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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN
ELEC TRIC AL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING

Saleh Faruque

Radio Frequency
Modulation Made
Easy

123
SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer
Engineering
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10059
Saleh Faruque

Radio Frequency Modulation

Made Easy

123
Saleh Faruque
Department of Electrical Engineering
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, ND
USA

ISSN 2191-8112 ISSN 2191-8120 (electronic)

SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering
ISBN 978-3-319-41200-9 ISBN 978-3-319-41202-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41202-3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016945147

© The Author(s) 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or
for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland
Preface

By inventing the wireless transmitter or radio in 1897, the Italian physicist Tomaso
Guglielmo Marconi added a new dimension to the world of communications. This
enabled the transmission of the human voice through space without wires. For this
epoch-making invention, this illustrious scientist was honored with the Nobel Prize
for Physics in 1909. Even today, students of wireless or radio technology remember
this distinguished physicist with reverence. A new era began in Radio
Communications.
The classical Marconi radio used a modulation technique known today as
“Amplitude Modulation” or just AM. This led to the development of Frequency
Modulation (FM), amplitude shift keying (ASK), phase shift keying (PSK), etc.
Today, these technologies are extensively used in various wireless communication
systems. These modulation techniques form an integral part of academic curricula
today.
This book presents a comprehensive overview of the various modulation tech-
niques mentioned above. Numerous illustrations are used to bring students
up-to-date in key concepts and underlying principles of various analog and digital
modulation techniques. In particular, the following topics will be presented in this
book:
• Amplitude Modulation (AM)
• Frequency Modulation (FM)
• Bandwidth occupancy in AM and FM
• Amplitude shift keying (ASK)
• Frequency shift keying (FSK)
• Phase shift keying (PSK)
• N-ary coding and M-ary modulation
• Bandwidth occupancy in ASK, FSK, and PSK
This text has been primarily designed for electrical engineering students in the
area of telecommunications. However, engineers and designers working in the area

v
vi Preface

of wireless communications would also find this text useful. It is assumed that the
student is familiar with the general theory of telecommunications.
In closing, I would like to say a few words about how this book was conceived.
It came out of my long industrial and academic career. During my teaching tenure
at the University of North Dakota, I developed a number of graduate-level elective
courses in the area of telecommunications that combine theory and practice. This
book is a collection of my courseware and research activities in wireless
communications.
I am grateful to UND and the School for the Blind, North Dakota, for affording
me this opportunity. This book would never have seen the light of day had UND
and the State of North Dakota not provided me with the technology to do so. My
heartfelt salute goes out to the dedicated developers of these technologies, who
have enabled me and others visually impaired to work comfortably.
I would like to thank my beloved wife, Yasmin, an English Literature buff and a
writer herself, for being by my side throughout the writing of this book and for
patiently proofreading it. My darling son, Shams, an electrical engineer himself,
provided technical support in formulation and experimentation when I needed it.
For this, he deserves my heartfelt thanks.
Finally, thanks are also to my doctoral student Md. Maruf Ahamed who found
time in his busy schedule to assist me with the simulations, illustrations, and the
verification of equations.
In spite of all this support, there may still be some errors in this book. I hope that
my readers forgive me for them. I shall be amply rewarded if they still find this
book useful.

Grand Forks, USA Saleh Faruque

May 2016
Contents

1 Introduction to Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Modulation by Analog Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 AM, FM, and PM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 AM and FM Bandwidth at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Modulation by Digital Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.1 Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3.2 Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.3 Phase Shift Keying (PSK) Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Bandwidth Occupancy in Digital Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.1 Spectral Response of the Encoded Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency Before
Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.3 ASK Bandwidth at a Glance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.4 FSK Bandwidth at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.5 BPSK Bandwidth at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Amplitude Modulation (AM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Amplitude Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 AM Spectrum and Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Spectral Response of the Input Modulating Signal. . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 AM Spectrum and Bandwidth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.4 AM Response Due to Low and High
Modulating Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 23
2.3.5 AM Demodulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 24
2.3.6 Drawbacks in AM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 24

vii
viii Contents

2.4 Double Sideband-Suppressed Carrier (DSBSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.4.1 DSBSC Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Generation of DSBSC Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.3 DSBSC Spectrum and Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.4 DSBSC Drawbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Single Sideband (SSB) Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1 Why SSB Modulation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.2 Generation of SSB-Modulated Signal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.3 SSB Spectrum and Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Frequency Modulation (FM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Frequency Modulation (FM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.2 The Basic FM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 FM Spectrum and Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.1 Spectral Response of the Input Modulating Signal. . . . . . . 37
3.3.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.3 FM Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.4 Carson’s Rule and FM Bandwidth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.5 Bessel Function and FM Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.6 FM Bandwidth Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 ASK Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3 ASK Demodulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 ASK Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.1 Spectral Response of the Encoded Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.4.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency Before
Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.3 ASK Bandwidth at a Glance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.5 BER Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5 Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3 Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) Demodulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Contents ix

5.4 FSK Bandwidth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 61

5.4.1 Spectral Response of the Encoded Data . . . . . . . . . ..... 61
5.4.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency Before
Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.4.3 FSK Bandwidth at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.5 BER Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6 Phase Shift Keying (PSK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.2 Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.2.1 BPSK Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.2.2 BPSK Demodulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.3 QPSK Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.4 8PSK Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.5 16PSK Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.6 PSK Spectrum and Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.6.1 Spectral Response of the Encoded Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.6.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Before Modulation . . . . . 79
6.6.3 BPSK Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
7 N-Ary Coded Modulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2 N-Ary Convolutional Coding and M-Ary Modulation . . . . . . . . . 86
7.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.2.2 Generation of Complementary Convolutional Codes . . . . . 86
7.2.3 2-Ary Convolutional Coding with QPSK Modulation . . . . 88
7.2.4 4-Ary Convolutional Coding with 16PSK Modulation . . . . 89
7.3 N-Ary Convolutional Decoder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3.1 Correlation Receiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3.2 Error Correction Capabilities of N-Ary Convolutional
Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.4 N-Ary Orthogonal Coding and M-Ary Modulation . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.4.2 Orthogonal Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.4.3 2-Ary Orthogonal Coding with QPSK Modulation . . . . . . 95
7.4.4 4-Ary Orthogonal Coding with 16PSK Modulation . . . . . . 97
7.4.5 2-Ary Orthogonal Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.4.6 4-Ary Orthogonal Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.4.7 Error Correction Capabilities of N-Ary Orthogonal
Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Modulation

Topics
• Background
• Modulation by Analog Signal
• AM and FM Bandwidth at a Glance
• Modulation by Digital Signal
• ASK, FSK and PSK Bandwidth at a Glance

1.1 Background

Modulation is a technique that changes the characteristics of the carrier frequency in

accordance with the input signal. Figure 1.1 shows the conceptual block diagram of
a modern wireless communication system, where the modulation block is shown in
the inset of the dotted block. As shown in the figure, modulation is performed at the
transmit side and demodulation is performed at the receive side. This is the final
stage of any radio communication system. The preceding two stages have been
discussed elaborately in my previous book in this series [1, 2].
The output signal of the modulator, referred to as the modulated signal, is fed
into the antenna for propagation. Antenna is a reciprocal device that transmits and
receives the modulated carrier frequency. The size of the antenna depends on the
wavelength (k) of the sinusoidal wave where
k = c/f m
c = Velocity of light = 3
108 m/s
f = Frequency of the sinusoidal wave, also known as “carrier frequency.”
Therefore, a carrier frequency much higher than the input signal is required to
keep the size of the antenna at an acceptable limit. For these reasons, a
high-frequency carrier signal is used in the modulation process. In this process, the

© The Author(s) 2017 1

S. Faruque, Radio Frequency Modulation Made Easy,
SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41202-3_1
2 1 Introduction to Modulation

Fig. 1.1 Block diagram of a modern full-duplex communication system. The modulation stage is
shown as a dotted block

low-frequency input signal changes the characteristics of the high-frequency carrier

in a certain manner, depending on the modulation technique. Furthermore, as the
size and speed of digital data networks continue to expand, bandwidth efficiency
becomes increasingly important. This is especially true for broadband communi-
cation, where the digital signal processing is done keeping in mind the available
bandwidth resources.
Hence, modulation is a very important step in the transmission of information.
The information can be either analog or digital, where the carrier is a
high-frequency sinusoidal waveform. As stated earlier, the input signal (analog or
digital) changes the characteristics of the carrier waveform. Therefore, there are two
basic modulation schemes as listed below:
• Modulation by analog signals and
• Modulation by digital signals.
This book presents a comprehensive overview of these modulation techniques in
use today. Numerous illustrations are used to bring students up-to-date in key
concepts and underlying principles of various analog and digital modulation
techniques. For a head start, brief descriptions of each of these modulation tech-
niques are presented below.
1.2 Modulation by Analog Signals 3

1.2 Modulation by Analog Signals

1.2.1 AM, FM, and PM

For analog signals, there are three well-known modulation techniques as listed
below:
• Amplitude Modulation (AM),
• Frequency Modulation (FM),
• Phase Modulation (PM).
By inventing the wireless transmitter or radio in 1897, the Italian physicist
Tomaso Guglielmo Marconi added a new dimension to the world of communica-
tions [3, 4]. This enabled the transmission of the human voice through space
without wires. For this epoch-making invention, this illustrious scientist was
honored with the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1909. Even today, students of wireless
or radio technology remember this distinguished physicist with reverence. A new
era began in Radio Communications. The classical Marconi radio used a modu-
lation technique known today as “Amplitude Modulation” or just AM. In AM, the
amplitude of the carrier changes in accordance with the input analog signal, while
the frequency of the carrier remains the same. This is shown in Fig. 1.2 where
• m(t) is the input modulating audio signal,
• C(t) is the carrier frequency, and
• S(t) is the AM-modulated carrier frequency.

