Albania at War, 1939–1945

Central European Studies

Charles W. Ingrao, General Editor

Albania at War,
1939–1945

Bernd J. Fischer

Purdue University Press

West Lafayette, Indiana
Copyright © 1999 by Purdue Research Foundation. All rights reserved.

03 02 01 00 99 5 4 3 2 1

The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI
Z39.48–1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Fischer, Bernd Jürgen, 1952–

Albania at war, 1939–1945 / Bernd J. Fischer.
p. cm. —(Central European studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1–55753–141–2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. World War, 1939–1945—Albania. 2. Albania—History—Axis occupation, 1939–1944.
I. Title. II. Title: Albania at war. III. Series.
D802.A38F57 1999
940.53’4965—dc21 98–46675
CIP
This work is dedicated to my mentor, Dimitrije Djordjevic, and

to my parents, Gertrud and Emil Fischer.

Contents

Acknowledgments / ix
Foreword / xi
Abbreviations / xiv
Note on Place-Names / xv
Maps / xvi

Introduction / 1
1. Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania / 5
2. The Construction of an Italian Albania / 33
3. Italian Greater Albania / 61
4. Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance / 89
5. The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy / 121
6. The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania / 157
7. Resistance to the Germans / 189
8. German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania / 223
Conclusion / 257

Note on Sources / 275

Notes / 285
Bibliography / 321
Index / 329
Acknowledgments

I am greatly indebted to many friends and colleagues without whom this work
would have been considerably more ¶awed than it is, and to the various
institutions who helped to make this work possible. The encouragement of my
friend and mentor, Professor Dimitrije Djordjevic, I will always gratefully
acknowledge. Professors Stephen Fischer-Galati, Peter Sugar, and Nicholas
Pano and my colleague Professor Clifford Scott read part or all of this work
and provided continuing encouragement through their useful comments and
suggestions. My Albanian publisher, Brikena Çabej, and my friend Altin
Rraxhimi also gave generously of their time to read the manuscript and offer
important suggestions. Gabe Downs helped with the index and Elmer Den-
man with the photographs and maps. I would also like to acknowledge Debra
Fehman and Barbara Blauvelt, whose encouragement and help were most
welcome. Finally, I would like to thank the many individuals who provided
assistance at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., the British Public
Record of¤ce in Kew, the Nash archives at the School of Slavonic and East
European Studies at the University of London, and the Auswärtiges Amt in
Bonn.
Many institutions provided the ¤nancial assistance that made travel to the
various archives possible. These include the National Endowment for the
Humanities, the American Council of Learned Societies, Wenatchee Valley
College, the University of Western Ontario, the University of Hartford, Indi-
ana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, and the West European Stud-
ies Center and the Russian and East European Institute, both at Indiana
University, Bloomington.

ix
Foreword

A lbania and its people have coursed this century in relative obscurity. That
they have attracted so little attention stems in part from the country’s small size,
population, and economy. Another reason is that Albania is the only nation-
state in all of central Europe to have remained neutral in both world wars. Its
abstention stemmed in large part from its immaturity as a political entity.
At its creation in 1913, it was in many respects an arti¤cial state, inspired
by Austria-Hungary’s determination to block Serbia’s access to the sea, rather
than by the natural evolution of a common national identity, political culture,
or centralized institutions. As a result, it did not actively participate in the
ruthless, high-stakes competition that has determined the fate, identity, and
agenda of the region’s other nations. At the Paris peace conference of 1919 it
neither shared in the spoils awarded to Greece, Italy, Romania, and Serbia, nor
in the punishment meted out to Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey. In-
stead, Albania and its people entered the interwar period together with an
assortment of emerging pre-national peoples, like the Croats, Slovenes, Bos-
niaks, Slovaks, and Ruthenes, who were caught in a kind of limbo between
winners and losers. Without the leverage to represent their national interests,
their fate was entrusted to those neighbors which had been enfranchised by
the Paris peace settlement. Whereas the results were hardly catastrophic, this
indifferent stewardship gave them a common interest with the Great War’s
defeated nations.
The discontents of the region’s defeated and disenfranchised nations were
readily exploited by opportunistic European powers, most notably by Fascist
Italy and Nazi Germany, prior to their defeat and replacement by Stalin’s
Soviet Union. Professor Fischer shows how the two Axis hegemons exploited
Albanian dissatisfaction with the country’s ethnically imprecise frontiers. Italy
pandered to these frustrations both through anti-Greek rhetoric and Albania’s
xi
xii Foreword

territorial expansion, ¤rst by border recti¤cations in the early 1920s, then by

aggression against Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941. When Italy collapsed two
years later, the German occupiers easily co-opted the Albanians. They readily
forged a common front against the Serbs, both by showcasing their commit-
ment to a “Greater Albania” and by assiduously promoting Albanian cultural
development in Kosovo. Unlike the Italians, however, they also met more
immediate needs by retaining better-quali¤ed political leaders from each of
the country’s confessional groups, as well as by utilizing the greater experience
and sensitivity of Austrian Germans who had served in the region under the
Habsburgs. Most remarkable of all was the respect that the Germans showed
for Albania’s independence and neutrality.
Fischer’s narration and analysis of the German occupation rectify a half-
century of amnesia and mythmaking by Marxist and nationalist historians by
increasing our understanding of the reasonably constructive relationship be-
tween the Third Reich and wartime Albania. Moreover, his case study raises
questions that might be usefully applied to other defeated or disenfranchised
peoples of the interwar period whom Nazi Germany both helped and used for
its own ends. Yet Hitler’s embrace proved fatal for his wartime collaborators. In
Albania, traditional elites, nationalists, and even the proto-democratic forces
that the Germans tolerated were judged guilty by association with the Nazi
scourge. Like so many of the defeated or disenfranchised nations of interwar
Europe, they were readily abandoned in favor of short-term advantages offered
by the Allies’ wartime partners. In Albania’s case, this meant not only the
Greeks, but the Communist partisans who had fought virtually alone against
the Axis occupation; as in Tito’s Yugoslavia, Albania was readily consigned to a
half-century of Communist rule, even though the Red Army had played no
direct role in its liberation.
For Albania, World War II may have been a catastrophe in terms of
immediate wartime suffering and a half-century of totalitarianism. But, as
Fischer demonstrates, it was the nightmare of World War II that transformed
it overnight into a state with substantial centralized governmental institutions
and a broadly based national identity. Once it has completed the turbulent
transition from Communism, its transformation will be complete.
Or will it? Watching the incremental progress of European nation-building
has been like listening to a Bach fugue, with different groups of people raising
their voices in succession. The French, Spanish, and British were the ¤rst, in a
process completed by the end of the eighteenth century. Then came the Ger-
mans and Italians in the middle of the nineteenth century. Over the next
half-century the “subject peoples” of the Ottoman empire, Austria-Hungary,
Foreword xiii

and Tsarist Russia’s Baltic littoral raised their voices. The outbreak of World
War II began what should prove the ¤nal passage of this chorus of nations. It
has been turbulent and unpredictable, though hardly more so than the ¤rst
three stages. It has featured Croats, Slovaks, and Albanians during World War
II and, more recently, Macedonians and Ukrainians. Nor should we overlook
the region’s two “confessional” peoples—the Jews and Bosniaks—both of whom
have built national homelands in the aftermath of a bloody partition. Surely we
are near the completion of this ¤nal stage. But we have yet to hear from the
large number of Albanians who remain denizens of other nation-states. An
appreciation for the continuity between past and present suggests that they will
someday complete the process by making themselves heard.

—Charles W. Ingrao
Abbreviations

AA Auswärtiges Amt (Germany)

CGR Captured German Records (National Archives)
CIR Captured Italian Records (National Archives)
CAB British Cabinet Papers
DDI documenti diplomatici italiani
FO Foreign Of¤ce (Great Britain)
OSS Of¤ce of Strategic Services (United States)
USDS U.S. Department of State
WO War Of¤ce (Great Britain)

xiv
Note on Place-Names

Albanian place-names have both a de¤nite and an inde¤nite form. As is often

done in English works dealing with Albania, I have used the de¤nite form in
place-names ending in vowels and the inde¤nite form with place-names end-
ing in consonants. Since much of Kosovo was added to the Albanian state
during the war years, the Albanian spelling, “Kosova,” is used throughout.

xv
 Albania, 1913–1941
(from Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle)

xvi
 Southern Europe and the Balkans
before World War II
(from Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost)

xvii
 Road Construction in Albania
(from Erich von Luckwald, Albanien)

xviii
 The Axis Division of Yugoslavia
(from Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost)

The Republics of Federal Yugoslavia

(from Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost)
ixx
INTRODUCTION

It is becoming increasing dif¤cult to justify yet another book dealing with

some aspect of World War II. Of all the armed con¶icts of past centuries,
World War II has engendered the most interest as well as an exhausting
amount of written material. The opening of the Soviet archives and the recent
commemoration of the ¤ftieth anniversary of the many de¤ning moments of
the war have resulted in yet another spate of books and ¤lms that examine the
con¶ict in retrospect. But most of the research and interest naturally concen-
trate on the major theaters of war and the major ¤gures involved. Little wars
are often overlooked. Yet in the small state the human suffering was no less
pitiful, the destruction no less devastating, the heroism no less laudatory, the
treachery no less despicable, and the impact no less profound.
Albania counts as one of these forgotten theaters, in which the struggle
was on a smaller scale, although it did not seem that way to the Albanians.
The struggle was long and intense, and for the Albanians it was disturbingly
familiar. The Albanians have known more than their share of war, often in-
vaded but perhaps never fully conquered. In World War I alone, the newly
created state of Albania was invaded and occupied by no fewer than six differ-
ent foreign armies. Enver Hoxha—Albania’s Stalinist dictator until his death
in 1985—was fond of repeating the often quoted adage that Albanians have
hacked their way through history with a sword in hand in order to build
socialism with a pickax and a ri¶e. The reference may be overly colorful, but
there is a certain truth to the assertion, particularly in the context of World
War II. Although not as dramatic as it was elsewhere, the war began earlier
and lasted longer in Albania. The Italians invaded and occupied Albania in
April 1939, well before the German invasion of Poland and before World War
II of¤cially began, though it did not seem that way to many Albanians.
In a certain sense the war in Albania can be seen as a microcosm of the
war in the rest of the Balkans and in Europe as a whole. Albania suffered from
all of the same complexities, if not more. In the short run, the Italian invasion
and the subsequent German invasion were unsuccessfully resisted by the brave
1
2 Introduction

few. Collaborators were found to fashion puppet governments, and resistance

was organized to punish the traitors and expel the invaders. As is true of other
areas of Europe, this resistance fragmented along political lines. The Allies
found it dif¤cult to decide which group to support, but nevertheless played an
important role in terms of leadership and supplies. The invaders were ¤nally
expelled and the collaborators liquidated, as in other areas of Europe. At the
end of the war in Albania, in late 1944, the communists found themselves
unchallenged and assumed both military and political leadership.
But Albania’s unique internal conditions produced signi¤cant variations
in the theme, and below a familiar surface the complications become endless.
During the Italian occupation the fragmentation among the resistance, for
example, was much more severe than in other parts of the Balkans or in
Europe. To complicate matters, many of these resistance groups proved to be
inconsistent, occasionally cooperating with the invader, then turning to resis-
tance, then reverting to cooperation. This vacillation can be explained, at least
partially, by the lack of a fully developed sense of nationalism. As a result, the
reaction of individual groups often depended principally on a regional, tribal,
and local considerations. This lack of a fully developed nationalism also deter-
mined the response of many of the tribal chieftains to the invaders; they
looked to play the various forces off against each other and thereby achieve
some advantage for their areas. It is simple to judge many of these Albanian
leaders in light of Vidkun Quisling and label them as traitors, but that would
attribute to them a level of nationalist sophistication that they did not yet
possess.
Many aspects of Albania’s experience under German occupation are also
unique. Albania’s peculiar internal conditions, as well as German needs, allowed
for the creation of a surprisingly independent occupation regime. This govern-
ment, by doing away with most outward signs of fascism and following a
reformist political and economic policy, managed to attract a signi¤cant amount
of genuine popular support. Much of this came as a surprise to both the Ger-
mans and the Allies, sending them scrambling for information upon which to
construct an effective policy. In the long run neither side succeeded in under-
standing the Albanians, and both failed to effectively control the situation.
Although both the Allies and the Axis failed, the impact of their struggle
was crucial for the Albanians. In the short term the Axis powers relied on and
temporarily bolstered the prewar political and social structure, and they pro-
vided some immediate economic relief. But as the war dragged on, the prewar
political structure was destroyed and the social structure was undermined
while the early economic advantages quickly dissipated. The Allies provided
Introduction 3

the Albanian resistance not only with an ideology but also with a considerable
part of the material resources required to conduct effective resistance.
The war’s long-term impact—as in other areas of Europe—was profound
and often paradoxical. The war changed everything. Axis policy was princi-
pally responsible for guaranteeing that the prewar political and social structure
could not be resurrected. The war, in general, pulled Albania out of one form
of isolation but propelled it into another. Prior to the war, Albania was argu-
ably the most isolated country in Europe. The wartime experience forcibly
brought Albania into contact with foreigners, their ideas, and their guns. But
while the Albanians were exposed to the outside world, the experience of the
war strongly reinforced a traditional xenophobia for which the Albanians are
legendary, a xenophobia reinforced and exploited by Hoxha’s Stalinist govern-
ment in the postwar world. Enver Hoxha found that Albania’s experience
during the war was his most useful tool in maintaining power based upon what
has been called a state-of-siege or garrison-state mentality, which emphasized
the danger that foreigners represented.
Under Hoxha’s iron hand a powerful resistance myth was created, in
which the Albanian people heroically defeated and expelled the fascist invad-
ers. This myth became the common bond, and Albania’s wartime experience
dominated all aspects of existence in Albania until the collapse of commu-
nism in the early 1990s. Writers, including the country’s preeminent novelist,
Ismail Kadare, used the war as the major theme of many of their works;
Albanian art and drama, even its currency, concentrated on the resistance;
Albanian education was not allowed to separate itself from the antifascist
struggle. Every aspect of Albanian civilization was measured by the wartime
experience. It is not possible to understand the Albanians—something that
is rapidly becoming more necessary with the recent opening up of Albania to
the rest of the world—without a clear understanding of Albania at war.
World War II might be an overexploited topic, but in this case an under-
standing of Albania from 1939 to 1945 is crucial if the Albanians of the late
1990s are to be dealt with intelligently. As Albania strives to become part of
Europe in a real sense for the ¤rst time and is thrust unprepared into the
international spotlight because of the continuing tragedy of the Balkans in
the 1990s and Albania’s own near collapse in 1997, an understanding of the
war years, which did so much to shape the state and nation over the past ¤fty
years, is valuable. It is hoped that this work will contribute to that under-
standing. It is further hoped that Albania at War will provide some moments
of interest for Balkan and European specialists and some small enlighten-
ment and enjoyment for the general reader.
This color painting is a ¤ne example of the Albanian version of Stalinist-realist art
depicting the Albanian partisans defeating a contingent of fascist troops. From the
cover of Mehmet Shehu’s book On the Experience of the National Liberation War.
C H A P T E R 1

COUNT CIANO’S INVASION OF ALBANIA

The Italian invasion of April 1939, which began the war in Albania, was the
culmination of centuries of Italian interest and twenty years of direct, if un-
successful, economic and political involvement in Albania, principally under
Benito Mussolini. The Straits of Otranto, which separate Albania and south-
ern Italy by forty miles of the Adriatic Sea, have always served more as a
bridge than a barrier, providing escape, a cultural span, and a convenient
invasion route. The proximity between the two areas facilitated numerous
connections, including classical Roman and Venetian contacts and the estab-
lishment of large Albanian colonies in southern Italy following the defeat of
Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeg, the ¤fteenth-century Albanian national hero
who held off a succession of Ottoman invasions. During the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, following the creation of the United Kingdom of Italy,
more active Italian interest transformed these occasional encounters into in-
creasingly signi¤cant involvement.1
The motivation behind Italy’s interest seems clear. Albania is important
from a strategic standpoint in terms of defense and offense. With control of
Vlora, or even simply the island of Sazan in the Bay of Vlora, the Italians could
dominate the Adriatic Sea. Italian naval specialists, recognizing that Italy had
no suitable base for naval operations on its Adriatic coast, eyed Vlora with
considerable interest.2 In offensive strategic terms, Albania could provide Italy
with a bridgehead into the Balkans. Further, the Italians had vague ideas about
Albania offering Italy territory upon which to settle excess population. It was
also assumed in Rome, although the Italians never produced adequate geolo-
gical charts, that natural resources, particularly oil and chrome, could be found
in abundance in Albania. As nationalism and imperialism became more attrac-
tive to Italian politicians and citizens alike, Albania loomed as a lucrative prize,
there for the taking.
Italy’s ¤rst opportunity to ¤nally take offensive action in Albania came
during the course of World War I. Although not yet a belligerent, Italy occu-
pied Sazan and Vlora in October 1914 without incurring the wrath of either
5
6 Chapter 1

side because all the major powers courted Rome. Italy’s eventual entrance on
the side of the Allies concluded a period of rather cynical bargaining, leading
to the secret Treaty of London. In exchange for a military contribution against
Austria, Italy was pledged extensive territories in Albania, although Rome was
required to agree to an eventual division of the remainder of Albania between
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece.3 During the course of the war, the Italians
succeeded in occupying half of the newly formed state (Albania had declared
its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912) but were forced out in
1920 because of Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to recognize the Treaty of London,
mounting domestic problems following World War I, armed Albanian oppo-
sition, and the Conference of Ambassadors’ decision to reestablish an indepen-
dent Albania. The conference mitigated Italy’s Albanian disaster by of¤cially
recognizing Italy’s prominent interest in Albania.4
Still, the removal of Italian forces proved to be unfortunate for the Italians
and, at least to a certain extent, for the Albanians as well. The Italian govern-
ment lost some prestige, and this issue was effectively exploited by Mussolini,
providing him with an important stepping stone on his road to power. The
Albanians came away from this experience believing that they had ejected the
Italians by force of arms and that they could easily do so again. This impres-
sion, exploited by Albanian politicians, did much to color the future relations
between the Albanians and the Italians.

Mussolini Assumes Power in Italy

With the advent of Benito Mussolini in 1922, Italy’s interest in Albania was
renewed. Mussolini chose to begin with economic penetration and found a
willing partner in Ahmet Zogu, who dominated interwar Albanian politics
¤rst as prime minister, then president, and then after 1928 as King Zog. Zog
eventually constructed a nonabsolutist monarchy, which was successful in
some ways. He was able to forcibly reduce the chaotic lawlessness of the
highlands and bring together some of the country’s divergent elements. The
independence that the northern tribes had enjoyed for centuries was at least
partially lost. Many tribesmen were forced to give up their weapons,
signi¤cantly reducing brigandage and the traditional scourge of Albania: the
blood feud. By the 1930s the central government was recognized in all parts
of the country, allowing Zog’s administration to collect taxes and draft recruits
for his army, something that would have been considered impossible im-
mediately after World War I. This degree of political stability, limited though
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 7

it was, did much to create an environment necessary for the growth of an

Albanian national consciousness. Zog signi¤cantly contributed to the process
of replacing tribal loyalty and local and regional pride with a rudimentary form
of modern state nationalism.
But Zog failed miserably in terms of economics. This was partially due to
the desperate economic conditions that faced Zog when he came to power in
Albania, but his inability to understand modern economics must also be consid-
ered a factor. As a result, he found it necessary to rely on foreign aid to survive.
When the League of Nations refused to grant a loan, that left only fascist Italy
with enough strategic interest and ¤nancial resources to make the decidedly
poor investment in Zog’s regime. Zog asked for aid and Mussolini’s government
obliged, on the assumption that economic aid would lead to economic and
political control and provide Italy with its long-sought Balkan foothold.
The ¤rst loan came in the form of an Italian-sponsored company for the
development of Albania’s resources. The company, called SVEA, loaned the
Albanian government a signi¤cant sum to be guaranteed by Albanian customs
receipts. The company also dictated how the money was to be spent.5 The cost
included an onerous pact of friendship and security that restricted Zog in
terms of foreign policy and virtually allowed for Italian intervention in internal
affairs as well.6
Zog felt that he could take the Italian money and strengthen the Albanian
economy to create unity, yet, through subversion, deny the Italians the type of
political control they coveted. Zog was not entirely unsuccessful: he received the
money, and he kept control of the state. But if this was a victory, it certainly was a
Pyrrhic one. First, the money was used unwisely. The roads and bridges con-
structed from the funds were built primarily for Italian military purposes. The
buildings constructed were principally of nonessential types, including ostenta-
tious fascist government buildings and a palace for Zog. Albania’s pressing needs,
including drainage and canalization and the development of indigenous industry,
were completely ignored.7 In the process Albania effectively became an economic
colony, with the Italians exercising considerable political in¶uence as well.8
But if nothing else, Zog was a nationalist, and he refused to give in
completely to Italian pressure. Mussolini tried threats and more bribes, but
Zog stood ¤rm. Ironically, Zog’s refusal to surrender Albanian political inde-
pendence convinced the Italians that the only way they could ever expect to
truly possess Albania was through outright invasion. In a sense, then, Zog’s
successful defense of Albania’s political independence ultimately cost Albania
its freedom. The task of destroying that independence was left to Count
Galeazzo Ciano, the new Italian foreign minister.
8 Chapter 1

In June of 1936, Count Ciano assumed control at the Palazzo Chigi, the
Italian Foreign Ministry. The new foreign minister was responsible for infus-
ing the Foreign Ministry with the tona fascista—a new aggressive spirit—but
also for developing and carrying out an approach to what the Italians were
beginning to refer to as the “Albanian problem.”
The count was not particularly well suited for the job, being inexperienced
and rather irresponsible. He was something of a playboy, not a hard worker, and
some ambassadors found him dif¤cult to take seriously. He could not seem to
concentrate on any one problem for more than a few moments. His lapses of
taste and manners alienated even Hitler, who referred to him as “that disgusting
boy.”9 Indeed, Ciano gained the respect of few in the diplomatic ¤eld, chie¶y
because of his exhibitionism, vanity, and lack of discretion. One of Ciano’s
girlfriends frequently passed important facts immediately to Lord Perth, the
British ambassador, and the count’s favorite haunt, the Roman Golf Club, was
well known to journalists as the best place in Europe for information leaks.10
Why Mussolini chose Ciano is clear. Ciano was married to the Duce’s
daughter, and he did what he was told. He was less subtle and less clever then
Mussolini, but showed deference to the Duce as one would to a superior being.
The count was so taken with Mussolini that he copied his mannerisms, his
deportment, and even his handwriting. The sound of the Duce’s voice on the
radio would bring him to tears.11
This emulation naturally carried over into the conduct of foreign affairs,
where the count not only followed Mussolini’s orders to the letter (at least until
1943) but worked to instill the ministry with Mussolini’s spirit. Like the Duce,
Ciano disliked reading dispatches, relying instead on newspapers and spies for
the information upon which to base policy. He kept his ambassadors completely
in the dark, to the point where Ambassador Dino Grandi in London looked to
the British Foreign Of¤ce for clues about the direction of Italian foreign policy.12
Although the count was rather ¶ippant and inconsistent in terms of policy,
he was able to ¤nd one project that held his interest and that he eventually came
to consider his private reserve: Albania. Ciano’s Albanian ¶irtation began
shortly following his ¤rst trip to Tirana, the Albanian capital, in April 1937.

Count Ciano Plans the Invasion

The visit itself was rather uneventful, except as an indication of the count’s
style and boundless energy. Again in an attempt to ape Mussolini, Ciano
dramatically ¶ew his own four-motored airplane to Tirana, taking with him a
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 9

bevy of Foreign Ministry of¤cials and photographers. During his three-day

stay, Ciano had numerous audiences with Zog, attended a myriad of banquets,
placed a wreath on the tomb of the queen mother, laid cornerstones, and
visited villages.13 More signi¤cant, it was during and immediately after this
visit that Ciano’s plans for Albania began to take shape.
The count’s initial actions were quite tame; he did not know exactly what
he wanted out of Albania except that a greater Italian presence must be the
¤rst step. In August of 1937 Ciano wrote: “I have persuaded the Duce to give
sixty millions to Albania over the next four years, for work of various kinds.
My visit to Tirana convinced me of the necessity for taking good care of this
sector of the front. We must create stable centers of Italian in¶uence there.
Who knows what the future will hold in store? We must be ready to seize the
opportunities which will present themselves.” The count then added
signi¤cantly: “We are not going to withdraw this time, as we did in 1920. In
the south [of Italy] we have absorbed several hundred thousand Albanians.
Why shouldn’t the same thing happen on the other side of the Adriatic?”14
By the beginning of 1938, Ciano seems to have decided that even waiting
for opportunities was no longer a reasonable approach; opportunities had to
be created. The foreign minister noted that “our penetration is becoming
steadily more intense and more organic. The programme which I had traced
after my visit is being carried out without a hitch. I am wondering whether
the general situation, particularly the Anschluss, does not permit us to take a
step towards more and more complete domination of this country which will
be ours.”15
It was while Ciano was in Albania attending the wedding of King Zog to
the Hungarian countess Geraldine Apponyi in April 1938 that the count ¤nally
decided that a radical solution to the Albanian problem was needed.16 Zog was
too clever to fall into a political protectorate through economic pressure; the
only way Albania would ever truly become part of Mussolini’s resurrected
Roman empire was through invasion. Having come to this irrevocable conclu-
sion, Ciano and a large staff of advisers and experts drew up an extensive plan,
while still in Tirana, to be presented to the Duce for his approval.
The report, discussed on 10 May 1938, was a well-prepared, detailed
analysis of Italy’s historical role in Albania, as well as a catalog of what Italy
could expect to gain from the action proposed by Ciano. In his report Ciano
took advantage of the Duce’s weakness for ¶attery, appealed to him on a
rational basis, and played on his worst fears.17
The report began by presenting Albania as a worthwhile objective for
Italian expansion, based upon highly dubious economic ¤gures. The count
10 Chapter 1

described vast opportunities in agriculture, livestock raising, forestry, the

¤shing industry, and mineral deposits. Here he was clearly playing on the
Duce’s not particularly successful attempt at autarchy, making Italy self-
suf¤cient so that in case of war it would want for nothing. Ciano also noted
that in ancient times Albania had been heavily populated; now it was practi-
cally uninhabited, but with proper Italian organization and management the
country could provide a home for up to two million Italians.18
Ciano assured the Duce that the Italians would be welcomed in Albania
because of the unpopularity of Zog’s regime, which was described as money
grubbing and riddled with nepotism. The ¶ashy extravagance of the royal
sisters and the massive expense of the royal wedding were much resented,
Ciano reported, and clearly emphasized the vast division between the rich and
the poor and the court and the people.
The count contrasted the ill feelings that most Albanians harbored for Zog
with the popularity of the Italians. Ciano maintained that apart from the pro-
Zog faction at court, “it is worthwhile to underscore that the people of the
capital, of the ports and whoever comes in contact with us, are instead in every
class and without reticence, pro-Italian. Also in the army, with a few exceptions,
the sympathies are with Italy.”19 Ciano’s assessment of the Albanian army was
true enough, particularly as the Italians had long since taken control of the
supply and training of Zog’s military. Ciano’s comments regarding the rest of
the population were absurd, and how he came by them remains a mystery.
Next, the count raised the specter of German hegemony in the Balkans,
one of Mussolini’s greatest fears. It was known that the Hungarians had shown
interest in Albania, and the count pointed out that it ought not be forgotten
that Budapest had often been the vanguard of Germanism. He further noted
that it would be a mistake to overlook the strong traces of former Austrian
in¶uence in Albania and the danger that Germany, reinforced by the Anschluss
(the German annexation of Austria), presented. Germany might attempt to
take and expand the political and economic position that imperial Austria
once held.20
Ciano was careful to play upon Mussolini’s need for glory with several
references to Italy’s poor military record, and he speculated on how Mussolini
was about to bury these bad memories with the proposed action in Albania.
The count argued that “in Albania, which belonged to us every so often in
history, we seek and we ¤nd the natural road to our expansion in the Balkans.
. . . In the sixteen years of Mussolinian policy it had been newly joined to Italy
by bonds of great importance. This work . . . must ¤nd at the opportune
moment its culmination in the annexation of Albania by Italy.”21
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 11

Ciano concluded by presenting Mussolini with three options. First, Italy

could continue to tighten its economic ties, but, the count suggested, the goal
of political domination could not quickly be achieved by this method. The
second option, which the count considered personally unsatisfactory, was
Albania’s partition among its neighbors. The third, and clearly his choice, was
outright annexation, which could be easily achieved by playing on the dissen-
sions between the Crown and the masses, fomenting a rebellion or internal
crisis, and moving in to restore order.22
Ciano’s diary tells us that Mussolini immediately agreed about the neces-
sity for a radical solution, and the count noted that the Duce was prepared
even to go to war as long as Albania was secured by Italy. Ciano had done well:
the specter of Germany frightened the Duce, and the count’s theatrics had
appealed to him. At one point Ciano had handed the Duce a specimen of
copper ore from the mines of Lezhë with the words “here are the Carthaginian
¤gs.”23 Mussolini was forced to take Ciano’s word concerning Albania’s vast
mineral wealth, because, true to the general disorganization of fascist Italy, in
all the years Italy had been involved in Albania no one had bothered to
conduct a proper geological survey.
Full approval of the plan, however, required a major decision, something
from which Mussolini always shied away. He would rather make small, unim-
portant decisions, for these would not leave him paralyzed by doubt. The
Duce, then, seems to have approved the plan in principle but wavered when a
¤nal irrevocable decision concerning implementation was needed. While
Mussolini agonized over whether or not to invade, Ciano moved ahead with
plans to subvert the Albanian government.
In order to reduce the possibility of armed resistance once the full plan
was set in motion, the count initiated a program designed to rapidly and
substantially increase Italian control over every facet of Albanian life. First, the
number of Italian military instructors was to be discreetly increased “with the
speci¤c mission to create annexationist cells in the Albanian army.”24 Under
the direction of the Italian minister Francesco Jacomoni and Giovanni Giro,
an Italian fascist of¤cial who was sent to Albania to organize Albanian youth
on the fascist model, economic and cultural in¤ltration was also to be in-
tensi¤ed. The number of Albanians on the Italian payroll was to be increased,
and the most important people, particularly the tribal chieftains, were to be
won over “on a personal basis with expressions of mutual interest, with prom-
ises and with corruption.”25
By June 1938 Giro reported that he had a considerable element of the
country under his control. He added that public opinion was steadily rising
12 Chapter 1

against Zog and that Italian intervention in the event of a disturbance would
meet with no opposition. The common people, Giro continued, would wel-
come with joy any improvement in material conditions, and the Italians could
expect to destroy the desire to resist within three days.26
Overjoyed by this news, and not bothering to check the veracity of this
extremely overoptimistic information, Ciano proceeded to draw up the next
phase of his plan with characteristic fascist vigor. The physical removal of Zog
played a key role in this phase. Ciano’s ¤rst attempt may have been an effort
to kidnap both the king and the queen. In early December the royal couple
put to sea, along with the minister of foreign affairs and other high of¤cials of
the government. Zog had promised Geraldine a short honeymoon trip and felt
secure enough to leave the country for a brief time, so they decided to sail to
Venice. The vessel and the crew were Italian, something that the count had
been adamant about supplying for Zog in June to “guarantee the impossibility
of his escape in any eventuality.”27
Soon after they left the harbor, Geraldine, who was already with child,
became ill because of the bad weather, and the doctor who was attending her
strongly recommended that the ship return immediately to Durrës, Albania’s
principal port. The queen, who was in her cabin, recalled, in interviews conducted
in the early 1980s, that a good deal of noise and commotion on deck followed this
decision and that Zog himself became very nervous. Geraldine maintained that
it became known afterward within the royal circle that the Italians had hoped
either to murder the king on board or to keep both of them in Italy.28
Although no strong evidence exists to support Geraldine’s contentions, it
is clear that Ciano and Jacomoni did come up with a detailed plan for the
assassination of Zog. Jak Koçi, one-time private secretary to the king and the
man responsible for procuring women for Zog while he was still a bachelor,
offered to carry out the deed for ten million lire.29 During the 1920s and into
the 1930s Koçi was involved in building the relationship between Albania and
Italy, and it seems he took his job somewhat too seriously. Ciano met person-
ally with an unnamed Albanian, who certainly was Koçi, on numerous occa-
sions to ¤nalize the plan.30
After Zog was dead, so Ciano’s scenario ran, the Italians would provoke
street ¤ghting and the rebellion of the mountain tribes. The population would
turn to Italy to restore order and in gratitude offer the crown to the Italian
king, Victor Emmanuel III. Following the offer, Ciano planned to ¤nalize the
annexation by conducting a plebiscite, similar to the one conducted by Hitler
in Austria at the time of the Anschluss. Jacomoni guaranteed that all this could
take place at a month’s notice.31
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 13

The plan was so carefully prepared that Ciano longed to put it into
operation. The foreign minister presented the scheme to Mussolini for ¤nal
approval in early December 1938. The Duce again approved of it in principle
but out of rationalism or doubt put a temporary lid on the overzealous count.
The international rami¤cations of such an act did not escape Mussolini. He
knew that if the plan were carried out, Italy would most likely drive Yugoslavia
into the waiting arms of the Germans. Ciano was forced to slow down and
turn his efforts to working out some kind of a partition deal with the Yugoslav
prime minister, Milan Stojadinovic.
Although Jacomoni reported after the war to the High Court of Justice
that Ciano let the idea of assassination drop at this point, the queen recalled
two separate attempts on Zog’s life during this period, which, she insisted,
were inspired by the Italians. Sometime in early 1939 she was told of an
incident in which a ri¶e had been found on the roof of one of the buildings
that lined the park behind the palace.
Geraldine also told an interesting story that apparently involved Koçi, whom
she accused of having bribed her Hungarian cook. The rather shaken woman
immediately informed the king, who told her to keep the money. Zog thereupon
apparently invited the offender to lunch and had the cook make one of
Geraldine’s least favorite dishes, something on the order of cabbage strudel. The
queen took one bite and gasped, whereupon the unfortunate Koçi jumped up,
demanding to know what they had eaten. The king, who had not lost his taste for
manipulation, exposed the culprit and, somewhat uncharacteristically, spared his
life in view of earlier service. Geraldine later said that Zog had Koçi thrown out
of the country, although he would later return and serve the Italians.32
Zog announced publicly that a plot to overthrow the government and kill
the king had been discovered and that the leader, Giovanni Giro, had been
asked to leave the country. Giro, whose principal role was as organizer of the
fascist “Dopolavoro,” or after-work, program, was still unsuccessfully trying to
organize an Albanian youth organization along Italian lines. He had long
made no secret of his hostility to the regime. It came to the attention of the
Albanian government that he had also been organizing those who were disaf-
fected with the monarchy into fascist action committees like the “Lupi di
Roma.” These groups, principally active in the south, fashioned themselves
after the Italian squadristi and clashed in the streets with supporters of com-
munism.33 Perhaps Giro’s greatest sin in Zog’s eyes, however, was his corre-
spondence with certain Albanian émigrés in Paris, including Zog’s old oppo-
nent Mustafa Kruja, who with Italian help had attempted to overthrow a
government of which Zog was a part in 1922.34
14 Chapter 1

Zog ordered his interior minister, the ruthless Musa Juka, to break up the
pro-Italian groups. One of Giro’s henchmen, the fascist journalist Vasil Al-
arupi, was detained in Durrës.35 Four Italophile Albanians were arrested, and
gendarmes were dispatched to various areas throughout Albania, including
Tepelena and Shkodra. As a ¤nal gesture, the king called out the army reserv-
ists and loyal tribesmen. Jacomoni, who was not always subtle, warned the king
not to interfere in Italian plans.

Zog Becomes Alarmed

By this time, of course, the king was growing alarmed and agitated, having
noticed that his relations with Italy had taken a turn for the worse. There had,
of course, always been tension between the Albanians and the Italians. Rome
regularly sabotaged or strictly directed the loans that had been made to the
Albanians, while Zog obstructed the Italians at every turn. Zog was using
Italian money to buy goods from the Japanese, and as Mussolini had feared
the king had asked the Germans why their economic drive had overlooked
Albania.36
These dynamics were more or less routine, however, so when Ciano’s
personal policies began making themselves felt, Zog knew the Italians were up
to something and quickly moved to stop them. Zog reasoned that if the
Italians were indeed trying to kill him, they would eventually succeed and
therefore realized that his only alternative was to attempt to placate them,
something that he had been considering. In October 1938 he sent a rather
pathetic message to Ciano proclaiming that “Albania now is in Italy’s hands,
for Italy controls every sector of the national activity. The king is devoted. The
people are grateful. Why do you want anything more?”37 Now, in March 1939,
the king called in Jacomoni and declared that he wished to reestablish the
most cordial relations with Italy. The Italian minister reported to Ciano that
he felt this was just a maneuver to gain time to permit the king to come to
some sort of understanding with third powers.
That kind of dealing was, of course, exactly what the king had planned.
He mentioned to the British minister Sir Andrew Ryan, in con¤dence, that
he was thinking of turning to the Germans.38 Geraldine maintained that soon
afterward Zog sent personal envoys to Hitler on two occasions and was told
each time that only through Mussolini could Zog expect to maintain a free
Albania. Aware that he was running out of options, the king, in anger, accused
Hitler of not being a patriot, “for no patriot would tell another patriot to go
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 15

and sell his country.”39 Ciano was concerned about Zog’s agitation and wanted
to move more quickly, particularly because by the middle of February circum-
stances had allowed him to return to his favorite plan of annexing Albania
outright with no compensation for its neighbors.
Following Mussolini’s suggestion, the count had gone to Milan
Stojadinovic during the middle of January. Ciano had hoped to convince the
Yugoslav leader of the advantages of an Italian takeover in Albania, a plan that
included a number of northern frontier corrections in Yugoslavia’s favor. He
argued that after such an action Albania would cease to be the focus of na-
tionalism, thereby reducing the problems concerning Kosova, the Albanian-
inhabited area of Serbia. The count also was prepared to promise a military
alliance and Italian support for any move Yugoslavia might make against
Thessaloníki to assure itself an outlet to the Aegean.40
Stojadinovic, who had been forewarned of Ciano’s purpose by Bozko
Hristic, the Yugoslav minister in Rome, was unhappy with the talk of “correc-
tion of frontiers“; he wanted partition. He spoke speci¤cally and covetously of
Shkodra, Shëngjin, and more extensive Yugoslav access to the Adriatic, which
would be made possible only by the cession of the northern provinces of
Albania and the completion of a railroad line.41
When the Yugoslav regent, Prince Paul, discovered that his prime minis-
ter was treating with Ciano concerning the partition of Albania, he was in-
censed. He was appalled that neither the cabinet nor the regent had been
included on such a critical matter, something that would have de¤nitely put
Yugoslavia in the Axis camp. More important, Paul, like King Alexander
before him, had no desire to increase the size of the Albanian population in
Yugoslavia. “We already have so many Albanians inside our frontiers and they
give us so much trouble,” Prince Paul complained, “that I have no wish to
increase their number.”42
Stojadinovic, for this and other reasons, was quickly forced out and re-
placed by Dragisa Cvetkovic, who was not only much closer to the regent and
his foreign policy but, more signi¤cant, was not known for his friendly attitude
toward Italy. After the dust had settled, Ciano was forced to reevaluate his
position. He came to two conclusions: ¤rst, “to go ahead just the same, with
Stojadinovic, partition of Albania between us and Yugoslavia; without
Stojadinovic[,] occupation even against Yugoslavia.”43 The count also decided
that it was now imperative to move as quickly as possible on his Albanian
project, and he hoped to begin the project by the ¤rst week in April.
Ciano’s new urgency stemmed primarily from the knowledge that the
Yugoslavs now knew the plan, and he feared that rumors regarding the under-
16 Chapter 1

taking would spread far and quickly. The count also feared that the pro-West-
ern Cvetkovic might move closer to Britain and France and perhaps attempt
to come to some understanding with the Albanians.
Jacomoni presented additional reasons for quick action, including the
increased demands for payments from tribal chieftains with which he was
being besieged. The Italian minister also suggested that the local leaders might
become suspicious of Italian hesitation and use the knowledge of their subver-
sive activities to force Zog to change his mode of governing. Finally, Jacomoni
argued that a number of exiles were about to be allowed back into Albania,
and Italy should move before they could effectively build a patriotic movement
of resistance against the Italians.44
Mussolini agreed with Ciano’s assessment concerning the Yugoslavs but
would not be hurried into the Albanian project. The Duce would not move
without the successful conclusion of the Spanish Civil War and the signing of
a pact with the Germans. Mussolini’s decision must have come as another
disappointment not only because Ciano’s plan was again delayed but also
because by mid-February rumors of some impending Italian move were be-
coming rather widespread, causing Ciano no little embarrassment. To counter
these stories the foreign minister decided, “We must spread the most varied
rumors; like the octopus we must darken the waters.”45
Ciano could do little else but wait for another opportunity to convince the
Duce that to hesitate any longer was not in the best interests of the Italian
empire. The German occupation of Prague on 15 March 1939 ¤nally offered
the count another chance. Mussolini’s initial reaction to the German move was
a combination of uncertainty and fear.
Ciano, on the other hand, perceived the German move as a cause to take
Albania. Germans troops in Prague led the count to one of his ¤rst outbursts
of indignation against the Germans, asking rhetorically at one point “Is it
worthwhile to deal loyally with such people?” He added, “It is useless to hide
that all this bothers and humiliates the Italian people. It is necessary to give
them satisfaction and compensation: Albania.”46
By 23 March the count had ¤nally convinced the Duce to support an
immediate drastic change in Italy’s relationship with Albania. Ciano was able
to do this by resurrecting the specter of the German menace as well as by
presenting Mussolini with notes of a meeting between Zog and Jacomoni in
which the king implied that he might be willing to grant Rome further con-
cessions.
The last remaining holdout to Ciano’s “¤nal solution” was Victor Em-
manuel. The Italian king informed Mussolini frankly that he was not in agree-
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 17

