuit-
breaker
• Check to see if the circuit is fitted with remote controlled switchgear and / or Fault
Passage Indicators (FPIs)

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• Take reasonable steps to ensure that no Plant or Apparatus is operated outside of

its rating
• Establish contact with relevant Transmission Company where Transmission Plant is
involved,

9 Fault Level Reduction

9.1 System Operating Voltages at 11kV or 6.6kV
Where the busbar fault level exceeds 150 MVA at 11kV or 100 MVA at 6.6kV, then the fault level
Shall, where practicable, be reduced before the first reclosing attempt as follows:
• If there are no parallel circuits across the bus-section, then the bus-section circuit-
breaker Shall be opened rather than disconnecting a transformer. This minimises the
number of customers who suffer subsequent voltage dips and is the preferred option.
• If there are parallel circuits across the bus-section or the bus-section circuit-breaker
has no telecontrol, then a transformer circuit-breaker Shall be opened. This Shall
normally be the transformer feeding the same section of busbar as the fault in order to
minimise the impact of operating two-stage busbar protection where fitted.
• If there are no telecontrol facilities available to reduce fault levels, then the first
attempted reclose may be made at the normal fault level. However, before attempting
any subsequent reclosures, the fault level Shall be reduced by manual Switching.

9.2 System Operating Voltages above 11kV

Any requirement for fault level reduction on Systems operating above 11kV, Shall normally be
location specific and Shall be detailed on the Network Management and Control system, or in the
appropriate records.

10 Re-energising from Source, Secondary or Pole-Mounted

Circuit-Breaker
10.1 If the faulted circuit includes any section of overhead line or free-standing cable /
transformer poles or structures, the Control Engineer Shall attempt to re-energise the
circuit as shown below in Table 10.1.

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Table 10.1 - Re-energising Circuit Table

Normal Weather Conditions

Abnormal Weather
Operating Voltage
Security Level Conditions, e.g. Gales /
(kV)
22:00 to 06:00 06:00 to 22:00 Lightning

Customer supplies
6.6 affected and / or After After
11 System at risk from 5 minutes 20 minutes
22 loadings or next fault
33 System firm against
Following inspection
next fault
Immediate
(with permission from Duty
As soon as practicable following Manager)
Customer supplies
investigation of probable cause and
affected
66 the agreement NMC Manager.
132
All other scenarios
Following inspection unless system
including System firm
stability issues arise
against next fault

NOTE: These time delays also apply to the first re-energisation attempt when fault sectioning on underground circuits.

10.2 Where immediate Switching is permitted, the Control Engineer Shall still risk assess and
make an informed decision based on the alarms, indications, weather conditions and any
other relevant information available before re-energising.
10.3 For all other situations shown in table 9.1, prior to reclosing, the Control Engineer Shall
confirm that no reports of accidental contact or damage have been received prior to re-
energising. For out-of-area networks, the Control Engineer Shall also check for damage
reports with the host Distribution Network Operator.
10.4 The relevant Transmission Company Shall be contacted prior to attempting any reclosure
which may affect a Transmission network, except in an emergency.
10.5 Any restoration sequence Shall also have regard for System voltage and frequency before
recovery of any significant lost load or generation.

11 Manual Closing of Circuits Post Trip

11.1 It is acceptable to manually reclose High Voltage circuits following operation and lockout of
automatic reclosing devices, providing this does not pose an unacceptable risk of injury to
the public.
11.2 The risk of injury to the public, who could be in the vicinity of any damaged or accessible
High Voltage circuit, when the circuit is manually reclosed, needs to be balanced against
the risk to the public from the ongoing supply loss.
11.3 Risk assessment of and requirements for manual reclosing of High Voltage circuits,
following operation and lockout of automatic reclosing devices, are necessary to minimise
the risk of Danger to the public.
11.4 Where manual closing of circuits post trip is required, reference Shall be made to the
Approved Procedure PR-NET-OSM-020 Manual Reclosing of Circuits Post Trip, Sequence
Operation and Lockout - Operational Safety Manual – Section 2.10.

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11.5 This Approved procedure is intended to assist Control Engineers with assessing the risk
of manual reclosing and what steps need to be taken before attempting manual reclosing of
High Voltage circuits following trip, sequence operation and lockout of automatic reclosing
devices. These steps are based on the common framework for manual reclosing of High
Voltage circuits in ENA SHE Standard 06.