Fig. 1.2 Modulation by analog signal

4 1 Introduction to Modulation

As shown in the figure, the audio waveform changes the amplitude of the carrier
to determine the envelope of the modulated carrier. This enables the receiver to
extract the audio signal by demodulation. Notice that the amplitude of the carrier
changes in accordance with the input signal, while the frequency of the carrier does
not change after modulation. It can be shown that the modulated carrier S(t) con-
tains several spectral components, requiring frequency-domain analysis, which will
be addressed in Chap. 2. It may be noted that AM is vulnerable to signal amplitude
fading.
In Frequency Modulation (FM), the frequency of the carrier changes in accor-
dance with the input modulation signal as shown in Fig. 1.2 [5]. Notice that in FM,
only the frequency changes while the amplitude remains the same. Unlike AM, FM
is more robust against signal amplitude fading. For this reason, FM is more
attractive in commercial FM radio. In Chap. 3, it will be shown that in FM, the
modulated carrier contains an infinite number of sideband due to modulation. For
this reason, FM is also bandwidth inefficient.
Similarly, in Phase Modulation (PM), the phase of the carrier changes in
accordance with the phase of the carrier, while the amplitude of the carrier does not
change. PM is closely related to FM. In fact, FM is derived from the rate of change
of phase of the carrier frequency. Both FM and PM belong to the same mathe-
matical family. We will discuss this more elaborately in Chap. 3.

1.2.2 AM and FM Bandwidth at a Glance

The bandwidth occupied by the modulated signal depends on bandwidth of the

input signal and the modulation method as shown in Fig. 1.3. Note that the
unmodulated carrier itself has zero bandwidth.
In AM:
• The modulated carrier has two sidebands (upper and lower) and
• Total bandwidth = 2
base band.
In FM:
• The carrier frequency shifts back and forth from the nominal frequency by Df,
where Df is the frequency deviation.
• During this process, the modulated carrier creates an infinite number of spectral
components, where higher-order spectral components are negligible.
• The approximate FM bandwidth is given by the Carson’s rule:
– FM BW = 2f (1 + b)
– f = Base band frequency
– b = Modulation index
– b = Df/f
– Df = Frequency deviation.
1.3 Modulation by Digital Signal 5

Fig. 1.3 Bandwidth

occupancy in AM, FM, and
PM signals

1.3 Modulation by Digital Signal

For digital signals, there are several modulation techniques available. The three
main digital modulation techniques are as follows:
• Amplitude shift keying (ASK),
• Frequency shift keying (FSK), and
• Phase shift keying (PSK).
Figure 1.4 illustrates the modulated waveforms for an input modulating digital
signal. Brief descriptions of each of these digital modulation techniques along with
the respective spectral responses and bandwidth are presented below.

1.3.1 Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) Modulation

Amplitude shift keying (ASK), also known as on–off keying (OOK), is a method of
digital modulation that utilizes amplitude shifting of the relative amplitude of the
6 1 Introduction to Modulation

Fig. 1.4 Modulation by digital signal

career frequency [6–8]. The signal to be modulated and transmitted is binary; this is
referred to as ASK, where the amplitude of the carrier changes in discrete levels, in
accordance with the input signal, as shown.
• Binary 0 (bit 0): Amplitude = Low and
• Binary 1 (bit 1): Amplitude = High.
Figure 1.4 shows the ASK-modulated waveform where
• Input digital signal is the information we want to transmit.
• Carrier is the radio frequency without modulation.
• Output is the ASK-modulated carrier, which has two amplitudes corresponding
to the binary input signal. For binary signal 1, the carrier is ON. For the binary
signal 0, the carrier is OFF. However, a small residual signal may remain due to
noise, interference, etc.

1.3.2 Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) Modulation

Frequency shift keying (FSK) is a method of digital modulation that utilizes fre-
quency shifting of the relative frequency content of the signal [6–8]. The signal to
be modulated and transmitted is binary; this is referred to as binary FSK (BFSK),
1.3 Modulation by Digital Signal 7

where the carrier frequency changes in discrete levels, in accordance with the input
signal as shown below:
• Binary 0 (bit 0): Frequency = f + Df.
• Binary 1 (bit 1): Frequency = f − Df.
Figure 1.4 shows the FSK-modulated waveform where
• Input digital signal is the information we want to transmit.
• Carrier is the radio frequency without modulation.
• Output is the FSK-modulated carrier, which has two frequencies x1 and x2,
corresponding to the binary input signal.
• These frequencies correspond to the messages binary 0 and 1, respectively.

1.3.3 Phase Shift Keying (PSK) Modulation

Phase shift keying (PSK) is a method of digital modulation that utilizes phase of the
carrier to represent digital signal [6–8]. The signal to be modulated and transmitted
is binary; this is referred to as binary PSK (BPSK), where the phase of the carrier
changes in discrete levels, in accordance with the input signal as shown below:
• Binary 0 (bit 0): Phase1 = 0°.
• Binary 1 (bit 1): Phase2 = 180°.
Figure 1.4 shows the modulated waveform where
• Input digital signal is the information we want to transmit.
• Carrier is the radio frequency without modulation.
• Output is the BPSK-modulated carrier, which has two phases u1 and u2 cor-
responding to the two information bits.

1.4 Bandwidth Occupancy in Digital Modulation

In wireless communications, the scarcity of RF spectrum is well known. For this

reason, we have to be vigilant about using transmission bandwidth. The trans-
mission bandwidth depends on the following:
• Spectral response of the encoded data,
• Spectral response of the carrier frequency, and
• Modulation type (ASK, FSK, PSK), etc.
Let us take a closer look!
8 1 Introduction to Modulation

1.4.1 Spectral Response of the Encoded Data

In digital communications, data is generally referred to as a non-periodic digital

signal. It has two values:
• Binary-1 = High, Period = T.
• Binary-0 = Low, Period = T.
Also, data can be represented in two ways:
• Time-domain representation and
• Frequency-domain representation.
The time-domain representation (Fig. 1.5a), known as non-return-to-zero (NRZ),
is given by

VðtÞ ¼ V \0\t\T
ð1:1Þ
¼0 elsewhere

The frequency-domain representation is given by “Fourier transform” [9]:

ZT
VðxÞ = V  ejxt dt ð1:2Þ
0
 
sinðxT=2Þ
jVðxÞj ¼ VT
xT=2
   
1 2 sinðxT=2Þ 2
PðxÞ ¼ jVðxÞj ¼ V T
2
ð1:3Þ
T xT=2

Here, P(x) is the power spectral density. This is plotted in (Fig. 1.5b). The main
lobe corresponds to the fundamental frequency and side lobes correspond to har-
monic components. The bandwidth of the power spectrum is proportional to the
frequency. In practice, the side lobes are filtered out since they are relatively
insignificant with respect to the main lobe. Therefore, the one-sided bandwidth is
given by the ratio f/fb = 1. In other words, the one-sided bandwidth = f = fb, where
fb = Rb = 1/T, T being the bit duration.
The general equation for two-sided response is given by

Za
VðxÞ = VðtÞ  ejxt dt
a

In this case, V(x) is called two-sided spectrum of V(t). This is due to both
positive and negative frequencies used in the integral. The function can be a voltage
1.4 Bandwidth Occupancy in Digital Modulation 9

Fig. 1.5 a Discrete time digital signal, b it is one-sided power spectral density, and c two-sided
power spectral density. The bandwidth associated with the non-return-to-zero (NRz) data is 2Rb,
where Rb is the bit rate

or a current (Fig. 1.5c) shows the two-sided response, where the bandwidth is
determined by the main lobe as shown below:

Two sided bandwidth ðBWÞ ¼ 2Rb ðRb ¼ Bit rate before codingÞ ð1:4Þ

1.4.2 Spectral Response of the Carrier Frequency

Before Modulation

A carrier frequency is essentially a sinusoidal waveform, which is periodic and

continuous with respect to time. It has one frequency component. For example, the
sine wave is described by the following time-domain equation:

VðtÞ ¼ V p sinðxtc Þ ð1:5Þ

10 1 Introduction to Modulation

Fig. 1.6 A sine wave and its frequency response

where
Vp ¼ Peak voltage

• xc = 2pfc
• fc = Carrier frequency in Hz
Figure 1.6 shows the characteristics of a sine wave and its spectral response.
Since the frequency is constant, its spectral response is located in the horizontal axis
and the peak voltage is shown in the vertical axis. The corresponding bandwidth
is zero.