ment with the new policy on Albania because he did not see the point of
risking such a venture in order to “grab a few rocks.” Perhaps Victor Emman-
uel simply did not approve of the dethroning of another king, although he had
already participated in the process once in Ethiopia and had once referred to
Zog as little more than “the better bandit,” unworthy of a member of the
House of Savoy as a bride. Either way, the Duce, who was now con¤rmed in
his decision, ignored Victor Emmanuel, informing Ciano that “if Hitler had
to deal with a nincompoop of a king he would never have been able to take
Austria and Czechoslovakia.”47
Although Mussolini had ¤nally agreed to Ciano’s basic idea for a solution,
he would not support unadulterated annexation. He hoped instead to attempt
to subordinate Albania by the construction of irreversible political, economic,
and military bonds between the two countries. The Duce himself drew up the
form of the ultimatum to Zog, which Ciano described as “very brief consisting
of three dry clauses which gave it more the appearance of a reprieve than of
an international pact.”48 The count, in conjunction with Leonardo Vitetti,
director general of the Of¤ce of General Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, came
up with his own proposal, which had the advantage of being couched in
courteous terms. The Duce eventually approved.
The count’s document consisted of eight major sections, including (1) a
rigorous defensive alliance, (2) the promise of Italian military aid in case of any
external threat to Albanian territory, (3) permission for the Italian government
to intervene to restore public order, (4) the concession to Italy of free use of
ports, air ¤elds, and communication lines, (5) the elevation of the status of the
Italian Legation to embassy, (6) provision for Italian ¤nancial and technical
assistance in each Albanian ministry, (7) the dismantling of customs barriers
between the two nations, and (8) the extension of the rights of Italian citizen-
ship to Albanians and vice versa. Ciano further required concessions regarding
fascist organizations in Albania, as well as the introduction of Italian organiz-
ers into the gendarmerie.49
Ciano believed that Zog would likely capitulate. He noted cynically in his
diary: “There is, above all, a fact on which I am counting: the coming birth of
Zog’s child. Zog loves his wife very much, as well as his whole family. I believe
that he will prefer to insure to his dear ones a quiet future. And frankly I
cannot imagine Geraldine running around ¤ghting through the mountains of
Unthi or the Mirdizu in her ninth month of pregnancy.”50
Meanwhile in Albania, because of continuing rumors of troop movements
and ultimatums, Zog and his government were confronted with ever increas-
ing requests for information, primarily from the diplomatic corps. Albanian
18 Chapter 1

government of¤cials denied that the situation was serious; most of them did
so honestly because Zog handled these negotiations personally. Zog was aware
that most of those around him were being paid by the Italians. As late as 30
March, the Albanian minister of foreign affairs would not admit that there
were any serious problems between Albania and Italy or that Albania was
menaced. He would not even speak of ¤nancial dif¤culties. Jacomoni informed
the British minister, Sir Andrew Ryan, that although ¤nancial dif¤culties
existed, Italy’s best course would be to respect Albanian independence and to
work with and through the Albanian regime.51 All of this seems to have
convinced Ryan that there was little cause for alarm.52
The king, too, probably for reasons of fear, had become much quieter since
his complaints against Italy, and Giro in particular, in February. On 25 March,
during a formal audience with Ryan, he said only that he intended to pursue a
“good” policy toward Italy, subject to two things: independence and integrity.53
This was, of course, exactly what Ciano hoped to seize from Albania with
his ultimatum. Zog could not accept, yet he feared Italian reaction if he did
not. The king fell back upon one of his favorite tactics: playing for time. On
28 March Zog informed Ciano that he supported the demands but that his
ministers refused to go along, an obvious ruse that did not fool even Ciano.
By 31 March, the Italian foreign minister decided that Zog had indeed refused
to sign.54
The count, however, was prevented from initiating his long-hoped-for
hostilities by military considerations, of which he became aware on 31 March.
Military preparations had begun shortly before the ultimatum was presented
to Zog. Four regiments of bersaglieri (specially trained mountain troops), one
regular infantry division, air force detachments, and all of the ¤rst naval squad-
ron had been ordered mobilized and concentrated at Apulia. Soon thereafter
an additional division as well as a battalion of tanks were ordered mobilized at
the suggestion of Marshal Pietro Badoglio, past and future chief of the general
staff, who nevertheless continued to oppose the invasion.
Despite the impressive numbers, the de¤ciencies of this force soon be-
came clear to both Ciano and Jacomoni after talks with General Alberto
Pariani, the chief of staff, and General Alfredo Guzzoni, who was to com-
mander the invasion forces.55 It appears that organizational problems pre-
vented the Italian army from gathering something as simple as a battalion of
trained motorcycle troops. Unforeseen problems with disembarkation further
complicated the enterprise and forced Ciano to take another look at the entire
undertaking.56
Apprehensive about the possibility of either an unsuccessful or a badly
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 19

executed landing, Ciano moved closer to the option of taking Albania with
Zog rather than against him. In conjunction with the Duce, the count drew
up a new set of conditions that Zog was expected to accept, since they sup-
posedly allowed the king to save face. These new demands were somewhat less
onerous than the ¤rst set and included (1) control of all ports, communica-
tions, roads, and air¤elds in the event it appeared that Albanian independence
was in danger; (2) an Italian organizer in each Albanian ministry who would
have the rank of minister ranking immediately below the Albanian minister;
(3) Italians in Albania would have equal civil and political rights with the
Albanians; (4) the raising of the Italian Legation in Tirana and the Albanian
Legation in Rome to the status of embassies.57
Following the presentation of these demands, Jacomoni made it clear to
Zog that the situation was now extremely serious. The king was given a simple
choice. If he accepted the demands, Ciano would go to Tirana to attend the
solemn ceremony of signing the treaty, accompanied by a strong squadron of
planes to emphasize the new relationship. If he refused, disorder would break
out on 6 April, followed by the landing of Italian forces on 7 April.58
The king, recognizing that the Italians had taken a step backward, or
perhaps fearing that the time had come for international help, ¤nally broke his
silence, informing the American minister not only of the Italian demands but
of his speci¤c reaction to these demands. In regard to the ¤rst demand, Zog
had informed the Italian minister that only after previous agreement and in
case he, the king, requested it, would he agree to the landing of Italian troops
in Albania. Zog refused the second demand, and as to the third, he agreed only
to extend civil rights to the Italians. He would not consent to allow Italians to
be elected to Parliament or to own land. The king saw no dif¤culty with the
fourth point. Zog further mentioned, however, that because some of his min-
isters had asked that he reconsider, he had asked Jacomoni for more time.59
The tense situation had, in the meantime, slowly made itself felt among
the population of Tirana. On the evening of 1 April there was a demonstration
in Tirana, nationalist and anti-Italian. On the night of 2 April, a larger, prob-
ably less spontaneous, and more de¤nitely pro-Zog and anti-Italian distur-
bance took place. The king had clearly decided by this time that Italy meant
to invade, and he hoped that the demonstrations would encourage the Italians
to reconsider or at least generate substantial nationalist resistance to the in-
vader. Within two days, Zog ordered general mobilization and the evacuation
of the Durrës civilian population, which apparently was never fully achieved.
Although somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of a negotiated settle-
ment, Zog nevertheless intended to keep all possible channels open and worked
20 Chapter 1

feverishly to come up with an acceptable set of counterproposals. Motivated by

the new slim hope of saving Albania, and by the fact that Queen Geraldine was
on the verge of giving birth to his heir, Zog presented Ciano with a revised plan
on 2 April, incorporating the few acceptable points of the Italian ultimatum.
The king agreed to certain demands but still refused to accept any proposal that
he deemed incompatible with the independence and integrity of Albania. Fi-
nally, the king asked that General Pariani, the only Italian who had gained the
respect of the Albanians, be sent to Albania to discuss the question at issue.
Pariani had served as military attaché in Albania in the 1930s and was one of
the few Italian of¤cials who had made a good impression.
Zog’s proposals were ignored. Despite the continuing military dif¤culties,
Ciano had regained his nerve and it only remained to create the proper im-
pression internationally. In the pursuance of this end, the foreign minister
directed that all Italian civilian personal and their families prepare to leave
Albania. Ciano announced to the world that such a move had become neces-
sary because Italian lives were in danger, a claim so blatantly ridiculous that it
was greeted with scorn by the diplomatic community in Tirana. The Duce
shared Ciano’s impatience with Zog, and as a result he decided on 2 April to
proceed with the invasion if Zog remained intransigent.
From an international perspective, the time was right for Mussolini; Ma-
drid had fallen, and although Mussolini had not yet concluded his pact with
the Germans, Hans Georg von Mackensen, the German ambassador in Rome,
reacted favorably when informed of the invasion plans.60 British prime minis-
ter Neville Chamberlain’s actions in March and early April con¤rmed
Mussolini’s ideas concerning Western inertia. On 23 March the Duce received
a letter from Chamberlain expressing concern and requesting the Duce’s aid
in maintaining international peace. Chamberlain’s statement in Parliament on
6 April served to signi¤cantly build the con¤dence of the fascist leadership.
The prime minister noted that with regard to Albania, the British gov-
ernment had “no direct interest, but a general interest in the peace of the
world.”61 Despite reports now arriving from many quarters concerning Italian
mobilization, Chamberlain did not feel that it was a propitious time to draw
the attention of the Italian government to the fact that the occupation or
annexation of Albania would violate the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1938,
which called for the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean. To
emphasize his lack of concern, the prime minister left on the evening of 6
April for a ten-day holiday in Scotland.
The same morning Zog had been presented with a personal telegram
from Mussolini ¤xing the expiration of the ultimatum at noon. The king
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 21

refused to accept but referred the matter to his ministers and a committee in
Parliament. The Italians gave him six more hours. While he waited he granted
the American minister an audience, which had been set up some time before.
Zog seemed by this time to have resigned himself to his fate. He referred with
bitterness to the fact that the Italians decided to launch their offensive at the
very moment when his wife was giving birth. Minister Hugh Grant noted that
the king gave the impression of a man who felt bitter disappointment for what
he considered a gross betrayal by the Italians as well as the rest of the world.
On 5 April, he had appealed to the democracies and on 6 April, to the Balkan
Entente, all, of course, to no avail.62
During the course of 6 April, warships appeared off Durrës and Vlora to
embark the last of the Italian civilians. In the afternoon dozens of Italian
planes passed over Tirana, dropping lea¶ets instructing the population to re-
fuse obedience to their government and not to resist the Italians. The lea¶ets
added that Italian forces would remain as long as necessary for the reestablish-
ment of peace, order, and justice. While the planes were ¶ying overhead, a
tremendous demonstration by a crowd of several thousand Albanians was
staged in the principal square in Tirana. Hundreds of young men cried for
arms with which to defend the country. According to Geraldine, Zog refused,
fearing that much innocent blood would be shed. In the evening a special
cabinet and parliamentary meeting voted to reject the Italian demands and to
resist with force the landing of Italian troops, while at the same time appealing
to the Italians for further talks.63 But the atmosphere was one of gloom.
Independence would be lost in either case.
Mussolini, who continued to vacillate, had not yet given up hope for a
negotiated settlement, although it could now only be achieved after the initial
landing. The Duce told Zog to send his negotiators to Guzzoni once the Italian
force had landed in Albania. Late on 6 April he sent the following orders to
Guzzoni: “If tomorrow morning a spokesman for Zog presents himself at the
moment of disembarkation, listen to him and notify me by telegram. If instead no
one asks to confer with you, execute the disembarkation smashing whatever
resistance.”64 Meanwhile the general was ordered to proceed with the invasion.

The Italian Invasion of Albania

At 5:30 on the morning of 7 April, Good Friday, some twenty-two thousand

troops supported by some four hundred aircraft, three hundred small tanks,
and dozens of warships attacked Durrës, Vlora, Shëngjin, and Saranda.65 With
22 Chapter 1

few exceptions, the Albanian army did not respond, but this should not be
surprising; it was small and underequipped. Of¤cially, it consisted of ¤fteen
thousand in 1938, but it is doubtful that more than eight thousand were in
uniform at any given time, a ¤gure further reduced to four thousand during
the winter. This numerical weakness was exacerbated by the fact that by 1939
most of the army’s training personal were Italians, who had effectively re-
moved the desire to ¤ght. Still, major ¤ghting took place at Durrës, where the
townspeople and a small contingent of troops sent from Tirana opposed the
invasion. Some of these troops consisted of members of the three-thousand-
man gendarmerie, who seemed more eager to resist, possibly because they were
trained and led by retired British of¤cers until the late 1930s.66 The defenders,
led by Durrës gendarmerie commander Abaz Kupi, although vastly out-
numbered and limited to ¤fty rounds of ammunition per man, managed to
beat back the Italians.
After the invaders had retired, the ships opened ¤re using shrapnel to
disperse the resistance. Instead of retreating, Kupi and his men moved forward
and lined a parapet closer to the water’s edge. Their courage was to no avail,
however, since the attackers landed again in larger numbers with a ¶anking
party. Kupi and his men were overcome by sheer weight of numbers, and after
in¶icting a good many casualties they retreated into town.
For two or three hours street ¤ghting occurred throughout Durrës, al-
though it was soon brought to an abrupt end after a transport disembarked a
large number of small tanks. By nine o’clock all effective resistance in Durrës
had ended, and the Albanian survivors were either having coffee in civilian
clothes in the cafés or making their way along the road out of the town toward
Tirana in the hopes of ¤nding somewhere a few more rounds of ammunition
with which to shoot another Italian or two before the inevitable end.67
Reports on the number of casualties differed rather signi¤cantly. The
townspeople of Durrës maintained that the Italians lost four hundred. Al-
though Italian propaganda claimed that Italy lost only twelve men in the entire
invasion, it is possible that approximately two hundred Italians were killed at
Durrës alone and that they may have lost as many as seven hundred in all.68
Albanian casualties may have been higher.
There was no important resistance at the port of Vlora, but Italian cyclists
were ambushed on the road outside the town and suffered some casualties. A
party of some forty men opposed the landing at Shëngjin with no more than
six or seven casualties on each side. The road to Tirana was open on all sides.
During the afternoon, however, Guzzoni’s triumphant march ground to a
halt and had to be delayed for six hours, much to the chagrin of Mussolini and
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 23

Ciano. Indeed, Ciano was horri¤ed that the delay would result in the impres-
sion that the Albanians had stopped the Italians.69 But the Italians themselves
were responsible. Despite Guzzoni’s able improvisations, the serious
weaknesses in the Italian military machine had made themselves felt and it
became clear to all involved, including the Duce, that had it not been for the
lack of organized resistance, the Italians might have been faced with a military
disaster. As Ciano’s chief assistant, Filippo Anfuso, who accompanied the
count on his ¶ight over the battle zone for campaign medals put it, “If only
the Albanians had possessed a well-armed ¤re brigade, they could have driven
us back into the Adriatic.”70
The organization of the entire expedition had been inadequate, partially
because the commanders were given little time to prepare. Pariani was told on
29 March that Albania would most likely be invaded and the operational
commander, General Guzzoni, was not told until late in the day on 31 March.
Even more remarkable, the air force did not receive its orders until two days
before the invasion. As a result of these serious oversights, once the Italians
reached Albania, they were seriously handicapped by badly trained, inade-
quately equipped, and poorly led men.
Guzzoni was forced to mobilize his own corps during a hurried train trip
down to Brindisi. As a result, the conscripts to be used were given no more
than a few hours’ notice, not enough time to learn how to operate the weapons
that they were expected to use. Many conscripts were attached to motorcycle
companies without knowing how to ride, while others joined signal units
without knowledge of Morse code.71 A British observer gives us an interesting
picture of the Italian troops sent to Albania. While they apparently behaved
well, they were sad specimens. Very young and in poor physical condition, the
troops were at least imperfectly trained. Their uniforms, ri¶es, machine guns,
and tanks were of poor quality.72 The Albanians were overwhelmed but hardly
impressed.
A paucity of important information both before and during the invasion
added to the dif¤culties. Although the Italians had built the port installations
at Durrës, the naval commanders were not told that the main harbor could not
accommodate deepwater ships. Radio communications were so defective that
the senior air force of¤cer had to ¶y back and forth between Albania and Italy
carrying messages to explain what was going wrong. He reported with aston-
ishment on the lack of unity of command, adding that if the authorities had
remembered to use air reconnaissance ¤rst, the Italians would have learned
that little resistance was to be expected.73
The Italian propaganda machine was thrown into action to mask the
24 Chapter 1

blunders. Of¤cial accounts reported that the attack would remain in history as
a classic masterpiece of ef¤ciency, organization, power, courage, and political
sense. Colonel Emilio Canevari, the best known of the military commentators,
reported the brilliant attack of nonexistent motorized formations in close
contact with the air force, and he explained that all observers were impressed
by the clockwork precision of a carefully studied and brilliantly executed
plan.74
All of this naturally came as a pleasant surprise to the operational com-
manders, who might have expected court-martials. They were delighted to
learn that fascism expected no better of them.75 Many people were aware of
the bungling, however, and Mussolini was forced to make a frank statement
to the leadership, explaining that the expedition had nearly failed because the
organization and the people at his disposal were so defective. In one sense at
least, the bungled invasion did the fascist leadership a great service; it made
clear to them how totally unprepared Italy was to ¤ght a major war.
Fortunately for the Italians, their mistakes were met with inactivity on the
part of Zog, his government, and his army. No serious preparations for resis-
tance were made; no leadership was offered. Zog behaved less than capably in
this ¤nal crisis. The king’s ¤rst concern on that fateful day was for the safety
of his family. Initially it had been suggested by members of Geraldine’s family
that the queen and her two-day-old son, Crown Prince Leka, seek refuge in
the American Legation. Hugh Grant, the U.S. minister, was approached and
readily gave his consent.76 There was some question about the queen’s health,
because she had not fully recovered from the cesarean birth of Leka.
At the last moment, Geraldine was pronounced healthy enough to travel
and was sent off in an ambulance at 4:00 a.m., one and one-half hours before
the invasion. The caravan of cars that accompanied the royal family snaked its
way slowly through southern Albania toward the Greek frontier.
After the queen was safely away, Zog moved to his prime minister’s
residence and from there broadcast a radio message to his subjects, urging
them to continue to ¤ght until every drop of blood was exhausted. Few Al-
banians owned radios, so few heard the appeal; even fewer were willing to die
for Zog. In the meantime, the king made a ¤nal effort to come to a negotiated
settlement with the Italians, sending emissaries to Guzzoni as Mussolini had
suggested. Close to noon, Zog sent Rrok Geraj, minister of national economy,
as well as Colonel Sami Koka, under the protection of the Italian military
attaché, to talk with the Italians at Durrës. After these last talks proved fruit-
less, the king made a fateful decision; he would follow his wife into exile.
The queen informed me that Zog had planned to withdraw into the hills
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 25

to continue resistance activities on a guerrilla warfare level, despite the sugges-

tion on the part of the government that he save himself by leaving the country.
The king was persuaded to abandon the idea, however, once the Yugoslav
position had been made clear. According to the queen, Belgrade informed Zog
that if he withdrew into the hills they would not only block his retreat but
would actually step in to stop Albanian nationalist agitation on their borders.77
Although Geraldine may have overstated the case somewhat, the dubious
attitude of the Yugoslav government certainly played a role in the king’s deci-
sion. Knowing that organized resistance could be sustained for only a short
time, the king would eventually have been forced to escape into Yugoslavia. If
Belgrade closed its frontiers, which was more than likely, the king and his
supporters could easily have been rounded up. Geraldine told her biographer
that a decisive factor in Zog’s ¶ight was Parliament’s decision that Zog leave.
Robyns writes that “it was not his decision but parliament’s.”78 If nothing else,
this contention demonstrates a lack of understanding of Zog’s dictatorship.
The fact that Albania was capable of little more than token resistance
must also have been considered by Zog. The army, because of the substantial
Italian in¶uence and the fact that Rome had always emphasized numbers
rather than quality, could not be counted on to be of much use to either side.
Indeed, as we have seen, the Albanian military seems to have played only a
minor role in the invasion.
This left only the tribesmen to carry on the ¤ght, many of whom Zog had
disarmed and who would have been, as a result, not only outnumbered but also
vastly outgunned. Although some of them might have fought for Zog—cer-
tainly his own tribe of Mati—it soon became clear, given the handicaps for
which Zog himself was primarily responsible, that the severe shortage of guns,
ammunition, and organization would have quickly crippled Albania’s organ-
ized resistance capabilities. It is also at least conceivable that Zog, after years
of sparring with the Italians, with no help in sight, simply did not have enough
energy to carry on the ¤ght. Clearly he was not dedicated to the idea of
resistance. Although this decision certainly saved a great many lives, it created
a good deal of controversy.

The Aftermath of the Invasion and Foreign Reaction

The king’s critics have roundly condemned him for his ¶ight to Greece, ac-
cusing him of deserting his country. German documents even maintain that
Zog may have spread rumors that Tirana was to be bombed, in order to clear
26 Chapter 1

the streets and cover his escape on horseback.79 Whereas this is likely, it is
perhaps an exaggeration to claim, as does socialist Albanian historiography,
that he ¶ed only after undermining preparations for armed resistance.80 The
act of ¶eeing was damaging enough. It is clear that whatever popularity he had
had was lost by this uncharacteristic act. Had he remained and appeared, for
example, at Durrës, or had he put up some token resistance in the hills, he
might have welded the Albanians together, although the wide social and eco-
nomic gap that blocked the development of the cohesive social order required
to withstand invasion made this unlikely.81 And he would have been overcome
in the end by the numerical superiority of the Italians in any case. Still, any
hostile action toward the invader would have at least allowed King Zog to
make a more positive impression on Albanian history. As it was, with their
country invaded and their king gone, most Albanians resigned themselves to
the inevitable.
The disappearance of the king and the collapse of resistance allowed the
Italians, moving inland from their beachheads in four columns, to take Tirana
on the morning of 8 April, basically without ¤ring a shot. The Albanian
garrison in Tirana had deposited its weapons in the garden of the Italian
Legation.82 At about 10:30 a.m. Italian soldiers on motorcycles followed by
small tanks entered the Tirana square. There were few people in the streets
and even fewer in the various ministries, since most of the government had
left with the king. Only the doorkeepers and a few subordinate of¤cers, who
did not try to conceal their bitterness, remained behind awaiting the invader.
Ciano, displaying his usual, presumably fascist inspired, energy, ¶ew to
Tirana shortly after the arrival of the Italian advance troops, eagerly expecting
the festive welcome that he had been guaranteed by one of his personal agents.
He was disappointed, for only a few turned out to welcome him. He was met
at the airport by General Guzzoni and the air force chief, General Giuseppe
Valle, who were anxious to explain what had gone wrong with the attack.
Jacomoni was there as well, because the Italians had been so con¤dent of
success that they had not bothered to evacuate their mission. Accompanied by
General Zef Sereqi, King Zog’s chief aide and the last Albanian minister to
Rome, Ciano arrived at Tirana city hall at noon and was met by Dr. Mihal
Sherko, secretary general of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well
as Xhafer Bey Ypi, the former prime minister and chief inspector of the court.
The thoroughly disreputable former archbishop of the Albanian Orthodox
Church, Vissarion, whom Zog had ¤red for leading a scandalous life, gave a
short speech to a small crowd gathered in front of the city hall and urged
cooperation with the Italians.83 His talk was not well received.
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 27

Italian propaganda reported that the Albanians were wildly enthusiastic

about the Italian invasion, an assertion that has no foundation in fact, although
there were some Albanians, including those who met Ciano on his arrival, who
deserted their country. Other notable examples of treachery include the case
of the ex-prefect of Durrës, Marco Kodheli, who ¶ed to Bari on 6 April to
broadcast statements condemning Zog and calling for a warm welcome for the
Italians. Kodheli returned to Albania on the day of the invasion to resume his
duties.84 The king’s own aide, General Sereqi, resigned his post as minister in
Rome shortly before the invasion and returned to Albania in the company of
Ciano. Sereqi had been promised a signi¤cant role in the Italian puppet state.
There were also, of course, many petty opportunists who saw the coming
of the Italians as a means by which to make a few lire. A particularly distress-
ing example of this sort of individual must be the Durrës tailor Reuf Xhuli,
whom Ryan discovered making Italian ¶ags out of calico on the day the
Italians marched in.85
But there were as many examples of individual heroism. Abaz Kupi, who
was never a staunch supporter of Zog, not only led the resistance in Durrës
but went on to organize a respectable guerrilla movement that the Italians
were never able to completely destroy. Showing equal bravery, but in another
way, the ex–prime minister Mehdi Bey Frashëri took it upon himself to broad-
cast scathing attacks against the invasion as well as address a remonstrance to
Mussolini. Following the departure of the government from Tirana, he urged
young men with revolvers to distribute themselves to preserve order. When the
invading troops were at the gates he sought asylum in the Turkish Legation,
continuing to refuse to sign a declaration in support of the Italians. His per-
sonal courage impressed even the German minister, who successfully appealed
to Rome to allow Frashëri to return home unmolested.86 Despite Italian guar-
antees, Frashëri was soon arrested and interned in Italy.
Apart from these few exceptions, general public opinion in Tirana varied
from indifference to open resentment. Many Albanians may have opposed
Zog’s regime but it does not follow that they would welcome Italian rule,
particularly since one of their general grievances had always been that Zog had
given too much away to the Italians. Privately, Ciano was not oblivious to the
attitude of the Albanians, noting in his diary, “There is a certain amount of
coolness, especially among the high school students. I see that they dislike
raising their arms for the Roman salute and there are some who openly refused
to do it even when their companions urge them. . . . I see the eyes of some
patriots ¶aming with anger and tears running down their faces. Independent
Albania is no more.”87
28 Chapter 1

With the invasion accomplished, Mussolini’s next move was to do what-

ever he could to defuse international opposition and justify the invasion.
Virginio Gayda, Mussolini’s unof¤cial mouthpiece opened the campaign in his
paper the Giornale d’Italia with a personal attack on Zog:

And more and more the King governed like a feudal lord, inconsiderate
of the most elemental needs of the people, greedy of money for his personal
whims, ambitious, irresponsible and fomenting both internal discord and
international intrigue. The implacable enemy of all Albanians not members
of his political clientele, he had in large measure, transformed the generous
Italian policy of ¤nancial and economic assistance into a quasi-exclusive pre-
serve to be doled out again by way of his personal exchequer.
Notwithstanding the treaties and the frequent Italian complaints, the
Albanian people were the last to pro¤t from Italian generosity. The protests
of Albanian patriots and the attempts at revolt of the poor and needy popu-
lace were alike silenced by the threat of arms.
A general discontent ranged around the royal house in Tirana. In these
last days King Ahmet Zog had requested from the Italian government new
gifts as well as personal protection and the dispatch of troops to garrison
certain points in Albania. But at the last moment, the Italian government
learned that these forces were intended to serve for a foolish coup de main
of the King against Kosovo with the evident intent of disturbing the tran-
quility and cordiality of Italo-Yugoslav collaboration.88

The editor of the Lavoro fascista attempted to rationalize the invasion on

the basis of state security, arguing that “at a time when all the democracies are
extending and attempting to extend their frontiers in all the regions of Europe
and Africa, where no real and natural interest calls them, Italy could not
neglect for her safety’s sake, the adjacent coast.”89
In the same vein, the Popolo di Roma commented that “it is enough to
look at a map of Italy to understand what supreme necessity of legitimate
defense obliges Italy to take her precautions in the Adriatic. . . . In the case of
war against anyone, the sure military possession of the Albanian coast is for
Italy a question of life and death.”90
Italy’s of¤cial explanation, as presented by Ciano in a forty-minute speech
before the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations on 15 April, merely restated
the comments of the press. In the presence of Reichsminister Hermann
Göring, as well as a number of Albanian delegates, the count, beginning
sometime prior to the Punic Wars, traced the historical ties between the
Italian and Albanian people. Relations were described as very friendly until the
advent of Zog. In spite of Zog’s constant animosity, Mussolini had been good
enough to continue the ¶ow of goods, services, and goodwill to the ever
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 29

grateful Albanian people. The count was careful to itemize the various bene¤ts
that Rome had bestowed on Tirana.91
Ciano argued that it was Zog himself who, realizing that disorder and
dissension within the country had reached too great a level, had asked the
fascist government for troops and arms to quell the unrest. Popular opinion,
not Italian soldiers, had forced Zog to ¶ee, according to the count. Less than
a week earlier Ciano had tried to convince Lord Perth that Zog had asked
Rome for aid in order to launch an attack on Yugoslavia.92 Sir A. Noble at the
Southern Department of the Foreign Of¤ce minuted on Perth’s report,
“Count Ciano is a liar, and a clumsy liar at that.”93
None of this was, of course, taken very seriously, and the only support
Ciano received, both for his speech and for his invasion, came from quarters
from which little else could have been expected. The Hungarian press took a
purely Italian view of the events in Albania. Pester Lloyd even went so far as to
comment that Zog bore a heavy responsibility for the fate of his unhappy
Hungarian wife. The Vatican’s Osservatore romano fully supported the move,
and the apostolic delegate to Albania asked Sir Andrew Ryan, who was a
Catholic, if he was not pleased now that Albanians could convert to Catholi-
cism without fear of government pressure.94
The Germans lent Italy full support, despite Italian attempts to conceal the
operation from Berlin until the last minute. An editorial in the Völkischer
Beobachter on 8 April accused Zog of ill-treatment of his people and the exploi-
tation of Italian generosity, which was, of course, quite true. But much was made
of the story that Zog was planning to use Italian troops in a move against
Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that the German minister in Tirana reported to
Berlin that the story of Zog’s projected attack on Yugoslavia was pure ¤ction.95
The of¤cial German communiqué released on the same day noted that
“Germany had the fullest understanding for the protection of Italian interests
in this area and would not be able to understand or approve if the Democratic
Western Powers, who have no interest there, should wish to interfere in the
juridically unexceptional position and action of our Axis partners.”96
Albania’s Balkan neighbors, although less willing to accept Italian expla-
nations, were too frightened to offer open opposition. Yugoslavia was given
twelve hours’ notice and took the time to ready two divisions but remained
quiet during and after the invasion, seemingly satis¤ed with the Duce’s pledge
that Italy was disinterested in the Albanians of Kosova. The Greek minister in
London, Charolambos Simopoulos, refused to accept any of Ciano’s explana-
tions, expressing complete skepticism about the stories of Zog’s project to
attack Yugoslavia and of important Albanian chieftains’ having asked Musso-
30 Chapter 1

lini to intervene.97 Because the Greek government was concerned about Corfu,
however, no strong reaction was forthcoming.
Only the Turks refused to accept the new situation and continued to grant
the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Albanian minister and
his staff. The Turkish government took the view that Zog’s rule had only been
interrupted, because he had not abdicated. Apart from Turkey, the invasion
was met with little more than gloom and misgivings in the Balkans.
In the West, the denunciation of the Italian action was widespread and
noisy. Newspapers of the Right, Center, and Left alike condemned with ex-
treme severity the attack on Albania. Without exception they considered it a
brutal and cynical act of unprovoked aggression in direct violation of the
Italo-Albanian Agreement of 1927 as well as the Anglo-Italian Agreement of
1938.
In Paris the invasion was considered a menace both to France and Great
Britain, especially for the latter in view of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. As a
result, both the newspapers and the government showed, as they had in the
past, a de¤nite tendency to look to London for some sort of a lead. Several
papers, including the Social Radical Ere nouvelle, criticized Great Britain for
its complacent attitude toward Italy in the Mediterranean.98
This criticism was not misplaced, for London proved that Mussolini’s lack
of concern for the reaction of the democracies was well founded. The ¤rst
British reaction seems to have been embarrassment that they had been taken
by surprise. Despite some Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) hints, on 3 April
Sir A. Noble still believed that Italy was not about to move against Albania,
and two days later in a cabinet meeting Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax
agreed. Following the invasion, Chamberlain took the Italian action personally,
writing his sister, “It cannot be denied that Mussolini had behaved to me like
a sneak and a cad.”99
The of¤cial Foreign Of¤ce reaction turned out to be a good deal milder
than the indignation expressed in the Western press. Both Lord Perth and
Lord Halifax advised against a strong reaction, fearing that Italy would only
be driven into greater reliance on Germany as a result.100 The prime minister,
who hurried back from Scotland for the occasion, approved this attempt to
appease Mussolini and as a result allowed the Anglo-Italian agreement to
remain in force without even denouncing Italy’s violation of it. The mild
British reaction surprised even Ciano, who noted in his diary that the memo-
randum from Lord Perth to the Italian government might have been com-
posed in the of¤ces of the Italian Foreign Ministry.101
Ciano noted happily in his diary on 10 April, “Reaction abroad begins to
Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania 31

lessen. It is clear above all that the British protests are more for domestic
consumption than anything else.”102 As a ¤nal step in Britain’s acceptance of
the Italian action, London applied to the Italian government for an executor
for a new consul general on 31 October 1939 and thereby gave de facto and
de jure recognition to the Italian invasion.103 Still it is an overstatement to
suggest, as Enver Hoxha does in his memoirs, that the British encouraged
Italy to occupy Albania.104
Although the Italian invasion violated the sovereignty of Albania, guar-
anteed by the League of Nations Covenant, the reaction of that body to the
outrage made it amply clear how completely impotent the league had become.
Because no nation complained to the league, the issue was not even discussed
until the Albanian chargé in Paris, Mehmed Abid, who had been instructed
by Zog to do so, sent a letter denouncing the aggression and requested an
immediate meeting of the Council of the League to decide about aid to be
given Albania.
The secretary general, Joseph Avenol, answered that because the request
had not come either from the Albanian government itself or through its ac-
credited representative in Geneva, he could not consider it as an appeal under
the covenant. On 13 May, the secretary received a letter from King Zog, who
asked for help in the reestablishment of Albanian independence. Avenol read
the letter to the Council of the League and “added that the reading of the
letter constituted the action he intended to take with reference thereto.”105
Under Italy’s direction, Albania withdrew from the league on 14 April 1939.
Despite the dif¤culties that the Italians had encountered during their
invasion of Albania, the leadership was delighted with the outcome and im-
mediately looked to the future. To the German ambassador and the visiting
Hungarian premier and foreign minister, Ciano exuberantly described Albania
as a great bulwark from which Italy would dominate the Balkans. Mussolini
immediately began to lay plans for using Albanians to stir up unrest among
their conationals in Yugoslavia and Greece, in anticipation of a more aggres-
sive foreign policy in the Balkans. By May 1939 the Duce seems to have
focused this new enthusiasm on Greece, whose defeat he saw as a means by
which to further expand his new Roman empire, as well as to drive the British
from the eastern Mediterranean. Just as the subjugation of Albania had created
an Italian lake out of the Adriatic, so the fall of Greece would turn the eastern
Mediterranean into an Italian sea.106
Western European leaders seem to have interpreted Ciano’s invasion in a
similar light. Despite initial widespread complacency, Zog and the Albanian
people seem to have been the last victims of appeasement, for the West drew
32 Chapter 1

something of a line at this point. A few days after the invasion, President
Franklin Roosevelt made his ¤rst serious intervention into European politics
by inviting Hitler and Mussolini to give assurances that they would not attack
a list of twenty-nine countries for ten years. More important, Britain and
France immediately moved to guarantee Greece and Romania against aggres-
sion. In Athens the British ambassador delivered to the Greek government
unconditional guarantees that London would not allow Corfu or any other
part of Greece to be taken by the Italians.
Ten days later the British announced the introduction of compulsory mil-
itary training, a move that seemed to mark a fundamental change in London’s
foreign policy. Soon after this signi¤cant development, London signed a pact
with Ankara. In a sense, then, events in Albania marked an important stage in
the process by which a coalition gradually developed to destroy fascism.107 It can
be argued that Albania’s sacri¤ce was not in vain, although the Albanians would
probably not have been consoled by the knowledge.
C H A P T E R 2

THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ITALIAN ALBANIA

The Albania of 1939, which Ciano intended to make bloom and Mussolini
hoped to use as a bulwark, presented a considerable challenge. There certainly
had been some development since independence in 1912, particularly in terms
of political stability and internal cohesion. But Zog’s limited constructive tal-
ent, his inability to grasp modern economics or ¤nd advisers who could, and
his failure to comprehend the true magnitude of the peasant problem left his
country far behind the rest of the continent. In 1939 Albania remained the
poorest, most isolated, and most backward state in Europe.
Agriculture and animal husbandry were the occupation of more than 80
percent of the population, though no more than 11 percent of the land was
arable. Zog’s ineffective attempts at land reform left most of the land in the
hands of religious orders and feudal Moslem landowners. A full three-¤fths of
the arable land in Albania was owned by 150 landowners. At least 40 percent
of the peasants were landless, living in grinding poverty. Agriculture and stock-
breeding techniques remained medieval, with iron plows found only in the
south and primitive crop-rotation systems requiring that 20 percent of the
arable land lie fallow. Albanian peasants, as a result, were the least productive
of all Balkan peasants, who in turn were the least productive of all European
peasants.1 Consequently, large quantities of wheat, corn, and rice were still
being imported (accounting for 23 percent of total imports in 1938) in an
attempt to meet the basic needs of the Albanian people.2
Like agriculture, Albanian industry lagged far behind even the rest of the
Balkans. In 1938, industry accounted for only 4.4 percent of the national
income.3 There were no large industrial establishments, and what industry did
exist was principally of the cottage variety, ful¤lling some basic household
needs. Each of the half dozen leading towns in Albania had a ¶our mill and
three or four additional factories such as dairies, distilleries, breweries, cigarette
factories, ¤sh canneries, and wagon works.4 Virtually all needed manufactured
goods, therefore, had to be imported, insuring that during the 1930s export
values never exceeded 50 percent of import costs. Both the expansion of this
33
34 Chapter 2

limited industrial base and the effective exploitation of Albania’s not inconsid-
erable timber and mineral wealth were severely hampered by a limited and
primitive transportation network. In 1939 Albania possessed forty miles of
narrow-gauge railroad and perhaps ¤ve hundred miles of surfaced road.5 The
rest of the transportation network consisted of cart tracks and paths that
virtually disappeared in the winter.
Social conditions remained almost as primitive as economic conditions. In
the north the Gegs, who made up close to two-thirds of Albania’s approxi-
mately one million people, remained tribal, still susceptible to the ravages of
the blood feud, although here Zog had made some progress since the 1920s.
In the south, home of the Tosks, impoverished peasants were still treated
essentially as serfs by their feudal Moslem landlords. Only three towns,
Durrës, Vlora, and Tirana, in any way resembled European cities, with Albania
as a whole just over 15 percent urbanized.6 Tirana, which was named Albania’s
capital shortly after World War I, had grown rapidly as a result, but still
possessed just over thirty thousand inhabitants in 1939. The dirty streets of
the capital presented the usual Balkan contrast of cheap modern structures
interspersed with hovels. The Italians had superimposed a series of rather
ostentatious government building in the center of town, along with the mod-
ern Hotel Dajti, and just outside the city in the middle of a wooded park, the
yet un¤nished tall yellow royal palace.7 General living conditions in Tirana and
elsewhere were poor; the people suffered from a bad diet that made them
vulnerable to disease. Public health services were nonexistent, and education
was still rudimentary. Albania had no university, few high schools, and an
illiteracy rate of 85 percent, the highest in Europe.8
But these problems would have to wait; the ¤rst priority was the creation
of an Italian Albania. Count Ciano, who had been responsible for the political
preparation for the invasion, was also primarily responsible for the absorption
of the newly conquered territory. Curiously, Ciano slowly developed a certain
paternalistic affection for the Albanians, which manifested itself in keen inter-
est not only in the planning for the integration of Albania into Mussolini’s
new Roman empire but also in the implementation of this policy.
Ciano was guided by one basic principle—the annexation of Albania,
based upon what he called a policy of justice and force, without the interna-
tional complications that this might cause. He wanted a colony without it
appearing to be a colony. Ciano was keenly aware of the promises of indepen-
dence and territorial integrity that he had indiscriminately handed out both to
foreign governments, as well as to the Albanians themselves. Not to engender
undo alarm, therefore, Ciano paid particular attention to both the pace and
The Construction of an Italian Albania 35

the form of the annexation. The opposition that he encountered came from
numerous directions, including the Albanians themselves, Victor Emmanuel
III, and Mussolini. Ciano achieved some initial success, although constant
readjustment was required, indicating signi¤cant problems in the process. Ul-
timately, of course, as with most military occupations, the hearts and minds of
the Albanians were not won over.
The creation of a new political structure was ¤rst on the agenda and
proved to be quite simple, because Ciano was able to use the existing ruling
class. Although Ciano found little sympathy among the population, as we have
seen, there was no shortage of collaborators. Ciano rapidly constructed a pro-
visional administration, ¤nding many willing to serve. He initially called on
those who had been politically marginalized by Zog, most with long-standing
contacts with Italy.9 Ciano also attracted many of the secretaries general of the
previous ministries.10 All of Zog’s ministers, with the exception of Rrok Geraj,
the minister of national economy, who had been sent to talk with Guzzoni and
in the old Roman tradition simply followed in his troop, had left with Zog.
This provisional government was headed by its most distinguished member,
Xhafer Bey Ypi, a former prime minister and chief inspector of the court up
to the time of the invasion. Ciano had originally planned to name Serreqi,11
but Ypi was clearly a bigger ¤sh. Others in this provisional government in-
cluded the previous press chief and Mihal Sherko, the general secretary for
foreign affairs. This provisional government followed a simple plan laid out by
Ciano, who, of course, hoped that his moves would be perceived as being
domestically inspired. On 8 April, both in Tirana and privately to the British
ambassador to Italy, Lord Perth, Ciano again explained that the Italians were
determined to respect Albanian independence and territorial integrity.12 This
was of course a ruse and fooled only a few. On 9 April Ciano told Lord Perth
that Italy’s further intentions would henceforth depend upon the Albanians
themselves, a clue to his future moves.13
As the rather transparent plan ran its course, Ypi, on 10 April, sent a
message to Mussolini reaf¤rming the loyalty of the Albanian people, who
con¤dently awaited the carrying out of Ciano’s program, which promised
“order, prosperity, political and social justice within the solemn frame of Fascist
liberties.” Lord Perth noted sarcastically that he was not aware there was such
a thing as Fascist liberties.14 On the same day, to complete the ¤rst phase of
the plan, Ypi broadcast a speech admitting the incapacity of Albanians to
govern themselves and stated that under Zog Albania had been nearing a
breakup, which the Duce had prevented. Ypi appealed to the Duce to save the
country.15 This is, of course, what Ciano had intended when he had announced
36 Chapter 2

two days earlier that his next steps would depend on the Albanians themselves.
The Albanians, at least to the satisfaction of Ciano, had spoken.
On 9 and 10 April, Ciano, working with what he called “some jurists and
other picayune professionals” laid out his plan for the annexation of Albania,
without the outward forms of annexation, liberally bribing former Albanian
of¤cials to win their cooperation. His ¤rst task was to subvert Mussolini’s
plan to construct some form of regency, presumably with a prince of Savoy
at the helm.16 This being done, and with the acquiescence of the “profession-
als” who told Ciano that his plan would not look like aggression, Ciano
gained Mussolini’s approval on 10 April and immediately set his scheme into
operation.
The ¤rst step required that Ypi call a constituent assembly, scheduled to
convene on 12 April. Although touted as a “national” assembly, the body of
159 consisted of 68 large landowners, 25 tribal leaders, and 46 business people,
as well as clerics from all denominations, a few intellectuals, of¤cials, and
of¤cers.17 Among this collection of prewar elite were found many who had
served both Zog as parliamentary deputies—apparently only a few former
deputies who had stayed in Tirana were unwilling to take part—and the
Turkish authorities before him. Those former deputies who had left the capital
were initially hard to ¤nd, with many having to be brought to Tirana aboard
Italian planes.18 Some of the delegates were apparently chosen quite arbitrarily
at a moment’s notice. Ryan reported that one delegate from Durrës was simply
instructed the day before to go to Tirana to attend an important meeting
dealing with local affairs.19 Many of the deputies chosen in this fashion were
rather sorry ¤gures, distinguished only by the level of their servility toward the
Italians.20