12 Fault Switching
12.1 No Specific Report of Network Damage
12.1.1 Where network automation is part of the System, this may automatically sectionalise faulted
circuits based on pre-determined conditions. This will operate prior to the intervention of a
Control Engineer. Where a sequence Switching scheme or remotely controlled switchgear
is fitted, then Operators Shall be directed to appropriate locations based on the outcome of
the initial Switching by these devices.
12.1.2 For Distribution circuits, if there is no specific report of network damage, and no automation
has operated, then the Fault Action Plan (see NOTE) Shall be followed. This identifies the
first Switching point that halves the circuit by customer numbers, consistent with the most
effective site access.
NOTE: Fault Action Plans are circuit specific Switching plans held in the Outage Management
System database and / or the network control system.
12.1.3 If the first Switching operation proves the faulted network is towards the source, then the
next Switching operation Shall aim to restore the healthy network from an alternative
source, where available. This should restore half the customers in the shortest possible
time.
12.1.4 Following the first restoration stage, the faulted network Shall be sub-divided again
consistent with the most effective access and operation. This process Shall continue until
the faulty section is identified. Where a multi-panel switchboard is installed on the network,
this can sometimes be used effectively to provide more rapid fault sectionalising and supply
restoration.
12.1.5 Where Switching has restored all but the last section of an all underground 11kV or 6.6kV
circuit, then the condition of this circuit section Shall be proven by either:
• Re-energisation, or
• Overvoltage (pressure) test, which Shall be carried out as soon as practicable and
certainly within 12 hours of the initial trip
12.1.6 If this test is successful, then all substations on the circuit Shall be patrolled in accordance
with section 12 of this Approved procedure.
12.1.7 For Distribution circuits operating at a higher System voltage than 11kV, with little or no
sectioning options, the Control Engineer Shall determine the next restoration action from
the protection and alarm information available. This may include further complete circuit
reclose attempts if the situation or weather conditions deem this to be appropriate.
Reference should be made to PR-NET-OSM-020 Manual Reclosing of Circuits Post Trip,
Sequence Operation and Lockout - Operational Safety Manual – Section 2.10 for guidance
on manual reclosing of circuits post trip, sequence operation and lockout.

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12.1.8 As Switching progresses, the Control Engineer Shall monitor the number of circuit-
breaker trips / fault level to ensure the 'remaining fault breaking capacity' limits of the circuit-
breaker are not exceeded. It may be necessary to energise the last few suspect sections
one at a time if the circuit-breaker 'remaining capacity' will only allow one more fault
clearance.

12.2 Damage or Other Incident Report Received

12.2.1 If a damage or other incident report is received and there are no reported injuries from site
and the section of network involved is able to be identified, then the damaged network Shall
be disconnected, and other supplies restored before visiting the site of damage.
12.2.2 If an associated injury report is received, then this Shall take priority over supply restoration.

13 Network Automation
13.1 The sequence of switchgear operations for circuits fitted with automation or remotely
controllable switchgear may be determined by a Fault Passage Indicator (FPI), normally
situated at the mid-point on each section of the circuit.
13.2 There are several types of FPI in use and all may be used for positive indication. However,
only three-phase FPIs or circuit-breaker based protection relays (including pole-mounted
circuit-breakers), which register the passage of both Earth and phase fault current, should
be used for negative indication.
13.3 When a fault occurs on a network fitted with FPIs the following procedures Shall apply.
13.4 Positive mid-point FPI indication:
• The first operation Shall be to open the mid-point switch remotely, as the FPI
indicates positively that the fault is beyond the mid-point, then the source circuit-
breaker Shall be reclosed immediately, without the need to reduce the fault level.
• Thereafter section 11 of this Approved procedure Shall be followed.
13.5 Negative mid-point FPI indication (3 phase FPI only):
• The first operation Shall be to open the mid-point switch
• After checking that the alternative supply is able to supply the section of network
beyond the mid-point and that the protective devices can be controlled from SCADA,
the normally open point Shall be closed
• Thereafter section 11 of this Approved procedure Shall be followed

14 Transient / Unknown Faults

14.1 If a 132kV, circuit auto-recloses successfully and the cause is unknown, then the circuit
Shall be patrolled by practical means (e.g. Helicopter, vehicle, foot) within 48 hours, or at
the first reasonable opportunity thereafter.
14.2 In the event that the line has been patrolled recently, with no fault identified, an alternative
management plan may be agreed between the relevant Control Centre and the field unit.
14.3 If a 6.6kV, 11kV or 33kV circuit-breaker has auto-reclosed successfully more than once in a
rolling month and the cause is unknown, then the circuit Shall be patrolled.