1.4.3 ASK Bandwidth at a Glance

In ASK, the amplitude of the carriers changes in discrete levels, in accordance with
the input signal where
• Input data: m(t) = 0 or 1.
• Carrier frequency: C(t) = Ac cos(xct).
• Modulated carrier: S(t) = m(t)C(t) = m(t)Ac cos(xct).
Since m(t) is the input digital signal and it contains an infinite number of har-
monically related sinusoidal waveforms and that we keep the fundamental and filter
out the higher-order components, we write:

mðtÞ ¼ Am sinðxm tÞ

The ASK-modulated signal then becomes:

SðtÞ ¼ mðtÞSðtÞ ¼ Am Ac sinðxm tÞ cosðxc Þ

¼ Am Ac cos ðxc  xm Þ
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1.4 Bandwidth Occupancy in Digital Modulation 11

Fig. 1.7 ASK bandwidth at a glance. a Spectral response of NRZ data before modulation.
b Spectral response of the carrier before modulation. c Spectral response of the carrier after
modulation. The transmission bandwidth is 2fb, where fb is the bit rate and T = 1/fb is the bit
duration for NRZ data

The spectral response is depicted in Fig. 1.7. Notice that the spectral response
after ASK modulation is the shifted version of the NRZ data. Bandwidth is given by,
BW = 2Rb (coded), where Rb is the coded bit rate.

1.4.4 FSK Bandwidth at a Glance

In FSK, the frequency of the carrier changes in two discrete levels, in accordance
with the input signals. We have:
• Input data: m(t) = 0 or 1
• Carrier frequency: C (t) = A cos (xt)
• Modulated carrier: S(t) = A cos(x −D x)t, For m(t) = 1
S(t) = A cos(x +Dx)t, For m(t) = 0
where
• S(t) = The modulated carrier,
• A = Amplitude of the carrier,
12 1 Introduction to Modulation

Fig. 1.8 FSK bandwidth at a glance. a Spectral response of NRZ data before modulation.
b Spectral response of the carrier before modulation. c Spectral response of the carrier after
modulation. The transmission bandwidth is 2(fb + Dfc). fb is the bit rate and Dfc is the frequency
deviation = 1/fb is the bit duration for NRZ data

• x = Nominal frequency of the carrier frequency, and

• Dx = Frequency deviation.
The spectral response is depicted in Fig. 1.8. Notice that the carrier frequency
after FSK modulation varies back and forth from the nominal frequency fc by  Dfc,
where Dfc is the frequency deviation. The FSK bandwidth is given by

BW ¼ 2ðfb þ Dfc Þ ¼ 2fb ð1 þ Dfc =fb Þ ¼ 2fb ð1 þ bÞ;

where b = Df/fb is known as the modulation index and fb is the coded bit frequency
(bit rate Rb).

1.4.5 BPSK Bandwidth at a Glance

In BPSK, the phase of the carrier changes in two discrete levels, in accordance with
the input signal. Here, we have:
1.4 Bandwidth Occupancy in Digital Modulation 13

• Input data: m(t) = 0 or 1

• Carrier frequency: C(t) = A cos (xt)
• Modulated carrier: S(t) = A cos(x + u)t
where
• A = Amplitude of the carrier frequency,
• x = Angular frequency of the carrier, and
• u = Phase of the carrier frequency.
Table below shows the number of phases and the corresponding bits per phase
for MPSK modulation schemes for M = 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, etc. It will be shown that
higher-order MPSK modulation schemes (M > 2) are spectrally efficient.

Modulation Number of phases u Number of bits per phase

BPSK 2 1
QPSK 4 2
8PSK 8 3
16 16 4
32 32 5
64 64 6
: : :

Figure 1.9 shows the spectral response of the BPSK modulator. Since there are
two phases, the carrier frequency changes in two discrete levels, one bit per phase,
as follows:
u = 0° for bit 0 and
u = 180° for bit 1.
Notice that the spectral response after BPSK modulation is the shifted version of
the NRZ data, centered on the carrier frequency fc. The transmission bandwidth is
given by

BW(BPSK) ¼ 2Rb =Bit per Phase ¼ 2Rb =1 ¼ 2Rb

where
• Rb is the coded bit rate (bit frequency).
• For BPSK, u = 2, one bit per phase.
Also, notice that the BPSK bandwidth is the same as the one in ASK modula-
tion. This is due to the fact that the phase of the carrier changes in two discrete
levels, while the frequency remains the same.
14 1 Introduction to Modulation

Fig. 1.9 PSK bandwidth at a glance. a Spectral response of NRZ data before modulation.
b Spectral response of the carrier before modulation. c Spectral response of the carrier after
modulation

1.5 Conclusions

This chapter presents a brief overview of modulation techniques covered in this

book. Numerous illustrations are used to bring students up-to-date in key concepts
and underlying principles of various analog and digital modulation techniques. In
particular, following topics will be presented in this book:
• Amplitude Modulation (AM),
• Frequency Modulation (FM),
• Bandwidth occupancy in AM and FM,
• Amplitude shift keying (ASK),
• Frequency shift keying (FSK),
• Phase shift keying (PSK), and
• Bandwidth occupancy in ASK, FSK, and PSK.
References 15

References

1. Faruque S (2014) Radio frequency source coding made easy. Springer, New York
2. Faruque S (2014) Radio frequency channel coding made easy. Springer, New York
3. Marconi G (1987) Improvements in transmitting electrical impulses and signals, and in
apparatus therefor. British patent No. 12,039 . Date of Application 2 June 1896; Complete
Specification Left, 2 Mar 1897; Accepted, 2 July 1897 (later claimed by Oliver Lodge to contain
his own ideas which he failed to patent)
4. Marconi G (1900) Improvements in apparatus for wireless telegraphy. British patent No. 7,777.
Date of Application 26 Apr 1900; Complete Specification Left, 25 Feb 1901; Accepted, 13 Apr
1901
5. Armstrong EH (1936) A Method of reducing disturbances in radio signaling by a system of
frequency modulation. Proc IRE (IRE) 24(5):689–740. doi:10.1109/JRPROC.1936.227383
6. Smith DR (1985) Digital transmission system. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. ISBN: 0442009178
7. Leon W, Couch II (2001) Digital and analog communication systems, 7th edn. Prentice-Hall
Inc, Englewood Cliffs. ISBN 0-13-142492-0
8. Sklar B (1988) Digital communications fundamentals and applications. Prentice Hall, Upper
Saddle River
9. Joseph Fourier JB (1878) The analytical theory of heat (trans: Freeman A). The University
Press, London
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observation in his front, while he himself remained encamped on the
left bank of the Chippewa. On the 4th, Brown advanced, driving
before him the corps of observation which destroyed the bridges as
it fell back. A detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons under
Lieutenant Horton, covering the rear, became involved in a skirmish
in which they drove a party of the enemy into a house, which would
probably have been captured had not assistance come to them. Four
men and eight horses of the 19th were wounded in the skirmish.
Brown encamped that night within sight of Riall’s position.
Riall was reinforced on the 5th by the arrival of the 8th regiment
from Toronto, and, greatly under-estimating Brown’s force, which
now amounted to about 5000 men with nine guns, he resolved on
leaving his field works, and attacking. At three in the afternoon,
Riall, whose force now amounted to about 1900 men, threw forward
a body of militia and Indians on his right flank. After some desultory
skirmishing they were driven back by increasing numbers, and fell
back on the three light infantry companies, who received their
assailants under U.S. General Porter with a terrific volley, driving
them back in complete disorder, till they themselves were in turn
forced to fall back by superior numbers. Riall, meanwhile, had
passed the Chippewa, and drawn up his whole force in order of
battle with three guns. After some cannonading, he formed six
companies of the Royal Scots, and five companies of the 100th in
two columns, and led them against the enemy’s centre. They were
received with a tremendous fire against which they were unable to
advance: almost every field officer, excepting Riall himself, was
struck down, and the columns, suffering heavy losses, were obliged
to withdraw, leaving their dead and many of their wounded on the
field. The 8th regiment covered the retreat, which was not pressed,
and the force recrossed the Chippewa to its former position. “The
guns were removed only by the gallant exertions of some troopers of
the 19th Dragoons, who attached their own horses to the carriages,
and rode off with them in the teeth of the enemy.”[63] The British
loss amounted to 515 killed, wounded, and missing, which fell
principally on the Royal Scots and 100th, who lost 422 officers and
men out of a total of 950 engaged. The 19th Light Dragoons had
one sergeant and five men wounded. General Riall, in his dispatch
after the battle, says:—
“I am particularly obliged to Major Lisle of the 19th Light Dragoons for the
manner in which he covered and protected one of the 24-pounders which had
been disabled. Lieutenant Colonel Pearson has reported to me, in the most
favourable terms, the excellent manner in which Lieutenant Horton, with a party of
the 19th Light Dragoons observed the motions of the enemy, while he occupied
the position he took on his first landing (on 3rd July), and during his advance to
this place.”