The Vërlaci Government

The constituent assembly, under the leadership of Ypi, was assigned a very
simple task: to follow the design set down by Ciano. The assembly performed
its role quickly and without much discussion. First it announced that as of 12
April, “the year 17 of the Fascist Era,” the Zog dynasty was deposed and the
Constitution of 1928, which constructed Zog’s monarchy, was abrogated.
Next, it announced that a close bond would be established between Albania
and Italy in the form of a personal union under Victor Emmanuel III, who
would be asked to assume the Albanian throne. At the same time Albanian
sovereignty and national freedom were proclaimed, and the population was
The Construction of an Italian Albania 37

encouraged to believe the Italians, who had promised Albania its national
freedom, own language, national ¶ag, peace, and justice.21 Albania was to
of¤cially become an autonomous constitutional monarchy hereditary in the
House of Savoy. Finally, a new government was formed with the great land-
owner and ardent foe of Zog, Shefqet Vërlaci as prime minister and head of
the ¤rst of the ¤ve puppet regimes constructed by the Italians.
The government included mostly nonentities, among them Xhemil Bey
Dino as foreign minister, whose only redeeming qualities seem to have been
that he was the son-in-law of Vërlaci and that while serving as Albanian
ambassador to Bulgaria under Zog (he had earlier been minister in London but
was forced to resign after his lover committed suicide on the steps of the
legation) he had sent Mussolini a congratulatory telegram during the course of
the invasion of Albania. Fejzi Bey Alizoti was chosen as ¤nance minister. He
was described as a strong Italophile who supplemented his meager income
during the 1930s by accepting a subsidy from Italy. He was said to be corrupt
and described as a gross creature physically and morally, with a certain amount
of low cunning.22 Andon Beca was chosen as minister of agriculture and do-
mestic economy by virtue of the fact that he was a loyal hanger-on of Vërlaci’s
and was injured in a Zog-inspired attempt on Vërlaci’s life in 1927. As a deputy
from Elbasan, he raised the cry of “Long Live Italy” at the opening of the
Albanian Parliament on 15 October 1938, evoking no response.
Maliq Bey Bushati, who would play an important role in later collabora-
tionist governments, was chosen to serve as minister of the interior. Bushati
was described as a man of character but no great intelligence who, although
admitting to having plotted against Zog with the Italians, was dismayed by the
lengths to which they went and resented their representing him as one of those
who had invited their intervention.23 Bushati would later claim that he partic-
ipated in order to save what could be saved, in order to resist through collab-
oration, a policy technique at which Albanians were particularly adept, after
some four centuries of preserving their nationality by a balance of warfare
against and diplomacy with the Turks.24
Perhaps the most distinguished of this otherwise uninspiring group was
the new minister of education, Ernest Koliqi, one of Albania’s foremost writers
and intellectuals. Described by one author as Italy’s “gray eminence” in Alba-
nia, Koliqi’s reputation suffered from his compromise with the Italians, partic-
ularly among many of his youthful followers who opposed the Italian inva-
sion.25 His reputation would have suffered even more had his supporters
known that he was on Ciano’s personal payroll.26
Even Ciano was not overly impressed with the new regime, noting in his
38 Chapter 2

diary on 12 April after his ¤rst meeting with Vërlaci that “I did not know
Vërlaci, had I known him I would have opposed his nomination. He is a very
surly-looking man, and will give us a great deal of annoyance.”27 Overall,
Vërlaci would turn out to be less trouble than Ciano had anticipated. However,
Vërlaci’s nature is perhaps best characterized by his request in December to be
allowed to assassinate King Zog. Vërlaci, whose daughter had been jilted by
Zog in the 1930s, was determined to see Zog dead, as demanded by traditional
Albanian blood feud law. Both Ciano and Mussolini refused to allow this,
reasoning that Italy could expect no bene¤t from such a move, only blame.
Perhaps Ciano’s ultimate statement regarding this new Albanian elite was
recorded in his diary following a reception at the Albanian royal palace in early
1941. Ciano noted rather ironically that the Italians were “missing eight cigar
lighters, a silver case, 60 knives and forks. As a debut on the part of Tirana
high society, that’s not bad.”28
Still, Ciano needed these people because they supported his vision with-
out hesitation, unlike others in both Italy and Albania. Ciano arrived in Tirana
on the day the constituent assembly met and immediately encountered oppo-
sition to aspects of his program. Many Albanians, who were cooperating with
the Italians, were concerned about the concept of a personal union under
Victor Emmanuel III. These leaders, principally chiefs from the Shkodra re-
gion, understood that giving the crown to the Italian king signaled the end of
Albanian independence. These chiefs would have preferred a prince of the
house of Savoy, or as Ciano modestly noted in his diary, Count Ciano him-
self.29 Ciano, in long discussions with the chiefs, repeated the myth that his
plan did nothing to threaten the form or the substance of Albanian indepen-
dence. The chiefs eventually desisted, either as a result of Ciano’s soothing
words, or because of the copious quantities of Albanian francs he liberally
distributed, and many of them declared the traditional Albanian besa, a pledge
of peaceful coexistence. A besa, which can be given to an individual or group,
allowed the Italians to travel freely through speci¤c regions, where, they prom-
ised, they would do no harm.30 Although northerners are reasonable in arguing
that this was not collaboration, the policy can be described as a form of passive
cooperation.
On 13 April the Italian Fascist Grand Council approved the union pro-
claimed by the Albanian constituent assembly, and three days later a law was
announced in Italy authorizing and proclaiming Victor Emmanuel’s accep-
tance of the crown of Albania.31 On 15 April Vërlaci headed an Albanian
delegation of forty-nine to Rome to of¤cially present the Albanian crown to
Victor Emmanuel III. Few of the persons included seemed to count for much
The Construction of an Italian Albania 39

in the country, indicating perhaps that there was not much of a rush to par-
ticipate in this ¤nal humiliation. The most distinguished member of the del-
egation, next to Vërlaci, was the ex-archbishop Vissarion, whose removal from
his see in 1935 cleared the way for the creation of the autocephelous Albanian
Orthodox Church. As we have seen, Vissarion resurfaced with the Italian
invasion and went out of his way to welcome the invaders, exposing himself
to universal contempt.32
The scene, as described by Ciano, was a curious one. The small group of
visibly depressed Albanians seemed lost in the great halls of the Quirinal Palace.

Vërlaci especially appears depressed as he pronounces, with a tired air and

without conviction, the words he has to say in offering the crown. The King
answers in an uncertain and trembling voice; decidedly he is not an orator
who makes any impression on an audience, and these Albanians who are a
warrior mountain people look with amazement and timidity on the little man
who is seated on a great gilt chair beside which stands a gigantic bronze
statue of Mussolini.33

In Victor Emmanuel’s acceptance speech and in Mussolini’s talk the day be-
fore, the Albanians listened anxiously for the word independence, but they did
not hear it. Mussolini, who sensed this, promised Ciano that he would talk to
them about national independence and sovereignty before they returned home.
The ¤ction needed to be preserved for the sake of Albanians as a whole and
for the sake of the collaborators in particular.
Ciano continued to pursue his plans at his own slow, steady pace and
continued to encounter frequent opposition. The Duce now wanted to move
faster; as early as 13 April he wanted to abolish the Albanian Foreign Ministry.
Ciano was again able to prevail, writing that “we must proceed gradually
unless we want to antagonize the rest of the world. So far matters have run as
smooth as oil because we have not had to use force. On the other hand, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of use to us in order to have a new state of things
legally acceptable without having to pass through an interminable polemic of
recognition. Later it can be quickly suppressed.”34

The 1939 Constitution

The constitution that institutionalized the personal union between Albania

and Italy sealed the fate of Albanian independence. The constitution was
handed to another visiting delegation of Albanians on 3 June. Ciano sugar-
40 Chapter 2

coated the pill with compensation of a personal nature, such as nominations

to the Italian senate and ambassadorial titles. Vërlaci was made an Italian
senator, Dino became an ambassador, Koliqi was given a professorship at the
University of Rome, and Serreqi was ¤nally rewarded for his betrayal by pro-
motion to the rank of general of division.35 These awards seem to have been
enough, because Ciano noted that, for the ¤rst time since the invasion, the
Albanians seemed to be visibly satis¤ed. Ciano too was satis¤ed and noted,
“The operation to emasculate Albania without making the patient scream—
the annexation—is now practically realized.”36
The constitution has been described by an American legal scholar as
typical of the new order that the European dictators imposed on conquered
states. “The whole political power is concentrated in the hand of the dictator.
His executive of¤cers are the department chiefs of the ruling state and a
governor general. At the same time the governor general exercises control over
a puppet regime which serves as buffer between the authorities of the ruling
state and the population of the subjugated country.”37 The tone of the new
relationship was set by the constitution’s introduction. There was not even the
semblance of an expression of the popular will by having it voted on by the
constituent assembly; rather, it was conferred by the sovereign authority of
Victor Emmanuel III in the same way that Abdul Hamid II introduced the
Constitution of 1876 to the Ottoman Empire. This decision seems to have
been made at the last moment, however, because as late as the middle of May
Jacomoni informed the German minister that the document would be laid
before the Albanian assembly in order to document Albanian participation in
the process.38 The release of the constitution was accompanied by at least one
positive development: according to Ryan, the rather sickening use of the ex-
pressions independent, independence, and personal union were ¤nally dropped.39
The document itself was known as the Statuto Fondementale and was
composed of forty-¤ve articles in seven chapters. Despite the veneer of con-
stitutional monarchy, what it created was a fascist military dictatorship—au-
thoritarian, hierarchical, highly centralized, and antidemocratic. It invested the
executive power of the state (which was exercised by Mussolini) in the king,40
who was to be represented in Albania by a lieutenant general. The lieutenant
general was responsible for the control of the puppet regime by appointment
and through permanent Italian counselors attached to each ministry.
On 23 April Francesco Jacomoni, the Italian minister, who had recently
been elevated to ambassador, was appointed the ¤rst lieutenant-general. The
appointment of Jacomoni, who was described as indefatigable but lacking in
sincerity, came as a surprise to some and a disappointment to others. It had
The Construction of an Italian Albania 41

long been assumed by many in collaborationist circles and among the diplo-
matic community that a prince of Savoy (with the Duke of Bergamo as the
favorite) would be appointed. The German minister suggested that the chief
reason a member of the house of Savoy was not appointed was because Zog’s
new palace was not yet ready and Tirana boasted no residence worthy of a
prince.41 Whatever the housing situation, the appointment was a mistake and
helped to undercut Ciano’s careful attention to sending the correct signals. The
appointment of so secondary a person as Jacomoni created the impression that
he was little more than a high commissioner in a conquered territory.42 Seem-
ingly aware that Jacomoni’s appointment might cause a problem, Rome hoped
to raise his comparatively low status by having the Albanian government
confer upon him the title of Altesse Serenissme. And needless to say, his
elevation had been preceded by the obligatory spate of telegrams to Mussolini
and Ciano requesting his retention and promotion to a higher position.43 To
his credit, though, Jacomoni, unlike most Italian of¤cials in Albania, treated
the Albanians as backward but not inferior.44
To complete the chain of command, Ciano constructed an undersecretari-
ate for Albanian affairs at the Foreign Ministry, to which Jacomoni would
report. The undersecretariate controlled a variety of Italian authorities in Al-
bania, including the Of¤ce of Civil Engineering, Of¤ce of Highway, Tramway,
and Automobile Transportation, and Of¤ces for Railroads and Public Works,
as well as directorates of the Italian Day Dispensary in Tirana, Albanian youth,
and after-work recreation centers, or Dopolavoro.45 Much of this bureaucracy
essentially created a parallel structure, because the Italian inspectorate of public
works was independent of the Albanian ministry of public works, and so on.
As undersecretary Ciano chose Zenone Benini, whose principal quali¤-
cation for the post seems to have been that he knew Ciano as a boy and served
with him in Ethiopia. He had joined the party in 1920 and had become a
squadrista, which, of course, appealed to Mussolini. But he had no training or
experience as a diplomat or a government minister, having taken a degree in
pure mathematics. Even the of¤cial Italian press had a dif¤cult time in explain-
ing his appointment. The Stefani Agency’s announcement concluded with an
almost apologetic “also very competent in corporate and syndical questions.”46
Ciano’s justi¤cation was that the situation required a technical expert because
it would be necessary to quickly develop a program of public works.
Through Jacomoni, Benini, Ciano, and Mussolini, the king, then, had
extensive authority. The king declared war and peace and commanded the
Albanian armed forces. The king was made responsible for issuing administra-
tive ordinances and appointing of¤cials. The constitution’s construction of
42 Chapter 2

several judicial and legislative branches was simple eyewash, since these two
branches were mere administrative units, subject to the will of the executive.47
Justice emanated from the king and was administered in his name by judges
whom he appointed.48
In general, the Italians retained the old judicial organization of the Zog
regime, which included a justice of the peace attached to every municipal
of¤ce; the courts of prefectures with an attorney attached; and the courts of
appeal, which heard appeals on penal and civil questions from the lower courts
of the prefectures. Political offenses were taken before a special court, and
military crimes were tried before military tribunals.49 The laws that these
courts carried out came principally from the Italian Criminal Code of 1930,
most of which was introduced by Jacomoni’s decree on 6 January 1940. The
code dealt in detail with all forms of crimes against the state. Personal freedom
did not exist under the Italians in Albania, because any citizen could be jailed
as a result of the decision of special committees of police internment. These
committees, one in Tirana and several in the provinces, were staffed by repre-
sentatives of the Italian police and fascist militia.50
Special laws against acts of sabotage—particularly those directed at roads
and telecommunication services—were introduced in late 1942 to supplement
the penal code. According to the decree, all inhabitants of villages within a
¤ve-mile radius of an act of sabotage were considered collectively responsible.
Heavy ¤nes and imprisonment of the heads of all families were imposed by
the special police internment committees.51
The legislative branch, also similar to its Zogist predecessor and its Italian
counterpart, was a sham. The statutes speci¤ed that the interpretation of laws
rested exclusively with the legislative power, but this claim was meaningless.
The legislature, called the Superior Fascist Corporative Council, had sixty to
seventy deputies made up of members of the newly created Central Council
and Directorate of the Albanian Fascist Party and members of a body called
the Central Council of the Corporative Economy. The latter body, which was
not constructed until March 1940, was composed of four sections representing
agriculture, industry, commerce, and the professions and arts. The members of
the Superior Fascist Corporative Council, fourteen of whom were Italians,
possessed virtually no legislative power. The body, appointed entirely by the
king, was convoked and prorogued by the king. No subject could be placed on
the agenda without the king’s consent. The king, in fact, issued decrees that
later came before the council for formal adoption. As if this were not enough,
the king also had veto power over the decisions of the council.
The collaborationist government was, of course, entirely controlled by the
The Construction of an Italian Albania 43

Italian authorities. The prime minister and his cabinet (restricted to ministers
of agriculture and forests, industry and commerce, justice, interior, ¤nance,
public works, and public instruction) were appointed and dismissed by the
king and responsible to the king, not to Parliament. Although all the ministers
were Albanians, each had a permanent Italian counselor ranked next to him.
The Italian counselors supervised all the of¤ces of the ministries and their
staffs, and had the right to sign all the acts issued by the ministries. Thus the
Italian advisers directed all the work of the ministries, acting on the orders of
the Jacomoni.52 The role of the Albanian ministers was never completely
de¤ned, although this did not seem to make much difference.
Conspicuously absent from this list of Albanian ministers were a foreign
minister and a military representative. Ciano had decided by June 1939 that
he had waited long enough and that he could now safely suppress the Albanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the remnants of the Albanian military
and security forces. Ciano noted in his diary that he decided on 25 May to
close the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was followed by the
inevitable announcement that the Albanian government had decided to sup-
press its own foreign ministry.53 The event itself was quick and anticlimactic.
On 3 June Xhemil Dino ¶ew to Rome and signed a treaty with Ciano at the
Palazzo Chigi providing for the uni¤cation of the diplomatic and consular
services of Italy and Albania. Foreign ministries were given a speci¤c amount
of time to apply for permission to open consulates general. Some states—in-
cluding the United States, France, and Turkey—refused and liquidated their
legations. Others—including Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and
Great Britain—acceded to the Italian demands.54 The British hoped to avoid
criticism for this of¤cial recognition of Italy’s military aggression by asking the
Italians not to give the event undue publicity. The Giornale d’Italia complied
and announced the recognition with little prominence.55
The small Albanian army, which had demonstrated its insigni¤cance dur-
ing the invasion, was reorganized by a series of Italian decrees promulgated a
few days before the introduction of the constitution. On 10 May a degree from
Jacomoni announced that the three-thousand-strong Albanian gendarmerie
would henceforth be absorbed into the carabinieri and commanded by an
Italian general of carabinieri, General Cristino Agostinucci (affectionately
known as the “Stuffed Lion” by Albanians), assisted by Italian and Albanian
subcommanders. As a military unit, it would come under the jurisdiction of
the supreme command of the Italian armed forces in Albania while cooperat-
ing with the Ministry of the Interior and the local police.56 The same degree
announced that the frontier guard would come under the command of Colo-
44 Chapter 2

nel Enrico Palandri of the Royal Guard of Finance.57 On 26 May the govern-
ment of Vërlaci “proposed” the merging of the small Albanian army (estimated
at this point at six battalions with a total strength of about sixty-¤ve hundred
men)58 into that of Italy’s. This move was approved by Italian law on 13 July
and con¤rmed by a decree from Jacomoni in December.59 To regulate the
number of of¤cers, it was announced, on 22 May, that of¤cers and noncom-
missioned of¤cers of the army, gendarmerie, and frontier guard who had not
returned to service by midnight 10 May would be considered to have resigned.
An active list of eight hundred of¤cers was eventually developed, of whom
only about two hundred were retained.60 The Italian military command, still
under General Guzzoni, was never subjugated to Jacomoni, a situation that
was to cause considerable subsequent problems.
Other levels of authority not directly regulated by the constitution included
the administration of local government. The Italians did little to change the
general structure of the administration of the Zog regime. The form and con-
tent, developed over a period of years, was authoritarian enough to ¤t right into
the plans of the fascist occupier. In any case, Italian advisers had already been
at work for many years, so that many aspects of the administration already
closely resembled their Italian counterparts.61 As under the Zog regime, local
government had no inherent powers, except when dealing with the tribal pow-
ers of the north. Local of¤cials were not elected but appointed by the central
government and controlled by the Ministry of the Interior. The same was true
of the advisers and the advisory councils of local of¤cials. The country was
divided into ten prefectures headed by prefects. Further subdivisions in de-
scending order included subprefectures, municipalities, communes, and, in cer-
tain districts, villages, headed respectively by subprefects, municipal heads, com-
mune heads, and elders. The most important local of¤cial was the prefect, who
wielded much administrative and police power as well as considerable authority
over local of¤cials. The smaller communes and villages were still presided over
by their own local of¤cials, but these of¤cials were now appointed by the central
government.62 It was only on local and relatively minor matters that Albanians
possessed any real decision-making powers.

The Albanian Fascist Party

Second only to the military as a power base outside the constitution, and the
third element of what for a time became a three-way power struggle (the other
two contenders being the Italian army and the Of¤ce of the Lieutenant Gen-
The Construction of an Italian Albania 45

eral) was the Albanian Fascist Party, the only political party in Albania. As in
Italy, the party was constructed to parallel the state and was able as a result to
gain considerable in¶uence for its parent, the Italian Fascist Party.
True to form, Ciano arranged on 11 April for a group of Albanians with
recognizable names to “request” the formation of an Albanian Fascist Party.63
By the end of April the Italian government had graciously consented. On 23
April Achille Starace, the secretary of the Italian Fascist Party, arrived in Alba-
nia, accompanied by considerable ceremony (including the exchange of nine-
teen-gun salutes) and two warships to announce the foundation of the Albanian
Fascist Party. Whether due to Ciano’s caution or traditional bureaucratic delays,
the party did not receive its constitution until 6 June 1939 and was not pre-
sented with an organized directorate and a central council until March 1940.64
Once its complex structure was ¤nally agreed upon, it came as a surprise
to only a few that the real power in the party rested with Giovanni Giro, a
personal friend of Mussolini who had created a series of diplomatic incidents
by attempting to construct a youth movement in Albania during the last years
of Zog’s reign.65 Giro, as inspector general of the party, directed the activities
of the Albanian secretary general, Te¤k Mborja.
Mborja, who was appointed by Victor Emmanuel in conjunction with
Starace and Vërlaci, was a lawyer and former deputy in the interwar Albanian
Parliament. He had supported Fan Noli, the Albanian democratic leader and
staunch opponent of Zog, and had represented the Noli regime in Rome in
1924. Ryan described him as a respectable person with a considerable amount
of energy.66 But as with other of¤cials appointed by Ciano, Mborja’s principal
quali¤cation was that he had been a friend of the Ciano family in the 1920s.
As head of the party Mborja sat in the Albanian cabinet as an ex-of¤cio
member and in so doing exercised some in¶uence. The press account of his
selection also mentioned that he would have some part in the direction of the
Italian party, although this was never spelled out clearly. What was spelled out
clearly was the Albanian party’s dependence on the Italian party, as demon-
strated by the provision that the Albanian party could only modify its own
statutes with previous agreement of the parent party.67
The statutes provided for a central council under the minister secretary,
provincial administrations under federal secretaries, fascios, (a form of national
leagues), regional groups, and nuclei. These groups, at least on paper, possessed
considerable authority. The central council of the party formed one of the two
elements of the Albanian Parliament. The party as a whole held considerable
in¶uence in local administrations and controlled various ancillary organiza-
tions. The latter included a fascist youth movement called Albanian Youth of
46 Chapter 2

the Lictor, as well as other youth organizations, university fascists—of whom

there were only a few because Albania had no university—female fascists, and
the Ente Assistènza Fascista, an assistance society.68 In exercising these polit-
ical, educational, welfare, and economic roles, the party commanded consider-
able power over the Albanian population. Still, the Italians maintained an
absolute veto over any of the actions of all Albanian organizations.
The rank and ¤le of the party was made up of native Albanians and
Italian residents in Albania. The statutes expressly excluded Jews and, as a sop
to Albanian sentiment in a passage de¤ning the prerequisites for membership,
included ¤delity and courage, “qualities characteristic of the people of Alba-
nia.”69 Members swore allegiance to Mussolini, described as the founder of the
empire and the creator of the new Albania, and pledged to serve the cause of
the fascist revolution with their lives, if necessary. The membership automat-
ically constituted a voluntary civil militia in traditional black shirts. The militia
was divided into four legions, which supervised ten cohort commands. The
apparent goal was the recruitment of two thousand members, or two hundred
for each of the ten cohort commands.70
Nominally, there was no compulsion to join the party, but methods were
found to make life dif¤cult for those who demonstrated reluctance, particularly
Albanian government of¤cials. As a result, the party was, of course, made up
of many people who joined for personal gain rather than any sense of doctrinal
conviction. Albania failed to produce nearly the number of ideological partners
for the fascists as did Romania or Croatia. Many who joined did so as a mere
formality. Accustomed to the system of graft and corruption that prevailed
under the Turkish Empire and under Zog, many of the Albanians, not known
for mastery of Western ideas of political morality, regarded the Fascist Party
as just another chance for the Italians to get rake-off. Philosophically accept-
ing the occupation of their country, many collaborated without any recognition
of the ideological betrayal involved. As we shall see, many would later head for
the hills once they realized what their collaboration would mean in the long
run.71 It is perhaps unjust to roundly condemn as traitors those who had yet
to fully develop a concept of modern Western nationalism.
A bungled attempt was even made to recruit Albanians from outside
Albania for membership in the Albanian Fascist Party. In May 1940, Mborja
sent two emissaries to Thessaloníki with the hope of forming an Albanian
fascist organization in Greece. The two, a parliamentary deputy and a journal-
ist, interviewed leading Albanians and attempted to convince them of the
brilliant achievements of fascism in Albania. The Greek Albanians advised
them to leave, which the emissaries readily consented to do.72
The Construction of an Italian Albania 47

Italianization of the Financial Structure

Italianization of the economy was also an important early priority. The Italian
government had for some time attempted to force a customs union on King
Zog in order to gain full control of Albania’s foreign trade and the economy
in general. Zog had successfully resisted, but soon after the invasion the Ital-
ians moved quickly to institute this long-standing goal. Jacomoni, as one of his
last acts as ambassador, negotiated the far-reaching union with Vërlaci and
announced the agreement on 22 April. Henceforth Albania and Italy were to
be considered, for customs purposes, one territory under the Italian customs
system. Italian and Albanian goods would be considered domestic goods and
traded freely between the two countries. All Italian export and import restric-
tions and all other international agreements now applied to the customs union.
All Albanian agreements with other states were considered null and void. All
administration and preventive services would be carried out by the Italian
customs service.73
The agreement also pegged the Albanian gold franc at 6.25 lire (one-half
of the franc’s actual worth) and extended to Albania the whole Italian system
of exchange control. Albanian currency would henceforth be covered by Italian
gold or notes through the Bank of Italy and printed by the Italian state press
or the press of the Bank of Italy. The Italian government took full ¤nancial
responsibility for the Albanian budget, the agreement having destroyed
Albania’s ability to raise revenue through customs. Italy promised Albania
¤fteen million gold francs a year, rather generous since Albania averaged about
half that sum in customs revenue. Finally, the agreement set up a mixed
committee to implement the various provisions, made up of representatives
from the Istituto Nazionale per i cambi con l’èstero (National Institute for
Foreign Exchange), the Bank of Italy, the National Bank of Albania (which
had already for some time been dominated by Italians), and the foreign min-
istries of both countries.74
The impact of the agreement was substantial and largely unanticipated by
the Italian authorities. With regard to foreign trade, the effect was expected.
Albania’s small export trade had been dominated by Italy for years, so little
changed here. In terms of imports, prior to the invasion Italy was responsible
for perhaps one-third of Albania’s imports, with Germany, Austria, and
Czechoslovakia providing perhaps one-sixth. As a result of the treaty Albania
would receive all of its needed imports from Italy or at least through Italy.
Of more signi¤cance for the average Albanian, however, was the provision
dealing with currency regulations. As a developing society, Albanians were just
48 Chapter 2

in the process of developing con¤dence in paper money. Although Zog was no

¤nancial genius, he had been very careful to build this trust by supporting his
currency with gold and by issuing and circulating gold coin. Under Zog’s
regime, the National Bank of Albania readily exchanged paper money for gold
or foreign currency. The value of the Albanian gold francs, therefore, remained
stable, and because of the constant need to change notes for gold, the amount
in circulation was kept at a minimum. In the ten years before the invasion, no
more than 11 million to 14 million gold franc notes circulated. At the end of
1937 that amount was covered by no less than 7.6 million in gold and 15
million in foreign currency.75
The introduction of Italian currency into Albania and the doubling of the
franc against the lira destroyed faith in Albanian currency. Albanians as a result
began to hoard gold, which could have been put to good use in the develop-
ment of the country. As the Italians would soon discover, their program for
Italianization of Albanian currency would have further negative effects as well.
The remaining independent bank, the Agricultural Bank, was fused with
the Bank of Naples on 12 May. All functions were transferred to an agricul-
tural credit section of what was described as the Banco di Napoli, Albania. The
indication here is that the Bank of Naples had created an Albanian subsidiary.
The transfer of this bank completed the Italian takeover of Albania’s ¤nancial
structure.

Propaganda

During the same short period of seemingly frenzied activity, Jacomoni and
Vërlaci signed an agreement giving Italians in Albania and Albanians in Italy
the same civil and political rights they enjoyed in their own countries. This
became possible following the startling discovery by Italian racial experts that
the lowly Albanians were actually of Nordic stock, just like the Italians.76
Ciano made special note of this agreement, suggesting that it was as important
as the annexation itself.77 The implications of this move were clear to all. The
Italians had ¤nally gained the right to own land in Albania. The German
minister commented that it was assumed that as a result the Italians, whom
he considered more energetic than the Albanians, would beat the Albanians
out of the most valuable land and that in a few years only the unfruitful and
inaccessible mountains would still be peopled with Albanians. He remarked
further that it was clear that for the Albanians, this recognition of equal rights
in Italy was practically worthless.78
The Construction of an Italian Albania 49

The Italians also paid particular attention to the control and diffusion of
propaganda. This included silencing the Zogist press and replacing it with
more cooperative papers. The two Tirana daily papers, Drita and Shtypi, were
closed and replaced by a new paper, called Fashizmi and edited by Alizoti,
which became the of¤cial organ of the Albanian Fascist Party. About a quarter
of the ¤rst issue appeared in Italian. The paper was not well received for a
number of reasons. First, the high illiteracy rate certainly had an impact. But
equally important, the Albanians in Tirana quickly identi¤ed Fashizmi for
what it was, a vehicle for the dissemination of unadulterated Italian propa-
ganda. Recognizing this handicap, the Italian authorities, in March 1940, tried
to make the paper more palatable by renaming it Tomori, after the highest
mountain in Albania. At the beginning of April, Qemal Vrioni, a member of
a well-known wealthy family who had been involved in a major revolt against
Zog in 1935, took over editorship. At the same time the paper ceased to be a
party organ.79 These cosmetic changes did nothing to diminish Italian control.
To complete their control of Albania’s rather limited news organizations, in
January 1940 the Italians decreed that the Albanian Telegraphic Agency
would henceforth be limited to Stefani Agency messages.
In order to disseminate propaganda in the cultural ¤eld, the Italian au-
thorities established the Skënderbeg Foundation, with its main of¤ce in Tir-
ana. Divided into two sections, the ¤rst, the Institute of Albanian Studies,
hoped to develop the “philosophical, literary, artistic, and historic culture in
Albania.” It members were appointed by Jacomoni, and its membership was
open to Albanian, Italian, and even foreign scholars. The second section, the
Italo-Albanian Skënderbeg Club, hoped to facilitate social relations between
Italians and Albanians and was open only to Italians and Albanians.80 De-
spite a substantial budget, the impact of the Skënderbeg Foundation was
marginal.

Education

Of considerably more concern in terms of Italianization was the Albanian

educational system. In this matter the Italians could not fail to act decisively.
Zog had considered education a priority, but it seems that there were always
more urgent priorities. The primary problem was a lack of quali¤ed teachers
and a lack of funds. Ordinary teachers received subsistence-level pay and in
most cases possessed no more than a primary-school education themselves.
The result was that although there had been some improvement during the
50 Chapter 2

interwar period, when the Italians invaded, Albanian education was still in a
rudimentary form.
The Italians found in existence some 663 elementary schools (for those
aged six to eleven)—up from 560 in 1930—and 19 intermediate schools (for
those aged eleven to thirteen), with a total of 1,595 teachers and 62,971 pupils.
There were also schools of the lycée type at Shkodra, Korça, and Tirana, as
well as the Ecole Normale at Elbasan, where full secondary education for
those aged eleven to eighteen was available. The dearth of secondary schools
was indicative of Zog’s belief that it would be a mistake to have too many
secondary schools because they would produce a “white-collar” class. Accord-
ingly, preference was given to the development of agricultural and technical
education. By 1939 there were 13 industrial schools, 1 technical institute, and
2 training schools for teachers. There was no university in Albania, and there
would not be one until 1957, but Zog’s government did provide a limited
number of scholarships (over two hundred by 1939) to enable some students
to ¤nish their education abroad. Most students went to Italy, but some of the
Greek-speakers from southern Albania ¤nished their education in Athens.
Unfortunately, the most quali¤ed were not always chosen, because the selec-
tion process for scholarships abroad, much like most other bene¤ts, was based
on favoritism.81
Not surprisingly, the most effective educational institutions during the
Zog years were run by religious organizations or by foreigners. In the north
Jesuits and Franciscans ran a number of schools that enjoyed good standing
and ¤lled, to a certain extent, the local need. The Americans supported a
technical school and two agricultural colleges, which they staffed and ¤nanced.
From the technical point of view, the Italians were the most helpful, for they
founded four arts and crafts schools to train mechanics and artisans.82
In southern Albania the educational situation was less discouraging. An
educational system dating back many hundreds of years was still in existence.
The schools were good, the teachers fully quali¤ed, and the standard of edu-
cation relatively high. Whether Greek propaganda, as was asserted by many
nationalists, took the form of subsidies distributed secretly for the upkeep of
these schools, or whether the relative prosperity of the south resulted in pub-
lic-spirited endeavors on the part of the local population, there existed in
southern Albania a state of educational well-being, which was unknown in
other parts of Albania.83
While Zog must be credited with some improvement in the Albanian
educational system, he did considerable damage as well. Ever suspicious of
the Italians, Zog was convinced in 1933 that the Italians were using their
The Construction of an Italian Albania 51

schools to in¶uence Albanian students politically and culturally. Zog’s minis-

ter of education convinced him that in some instances portraits of Mussolini
and Victor Emmanuel had replaced those of Albanian heroes. The minister
further argued that the Italians had actually built more schools than were
needed in certain areas of northern Albania. Although some of these com-
plaints were not entirely unjusti¤ed, Zog’s fear of the Italians ran away with
him. Convinced that the Italians were making insidious advances to the
entire Catholic north in an attempt to undermine his in¶uence among the
tribes and replace it with their own, Zog struck a blow for nationalism.84
Unfortunately the blow was also aimed directly at Albania’s already meager
educational system. Zog closed all foreign schools. Had the Albanian school
system been somewhat stronger, the departure of the foreigners may not have
had such a resounding impact. As it was, the entire system was thrown into
chaos and did not begin to recover until some of the foreign schools were
allowed to reopen several years later, in 1935. This con¶ict with the Greeks
was never fully resolved.85
When the Italians arrived in 1939 they ¤rst closed the schools in order to
carry out a general evaluation of their priorities for both the students and the
teachers. The latter were a particular concern, since it had not escaped the
Italians that teachers were perhaps more likely than any other in¶uential sub-
ordinate class in the country to include a fair number of patriotic idealists.
Extensive weeding out and retraining commenced immediately. Most non-
Italian foreign schools were closed, and the number of secondary schools was
reduced even further. This last development was justi¤ed, by the Albanian
minister, on the same basis as Zog’s argument that these schools did little but
increase inordinately the number of candidates for of¤cial employment. The
secondary school in Korça was closed primarily because it was the chief center
of French culture in the Albanian educational system. Minister Koliqi sug-
gested that the school was responsible for the dissemination of subversive
ideas.86 To counter this and other foreign in¶uences, both Albanian and Italian
were taught and new textbooks boasting politically correct historical interpre-
tations were hurriedly introduced.
Controlling the educational establishment proved less arduous than con-
trolling the students. The Italians attempted to supervise the students by setting
up a series of fascist youth organizations. The Federazióne della Gioventù
Albanese del Littorio was formed. Girls were organized into the Gioventù
Femminile del Littorio, and boys under fourteen were assigned to groups of
Balilla. Italian authorities would soon discover, however, that winning the hearts
and minds of Albanian students was not as simple as they had hoped.
52 Chapter 2

Religion

Establishing control over Albania’s diverse religious hierarchies proved to be a

much simpler task. Albania had always been something of a religious anomaly
in the Balkans, with its 70 percent Moslem majority. The remaining Albanians
were divided between the Orthodox Church (20 percent) prominent in the
Hellenized fringe in the south and the Catholic Church (10 percent) promi-
nent in the area around Shkodra in the north. Although Albanians have never
been considered religious fanatics, the existence of three religious communities
(not to mention the various subdivisions among them) was considered by
Albanian nationalists as an invitation for foreign intervention. Elsewhere in
the Balkans religion often served as a unifying force; in Albania it proved to
be divisive. Because this division constituted a block to the development of a
national community, twentieth-century nationalist leaders, particularly Zog,
who was not a religious bigot and not even very religious, hoped at least to
remove control of Albanian churches from the hands of foreigners.
The Moslem faith in Albania, with most of the faithful belonging to the
Sunni branch, separated itself from any outside control in 1923. The other two
churches proved to be more of a problem. Zog turned ¤rst to the Orthodox
Church, arguing that ties with the ecumenical patriarchate in Istanbul should
be severed.
The ¤rst step in this direction had been taken as early as 1921 by Fan
Noli, who had already played a leading role in the formation of the Orthodox
Church among Albanian émigrés in the United States. He and a few associ-
ates, undeterred by the fact that the mass of the Orthodox faithful seemed to
be out of sympathy with their aims, proceeded to open a vigorous campaign
in favor of religious independence. They received the support of successive
Albanian governments, which looked favorably on a movement whose orga-
nizers preached liberation from alien control.
In September 1922 the Congress of Berat was called by the government
to deal with the question. The congress, made up of various delegates chosen
in no organized fashion, declared the Albanian Orthodox Church to be auto-
cephalous and ruled that Albanian instead of Greek should be used for litur-
gical purposes. In addition, the congress constructed a council headed by V.
Marko, one of Noli’s aides, to control the church and appoint bishops to an
Albanian synod. The Congress further appealed to the patriarch to legalize the
projected severance.87 The decisions of Berat remained largely inoperative,
however, because of the lack of a hierarchy. Albania did not have a single
Orthodox bishop after World War I. The mission sent to Istanbul to discuss
The Construction of an Italian Albania 53

matters with the patriarch failed to convince the patriarchate to recognize the
autocephalous character of the church.
Zog reopened the negotiations in 1926, but by 1928 the position of the
church remained what it was in 1921. Having decided that the patriarch was
nothing more than an instrument of Greek propaganda and was purposely
delaying in the hope of imposing upon the new church restrictions to secure
the supremacy of Greek in¶uence, Zog decided to take matters into his own
hands.
In February 1929, a meeting took place in Zog’s villa for the purpose of
creating a synod. The only bishops available were unfortunately of question-
able character. Archbishop Vissarion, described earlier, who had been educated
and ordained in Greece and consecrated at Kotor by two Russian bishops,
became the ¤rst head of the church. He was assisted in the organization of a
council by Bishop Victor, a Serb by birth and citizenship, who was for some
time in charge of the small Serbian colony at Shkodra and who was conse-
crated bishop in Belgrade in 1923 by the Serbian patriarch. Upon returning to
Shkodra, Victor began acting in an episcopal capacity, illegally in the eyes of
the patriarchate, because he was technically part of the Serbian Church, which
had no jurisdiction over Albanian territory.88
Zog prevailed upon these two prelates to consecrate three uneducated
country priests in order to ¤ll the remaining seats on the ¤ve-man synod.
Istanbul immediately excommunicated all but the Serbian bishop, hoping that
Belgrade would independently condemn Bishop Victor, but to no avail.
Thus the autocephalous church was established with a certain semblance
of legality. But the solution brought little immediate tranquility in its train,
since the new synod was distrusted by the rank and ¤le of the Orthodox
Church. Incidents that revealed hostility toward it led to petty acts of perse-
cution on the part of the authorities. Although he professed contentment, Zog
was fully aware of the blemishes and continued to search for a lasting solution.
The rift between the Albanians and Istanbul remained unresolved until
1937, when Zog relieved Vissarion of his duties, apparently because the latter
had continued to live a scandalous life. Zog found a certain Kristopher Kissi,
who had been a bishop before the war but was without a see, to replace
Vissarion.89 As a result of Kissi’s appointment as Orthodox metropolitan of
Tirana, and because the other bishops were also replaced by more acceptable
candidates, the patriarch ¤nally, on 13 April 1937, recognized the Albanian
Orthodox Church as autocephalous.
Although the Catholic Church claimed the smallest number of adherents,
in many ways it was the most susceptible as a conduit of Italian in¶uence. Like
54 Chapter 2

the Orthodox in the south, the Catholics (with the exception of the great
Catholic tribes) were urban, often middle-class and foreign-educated, and as
a result were more in¶uential than their numbers would merit. The clergy,
with its effective educational system, provided the natural leadership for this
community. Zog, himself a Moslem, was perhaps more suspicious of the Cath-
olics than he needed to be, but this can be explained by the church’s obvious
connection with Italy and his ever increasing reliance on Italian ¤nancing.
There was, of course, no question of creating an independent Catholic
Church, so Zog was limited to attempting to control it through the force of
state power. Zog was frightened by the Catholics and their connections with
the Italians but felt it was important, on occasion, to demonstrate his indepen-
dence from Catholic and Italian in¶uence. He was successfully able to do this
on a number of occasions which helped him to maintain some measure of
control over the Catholics.
Zog’s ¤rst major con¶ict with the Catholics in Albania and their protec-
tors involved the institution of a new civil code in 1927, which called for civil
marriage and divorce. By implementing this code Zog hoped to end the shoot-
ing of faithless wives, a custom generally accepted in Albania. The Vatican
objected strenuously, and the Italian minister pointed out that domestic reac-
tion among the Catholics in the north might result in the organization of an
opposition party. Zog stood his ground, informing the archbishop of Shkodra,
the spiritual leader of Albanian Catholics, that he would not tolerate protests
from the church and that “any priest whose enthusiasm ran away with him
beyond proper bounds would soon be provided with a tree with adequate
strength to support his weight.”90
Zog’s warning was taken seriously, since he had demonstrated in 1926
that he was willing to take drastic measures against Catholic leaders. In No-
vember a revolt had broken out among Catholic tribesmen of Dukagjin, who
were subsidized but not encouraged by the government in Rome. Zog, with
overwhelming ¤repower, quickly crushed the insurrection and arrested and
sentenced to death many Catholics, including a number of priests. Rome
asked that they be spared. This put Zog in a rather awkward position, for if
he reprieved the priests who had openly confessed their guilt, he would have
been attacked by the Moslems, who remembered that some years earlier he
had hanged several Moslem clerics for complicity in a revolt. He would also
have been accused of being a slave to the Italians. Further, it seems that Zog
actually wanted them dead, commenting to the British minister “I do so much
want to hang them as they deserve.”91
The problem was ¤nally solved by use of Zog’s odd, and brutal, system of
The Construction of an Italian Albania 55

checks and balances. Zog bowed to Italian pressure and commuted the sen-
tences of the priests who had proudly confessed to having participated in the
revolt. In order to satisfy the domestic demand that he hang a priest, however,
he brought forth one who few knew had been arrested and quickly hanged
him. In this way Zog was able to remind the Catholic hierarchy that despite
an occasional need to compromise, his power was considerable. Although
Zog’s relationship with the Catholic Church in Albania was never cordial,
demonstrations of this sort allowed him to effectively mitigate what he per-
ceived as a potential for foreign in¶uence and disunity.
Zog had created, if not compliant, at least quiet religious communities,
particularly at the upper levels of leadership. This made Italy’s task after the
invasion much simpler. With this background, the Italians had remarkably
little trouble with Albania’s religious communities. Still, Mussolini was clearly
uneasy about the Moslem religious community and desperately sought out
methods by which to tie them to Rome. Perhaps his most novel suggestion
was the construction of a large mosque in Rome. Victor Emmanuel supported
the idea, although this is hardly surprising, since the king enthusiastically
supported any program that struck at the church. The Vatican, of course, was
horror-stricken, and Ciano’s intervention was required to smooth the ruf¶ed
feathers. Ciano correctly assumed that the way to win over the Albanian
Moslems was not by building mosques but rather by increasing the wages of
Albanian Moslems.92
Ciano felt so con¤dent about the Moslem organization that he went so
far as to replace the nominal head of the church, who had recognized the
Italian regime in Albania, with an even more easily controlled “Moslem Com-
mittee.” The Moslem community at large accepted this change with little
complaint. Indeed, in a remarkable full-page analysis in the ¤rst edition of
Tomori, a leading Moslem cleric concluded that the terms fascism and Islam
were essentially synonymous.93 The one exception was the Bektashi dervish
organization, much of whose leadership never fully accepted the Italian inva-
sion and remained in opposition.
Although no solid evidence exists, it is highly likely that the Italians
¤nally tired of this constant opposition and had the head of the Bektashi sect,
Nijaz Deda, murdered. The German minister reported that the aged head of
the sect, as well as a Dervish who hurried to his rescue, was killed on 28
November 1940, Albania’s independence day. The outrage occurred at about
midnight in a cloister just outside of Tirana. Five fascist policemen outside the
complex did nothing, and the murderers, when caught, had thirty thousand
francs with them. Jacomoni ordered a state funeral and ordered top-level party
56 Chapter 2

and government people to attend.94 The Italian authorities released the story
that the motive for the killings was robbery, but few were convinced. For
Jacomoni the important point, of course, was that the entire Moslem religious
hierarchy either support the occupation or at least remain neutral. By exhibit-
ing the same degree of ruthlessness that Zog had, Jacomoni was able essen-
tially to achieve his goal.
The Orthodox hierarchy proved compliant as well. Vissarion’s unashamed
boot licking has already been mentioned. His motivation was, presumably, to
ingratiate himself in order to be offered a new of¤cial position within the
church leadership. Vissarion might have succeeded in this were it not for the
fact that the existing hierarchy supported the invasion as well. The head of the
church, Archbishop Kissi, and his three bishops expressed formal approval of
the invasion in 1939.95
The Catholic Church and many Catholics, not surprisingly, proved to be
quite supportive of the invasion. Even today many older Albanian Catholics
remember the Italian occupation with fondness. Italy brought them priests
and took their children to seminaries. The Italian troops behaved well and had
after all gotten rid of Zog for them.96 There were, however, many exceptions
to the rule of Catholic cooperation with the Italians, particularly among the
village priests. Most of these priests had been trained in Albania and were
quite nationalistic. A number actually left the country after the invasion. The
hierarchy, on the other hand, often found it dif¤cult to contain their enthusi-
asm. The apostolic delegate, L. Nigris, saw the invasion as a very positive
development that allowed all those Albanians who wished to become Catholic
greater freedom to do so.97 The Albanian hierarchy, with its two archbishops
and four bishops, was given immediate tangible evidence of its members’
increased signi¤cance.
Much of this evidence was, of course, monetary. In the ¤rst Italian budget
for the annexed Albania, religion in general received considerable attention.
Zog’s last budget had allotted 50,000 francs to the Moslems and 35,000 to the
Orthodox Church. The Italians allotted 375,000 to the Moslems, 187,500 to
the Orthodox Church, and 156,000 to the Catholic Church. Although all the
religious hierarchies did very well in comparison, given the numerical 7 to 2 to
1 division in Albania the Catholics were treated with considerable generosity.98
As further evidence of the Italian bias in favor of the Albanian Catholics,
in February 1940 Jacomoni began pushing the Uniate Movement, but under
Catholic supremacy. Zog had traditionally discouraged this position because
of potential religious con¶ict but the Italians seemed unconcerned about this
possibility. They correctly assumed that a great deal could be done with money.
The Construction of an Italian Albania 57