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14.4 If the patrol fails to locate the cause, then portable FPIs Shall be fitted at strategic points on
the circuit and moved to localise the fault on any subsequent reclosures or lockouts. The
Control Engineer Shall be informed of the position of these portable FPIs.
14.5 On every occasion that an all underground circuit trips and is re-energised without any
cause being found, the connected substations, Switching stations and cable compounds
Shall be visited as soon as practicable in daylight to check that the busbars, cable boxes
and exposed cables show no sign of distress.

15 Busbar Faults
There are differences in busbar protection arrangements between the South and the North Licence
areas relevant to this section.

15.1 South Licence Area

15.1.1 Most grid sites with open 33kV busbars are fitted with an auto-reclose scheme which will
attempt to re-energise the site following a busbar fault. The operation of these schemes is
covered by the Approved Procedure for Operation of 33kV Busbar Auto-Reclose Schemes.
15.1.2 Section 14.4 of this Approved procedure applies where this type of scheme is not installed
or following partial restoration by this type of scheme.
15.1.3 Most primary sites are fitted with protection which only disconnects the affected section of
busbar for a busbar fault or for an un-cleared feeder fault.

15.2 North Licence Areas

Most grid and primary sites are fitted with protection which only disconnects the affected section of
busbar for a busbar fault or for an un-cleared feeder fault.

15.3 Situations Where Busbars Shall Not Be Remotely Energised

15.3.1 Busbars Shall not be remotely re-energised in the following situations, until a site inspection
has been carried out:
• Those associated with a Transmission System or 132kV Networks operated by
SEPD.
• Where the busbars and associated Apparatus are all indoors or enclosed (unless
there is sufficient information available to indicate protection / Plant maloperation (see
section 15.4 part 2)
• Where a positive report of fire or disruptive failure from the site has been received
• Where staff are known to be working on site but attempts to contact them have been
unsuccessful
• Where an automatic Switching scheme has already restored supply to all customers
affected and there is no immediate threat to the integrity of the System
• Where, under section 15.4 of this Approved procedure, the attempt to open an
outgoing circuit by telecontrol fails, thus indicating a ‘stuck’ circuit-breaker
15.3.2 In all other circumstances, following an assessment of fault alarms and operations, section
15.4 of this Approved procedure Shall apply.

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15.4 Situations Where Busbars May Be Remotely Energised

Part 1 – Outdoor (air insulated) busbars
15.4.1 Where all or part of the busbars have become de-energised and the load affected is within
the rating of a single transformer or incoming circuit, then an attempt Shall be made to re-
energise the affected busbars immediately via a single transformer feed or incoming circuit.
15.4.2 If this is successful then, where practicable, no further Switching Shall be carried out
pending an immediate inspection.
15.4.3 If the load exceeds the rating of a single transformer or incoming circuit, then:
1. The busbars Shall be split and/or potential load Shall be disconnected as necessary
2. An attempt Shall be made to re-energise each section of busbars in turn
3. Only the minimum amount of Apparatus to restore supplies Shall be energised until the
site has been inspected
15.4.4 If an attempt to remotely re-energise the whole busbar has failed, or where an automatic
Switching scheme has already restored one section of busbars then:
1. Any remaining busbar Shall be split
2. All outgoing circuits fitted with telecontrol Shall be opened
3. An attempt Shall be made to re-energise each remaining section of busbar, but only
using a transformer or incoming circuit not previously used to attempt re-energisation,
until the faulty section has been identified
4. Only the minimum amount of Apparatus to restore supplies Shall be energised until the
site has been inspected
15.4.5 If the attempts to restore supplies via the busbars are unsuccessful, remote Switching
Shall be used to restore supplies from alternative sources, while staff travel to site.
Part 2 - Indoor and enclosed outdoor busbars
15.4.6 Indoor or enclosed outdoor busbars Shall not be re-energised until they have been
inspected on site (including the integrity of the gas insulation in GIS Switchgear), unless
there are positive indications that protection and / or Plant has mal-operated.
15.4.7 Where an FPI or other protection alarm(s) indicate a mal-operation and the suspect
Apparatus can be disconnected from the affected busbar by telecontrol, then one re-
energisation attempt may be made.