In consequence of this repulse, nearly the whole of his Indians

and many of the militia left Riall, in order to look after their families.
On the 8th, Brown threw a bridge across the Chippewa, three miles
up the stream, thus turning Riall’s right. Riall thereupon broke up his
camp, and withdrew to Fort George. Brown continued his advance,
occupied Queenston Heights, and took up a position, investing Fort
George, with his right resting on the Niagara river, and his left on the
lake. Riall, after strengthening the garrisons in the forts, withdrew in
the direction of Burlington Heights. To do this, he executed a
remarkable night march, to avoid the enemy by whom he was
hemmed in. At midnight, his force entered the lake, which is very
shallow for a hundred yards from the shore, and, wading through
the water for two miles and a half, he marched round the left wing
of the investing army, without being detected by their vedettes. For
ten days Brown lay inactive, looking for the arrival of the U.S.
Ontario squadron to enable him to strike a decisive blow. But the
squadron had been blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour ever since the
capture of Oswego, and was unable to render him any assistance.
Frequent skirmishes took place, in which the United States’ troops
suffered losses, often at the hands of the Canadians who were
roused to fury by the outrages committed on them. On one occasion
the U.S. General Swift was killed by a patrol of the 8th regiment; a
wagon train was destroyed, and the picquet guard at Erie cut off to
a man. In retaliation for these losses, the United States’ troops
burned the village of St David’s, and destroyed every dwelling-house
between Queenston and Niagara Falls; under circumstances of such
barbarity that the Colonel in command was dismissed from the army.
Meanwhile, Riall received some reinforcements from Toronto, and
a great number of militia again joined him, badly armed and
undisciplined, but exasperated beyond measure at the brigand-like
acts of the invaders. This enabled him to advance, and threatened
Brown’s communications. On the 20th, Brown advanced to Fort
George, and commenced preparations for a siege, in the hopes that
Riall would again hazard an engagement with inferior forces to
relieve the Fort. Two days later, Riall with 1700 regular troops, 700
militia, and some Indians, took post in front of Twelve Mile Creek, in
readiness to fall upon Brown if he should commence active
operations against Fort George. On the 23rd, Brown received
intelligence that the U.S. squadron was closely blockaded in
Sackett’s Harbour, and was in no position to render him assistance.
He at once broke up his camp, and withdrew to the right bank of the
Chippewa, with the intention of depositing all unnecessary baggage
and stores at Erie, and then making a rapid advance on Burlington
and Toronto. On the same day, General Drummond reached Toronto,
from Kingston, with the 89th regiment. These were at once sent
forward, under Lieutenant Colonel Tucker, to Fort Niagara, with
instructions to take drafts from the garrisons of the different forts,
and to march, on the 25th, to Lewiston, where Brown had
established a base of supplies. Riall was, at the same time, ordered
to advance towards the Chippewa. Drummond himself embarked for
Niagara, on the afternoon of the 24th, leaving Toronto with only a
few invalids as a garrison.
At midnight of the 24th, Riall detached about 900 men under
Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, with whom was a troop of the 19th
Light Dragoons under Major Lisle, to advance and occupy the high
ground near the Niagara Falls. By seven o’clock the next morning,
after a fourteen-mile march, Pearson occupied a hill by Lundy’s
Lane, within three miles of the United States’ camp, and one mile
from the Niagara Falls. At the same time, Drummond landed and
commenced his march along the left bank of the Niagara river, while
Tucker, in accordance with previous orders, marched along the right
bank on Lewiston. Lewiston was captured at noon, and the two
parties reunited at Queenston. Sending back part of the force,
Drummond, with 815 men and two guns, held on his way to Lundy’s
Lane. Brown, on receiving intelligence of Tucker’s advance on
Lewiston, believing that his more considerable stores at Fort
Schlosser were threatened, and that Pearson’s party at Lundy’s Lane
was only a strong patrol, resolved to make a countermove on
Queenston and Fort George. Riall’s remaining brigades at Twelve
Mile Creek were under arms at daybreak to support Pearson. Their
advance was then countermanded, and they remained in camp till
noon, when a force, numbering 1230 rank and file, with four guns,
under Colonel Scott, was ordered to march at once for Lundy’s Lane.
On neither side was there any immediate expectation of a battle.
A little before five in the afternoon Brown detached a force of
about 1800 men and two guns under General Scott to advance on
Queenston. On coming in contact with Pearson’s outposts, Scott
became aware that the force in front of him was stronger than he
had supposed, and delayed his attack, while he sent back to Brown
for more troops. Riall, who had ridden on to join Pearson, took
Scott’s brigade for the advance of Brown’s whole force. He at once
sent back word to the force advancing from Twelve Mile Creek,
which was still three miles away, to retire on the heights near
Queenston, and ordered Pearson to retreat on that point. After
retiring half a mile, Riall and Pearson met Drummond advancing.
Drummond at once took the command, ordered the position at
Lundy’s Lane to be re-occupied, and sent word to countermand
Riall’s last order to Colonel Scott, whom he directed to press on and
join him.
Scott (U.S.), fearing an ambush, advanced with great caution,
which just allowed time for the British force to regain the hill before
it could be occupied by the enemy. Drummond’s force now
amounted to about 1700 men, thus disposed. On the summit of the
hill were two guns: a little behind them were five companies of the
Royal Scots, a detachment of the 41st, the 89th, with their left
resting on the road running parallel with the river from Queenston to
Niagara Falls. The line was prolonged towards the river by some of
the 8th and some militia. On the road, somewhat retired, was Major
Lisle’s troop of the 19th Light Dragoons. Both flanks were thrown
forward, the woods on the right of the line being occupied by the
Glengarry regiment, a corps of the Macdonald clan raised in Canada,
that fought all through the war with great distinction. By a curious
coincidence, Drummond had under his command three regiments, in
which he had served as a regimental officer; the Royal Scots, the
8th, and the 41st.
Scott commenced his attack about half past six, along the entire
front. On Drummond’s right and centre, the attack was not pushed
home, and the British guns on the hill, from their advantageous
position, had a decided superiority over the attacking artillery. But on
Drummond’s left, the attack was successful. A battalion, ordered by
Scott to make a wide turning movement through the dense forest
between the road and the river, suddenly attacked the Canadian
militia in flank, threw them into disorder, and captured some
prisoners, occupied the road, and forced back Lisle’s troop of the
19th for over a mile. At this juncture, General Riall was severely
wounded, and, being taken to the road, was conducted by mistake,
in the growing darkness, into a party of the enemy, by whom he was
at once made prisoner. The Canadian militia, however, quickly
recovered themselves, and formed up in rear of the 89th, at right
angles to them, covering the flank and rear of the British position.
They also cleared the road to the rear, and the enemy made no
further headway on this flank during the remainder of the battle.
Scott now made a determined attack, with the rest of his troops,
on the British centre. It was repulsed after some severe fighting, in
which both sides suffered heavily. A lull in the action then occurred,
during which the artillery on both sides maintained their fire. Scott,
while reforming his ranks, was joined by Brown and the rest of the
United States’ troops; at the same time, Drummond was joined by
the rear division of Riall’s troops, which had been marching and
counter-marching, under conflicting orders, since they left Twelve
Mile Creek. With them came the second troop of the 19th.
“For a few minutes firing almost ceased, and this interval was employed by
the United States’ artillerymen in bringing forward fresh supplies of ammunition,
and a daring officer, Captain Brooke, stealthily crept up the hillside until within a
few yards of the British battery, with a dark lantern, which he suspended in a
thicket, as a guide for his gunners to take aim by; for although the moon had
risen, its light was rendered faint and uncertain by drifting clouds of smoke and
dust, and the position of either line of battle was simply indicated at intervals, by
the flash of their guns.”[64]