Archbishop Kissi of the Orthodox Church, not known for his incorruptibility,
was apparently offered money.99 Although this Italian program experienced
little success in the long run, its institution helped to guarantee the loyalty of
the Catholic hierarchy.
Italian Albania, in terms of its structure, proved to be little different from
its Zogist predecessor, at least in the early years. Zog had created a non-
absolutist, monarchical dictatorship with the cooperation of the old feudal
aristocracy, made up of the great landowners of the center and south, with the
cooperation of the major northern tribal chieftains. Power remained with Zog,
but he could never afford to alienate his constituency. Many of them, particu-
larly the chieftains of the north, were kept in line with favors and simple graft.
An often used formula was to commission a chief as a colonel in the Albanian
army and then provide him with enough gold on a monthly basis to support
a certain number of nonexistent troops.
The Italians were quite experienced and comfortable with this system of
graft. Ciano, in particular, considered himself to be something of an expert in
the art of the bribe. The Italians recognized that the chiefs were not politically
signi¤cant on a national scale, since they could rarely afford to leave their areas
for any length of time. In light of this realization, the Italians seemed more
willing to give the chiefs even greater freedom in their own areas. This, of
course, encouraged local loyalty at the expense of state loyalty. Here, Italian
policy did considerable damage to the budding Albanian nationalism Zog had
carefully and painstakingly sought to instill during his reign. Of the great
landowners who cooperated with Zog, some left with him. Most of these,
however, soon returned. In any case, the Italians were not required to look too
far to ¤nd individuals from good families who had been alienated by Zog. Zog
had started his career as a minor chieftain. His road to power was littered with
the bodies of those who opposed him. By Albanian custom, killings of this
nature required the imposition of the traditional blood feud. By the 1930s it
was estimated that some six hundred such blood feuds haunted Zog, often
making him a prisoner in his own palace. Many of these people, too, were
more than willing to cooperate with the Italians. The invasion produced little
in terms of radical political or social shifts. Internal rivalry and struggle be-
tween these people remained of a personal rather than a political or social
nature. The power, or lack thereof, that the traditional feudal elite exercised
was also very similar. As under Zog, these people had limited real power. This
arrangement changed little under the Italians.
As Luan Omari, perhaps the leading socialist Albanian legal historian,
tells us, the Italians did not change much structurally and really did not need
58 Chapter 2

to. While Italian Albania was certainly more centralized, the judicial and
legislative structure possessed the same lack of independence as under Zog.
Although Zog conducted the occasional election for his Parliament, with
advantages of extensive electoral interference along with the very high illiter-
acy rate, it would be absurd to speak in terms of democracy under Zog. The
elective principle, insofar as it existed, was abolished entirely under the Italians.
Omari argues that the new constitution resulted from a merger of the Italian
and Zogist constitutions. This seems a fair characterization. What we have
here is a miniature Italy grafted onto a Zogist frame. The operation was
performed slowly and occasionally with tact. The result was a nonabsolutist,
fascist, military dictatorship in the guise of a constitutional monarchy. The
next step was to try to sell it to the Albanians.100
The wedding of Zog and Geraldine, 28 April 1938. ( Jacomoni)

Zog’s representative Rrok Geraj meets with General Guzzoni at Durrës on the day of
the Italian invasion. ( Jacomoni)
Xhafer Ypi offers Italy a personal union with Albania following the Italian invasion,
12 April 1939. ( Jacomoni)

Ceremony at the Quirinale Palace in Rome—the Albanian crown of Skenderbeg is

offered to the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, 16 April 1939. ( Jacomoni)
C H A P T E R 3

ITALIAN GREATER ALBANIA

Ciano was willing to exaggerate Italian popularity in Albania in order to

convince Mussolini to invade. Ciano could delude Mussolini, but he found
self-deception, particularly following his ¤rst visit to Albania after the inva-
sion, more dif¤cult. Rather than receiving the warm welcome his agents had
assured him, he saw overt hostility. Once the Italians had established their
occupation, therefore, Ciano made every effort to improve the dismal reputa-
tion the Italians had traditionally experienced and to win over the populous,
or at least, some of the populous. A carrot-and-stick approach was adopted,
with, at least during the ¤rst year, considerably more emphasis placed on the
former. With this initial altruism, the Italians hoped to improve both their
political and economic position in Albania.
In a sense, Italy’s conciliatory attitude began to make itself felt on the very
day of the invasion. Observers noted that the Italian naval gunners at Durrës
refrained from using high explosive shells and restricted their ¤re to the extent
that surprisingly little damage was caused. Once ashore, Italian troops behaved
with restraint and even friendliness, despite some determined Albanian resis-
tance. While many examples of fraternal behavior can be found, very little
overtly harsh action was reported.1 Ciano’s diary tells us that he personally
gave orders that Albanian soldiers, particularly the of¤cers, were to be well
treated.2 Once the ¤ghting, what little of it there was, had stopped, the Italians
demonstrated increased restraint and caution. Andrew Ryan reported on the
good-natured naïveté of the Italian soldiers sent to guard the British mission
in Durrës.3 It is likely that this attitude stemmed partially from the basic
nature of the recently drafted Italian peasants, who had nothing against Al-
banians, and partially from of¤cial policy.
Ruth Mitchell, a long-time British resident of Albania, wrote on 26 April
1939, “The pain being taken not to offend or annoy the people, not to give
the slightest feeling of conquest or superiority is really remarkable.”4 Indeed,
the Italians were careful to avoid the impression of occupation. The port of
Durrës was free for anyone to walk around. One saw an occasional sentry
61
62 Chapter 3

guarding a dump of ri¶es or a vessel unloading oil, but only small garrisons
were found in both Durrës and Tirana. And the road between these two
principal towns of Albania was left entirely unguarded. Where security patrols
did exist, the Italians made certain, at least in the early months, that they
consisted of one Italian carabinière and one Albanian soldier—although ru-
mors naturally circulated that the Albanians had guns but no bullets.5 Even as
large numbers of troops and much war material arrived, both were quickly sent
to outlying regions. The troops who had participated in the invasion were
quickly replaced by fresh troops who had no connection with actually shooting
Albanians.6

Winning the Hearts and Minds: Social Development

Ciano hoped to reinforce an impression of benevolence with a number of

initial gestures aimed more at public relations than at addressing any of
Albania’s profound social and economic problems. One of Ciano’s ¤rst moves
was to distribute food and clothing in some of the many poor areas and to
release those prisoners who had not already been set free.7 Ciano, who greatly
enjoyed playing the savior of the Albanians, did much of this in person. He
personally distributed 190,000 gold francs to the needy in Tirana, Shkodra,
Vlora, Gjirokastra, Saranda, Korça, and Kukës. Because the money was given
directly to the poor, bypassing the usual bureaucracy, it did some good. Al-
though Mussolini had not been informed, Ciano soothed his ire by reporting
that Italian generosity had resulted in demonstrations in recognition of Italy
and the Duce.8
Italian largess was followed by a well-orchestrated anti-Zog campaign.
Ciano recognized that Zog maintained the support of some Albanians, and
many others at least equated the memory of the king with an independent
Albania. The campaign included changing all those street names in Tirana and
elsewhere that were associated with Zog and his family. As usual, Ciano and
his agents used excessive zeal. The southern port of Saranda, which had re-
cently been renamed Zogai, was now called Porto Edda, after Ciano’s wife,
Mussolini’s daughter. The giant inscriptions “GZ”—for Geraldine and Zog—
and “ZOG” on the great bluff behind Zog’s summer residence in Durrës were
cleverly transformed into “REX.” The compound itself was turned over to the
Italian “Dopolavoro” organization to serve as a holiday camp for Albanian and
Italian workers. Accommodation was provided for hundreds at a time for a
two-week period at the cost of two francs per head per day.9 In announcing
Italian Greater Albania 63

this new bene¤t Fashizmi alluded to the orgies that Zog had hosted there.10
To remove Zog’s picture from wide circulation, all Albanian currency was
recalled but quickly released once Zog’s features had been obliterated.11
The Italian press and the Italian-controlled press in Albania heaped scorn
on Zog and his sisters for their extravagance and lack of concern for the
average Albanian. Much was made of the story, which the Germans repeated
in their documents, that Zog, on the evening of 7 April, had manufactured the
rumor that Tirana would be bombed, in order to screen his and his
government’s ¶ight. Whether the story was true or not, by the end of April it
was generally believed. In July, the announcement of the sequestering of his
property was accompanied by a further barrage of anti-Zog sentiment. This
was probably unnecessary, since Zog had been remarkably effective in discred-
iting himself—he needed little help from the Italians. To the credit of the
Italians, Geraldine escaped this campaign. Indeed, Rome even went so far as
to offer to return her wedding gifts. She refused.12
The Italians hoped to contrast Zog’s unpopularity with at least the ap-
pearance of popular support for their actions. Much publicity was given to
messages of welcome from the heads of Albania’s various religious communi-
ties. Some were disgustingly obsequious. The Italians, like Zog, paid a great
deal of attention to the tribal leaders because of their important regional
in¶uence. Groups of them were brought by car and airplane to Tirana and
were received by the lieutenant general to extend a besa and to swear their
allegiance to the new king. Particular attention was paid to the chiefs from
Mati—Zog’s own clan—as well as to a large body of some 250 chiefs, includ-
ing the leaders of the powerful Catholic Mirdita tribe. This latter group was
headed by the principal Mirdita chief, who was honored with the title of
“prince.”13 The remainder received more conventional honors, including re-
gional appointments and sacks of money. Ciano’s diary tells us of distributing
bundles of Albanian francs to initially recalcitrant chiefs.14
Similar methods were used to demonstrate a groundswell of popular sup-
port when auspicious occasions demanded it. Ciano’s visit to Durrës in August
1939 serves as a good example. He was greeted by some thousands of peasants
who had been brought in from outlying districts, paid, and provided with small
Italian and Albanian ¶ags. There was little real enthusiasm except from a band
of enterprising peasants who tapped a large barrel of wine that had been left
in the street. After having consumed considerable quantities, they proceeded
to utter fascist slogans with a fervor that would have satis¤ed even the most
exacting organizer.15
But the Italians were ready to do more than engage in propaganda to
64 Chapter 3

improve their image. Having learned from their mistakes in Ethiopia, they
were ready to offer widespread tangible bene¤ts to the Albanians. One of the
more successful programs initiated to win the hearts and minds of the masses
was the sending of Albanian children to summer camps. The program, spon-
sored by the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio, was originally greeted with such
hostility and suspicion that the ¤rst posters announcing the plan disappeared
and many of the ¤rst children who traveled to Durrës and Vlora were accom-
panied by hysterical parents who were certain that they would never see their
children again. The parents cried that when the Serbs came, they took the
children, when the Turks came, they took the children, and now the Italians
were doing the same. One mother gave her small son her glass eye, saying
“When you are a man and perhaps free, you will come back and look for me.
If you see a woman with one eye of this color you will know it is your
mother.”16
Their fears were unjusti¤ed, however. Upon arrival in Bari, the ten thou-
sand children sent in July and August were given colored disks to wear around
their necks, and their clothes were taken for disinfection and kept for the
return journey. The children were bathed; sent for medical inspection; and
given new clothes, a toothbrush, and toothpaste—the last of which most ate
immediately. Next, they were served dinner, given postcards of Mussolini and
the king, and then sent off for a month to Ravenna. The organization was
reported to be excellent at every step, down to a personal visit by Mussolini on
29 August. On their return, after a ¤ne time in the open air, the children
looked healthy and happy. Every effort had been made to impress these chil-
dren favorably with the bene¤ts of the new regime, to good effect.17 The
program proved to be good propaganda and provided tangible bene¤ts to
thousands of children.
Opportunities to study abroad and tours of various types for adults, with
the same intended goal, were also arranged. In July 1939, Professor Koliqi, the
Albanian minister of education, announced that there were more than 400
Albanian students studying abroad. Of these, 150 held full scholarships from
the Ministry of Education and 40 from the Ministry of National Economy.
All of the 190 scholarship recipients, as well as 50 percent of the remaining
210—who were self-supporting—were studying in Italy.18 Many of these stu-
dents were enrolled in the Battaglioni Scanderbey in cooperation with the
Italian Gioventù Universitària Fascista, a politically inspired student organiza-
tion. At the same time, the Italian government introduced a program allowing
teachers and pupils from Albanian schools to tour Italy and Libya.19
Even more tangible, the Italians dispatched a number of “missions” to see
Italian Greater Albania 65

to the improvement of health standards and general living conditions in Al-

bania. With considerable publicity, in May 1939, a dental mission arrived from
Rome—forty people in 10 groups of four—to tour Albania. Although they
only stayed for ten days, the Italian authorities announced that a permanent
dental center was to be established in Elbasan. Mussolini instructed Jacomoni
to eradicate malaria in six months as well as to begin a campaign against VD
and TB, which although perhaps not epidemics, took a considerable toll
among Albanians and Italians.20 Jacomoni made considerable headway. He
appointed an Italian doctor as technical councilor to the Albanian Department
of Health and, more important, saw to the construction of a number of hos-
pitals in Tirana and other towns.21
In July a well-equipped sanitary mission arrived and toured various pro-
vincial centers, announcing that permanent establishments would be set up in
some of these centers. In August Count Ciano arrived to attend a ceremony
in honor of the completion of the ¤rst phase of a scheme to provide Tirana
with an adequate water supply. As part of this phase, water was pumped from
the bed of the Tirana River and transported in pipes to the city. The second
phase included the construction of a reservoir at a higher level, which would
provide the necessary pressure for distributing water to each household. Sim-
ilar improvements were planned for Durrës, Vlora, Korça, and Gjirokastra.22
The local fàscio in each town also provided a number of services. They dealt
summary justice to swindling or pro¤teering shopkeepers, arbitrated local dis-
putes, and arranged through their women’s organization for midwifery service
and home nursing. They even helped with house repairs.23 Ciano summed up
Italian policy in his diary, noting “it will be necessary quickly to carry out a
program of public works. Only this way will we de¤nitely link the people to
us and destroy the authority of their chiefs, showing that only we are capable
of doing what they have not been able or did not want to do.”24

Winning the Hearts and Minds: Economic Development

While all of this activity was received favorably by most Albanians affected,
the Italians believed that they could make the greatest immediate positive
impact in the economic sphere. At the same time, they hoped to garner sub-
stantial bene¤ts from Albania’s natural resources, agricultural potential, and
pool of cheap labor. The ¤rst priority was to produce an accurate study of
Albania’s prospects, since, despite Italy’s long-term economic involvement, this
seems not to have been done. The ¤gures that Count Ciano presented to
66 Chapter 3

Mussolini on 10 May 1939, stressing Albania’s vast agricultural and mineral

potential, were extremely optimistic estimates. When Ciano handed Mussolini
a chunk of Albanian copper ore, proclaiming it to be the Carthaginian ¤gs, he
was demonstrating able showmanship but very little else.
The task of gathering the required information fell to Zenone Benini,
Ciano’s undersecretary for Albanian affairs. Benini issued his report in Octo-
ber 1939, and though not as exaggerated as that of Ciano’s, it too was overly
optimistic. In terms of iron ore, Benini reported that Albanian deposits were
suf¤cient for Italian requirements for ten years. Further, Albania was said to
possess enough sulphate of copper and bitumen to take care of Italian require-
ments inde¤nitely. Oil production would increase, and some 500,000 acres of
land would soon be drained for the cultivation of cotton, oil seeds, and maize.25
While he did not mention Italian colonization in this published report, in-
formed observers hardly needed to be reminded that this had long been a
priority. Ciano had long predicted that Albania—Italy’s quinta spónda, or ¤fth
shore—could become home to millions of surplus Italians, although as with
most of his statistics he seems to have just pulled this number out of a hat.
To facilitate this exploitation, Benini ordered the complete overhaul of
Albania’s weak infrastructure. Work was begun on thousands of miles of roads
constructed by the Italian ¤rm Aziènda Strada Albanìa. New airport runways
were constructed, harbors were enlarged and modernized, and railroad con-
struction was begun. Although the latter was not completed under the Italians,
signi¤cant progress was made, to the extent that the Tirana-Durrës line could
be opened in 1946. Postal and telephone service was upgraded.26 Yards and
warehouses were constructed in anticipation of the bounty that careful Italian
planning and technological advancement would produce.
Many of Benini’s conclusions had merit, but on the whole he too had
exaggerated. On the agricultural front Albania was and would continue to be
a drain on Italian resources. Rather than producing a surplus to feed the army
of occupation, even in the best of times Albania required the annual importa-
tion of 20,000 to 30,000 tons of cereals.27 This need was hardly offset by the
modest exportable surplus production of some 2,000 tons of olives, 1,500 tons
of dried beans, and about 2,000 tons of assorted dairy products and some
livestock.
Albania’s mineral resources proved to be much more impressive. While the
effective exploitation of iron ore, bitumen, and copper would have to await the
completion of an adequate road network—which in 1939 was a long way
off—Albanian oil and chrome reserves were of immediate importance to the
Italians. Crude oil was produced at wells in the Devoll Valley near Berat and
Italian Greater Albania 67

carried by an Italian-built pipeline to Vlora for shipment to Italy. In 1939

shipments amounted to 175,000 tons and an increase to 200,000 tons was
expected by 1940. There seems to be some confusion as to what percentage of
Italian needs this quantity could ¤ll. The British Ministry of Economic Warfare
suggested in December 1940 that Albania provided about one-third of Italy’s
oil imports. Other, and more numerous, sources suggest that the ¤gure was
much lower, even below 10 percent.28 There was general agreement, however,
that the oil would be expensive, since its quality was not particularly good—
having an asphaltic base and high sulfur content. The dif¤culty of extraction
and shipment added to the cost, including, of course, the need to ship it to Italy
for re¤nement and return it to Albania as motor and aviation fuel.29
Chrome, important in the production of steel, was perhaps Albania’s most
signi¤cant mineral resource for the Italians. Like oil, it was already being
extracted and exported. Unlike oil, Albanian chrome reserves provided Italy
with 100 percent of its needs. This would become particularly crucial once
Italy entered the war, since Albania possessed the only source of chrome
available in the territories controlled by Italy.
The Italians, then, hoped that extensive investment in Albania would
bring both economic and political bene¤ts. Despite a weak domestic economy,
Mussolini guaranteed the Albanians the sum of 22 million pounds over ¤ve
years for economic development, considerably more than the 8.2 million
Rome had spent since the early 1920s.30 Initial reports of Italian activity were
quite favorable. Ruth Mitchell commented at the end of April 1939, “What a
great improvement there is in the condition of the people already. . . . The
whole atmosphere had become brisker and more enterprising; now at least
there is hope.”31 Even the German minister Eberhard von Pannwitz, who was
perpetually critical of the Italians, commented favorably on the Italian tempo,
which he likened to the Nazi tempo in Austria after the Anschluss.32
It is clear that the Italians did much initial economic good and many
Albanians bene¤ted, particularity merchants and the vast lower class. The new
construction projects brought in large amounts of capital and employed many
Albanians. Although most of the ¤rms handling the contracts were Italian,
most of the foremen were Italian, and many of the workers were imported from
Italy, unemployment, which had been a problem under Zog, ceased to be a
problem. Principal among the new projects was road construction. By the mid-
dle of May the Italians had already renovated the road between Tirana and
Durrës, reducing car travel time from one and a quarter hours to ¤fty minutes.33
On 25 May 1939 Fashizmi announced a program for the construction
within two years of ¤fteen hundred kilometers of modern roads, soon sup-
68 Chapter 3

ported by an Italian law authorizing 800 million lire in funding, 150 million
of which was allocated for the ¤rst two years. The program consisted mostly
of widening and reconditioning existing roads. And despite Mussolini’s per-
sonal order that the roads be planned in such a way as to lead to the Greek
border, many served important commercial functions.34 By the end of August
seventeen thousand Albanian laborers and ¤ve hundred Italian foremen were
employed on the project. By early 1940 it was reported that some thirty
thousand workers, supported by Italian engineers, were building roads and
bridges in Albania.35
Other high-pro¤le projects included land reclamation, for which the Ital-
ian government set aside 1,200 million lire to be spread over eight years. Ciano
visited Durrës on 19 August 1939 and inspected the ¤rst reclamation plans.
More than thirteen thousand hectares were to be reclaimed in the Durrës area
by the end of 1941. As early as mid-May 1939 twenty-¤ve hundred Albanians,
under the direction of ten Italians, were busy enlarging the runways of many
Albanian airports from one to two kilometers.36 Harbor construction was also
a major priority. After the embarrassment of April 1939, when naval com-
manders were unaware that Durrës could not handle ocean-going vessels—de-
spite the fact that Italian engineers had worked on the harbor for Zog—the
Italian authorities determined that Albanian ports, particularly Durrës, would
be enlarged. The government in Rome also allotted 200 million lire for the
¤rst stage of railroad construction connecting the oil ¤elds with the port of
Vlora, as well as a line from Durrës to Elbasan, near the Greek frontier.
Considerably less useful but also a source of some employment for the
Albanians were the large fascist buildings in Tirana, which Italian authorities
felt necessary to demonstrate Italy’s imperial glory. Amidst the huts of Tirana
the Italians built marble palaces for the Fascist Party, the fascist youth move-
ment, and the Instituto Fascista Albanèse pégli infortuni sul Lavóro, the fascist
social services.37 Not only were the buildings unnecessary, but they proved to
be less than functional, with large facades but remarkably small interiors. More
useful were the warehouses and barracks built throughout Albania. And in
February 1940 the Ente Turìstico Alberghièro Albanìa was established to
construct and operate hotels in Vlora, Shkodra, Korça, Elbasan, Berat,
Gjirokastra, Porto Edda, Tirana, and Durrës. The announcement was wel-
comed not only as a means to stimulate Albania’s nonexistent tourist industry
but also to alleviate the chronic hotel shortage in the capital. It had not been
possible to ¤nd a hotel room in Tirana since the invasion.38 Within one year
of the invasion there were approximately 140 different Italian enterprises func-
tioning in Albania. They dominated Albanian ¤nance, public works, agricul-
Italian Greater Albania 69

ture, mining, industry, communications, and transportation—every vital sector

of the Albanian economy.39
All this activity had a considerable immediate impact on many Albanians.
The Italians provided many jobs, possibly too many. As more and more pro-
jects were inaugurated, more and more agricultural laborers abandoned their
previous jobs, leaving an agricultural labor shortage. The attraction, of course,
was primarily ¤nancial, because the Italians had doubled the wages of un-
skilled workers on public projects from one to two francs a day. Albanian
workers were also afforded unemployment insurance along modern lines. And
civil servants were not overlooked in this spasm of generosity. Those who were
cooperative had their pensions and even their back wages paid. By May 1939,
civil service salaries had increased by 22 percent.40
The increase of salaries itself in troubled times does not, of course, guar-
antee a higher standard of living. But the Italians seem to have taken that
into consideration as well. Italian authorities ¤xed prices, including rents as
well as the cost of wheat and other cereals. The cost of such services as water
supply, electricity, transport, and hotels was regulated, and the vendors were
required to display prices. The government provided regulation and arbitra-
tion of disputes.41
Although these measures were unpopular with some merchants and prop-
erty owners, they came as a relief to the vast majority of people. The National
Bank of Albania testi¤ed to the new economic activity and the general higher
standard of living by reporting in April 1940 that (1) the increase of banknotes
in circulation from 12 million francs at the time of the invasion to 20 million
at the time of the report—since in¶ation was not yet high—was evidence of a
real increase of Albania’s wealth and (2) both ordinary and company accounts
held by the bank had increased.42 Ciano commented, perhaps overoptimisti-
cally, in May 1940: “There is no question that the mass of the Albanian people
have been won over by Italy. The Albanian people are grateful to us for having
taught them to eat twice a day, for this rarely happened before. Even in the
physical appearance of the people greater well being can be noted.”43
If Albanians did not notice by themselves that they were better off, the
Italians and their Albanian puppets were ever ready to remind them. Fashizmi,
on 19 January 1940, published an article comparing the tax burdens of various
countries. Readers were told that taxes in dollars per head per year were lower
in Italy than anywhere else in Europe. The ¤gures quoted were Italy: 30.9;
France: 54.5; the United States: 107.5; Great Britain: 107.8; Germany: 109.7.
The author invited Albanians, in a spirit of self-congratulation, to consider
their own comparative immunity from taxes. Of the total annual revenue of 26
70 Chapter 3

million francs, taxation—direct and indirect—accounted for 11.8 million.

Taxes listed included a house tax, a tithe on agricultural products, the poll tax
on livestock, the tax on certain articles of consumption (alcohol, tobacco, sugar,
coffee, and ¶our), the yield of state monopolies, and of¤cial fees. This equaled
about 11.8 Albanian francs per head, or 3.7 dollars, which was claimed as the
world’s lowest rate of taxation. The article also noted the Albanian
government’s pledge to reduce taxation if possible, or at least not to increase
it. Albanians were implicitly reminded, further, that they were getting a lot for
nothing.44

Winning the Hearts and Minds: Irredentism

But Ciano believed that the Italians could engender the greatest goodwill by
pursuing Albanian irredentism, something that happily coincided with Italian
plans for Balkan conquest. When Albania’s state boundaries were delineated
by the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913, many Albanians were
left outside of the new state. The largest group of unredeemed could be found
in Kosova, which had served as the cradle of Albanian nationalism in the
nineteenth century but, following the Balkan Wars, became part of Serbia. A
much smaller number of Albanians was found in Macedonia, and even smaller
numbers inhabited Montenegro and the region of Çamëria in northern
Greece.
Zog, although he titled himself “King of the Albanians” to help establish
his nationalist credentials, had not pursued an irredentist policy for a number
of reasons. Kosovar chieftains were among his most dangerous rivals. It is also
possible that he had made an agreement with the Yugoslavs to leave Kosova
to them in return for the support they gave him in forcibly returning to power
in 1924. He may also have come to the sensible conclusion that his other
problems precluded expansion. Maintaining power was far more important to
Zog than a dangerous foreign policy that could have led both to war with a
much stronger neighbor and to internal con¶ict.
Despite Zog’s reluctance to pursue irredentism, the issue did not die, par-
ticularly in light of Serbian repression of Albanians in Kosova. The Italians,
though they had not pushed the issue prior to the invasion, decided to take full
advantage of irredentism once Albania was part of the imperium. In June 1939
Ciano, in referring to Kosova and Çamëria, noted that Mussolini de¤ned irre-
dentism as “the little light in the tunnel,” the ideal spiritual motive to keep the
Albanian nationalism spirit high.45 He believed that it was simple for the Ital-
Italian Greater Albania 71

ians to increase their popularity by becoming champions of Albanian national-

ism, and he was encouraged to learn—from the Albanian ex-minister in Bel-
grade—that the 850,000 Albanians of Kosova were “physically strong . . . mor-
ally ¤rm and enthusiastic at the idea of union with their mother country.”46
First, however, Ciano reassured Greece and Yugoslavia of his disinterest
in their Albanians. In the case of Yugoslavia, he took advantage of a meeting
with Foreign Minister Jovan Markovic on 22 April 1939 in Venice to do so
personally. The day before, Ciano noted in his diary that “for the moment we
must not even allow it to be imagined that the problem is attracting our
attention; rather“—he wrote in his usual rather colorful fashion—“it is neces-
sary to give the Yugoslavs a dose of chloroform.”47 This is apparently what
Markovic was administered.
Assuming that his personal assurance of disinterest was enough, Ciano
next launched a clumsy and transparent campaign to keep the ¶ame of irreden-
tism alive in Albania. For the most part, the campaign took the form of what
was made to look like a series of spontaneous outbursts of nationalist enthusi-
asm from Albanians in the puppet government and among the population at
large. There was, of course, the occasional hint from an Italian of¤cial. Ciano
had himself inaugurated the campaign on 13 April 1939, when, in addressing
the staff of the soon-to-be-disbanded Albanian Foreign Ministry, he noted that
Italy wished to enlarge Albania’s frontiers and help it realize its national aspi-
rations. To help him in this process, Ciano created the Of¤ce for Irredentism
at the Undersecretariate for Albanian Affairs. Ciano asked Koliqi to draw up a
program on irredentism based upon Ciano’s three-stage priority: (1) general
broad propaganda laying stress on culture and religion, (2) same as to the
management of public welfare, and (3) clandestine military organization to be
ready for the moment when the inevitable Yugoslav crisis came to a head.48
Other Italian of¤cials quickly became involved in adding fuel to the ¤re
of irredentism. In the middle of June in a speech at Korça, the Italian minister
of public instruction, Giuseppe Bottai, compared Albania with Piedmont and
spoke of its enlargement in two or three years. The Yugoslav consul com-
plained, and the local Albanian papers suppressed the passage. Later in the
month, the Greek minister in Tirana reported to his foreign minister that
Marshal Badoglio, who was on a tour of Albania, promised his audiences
greater prosperity and the extension of Albania’s frontiers. Jacomoni made
similar references during the ceremonies welcoming the marshal.49
Next, Ciano arranged for extensive direct Albanian involvement. During
his visit to Albania in mid-August 1939 his efforts to mobilize Albanians met
with some success. In his welcome address, the prefect of Tirana expressed his
72 Chapter 3

desire for the unity of all Albanians and the creation of a greater Albania with
the help of the fascist imperium. Ciano promised that Italy would see to it that
Albania realized its deepest desires, and he ended his short talk with “Viva la
Grande Albania.” Ciano was also greeted with numerous posters, banners, and
maps of an enlarged Albania put up by Italian blackshirts. Favorite slogans
included “Duce, we think of all Albanians in the world” and “Duce, think of
our brothers.” Albanian demonstrators—who the German minister reported
had been organized several days in advance—met Ciano with signs and banners
that proclaimed, “We are Albanians from Kosova” and “Long Live Kosova.”
While Fashizmi took no part in this irredentist outburst in August, a
violent article did appear in October. When both the Yugoslav and Greek
ministers complained, the Italian director general of press propaganda and
tourism disclaimed responsibility, maintaining that a young student—who
would henceforth be watched—was the responsible party.50 Ciano’s strategy
was clearly to keep the issue alive, without ever pushing it too far at any single
instance.
These occasional references to Albania’s unredeemed increased through-
out 1940 as Mussolini came closer to making a decision about further military
action in the Balkans. During the months before the Italian invasion of
Greece, most public pronouncements by either Albanian or Italian of¤cials
were accompanied by some “spontaneous” demonstrations followed by a
pointed reference by the speaker concerning the inevitable union of unre-
deemed Albanians with the mother country. In March, for example, Mustafa
Kruja gave a series of speeches, relayed by loudspeaker and printed and circu-
lated, in which he made references to Albania’s unredeemed territories. He
referred to Albania’s frontiers as “clearly traced and admitting to no doubt but
not corresponding to the effective extension of Albanian rights, either of pri-
ority of possession, ethnical af¤nities of population or common aristocracy of
origin.” In case this verbosity left the audience confused—which it undoubt-
edly did—someone in the audience was quickly prompted to shout, “Kosova!”
Senator Kruja answered: “There is a war on in Europe now. When it is over
you will ¤nd that all your hopes are realized.”51
The principal irredentist demonstrations, however, accompanied Ciano’s
frequent visits to Albania. In the middle of May 1940 the count conducted
another well-publicized photo opportunity tour of Albania, giving away
money and reviewing parades. His visit was accompanied by the now-obliga-
tory banners that carried inscriptions saluting Kosova and Çamëria. Ciano was
convinced that these constant references to irredentism were winning over the
Albanians. After the May 1940 visit he noted in his diary “a warm welcome.
Italian Greater Albania 73

The Albanians are far on the path of intervention. They want Kosova and
Çamëria.”52 At the same time Greece and Yugoslavia were being reassured.
Mussolini, in his speech declaring war on the Allies in June, guaranteed
Greece and Yugoslavia safe from invasion. So the Albanians might not mis-
understand, however, Piero Parini, Jacomoni’s deputy, assured Vërlaci in the
presence of the German minister, Pannwitz, that one must listen to the tone
of the speech rather than the content.53
In light of Hitler’s successes elsewhere, Mussolini moved ever closer to the
determination that Italian imperial glory required action in the Balkans.
Ciano’s role, as with the invasion of Albania, seems to have been decisive.
Although action in the Balkans certainly ¤t into the Duce’s overall ambitions,
the timing and direction remained rather vague. Mussolini had a hard time
with decisions; Ciano’s destiny seems to have been to continue helping him
make disastrous ones. By April 1940, Ciano began turning his attention to
Greece in earnest. Because of political considerations, particularly German
pressure, Ciano decided that Kosova and Yugoslavia would have to wait.
The pattern of events had much in common with his approach to the
invasion of Albania. Without any word from Mussolini, he began gathering
information, laying the groundwork, and experimenting with possible scenar-
ios. During his visit to Tirana in May 1940, Ciano took the opportunity to
question the general commanding Italian forces in Albania, General Carlo
Geloso, about how many troops would be needed to invade Greece. Geloso,
who estimated that ten or eleven divisions were required, and seemed to show
little enthusiasm for the project, was immediately removed and replace by
Sebastian Viscounti Prasca, who would not make the same mistake. Viscounti
Prasca demonstrated boundless enthusiasm for the project and did not bother
about assembling an adequate army. Jacomoni added to Ciano’s con¤dence by
reporting on the magni¤cent spirit of the Albanian fascist militia and their
burning desire to ¤ght for the expansion of Albania and the Italian empire.54
Ciano, meanwhile, indulged in his usual penchant for spies and saboteurs,
ordering that Albanian irregulars from both sides of the Greek frontier be
recruited to cause unrest in Çamëria. He even toyed with the idea of having
an Albanian assassinate the king of Greece, frighteningly reminiscent of the
plans to murder King Zog.55
But this was about as far as the plans went for the moment, as Mussolini
was naturally preoccupied with Italy’s declaration of war on the Allies and his
usual vacillation about where to attack next. In terms of the Balkans, Musso-
lini seemed to be leaning toward Yugoslavia, but Ciano was determined to
further his Greek plans. Ciano’s enthusiasm was redoubled by an intercepted
74 Chapter 3

Greek message in which General John Metaxas, the Greek strongman, re-
ferred to Ciano’s “brutal and boorish manner.”56
To insure that the Duce would not forget Greece, Ciano, through Jacomoni,
manufactured a series of border dif¤culties that showed Italian propaganda and
diplomacy to be remarkably inept and lent considerable credence to Metaxas’s
un¶attering assessment of Ciano. Ciano decided to focus on an incident in June
when unknown assailants, possibly Greek police, killed and beheaded Daout
Hoxha, a leader of the Albanians in northern Greece.57 It has been suggested that
Hoxha on occasion may have worked as an Italian agent hired to foment unrest
in Çamëria.58 The Stephani news agency—later repeated by the of¤cial German
news bureau—portrayed Hoxha as an Albanian freedom ¤ghter and patriot
treacherously murdered by Greek agents who then cut off his head and passed it
from one Albanian village to another in Çamëria to intimidate the population.59
The Greek news agency refuted every point, maintaining that Hoxha was
a notorious criminal who for twenty years had been sought by Greek author-
ities for robbery and murder. The Greeks reported that far from being in a
state of agitation, the few Albanians in Çamëria were happy with the pater-
nalistic Greek regime. To placate the Italians, Athens arrested two Albanians
for the crime and held them in anticipation of extradition requests from Italy.
The Italians, most likely because of the usual slovenliness demonstrated by the
Foreign Ministry, never requested extradition.60
On 10 August Ciano presented Mussolini with the Italian version of the
Daout Hoxha story, effectively bringing the rather ¤ckle dictator’s attention
back to Greece. Mussolini, seemingly incensed, called for an “act of force,
because since 1923 [the Corfu Incident] he had some accounts to settle and
the Greeks deceive themselves if they think that he has forgotten.”61 On the
next day the Duce called for more particulars on Çamëria and ordered a
Stephani dispatch that was to start agitation on the question. Within a day the
Italo-Albanian press poured forth with bold headlines deploring Greek op-
pression in Çamëria, which had some basis in fact—the Greeks had generally
treated the Albanians of northern Greece deplorably.62 Mussolini also ordered
Jacomoni and Viscounti Prasca to report to Rome to discuss his new determi-
nation to launch a surprise attack on Greece by the end of September. On 12
August 1940 Mussolini told Ciano, Jacomoni, and Viscounti Prasca that un-
less Corfu and Çamëria were yielded without a ¤ght, Italy would “go the
limit.” Jacomoni and Viscounti Prasca, according to Ciano, announced that the
action was possible, even easy.63 War came one step closer when an Italian
submarine sank the antiquated Greek cruiser Helli in Greek waters on 15
August. As an indication of the level of confusion in Italian policymaking at
Italian Greater Albania 75

this time, Ciano knew nothing of this incident, commenting only that “I
consider the intemperance of Di Vecchi at the bottom of it.”64
By this point Berlin became alarmed and informed Ciano and Mussolini
in no uncertain terms that the status quo in the Balkans must be maintained.
Mussolini meekly acquiesced but allowed preparations to continue just the
same. Viscounti Prasca busily moved Italian units to the Greek frontier while
Jacomoni armed and trained Albanian guerrillas to spread terror and disrupt
the Greek rear. Italian of¤cials even took to encouraging one another.
Jacomoni sent frequent messages to Ciano detailing the supposed miserable
and grave conditions endured by the Albanians in Çamëria, while directing the
Albanian press and radio to continue the exaltation of Daout Hoxha.65
In his growing enthusiasm for the projected invasion, Jacomoni went so
far as to suggest that the operation should begin with a mock attack by
Albanian irregulars on an Italian border post to serve as a pretext. This, of
course, was little more than a rehash of Heinrich Himmler’s rather transparent
raid on the Gleiwitz radio station in August 1939 immediately preceding the
German invasion of Poland.66
If German objections momentarily convinced Mussolini to suspend plans
for an invasion, German action in Romania encouraged Mussolini to act
immediately. When on 12 October 1940 German troops entered Romania,
Mussolini was livid, complaining to Ciano that “Hitler always faces me with
a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will
¤nd out from the papers that I have occupied Greece.” Although there was
still some resistance from the general staff, particularly from Badoglio, Mus-
solini dismissed it by boldly proclaiming that “I shall send in my resignation
as an Italian if anyone objects to our ¤ghting the Greeks.” Ciano himself was
equally convinced that the operation would be “useful and easy.”67
Reports from Albania were all positive. Jacomoni announced that the
Albanians of Çamëria were favorable to the Italians and drew up plans for
their immediate assistance.68 More important, Jacomoni reported, Albanian
youth, who had always been reserved, now made open manifestations of ap-
proval. They awaited the invasion keenly and enthusiastically. Overreaching
himself, Jacomoni claimed that all the Albanian patriots and troops were
burning with the desire to liberate Epirus (northern Greece) once and for all.
He was hardly able to prevent the Albanians from crossing the frontier on
their own. Mussolini, apparently convinced by this nonsense, was actually
afraid that extensive military participation on the part of the Albanians might
convince them that the inevitable victory over the Greeks was primarily the
result of Albanian arms.69 He need hardly have been concerned.
76 Chapter 3

With all these excellent reports, added to his rage at the Germans, on 13
October Mussolini ¤xed 26 October as the day of the invasion. Although this
was something of an innovation—in the past he had simply issued directives—
on 15 October Mussolini summoned a council of war to announce his decision
and receive direct reports from his ministers and generals. Present were Ciano,
Viscounti Prasca, Jacomoni, Badoglio, and General Mario Roatta, deputy chief
of staff of the army. Conspicuously absent were naval and air force representa-
tives. Jacomoni repeated that the Albanians were enthusiastic and the Greeks
depressed.70 Ciano, despite evidence to the contrary from Emanuele Grazzi, his
minister in Greece, supported Jacomoni’s position, arguing that the economic
polarization in Greece made the lower classes “indifferent to everything includ-
ing our invasion.”71
From a military standpoint Mussolini was assured that all was in readi-
ness. Viscounti Prasca announced that he had prepared the operation down to
the smallest detail—it was now as perfect as humanly possible. He con¤dently
told Mussolini that he expected to oppose a Greek army of thirty thousand
(the actual ¤gure turned out to be about ten times that many), which would
be taken by a series of quick envelopments. After an hour and a half, Mussolini
concluded that the problem had been examined from every angle and that
there was nothing left to be said.72
On 22 October Ciano drew up an ultimatum to be presented to Metaxas.
It was similar to the one that he had offered Zog the year before and was
intended to leave Greece “no way out, either occupation or war.”73 Greece was
required to immediately agree to Italian occupation of some strategic bases. As
a further example of carelessness of method, Grazzi, when asked, was unable
to inform Metaxas which strategic bases the Italians had in mind.74 Metaxas,
without consulting his government, answered with his now famous “Oxhi!” or
“no.” Jacomoni was then allowed to set his Albanian irregulars to work and
had them attack an Italian border installation. The net result was the wound-
ing of two unfortunate Italian carabinieri. The ruse fooled no one.75 Oddly
enough, surprise was on their side, however. The Greeks did not believe the
Italians foolish enough to attack so late in the year.

