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Question 2
1. Absence of Incident Records:
By choosing not to keep an accident/incident book, the GM
dismissed it as unnecessary, which weakens both effective health and safety management and accountability.
2. Neglectful Approach to Near Misses:
Near misses were not considered serious or worth
documenting by GM, creating a culture of overlooking risks.
3. Restricted Access to Training:
Due to the GM's hectic schedule, new employees received
health and safety training only when the GM was free, resulting in inconsistent training and possible knowledge gaps.
4. :Limited Support for Safety Initiatives:
The GM prioritized aesthetics over safety by refusing to
replace the rooftop glass panels, neglecting to address known risks effectively.
5. Neglecting to Involve Workers:
The receptionist mentioned that the GM seldom interacted with staff, missing chances to address safety concerns, which lowered trust and morale.
6. Unwillingness to Assume Safety Responsibilities:
The GM's lack of engagement in health and safety, combined
with transferring full responsibility to the new HSM, reflected weak commitment to safety leadership.
7. Lack of Robust Contractor Selection Procedures:
The GM admitted hiring unqualified contractors, neglecting
safety checks, which compromised the rooftop glass installation.
8.Reluctance to Conduct Risk Assessments:
By initially neglecting risk assessments, the GM delayed identifying and addressing hazards, such as the weak rooftop glass, which created unsafe conditions.
9. Inefficient Communication of Safety Protocols:
The GM believed he was ignorant of safety and health rules, so
he failed to record accidents or near-misses in a "incident book." Consequently, there was a lack of openness and a challenge in communicating health and safety meetings to the employees. 10. Inadequate Safety Induction Scheduling:
Safety inductions were held only when the GM was available,
causing inconsistent understanding of safety protocols and potential confusion during incidents.
11. Dismissal of Worker Safety Input:
The GM damaged the staff's confidence by dismissing their
suggestions about the glass installation and the need for effective risk controls, which led to a breakdown in trust.
12. A Lack of Proactive Safety Management:
The GM allowed dangers to persist in the workplace because he
did not take proactive steps to reduce risks on a daily basis and only considered them after an incident had happened.
13. Excluding Health and Safety from Decision-Making:
The GM's focus on the hotel's appearance and beauty
overshadowed the health and safety of all staff and visitors, compromising the establishment's overall safety regulations.
14. Poor Understanding of Health and Safety
Responsibilities:
The GM, aware of his lack of competence in managing the health
and safety of the entire organization, did not take steps to improve or actively manage hazards.
15. Inadequate System for Tracking Safety Performance:
The GM did not establish a system for tracking and reviewing
health and safety performance, which resulted in missed chances to identify trends and areas for improvement.
16. Insufficient Support for Developing a Safety Culture:
A negative safety culture resulted from the GM's disinterest in
safety discussions and contempt for incident reporting, which made employees less likely to report hazards or accidents.
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