Drummond employed part of his reinforcement to strengthen his

right, while the remainder formed a second line in rear of the first. A
field gun was also brought up in line with the two guns on the hill.
The United States’ commander was now convinced that the
capture of the hill and the guns on it was necessary to success.
Forming a brigade, 1400 strong, in the hollow of the hill, he sent
them straight against the guns. Part of them recoiled under the
heavy fire, but one battalion was able to approach under a screen of
dense thickets, and gained a position behind a log fence within
twenty yards of the guns without being observed. Pouring in a
volley, they rushed on the gunners with the bayonet, and were at
once masters of the guns, which were turned upon the British line. A
large body of United States’ infantry were then brought up on to the
hill, and their artillery ascended the slope at a gallop. In doing this,
one gun, of which the drivers were killed by a sudden volley, was
taken by the horses into the British ranks, and secured.
“The remainder of the British artillery was at the same time brought forward,
until the muzzles of the (opposing) guns were only a few yards asunder, and the
battle thenceforward became a confused, ferocious and sanguinary struggle,
waged frequently at the bayonet’s point, or with clubbed muskets, the British
striving desperately to regain the ground they had lost, and their opponents to
thrust them down into the hollow beyond, and drive them from the field.
Regiments, companies, and sections were broken up and mingled together. They
retired, rallied, and were led to the charge again.”[64]
 Walker & Boutall sc.
BATTLE OF LUNDY’S LANE
9 p.m. 25th. July, 1814.
From L.L.H.S. Publications.
 For over two hours this desperate struggle in the dark continued,
with varying fortunes. At one moment, the 103rd, a young regiment,
was forced back in disorder; at another the U.S. guns were
captured, and two of them spiked. Neither side could make
headway, in spite of frequent attacks and counter-attacks.
Drummond was severely wounded but kept the field: nearly one-
third of the British force were killed and wounded. The U.S. forces
were in equally bad case. Three of their generals were wounded,
while the rank and file had lost heavily. In the confusion and
darkness the whole force had become disorganized; Scott’s brigade,
that had commenced the fight, had dwindled to a few companies:
there were an enormous number of stragglers. Closing their ranks
for a last attack the wearied British troops, headed by the light
company of the 41st, regained possession of the hill and of the
guns, just as Brown had decided on withdrawing. Desultory firing
continued for a few minutes: it was not till near midnight that the
British troops, wearied by prolonged marching and fighting,
remained in undisturbed possession of the field. Two of the enemy’s
guns remained in their possession, while one British gun was carried
off.
Thus ended the battle of Lundy’s Lane, the most severely
contested action of the war. On the British side both generals were
severely wounded, one of them being taken prisoner. Out of a total
strength of somewhat less than 3000, the total British loss amounted
to 5 officers and 76 men killed, 30 officers and 532 men wounded,
14 officers and 219 men missing and prisoners. The disproportion of
wounded to killed, in this and other actions, was mainly due to the
frequent use of buckshot by the enemy. The heaviest losses fell on
the Royal Scots and 89th, who, out of a total of about 900 present,
suffered a loss of 426. The 19th Light Dragoons had two wounded
and one missing, together with three horses killed, ten wounded,
and one missing. The United States’ loss was never correctly stated.
Of the four generals engaged, three were wounded, while the
disorganization of their force of about 4500 men engaged, and the
loss of 16 officers killed and 56 wounded, makes it probable that
their loss in killed and wounded was not less than 1200. Several
hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the British. In his
dispatch, General Drummond writes, “In reviewing the action from
its commencement, the first object which presents itself as
deserving of notice, is the steadiness and good countenance of the
squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, under Major Lisle, and the
very creditable and excellent defence made by the incorporated
militia-battalion &c.” This refers to the first period of the action when
the left of the line was forced back.
The following day, General Ripley, who had succeeded to the
command of the United States’ troops, advanced across the
Chippewa to see to his dead and wounded; finding the field in
occupation of the British, he immediately retired, broke down the
bridge, destroyed a quantity of camp equipage and stores, and
retired precipitately to Erie, which he reached on 27th. The light
troops, cavalry and Indians were sent in pursuit, and made a few
prisoners. On reaching Erie, Ripley at once set to work to enlarge
and strengthen the defences, in anticipation of attack.
Drummond, after repairing the bridge, and receiving some
reinforcements that brought his effective strength up to 3150 men,
followed in Ripley’s footsteps, and appeared before Erie, which he
invested on 3rd August. Ripley’s position was now very strong, with
new earthworks and batteries extending from the fort to the edge of
the lake. On the river side he was covered by the batteries at Black
Rock: while from the lake, his defences were flanked by the fire of
three gunboats. On the night of the 3rd, Drummond threw a small
party of about 450 men across the river to capture the batteries at
Black Rock. Failing to effect a surprise, they recrossed, with the loss
of 25 men k.w.m. Two days later, the spirits of the besieged were
raised by the arrival of General Gaines to supersede Ripley. On the
night of the 12th, a daring exploit was performed by Captain Dobbs
of the Royal Navy. With 75 seamen from Lake Ontario, he attacked
and captured, in open boats transported overland, two of the three
gunboats on Lake Erie: the third gunboat cut its cable, and escaped.
On the 13th, Drummond’s batteries opened fire on the enemy’s
works, and continued the cannonade on the following day,
preparatory to a grand assault. At 2 A.M. on the 15th, the assault was
delivered in three columns. The right column, headed by Sergeant
Powell of the 19th Light Dragoons, “who was perfectly acquainted
with the ground, volunteered to act as guide, and preceded the
leading subdivision in the most intrepid style,” was to attack a work
called Snake Hill at the border of the lake. The picquet of cavalry
under Captain Eustace, 19th Light Dragoons was detailed to act with
the right column. The rest of the squadron was drawn up in the rear
of the most advanced battery, in readiness to receive prisoners, and
conduct them to the rear. The centre and left columns were to
assault the fort at different points. The scaling ladders with the right
attack were too short; after prolonged efforts, and suffering great
losses, the column was obliged to retire without gaining a footing.
The left column also was beaten back, losing its leader and many
men. The centre column, which was the weakest of the three, led by
Lt. Colonel Drummond, the general’s nephew, alone effected a
lodgment, and maintained its position till daylight, in spite of the
most desperate efforts of the garrison. Lt. Colonel Drummond fell;
but his men, reinforced from the left column, continued to resist all
attacks made to dislodge them, till a tremendous explosion of stored
ammunition took place, killing many, and forcing the remainder to
retire. Almost every officer with the centre and left columns was
killed or wounded. This disastrous repulse cost the British force a
loss of 905 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing; great part of
the loss being ascribed to the explosion.
Drummond continued the blockade, and his troops now began to
suffer greatly from sickness. On the 2nd September, General Brown,
who had recovered from his wound received at Lundy’s Lane,
resumed command of the U.S. forces at Erie, in place of Gaines who
had been severely wounded. On the morning of the 7th, a United
States’ picquet, consisting of an officer and 21 men, was surprised
and cut off to a man, by a small party of infantry and a detachment
of the 19th Light Dragoons under Captain Eustace, the whole
commanded by Captain Powell, D.A.Q.M.G. The General Order of the
same day says: “Sergeant Powell, 19th Light Dragoons, has been
named to the Lieutenant General as having again distinguished
himself on this occasion.” This brave soldier was subsequently taken
prisoner, and is believed to have died before he could be exchanged.
On the 17th September, favoured by a heavy fall of rain, Brown
made a sortie in three strong divisions. The battery guards were
surprised, and the whole line of entrenchments was for a time in the
assailants’ hands; till Drummond, bringing up troops from the camp,
drove out the enemy, and recovered possession of his batteries. The
sortie cost the British troops 609 killed, wounded and prisoners, in
addition to three of their few heavy guns destroyed, and other
damage. This, together with continuous bad weather and increasing
sickness among his troops, caused Drummond to give up the
blockade, on the 21st, and withdraw his Head Quarters across the
Chippewa on the 24th, which was done without molestation. A
strong body of troops was maintained in advance of the Chippewa,
occupying the line of the Black Creek. In his dispatch of 2nd October
to Sir George Prevost, Drummond reports the capture by the enemy
of a patrol of a corporal and six men of the 19th Light Dragoons.
“The Dragoons must have been most culpably careless and
confident, or the circumstance could not have happened.” About the
8th October, General Izard, with a large body of U.S. troops, arrived
by land at Lewiston, from Sackett’s Harbour. Instead of crossing the
river to Drummond’s rear, as he should have done, he continued
along the river to Black Rock, and assumed the command at Erie.
Izard’s force now amounted to over 8000 men, from whom some
decisive action was to be expected. Izard advanced to Black Creek,
and offered battle, which Drummond was not strong enough to
accept. Beyond some skirmishing, Izard made no further use of his
superiority of force, awaiting co-operation from the lake. But the
U.S. squadron on Ontario was held fast in Sackett’s Harbour by Sir
James Yeo. Izard remained inactive till 20th October, when he fell
back, and carried his force across the river to Black Rock and
Buffalo. On the 5th November, he blew up Fort Erie and evacuated
the place. Drummond at once disposed the men in winter quarters.
Major Lisle’s squadron was ordered to hold itself in readiness to
proceed to Lower Canada, and one troop under Captain Eustace was
sent to Ancaster.
Several times during the summer marauding parties from the
United States, taking advantage of the undefended state of the
Detroit frontier, had crossed the border, plundering and burning, and
carrying off peaceable inhabitants. Drummond was unable to spare
any force to meet this evil, and the province suffered cruelly.
Towards the end of October, a mounted force of 1500 undisciplined
men, under General McArthur, crossed the border by Lake St Clair,
and marched to Moravian town on the Thames river, continuing
eastwards in the direction of Burlington Heights, where only a few
militia and some 300 of the 103rd, under Lt. Colonel Smelt, were
stationed. Smelt at once moved forward to Grand River with about
170 men of the 103rd, 27 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 150 militia
and some Indians. After making a demonstration of crossing,
McArthur turned back and regained Detroit, on the 17th November,
without having effected anything beyond the destruction of a great
quantity of property. “Both in their advance and in their retreat their
progress was marked by plunder and devastation.” Captain Eustace
and his party marched to Dover.
A return, dated 8th November, shows that out of 7552 men on the
frontier between Toronto and Long Point, 1327 were in hospital at
that date. The total strength of the 19th Light Dragoons’ squadron