The Italian Invasion of Greece

On 28 October, with eight divisions—some 140,000 men—under torrential

rain, the Italians invaded Greece along a 150-mile front. The operation was
rather haphazard, with no attempt to take Corfu or to bomb any of the vital
Italian Greater Albania 77

centers of Greece’s military and administrative activity. Instead, the Italians

launched a series of surprisingly inadequate sporadic air raids on the civilian
population. The hastily prepared invasion force was poorly equipped, poorly
trained, poorly supported, and led by rank-conscious incompetents.76 Still, on
the coast the Italians experienced considerable success, penetrating ten miles
by 9 November. But in the center Viscounti Prasca was stopped. Ciano, be-
coming uneasy, ¶ew to Tirana to encourage the Italian generals. His fears were
temporarily allayed by the continued optimism of Viscounti Prasca, who re-
ported that despite dif¤culties, his troops were behaving well and that even the
Albanian blackshirt militia battalions were demonstrating high morale. One
of the wounded Albanian heroes was reported to have announced in pidgin
Italian, “We all die, so that Duce pass.”77 The Italian press contributed to this
volume of misinformation by reporting that the Greeks were welcoming the
Italian soldiers and were thankfully accepting imitation bronze busts of the
Duce, which fascist agents were distributing.78
In reality the Italian military situation became very desperate very
quickly. By 6 November Ciano admitted that the initiative had passed to the
Greeks. The Greeks had counterattacked in western Macedonia and routed
the best of the Italian Albanian troops, the one-thousand-man “Tomori”
Battalion. Badoglio ordered reinforcements but to little avail. The Battle of
Metsovo on 11 November served as a model for subsequent Greek victories.
The crack Italian Alpine “Iulia” division, counting on tanks and air cover,
had advanced along the valleys toward Metsovo, taking no notice of the high
ground to the rear. Greek mountain regiments, which were actually disobey-
ing orders, made a forced night march and occupied the high ground. At
dawn they attacked and after some hard ¤ghting, the Italians broke and
¶ed.79 The tanks could not function in the rough terrain, and despite Italian
air superiority, the rain and cloud cover prevented them from ¶ying. When
they did the Greeks were prepared, having obtained the Italian air force
codes and operational instructions, leading to interception and high Italian
losses.80
On 14 November General Alexandros Papagos, chief of staff of the Greek
army, with forces that now slightly outnumbered the Italians, began a general
counteroffensive. His troops, better equipped, supplied, and motivated, not
only drove the Italians out of Greece but soon were in control of large sections
of Albania. Korça, the third-largest town in Albania, fell on 22 November, a
blow to Italian prestige and a boost to Greek hopes. At this battle alone the
Italians lost two thousand men captured, as well as thirty-¤ve artillery pieces
and six hundred machine guns. As a ¤nal humiliation, at Menton in France,
78 Chapter 3

just beyond the Italian frontier, posters appeared proclaiming, “This is French
territory, Greeks, do not advance further!”81
Viscounti Prasca, who blamed everyone but himself, was replaced and
Badoglio resigned, but the Italian collapse continued. By December the Greeks
had taken Gjirokastra, Pogradec, and Porto Edda, along with approximately 25
percent of Albania. Panic gripped the Italian leadership. General Ubaldo
Soddu, Viscounti Prasca’s replacement, concluded that military action was im-
possible and that the situation could only be handled through political inter-
vention. Ciano quoted Mussolini as admitting, in despair, “There is nothing
else to do. This is grotesque and absurd but it is a fact. We have to ask for a
truce through Hitler.”82 The Duce was only saved from this humiliation by the
weather, which stopped the Greek offensive and created a virtual stalemate.
Over the next few months, Mussolini sought desperately to break the
stalemate. Soddu was replaced in late December for general incompetence and
after Mussolini discovered that he spent his evening hours composing music
for ¤lms.83 In January Mussolini, to restore morale, ordered ministers, high
party of¤cials, and members of the Chamber of Fascis and Corporations under
forty-¤ve years of age to serve on the front in Albania. The bewildered and
irate fascist elite—without servants or suitcases—were sent to struggle in the
mud, rain, and snow of the Albanian mountains. Dino Grandi, a leading
fascist, commented after the war that in the muddy trenches of Albania he
made contacts and outlined the resolution that would later topple Mussolini.84
Finally on 9 March the Italians, with Mussolini present, launched a powerful
counteroffensive with some twenty-eight divisions, over 300,000 men, nearly
one-third of the entire army.85 Despite numerical superiority and better orga-
nization, little came of it, and after ¤ve days it was discontinued. By this time
the ¤ghting morale of the troops was irreparably damaged, and Mussolini was
forced to wait for the Germans to come to his rescue. Italian losses were
extensive, and included 14,000 dead, over 50,000 wounded, 25,000 missing,
and over 12,000 maimed during the frozen winter months.86
The blame for this disaster could be and was spread widely. Zenone
Benini—and Mussolini in conversations with Hitler—blamed the Albanians.87
And indeed, despite misplaced high hopes on the parts of Ciano, Jacomoni, and
Viscounti Prasca, the Albanians demonstrated a marked lack of enthusiasm for
either side.88 Albanian armed forces played only a minor role in support of the
Italians. Mussolini claimed that two Albanian battalions were attached to each
Italian division that invaded Greece. While this is certainly an exaggeration, at
least two battalions of Albanian fascist militia, the “Tomori” and the “Tar-
aboshi,” saw action against the Greeks in the Korça area.89 Mussolini later
Italian Greater Albania 79

noted that through March 1941, ¤fty-nine Albanians had been killed and
seventy-eight wounded.90 The complete story is somewhat less glorious. The
Albanian Fascist Party was made up principally of opportunists who expected
to bene¤t materially from their connection with the fascist occupier. When
faced with the hard reality of a mountain campaign against a determined
enemy, Albanian units either deserted or defected in droves.91 Those who re-
mained did so poorly that they were ultimately withdrawn and con¤ned to a
concentration camp in central Albania.92 Had the Italians used them in the
Albanian areas of Çamëria rather than in the Orthodox areas of Korça, perhaps
the militia might have demonstrated more enthusiasm.
Irregular Albanian cooperation with the Italians was also quite limited.
Despite the large sums that Jacomoni spent for “political” purposes, the return
was pitiful. Albanian spies, in attempting to provide him with what he wanted
to hear, convinced him—among other things—that the Albanians in Greece
would rise. Some even suggested that the Greeks themselves would rise in favor
of the Italians. Once the Greeks had taken parts of Albania, these agents were
to operate beyond Italian lines, providing sensitive intelligence and were to
harass the Greek forces. There is some evidence of sabotage, particularly inter-
ruptions of military telephone and telegraph services, and news reached Athens
that some saboteurs were being shot.93 All this activity was of a limited nature,
however, with little effect. These spies and saboteurs were rather uncommit-
ted—the principle motivation was, of course, money. Their collective ineffec-
tiveness is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that at no time were they able to
locate Greek army corps headquarters, which the Italians hoped to bomb.
Despite the claims of socialist Albanian historiography to the contrary,
the Albanians did little more to help the Greeks.94 By early November reports
surfaced that Albanians were interfering with Italian military efforts, cutting
telephone communications, seizing ammunition, harassing the Italians with
hand grenades, and providing intelligence to the Greek army.95 Although this
aid may have been more substantial than that given to the Italians, it still must
be considered minimal, and it came primarily from the Greek minority in
southern Albania, who warmly welcomed the arrival of the Greek troops.96
Why the Albanians refused to help the Italians is clear. The Italians were
perceived as invaders, and irredentism was not as all-pervasive as Ciano had
hoped. Many Albanians took the view that if they were unable to preserve
their former small and independent country, revisionist aspirations were
merely ridiculous. Even those who took an active interest in their conationals
beyond the frontiers questioned whether an extension of the Italian puppet
regime to include these elements was really a desirable development.97
80 Chapter 3

That the Albanians did not support the Greeks more extensively can also
be explained. The government in Athens made a number of errors in political
warfare. Of¤cial statements and actions did little to alleviate the traditional
mutual mistrust between the Greeks and Albanians. Soon after the Greeks
had begun driving the Italians back into Albania, General Metaxas announced
that Greek forces were ¤ghting for the liberation of Albania, but he said
nothing about the independence of Albania. Elaborating in private, he said
that he did not want Albania and would gladly see it free and independent,
but that the future settlement had to secure certain strategic points to Greece
to protect it against further attack.98 The British ambassador in Athens re-
ported to London that “They [the Greek government] have never stated
exactly what they have in mind but I have little doubt that they have their eyes
on Northern Epirus. I don’t know what precise boundary they hope to ¤x. . . .
I doubt they have thought this out except that it must include the southern
lateral road.”99 Although the Albanians were naturally not privy to these com-
munications, the ambivalence of Metaxas’s statement about liberating Albania
was not lost on the Albanians, and had it been, the Italians were there to
interpret it for them. As if this were not enough, the BBC, in an Albanian-
language independence-day broadcast, stated, “The Greeks are not out for any
expansion at our expense or anyone else’s.” Pearson Dixon, head of the Alban-
ian Section of the Southern Department at the Foreign Of¤ce, fumed that the
BBC ought to be on the lookout for this type of Axis propaganda.100
In terms of occupation policy, the Greeks, for the most part, followed
normal procedures in occupied territories in times of war. Papagos ordered, for
example, the continued operation of the Albanian civil courts whenever pos-
sible and the application of Albanian law insofar as it did not con¶ict with the
interest of the occupying forces.101 The director of the Albanian state bank
presented further evidence of the correctness of Greek behavior. He informed
the German minister that all reports of atrocities were simply propaganda,
adding that once the Greeks had pulled back he found the safes in the state
bank still intact. Indeed, the Greeks had not even tried to open them. Even
the pictures of Mussolini and Victor Emmanuel could still be found—they
had been neatly stacked in the back of the bank.102
Still, some Greek actions did much to reinforce the impression that Greek
aims included territorial acquisition. Upon driving the Italians out of Korça,
the Greek military apparently received instructions from Athens to inhibit
Albanian independence-day celebrations on 28 November. The military ig-
nored the instructions and was reprimanded. The military command at
Gjirokastra received similar orders and proved more diligent in carrying them
Italian Greater Albania 81

out. Fear was further exacerbated when the Greeks set up a municipal council
in Korça consisting of eleven Greeks and four Albanians under an Albanian
mayor.103 Perhaps the most telling reason why Albanians did not participate
more extensively on the Greek side was because direct offers of aid were often
refused. Laird Archer, director of the Near East Foundation in Athens, notes
in his diary a series of conversations with Frederick Nosi, the former inter-
preter at the American Legation in Tirana. Nosi expressed perplexity over the
Greek refusal to accept him as a volunteer or to accept similar offers from large
groups of Albanian exiles in Greece.104 The Greeks clearly wanted to be careful
to avoid the impression that non-Greek Albanians had anything to do with
ejecting the Italians from southern Albania. The Greeks were perhaps too
concerned with long-term political thinking at the expense of practical short-
term military considerations.
Apart from blaming the Albanians, the Italians blamed each other as well.
Mussolini blamed both his military and political advisers—he was right, of
course, but he was the one who surrounded himself with incompetence. Of
Viscounti Prasca, Mussolini concluded, “every man must make one fatal error in
his life—mine was listening to Viscounti Prasca. . . . The human material I have
to work with is useless, worthless.”105 These sentiments were certainly shared by
some who served under Viscounti Prasca. A captured Italian of¤cer—a philoso-
phy student from the University of Rome—described the invasion as grotesquely
mismanaged with farcical strategy and nonexistent tactics—units were put into
the line in a haphazard manner, a division at a time, wherever a break occurred.106
Ciano came under ¤re as well, for spreading misinformation. Indeed, it is
reasonable to suppose that Ciano would have lost his job had the Italians been
pushed into the sea. There can be no doubt that Ciano received and passed on
ludicrous information. One reason for this was Ciano’s irrepressible penchant
for using spies and intrigue to gather information and conduct policy. Ciano
was completely misled by his Albanian spies concerning the attitude of both
the Greek and Albanian population near the frontier and about the Albanian
attitude toward the invasion.
Perhaps the best example of Ciano’s carelessness was his assumption that
the Greeks would not ¤ght because of the bribes he had distributed to the
Greek military leadership. The money was apparently taken to Metaxas, who
told his of¤cers to keep it but redouble their efforts to resist the Italians.107 For
his part, Ciano preferred to blame the soldiers, commenting “Our soldiers have
fought but little and badly. This is the real fundamental cause of all that has
happened.”108 This is at least partially true, although the principal reason seems
to have been unpreparedness. Incredibly, two weeks before the invasion, Mus-
82 Chapter 3

solini, without consulting the chief of the general staff, ordered a large-scale
demobilization, sending some 600,000 trained soldiers, or about half of the
army, home. This process could not be halted until 10 November, so many of
those who participated in the attack had just been called up and were essentially
untrained.109 This practice, it seems, continued into 1941. On 22 January Ciano
forwarded to Mussolini a letter he had received from a professor at Livorno
who complained that his eighteen-year-old son had been mobilized on 17
January and sent to Albania the same day, without knowing what a ¤rearm was.
Ciano noted in his diary, “This explains so many things.”110 Badoglio recog-
nized the de¤ciencies, and his evaluation of the problem was essentially correct,
though he refused to confront Mussolini. He was quoted by Ciano as remark-
ing just before he resigned: “There is no doubt that Jacomoni and Prasca have
a large share in the responsibility of the Albanian affair, but the real blame must
be sought elsewhere. It lies entirely in the Duce’s command.”111
The Germans, meanwhile, watched the Italian disaster in Albania with
irritation and alarm, partially, one would suspect, because they might have
been able to stop it. As a result of information from numerous sources, includ-
ing the reports from Pannwitz, the German Foreign Ministry was convinced
by 18 October that the Italians planned to invade Greece. Despite this knowl-
edge, Hitler was unwilling to alienate Mussolini by asking him a direct ques-
tion about his plans.112 But German anxiety and anger increased as reports of
the full extent of the debacle began to arrive. Pannwitz in Tirana cabled that
Italian expectations of Albanian involvement were completely unfounded and
unrealized. General Enno von Rinteln, the German military attaché in Italy,
who toured Albania in early November, added further reasons for the Italian
failure. At least one—the severe weather—could not be entirely blamed on
Italian planning and execution. The Italian command in Albania, not surpris-
ingly, heavily emphasized this factor in its own reports.113
But Rinteln had found other problems as well. He concluded that the
Italians were entirely unprepared for the attack. He noted the transportation
problem, for which he saw no immediate solution. He commented that supply
of munitions and food to the front was inadequate, suggesting that corruption
in the rear might be one of the explanations.114 He might have added that
Albania had but one port—Durrës—that could handle large quantities of heavy
equipment and that the port was ¤lled with vessels unloading marble for the
pointless fascist buildings being constructed in Tirana. Those who planned the
campaign were convinced that a division could be disembarked in a single day
at Durrës. The Italian Navy, not consulted until after the campaign had begun,
later announced that rather than one day, one month would be needed.115
Italian Greater Albania 83

After being asked for help, the Germans attempted to control the damage
militarily and diplomatically. By 9 December ¤fty Junker 52S transport planes
had been transferred to Rome and were ¶ying between Foggia and Albania.116
At the same time, preparations were made for what was called “Operation
Cyclamen,” the dispatch to Albania of a German corps, including the First
Mountain Division and armored forces. The task of this unit was to assist the
Italians in breaking the Greek line and to support a frontal assault on Greece
itself by General Siegmund List’s army from Bulgaria. But Hitler ultimately
gave up on the plan in consideration of the enormous transportation problems
and because German troops in force in Albania might warn the Allies about
the impending move against Greece.
Simultaneously, the Germans considered a diplomatic solution through a
separate Italian-Greek peace, with Greece being awarded some Albanian terri-
tory. Much to the anger of the Italians, the Germans never broke diplomatic
relations with Greece, so they were in an excellent position to conduct negotia-
tions. But this too came to nothing when the 27 March 1941 coup in Yugoslavia
toppled the regent Prince Paul and those who had signed the Tripartite Pact. This
event convinced the Germans that Axis prestige could only be restored through
a successful military campaign.117 The Italians were ¤nally saved by the Germans
in April 1941 with the invasion and rapid defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece.
The Italians took no part in the war, fearing the considerably stronger
Yugoslav army. Italian commanders informed the Germans that they would
attempt to hold the Albanian frontier against the Yugoslavs but in the end
were unable to do even that. The Yugoslavs foolishly crossed into Albania but
were required to withdraw after only three days in an attempt to stop the
Germans, who had already entered Kosova from the east.118 Of course it was
to no avail, and the Yugoslavs were rapidly defeated.
The Greeks suffered a similar fate. Greek forces, even those in Albania,
as a ¤nal gesture of contempt for the Italians, made a point of surrendering to
the Germans. The Germans proceeded to establish a brutal occupation regime
in Greece and simply dismembered Yugoslavia, resulting in the creation of
powerful resistance movements.

The Creation of Greater Albania

Although it was clear to all that the Italians had failed to humble the Greeks
by force of arms, Ciano hoped at least partially to redeem Rome’s tattered
reputation in the eyes of the Albanians by effecting a favorable territorial
84 Chapter 3

settlement. He was still hoping to make the most of irredentism. By now, of

course, the situation was somewhat more complex—he had the Germans with
which to deal. In August 1941 Victor Emmanuel was able to declare the
creation of “Greater Albania,” which would come close to including all Balkan
Albanians. On the surface, it seemed that the Italians had lived up to their
promise. In reality, however, the circumstances surrounding the declaration did
much to undermine the positive effects on Italo-Albanian relations that the
Italians might have expected from such a development.
With the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Italians hurried to construct a case
for enlarging Albania and present it to the Germans. Ciano had really not
expected that Italian Albania would actually ¤nd itself in possession of Kosova;
rather, he had used the issue as propaganda to ¤re up the Albanians and
threaten the Yugoslavs. This is evidenced by the fact that it was not until the
end of April that he called four Albanian specialists to Rome to formulate
claims. A maximum and a minimum program were drawn up. The maximum
program was a Greater Albania of two and a half million to three million
people, including Podgorica, Novi Pazar, Ohrid, Bitol, Florina, Ioannina, and
Arta, in other words besides Kosova, large sections of Montenegro, Macedo-
nia, and Greece.119 That this Greater Albania remained a suggestion and never
became a demand indicates that the Italians recognized that this maximum
program was unobtainable. Albania, never having been an empire, had no
historical claims to much of the territory the Italians hoped to receive, and
Albanians made up only a minority in much of these areas. With the maxi-
mum program, Albania would have become a multinational state, with an
Albanian majority of only 55 percent. In any case, the Germans, encouraged
by the Bulgarians, refused to consider these excessive claims.
The minimum program still increased the population of Albania (which
stood at somewhat over 1 million) by between 500,000 and 850,000 people,
primarily from Kosova and the Dibra area of Macedonia, and a small strip of
Montenegro.120 This plan left less than 20 percent of the population of new
Albania as minorities, a much more manageable ¤gure. Although the addition
of these Kosovar Albanians would signi¤cantly increase the Moslem majority,
Italy hoped to command their loyalty as citizens of Albania. The Italians also
hoped that the addition of large numbers of Moslems would force the Ortho-
dox and Catholic Albanians into closer collaboration with the puppet regime.
Once the goals were established, the campaign began. Jacomoni encour-
aged the leaders of a Kosova irredenta movement—which included Rexhep
Mitrovica and Bedri Pejani—to telegraph Mussolini requesting the liberation
of Kosova. He need hardly have made the suggestion, because many of
Italian Greater Albania 85

Albania’s more extreme nationalists feared that the Italians would not press the
Albanian case with proper vigor.121 But Ciano, who continued to view Albania
as his own private ¤ef, energetically lobbied the Germans. On 21 April he met
German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and carefully presented the
military, economic, and ethnic reasons for pushing Albania’s frontiers to the
east and south. After their third meeting on 24 April, a compromise—later
con¤rmed by the Vienna Awards—was reached. Albania was awarded most of
the territory Ciano had requested, with a few exceptions. Bulgaria was
awarded the region around Ohrid, which the Bulgarian foreign minister had
assured the German minister in So¤a was sacred to Bulgaria. King Boris had
reinforced Bulgarian claims at a private audience with Hitler on 19 April, two
days before Ciano got to Ribbentrop. Hitler told Boris that his request seemed
reasonable.122
Bulgaria thereby established control over extensive ethnic Albanian–in-
habited land in Macedonia. Italian Albania and Bulgaria now shared a frontier
that became the cause of considerable Italo-Bulgarian friction and the subject
of almost constant incidents, which often degenerated into armed con¶ict
between Bulgarian troops against Italians supported by some Albanians on
both sides of the new frontier. Although the Bulgarian occupation of the
Slavic areas of Macedonia was reasonably benevolent, at least for a time,
treatment of the ethnic Albanians was uniformly harsh. Later in the war the
Bulgarians decided to resolve the issue by simply driving the Albanians out of
their portion of Macedonia.123
Although the Italians gained some control over Çamëria, including the
districts of Ioannina, Thesprotia, and Preveza, with some 300,000 inhabitants,
and hoped to annex this territory to Albania, the Germans would not allow it.
Albanian enthusiasm, despite all the earlier propaganda, was much less than
had been expected.124 Although the Italians went so far as to choose Xhemil
Dino as high commissioner for Çamëria, this area remained under the control
of the military command in Athens. A small district at the southeast end of
Lake Prespa, between Florina and Bilisht, did come under the administration
in Tirana, so far as police and customs were concerned.125
Ciano’s biggest disappointment, however, and the cause of long-term
Italo-German friction, concerned certain Albanian areas of Mitrovica, which
the Germans retained for themselves. The principal German motivation was
to control the iron ore deposits at the mines of Trepça. The situation became
considerably more complex, however, when the Germans proceeded to con-
struct a model occupation regime. General Eberhard, commander of the Ger-
man 60th Motorized Infantry Division, met with Albanian leaders and signed
86 Chapter 3

a series of agreements. These agreements allowed considerably more autonomy

than the Italians were willing to grant the Albanians in Greater Albania. The
Germans allowed for the construction of a council, many of whose members
came from Kosova and “old Albania” (which is what pre-1941 Albania came
to be called). The Germans allowed village elders to direct most of their own
affairs and even constructed dozens of Albanian-language primary schools.
Even Prime Minister Vërlaci was heard to note that the Germans seemed to
be doing very well in Mitrovica.126 German policy certainly contrasted sharply
with the Serbian administration of old Yugoslavia as well as with the Italian
puppet regime in Kosova.127
The German general, who had a particular sympathy for the Albanians,
also saw to the construction of an Albanian gendarmerie of one thousand men
and managed to recruit of¤cers and men from Kosova and old Albania.128 The
troops wore the emblem of Skënderbeg and ¶ew the old Albanian ¶ag. This
was particularly disturbing to the Italians, since they had created a fascist
Albanian ¶ag. The Italians were also concerned that the name of Prince Wil-
liam of Wied—a German prince who had served as Albania’s ¤rst ruler in
1914 and had never abdicated—was frequently heard in public. It did not
escape the notice of the Italians that Wied’s son was an of¤cer with the
German army in Romania. Perhaps most galling of all, the German com-
mander in Mitrovica seemed quite tolerant of anti-Italian activity. Gestapo
agents had even gone so far as to contact members of the growing Albanian
resistance.129
Although undoubtedly unaware of the Gestapo contacts, by November
Ciano had enough reasons to be concerned. In a strongly worded protest to
German ambassador Mackensen, Ciano accused the Germans of deliberately
fostering an autonomous Albania under German leadership that would serve
as a focal point for opposition to the Italians. The new state would eventually
be led by Wied’s son, who would construct a government made up of anti-Ital-
ians and a militia that would take an oath directly to Hitler. As a solution to
the problem, Ciano suggested that, as a gesture, Hitler might want to cede
Mitrovica to Albania.130 The German Foreign Ministry conducted a full in-
vestigation and found that some of Ciano’s claims were true. The Foreign
Ministry cabled Belgrade and Tirana, making it clear that Mitrovica must,
under no circumstances, become a source of tension between Italy and Ger-
many. Mackensen was instructed to tell Ciano that there was no truth to the
allegations that the German military was consorting with anti-Italian Al-
banians. German interest in Mitrovica was de¤ned as restricted to maintaining
peace and quiet, which was being fostered by the granting of local cultural
Italian Greater Albania 87

autonomy. Mackensen was further instructed to ignore Ciano’s call for the
inclusion of Mitrovica into Albania and, if he should bring the topic up again,
to refer him to the Vienna Awards.131 This seems to have satis¤ed the Italians
temporarily, allowing them time to absorb Kosova and to attempt to bene¤t
from its inclusion into Albania.
The absorption of Kosova proceeded with some energy and provided
Albania with considerable bene¤t. Iliaz Agushi, who was placed in charge of
Kosova as minister of liberated territories, installed a regime dependent on
Tirana and initiated a number of policies that bene¤ted both the population
of Kosova and that of old Albania. The great Kosovar landowners who had
been dispossessed by the Serbs were to be placated by being paid one-quarter
of the income from their former estates.132 And one source suggests that to
match Serb policies during the interwar period, between 70,000 and 100,000
Serbs were forced out of Kosova,133 many of whom ended up in concentration
camps in Prishtina and Mitrovica. These Serbs were apparently used as labor
on forti¤cation works in Italian Albania and as workers in the Trepça mines
for the Germans. The Serbs most vulnerable were those brought in by the
Yugoslav government between 1918 and 1940 to settle some of the 154,287
acres of land seized from Albanians and whose settlement was accompanied
by forced expulsions of Albanians.134
The Albanian puppet government launched an ambitious educational
program that included the opening of 173 Albanian primary and many sec-
ondary schools, the ¤rst in forty years.135 Albanian schools in Kosova were shut
down in 1918 in order to “Serbianize” the population. By 1921 Serbian au-
thorities had decided to deny the Albanians access to any education, in an
organized effort to keep them ignorant and illiterate. A Serbian of¤cial wrote
in 1921 that “the Albanians will all remain backward, unenlightened, and
stupid; nor will they know the state idiom [Serbian], which would help them
to ¤ght against us. It is in our interest that they remain at the present level of
their culture for another twenty years, the time we need to carry out the
necessary national assimilation in these areas.”136 Under these circumstances,
it is hardly surprising that many Kosovars viewed the Italians, with their
20,000 occupation troops and their Albanian puppets, as liberators.
But old Albania clearly bene¤ted from this addition as well. Apart from
the considerable subsoil wealth, Kosova provided a substantial agricultural
surplus, badly needed in old Albania. The National Bank of Albania reported
in 1942 that the Kosova regime, despite a one-¤fth decline in wheat sown as
compared to before the war, was producing as much as old Albania. Total
maize production was also about one-half of that produced in old Albania.
88 Chapter 3

Because Kosova contained no more than two-thirds of the population of old

Albania, a surplus was produced. In 1942 twenty thousand tons of grain and
thirty thousand tons of corn were shipped to old Albania from Kosova; two-
thirds of the maize and one-third of the wheat could also be exported from
Kosova to Albania without depleting the resources of Kosova in any way.137
The union solved the problem of chronic lack of cereals.
Those committed to the fascist regime made the most of the acquisition
for the purposes of propaganda. And indeed the annexation of Kosova was a
popular move both in Kosova and in old Albania. Albanian socialist
historiography admits that “a section of the population fell victim to this
nationalism.”138 But it was not enough enthusiasm to win any lasting support
for the Italians. By the time Kosova was annexed in 1941, the Italians had
already lost the battle to win the hearts and minds of the Albanians; in fact,
some have suggested that the adventure that ultimately brought Greater Al-
bania about—the Italian invasion of Greece—ruined all that the Italians had
done in Albania by contributing to the collapse of the relative stability of the
early period of the Italian occupation. In a way, then, the achievement of
Albania’s territorial dreams directly coincided with the beginning of the end
for the Italians. The negative impact of Italian policy vastly outweighed the
positive. This is perhaps best illustrated by the steady rise of disenchantment
and resistance.
C H A P T E R 4

ITALIAN REPRESSION AND THE

BEGINNING OF RESISTANCE

The Italians made many mistakes in Albania, not the least of which was
assuming that they could win over a majority of Albanians at all. The Albanian
attitude toward the Italians in 1939 ranged from indifference to suspicion to
passive antipathy to hatred; by late 1940 the latter was the prevailing emotion.
Unlike with their feelings about the Germans after 1943, the Albanians never
respected the Italians, although with increased repression came fear. The Al-
banian attitude toward the Italians was guided in part by the mistaken as-
sumption that Albanian arms had actually driven Italian armies into the sea in
1920. This national myth had been fostered by Zog and did the Albanian
nation a disservice because it encouraged Albanians to underestimate the Ital-
ians and often not to take them seriously.

Growing Italian Unpopularity

This overly negative attitude about the Italians was reinforced during the
1920s by the impression left by a few hundred Italian artisans and small
merchants who had been abandoned in Albania after World War I and who
begged soldi to survive. Mussolini’s restructuring of the Italian government
and his military exploits in Spain and Ethiopia did little to alter the impression
of many Albanians. Educated Albanians considered the Italians to be parvenu
in the European community of nations, newcomers who were really not in a
position to bring culture or economic well-being. There were intangible con-
siderations as well. Albanians did not like the entire Italian Weltanschauung,
and they disliked what they considered the weak, nonmasculine way the Ital-
ians carried themselves and behaved. Many Albanians believed Italians to be
liars and dissimulators.1
The vast sums of money the Italians spent in Albania did little to alter
this attitude. This was partially the case because many Albanians believed that
89
90 Chapter 4

Italian money was not really meant for Albanian development but rather for
Italian interests exclusively. Many Albanians believed that the Italians hoped
for Albania’s ¤nancial destruction under Zog and saw to the squandering of
large sums of money to help bring this about. After the invasion some Italian
policies were based to a certain degree on altruism, but even these seemed to
mis¤re. Add to this background the blunders and mismanagement, and it is
not dif¤cult to imagine how the Italians became increasingly unpopular. Even
those Albanians who had initially supported the Italians—either out of a sense
of saving what could be saved or out of simple venality—began to turn away
as the excesses of the fascist movement began to have an impact. As Italian
mistakes multiplied, Albanian opposition grew. As opposition grew, resistance
increased. The Italians responded by grasping for a policy, but settled for
increased repression, tempered by sporadic and often erratic concessions.
The Italian administration of Albania was not successful, and many of
Rome’s problems were self-imposed. On the whole, the Italians behaved badly.
After an initial burst of activity they settled into disorganization, lack of direc-
tion, corruption, and a preference for form over content. Corruption was wide-
spread and reached the highest levels of the administration. Albania, and the
vast sums that Rome spent there, provided a unique opportunity for countless
Italian adventurers and con men, as well as a temptation for contractors and
suppliers who might otherwise have remained legitimate. Because the sums
were so vast, a considerable bureaucracy grew up to administer the money. The
fascist bureaucrats did much to secure jobs for their friends and contracts for
¤rms in which they had a personal interest. The marble buildings that the
Italians constructed for various fascist organizations have been mentioned. It
is not surprising that Mussolini’s private secretary was intimately connected
with the marble quarries at Carrara.2 Ciano himself became involved. With
the large secret funds at his disposal for miscellaneous expenses in Albania,
Ciano initiated a vast network of corruption. When the Italian police discov-
ered it, they determined not even to inform Mussolini.
This is not to suggest that corruption was something new and shocking
to the Albanians. But under Zog it had been more or less limited to the court
and its immediate vicinity. With the Italians it became much more widespread
and very obvious. Albanians quickly became aware that high Italian govern-
ment and party people had ¤nancial interests in speci¤c projects and that
enormous prices were paid for particular construction projects and deliveries,
far in excess of their actual worth.
Giovanni Giro, the inspector and real power behind Albanian fascism and
the Albanian youth movement, proved to be another high of¤cial implicated
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 91

in the vast corruption schemes. He was responsible for the collection of large
sums from rich merchants for party work, funds that he personally controlled.
Giro’s Italian opponents and competitors—including Jacomoni—made public
his indiscretions and arranged to have him removed from his post, which Giro
heard about only by listening to the radio. Few lamented his passing; the
Albanians in the government found him boorish, fanatical, and unsophisti-
cated, with a penchant for employing and raising to power many thoroughly
disreputable Albanians. Giro was also heartily disliked for his barely concealed
contempt for all Albanians, which led him to try to Italianize everything,
including the Albanian language, which he referred to as a “meaningless dia-
lect.” Giro became an embarrassment to Jacomoni by his corruption as well as
by his tending to disregard the lieutenant general’s authority.3
Giro was not alone in his contempt for the Albanians. Ciano complained
particularly about the Italian middle classes, who, he maintained, “treat the
natives badly and who have a colonial mentality. Unfortunately, this is also true
of military of¤cers and, according to Jacomoni, especially their wives.”4 The
German minister, further, reported about incidents in which Italian soldiers
and workers not only harassed and insulted Albanian women, but also were
caught stealing both in villages and in Tirana.5
The Giro affair pointed to another Italian problem, namely, the often
bitter rivalry between the various levels of Italian authority. Rumors of dis-
agreements between soldiers and civilians—even between Jacomoni and Gen-
eral Guzzoni—began within a month of the invasion.6 With the arrival of
Giro, the struggle seems to have become three-way. The replacement of Giro
by Piero Parini, who retained his positions as adviser to the Albanian prime
minister and secretary general to the lieutenant general, removed one compli-
cation but by no means solved the problem. Since the very nature of Italian
fascism encouraged interdepartmental friction and personal jealousy, it is per-
haps only surprising that those attributes took as long as they did to surface in
Albania. In a note to London describing the increase in rivalry, the British
consul general commented that as the internal Italian hostilities increased,
Jacomoni’s wife began taking intensive English lessons.7
Giro’s annoying style, which corresponded to Ciano’s tona fascista and was
often referred to as dinamismo, was evident in many Italian actions. This
general attitude of nervous haste did much to further alienate the Albanians.
A period of quiet reform and abstinence from provocative manifestations
might—at least prior to the invasion of Greece—have assured Italy of valuable
support. Instead, the Italian authorities pushed forward with little concern for
Albanian sensibilities, assuming that only rapid results could maintain Italy’s
92 Chapter 4

imperial pride. Much of Italy’s activity was really smoke and mirrors, and it
was often perceived by the Albanians as little more than a series of public
relations stunts. For many Albanians, the grand new fascist buildings in down-
town Tirana, large but essentially useless, stood as a symbol of the occupation.
The German minister pointed to the new Tirana stadium as another
example of this principle of form before function. The stadium had twenty
thousand seats, although Tirana itself at the time had a population of just
thirty thousand. The parades for Ciano further illustrate the point. When he
visited Albania for a triumphal tour in May 1940, uniformed Albanian girls
were trotted out with 100 new bicycles, 100 tennis racquets, and 50 fencing
masks and foils. But there was no tennis court or teacher, no fencing club, and
no fencing instructor.8 The reality was considerably different: Albania was
soon worse off than it had been under Zog. Within a year of the Italian
invasion the hospital in Tirana was in worse shape than it had been under
Zog—when it was directed by a German doctor. Many of the apparatuses no
longer functioned properly and were not replaced. After an initial spurt of
activity, the construction of the much advertised road network slowed, and
after a year—because of constant military and commercial traf¤c—the roads
were actually in worse shape than they had been under Zog.
In some matters the Italians seem to have gone out of their way to alienate
the Albanians. The new ¶ag serves as an example. The Italians took the old
¶ag, a black double eagle on a red ¤eld, and added a fascis on either side,
looking as if they were about to crush the old symbol. To make matters worse,
the Italians topped the eagle off with the crown of Savoy, which itself is topped
by a cross. In a country where 70 percent of the people were Moslem, this was
little more than woodenheadedness. When the Italians tried to explain that
the fascis was the symbol of the old imperial Roman order and that it should
be valued for its history, they were asked to explain why, in that case, it did not
make up part of the Italians’ own ¶ag.9 Ciano noted in his diary that Victor
Emmanuel observed in a sarcastic tone that the new ¶ag did not contain all
the heraldic symbols of the house of Savoy, indicating that it could have been
worse.10 As we have seen, the new Albanian fascist ¶ag became an even greater
problem when the Germans allowed the Albanians of Mitrovica to use the
original ¶ag.11
Moslems were further outraged when Italian curfew restrictions began to
interfere with the traditional fast of Ramadan. And the Moslems of Albania,
through family connections, felt themselves very close to Turkey and Egypt,
two countries that allowed Zog to maintain semiof¤cial missions for years.
This was done partially out of courtesy to Europe’s only Moslem ex-king and
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 93

partially as an indication of displeasure with the Italians. Both states saw

Italian imperialism as a direct danger. The attitude of Turkey and Egypt con-
tinued to in¶uence many Albanian Moslems.
The most widely held complaints about the Italians, however, had to do
with the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. An old Balkan saying ad-
monishes that an empty belly burns a hole in the ¶ag. After initial improve-
ment, the extensive dislocation of the Albanian economy began having a neg-
ative impact, effecting Albanians at all economic levels. Following a temporary
upsurge, because of the massive in¶ux of capital, the period of the Italian
occupation saw working and living conditions deteriorate both in the towns
and in the countryside.12
The economic problems caused by the Italian presence, although often
unavoidable, occasionally resulted from faulty Italian policy. The customs
union proclaimed on 22 April 1939 did much to undermine the con¤dence in
paper money that Zog had painstakingly attempted to build up during the
years of his reign.13 The customs union also harmed or bankrupted what little
industry and homecraft the Albanians were able to produce, throwing many
skilled workers out of work. Granted, the industrial base was minuscule by
modern standards, accounting for little more than 4 percent of the national
economy at the beginning of the war.14 What little did exist, however, was
destroyed by low-cost, often low-quality Italian imports.15 Although the peas-
ants saw some bene¤t from these low-priced goods, in general they too were
worse off. Compulsory delivery of agricultural products at low prices, the
expropriation of small farms by Italian banks, and the con¤scation of thou-
sands of acres of land for military needs further impoverished much of the
peasant majority.16
The principal economic complaints, however, were produced by shortages
and rising prices, and of the two the latter was clearly the most serious. Within
less than a year of the invasion, prices for certain goods had risen sharply. By
pegging the Albanian franc to the lira and by instituting rigorous currency
control, the Italians quadrupled the price of a paper gold napoleon. Peasants
and merchants reacted by raising prices to re¶ect the pre-occupation equiva-
lence of Albanian paper and gold. One lek, which had bought seven eggs in
April 1939, bought two in February 1940. The price of potatoes had risen by
200 percent, that of low-quality meat from three to eight leks per kilogram.
The minimum daily wage for unskilled labor had been doubled by decree,
which damaged the interests of small employers. They were further hit by the
various obligatory contributions to the funds of Fascist Party organizations
and to social services. But many of the “voluntary contributions” were simply
94 Chapter 4

passed on to the public in the form of higher prices. The cost of construction
material rocketed with the housing crisis brought on by the Italian civilian
invasion, and the extensive program of public buildings, roads, of¤cial resi-
dences, and fascist centers strained all available supplies and brought pro¤t to
none but Italian contractors.17
The Italian-controlled National Bank of Albania con¤rmed what every
Albanian was experiencing and published the following index ¤gures for the
increase in foodstuff prices:

June 1937 51.9

June 1938 52.8
June 1939 55.2
Oct. 1939 62.8
Nov. 1939 67.7
Dec. 1939 72.118

Shortages, too, caused new problems for the Albanians. By February 1940
wheat, maize, ¤sh, ¶our, and ¤rewood were all uncomfortably scarce. Tirana
frequently suffered from bread famine, and bread could rarely be found in
Durrës after 8 a.m. The common assumption was that the Italian garrison was
being fed at the expense of the Albanian population. This was actually not the
case. The requirements of the Italian army may have depleted supplies of
certain local produce, such as vegetables, but almost all of the needed supplies
were brought from Italy. In general, the Italian soldiers serving in Albania
fared poorly. Since everything they needed—including meat, potatoes, pasta,
oil, ¶our, hay, straw, gasoline, and grease—had to be sent from Italy, they were
completely at the mercy of the feeble transportation system. As a result, they
too suffered from food and supply shortages as well as from too few barracks
and a shortage of drinking water. Often malnourished, they were particularly
susceptible to malaria, dysentery, and typhus.
The shortages that affected the Albanians were often actually caused by a
scarcity of labor and by the weather. The many thousands of Albanians em-
ployed on road construction reduced agricultural labor and, more notably,
labor available for woodcutting. Most of the food shortage in late 1939 and
early 1940 was caused by excessive rains. The British consul general in Febru-
ary reported that it had rained for twelve days out of every fourteen since the
autumn of 1939 and that the farmers in much of Albania were in despair.19
But whether they were responsible or not, the Italians were handed the blame.
It should also be noted that the complaints were subject to regional dif-
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 95

ferences. The north did not experience as heavy an Italian presence and be-
cause the Italians favored the Catholics in any event, conditions were perhaps
less severe. But this only meant that the complaints against the Italians were
of a different nature. Because of the Italian policy of weapons con¤scation, the
northerners, for example, found it dif¤cult to protect themselves from raids
mounted by armed Montenegrins. The Albanians complained that the Italian
carabinieri did nothing. The Albanians of Kosova had similar complaints
about marauding Bulgarians.20
It seemed that no matter what the Italians did, their collective reputation
suffered among the Albanians. Their outwardly bene¤cent measures for local
economic reconstruction, including the reclamation of land and the mortgage
and loan facilities for farmers, were perceived by the Albanians as mere prep-
aration for extensive Italian colonization. The methods employed by the banks
in granting agricultural loans and arranging mortgages seemed to Albanians to
be designed mainly to acquire the best lands and the best olive trees for
eventual distribution to Italian settlers, who, thanks to the new constitution,
were now able to own land in Albania. The extensive business and infrastruc-
ture projects were seen in the eyes of many Albanians as pompous attempts at
propaganda victories aimed at enriching Italian companies, exploiting Al-
banians, and paving the way for more Italian workers and colonists. By the
middle of 1940, Italian civilians were arriving at the rate of two hundred to
three hundred a day.21 Between April 1940 and September 1941 more than
¤fty-one thousand Italian workers and colonists arrived in Albania.22
The Italians seemed to have rapidly alienated many important segments
of Albanian society. Merchants complained of the restrictions of currency
control and the system of obligatory import and export permits. These were
granted or refused by the banks in strict accordance with Italian commercial
interests; if Italy could supply the article, it was useless to apply for permission
to import it from elsewhere. Those who had previously dealt with foreign
companies in states other than Italy either went out of business or switched
their business to Italian ¤rms. Merchants, as was the case with most Al-
banians, were also unhappy about the new Albanian currency pegged to the
lira. A currency black market quickly developed, and foreigners were offered
twice the of¤cial rate for many Western currencies. Merchants imported any-
thing they could ¤nd in their anxiety to hold goods of any kind rather than
Albanian paper money.
Albanian businessmen of all types complained that they were being el-
bowed out and that it was impossible to obtain approval for any new Albanian
enterprises. When an Albanian came up with a ¤nancial scheme, there was
96 Chapter 4

always an of¤cial to suggest that the plan should be Italo-Albanian in charac-

ter and then to produce an Italian to organize it.23
The Greek minority in the south disliked the 1940 order that made
Albanian instead of Greek the language of instruction in their schools. The
Orthodox in general were concerned about the favor being shown to the
Catholics, as well as the powerful pressure, usually in terms of bribes, put on
their Archbishop Kissi—and he was quite susceptible to this type of pres-
sure—to induce sympathy with the Uniate movement within his ¶ock.
But the greatest distaste for the Italians and their methods was demon-
strated by the professional classes, intellectuals, and students. Their opposition,
although often exacerbated by the inconveniences in which their contact with
the Italians inevitably resulted, was motivated primarily by principle. It is here
where budding Albanian nationalism could be found, the newest nationalism
in the Balkans, a twentieth-century phenomenon fostered and strengthened by
Zog. And it was among this group that the resistance would ¤nd willing
¤ghters.
Eventually the Italians alienated even those who had originally been will-
ing to collaborate. They complained that the Italians did not understand or
trust them, that the Italians hoped to disenfranchise them in their own state.
The Albanian collaborators complained that they were being shut out of all
major decisions, that Albanian patriots were being imprisoned, and that the
Italians were involving themselves in every facet of Albanian administration,
even in those areas where they had demonstrated nothing but incompetence.
They further complained that the Italians often acted disgracefully, and that
public safety had declined since Zog’s day. Italian military incompetence in the
war against Greece had resulted in the destruction of much of southern Alba-
nia, and it did much to drive Albanian collaborators to look to the Germans
as more competent allies.24
But recognizing that their futures were linked to fascist Italy, the Albanian
collaborators made a series of suggestions with a view to creating a more equal
and perhaps stronger relationship. Albanian of¤cials suggested that this might
be possible if the Italians took a number of steps, including (1) stricter adher-
ence to the proclaimed independent state of Albania within the structure of the
personal union under Victor Emmanuel III, (2) increasing the power of the
lieutenant general, who was too dependent on a long list of Italian of¤cials
other than the king (he was forced to listen to the undersecretary for Albanian
affairs and in police matters to the general in charge of the carabinieri, as well
as to the independent military secret police), (3) the creation of a new Albanian
government with real power, (4) the creation of a real Albanian administration
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 97

with real power, (5) the transfer of police powers to an Albanian administration,
(6) the reduction of the number of Italian of¤cials and the reduction of their
responsibility, (7) the reduction of the number of Italian advisers in any ministry
to ¤ve as well as the reduction of their power, (8) turning the Albanian Fascist
Party over to the Albanians, and (9) genuine attempts to reduce the rampant
corruption. Albanian of¤cials complained that the Italians had refused to ful¤ll
any of their promises and warned that to gain the support of even the most
pliable Albanian, this was a prerequisite.25 Albanian of¤cials advised both
Jacomoni and Ciano that the possibility of loyal cooperation was still there but
that by the middle of 1941, time was running out. The Italians had to choose
between true collaboration or a simple occupation.26
The Italians were willing to admit that mistakes had been made, that they
had often attached themselves to the wrong people, and that they had dealt
with Albania only as a plantation economy. Many admitted that the imposi-
tion of the Fascist Party might have been a mistake. The war against Greece
had interrupted the reconstruction of Albania and damaged the Italian
image.27 Despite this limited self-criticism, however, little changed, at least
while the Albanians remained quiet.