16 High Voltage Overhead Network Fuse Replacement

16.1 During major weather-related events, e.g. lightning storms, the High Voltage System up to
and including 33kV lines with distributed transformers, can experience multiple High
Voltage fuse failures with no permanent damage. In these circumstances, it is permissible
for the Control Engineer to issue an instruction for 'Delegated Fuse Replacement', to
replace all fuses that have operated 'as found'.
16.2 This instruction Shall be issued on a circuit basis directly to suitably authorised staff by the
Control Engineer.
16.3 The 'Delegated Fuse Replacement' instruction Shall be issued as a standard Switching
instruction, which Shall be logged by the recipient, and on completion of work or shift Shall
be confirmed back to Control Engineer as complete.

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16.4 Individual fuse replacement Shall only be attempted after the network protected by the fuse
has been inspected and no obvious damage identified. Where inspection is not reasonably
practicable, e.g., a long inaccessible spur, then a check Shall be made to ensure that there
have been no ‘damage calls’ and that there has been a suitable delay, as required by
section 10 of this Approved procedure.
16.5 All fuse replacements Shall be recorded on a standard Switching log with 'instructed' and
'carried out' times.
16.6 The completed field Switching log details Shall be relayed back to the Distribution Control
Centre as soon as practicable after the delegated instruction is confirmed back to the
Control Engineer as complete.

17 Disconnecting Known Live Faults

17.1 When Switching to disconnect known faults where the circuit / Apparatus remains Live,
the minimum number of customers Shall be interrupted for the shortest possible time, but
without risk to the Operator.
17.2 The following methods of achieving this Shall be utilised:
• Use of a ground-mounted or pole-mounted circuit-breaker
• Use of overhead line switch provided the fault is remote from the switch pole and
stable (i.e., a Broken Jumper)
• Live-line disconnection of faulty / suspect Apparatus after the circuit has been made
Dead and hot stick Live-line techniques are used on the Dead connections to
disconnect the Apparatus before re-energising

18 Removing Debris from Overhead Lines

18.1 Removing debris such as trees, balloons, and ice from 11kV and below overhead line
Conductors carries a risk of clashing Conductors, breaking Conductors and/or electric
shock.
18.2 The following principles Shall be followed to avoid these risks:
• Where the item can be removed entirely using insulated rods/tools and there is no risk
of breaking or clashing bare Conductors, then this may be done with the circuit Live
• If removing the item carries a risk of clashing bare Conductors, but no risk of
breaking a Conductor, and the item can be removed with insulated rods/tools, e.g.,
removing ice accretion from a large Conductor, or to remove a sapling, then this
Shall be done with the relevant section of circuit de-energised
• Where insulated rods/tools cannot be used and / or there is a risk of breaking
Conductors, then the section of circuit Shall be Isolated and Earthed, and a Permit-
to-Work issued
• Where the item is being removed with the line de-energised, but the circuit has not
tripped on fault, then it Shall be verified that the line is Dead by the use of Approved
testing equipment or checking supplies at a local transformer

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19 Manual Closing of Circuits Post Trip

19.1 It is acceptable to manually reclose High Voltage circuits following operation and lockout of
automatic
19.2 The risk of injury to the public, who could be in the vicinity of any damaged or accessible
High Voltage circuit, when the circuit is manually reclosed, needs to be balanced against
the risk to the public from the ongoing supply loss.
19.3 Risk assessment of and requirements for manual reclosing of High Voltage circuits,
following operation and lockout of automatic reclosing devices, are necessary to minimise
the risk of Danger to the public.
19.4 Where manual closing of circuits post trip is required, reference Shall be made to the
Approved Procedure PR-NET-OSM-020 Manual Reclosing of Circuits Post Trip, Sequence
Operation and Lockout - Operational Safety Manual – Section 2.10.
19.5 This Approved procedure is intended to assist Control Engineers with assessing the risk
of manual reclosing and what steps need to be taken before attempting manual reclosing of
High Voltage circuits following trip, sequence operation and lockout of automatic reclosing
devices. These steps are based on the common framework for manual reclosing of High
Voltage circuits in ENA SHE Standard 06.

20 Revision History
No Overview of Amendments Previous Document Revision Authorisation
01 New document created TBC 1.00 Richard Gough
02

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