was 123, of whom 34 were sick.
The operations for the year were at an end on this part of the
frontier. Fort Niagara still remained in British hands, and the
projected attack on Kingston had not been made. The only results of
the strenuous efforts made by the United States’ government, at this
point, had been to show the improvement of their troops, both in
generalship and fighting power, since the beginning of the war.
Beyond this, there was nothing to show for the offensive operations
undertaken by the United States during the year.
The abdication of Napoleon, and the peace concluded in Paris at
the end of May, set free for service in America the troops serving
under Wellington in the south of France. A number of regiments
were embarked at once for Quebec, so that, by the end of August,
Sir George Prevost had upwards of 16,000 British troops in Lower
Canada. With them came instructions to attack Plattsburgh, which,
to observers at a distance, appeared to be the point from which the
most formidable attack might be directed against Montreal. The
strategy was at fault, as the experience of the preceding year had
shown that, while Kingston continued to be held in force, no attack
from Plattsburgh was likely to be successful. On the other hand, a
British success at Plattsburgh could lead to no decisive result. The
true point of attack was Sackett’s Harbour, on Lake Ontario. The
occupation and retention of this point would have destroyed the U.S.
naval power on the lake; Montreal and Kingston would have been
secured from attack; and Sir Gordon Drummond would have been
master of the situation on the Niagara frontier. The U.S. government
gauged the situation more correctly, and denuded Plattsburgh of
troops to reinforce Sackett’s Harbour. The event showed that
Plattsburgh was only of secondary importance.
For the expedition against Plattsburgh Sir George Prevost formed
three brigades on the frontier extending from the Richelieu river to
the St Lawrence commanded by Major Generals Power, Robinson
and Brisbane. The whole division was under command of Major
General de Rottenburg, and amounted to 11,000 men. With it was
the rest of the 19th Light Dragoons not engaged on the Niagara
frontier.
On the 3rd of September, Sir George Prevost, advancing by
Chateaugay from the St Lawrence, crossed the frontier to Chazy,
and, on the 5th, reached, without opposition, a point eight miles
from Plattsburgh. The U.S. troops about Plattsburgh, at the time,
amounted to about 1500 men, of inferior quality, under General
Macomb. This force was augmented by about 3000 militia from the
surrounding neighbourhood during the operations, but neither in
quality or numbers was it fit to stand before the troops under
Prevost. On the 6th, the army advanced on Plattsburgh, driving in
the U.S. pickets and outposts. So feeble was the resistance made
that General Macomb mentions in his dispatch that the British troops
pressed on in column, not even deigning to fire, except by their
flankers and advanced patrols, on the militia that they brushed out
of their way. In the advance, the 19th Light Dragoons had one man
and two horses wounded, two men and six horses missing.
Plattsburgh stands on the Saranac creek which runs at right angles
into Lake Champlain. The high ground on the south side of the
Saranac was occupied by Macomb with some hastily constructed
redoubts. The houses on the north of the Saranac were occupied by
British troops, on the 6th. On the lake lay the U.S. squadron,
consisting of four vessels and ten gunboats. The British squadron,
consisting of four vessels and twelve gunboats, was still at the north
end of Lake Champlain, awaiting the completion of the flag-ship
which had only been launched ten days previously, and whose crew
had hardly joined her from Quebec. Sir George Prevost had only to
advance on the 7th to make himself master of the feeble defences
opposed to him, when he suddenly conceived the idea that he must
await the co-operation of his lake squadron. For four days Prevost
lay inactive, while he urged Captain Downie with his ill-prepared
ships to join him, and engage the enemy’s squadron: the time was
utilised by Macomb in strengthening his defences and collecting
reinforcements. On the 11th, the British squadron appeared in sight,
and engaged the U.S. ships, while Prevost put his troops tardily in
motion. They forded the Saranac, and ascended the opposing
heights, when, with victory in their grasp, they suddenly received the
order to withdraw to their former positions. The British lake
squadron, after a most deadly contest of over two hours, had been
completely defeated, and Sir George Prevost at once threw up the
sponge. The same night, leaving his sick and wounded, together
with a quantity of stores, he commenced a retreat, which much
resembled a flight, to the Canadian frontier. In the many wars in
which the British army has fought, it would be hard to find a parallel
instance in which British troops have been so mishandled. The co-
operation of the fleet was unnecessary, as the enemy’s squadron
could not have maintained its position with the whole of Plattsburgh
in British hands. Nine thousand of Wellington’s veterans, who had
defeated Napoleon’s choicest troops again and again, were made to
retreat from an inferior force that could not have withstood them for
an hour, with a loss of less than 40 killed since they had crossed the
frontier. No wonder that the enemy first took the retreat for a ruse
de guerre, and that a British General broke his sword, vowing he
would never serve again. In the whole of the operations against
Plattsburgh, the land forces under Prevost’s immediate command
suffered a total loss of 37 killed, 150 wounded and 55 missing. In
their anger at the fiasco, an immense number of men deserted
during the retreat, causing a greater loss than a successful
prosecution of the enterprise could possibly have entailed. The 19th
Light Dragoons while covering the retirement, lost five men and
horses taken prisoners.
Only brief mention need be made of land operations elsewhere, as
they do not come within the scope of operations in which the 19th
Light Dragoons were concerned. In the middle of August, a
combined military and naval expedition fitted out from Bermuda,
under Major General Ross and Vice Admiral Cockburn, landed at
Benedict in the Potomac river, 50 miles from Washington, and
marched on that town. At Bladensberg, on the 24th, Ross
encountered a U.S. army of about 8000 men under General Winder,
and gained a complete and easy victory, taking 10 guns.[65]
Washington was occupied the same evening. On the following
evening, after burning the most important public buildings, in
retaliation for the outrages committed on the Canadian non-
combatants, the force retired, and re-embarked on the 29th, without
molestation.
At daylight on the 12th September, the same force landed 13
miles from Baltimore, and advanced on that place. On first coming in
touch with the enemy, Ross was killed by a chance shot. Colonel
Brook assumed the command, and at about five miles from
Baltimore a United States’ force of about 7000 men was encountered
and overthrown in less than half an hour. Two field pieces and many
prisoners were captured. Preparations were then made for a
combined attack on the city, when it was discovered that the
harbour was so effectually closed by sunken vessels, that naval co-
operation was impossible. It being considered that, under these
circumstances, the loss that must be incurred in taking the place by
storm would be out of proportion to any benefit to be gained, the
troops were withdrawn, and re-embarked without the slightest
molestation, on the 15th. The troopships, after hovering on the
coast, rather aimlessly for another month, then set sail for Jamaica,
where an expedition was preparing against New Orleans.
The mistake that had been made by the United States government
in the early part of the war, in under-rating the difficulty of
conquering Canada, and in believing that the inhabitants would join
the invaders, was now to be repeated by the British government.
British Ministers had been brought to believe that the inhabitants of
Louisiana were disaffected to the U.S. government, and that the
State could easily be taken possession of. With this object, an
expedition against New Orleans had been planned in England; and,
it was in order to save the troops for this purpose, that the attack on
Baltimore had been abandoned. New Orleans, though a great
commercial centre, was devoid of any military importance, and the
expedition was destined to furnish another example of the faulty
strategy that was exhibited on both sides during the war.
On the 8th December, the expedition under Major General Sir
Edward Pakenham, appeared off the coast, and, on the night of the
12th, captured the enemy’s squadron of gunboats. On the 16th, the
landing of the troops commenced, at the mouth of the Pearl river.
Considerable delay ensued, owing to the swampy nature of the
ground, and the advance did not approach the city till the 23rd.
General Jackson, in command at New Orleans, occupied a long line
of entrenchments at right angles to the river. He was also assisted
by armed vessels on the Mississippi which inflicted severe losses on
the British troops, and greatly delayed their advance. On the
morning of the 8th January, the attack was made, and repulsed with
heavy slaughter. Pakenham fell at the head of his men; Major
General Gibbs died of his wounds the following day, and Major
General Keane was severely wounded. The total loss amounted to
2119 killed, wounded and missing. So strongly were the enemy
posted, that his loss did not exceed about 80 men. Under this
disastrous repulse the expedition withdrew on the 18th, and re-
embarked. A portion of the expedition was then directed against Fort
Bowyer, on Mobile Point, which capitulated, on 12th February,
without resistance. Twenty-eight guns and over 300 prisoners fell
into the hands of the British.
In the middle of March, news was received that a Treaty of Peace
had been signed at Ghent on 24th December, and the war was at an
end.
During the summer of 1814, the Head Quarters of the regiment
was moved from La Prairie to Chambly, where they remained as long
as the regiment was in Canada. The four troops left behind in
Ireland had been moved, on the embarkation of the regiment for
Canada, to Radipole Barracks, near Weymouth; and thence to
Maidstone, in February 1814. In July of the same year, the regiment
lost its Colonel, Lord Howe, by death. In his place, Lieutenant
General Sir William Payne Bt., was transferred as Colonel, from the
23rd Light Dragoons. He was an officer who had served in the Royal
Dragoons, and commanded the British Cavalry at the battle of
Talavera. His connection with the regiment was very brief, as, in the
following January, he was appointed Colonel of the 12th Light
Dragoons. In his place, Major General Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur
K.C.B., Lieutenant Colonel in the regiment, was appointed Colonel.
Sir John Vandeleur had entered the army in 1781, and saw service
in Flanders in 1794, and at the Cape of Good Hope in 1796. He
commanded a brigade of cavalry, under Lake, in the wars against
Scindia and Holkar, 1803–5, and especially distinguished himself at
Laswaree, and on other occasions. In 1807, he exchanged into the
19th as already mentioned.[66] In 1811, he commanded an infantry
brigade in Spain, under Wellington, and, at Ciudad Rodrigo, led the
assault after Craufurd’s fall, when he was severely wounded.
Afterwards he commanded the 4th cavalry brigade at Waterloo, and
succeeded to the command of the whole of the cavalry, on Lord
Uxbridge being wounded.
During 1814, gold lace was substituted for silver in the uniform of
the regiment.
In May 1815, sanction was granted, under the following order, for
Major Lisle’s squadron to wear the badge “Niagara” for their services
on the Niagara frontier. The privilege seems to have been extended
later to the whole regiment.
Horse Guards
19th May 1815.
1815.
19th Light
Dragoons
(Squadron
under Major
Lisle). Royal
Scots—1st
Battalion. 8th
or King’s—
1st Battalion.
41st—Fl.
Cos. 89th—
2nd Batt.
100th—
103rd—
Glengarry Lt.
Inf. Fencibles.