Early Nonviolent Resistance

But the Albanians did not remain quiet very long. Still, resistance in Albania
began slowly after the Italian invasion of April 1939, because the average
Albanian outside of the major towns successfully ignored the Italians, not a
dif¤cult task given Albania’s rather primitive level of development. Poor trans-
portation and communication facilities fostered localism. The number of ra-
dios in the country was estimated at two to three thousand and there were few
newspapers. With Albania’s illiteracy rate approaching 85 percent, more news-
papers would have had only a limited impact in any case.28 Albania’s traditional
society of clan chiefs and feudal beys further inhibited resistance.29 The clans-
men and peasants would not move without leadership, and their leaders, for
the most part, were either cooperating with the Italian authorities or were at
least reluctant to act against them. Many were hesitant to act against the
Italians because the Italians, who hoped to work through them, actually in-
creased their local authority.
Many, both leaders and led, were understandably awed by the number of
Italian occupation troops, some seven divisions, by 1943.30 And even if the
Italian troops did not project the image of ef¤ciency that the Germans would
98 Chapter 4

later project, their vastly superior number and their modern weapons clearly
had an impact. The lone Albanian peasant with his outmoded Turkish long
ri¶e could not help but be impressed. The Albanians, further, had been over-
run by foreign troops so often—since the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913 they
had seen Serbs and Austrians, Greeks and Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Ital-
ians—that many had persuaded themselves that the new Italian invasion, too,
was just momentary. Peasants who had seen their houses burned down three
times in three years by different invaders are slow to challenge new authority.
So there was grumbling, but in the early months no organization of leader-
ship—or overtly oppressive occupation policy—to bridge the gulf between
grumbling and adventure.
Nevertheless, grumbling increased and isolated acts of nonviolent resis-
tance, ranging from noncooperation to public acts of de¤ance, did begin im-
mediately after the invasion and increased as the Italian occupation dragged
on. Much of this early opposition involved a new, growing vocal group in
Albania, the increasing number of intellectuals educated abroad and domesti-
cally educated students, who had a stronger sense of national identity than did
the Moslem peasants, who were dominated by their feudal lords, or the illiter-
ate tribespeople of the north. It is important to note that this opposition, while
primarily directed against the Italians, was also directed against the traditional
Albanian ruling classes, the feudal landlords and chiefs, who with Zog had
obstructed social change in the interwar period and were performing the same
function with the Italians.
The Italians took immediate notice of this growing unrest. Count Ciano,
on his ¤rst of¤cial visit to Albania ¤ve days after the invasion, noted in his
diary that some Albanians, particularly high school students, disliked raising
their arms in the Roman salute, while some refused to do it at all.31 This was
only the beginning. In May Ciano noted that “there is a bit of a storm in the
intellectual spheres of Albania, which explains why twenty or so people will
immediately be sent to concentration camps.”32 But the demonstrations not
only continued; they became more serious.
At the end of May 1939, a widely reported incident took place in Tirana’s
movie theater. During the showing of a ¤lm, Zog and his wife appeared in a
news clip, and some in the audience rose and shouted, “Long Live Zog.” The
performance was stopped, and each member of the audience was asked
whether he or she had taken part in the demonstration; two young men
admitted participation, and their names were taken.33 Although this incident
certainly did not indicate a resurgence of popular feeling in support of Zog, it
did demonstrate growing vocal hostility toward the Italians, particularly
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 99

among the young. The Albanian ¶ag day, 28 November, witnessed the most
serious student demonstrations since the invasion. In Tirana older students
refused to learn the fascist anthem, “Giovinézza,” despite intensive instruction
from the local fascists, and during the parade honoring the day, they sang
Albanian patriotic songs instead. Despite the fact that in the parade they were
positioned between the police and the military, they still burst out singing
“Albania, Albania.” Some observers reported shooting. After the parade stu-
dent leaders were called to explain their actions, but were soon released.34
On the same day, similar demonstrations occurred elsewhere. In Shkodra
a crowd of two hundred students and two hundred workmen singing patriotic
songs failed to salute the head of the local Fascist Party. He complained and
the local police investigated, ¤nding that some of the workers claimed to be
communists. Eight students, three of whom professed to be communists, were
arrested and jailed. Of¤cials in Korça and Vlora reported student demonstra-
tions as well. It seems that many of the ringleaders, like those in Shkodra, were
arrested and some, along with several schoolteachers, sent to concentration
camps.35
But the students would not be discouraged. In January 1940 Ciano noted
in his diary again that students and intellectuals were still causing trouble.36
The diplomatic community too commented on the continuing student distur-
bances. The British consul general reported on 3 February that demonstrations
had occurred in Korça and Shkodra. Failure on the part of the students in
Korça to salute fascist of¤cials with the requisite enthusiasm led to the inter-
vention of the carabinieri. Carabinieri of¤cials apparently visited the lycée
attended by the offending students and despite the protests of the headmaster,
entered the classrooms. Again the student’s salute was un¶atteringly slovenly.
The headmaster selected two of the worst offenders and asked them what
homes they came from: one was the son of the prefect of Pogradec and the
other was the son of Xhafer Bey Ypi, the minister of justice. The headmaster
led the carabinieri to the door and slammed it behind them. The minister of
education was sent to investigate, and he closed the lycée.37
The Italians continued their crackdown by sending thirty to forty board-
ers on government scholarships home from the lycée at Shkodra. According
to several eyewitness accounts, this action resulted in some three hundred irate
students beating up some of their teachers, whom they considered to be crea-
tures of Italian policy. The unfortunate instructors were apparently driven
through the streets toward what the students considered to be their spiritual
home, the local Fascist Party of¤ce.38 The German consul general reported
similar problems in April. He noted that pictures of Mussolini and Victor
100 Chapter 4

Emmanuel were torn down or defaced, that Italian ¶ags were being torn down,
and that students throughout Albania were demonstrating and refusing to sing
the “Giovinézza.” Ramiz Ali, Albanian president from 1985 to 1992, person-
ally remembers the growth of student demonstrations from 1939 to 1941 in
Shkodra, Tirana, Korça, Vlora, and elsewhere, with some of his own professors
arrested for antifascist activity.39 The authorities reacted by again dispatching
the minister of education, who before the invasion had had a reputation as a
nationalist. He had attempted to maintain this impression by posing as the
champion of nationalist youth and democratic ideas in a collection of poems
published after the invasion. By early 1940, however, few were willing to
accept him in this role and more often than not, he was received with shouts
of “traitor.”40
Other elements of Albanian society soon took up the example of the
students and young intellectuals. Albanian socialist historiography makes
much of this early dissatisfaction on the part of the workers. Although it is
undoubtedly an exaggeration to suggest that they were signi¤cantly in¶uenced
by the growing Albanian communist movement or that they had, by this time,
developed a class consciousness, worker’s incidents occurred with increasing
frequency. As early as June 1939 workers at the Vlora dockyards went on strike
for higher wages, which occasioned the intervention of the carabinieri.41 In
October 1940 workers struck at the mines of Selenica, and twelve were im-
prisoned before the interior minister gave in to their demands.42 These initial
strikes spread to include foreign contractors. In April 1940 eighty workers
struck at Ferrobeton in Vlora.43 While these strikes may not have been entirely
antifascist in character, refusal on the part of the workers and other employees,
despite some pressure, to join the Fascist Party was reported to be wide-
spread.44
Sabotage, both symbolic and actual, was reported by Italian authorities
and foreign observers. The symbolic variant included continued defacement of
the portraits of Italian leaders. Perhaps the most interesting variety of deface-
ment was the smearing of honey on the chin of the Duce’s portrait during the
summer—which quickly gave the impression that Mussolini had a beard of
¶ies. But Albanian socialist historiography reports more serious sabotage as
well. Pollo and Puto claim that particularly after the Italian invasion of Greece,
sabotage signi¤cantly reduced Albania’s output of raw materials. Production at
the petroleum works was reduced by 25 percent, and entire galleries exploded
in Albania’s chromium mines. This activity was accompanied by the appear-
ance of anti-Italian ¶yers in the major towns, something that became common
after the beginning of 1940.45
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 101

Early Armed Resistance

Incidents of armed resistance increased as the occupation wore on. It is true

that early anonymous attacks on fascist policemen and of¤cials were barely
distinguishable from traditional Albanian brigandage. Soon, however, distinc-
tions began to be made. In May 1940 the British consul general reported a
sudden outbreak of robberies and housebreaking in Durrës and Tirana, carried
out by armed gangs operating with cars. Ex-archbishop Vissarion was beaten
and robbed, and a number of Italians, several soldiers, an of¤cer, and a foreman
were killed. What was noteworthy here was that housebreaking and this type
of armed robbery had never been characteristic Albanian crimes.46 It can be
assumed, therefore, that the motive here might have been political—an at-
tempt to embarrass both the Italians and their puppet Albanian regime.
The motive of the ¤rst organized uprising against the Italians is also
questionable. The action occurred among the Catholic Mirdita tribe in the
north in the summer of 1940. It is surprising only in that it occurred among
Catholics, who bene¤ted from Italian pro-Catholic policies, and that it oc-
curred among the Mirdita in particular, whose chief had been a bitter foe of
Zog’s and actually lent the Italians considerable support. The revolt, which was
easily suppressed, was undoubtedly occasioned by the fear that the Italians
would conscript young men and send them to ¤ght for the Italians in North
Africa, which the Italians had been careful not to do.47
The motives of some armed resistance, however, were never in question.
Enver Hoxha tells us that the armed struggle against the Italians began on 7 April
1939 and continued uninterrupted from that point.48 Although this may have
been an exaggeration, armed resistance motivated by patriotism was not uncom-
mon during the early years of the Italian occupation. British newspapers, perhaps
overoptimistically, reported in August 1940 that the large Italian army was having
trouble. An Italian battalion had apparently been ambushed near Burrel, losing
men and material. In another incident an Italian lieutenant colonel was killed.
British ambassador Sir Ronald Campbell in Belgrade passed on reports that he
received suggesting that the Italians were losing more than ¤fty men a day in
ambushes.49 Much of this might be considered wishful thinking—particularly
since the Italians had declared war on Great Britain two months earlier.
As early as May 1940, the Italians began to report the operation of spo-
radic armed bands, often near the border regions and usually interpreted as
organized criminal activity. Ibrahim Kupi, the brother of Abaz Kupi, is men-
tioned in this context. Although Ibrahim Kupi was originally reported oper-
ating north of Kruja, by August 1940 he was reported to have moved to border
102 Chapter 4

regions to coordinate his efforts with like-minded leaders on either side of the
Yugoslav border. Also mentioned in these early reports are Murat Kaloshi, a
former Zogist gendarmerie commander, and several Dibra bands—one led by
Haxhi Leshi. The guerrilla ¤ghters Myslim Peza and Muharrem Bajraktari,
who would soon play important roles in organized band resistance, are ¤rst
mentioned in these summer 1940 reports as potentially dangerous elements.
Although these groups were perhaps not yet fully organized, they were cred-
ited with cutting wires, distributing anti-Italian lea¶ets, and committing
minor acts of sabotage, which the Italians simply referred to as terrorism.50
While these groups operated only sporadically and without much success until
late 1942, they proved to be the beginning of what would become a serious
challenge to ¤rst the Italians and then the Germans.
The Italians began to take more serious notice of this growing problem
when, on 17 May 1941, an attempt was made on the life of Victor Emmanuel
III, during his ¤rst of¤cial visit to Albania.51 Ciano, in his diary, dismissed the
incident, suggesting that the youth, Vasil Laçi, was a Macedonian Greek rather
than an Albanian.52 The Italian press described him as “under a spell of poetic
madness.” The Italian authorities hanged him in Tirana ten days later and
stepped up repression in general. Albanian socialist sources reported that in
May 1941 1,130 houses were searched, 21,131 Albanians were declared ene-
mies of the state, and 5,270 were interned.53
German military representatives in Tirana reported to Ambassador
Mackensen in Rome that as late as November 1940, they thought it unlikely
that the quiet in the land would soon be disturbed. By the end of 1941 these
same observers complained about the security situation in Tirana itself.54 By
that point the Italians had begun losing control of all but the main towns and
communication routes. This can be explained, at least partially, by the moun-
tainous terrain of most of the country, which for centuries provided refuge for
Albanian tribesmen ¤ghting the Turks and Albanian brigands plundering
whomever they encountered. While Italian road construction was slowly mak-
ing some of these areas more accessible to policing, Albanians were returning
to their old habits faster than the Italians could build roads.

Early British Involvement with the Resistance

The British can rightly claim a share in initiating the ¤rst organized Al-
banian resistance against the Italians. As early as April 1940 British agents of
military intelligence (R), a branch of the War Of¤ce that was involved with
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 103

fomenting guerrilla warfare and/or Section D (which stood for destruction) of

the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) became interested in Albania. The British
intelligence community, in¶uenced by the overly romantic ideas of Englishmen
who had been in Albania during the interwar period, was convinced that Alba-
nia was the ideal place for their ¤rst attempt to encourage guerrilla warfare in
southeastern Europe. The same geographical features that allowed the Al-
banians to hold out against the Turks—the rugged inaccessible mountains—
were deemed just right for resistance. In reality, however, Albania was perhaps
less ready than its neighbors for this type of war. With its arrested political
development; its rudimentary nationalist development, with no real recognition
of territorial unity at even higher levels; its primitive social organization; and its
inexperience with modern tactics, including aerial bombardment and mecha-
nized columns, Albania was far from ready to develop a modern people’s war.55
But these are things that the British learned only with experience. In
April 1940 they rushed ahead with plans to initiate guerrilla warfare and
eventually raise a rebellion against Italian rule. The scheme, set in motion in
Yugoslavia, included collecting information, establishing contact with Alban-
ian patriots in Kosova and Albania proper, and setting up organizations to
smuggle in supplies for an eventual uprising.56 British agents established con-
tact with a number of loosely organized Albanian groups—most of which
centered around a nucleus of a powerful family and its retainers—engaged in
information gathering and maintaining a wide network of contacts. Principal
among these groups was one led by the wealthy Kosova landowner Gani Bey
Kryeziu and his brother Said Kryeziu. The Kryezius became the focus of
British operations because of their pro-Western stance, because of their good
relations with Yugoslav authorities, and because they wielded in¶uence both
in Kosova and in Albania.
Gani Kryeziu had been a bitter opponent of King Zog’s—principally
because Zog opposed Kosova irredentism and because Zog was responsible for
the assassination of Kryeziu’s brother Ceno Bey in 1927.57 With the Italian
invasion, however, Gani Kryeziu, as a patriot, had dropped his opposition to
Zog and supported a broad resistance movement. It was on his suggestion that
the British ¤rst made contact with Colonel Abaz Kupi, then in exile in Istan-
bul, who had led the Albanian resistance to the Italians at Durrës and would
become the leader of the Zogist force of resistance.58
Kupi, an Albanian chieftain in the Ottoman tradition, spent thirteen years
of his life as an outlaw in the mountains, ¤ghting against the Turks in the
Balkan Wars, against the Austrians in World War I, against Zog in 1923, and
with Zog in 1924. In 1934, in typical tribal fashion, he accepted the position
104 Chapter 4

of major in Zog’s gendarmerie, with responsibility for his home area in Kruja.
Kupi was brave and generous, yet at the same time ruthless and cunning, with
a rare capacity for making each man believe he was his friend. Physically he
was rather short and looked a bit like Napoleon as ¤rst consul—particularly
since Kupi combed his hair down over his forehead to cover a scar from a
bullet wound.59 Kupi’s abilities as a ¤ghter and Albanian-style diplomat were
thought useful both by Kryeziu and the British. The promise of British sup-
port convinced Kupi to travel to Yugoslavia in late 1940 to work more closely
with British intelligence and the Kryezius.
Kupi in turn enlisted other supporters of Zog while Said Kryeziu won
over Mustafa Gjinishi, a member of Albania’s small but growing communist
movement. While communism had played only a minor role in Albania during
the Zogist years, Said Kryeziu, whose opinions inclined to the Left, sensed
that a growth of a radical movement in Albania was inevitable. Gjinishi’s
adherence to the budding resistance movement was considered fortunate by
the British, in light of the generally negative attitude that other communists
in Albania expressed toward the British. The British were unsure whether
Gjinishi was following orders or acting on his own. Albanian socialist
historiography and Enver Hoxha dismiss Gjinishi as a traitor, presumably
because of his later opposition to Hoxha. In any case, relations between the
once bitter enemies—Gani Kryeziu, Mustafa Gjinishi, and Abaz Kupi—ap-
parently were quite cordial, even friendly. In an ominous and deadly accurate
prediction of the future, however, the three agreed that once the Italians were
expelled, they would have to ¤ght among themselves for power in a postwar
Albania.60
These initial British contingency plans received further impetus with Italy’s
entry into the war in June 1940. Military intelligence (R) and Section D agents
in Yugoslavia began operations in Greece, where they contacted leading Alban-
ian exiles, established dumps of demolition material near the Albanian frontier,
and explored the possibility of acquiring agents on the Albanian side who could
establish dumps at selected points in Albania.61 In June and July 1940 reports
reached Tirana of the activities of Kupi and Kryeziu, accompanied by the
disturbing news that many Albanians were crossing the border to join them.62
Although both the British Foreign Of¤ce and the Middle East High Com-
mand approved of Section D’s plan for Albania, the agents were warned not to
do anything that might provoke an Italian invasion of Greece. Repeated warn-
ings about provoking the Italians stopped plans for an uprising in Albania. But
secret preparations continued not only in Yugoslavia and Greece but elsewhere
as well. The Foreign Of¤ce decided to construct a secret and unof¤cial Alban-
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 105

ian central committee in London to coordinate the various Albanian organiza-

tions abroad. This group was to be headed by Sir Jocelyn Percy who had helped
organize the Albanian police for Zog.

The Role of Zog

The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 changed the situation again.
Since the British War Of¤ce was convinced that an attack on the Italian rear
by the Albanians would be of great help to the Greeks, plans were resurrected
and this time the general reluctance to use Zog was even set aside. Following
Zog’s ¶ight from Albania, he wandered for months in search of asylum, until
it was ¤nally granted him by England on the occasion of the fall of France. As
soon as Zog arrived in England, he and his agents began lobbying for some
role in the war. Because the British had of¤cially recognized the Italian annex-
ation of Albania and had replaced their minister with a consul general, Zog
was admitted to England merely as a private citizen. Zog hoped to change his
status and assume an active role in the war, out of patriotism and a shrewd
understanding that this would legitimize him as far as at least some Albanians
were concerned. Zog’s active participation in the war, with British acquies-
cence, would have committed the British to the restoration of some form of
Albanian independence after the war and possibly a role for Zog himself.
The British government, sensing that Zog lacked popularity in Albania,
and wishing to maintain a free hand, refused to grant Zog any role and even
required that before admitting him he agree to refrain from political activity
of any kind. By the early fall of 1940 British policy toward Zog had changed
very little, perhaps best summarized by a Foreign Of¤ce minute from Pearson
Dixon, of the Southern Department. Pearson noted,

I said that in our view it would be a mistake to put forward King Zog’s name
in any way as a ¤gurehead for the recovery of Albanian independence. Not
only was he largely discredited personally, but we did not want to commit
ourselves as to the future status of Albania, which we should be bound to do
to some extent if the ex-king was to be used. At the same time we should
naturally not be adverse to letting Albanians abroad know that King Zog
among others was behind an independence movement if this would really
help.63

Zog had initially agreed to refrain from political activity but proved to be
something of a problem regardless. The Italian government was concerned
106 Chapter 4

that he was admitted to England at all, particularly in light of the fact that
some Moslem states, such as Turkey and Egypt, refused to recognize the
annexation and allowed Zog’s missions to remain open. (This of course was
much less of a problem after Italy entered the war.) And Zog himself was far
from inconspicuous. He brought with him to England some one hundred
sacks of gold, possibly part of the Albanian state treasury, and installed himself
on an entire ¶oor of the Ritz Hotel. He was accompanied by thirty-six people,
six of whom were listed as “H. M. Ordinance Of¤cers.” These of¤cers turned
out to be his personal bodyguard of Albanian tribesmen, who—much to the
annoyance of Scotland Yard—carried sawed-off shotguns. In light of these
problems, the Foreign Of¤ce decided—as it did with numerous politically
undesirable people—to ship Zog off to the United States.64
At the last moment, after many of the arrangements had been made, the
Foreign Of¤ce changed its mind. This change of policy was effected in part by
the arguments of Zog’s secretary Qazim Kastrioti, who, obviously encouraged
by the king, suggested that the British would be making a serious mistake in
expelling Zog. Kastrioti maintained that all Albanians, including formerly
implacable opponents who had been exiled by the Zog regime, were willing to
support the king’s wartime leadership and if he left Europe their cohesion
would be destroyed and their usefulness crippled. Only Zog had suf¤cient
status to induce Albanians to take the risks involved in embarrassing the
Italians. Finally, Kastrioti argued that Zog possessed great assets in his good
relations with the Turkish government and in the high regard that the people
of Islam had for the only Moslem king in Europe.
While recognizing that much of this argumentation was overstated, for-
eign secretary Lord Halifax reversed the earlier decision to expel Zog. He
feared that Zog would spread stories of British inhospitality once in the
United States. Lord Halifax was also unwilling to ask the United States to
receive people like Zog, who would probably do no harm in England. The
foreign secretary decided to reserve that option for those the government
desperately wanted out of England. The Foreign Of¤ce’s greatest fear, how-
ever, was that the government might be faced with criticism along the lines
that it had lost an opportunity of pursuing the war more vigorously against the
Italians if Zog were required to go.65
With the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940, the British attitude
toward Zog changed. Zog himself saw the invasion as an opportunity to again
put his name forward and did so. Zog reminded Sir Andrew Ryan, the former
British minister in Albania who acted as an unof¤cial liaison between the Foreign
Of¤ce and Zog, that he could rally some thirty thousand supporters—many with
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 107

whom he had remained in contact—and equip them with ten thousand ri¶es,
which, Zog maintained, were hidden in northern Albania, a claim that the British
took seriously. The Italians believed the number of ri¶es to be even higher.
Colonel Gabrielli, the Italian military attaché in Tirana, reported in May 1939
that some forty thousand ri¶es with ammunition remained at large.66
On 8 November 1940 Zog presented the Foreign Of¤ce with a concrete
plan. He suggested that he himself go to Istanbul and organize the fourteen
thousand Albanians there into a ¤ghting force to be landed in Thessaloníki.
This force was to be augmented by the Albanian community in Greece, which
Italian intelligence reported had already organized a committee that was in
contact with the British. From there he would initiate a small ¤ghting front
with the twenty of¤cers at his disposal, while at the same time directing a
general uprising against the Italians. He believed that a major revolt could be
stirred up by the tribes of the north and among the Kosovars. Although the
same could not be expected of the weaker, less warlike southern Albanians,
they could at least be counted on to harass the Italians. To support his case,
Zog noted that the Kosovars were ready to send a delegation to meet with
him, and he produced a series of telegrams from the Albanian community in
Istanbul requesting that he come and organize this proposed ¤ghting force.
Both Percy and Ryan lent their support to Zog’s plan, concluding that with
proper ¤nancing, Zog could direct a united Albanian effort suf¤cient at least
to embarrass the Italians.67
Meetings were held between the Foreign Of¤ce, War Of¤ce, and the new
Special Operations Executive (SOE), formed in July 1940 by the war cabinet
in the process of reorganizing existing intelligence agencies. SOE, which was
destined to play a leading role in guerrilla warfare in Albania, was designed to
coordinate and carry out subversive activities under the direction of the min-
ister of economic warfare.68 All parties in principle accepted the idea of using
Zog along the lines that he had suggested, with SOE displaying particular zeal
in suggesting that Zog should be ¶own to Greece.69 But before ¤nal arrange-
ments could be made, the British hoped to determine the attitude of the
various governments involved and the true extent of Zog’s popularity inside
Albania. Here the trouble began. The entire project was called into question
almost immediately by the uncompromising attitude of the Greek strongman
General Metaxas and the British minister in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, who
some in the Foreign Of¤ce had accused of having “gone native.”
Metaxas argued that because of Zog’s unpopularity, his presence in the
Balkans would actually aid the Italians. This reaction was not unexpected by
the British, and Metaxas’s motives were quite clear. The Greeks, who had by
108 Chapter 4

this time driven the Italians back into central Albania, had not liberated Al-
bania in order to hand it back to the Albanians. Metaxas was interested in
retaining large sections of southern Albania, and he recognized that if he
allowed Zog any role in resistance he would run the risk of committing himself
to the restoration of an independent Albania under Zog’s rule. Accordingly,
Metaxas even refused to allow Zog to broadcast a rallying speech from Radio
Athens on the Albanian independence day. Later, in February 1941, the Greek
government went further and successfully blocked the broadcast of a BBC
interview with Zog. The Greek government, among other points, objected to
a remark made during the interview in which Zog hoped to see Albanians free
and happy within their legal frontiers.70
Metaxas did, however, react favorably to the suggestion on the part of
Istanbul Albanians who hoped to form a legion in Greece. Because the offer
was not made dependent on Zog’s leading it, Metaxas welcomed their partic-
ipation, provided that they could equip themselves.71
The British, however, still believed that Zog could play a useful role in the
resistance and even before discovering the attitude of the other parties involved,
on the night of 23 November offered to ¶y him to Cairo as the ¤rst step in
carrying out these plans.72 The hope was to begin some sort of operation on 28
November, Albania’s independence day. Zog was taken somewhat by surprise and
decided not to be hurried in such a manner, at least not until he had been able to
see either Winston Churchill or Lord Halifax. Zog was, of course, keenly aware
that the British government would make absolutely no commitment regarding
the future of Albania. He hoped that a meeting with either the prime minister or
the foreign secretary would at least give him some measure of legitimacy, which
might later be useful. Queen Geraldine, in her authorized biography, maintained
that Zog met frequently with both Churchill and Lord Halifax and advised them
on the conduct of the war, but British documents make clear that no such
meetings ever took place.73 Zog allowed the moment to pass.
Geraldine maintained that Zog was wise not to have gone, since the plane
that would have taken him was shot down en route.74 But even had he safely
arrived in Egypt, Zog would have been unable to participate as he had hoped.
Within days of the Foreign Of¤ce’s offer to ¶y Zog to Cairo, telegrams began
coming in advising that Zog be kept in England.
Every government or British of¤ce slated for some sort of participation in
the project reacted negatively to the plan. The Turkish government made it
clear that they would not welcome Zog in Istanbul. Of the other possible
staging areas, Cyprus was disquali¤ed because of Greek objections and Pales-
tine was ruled out after the colonial of¤ce pointed out that it would be a
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 109

mistake to admit a non-Jew. The British ambassador in Belgrade, Ronald

Campbell, cabled that the Yugoslav minister of war had been informed by the
general commanding the Third Yugoslav Army on the Yugoslav-Albanian
frontier that the Albanians with whom he was secretly in contact were united
in their opposition to Zog. This should not have surprised the British, since
the Yugoslavs had no love for Zog, and the Albanians with whom the general
was in contact were undoubtedly Kosovars, many of whom resented Zog’s
reluctance to pursue Kosovar irredentism.
Zog’s resistance plan was ¤nally killed by reports from the Cairo embassy
and from the commander in chief Middle East. After soliciting a report from
Colonel Wilfred Stirling, head of the commander’s Albanian mission in Istan-
bul, General Archibald Wavell, the commander in chief, strongly advised
against the project. The British minister in Cairo, John Lampson, concurred,
adding that he felt it most unwise to send Zog to Cairo, since he doubted
whether the Egyptian court or government would welcome his presence.
Lampson further added that because Cairo was ¤lled with so many doubtful
legations, Zog’s every move would be spied upon and reported to the enemy.75
SOE, with Foreign Of¤ce participation, continued to move ahead on the
Albania plan—now without Zog—in the form of a northern rising centering
around Gani Kryeziu. Kryeziu was slated to occupy Kukës and proclaim an
Albanian national government, headed by himself, which would release a
statement of hostility toward Italy and friendship toward Greece. The plan
was again put before the Greeks, who again rejected it out of hand, Metaxas
arguing in favor of coordinated activity of several small bands, something that
did not include unwanted political implications. Palairet seems to have ¤nally
lost his patience, cabling caustically to the Foreign Of¤ce, “I hope that the zeal
of the experts on Albania will not be allowed to outrun their discretion and
that we shall not thrust any such ambitious but ill-considered schemes on the
Greek government who are after all chie¶y responsible for the conduct of the
campaign in Albania.”76 Anthony Eden, who had replaced Lord Halifax as
foreign secretary, became involved at this stage, noting that “SO2 [which is
what SOE was referred to as in Foreign Of¤ce papers of the time] seems to
have rushed ahead without much thought.” And three weeks later, he stated,
“One thing must be clear. SO2 do not and must not conduct foreign policy.
They are our instrument and not we theirs.”77 Eden was perhaps being overly
harsh, since Foreign Of¤ce functionaires participated at every stage of the
planning. In any case, it is clear that Greek sensibilities were the principal
factor determining British policy toward Albania at this stage, which would
cause the British trouble in Albania later in the war.
110 Chapter 4

Both the plan, in its various forms, and Zog were dropped at the end of
December 1940. Zog was to be kept in what the Foreign Of¤ce referred to as
“warm-storage.”78 It is possible that an important opportunity was missed.
Although Zog’s ¶ight and the character of his family and regime made him
unpopular in many circles in Albania, and although Lawrence Grafftey-Smith,
the British consul general in Durrës, was correct in reporting that there was
no substantial pro-Zog party in Albania, Zog could certainly still command
considerable support. It is true that few in the Orthodox community in the
south and in the Catholic community in the north, and few of the Kosovars,
would have resisted the Italians for Zog. Still, to the Moslem majority—of
which Zog was a member—he remained the only ¤gure of national stature,
and indications were that an active resistance posture on Zog’s part would have
encouraged resistance in Albania. It would also have done much to undo the
damage to his own reputation that his ¶ight had caused.
As it was, all the British planning and negotiation to encourage Albanian
resistance at this early stage came down to one rather pathetic operation in
April 1941, after Hitler decided that Mussolini needed to be rescued from
the Greeks. Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia, in an effort to
create a diversion to support the Yugoslav armies, a British of¤cer led a small
band of Albanians, centered around the Kryeziu group, on an abortive inva-
sion of Albania. Lieutenant Colonel Dayrell Oakley-Hill, who knew some-
thing of Albania by virtue of his having participated in organizing Zog’s
gendarmerie, led a tiny force of some three hundred from Kosova into Alba-
nia, without radio communications, suf¤cient arms, air support, or even the
promise of support or supplies from anywhere. Campbell in Belgrade, pre-
sumably out of a feeling of pity, cabled London on 22 March 1941 that in
view of the planned operation it would be useful if the BBC mentioned
Albanian independence, or better yet, if the group were provided with some
weapons or something.79 His suggestion seems to have fallen of deaf ears.
Oakley-Hill and his group were on their own.
Once inside Albania the force was able to gather a few hundred support-
ers, but as soon as Yugoslavia collapsed, so did the lilliputian invasion. Enver
Hoxha celebrates the collapse of the mission, arguing that its real purpose was
to (1) create conditions in which Albania would enter the sphere of British
in¶uence in the future and (2) sti¶e the development of any other resistance
center outside of British control.80 As usual with Albanian socialist historians,
Hoxha gives the British far too much credit in terms of an organized political
policy. Hoxha’s attitude toward this mission is important, however, since ev-
eryone associated with it became suspect in his eyes.
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 111

Of the leadership, Oakley-Hill surrendered to the Germans, an act ridi-

culed by Hoxha. The Kryeziu brothers were captured by the Italians and sent
to a concentration camp in Italy. Mustafa Gjinishi managed to work his way
south to join some of his communist colleagues in the Korça area, and Abaz
Kupi made his way to his own area of Kruja and there built up one of the ¤rst
permanent organized resistance forces in Albania.81

The First Permanent Guerrilla Bands

By the end of 1941 several permanent organized guerrilla bands were reported
to be in operation. These ¤rst small groups centered around returned band
leaders, such as Abaz Kupi, who developed a nucleus of family members and
then slowly spread their in¶uence. This family-tribal feature distinguishes
them from the early resistance groups in the ruins of Yugoslavia and Greece,
which tended to be more ideological and less personal. The individuals ¤rst
mentioned in this more organized context included again Colonel Muharrem
Bajraktari, who, after plotting against Zog, left Albania for Yugoslavia and
then France in 1936. He returned to Albania after the Italian invasion and
immediately began organizing a small band in the Lumë district of northeast
Albania. Bajraktari was believed to cherish an ambition of becoming president
of an Albanian republic, and in his more expansive moments, the leader of
some form of Balkan federation. Apart from his rather vaulted image of his
potential, he was also said to have a persecution mania that sometimes verged
on insanity.82 Still, he was to develop a good reputation as a resistance ¤ghter.
Another ¤gure to gain early prominence as a band leader was Myslim Peza,
whom the Italians had already mentioned as a brigand. Like Bajraktari, Peza
was also an early opponent of Zog, having left Albania in 1925 after Zog’s
return to power. Peza was active in central Albania near Tirana, in areas adja-
cent to those where Abaz Kupi was operating. Peza is the only one of these
early resistance leaders who would develop a close relationship with the com-
munists. Socialist historians report that even before the organization of the
Albanian Communist Party, Enver Hoxha recognized the signi¤cance of Peza’s
movement and sent communists to organize his group for him, help that Peza
gladly accepted.83 Indications are, however, that this claim by historians is
merely an attempt to predate active communist participation in the resistance.
Also included in this early group of resistance leaders was the Moslem
Bektashi cleric Baba Mustafa Martaneshi, also known as Baba Faja, abbot of
Martanesh, who operated in the vicinity of Elbasan and was able to gain
112 Chapter 4

followers by emphasizing the anti-Islamic nature of fascist Italy and the dan-
gers that Italian imperialism posed for coreligionists in Turkey and Egypt. For
his antifascist pronouncements, his occasional military activity, and his coop-
eration with the budding communist movement, Baba Faja became one of the
most wanted men in Albania.84
What distinguished this new organized resistance from the earlier indi-
vidual or small group activity was objective and impact. The new organized
groups, rather than attacking individual soldiers often only for personal gain
and cutting an occasional wire, attacked targets of economic importance to the
Italians. In October, for example, the New York Times reported that the oil
pipeline to Vlora had been cut.85 In the following month it was reported,
although not con¤rmed, that the important iron and copper mines in the
Mirdita district of northern Albania were partly destroyed.
Although these acts posed no serious military threat to the Italians—at
least not until late 1942—the mere existence of the groups and their continued
growth were matters of concern. Some foreign observers were surprised at the
growth of both vocal and active organized resistance. The British consul com-
mented that “the apathy of Albanians towards the abuses of the Zog regime
was deplored in a succession of dispatches from this post as the most disqui-
eting feature of local political life.”86 To Grafftey-Smith, then, any vocalized
discontent was a surprise, let alone organized violent resistance.

The Italians Respond

The Italians initially, too, seemed genuinely surprised at the growing opposi-
tion, given the vast sums of money—which they could ill afford—being
thrown at the Albanians. Understandably, therefore, the Italians lacked a co-
hesive policy in response. What emerged was an uneven combination of in-
creasing repression and further concession. Soon after the invasion Ciano laid
down the broad outlines of Italian policy in Albania, suggesting that “there
must not be the least sign of weakness, justice and force must be the charac-
teristics of the new regime.”87 To be sure, the Albanians received as much
justice as did the Italians themselves. The new constitution extended to the
government extensive powers of detention and internment and severely re-
stricted the personal rights and liberties of Albanians, not to suggest that Zog
had been particularly conscious of these rights and liberties either.
Ciano was quick to use this power given to the authorities. Intent on
dealing harshly with what he called troublemakers, Ciano personally ordered
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 113

many deportations and internments. On 30 May 1939 former prime minister

Mehdi Frashëri, who had sent a nasty telegram to Mussolini on the occasion
of the Italian invasion, left his refuge in the Turkish Legation after receiving
assurances that he would not be molested. He was forced—along with his
family—to accept exile in Italy. Rrok Geraj, former minister of national econ-
omy, and Eqrem Bey Libohova, the former Italophile minister of foreign
affairs, were detained in Rome. Arrests and exiles continued throughout the
summer of 1939 and increased in number as the Italians began to realize how
unpopular they were. Italian authorities had explained the occasional resis-
tance and continuing violence of the ¤rst few months of their occupation by
suggesting that the root cause was prisoners who had been released an 7 April
by the Zog regime, running rampant and creating havoc. The Italians further
rationalized that part of the problem stemmed from an increase in blood feud
violence, which any change of regime in Albania engendered.88
By the summer of 1939 these arguments were no longer credible, and
repression increased. In June 1939 Fashizmi published a series of warnings—
one under the title “Draconian Punishment”—directed at those who failed to
accept the new status quo.89 The Italian secret police was given a freer hand
and determined to limit or entirely sever contact between Albanians and for-
eign legations. By the end of the summer, through constant surveillance and
intimidation, Italian military intelligence (Servìzio Informazioni Militare, or
SIM) agents effected a virtual total boycott of foreign legations in Tirana.
Everyone was watched. The German consul reported that the Italians had
hired an army of informants to discover who was critical of their policies. As
with many other Italian initiatives, however, the Albanians quickly turned this
program to their own use. Albanians denounced blood feud enemies and
simple rivals, involving the Italian authorities and their puppets in all manner
of private quarrels. The Italians eventually caught on and began taking these
denunciations somewhat less seriously.90
None of these Italian measures had any positive effect on the problems
they faced; indeed, the security situation continued to deteriorate. As it did,
Italian pressure increased. In June 1939 decrees were issued ordering the arrest
and deportation of persons deemed dangerous to the public law and order as
well as orders demanding the surrender of arms and ammunition. In January
1940 further decrees condemned crimes “against the personality of the state.”91
A set of particularly harsh decrees were reportedly issued on 11 April 1940—
which banned demonstrations, rallies, processions, and meetings—with severe
penalties, including death, for those who de¤ed the decrees.92
In 1942, following the beginning of organized resistance, a series of new
114 Chapter 4

draconian laws were enacted. In April the newspaper Tomori published a

lengthy set of new decrees, which included (1) fascist military patrols were
ordered to shoot any passers-by who did not stop when ordered to, (2) coffee-
houses and various other establishments were ordered closed from 7:30 p.m. to
7:30 a.m., (3) a general curfew was instituted from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m., (4) women
were forbidden to wear veils in the street, (5) those caught wearing unautho-
rized military uniforms were subject to the death penalty, (6) the riding of
bicycles and motorbikes was forbidden, (7) closed vehicles were prohibited, (8)
gatherings of more than ¤ve people were prohibited, and walking in groups
was prohibited, and (9) those who had not declared the possession of stencils
for printing signs were to be sentenced to ¤ve years in prison.93
In August Tomori reported further decrees, including “All prefects in Al-
bania are authorized to ¤x by order the delay during which all rebels in the
district of a certain prefecture must give themselves up under penalty of death
for infringers. The families of those who do not surrender will be interned in
concentration camps, their houses burned and their possessions con¤scated.
These measures will also be taken for military deserters and for recruits who
will not respond to the calling-up orders.”94 A number of Albanian collabora-
tors found these new restrictions too dif¤cult to accept and resigned from the
government.
And for those who were still not convinced to cease their opposition,
rumors began to spread of assassination squads made up of Albanians hired by
the Italians to silence Albanian patriots.95 Although the existence of these
squads is still in doubt, a number of prominent unsolved murders did take
place. As we have seen, the most celebrated may have been that of Nijaz Deda,
the chief abbot of the Moslem Bektashi sect on 28 November 1941, in a
cloister about one and a half miles from Tirana. The abbot was guarded by a
fascist military patrol, which apparently failed to intervene.96 This outrage may
have been meant as a warning, particularly in light of the fact that many
members of the Bektashis were active in the resistance.
But as the German consul noted, along with the new whip came new
helpings of sugar bread. Interspersed between increasing repression, the Ital-
ians made further concessions. The authorities had already demonstrated—
with the removal of Giro—their willingness to jettison unpopular of¤cials and
programs. One of the least popular innovations for which the Italians were
responsible was the creation of the Albanian Fascist Party, and this was one of
the ¤rst organizations that the Italians were ready to rearrange. As early as
January 1940, at the ¤rst of¤cial meeting of the party, Te¤k Mborja, the
Albanian secretary, spoke of mistakes, particularly in recruitment.97 In March
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 115

the Italians determined to start by reorganizing the party’s of¤cial newspaper,

Fashizmi, which had proven to be a complete failure. First they replaced the
Italian editor with an Albanian. Then they severed the paper’s connection with
the party and renamed it. As mentioned in chapter 2, a new name, Tomori (the
name of the highest mountain in Albania and an object of some patriotic
reverence) was chosen. None of these changes seem to have done much good,
however, since the few literate Albanians recognized from the start that the
paper was a creature of the Italians and would remain so.

The Kruja Government

Because the changes in the party seemed to have little effect on Albanian
dissatisfaction, the Italians turned to more signi¤cant administrative changes.
In November 1941, the Of¤ce of the Undersecretary of State for Albanian
Affairs was replaced by a mixed Italo-Albanian commission, which was in-
tended to give the Albanians at least the impression of participation in deci-
sion making. Perhaps more important, in December the entire Albanian pup-
pet government was replaced. Ciano noted in his diary that as early as June
1941 Jacomoni and Mussolini had agreed on some new directives for Albania
in order to try to do something about declining support. The basic idea was,
without eliminating the beys, to broaden the Albanian government by includ-
ing new elements closer to the intellectual classes and the people. This was to
be accompanied by more extensive autonomy for the government.98 By No-
vember Jacomoni’s plan was complete. He proposed replacing Vërlaci and
some of his reactionary landlords with Mustafa Kruja.
Kruja, a man of relatively humble origins—his father was a retainer of
Zog’s uncle, Esad Pasha—had been active in Albanian politics since 1912.99
An opponent of Zog and of the beys, Kruja rose to become prefect of Shkodra
under the short-lived government of Fan Noli. He was described in a 1924
dispatch as “a man of considerable intelligence but . . . he is also a truculent
ruf¤an who is notorious for having caused the assassination of a least two
persons of note whose existence was politically inconvenient to him.”100 With
the fall of Noli’s regime, Kruja ¶ed to Zara, where, while receiving a subsidy
from the Italian government, he became a strong irredentist and a person of
consequence among Albanian political refugees. He returned to Albania
shortly after the Italian invasion and was rewarded for his steadfast support
with the title of Italian senator.
But his appointment as Albanian prime minister caused a considerable
116 Chapter 4

stir; Ciano had reservations, and Vërlaci was livid. Ciano commented in his
diary that Kruja’s appointment “means a further concession to the extremists
of Albanian nationalism. Up to now the results of this policy have not been
good; things went better when Benini concentrated authority in Rome.”101
Vërlaci hurried to Rome and complained bitterly to Ciano and Mussolini.
Ciano noted, “I saw Vërlaci who spat venom when talking about Jacomoni and
this is natural because he was shown the door. . . . When he saw Mussolini
Vërlaci behaved badly. . . . He naturally detests Kruja, but he does not have
solid arguments against him. He con¤nes himself by saying that the country
cannot be governed by a man who is the son of a servant by whom Vërlaci
himself had been served a cup of coffee in the home of Esad Pasha.”102 The
budding resistance abruptly ceased its criticism of Vërlaci immediately after
his ouster because he apparently began to subsidize the resistance in order to
discredit Kruja with the Italians as a man who could not keep order.
Kruja’s cabinet certainly included more of a cross section of Albanian
society than had Vërlaci’s. Most were strong nationalists intent on preserving
Greater Albania. The cabinet included younger elements, such as Tahir
Shtylla, who counted as a recognized scholar, and members of the Albanian
intelligentsia. Kruja also included Hasan Dosti, who eventually became a lead-
ing member of the resistance, and Kostaq Kota, who had served as Zog’s last
prime minister. Kruja hoped that this cabinet, as well as achieving a promised
restoration of some freedoms, would win the adherence of a substantial num-
ber of Albanians from all levels of society.
The Italians seemed willing to take a chance on Kruja. Even Ciano was
won over, it seems, by Kruja, who convinced him that the situation was actu-
ally quite calm. Although this assessment agreed with that of Jacomoni, who
like most fascist of¤cials was hesitant to deliver bad news to Ciano or Musso-
lini, it was, of course, nonsense. Oddly enough, Vërlaci was the only one with
Albanian experience to lay out the problems that Italy faced, informing Ciano
that matters were troubled and the people dissatis¤ed, an honest approach that
certainly played a role in his own dismissal. But Kruja’s attitude did produce
some results.
In his ¤rst meeting with Mussolini, the Duce promised to grant the
Albanians a more liberal and autonomous local regime.103 And Kruja was able
to extract further concrete concessions. First Kruja was able to convince Mus-
solini to restore to Albania its old ¶ag. On 4 May, after informing Victor
Emmanuel, the crown of Savoy and the fasces that framed the Albanian eagle
were removed.104
Kruja was also able to effect the release of a large number of antifascists
Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance 117

interned in Italy, extract an offer of amnesty for the bands operating against
the Italians, and resurrect an independent Albanian gendarmerie, which had
been dissolved soon after the invasion as being too Zogist.105 The new militia
was to be composed of three thousand men, whose task it would be to relieve
the gendarmerie of their guard duties once a level of security was returned to
the countryside. The thousand Albanians who were employed as assistant
gendarmerie were to be integrated into the new unit. As a ¤rst step, Kruja
called for the creation of a three-hundred-man volunteer force to police the
area around Kruja, which happened to be the district in which Abaz Kupi was
active.106
Kruja’s policies achieved some initial success. German sources tell us he was
able to make contact with some of the band leaders, many of whom he had
personal relations with from their days of anti-Zog activity. Some were even
won over—at least temporarily—including Myslim Peza, who accepted full
amnesty and freedom of movement. Peza would not, however, come to Tirana
to collect a promised subsidy because he distrusted the Italian authorities.107
Kruja’s success, however, proved to be both super¤cial and temporary.
Many of his policies back¤red almost immediately. Many of the antifascists
whose release he secured immediately ¶ed into the hills to join the growing
resistance movement, as did many of the Albanian recruits, who disappeared
with their weapons.108 The security situation, far from improving, deteriorated
rapidly. Common crimes continued to increase, and ever larger sections of the
country fell to the band leaders. The relative stability of the early period of
Italian occupation was lost forever. Italian incompetence, the failure of the war
against Greece, the worsening economic conditions, and the growing resis-
tance movement insured that those early days would not return. Despite this
dismal picture, however, the Italians were still fortunate in at least one respect:
by the end of 1941 Albania had still not developed a truly national resistance
movement. The band leaders were primarily tribal chieftains who could not
and would not leave their areas for extended periods. In most cases they also
defended their areas as jealously against one another as they did against the
Italians and their Albanian puppets. But this bene¤t, enjoyed by the Italians,
also proved temporary. With the maturing of the communist movement,
something close to a national resistance movement was ¤nally developed.
Italian reconstruction at the port of Durrës during the Italian occupation. (Luckwald)

Italian construction of the new Dopolavoro building in Tirana during the Italian oc-
cupation. (Luckwald)
Zog’s palace, built by the Italians and then after the invasion turned into a military
hospital on the orders of Victor Emmanuel III during the Italian occupation. (Luckwald)

Albanian youth march to school in new fascist uniforms during the Italian occupation.
(Luckwald)
Mussolini meets with his commanders in Albania during the Italo-Greek war,
March 1941.

Albanian prime minister Vërlaci and Victor Emmanuel III at the airport in Tirana,
May 1941. ( Jacomoni)
C H A P T E R 5

THE GROWTH OF RESISTANCE AND

THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY

By the end of 1941, German diplomats reported that the security situation
in Albania was becoming dif¤cult. By the early summer of 1942, they reported
anarchy in the open land, with Italian control restricted to the major towns,
the major roads, and military installations.1 One year later the occupation
system was in tatters, and by August 1943 it had collapsed entirely. A series of
events explains these developments, with the most important occurring out-
side of Albania, involving the general course of World War II. But events
inside of Albania did much to contribute to the Italian collapse. And the most
signi¤cant was the rise of something close to a national resistance movement
dominated by Albanian communists and aided by the British.

The Creation of the Albanian Communist Party

The story of the rise of the communist movement in Albania is as byzantine

as it is remarkable. Beginning with no more that a few dozen ¤ercely indepen-
dent adherents, the movement, in a matter of decades, gained power in a state
where communism was little known and was juxtaposed or at least alien to
many indigenous traditions. The communism that developed under these cir-
cumstances was naturally unique and often seemed indistinguishable from
extreme nationalism. Tracing this story is often fraught with danger. Because
Albanian socialist historians tended to be very selective in the materials they
used, there are several versions of these events. Indeed, the formation and rise
of the Albanian Communist Party and its relationship with the Yugoslav
Communist Party have engendered more historical dispute that perhaps any
other issue in modern Albanian history.
Communist activity in Albania dates from the early 1920s, when a group
of Albanian nationalists were encouraged and then ¤nanced by the Comintern
through its Balkan Communist Federation. Bajram Curri and his colleagues
121
122 Chapter 5

in the Kosova Committee, a group of northerners who sought the union of

Albania and Kosova, were attracted by the federation’s call for the readjust-
ment of Balkan frontiers based upon the principle of national self-determina-
tion. The Comintern tried concurrently to establish a communist party in
Albania, the only Balkan state that did not have one at that time. Although
these efforts failed, interest in communism increased among some Albanians
following the overthrow of the Fan Noli government in 1924. Noli and many
of his followers ¶ed, and some organized the Committee of National Libera-
tion (KONARE), which by 1928 was essentially controlled by the Comintern.
KONARE was instrumental in sending about twenty-four Albanians to Mos-
cow for training.2 These two dozen organized a diminutive Albanian commu-
nist party in exile and were directed to return to Albania to found an indige-
nous party.
The most active of these early Albanian communists was Ali Klemendi,
who returned to Albania in 1930 and succeeded in constructing a few com-
munist cells. Klemendi’s in¶uence was sporadic and limited, however, as was
his presence. In prison from 1932 to 1935 and deported in 1936, he ¤nally
died in 1939 of tuberculosis in Paris, which had become a center for Albanian
communists. In the meantime the Comintern sent Koço Tashko, who arrived
in Albania in 1937 and discovered four squabbling groups with a combined
membership of less than two hundred, who posed little or no threat to the Zog
regime.3 The groups included Zjarri (Fire), which was not orthodox; a group
in Tirana; one in Shkodra; and one in Korça. Of the four, the Korça group
generally supported the Comintern line, and it is here, therefore, that Tashko
concentrated his energies. But the internal disputes went from bad to worse.
In February 1939 most of the Shkodra group was arrested by agents of Zog—
foul play on the part of the other groups has been suggested.
When the Italians invaded in 1939, the communists were too weak and
divided to take any action, although Albanian socialist historiography reports
that they all resisted with determination.4 While some individual communists
are said to have joined some of the small but growing resistance bands, there
seems to be little evidence to suggest that the communists groups did anything
more than organize a few demonstrations. In keeping with their inability to
agree or compromise, the four groups developed different bases of support and
different strategies for dealing with the occupation. The Korça group, which
remained orthodox, had a better mix of intellectuals and workers than did the
other groups. It had been active in the small but growing trade union move-
ment and therefore had some contact with the masses. It called for general
resistance against the invader. The remnants of the Shkodra group, which had
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 123

greater contact with youth and the schools, endorsed a traditional working-
class socialist revolution.5 The Zjarri group, which was labeled Trotskyite and
anarchist, argued that the fascist stronghold should be taken from within; in
other words, some degree of cooperation with the Italians was required.6
Instead of facilitating the unity of the various groups, the invasion seems
only to have caused further splits. A “Youth” group split off from the Korça
group and took the position that because Albanian peasants were so conser-
vative, no real basis for a party existed. The Yugoslav communists later con-
demned this group as a little more than a gang of thieves. The situation was
further complicated when the Germans took France in 1940 and sent many
Albanian communists back to Albania. The Italians allowed them to move
around freely because many of them followed the prevailing Comintern line
and denounced the war as imperialistic.7 By early 1941, apart from some
independent communists who had been returned from Paris, there were eight
separate groups, two of them considered Trotskyite.
At this point, the Yugoslavs seem to have stepped in. The Communist
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was probably motivated at least in part by the
trouble it was having setting up cells in Kosova. In order to attract the Al-
banians there, the CPY, at its Fifth Congress in the summer of 1940, had
reaf¤rmed its 1929 decision to support the principle of national self-determi-
nation in regard to Kosova. The party was a long way from power and had
little to lose. But this move did not have the desired effect of gaining recruits
among the Albanians of Kosova. It is likely that the CPY thought the con-
struction of an Albanian party would be of help in this regard.8 In any case,
the Shkodra group appealed to the Yugoslavs for help in constructing a party.
The German attack on the Soviet Union provided a new sense of urgency for
Albanian communists. As Enver Hoxha was later to write, “the struggle didn’t
begin with the entry of the Soviet Union but at that point it became clear that
the struggle would not be in vain.”9
Following an initial failure, two Yugoslav emissaries, Miladin Popovic and
Dusan Mugosa, convinced representatives of three of Albania’s communist
groups to meet with them in Tirana at the beginning of November 1941. After
six days—and twenty years of struggle—the ¤fteen communists present at this
meeting elected a provisional central committee of seven and in so doing
founded the Albanian Communist Party (ACP). The most controversial ques-
tion regarding the founding of the ACP involves the level of Yugoslav partici-
pation. Of¤cial Albanian socialist historiography fails to mention the Yugoslavs
at all, giving credit to the Albanian leadership, which was spurred into action
by the need to resist the Italians and by the German invasion of the Soviet
124 Chapter 5

Union. At the other extreme some Yugoslav historians and émigré Albanians
argue that the Yugoslavs were principally responsible for the creation of the
Albanian Communist Party. Stavro Skendi, for example, argues that Popovic
and Mugosa were sent to organize the party, choose the members of the central
committee, and became the real leaders of the Albanian party. Stavro Skendi
suggests that the ACP was little more than a branch of the CPY.10
But this conclusion may be an overstatement. Mugosa himself has writ-
ten, “True, the movement was fragmented and lacked coordination. True we
assisted in establishing proper discipline and cooperation among the various
groups. Yet this should not be interpreted to mean that the Albanians could
not accomplish this task themselves. They possessed capable leaders who
would have, in time solved their administrative problems. We were invited to
assist and did so.”11 The historian Nicholas Pano’s assessment is the most
reasonable. Pano argues that “while it is true that it required a world war,
foreign occupation and Yugoslav assistance to achieve this goal, it should also
be noted that the objective could not have been realized without the existence
of a small, hardcore, native communist movement.”12
The central committee of the new party chose Enver Hoxha as secretary.
The choice was not an obvious one, but Hoxha had a series of natural advan-
tages. First, although he was an active member of the Korça group, he re-
mained outside of the top leadership. He was probably a compromise candi-
date. While he had not distinguished himself as a leader, he was respected, well
educated, well spoken, and dedicated—a pleasant, good-looking young man of
thirty-three.
Hoxha, who would dominate the party and Albania for the next four
decades, was a Moslem Tosk from Gjirokastra in the south. He is perhaps best
described as an nationalist ¤rst, then as a Stalinist communist, and ¤nally as an
intellectual.13 Since his family was reasonably well off, Hoxha received as good
an education as Albania had to offer, including one of Zog’s scholarships to
study abroad. Hoxha attended the University of Montpellier, where he studied
natural sciences, although his real interests included history and political sci-
ence. Here he further developed his leftism and patriotism, which had already
become apparent in his lycée years in Albania. In 1934 he lost his scholarship
and moved to Paris, where a large Albanian émigré community could be found.
He apparently preferred the company of non-Albanian leftists, ignoring such
organizations as KONARE. He later expressed considerable contempt for
KONARE, writing “illegal work under Zog’s repressive regime demanded great
sacri¤ce which the leaders of the organization were not ready to make.”14
While his contact with Albanian radicals in exile seemed limited, he did
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 125

join the French Communist Party and established some connection with the
party newspaper, L’Humanité—although what kind of connection remains un-
clear. The of¤cial histories use rather imprecise language in describing his
relationship with the paper, including “he established connections with the
editorial board of L’Humanité, . . . to which he contributed materials denounc-
ing Zog’s regime,”15 and “in Paris he became involved in editing L’Humanité.“16
In any case, when he returned to Albania in 1936, without a degree, he was a
con¤rmed Marxist, well versed in ideology and quite enthusiastic. Hoxha was
hired to teach French at the lycée in Korça, where he joined the Korça group
and became one of its active members but was not, apparently, within the
leadership circle. In December 1939 he was ¤red by the new Italian adminis-
tration for his radical views and was sent to Tirana by the Korça group to
spread its in¶uence. The tobacco shop that Hoxha ran soon became a meeting
place for leftists, and Hoxha was ultimately forced to go underground to avoid
arrest, at which point, he tells us, he became one of the principal forces behind
the movement for unity.
With a secretary, a provisional central committee, and its Yugoslav advisers,
the party was ready to meet its ¤rst challenges. Its problems were many. First it
was virtually unknown, with an initial membership of 130, most of whom were
young intellectuals and middle-class students—although there were some la-
borers and artisans in the movement as well. Many of these people, including
Hoxha himself, were in¶uenced primarily by Western intellectual traditions,
alien to the majority of Albanians who were conservative, xenophobic peasants.
The ¤rst goal, then, was to boost membership by direct recruitment and by the
establishment of a program that might attract the average Albanian. Mugosa
directed recruitment, while Popovic stayed with Hoxha to help organize the
party and its basic program. That the Yugoslavs provided the pattern to follow
for the Albanians is clear, including the adoption of the Yugoslav slogan “death
to fascism, liberty to the people,” as well as the red star on the cap.17
Hoxha moved quickly on both fronts. He based the party on traditional
Marxist-Leninism and democratic centralism, denouncing both social democ-
racy and Trotskyism. The communist groups were of¤cially dissolved and were
replaced by local cells and regional party committees run by a network of local
party of¤cials. Membership was open to all who expressed themselves ready to
accept the discipline of the party, with early recruitment targeting young in-
tellectuals and youth, chie¶y high school students, artisans, small shopkeepers,
and a few labor leaders, as well as a few petty thieves.18 By January 1942,
however, the party had grown to only some two hundred members, approxi-
mately the same number as claimed to be communists in 1937.
126 Chapter 5

The initial growth of the party was modest for a number of reasons. First,
Hoxha, despite dissolving the communist groups and warning of “groupism,”
was faced with ideological struggles both within and outside of the party. The
Zjarri group, which had not participated in forming the party, continued
struggling for its own unorthodox position. The of¤cial history of the party
complains that party work was undermined by a “5th column of Zjarri
chiefs.”19 Perhaps more troubling, however, were the remnants of the “Youth
Group,” which objected to expanding the party by taking in illiterate peasants.
The dispute was serious enough to jeopardize the existence of the party. But
by the summer of 1942, Hoxha, who had by this time begun to exhibit that
relentless drive that would serve him so well, managed to purge these divisive
and disobedient elements from the party. But their in¶uence had spread, and
it became necessary to dissolve the Gjirokastra district committee to destroy
the “liquidatory” elements who controlled it.20
At the same time Enver Hoxha was able to censure both Koço Tashko
and Mustafa Gjinishi for criticizing party direction. Hoxha tells us that these
two were being uncooperative because of their lack of advancement within the
party. But Hoxha was more likely motivated by the fact that both had more
experience than he and could at some point threaten his position. Here he was
taking a lesson from the rise of Stalin.
Although these purges by no means ended internal party strife, they did
allow Hoxha to turn his attention to other signi¤cant priorities, including
expanding popular acceptance of the party and its goals. These goals were set
down in a twenty-eight-point program that included the slogan “to ¤ght for
national independence and a people’s democratic government.” The political
line and communist propaganda envisioned workers and peasants being
formed into military units that were to include all nationalists who truly
wanted to ¤ght, to prepare people for an armed uprising but not to neglect
other forms of struggle until the uprising was practical, and to eventually create
a people’s army but until that was practical to rely upon band and partisan
warfare. This struggle was to be linked to that of the Allies ¤ghting the Axis,
but the struggle of the Soviet Union was to be emphasized and the party was
instructed in “developing love for the Soviet Union.”21
While the communists were fairly successful in increasing growing oppo-
sition to the Italians and their Albanian puppets, they were much less success-
ful in attracting wide-scale support for their movement. This is perhaps not
surprising, since the party was dominated by intellectuals and middle-class
students. Their natural constituency was rather small. In 1939 there were
probably no more than two thousand to three thousand people who might be
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 127

considered intellectuals in the country, and Albania certainly had the smallest
middle class in Europe, when considered as a percentage of its population.22
As for the communists’ traditional ideological partner, the working class, one
need only remember that in 1939 only 4 percent of the national economy
could be considered industrial.
And the communists made an already dif¤cult situation even more chal-
lenging. They handicapped themselves in that many of their more visible
advisers were Slavs, who had always aroused suspicion and fear among Al-
banians. We are just now learning from the recently opened party archives how
completely dependent Hoxha was on those advisers. In an internal discussion
in 1944, Hoxha confessed that “when the Party was formed, our reliance on
those two comrades, Miladin and Dusan, was great, because I was without
experience and without clear views on organization and policy.”23
To make matters worse, the communist approach to social issues left the
impression that Albania would become part of some nebulous Slav-dominated
Balkan federation. In an attempt to dispel some of these unfortunate impressions,
the provisional central committee ordered that communist propaganda be
deemphasized in favor of the struggle against fascism and the Italian invader.
Hoxha determined that the party would stimulate and then lead the re-
sistance by example. As we have seen, resistance, even organized resistance,
had already begun. In order to catch up with events, the party quickly began
to organize its own resistance groups, which were expanded into active bands
by December 1941 and early 1942. The informal resistance groups consisted
of perhaps ¤ve to ten people who operated from their homes. They were
responsible for various acts of sabotage and the spreading of propaganda in
order to do damage to the enemy and to attract the attention of the masses.
As early as the fall of 1941, communist propaganda, whether it originated
with the Albanians or not, was commanding the attention of many in Albania.
The German consul reported that soon after the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, communist propaganda handouts appeared in Tirana and sev-
eral other Albanian towns. At the same time, the hammer and sickle appeared
on the walls of various public buildings. Although the handouts included the
letters PKSh, for Albanian Communist Party (which of course did not yet
exist, although the consul was unaware of this fact), the German consul be-
lieved that the handouts were not of Albanian origin. He came to this conclu-
sion based upon the language used, which he argued was alien to Albanian
circumstances, and because of how the lea¶ets were randomly distributed. The
consul entertained the possibility that the Italians themselves were responsible
for the communist propaganda in order to use the occasion to arrest uncoop-
128 Chapter 5

erative Albanians. He reported that many Albanians seemed to think along

the same lines. As another explanation, he argued that there were many com-
munists among the Italian soldiers stationed in Albania.24
To lend credence to these assertions, the consul listed a series of incidents
in which Italians were observed distributing communist propaganda. In
Elbasan and in Korça, Albanian night security personal observed uniformed
Italians on bicycles disseminating communist literature. In a small town near
Durrës, Albanian police arrested a number of Italian carabinieri painting com-
munist emblems on village walls. An Italian major was arrested attempting to
smuggle communist material into Durrës, and two other Italian of¤cers were
caught and charged with the same crime in Tepelena.25
While these incidents are dif¤cult to verify, it is clear that both the Italians
and Kruja were quick to blame communists for their various troubles. As an
example, in March 1942 in Korça, Skënder Çami, an Albanian major of gen-
darmerie, was assassinated. The German consul reported that, as usual, the
perpetrators were unknown. Tomori, the government newspaper, however, im-
mediately declared that the assassins were paid agents from Moscow. To sup-
port this claim, the paper frequently referred back to the communist propa-
ganda handbill campaign that had occurred following the German invasion of
the Soviet Union.26 Kruja, too, from the beginning of his regime began label-
ing all in opposition to his government as communists who were being sup-
ported with foreign gold from Montenegro and Serbia.27 This was a rather
transparent attempt to convince all those Albanians not yet involved with the
resistance that only foreign radicals or foreign paid radicals were in opposition
to his government.
Regardless of how much of this early communist propaganda actually
originated with the ACP, by the summer of 1942, the party was growing
rapidly. Hoxha’s attempt to deemphasize the social revolution was beginning
to pay off. Many of the landless peasants in the south, who were Orthodox
and labored on the estates of Moslem landowners, responded to the basic
slogans of resistance to the foreigners and traitors and of land to those who till
it. These simple slogans addressed the crucial issues in Albania: the national
problem and the land problem. As the party grew, its bands grew and resis-
tance grew. Other than the various demonstrations for which the communists
were responsible, these ¤rst acts seemed to have been assassinations of collab-
orators and Italian of¤cials. Young patriots, often armed with their own pistols,
carried out these early attacks without giving up their jobs or their homes.28
As 1942, the fourth year of the occupation, wore on, the local press and
foreign consulates began to report an increasing number of attacks. In May the
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 129

chief of police of Tirana was gunned down. There were a number of attacks
on Prime Minister Kruja, none of which were successful, although members
of his family, including his son, were killed. During the summer an arms repair
factory was attacked. Perhaps the most spectacular act of sabotage organized
by the new communist bands was the interruption of all telephone and tele-
graph communications in June and July of 1942.29 In August the party pub-
lished the ¤rst issue of its paper Zëri i Popullit, which allowed the communists
to widely disseminate—and often exaggerate—their achievements.
But while these communist activities were becoming increasingly annoy-
ing, the biggest problem facing the Italians remained the northern bands. By
the summer of 1942, the Italians had virtually given up the north. The gen-
darmerie posts that still remained in place were concerned primarily with their
own security and the gendarmes rarely ventured out. Even some of the main
roads could only be used by well-protected convoys. Although many of the
northern leaders, including Peza and Kupi, occasionally negotiated cease-¤res
with the Italians, Kruja’s attempt to coopt them ultimately proved unsuccess-
ful. While the in¶uence of the chiefs remained regional, it was they who were
considered Albania’s resistance leaders both at home and abroad.
The communists were determined to change this impression and seize the
initiative with a bold stroke. They hoped to create a popular front national
resistance movement dominated by their own party. Still, there were divisions
in the party on this approach. Popovic actually opposed the idea, suggesting
that there was a genuine possibility that such a movement would merely result
in the loss of time and in supplying scarce resources to criminals who would
soon become traitors, such as the Yugoslav nationalist leader Draza
Mihailovic. Popovic’s position was initially supported by Hoxha, who feared
that the leading role of the party would be threatened. But the veteran com-
munists—including Mustafa Gjinishi, Ymer Dishnica, and Koço Tashko—
called for a united front to include all who were willing to ¤ght the Italians,
and they prevailed.30 Hoxha came around and eventually decided that this plan
had the potential of thrusting him into the limelight, thereby helping him with
his goal of a socialist Albanian under his leadership.

Formation of the National Liberation Movement

Accordingly, in September 1942 Hoxha invited the northern chiefs, the land-
owning beys of the south, and the old liberals and republicans who had op-
posed Zog to a conference at Peza. The spot was chosen carefully in an
130 Chapter 5

attempt to associate the party with Myslim Peza, who by now, like Kupi, had
become something of a legend in Albania. About twenty people attended,
including some band leaders, a few people identi¤ed as private patriots, and of
course representatives of the Communist Party. Hoxha was undoubtedly re-
lieved that the beys, liberals, and republicans declined to attend, leaving the
communists as the only organized political party at the meeting. Although the
of¤cial party history tells us that the delegates agreed to set aside political
differences, it is clear that hard bargaining took place. Kupi was unhappy with
the term partisan, the use of the red star, and some of the political decisions.
Kupi ultimately gave in on these points and even agreed to make Zog’s return
dependent on the popular will. In exchange Hoxha mitigated some of the
strident language associated with social reform.
Elements within the party later accused Hoxha of “sectarianism” for being
unwilling to compromise further. Indeed, he was rather reluctant to cast his
net too broadly and never included the diverse liberal elements that Tito
accepted into his organization. Hoxha was clearly focusing on the postwar
political structure, not wanting to burden himself with excess political bag-
gage. Hoxha was a gambler, and he was clearly taking a big risk that other
strong resistance organizations would not form outside of his control. He was
taking a page from Lenin. But he did manage to attract Kupi, Peza, and Baba
Faja, three of the principal resistance leaders in Albania.
From these various compromises, the Peza conference laid the basis for
the Lëvizje Nacionalçlirimtare (National Liberation Movement, or NLM).
Although socialist Albanian historiography makes no mention of it, British
sources maintain that the old liberal Mehdi Frashëri, a former prime minister
and one of the most distinguished Albanians, then interned in Italy, was
chosen as honorary president.31 His later collaboration with the Germans is
likely at the root of the hesitation on the part of socialist historians to mention
him in this light. A general council was established made up of seven commu-
nists, including Mustafa Gjinishi and Enver Hoxha, and three noncommu-
nists: Abaz Kupi—who was persuaded to participate by Mustafa Gjinishi—
Myslim Peza, and Baba Faja. But a British of¤cer who later observed the
working of this group reported that Baba Faja and Myslim Peza were middle-
aged, rather old-fashioned, good livers, very heavy drinkers, and possessed of
considerable personal charm and courage. They were, apparently, at the same
time comparatively uneducated, lethargic, and somewhat incompetent. Be-
cause Kupi basically kept to his own area, the general council was not only
dominated but controlled by communists.32
It should not be surprising, due to the council’s composition, that the
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 131

General Council of the NLM adopted proposals set down by the ACP with
regard to the conduct of the war and the rudiments of an administrative struc-
ture. The main points were incorporated into a basic platform that included the
following points: (1) to wage uncompromising war against the fascist invaders
and the traitors, for a free, independent, and democratic Albania, (2) to organize
all true Albanians into a united national liberation front without discrimination
as to class, political conviction, religion, or region of origin, (3) to set up na-
tional liberation councils everywhere as organs uniting and mobilizing the peo-
ple in war and as organs of the people’s power, and (4) to popularize and prepare
for the people’s armed uprising as the ultimate stage, the logical consequence of
the partisan war.33 The failure to mention radical social reform in the platform
was intended to draw the support of noncommunists.
The general council supervised the national liberation councils and the
partisan units. The councils—suggested by Enver Hoxha—in those areas yet
to be liberated functioned as propaganda agencies, collected materials neces-
sary for the war, conducted espionage, organized the economic struggle against
the Italian capitalist companies, and sabotaged the accumulation of agricul-
tural products by the fascists. In those areas already liberated by the parti-
sans—once this became a reality—the councils were to function as the new
state, or in Albanian socialist terminology, as “organs of the people’s power.”
They were responsible for maintaining law and order; developing the local
economy; overseeing the food supply and the sowing and harvesting of grain;
managing trade; organizing education, culture, and the press; settling blood
feuds; and maintaining readiness for war.34
The immediate concern, however, was to expand the small communist
bands into larger and more numerous NLM bands, insuring that the party
could maintain political and military control. And the organizational structure
of the new bands did much to insure that this would be the case. The bands
were constructed on the Yugoslav model and consisted of a nucleus of party
members who had been forced to leave the towns. The bands were based in
the countryside and survived with help from the peasants. The peasants, as the
of¤cial history admits, were initially suspicious and even subjected these party
members to mockery.35 But slogans—like “land for those who till it“—and
pressure brought many around, particularly as more students, artisans, employ-
ees, and workers joined the movement. The plan, as drawn up by the General
Council of the NLM, envisaged bands of ¤fty to sixty, commanded usually by
a nonparty member but advised by a political commissar. The commissar left
military jurisdiction in the hands of the commander, except (1) when orders
were at variance with the political line of the party, (2) when orders were at
132 Chapter 5

variance with the interests of the war of national liberation, or (3) when
treason on the part of the commander was involved.36 In other words, non-
communist commanders had the freedom to do exactly what they were told.
The party, whenever possible, directed both politically and militarily. To
strengthen control, each band had a party cell at its core, which usually held
weekly meetings to deal with organization and theory issues. Both the cells
and the political commissars were responsible to the regional committees of
the party. Popovic, who attended the conference as an adviser, hoped to further
strengthen party control by creating a general staff that would tie the various
units together, but his suggestion was not adopted.37
These partisan units were supplemented by territorial units—irregular
self-defense detachments made up of volunteers. These were planned for every
larger village or one for two or three villages together. Their function was to
protect the liberated zones and to serve as a source of replenishment for the
regular partisan units. The recruitment program proved to be quite successful;
the party history relates that by the end of 1942, there were some two thou-
sand partisan ¤ghters plus a larger number of territorial units and reservists.38
These groups also had become active enough that the Italians mounted several
drives against partisan forces and centers, beginning a cycle that was at least
partially responsible for the partisan success. The partisans would launch an
attack, and the Italians would respond. Because the Italians generally feared
the Albanians, they usually responded only with large units, which rarely
found partisan forces and therefore were restricted to conducting punitive
reprisals, including the shooting of hostages, but principally the burning of
villages. This naturally resulted in an increase in the number of homeless
peasants who swelled the ranks of the partisan forces.39

Formation of the “Balli Kombëtar“

The liberals, republicans, and beys who had declined Hoxha’s invitation to
participate in the Peza conference, viewed these various developments with
considerable concern. Many quickly concluded that in order not to be entirely
shut out of power at the end of the war, they would have to demonstrate
something more than mild dislike and noncooperation with the Italians. To
facilitate a more active role, the liberal nationalists, some of whom nevertheless
also established loose links with the NLM, in November 1942 formed a group
called the Balli Kombëtar (National Front), or BK. This group hoped to
provide a political and military organization for the moderates who distrusted
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 133

the communists. The leaders of the BK claimed that the group was founded
on the ¤rst day of the Italian invasion, and indeed, there probably was some
informal organization among a few former politicians,40 but the organization
and its platform were clearly a direct reaction to the founding of the NLM.
Albanian socialist historiography argues that it was put together by the reac-
tionary middle class, big landowners, big merchants, reactionary clergy, rich
peasants, and the Trotskyite Zjarri group, with the support of the fascist in-
vaders.41 While much of this is overstated, it does not go as far as Milovan
Djilas, the Yugoslav politician and writer, who has described the BK as “Al-
banian minority fascists.”42 But when Hoxha suggested that the BK was
formed not to ¤ght the invader but rather to disrupt the political work of the
Communist Party, he is not far from the truth.
As its leader, the BK chose the elderly and largely ineffectual Mithat
Frashëri, a former diplomat and a cousin of Mehdi Frashëri. Mithat Frashëri
enjoyed little of the respect that his cousin commanded, and he was described
as an obstinate and romantic Tory who surrounded himself with people of
questionable integrity. The central committee formed to conduct policy appar-
ently had originally included some moderate and younger members, but be-
cause these elements were soon arrested by the Italians, the older, more con-
servative members—those prone to collaboration—were left in charge. This
included a number of individuals from the so-called Paris group, anti-Zogists
who had spent most of the interwar years in exile in France and had only
returned after the Italian invasion. The most prominent among this group
included Ali Këlcyra, who had an appearance and eloquence in the tradition
of the old French Radical Party, but was a politician of the Zog school, and
Rexhep Mitrovica, who would later head a collaborationist government under
the Germans.
The programs that the BK leaders developed were not only in direct
reaction to the NLM’s program, but also had the disadvantage of being rather
vague. The BK actually developed two programs, the “Eight Points” and the
“Decalogue,” which both sounded, at least super¤cially, like the NLM pro-
gram. For example, both the BK and the NLM declared themselves to be
above politics and open to all Albanians. But there were a number of import-
ant differences. The BK program sought to reestablish a “free, ethnic and
democratic Albania,” a clear reference to the desire to retain Kosova.43 While
this point attracted the support of many Albanians, the fact that the BK
programs did not suggest ¤ghting as a means to achieve an ethnic Albania, did
not mention who had power, and did not even mention whom the BK was
struggling against, was certainly a disadvantage. In essence, the BK program
134 Chapter 5

was passive. The leadership hoped to avoid useless destruction, wait for the
defeat of the Axis before encouraging a national uprising, preserve Albania for
the Albanians, and preserve the military strength of the BK for the inevitable
confrontation with the communists.44 But this is not to suggest that there was
not actual resistance. Many of those who eventually associated themselves with
the BK had resisted before joining and some continued to resist. In general,
the BK was a much looser organization, which allowed the individual com-
manders of the çetas, the small resistance groups, to act independently. Many
used this freedom to resist the invader.
The BK was able to construct what in many ways became a parallel
organization to the NLM. Aside from the central committee, regional com-
mittees were constructed in many districts, and at least two publications ap-
peared periodically. The BK put together its own youth organization called the
Rinia Balliste. The BK attracted the support of numerous members of the
Kruja government, including Fuat Bey Dibra, the minister of national econ-
omy, and Hasan Dosti, the minister of justice, as well as a number of import-
ant of¤cials in the Gjirokastra area, including the prefect Faik Qyku. Much of
this was very disturbing to the NLM, particularly as BK in¶uence grew in the
villages of southern Albania, where the BK agitated against the NLM and
constructed BK organizations.45 The BK was initially less successful in ex-
panding its in¶uence among the chiefs of the north. Although the chiefs
certainly were more sympathetic to the program of the BK, their distrust of all
central authority—and the fact that the Italian occupation had affected the
mountainous north politically and economically to a lesser extent than the rest
of the country—convinced the chiefs to remain aloof from both the BK and
the NLM, as well as from each other.
And like the communist-dominated NLM, the BK established contact
with similar organizations in Yugoslavia and Greece, or at least made an effort
to do so. Some tenuous links were established with Mihailovic, but this con-
tact proved to be of little value to either organization. Attempts to contact the
Greek nationalist leader Napoleon Zervas were not made until May 1944,
when Dhimitër Falo was sent to negotiate a general agreement. Included in
the proposed agreement were provisions recognizing the territorial integrity,
independence, and sovereignty of both states, provisions calling for military
and economic cooperation, and Greece was to support Albanian demands to
retain Kosova and Dibra. But this scheme came to nothing when Falo was
caught, with his documents, by Albanian partisans and shot.46
There are some isolated reports from early 1943 of cooperation between
BK and NLM units. This can perhaps best be explained by the loose BK
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 135

structure and by the fact that months often went by without contact with the
leadership. This is similar to the development of resistance in Yugoslavia, where,
until the end of 1942, Tito and Mihailovic coordinated some of their actions
and shared some supplies.47 In general, however, relations between the BK and
the NLM before the Italian collapse in the summer of 1943 were hostile but
con¤ned to a ¤erce propaganda war, indicating the concern both had about the
mere existence of the other. Both had weaknesses readily exploited by the other.
The BK naturally emphasized the communist core of the NLM, the prolifera-
tion of foreigners in its leadership, and the possibility of Albania’s losing its
independence to a Slav-dominated Balkans, or at the very least, the loss of
Kosova. The NLM countered with charges that the BK leadership was little
more than the old traditional ruling elite trying to maintain Albania as it was
under Zog, only without Zog. Hoxha argued persuasively that the BK’s oppor-
tunistic program allowed one to question its patriotism.
Hoxha wrote that “some are partisans of intrigue . . . some are partisans
of alarmism, the third group are partisans of big words, but none are partisans
of deed.”48 The NLM pointed out, correctly, that the preponderance of large
landowners among the leadership led one to question the seriousness of its
land reform proposals. But Hoxha was more than a little worried about the
BK in January 1943; after all, its forces were more numerous than his own,
having been more successful with peasant recruitment. But the partisans were
better propagandists, so their actions were widely known, and as the Italians
weakened and withdrew to the cities, the partisans gained access to more and
more villages and were able to steadily increase their own peasant recruit-
ment.49 Still, socialist historians admit that the emergence of the BK in the
political arena created signi¤cant problems for the NLM. The BK’s ties to
the “rural gentry,” especially in southern Albania, caused many members of the
NLM to “waver and hesitate,” necessitating, once again, the dissolution of
some NLM councils in the south.50
Hoxha wrote of the BK in 1943, “It is a great obstacle indeed, because we
should not underestimate the individual in¶uence of its adherents in Albania,
always bearing in mind that they have succeeded in creating among the people
the opinion that there exists a nationalist organization with which the com-
munists should come to an understanding and agreement.”51 This popular
pressure was augmented for Hoxha by directives from the outside. In Decem-
ber 1942 Mugosa ¤nally returned to Albania with recognition for the party
from the Comintern and orders that worried Hoxha. Hoxha was directed,
most likely by Tito, to redouble his efforts in pursuit of popular front policies.
As many upright patriots as possible were to be recruited both as ¤ghters and
136 Chapter 5

as leaders. In the meantime, party propaganda was not to go beyond the

bounds of the national liberation war. Hoxha had been ordered, in no uncer-
tain terms, to come to some accommodation with the BK. As we will see,
attempts at an agreement between the BK and the NLM were made.