Sir,
I have had the honour to lay before the Commander-in-Chief
your letter of the 26th February last, and am directed to acquaint
you in reply that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been
pleased, in the Name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve
of the Regiments named in the Margin, being permitted to bear
on their Colors and Appointments in addition to any other Badges,
or Devices, which may have been heretofore permitted to be
borne by those Regiments the Word “Niagara,” in consequence of
the distinguished Conduct of those Corps in the Capture of Fort
Niagara by Assault on the 19th December 1813, and in the Battle
at Lundy’s Lane, in North America, on the 25th July 1814.
I have &c.
 H. Calvert
A. G.

Lt. General
Sir George Prevost Bt.
or General Officer Commanding Canada.

Detachments of the regiment were quartered at La Prairie, Isle

aux Noix, Blairfindie, Quebec, Montreal, and St John’s.
In 1816, the whole of the ten troops of the regiment, amounting
to 620 rank and file, appear to have been in Canada. At the very end
of the year, the strength of the Canadian establishment was fixed at
5000 rank and file. In order to bring it down to this number, the 19th
were held under orders to return to England, but, it was not till the
following 6th August that they embarked at Quebec, and landed at
Tilbury, 13th September. On landing they marched to Romford,
where they remained till the following March.
The execution done by the Polish lancers at Waterloo induced the
military authorities in England to arm four regiments with lances.
Accordingly, the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 23rd Light Dragoons were
equipped as Lancers, in September 1816. But great reductions in the
military establishments were in progress, and, in October 1817, the
23rd were disbanded, their horses being made over to the 19th,
whose establishment was reduced to eight troops. At the same time,
the 19th were ordered to be equipped as lancers.[67]
In March 1818, the regiment was moved to Hounslow and
Hampton Court, with detachments at Pimlico and Kensington. On the
26th May, the regiment, together with the 10th Hussars, was
reviewed at Hounslow by the Prince Regent, and, in November, they
were on duty, at Datchet, for Queen Charlotte’s funeral.
The regimental muster rolls show that in October the regiment
had 455 rank and file.
In June of the following year the regiment moved to Brighton,
with troops at Hastings, Arundel and Rottingdean.
 A year later (June 1820), the regiment was ordered to
Nottingham, with troops at Mansfield, Sheffield, Loughborough,
Peterborough and Derby. In spite of the distance, they marched to
Hounslow to be reviewed, on 4th August, in company with the 10th
Hussars and 12th Lancers, by George IV., when His Majesty
expressed his “unqualified approbation” of the three regiments.

OFFICERS OF THE XIXTH LANCERS, 1818.

to face p. 218.

During the winter, the regiment marched to Manchester, and, in

the end of May, embarked for Ireland, where they were quartered at
Newbridge. But further reductions were in progress, and, on 23rd
August 1821, warrants were issued for the disbandment of the 18th
Light Dragoons and 19th Lancers, which were carried into effect on
10th September. The strength of the 19th, at the time of
disbandment, was 103 officers and non-commissioned officers, 336
rank and file, 273 horses.
 PA RT I V

T H E N I N E T E E N T H “ P R I N C E SS O F WA L E S ’
O W N ” H U SSA R S
(1858–1899)

CHAPTER I

RAISING OF THE REGIMENT

(1858–1882)

The East India Company raises European Cavalry regiments—Their formation—The

Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry—Services transferred to the Crown—The
“White Mutiny”—Made 19th Light Dragoons, afterwards Hussars—General
Pattle—Regiment at Meerut—General Hall—Regiment ordered to England—
Badges of old 19th Light Dragoons granted—Regiment ordered to Ireland—
Guidons of old 19th Light Dragoons presented to the regiment—Regiment
returns to England—Ordered on active service.
In May 1857, the mutiny of the Bengal Native Army occurred, which
so profoundly changed the nature of British administration in India.
Through carelessness and false economy, the East India Company
had allowed the number of European troops in India to sink to a
dangerously low level, in proportion to the number of native troops.
As against some 230,000 native soldiers, the European troops
numbered less than 40,000 men, of whom about 23,500 were royal
troops. The Company’s European troops in India consisted, at that
time, of nine battalions of Infantry, seventeen troops of Horse
Artillery, and forty-eight companies of Foot Artillery. Apart from other
measures for restoring tranquillity, it was determined to raise three
additional battalions of Infantry, and to replace the mutinous Bengal
Native Cavalry by Europeans. Of the ten regiments of regular Bengal
Native Cavalry, seven had mutinied, and two had been disarmed.
In November 1857, intimation was sent to the Governor General
that it had been decided to form four regiments of Cavalry, for the
Company’s service, of men recruited in England, of ages between 20
and 30 years, and of a standard height not less than 5 ft., and not
exceeding 5 ft. 4 in. Each regiment was to consist of ten troops, with
70 privates per troop, together with the usual number of officers,
non-commissioned officers and staff. All accoutrements, arms, and
equipments were to be of a lighter description than those in
common use by British Cavalry: and the men were to be collected at
a depot in England (Warley), to be trained for three months, before
being embarked for India. A lower standard of height than that of
the Royal Army was adopted, with the intention that the recruiting
for the Royal Army should not be interfered with, and it was thought
that, by tapping a new stratum of recruits, men would be easily
obtained. These anticipations were justified. The whole nation had
been roused by the sufferings of our countrywomen in India, and
recruits flocked in. Three weeks later, the Court of Directors were
obliged to write to the Governor General that, in consequence of the
very rapid recruiting, accommodation could not be provided for the
men, in England, and it was necessary to embark a large body of
them, for Calcutta, at once.
With regard to these undersized men, it may be said here, that a
large number of them made excellent soldiers in time; but there was
a considerable proportion of them, big men on short legs, over 25
years of age at the time of enlistment, who were unfit for cavalry
purposes.
After being kept some time near Calcutta, the men were gradually
forwarded to Allahabad, where they were collected in June 1858, an
almost undisciplined mob, without permanent officers, without
horses, and without equipments. On the 17th June, we find Major
General Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) writing to
Major General Sir Hope Grant, then in the field against the rebels:
“We are about to organize the four regiments of Bengal Dragoons,
and to divide the recruits into four bodies without delay. How would
it suit you to have one of these young corps attached to the ‘Bays’
(2nd Dragoon Guards), and another to the 7th (Hussars)? Not a man
has ever been on a horse, and the men are at present armed with
muskets.”
By the end of June, the apportioning of the men into regiments
was complete, and, on the 3rd July, the regiment with which our
interest lies, became established as the Bengal 1st European Light
Cavalry, to be quartered at Allahabad. The other three regiments
marched for various cantonments in North Western India. A fifth
regiment was formed at Peshawur, in November, of volunteers from
Royal infantry regiments, who had been formed into a cavalry corps
for temporary service during the Mutiny.
To officer each of these regiments, the officers of two of the ten
mutinied or disbanded Bengal Native Cavalry regiments were
utilized: but, instead of placing them upon a single list, they were
kept on separate lists for promotion, which were styled Right and
Left Wings, corresponding to their late regiments. All officers newly
appointed, who had belonged to neither of the old Native regiments,
were to be borne on the strength of the Right Wing, so that, in
process of time, the Left Wing was destined to disappear; but the
process would have been one of thirty years or more, according to
the rate of promotion then existing in the Company’s service.
The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry was officered by the
surviving officers of the 1st and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry, both of
which regiments had mutinied. For remounts, the men were given a
number of horses hastily purchased at the Cape of Good Hope and
in Australia, most of them wild unbroken bush horses that had never
been handled. An officer who served with the regiment at this time,
writing of it forty years afterwards, says:—
“No regiments were ever raised under such absurd conditions, and, if the
object had been to prove them a failure, no course better calculated to achieve
that end could have been pursued. The only old soldiers sent to assist us were two
or three infantry men from a Fusilier regiment, none higher in rank than Corporal.
When the authorities were addressed on this subject, one or two cavalry soldiers,
I think from the 7th Hussars, were sent; the highest in rank being a Lance
Corporal who was promptly made a Troop Sergeant Major, and I don’t think turned
out a success. The horses, like the men, were all untrained, and some of the
horses from the Cape were perfect devils, very difficult to clean, and for some time
impossible to ride or to shoe. I have a vivid recollection of one roan, who stood in
his stall for days covered with mud, because no one could go near him. Out of the
crowd of raw recruits, we had to find all our Non-Commissioned officers from
Troop Sergeant Major downwards, so it may be imagined what little respect was
paid to the highest grades.”

On the 1st November 1858, the Crown assumed the government

of India, and the East India Company thenceforth ceased to exist.
No attention was paid to the view that might be taken of the
change, in the ranks of the Company’s army. The British soldier,
though he yields to discipline, never forgets that he is a soldier by
his own free will; he objects to be treated like a conscript. The late
Company’s European soldiers quickly came to believe that their
rights had been infringed. Had they been asked to volunteer for
service under the Crown, they would have done so almost to a man;
but they objected to be handed over “like bullocks,” as they
expressed it. The Indian government consulted its legal advisers,
who treated the objection as a purely technical one, prompted by a
wish for the offer of a bounty. So long as the men were retained for
the local service for which they had enlisted, it was considered that
they had no grievance. It was decided that the men had no case,
and a General Order to this effect was published in April 1859. The
agitation quickly assumed a serious aspect, and, during May, there
was a time when, in a few cantonments, a collision between the
Royal and the late Company’s European troops appeared possible.
The movement was not confined to the newly raised regiments, but
was equally shared in by the old soldiers of the late Company, who
had shown their fine qualities on many a hard fought field. The
behaviour of the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry was similar to
that of the local European forces in most other places. All guards
and barrack duties were performed without demur, but the men
refused to turn out for parade. On one occasion the canteen was
broken into, and an attempt was made to release prisoners.
Mutinous language was used to officers in a few instances, and
shots fired in defiance, but not with evil intent. Under the
circumstances already related, it is surprising that nothing worse
occurred. In one instance alone, in one of the newly raised infantry
regiments, was there a dangerous attempt to act as an organized
armed body hostile to the State. This was speedily repressed, and
the ringleader shot.
The Calcutta government quickly recognized its mistake. In the
end of June, orders were published allowing the men the option of
discharge, but no bounty was offered to those who elected to
remain, while those who took their discharge were not allowed the
option of re-enlistment, as long as they remained in the country.
Under the feeling of exasperation that had grown up, upwards of
10,000 men elected to take their discharge, of whom 2800 re-
enlisted on reaching England.
The trouble with the Indian local European forces, in 1859, has
been frequently cited as a cogent reason against the maintenance of
a body of British troops in India, for local service only; a measure
that would overcome many difficulties now felt in army
administration. Those who study the events of 1859 must recognize
that the trouble arose, not from the conditions of service, but from
the mistakes of those in authority at Calcutta. The “White Mutiny”
was no mere outbreak against discipline: it was the vindication of
the men’s claim to be consulted in the disposal of their services.
While these events were in progress, orders were received for the
regiment to march to Cawnpore, which it did in June.
Early in 1861, it was determined to cease the maintenance of any
European force for local service in India, and, on 6th May, the
officers, non-commissioned officers and men were called on to
volunteer for General Service. They responded, almost to a man,
and the regiment received the designation of the 19th Light
Dragoons. In the same way, the Bengal 2nd and 3rd European Light
Cavalry became the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons; the 4th and 5th
being disbanded. At the same time, the establishment was
assimilated to that of other British cavalry regiments in India, viz.
nine troops (one at the depot in England) with 585 corporals and
privates: 693 of all ranks. Three months later, under Horse Guards
order of 17th August 1861, the designation of the regiment was
changed to the 19th Hussars. The standard for recruits was
assimilated to that of other Hussar regiments.
At the beginning of February 1862, the regiment was moved to
Lucknow.
On the 30th July, in the same year, the complete roll of officers
was gazetted.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Vanbrugh Jenkins.

John Hatfield Brooks.

Major
Roland Richardson.

Henry Cadogan Craigie.

Sir John Hill, Bt. Bt. Major.
Henry Edward Ellice.
Robert Baring.
Captain Melville Clarke.
Hugh Henry Gough, V.C., Brevet Major.
Frederick Peter Luard.
Richard Talbot Plantagenet Stapleton
Charles Manners Sutton Fairbrother.

Lieutenant Charles Hay Fairlie.

Abel Henry Chapman.
Cecil Clarke Jervoise.
Arthur George Webster.
 Robert Morris.
Edward Stirling Rivett-Carnac.
John Biddulph.
George Cortlandt Buller Taylor.
Charles John Prinsep.
Albert Hearsey.

Elliot Alexander Money.

Joseph Boulderson.
Frederick Henry Huth.
Cornet
Charles Robert St. Quintin.
Francis Dallas Harding.
Seymour Duncan Barrow.

Riding Master George Couch.

Adjutant Abel Henry Chapman.

Paymaster Henry Octavius Currie.

The greater number of them had belonged to the Company’s 1st

and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry.
In September, General William Pattle C.B. was gazetted to be
Colonel of the regiment. He was an old Company’s officer who had
entered the service in 1800. He served under Lord Lake in the
Mahratta campaigns of 1803 and 1804, and was present at the
battles of Alyghur, Delhi, Laswaree, the siege of Bhurtpore &c. He
served through the Mahratta war of 1817–18, and commanded the
cavalry under Sir Charles Napier, during the conquest of Scinde, and
at the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad.
Under orders from the War office, dated 6th January 1863, the
establishment was reduced by one troop, leaving seven service
troops and one at Maidstone.
In the autumn, orders were received for the regiment to march to
Meerut, where it arrived 28th November. Here the regiment
remained till the end of 1867. The only events to be noticed during
these four years are a reduction of establishment by 56 privates in
1866: and the presence of the regiment at the great Durbar held by
the Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence, at Agra, in November 1866, when
the 19th were brigaded with the 2nd Dragoon Guards.
In the beginning of 1865, the regiment lost its Colonel by death.
In his place Lieutenant General John Hall was appointed Colonel.
On the 10th December 1867, the Head Quarters of the regiment,
with four troops, marched for Benares, being followed, a month
later, by the remaining three troops, who marched to Cawnpore.
In the ordinary course of relief, the regiment was intended to
leave India in 1872. In a sudden fit of economy, the Indian
Government decided to get rid of two cavalry regiments, so that,
without any previous warning, the regiment received telegraphic
orders, on 18th January 1870, to proceed to England immediately.
Similar orders were sent to the 7th Hussars, then serving in India.
Volunteering was at once opened to men electing to serve in other
regiments remaining in India, and, on 24th January, the regiment
was re-united at Allahabad, whence it proceeded to Bombay, where
it embarked on board the Jumna on the 14th February. So
unexpected had been the move, that a draft for the regiment, from
England, joined it four days before sailing. The strength of the
regiment leaving India, was as follows: 18 officers, 51 sergeants and
corporals, 7 trumpeters, 257 privates, 28 women and 55 children.
On the 22nd March, the regiment landed at Dover, and proceeded
to Canterbury, whence all the Cavalry Depot troops, excepting those
of the 20th and 21st Hussars, had been moved to Maidstone. But
the British Government were as unwilling to have the home military
establishment increased by the two regiments thus sent from India,
as the Indian Government had been to retain them, and the idea of
disbanding two regiments was entertained. The Manchester school
was predominant; shortsighted financial considerations alone had
any weight. The changes rung in the establishment of the regiment
for the next four months show the hesitating counsels that prevailed.