The Continued Growth of Resistance

As both organizations grew, so did resistance—particularly that carried out by

the NLM. Resistance had been stimulated by a number of factors. It was clear
to many Albanians—through BBC and other sources—that the Axis, partic-
ularly after the battle of Stalingrad, was on the defensive. Albanians were
further encouraged by the December 1942 declarations made by the principal
Allied states (which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter)
calling for the reestablishment of Albanian independence after the war. The
declarations had a particularly good effect on the resistance and they fright-
ened Kruja, who held an emergency grand council meeting on Christmas Day
to denounce the statements. One of the members made an anti-Italian speech
and was immediately arrested.52
But the principal reason for increased resistance was the successful recruit-
ment policy and the growing organization of the NLM. By early 1943 NLM
bands began to coordinate their activities for the ¤rst time. Because of the
efforts of the NLM, resistance in Albania became national for the ¤rst time,
and the Italians were forced to adjust their military tactics as well as their
political policy. By January it was estimated that there were three thousand to
four thousand partisans in all, the bands growing as the reprisals became more
onerous. Of particular help to recruitment was Kruja’s decision to send gov-
ernment-equipped Dibra bands into southern Albania, where they behaved
considerably worse than did the Italians.53 In an interview with the German
consul on 3 February 1943, Lieutenant General Jacomoni admitted that since
the end of 1942 the attitude of the Albanians toward the Italians had taken a
signi¤cant turn for the worse, and he went so far as to question whether
Albania would remain part of the Italian kingdom. Ten days later the head of
the Italian carabinieri admitted that much of the open land of southern Alba-
nia was in partisan hands. He argued that “energetic” methods were necessary.
The Italians, he said, should follow the German example and shoot ¤fty
Albanians for each Italian death.54
To make matters worse, multiband attacks on Italian positions increased,
particularly in the Korça, Gramsh, and Vlora districts of the south. And in
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 137

March, after the ¤rst national conference of the Albanian Communist Party,
bands were consolidated into the First Partisan Battalion, which included three
or four bands. This further complicated the military situation for the Italians.
In April some of these new units carried out assaults on Italian troop concen-
trations near the Selenica mines. In May partisans of the Korça district fought
what came to be known as the Battle of Leskovik, in which the partisans
claimed two hundred Italians killed and a dozen trucks and armored cars de-
stroyed. In June a major engagement took place on the Struga-Dibra highway.
At the outset of July major encounters took place at Përmet. After ¤ve days of
¤ghting—during which the Italians, supported by aircraft, were forced to call
in reinforcements from Berat, Gjirokastra, and Tepelena—the partisans with-
drew but claimed ¤ve hundred Italians dead and dozens of vehicles destroyed.55
By June the partisans claimed to have ten thousand ¤ghters in thirty
partisan bands and twenty battalions. In addition, there were twenty thousand
reserves made up of peasant bands of volunteers and the urban guerrilla units.
At the beginning of July the General Council of the NLM decided to form
the headquarters of the National Liberation Army, which the communist party
had decided on in March. A general staff was established with Hoxha as
commissar and Spiro Moisiu, a relative nonentity whom Hoxha could control,
as military commander. District staffs were established and Albania’s ¤rst
brigade was formed, with Mehmet Shehu, the partisan’s ablest military ¤gure,
as commander. When the ¤rst brigade was ¤nally established in August, it
consisted of four or ¤ve battalions with a total strength of ¤ve hundred men.56
Despite these new organizations, however, the traditional character of partisan
warfare—no frontal attack—was retained until late 1944.
While many of these Italian casualty ¤gures are undoubtedly exaggera-
tions and many resistance operations ended in failure, the Italians slowly began
to panic, grasping for a more effective political and military policy. Still, de-
spite the increasing problems throughout 1942, Ciano heard nothing but pos-
itive reports from his of¤cials. Given the Italian experience with the invasion
of Greece, he should have been more suspicious than he was. In March 1942
Ciano notes in his diary that Jacomoni reported that the situation was quite
good. In April, continuing the general self-delusion, Jacomoni reported that
the only problem was the shortage of material that prevented the Italians from
continuing with their public works. By September Ciano began to hear about
an undercurrent of discontent, but in October Jacomoni sent him another
favorable report on Albania. The lieutenant general reported that the critical
period—which he had neglected to mention—was now over and with some
gesture of force against the rebels, it was possible to bring order and quiet back
138 Chapter 5

into the country. In December he seems to have sent Ciano yet another
favorable report, and as late as January 1943 General Lorenzo Dalmazzo,
commander of the Ninth Army in Albania, viewed “the Albanian situation
with remarkable tranquillity.”57
Although Ciano was clearly guided by what he longed to hear, he was
clever enough to take some precautions. As early as March 1942 he com-
plained: “But there is a matter that has attracted my attention, the insuf¤ci-
ency of our military forces [in Albania]. We have scarcely four divisions, each
composed of two regiments and the regiments composed of two battalions; a
small number of carabinieri, not one tank.”58 He took his concerns to Musso-
lini, who agreed to send a few more troops and some companies of light tanks.
But this did not satisfy Ciano, who complained again in September about the
lack of troops. “There are four divisions, but in name only, in reality 11 thou-
sand men. Cavallera, to whom I communicated the alarm could do nothing
more than give me ¤fty tanks; not enough.”59 It seems that Ciano had to wait
for general cries of alarm before he could convince Mussolini and the Com-
ando Supremo to reinforce the Italian garrison.
In January and February 1943, the extent of the problem seems to have
convinced at least some of the Italian of¤cials in Albania that Ciano and
Mussolini needed to be told the truth. On the night of 17 January the police
inspector of Tirana sounded the alarm. He sent a telegram to the Foreign
Ministry complaining of a government crisis and growing rebellion, suggesting
that the only solution was to hand the government over to the Italian military.
Ciano seemed genuinely surprised, noting in his diary, “Now one thing is clear,
either someone is too cool or too nervous.”60 After confronting Jacomoni on
the phone on 18 January, the lieutenant general admitted, in a veiled way, that
things were quite bad.

Italian Response

Ciano and the Italians began countermeasures. Jacomoni had already begun to
act, apparently without the knowledge of Ciano. Indeed, that seems to have
been the intention, for one of Jacomoni’s early moves was to keep the growing
opposition as quiet as possible. As an example, the Italians took pains to
suppress any report that suggested that the countryside was experiencing un-
rest. Tomori, the only paper in Tirana, mentioned only those incidents that
occurred at the very gates of the city—incidents about which the population
would hear in any case. And then the Italians would maintain that the incident
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 139

was the exception in a sea of tranquillity.61 But to accompany these attempts

at denial and obfuscation, Jacomoni and the other Italian of¤cials continued
the traditional reactive carrot-and-stick policy, which, although it had not
achieved much success in the past, seems to have been the only policy they
could envision.
The Italian authorities would have preferred to leave the suppression of
resistance to Kruja, who had pushed since his appointment for the construc-
tion of an effective Albanian gendarmerie. But the Italians were reluctant to
give too much to the Albanians, and even if they had given Kruja all the
weapons and the training he requested, it would—in the estimation of many—
have only constituted a half measure. But something had to be done for Italian
prestige, particularly when incidents in Tirana itself began to increase. Tirana
had always constituted something of a safe haven for Italian of¤cials, particu-
larly those assigned to outlying regions who came to the capital infrequently.
Now this oasis, too, by the fall of 1942, was experiencing open gun¤ghts in
the streets.62
In any case, those units of Albanian forces that were constructed or armed
by the Italians proved to be more trouble than they were worth. The Dibra
bands that Kruja sent into southern Albania were—because of their atroci-
ties—swelling the ranks of the partisans. To make matters worse, many of
Kruja’s police defected to the resistance, taking their weapons with them.
The Italians, then, were forced to rely on their own resources to combat
the growing resistance. The ¤rst major operations that the Italians launched
were against the Peza region in September and the Vlora region in December
1942.63 Because the resistance was ¤ghting a traditional guerrilla-style war, its
members had no intention of confronting large Italian units. As a result, little
¤ghting actually took place in these ¤rst operations, and the Italian actions
degenerated into punitive expeditions in which many villages were burned and
many civilians were killed. The net result in military terms was more volun-
teers for the resistance and of course increasing hostility on the part of the
population—in particular the population of the south—to the Italian author-
ities and their Albanian puppets.
Italian authorities in Rome, in the meantime, decided to heed Ciano’s
persistent warnings and increased the size of their forces in Albania. Although
Ciano’s estimates of Italian troop strength in Albania were certainly low, an
increase was warranted and the Italians hoped that they might overawe the
Albanians with numbers. Signi¤cant reinforcements were sent, and by the end
of February 1943 the Italians had at their disposal, at least on paper, over
100,000 troops. Of this number, however, close to 17,000 were Albanian troops,
140 Chapter 5

12,000 were GAF costieri presidiari (coast guard) 11,000 were intendénza (com-
missariat), and 5,000 were territorial defense. This left a little more than 55,000
regular Italian troops.64 But a secret report noted that half of these were unus-
able in operations. The military problem was aggravated, so the report contin-
ued, by the high degree of unreliability of the Albanian forces.65
Since the military option seems to have had little of the desired effect, the
Italians hoped to placate the Albanians through political tinkering. The exper-
iment with Kruja, after one year, had achieved none of the desired results. As
a representative of a class other than the beys, his principal task had been to
broaden the support that the Albanian puppet regime could command among
the population. This had not happened. Indeed, the principal result of Kruja’s
appointment was to alienate the beys. By the end of 1942, this fact seems to
have become clear to the Italian authorities. A SIM report concluded that the
Italians had made a mistake in giving the government to the people—they
should have left it to the beys. By early December Jacomoni seems to have
come to a similar decision, concluding that Kruja had to go. He commented
to Ciano that “here is a man who in our best interest we should have destroyed
gradually.”66
Instead, Jacomoni destroyed Kruja all at once, which helped to cause a
political crisis that ended his own career. Kruja was forced to resign in early
January 1943, and Jacomoni planned to construct a government of landowners,
who Ciano—rather naively—believed still had considerable in¶uence in Alba-
nia and were in a strong position to impact public opinion.67 Jacomoni turned
to Eqrem Bey Libohova, who had been Zog’s minister of court and had
stopped a bullet for the king during an assassination attempt in Vienna in
1931.68 It was undoubtedly this unintended sacri¤ce that encouraged Zog to
overlook the fact that Libohova spent most of his political career in the pay of
the Italians. Jacomoni hoped that Libohova, while totally without scruples,
would be able to bring around all of the southern landowning class (the beys),
many of whom had been alienated following the appointment of Kruja.
This task proved to be somewhat more dif¤cult than Jacomoni had antic-
ipated. As Ciano complained in his diary on 1 February, “The men who were
most faithful to us are trying to abandon ship. Even Vrioni. Even Vërlaci.”69
Reports circulated abroad that Vërlaci was even attempting to sell some of his
vast estates. Jacomoni was having trouble ¤nding southern landowners to ¤ll
Libohova’s government. He was ¤nding it necessary to depend too heavily
upon men from new Albania, men who had more to lose with an Axis defeat.
Jacomoni did manage, initially, to attract the Mirdita chief, but he drove a hard
bargain. The chief demanded control of the entire government as the price for
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 141

his cooperation. Jacomoni would not be blackmailed and ultimately was forced
to appoint men who had no hope of placating any segment of Albanian
society.

The Fall of Jacomoni and Ciano

This cabinet crisis convinced Ciano that Jacomoni himself had outlived his
usefulness; he noted that “For a certain period he did very well, but now his
policies are turning sour. We need a man who can talk about force and can also
employ it. I propose Guzzoni or Pariani, two generals who know the country
and are well regarded.”70 Within two days, however, on 5 February, Ciano
himself was forced to resign. As a consolation Ciano was offered a list of
options, one of which was the position of lieutenant general in Albania. He
wrote in his diary, “I decisively reject the governorship of Albania where I
would be going as an executioner and hangman of those people to whom I
promised brotherhood and equality.”71 Paternalistic to the end, Ciano of
course was refusing to take responsibility for a situation caused almost exclu-
sively by his own policies and actions. Ciano’s obsession with Albania hastened
the collapse of his own career as well as that of Mussolini.
The Italian position in Albania was becoming increasingly desperate. Be-
fore Jacomoni could be replaced by anyone, the three-week-old government of
Libohova was removed; Ciano complained just before his own ouster that the
government was up to its “old tricks.” Libohova was replaced by Maliq
Bushati, who had served as minister of justice in Vërlaci’s post-invasion gov-
ernment and yet had a reputation as a nationalist. Although Bushati had
counted as a long-time opponent of Zog’s, the two had corresponded since the
invasion, something about which the Italians were certainly unaware. Albanian
socialist historians maintain that Bushati was also a leader of the BK. The
Italians were being forced to accept people who had little interest in maintain-
ing Italian domination in Albania.
Aware of this, Bushati, who also became provisional head of the National
Fascist Party of Albania, was carefully watched. His vice-premier was the
Kosovar Iliaz Agushi, who had served a minister of the new territories in 1941.
As minister of the interior, the Italians ¤nally succeeded in recruiting the
Mirdita chief Gjon Marka Gjoni, who would demonstrate considerable ruth-
lessness in his pursuit of the partisans.
But the Bushati government lasted only a few weeks. Problems between
the premier and Marka Gjoni began immediately, principally with regard to
142 Chapter 5

the handling of resistance in the south. The government, composed primarily

of northerners, had less chance than the previous two governments of convinc-
ing the southerners to cease their resistance, so the minister of the interior
favored abandoning persuasion for force. Bushati disagreed. Bushati had also
appealed to the Italian authorities to release many citizens of Korça who had
been interned in the concentration camp at Durrës. The Italians refused.
Bushati further annoyed the Italians by frequent complaints about Italian
atrocities in southern Albania against the partisans.72
By this point, Mussolini had chosen General Alberto Pariani as
Jacomoni’s replacement. Pariani had considerable experience in the Balkans as
governor of Corfu just prior to his Albanian appointment and as the head of
the Italian military mission in Albania from 1927 to 1933. He gained the
respect of his hosts, and even the Germans considered him to be one of the
most competent senior Italian of¤cers.73 Zog, it will be recalled, had asked for
Pariani as a mediator during the desperate ¤nal days of his regime. Pariani was
a man of good reputation and extensive experience, thrust into what was
rapidly becoming an impossible situation.
Pariani was not unaware of the challenge of the task that faced him. Upon
accepting the appointment, he wrote a private note to Mussolini describing
the situation as grave and chaotic.74 He suggested that the Albanians be given
back a substantial degree of their independence as a ¤rst step toward defusing
the situation. The speci¤cs of his program included (1) equality of rights for
Albanians and Italians in both countries and diplomatic representation in each
other’s capitals, (2) restoration of a truly independent Albanian gendarmerie
and army, (3) the establishment of an Albanian home guard with the express
purpose of combating the inroads made by the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, (4)
returning control of Albanian customs to the Albanian government, (5) disso-
lution of the Albanian Fascist Party and its replacement by a new organization
called the Protection of Greater Albania.75 Clearly, he did his utmost to play
the nationalist card. At the same time, however, Pariani let it be known that
he would not allow his work to be disturbed from any side, and as a demon-
stration of his resolve, he increased Italian troop strength to some ¤ve and
one-half divisions.76 Pariani, then, could do little more than continue the
existing policy of concessions and repression.
Pariani’s regime was not without its successes, not the least of which was
a March 1943 agreement between Lorenzo Dalmazzo, the commander of the
Italian Ninth Army, and Ali Këlcyra, one of the leaders of the BK. This
so-called Dalmazzo-Këlcyra agreement, about which there is considerable
controversy,77 effectively neutralized a section of the BK. Albanian socialist
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 143

historiography suggests that this agreement committed the BK to prevent any

assault against Italian troops and to help the Italians in their punitive opera-
tions in southern Albania.78 Since BK policy was based on a fear of reprisals,
it is unlikely that much was done to assist in Italian punitive operations. But
the BK did signi¤cantly reduce its military operations to prevent reprisals and
to save its strength for the inevitable con¶ict with the NLM. This agreement
was clearly of some bene¤t to the Italians, but since most of the actual resis-
tance was being conducted by the NLM, that bene¤t was minimal.
The problems and failures of Pariani’s regime, however, were substantially
more important than his successes. To be sure, the obstacles in his way were
formidable and few could have done better. Nevertheless, Pariani seemed to
do little more than lurch from crisis to crisis. Not the least of his problems
were generated by Bushati, who seems to have made some genuine efforts to
protect Albanians while assuming greater responsibility for internal affairs. But
given the increasingly anarchistic internal situation, Bushati’s hopes and efforts
were, of course, in vain. By the end of April his cabinet was in crisis, and it fell
at the beginning of May. The cabinet—made up primarily of northerners—
was, naturally, unsuccessful in controlling the south, despite Marka Gjoni’s
extensive use of repressive measures. Pollo and Puto suggest that dozens of
villages were burned and hundreds slaughtered.79 Pariani reluctantly approved
of these measures, and Bushati continued to complain. Pariani ultimately ¤red
Bushati.80
Pariani was hard pressed to replace him, however, since by the end of May
1943 most Albanians were convinced of the inevitability of an Italian defeat.
It was two weeks before Pariani could round up Italy’s fourth collaborationist
regime. Eqrem Libohova was reappointed as prime minister, indicative of the
shrinking pool of candidates. The cabinet was made up of the usual suspects,
people who had served in one or more of the occupation regimes, and once
again northerners dominated. Agushi once again became deputy prime min-
ister as well as minister of public works and ¤nance.81 In what seemed to be
little more than a pro forma action, the Italians dropped lea¶ets from planes
encouraging Albanians to work together with the new government. The
lea¶ets outlined yet another new program and threatened those who failed to
cooperate with the usual dire consequences.82 But the composition of this last
collaborationist regime under the Italians made it clear that the Italians had
¤nally given up expecting much from the Albanian collaborators. The ¤ghting
in the south had become more serious—schools were closed—at the end of
May nonessential Italian personnel were being evacuated from Albania.83 In
addition to his increasing problems with the Albanians, by the spring of 1943
144 Chapter 5

Pariani had the British to contend with as well—the British, who after nearly
two years since their last involvement in Albania, had returned in an attempt
to coordinate and stimulate the resistance.

The Return of the British

The British had done very little with regard to Albania since 1941 with the
exception of dealing with competing groups of exiles and attempting to gather
material upon which to base a policy. In this latter regard, the British had not
been overly successful. The misconceptions that had generated the unsuccess-
ful mini-invasion from Kosova in April 1941 had not been dispelled. And the
British had no clear idea of the important events that had taken place in
Albania since 1941. Their sources were limited to the occasional traveler’s
report and the predominantly anticommunist exile groups, which quite often—
even when aware of internal developments, which was rare—misrepresented
events for their own interests.
The Foreign Of¤ce did commission a few policy papers from Albanian
specialists in Britain, but these people were generally limited to knowledge of
prewar developments. As a result, their material was often misleading. Arnold
Toynbee, for example, produced a lengthy paper on the territorial dispute
between Albania and Greece, which was rather cavalier about Albanian
claims.84 In general, the British government questioned the viability of
Albania’s territorial unity and whenever possible supported the claims of their
principal ally in the Balkans, Greece.
Perhaps the clearest summation of British policy toward Albania at the
time is contained in a memo written by Pearson Dixon at the end of May
1942. Dixon reviewed the history of Britain’s relations with Albania, noting
that Britain originally condoned the Italian annexation of Albania when on 31
October 1939, the government announced in Parliament that it had appointed
a consul general. With Italy’s declaration of war in June 1940, the government
announced publicly that it had regained its liberty of action. The British
government did not de¤ne its position but declared itself free to do so. Dixon
cited as reasons for this negative position (1) the assumption that Albania was
not a viable state and that it would need some form of foreign protection, (2)
the problem of Zog, who was deemed unpopular—his presence in Britain
would make it dif¤cult to avoid suspicion that Britain secretly supported him
if Albania was recognized, and (3) Yugoslav and Greek claims on Albanian
territory. Still, Dixon concluded that it was time for some sort of statement on
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 145

Albanian independence based upon both political and military considerations.

The Albanian population would welcome it, resistance would be stimulated,
and a possible Greek-Yugoslav con¶ict over what both considered spoils might
be averted.85 Lord Glenconner, head of SOE in 1942–43, went even further,
announcing that he had a plan for subversion in Albania that would be aided
by a declaration on the territorial integrity of prewar Albania.86
When foreign secretary Anthony Eden did ¤nally make a statement on
Albania, he did so not as a result of an appreciation of events in Albania but
because of the war in general.87 With the American landing in North Africa
in November 1942, the Allies took the offensive in the Mediterranean. In light
of this fact, Eden decided, after informing the Soviets and the Americans, to
¤nally make a statement on Albania. The statement, made in Parliament on
17 December, expressed sympathy with the fate of Albanians and called for
the restoration of Albanian independence, recognizing that the form of gov-
ernment would be left up to the Albanians themselves after the war. Following
strenuous objections from the Greek government in exile, Eden added that the
question of frontiers would be left to the peace settlement.88 The Americans
had made a similar statement—although without the quali¤cation on the
frontiers—several days earlier. A Soviet statement followed that of the Brit-
ish—despite Hoxha’s contention that the Soviets came up with a more im-
portant statement earlier.
The statement had a good effect on the Albanians, but it still did not
outline a clear British policy on the future of Albania. As Dixon minuted in
March 1943, “We, however, interpret our declaration to mean that while we
shall endeavor to reestablish an independent Albanian state after the war, we
do not regard an Albanian state as now existing. Thus no question of recog-
nizing any Albanian government in exile arises at present.”89 As the British
prepared to become involved in Albania militarily, then, the Foreign Of¤ce
still maintained a nonpolicy in relation to the country’s existence as a state, its
future frontiers, its future government, and its future place in the Balkans. The
British of¤cers who were dropped into Albania, then, were not only ignorant
of political conditions in Albania but were backed up by nothing more than
political emptiness.90
As suggested earlier, renewed military attention to Albania—like renewed
political attention—came about less because of an understanding of Albanian
conditions than as a result of the course of the war as a whole. Enver Hoxha
maintains that the British renewed their interest in Albania out of alarm at the
rise of the Communist Party’s activities and because of news about the con-
ference of Peza.91 But this is simply not the case. Renewed British interest
146 Chapter 5

developed slowly, and those involved were motivated by somewhat more far-
reaching ends. General Lord Glenconner must be given some credit for this
renewed interest. Although he failed to convince the Foreign Of¤ce in June
1942 to make a statement to aid Albanian resistance, he was encouraged by
Dixon to continue his plans for subversion in Albania.92 These plans, however,
were still in preliminary stages.
In December 1942 these plans were given further impetus. Joint British-
American planners began drawing more extensive attention to subversive ac-
tivities in the Balkans as a means of speeding the expected collapse of Italy.
This would require that the Germans occupy the Balkans and Italy, thereby
straining their resources in the Soviet Union. This was considered particularly
signi¤cant, since the cross-channel invasion of France was ruled out for 1943,
making it imperative that something be done for the Russians. Many of these
ideas were included in the of¤cial memorandum on future strategy presented
by the British Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca conference in January 1943.
The most signi¤cant elements of this memorandum were adopted at Casa-
blanca, and resistance movements in the Balkans became of prime importance
for the ¤rst time.93
In the meantime, as a result of a general agreement between SOE and the
U.S. Of¤ce of Strategic Services (OSS) in June 1942, SOE was given priority
over subversive operations in the Balkans.94 The Albanian section of SOE,
which initially had consisted of little more than Margaret Hasluck, the widow
of a noted archaeologist who spent some ten years living in Elbasan, was
enlarged and moved to Cairo.95 Brigadier Keeble, head of MO4 in early
1943—which is what SOE Cairo was called at the time—recruited of¤cers to
drop into Albania to act as British liaison of¤cers.96 The task of these agents
was to contact, coordinate, and direct the supply of those groups or individuals
resisting the Italians. The instructions seemed clear, and despite Enver
Hoxha’s claims there was no political brief included. The mission was con-
ceived as a strictly military one.
The ¤rst group was sent in in April 1943 and was under the command of
Major Neil (Billy) McLean, a tall, fair-haired young of¤cer of the Scots Grey
Regiment. Hoxha, who would develop an intense personal dislike for McLean,
described him as having a cold, clean-shaven face, and intelligent blue eyes
with the look of a savage cat about them.97 McLean was accompanied by an
interpreter, a wireless operator, and his second in command, Captain David
Smiley, whom Julian Amery described as someone who liked his friends and
disliked his enemies, but otherwise was more interested in things than in
people. Smiley lived for action alone and was happiest on a dangerous recon-
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 147

naissance or when “blowing things up.”98 Because of their ardent anti-

communism, McLean and Smiley would become a considerable worry for
Hoxha.
McLean’s mission—code-named “Consensus”—arrived in Greece in
April, because there was no real contact with Albanian bands at the time.
Greek resistance ¤ghters of the EAM supplied the British with guides, mules,
and escorts and then handed them over to the nearest Albanian peasants on
the frontier.99 At ¤rst Albanian resistance leaders of all parties refused to deal
with them, being suspicious of their Greek contacts and convinced that they
had come to develop Greek bands on Albanian soil. The ¤rst partisan leader
of stature that they encountered, Bedri Spahiu, required them to return to
Greece.100 Although they had more reason to be suspicious than did the BK,
it was the partisans who ¤rst recognized the potential and accepted the British.
Still, in was not until June that McLean succeeded in making contact with a
representative of the NLM council. After a dif¤cult trip, McLean ¤rst met
with the council itself at the July meeting at Labinot, where the General Staff
of the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA) was created.
Hoxha boasts at length in numerous works that he intentionally treated
the British badly. He kept them waiting to make it clear to them that they
could not just walk into Albania without ¤rst obtaining permission from the
NLM. He failed to mention, however, how this could have been possible
without ¤rst making contact. Because they were British, Hoxha also told them
very little about the political situation in Albania and tried to do what he could
to restrict their movements to keep them in the dark as well as to keep them
as much as possible away from the rivals of the NLM. Hoxha writes that he
did this because the British of¤cers were sent to spy, to assist the British agents
in Albania—read all those who opposed Hoxha—and to do their utmost to
ensure, under the disguise of aid, that the people’s revolution fail.101
While Hoxha’s reception was certainly cool, as McLean readily con¤rms,
much of the delay preventing McLean from contacting the NLM council
more quickly can be attributed to poor communications and lack of organiza-
tion. After all, in the ¤rst three months after contact—that is, June through
August—the British dropped 19.5 tons of weapons, ammunition, and supplies
to McLean and Smiley, of which the partisans received the lion’s share.102
Hoxha surely recognized this potential. As a pragmatist, he certainly would
have made contact with the British at the earliest possible movement, not only
for the supplies but also for the legitimacy such a connection would bring. This
postwar reconstruction of Hoxha’s, as with so many others, served a political
purpose once the British were declared the enemy.
148 Chapter 5

Once the connection was made, it rapidly became clear how fortuitous the
presence of the British was for the partisans. The British arrived just at the
time the NLM decided to organize larger permanent military units—bri-
gades—as a major step toward the construction of a regular army, a move with
both political and military signi¤cance. Albanian socialist historians argue that
the principal source of arms and ammunition for the partisan movement came
from raiding enemy supplies. The principal source of clothes and food was the
supportive population and the careless Italians. These historians do admit,
however, that the people gave supplies only gradually, that major political work
was required to convince them to do this. As a result, the partisans suffered
from major and daily de¤ciencies, no ¤xed ration of food, no hot meals, and
no regular supply of clothes or health services.103
It is undoubtedly true that the partisans were able to live off the country-
side while they remained divided into small guerilla bands. How they intended
to arm equip and maintain brigades by these same means remains a mystery.
Larger military organizations of this sort require a permanent reliable source
of supply, which the Albanian peasants had no way of providing, even if they
had wanted to. Smiley and McLean, then, as their ¤rst task were given the job
of organizing, training, and equipping the First Partisan Brigade.104 The Brit-
ish threw themselves into the task, and after several months of airdrops, in
August the brigade was ready, commanded by perhaps the most experienced
and effective Albanian military leader during the war, Mehmet Shehu.
Albanian socialist historiography and Hoxha rarely mention British sup-
plies except when referring to them as “so-called” aid or aid to the enemies of
the NLM, who, it is maintained, were given ample weapons.105 Hoxha com-
plained that McLean received chocolates by air, noting that “Per¤dious Albion
had aircraft for such things, but when it came to dropping weapons to us who
were ¤ghting fascism, aircraft were not available.”106 It certainly is true that
Albania was a low priority and few planes were assigned, but much material
did get through.107 Some of it was clearly of questionable value: boots for left
feet only, battle dress for midgets or giants, underpants big enough for Sumo
wrestlers, ammunition of the wrong caliber, weapons without ammunition.
Some of the material was certainly destroyed when parachutes failed to open,
and some of it was carried off by local peasants when it was dropped too far
from the drop zone. Still, the bulk of the material must have been weapons,
ammunition, explosives, uniforms, blankets, and so on, put together to
McLean’s speci¤cations.108 But naturally it was never enough. Hoxha consis-
tently complained—with some justi¤cation—that he was being asked to en-
gage a vastly superior enemy with extremely limited resources. McLean tells
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 149

us, for example, that the armament for one armored Albanian brigade con-
sisted of three 81mm mortars, one 45mm mortar, ¤ve Breda machine guns,
one U.S. bomb thrower, six automatic Breda ri¶es, and individual ri¶es.109
Though limited, what the British were giving the Albanians was by Albanian
standards quite substantial, and it came at a critical time.
Apart from helping to supply the Albanian resistance, the British also
hoped to facilitate resistance unity. It did not take McLean long to discover at
least some of the divisions that existed in the resistance, and because these
were not properly understood, the British believed that unity among the Al-
banian resistance was less dif¤cult to achieve than under the Yugoslavs or the
Greeks. Although Hoxha tells us in his memoirs that he successfully prevented
contact between the British and the non-NLM resistance for a signi¤cant
period, this seems not to be the case. In July and August six more missions
were dropped and sent to various parts of the country. While the McLean
mission had been considered an all-Albania mission, these later missions were
assigned to speci¤c regions; one went to contact the important Dibra chiefs,
one was sent north of Tirana into the Kruja area, one was sent to the Vlora
region, where the countryside was loyal to the BK, and one was sent to Myslim
Peza’s area.110

The Mukje Agreements

While the British were dispersing throughout Albania in the hopes of facili-
tating unity, representatives of the NLM and the BK were meeting at Mukje
in what turned out to be the last serious attempt to unify the two groups.
Almost every aspect of this important meeting—which took place near Tirana
between 1 and 3 August—is racked with controversy. To begin with, the
question about who initiated the meeting seems rather unclear. Albanian so-
cialist historians and Hoxha argue that Hoxha and the central committee of
the Communist Party were responsible, demonstrating their genuine interest
in uniting all patriotic Albanians.111 The historians Nicholas Pano, Bernhard
Kühmel, and Stavro Skendi argue that British pressure was at least partly
responsible for the meeting, although Reginald Hibbert—one of the British
of¤cers in Albania during the war—writes that the meeting took place without
the knowledge of British of¤cers.112 McLean maintains that Kupi was respon-
sible, and the historian Elizabeth Wiskeman argues that British of¤cers and
Kupi initiated the meeting.113
It is clear, at least, that both sides were interested in the meeting. The
150 Chapter 5

inevitable collapse of fascism in Italy made a free Albania—perhaps to be

occupied by the Allies—at least possible. The BK began to realize that its
relative inactivity might prove to be a signi¤cant disadvantage in such an
eventuality, particularly since the partisans had not been hurt by Italian mili-
tary action, as the BK had hoped. In June and July, therefore, the BK changed
tactics, distancing itself from the collaborationist government, strengthening
its armed units, and issuing more uncompromising propaganda, although this
shift also seems to have been accompanied with less, not more, military activ-
ity.114 For the BK it was the ideal time to come to terms with the NLM. It
was also a good time for Hoxha, who too at least considered the possibility of
an Allied landing, an eventuality that would principally bene¤t the pro-West-
ern BK, to come to terms with that group. It was also more than likely that
British of¤cers made further shipments of gold and weapons contingent on
some attempt at unity. Finally, Hoxha was still under insistent Comintern
pressure to create a politically correct united front.
All of these pressures together resulted in an organizational meeting at
Tapiza on 26 July. Here the BK representatives suggested the organization of
a provisional government in Kruja, the city of the Albanian national hero
Skënderbeg. The NLM representatives refused to agree to this suggestion but
did send delegates to Mukje for further discussions. Representing the NLM
were Kupi and two moderate communists, Mustafa Gjinishi and Ymer Dis-
hnica. The BK sent, among others, Mithat Frashëri, still possessed of consid-
erable diplomatic skill, and Hasan Dosti, an accomplished jurist who had
moved from collaboration to opposition when he ¶ed Tirana in June along
with most of the BK central committee.
The agreement that the delegates worked out speaks to the skill of the BK
negotiators. The Mukje Agreements called for the construction of a new na-
tional committee for the salvation of Albania, which would be made up of
equal numbers of both organizations and would be headed by Hasan Dosti.
The committee would function as a provisional government. The delegates
supported the concept of an “ethnic Albania” based upon the enlarged fron-
tiers of 1941. The delegates also proclaimed Albania’s independence by annul-
ling the decisions of the fascist assembly of 12 April 1939, which had con-
structed the ¤rst puppet Albanian government after the Italian invasion.
Finally, the assembled delegates agreed immediately to take up arms against
the Italians.115
That the BK got the best of this compromise agreement is clear. The
NLM, as an organization, was not part of the provisional government. The
Albanian Communist Party had failed to force the inclusion of any provisions
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 151

outlining social change. The agreement also was to the disadvantage of the
ACP in that the party’s policy of linking resistance to a political revolution
through the destruction of the existing system was not part of the program.
What happened next has been interpreted in any number of ways. What
is clear is that ¤rst Hoxha, then the ACP, and ¤nally the NLM rejected the
Mukje Agreements. Albanian socialist historiography argues that the NLM
delegates exceeded their authority and that Dishnica gave way to demagogu-
ery, while Gjinishi came out of the meeting an ardent supporter of the reac-
tionary claims of the middle class.116 Nicholas Pano, relying on both Albanian
and Yugoslav sources, convincingly argues that Enver Hoxha and the central
committee of the ACP were ready to approve the agreements but were pre-
vented from doing so by Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Tito’s roving ambas-
sador in the Balkans, who happened to be in Albania at the time. Hoxha hurls
invective at Tempo in his memoirs, calling him a political gangster who was
attempting to seize the leadership of all the resistance movements in the
Balkans by the creation of a Yugoslav-controlled Balkan staff.117
This may indeed have been the case, but the principal problem here was
again Kosova. Although the Yugoslav Communist Party had approved a reso-
lution calling for self-determination in Kosova as recently as 1940, by 1943 the
situation had changed. The party was now not nearly as far away from power
and Tito was unwilling to alienate the Serbs, many of whom still considered
Kosova sacred. The Yugoslavs themselves claim a role in the rejection of the
agreements, criticizing Hoxha and the central committee—with the exception
of Koçi Xoxe, one of the founders of the ACP from Korça, and the hard-liners,
who always supported the Yugoslavs—and accusing them of deviationism and
irredentism.118
That the Yugoslavs played an important role in these events is certain.
Hoxha complained of continual attempts on the part of the Yugoslavs to
interfere in Albanian affairs. He also argued, however, that he successfully
prevented them from doing so. This is hardly likely. Hoxha’s position on
Kosova itself was made clear at the NLM Labinot conference in September.
Although he had rejected the Mukje Agreements, he spoke of Kosova in terms
similar to those used by the BK at Mukje. As Yugoslav in¶uence increased and
as Hoxha began to realize that maintaining control of Kosova might be an
internal political disadvantage (Kosova was entirely Geg), he did eventually
come into line on this issue.119
It is reasonable to conclude that neither side wanted to work with the
other and that both looked for a way out while blaming the other. In this
instance the NLM and the ACP were more forthright. Despite a momentary
152 Chapter 5

surge of BK resistance immediately following Mukje,120 the BK was reluctant

to resist because of the dangers of reprisals; there is no reason to believe that
its position had changed. And Harry Fultz, who headed the Albania desk at
the OSS and had considerable experience with Albania prior to the war,
concludes that the BK might have been looking for a reason to break the
agreement once it became clear that the organization would have a chance to
work with the Germans.121 The BK was saved the trouble by Hoxha’s action
and accumulated some political capital in the process. After all, the BK could
not be held responsible for breaking the agreement.
Although the episode itself remains somewhat murky, the results are less
so. Mukje constitutes a major turning point for the ACP and for the resistance
in general. The collapse of the agreement marked the beginning, or at least a
signi¤cant escalation in, the mutual animosity and distrust between Hoxha
and the Yugoslavs. Internally, Mukje weakened the moderates within the party,
such as Gjinishi, Dishnica, and Hoxha himself, who moved even further to the
Left to save his own position. In terms of the resistance movement in general,
the episode signaled two important events that will be discussed in more detail
in chapter 7: the defection of Kupi and the beginning of the civil war, which
further complicated the resistance picture in Albania.122 But ¤rst the occupa-
tion picture changed as well, with the fall of Mussolini’s regime at the end of
July and, within six weeks, the replacement of the Italian occupation by a
German one.

The Fall of Mussolini

Mussolini’s regime had been battered by ever increasing military defeats and
growing internal opposition. His armies had been humiliated and expelled
from North Africa. His navy was destroyed through foolish policies. His par-
allel war against Greece had been a disaster. After Stalingrad, the Axis forces
in general were forced on the defensive. And through it all, Mussolini did not
make the trains run on time. The successful Allied invasion of Sicily on 10 July
constituted the ¤nal blow to his waning political prestige. Internal opposition
had, by this point, reached the Italian Fascist Grand Council and ultimately
included Count Ciano, his son-in-law. The intrigues of Victor Emmanuel III
and growing distrust and resentment within the Comando Supremo helped
speed Mussolini’s end. On 24 July 1943 members of the Fascist Grand Coun-
cil, hoping to save their own skins, deposed Mussolini, who was soon arrested
but quickly rescued on Hitler’s orders. He was replaced by Marshal Pietro
The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy 153

Badoglio, who, while responsible for much of the ¤asco, had some credibility
with the Allies because he had resigned as chief of staff of the Comando
Supremo in December 1940. Badoglio, it seems, was only waiting for the ideal
time to surrender, which he did on 8 September.
Without a doubt, the Albanians contributed signi¤cantly to these events.
The Italians had demonstrated early their inability to administer Albania ef-
fectively. Corruption and lack of ¤nancial accountability doomed their efforts.
What little was accomplished was ruined by the failure of the war against
Greece. Rudimentary nationalism—some of it instilled by Zog—combined
with Italophobia and economic problems brought on by the occupation slowly
aroused the Albanians to resistance. Once individual and scattered resistance
was channeled by the NLM, the Italians found it necessary to augment
signi¤cantly their security forces just to protect their garrisons in Albania’s
larger towns. By July 1943 the Italians had between seven and eight divisions
stationed in Albania, although none was anywhere close to being at full
strength. Although the Italians were in no danger of actually being thrown out
of Albania, the fact that 100,000 troops could not establish even rudimentary
security destroyed what little prestige Italian arms had and helped contribute
to critical morale problems. All of this naturally contributed signi¤cantly to
Mussolini’s problems at home. Albania, then, deserves considerable credit for
the fall of Mussolini and the surrender of Italy.
Mustafa Kruja becomes prime minister of Albania, 19 February 1942. ( Jacomoni)

The Zogist resistance leader Abaz Kupi in exile in 1940. (Amery)

The independent resistance leader Gani Bey Kryeziu in 1927. (Amery)

The independent resistance leader Muharrem Bajraktari. (Amery)

British general Trotsky Davies (with hat, in foreground) and his staff in Albania in
autumn 1943. Pictured from left: Smiley, McLean, Nicholls, Hare, Davies, Smythe.
(Amery)

Hoxha posing with guards at General Headquarters, late 1943 or 1944. Such arranged
photographs served as effective propaganda.
C H A P T E R 6

THE GERMAN INVASION AND THE

CONSTRUCTION OF A GERMAN ALBANIA

The Germans watched Italy’s decline with some alarm, recognizing that in
the event of a complete collapse, their own responsibilities would increase
signi¤cantly. Italian-occupied territories everywhere, including Albania, would
have to be invaded and held, straining an already overburdened Wehrmacht.
The Germans also realized that they had perhaps been overcautious of Italian
sensibilities with regard to interference in Albania, overcautious to the extent
that, in July 1943, as action seemed increasingly imminent, the foreign minis-
try and the Wehrmacht realized that they knew next to nothing about Albania,
a problem that had plagued the Italians—although Rome had no good reason
for a dearth of information—and the British. Like the British and the Italians,
the Germans lacked proper intelligence upon which to base policy decisions.
This problem was never entirely resolved.

German Interests in Albania

Germany’s connection with Albania during the twentieth century was mar-
ginal, although with a few exceptions. The ¤rst important exception was the
appointment—by the Great Powers—of Prince Wilhelm of Wied, the grand-
nephew of Wilhelm II of Germany, as prince of the newly founded Albanian
state in 1913. Although Wied, overwhelmed by circumstances, lasted a scant
six months, it was long enough to leave a favorable impression on some in
Albania.1 During the various regimes of Zog, from 1922 to 1939, German
interest in Albania was almost nonexistent, except for a short interlude during
the six-month premiership of Mehdi Frashëri in 1936.
Mehdi Frashëri, who had sympathy for the Germans partly because he

157
158 Chapter 6

had studied in Austria, worked with the German minister Erich von
Luckwald, in the hopes of establishing closer relations and to gain some pro-
tection for the Albanians from the Italians. The German Foreign Ministry was
hesitant, particularly after the Italians became nearly hysterical upon learning
of Frashëri’s overtures.2 King Zog, who found it prudent to placate the Italians
in late 1936, jettisoned Frashëri, replacing him with Kostaq Kota, a pro-Italian
yes-man who immediately reversed not only Frashëri’s liberal internal policies
but also swung Albania once again solidly behind Italy.3
Albanian-German relations during the last years of Zog’s regime were, as
a result, extremely limited. Hitler sent Zog a Mercedes on the occasion of his
wedding to Geraldine in 1938, prompting Zog, who rarely missed an oppor-
tunity to irritate the Italians, to inquire of the Germans if they were not
interested in Albanian oil. The German minister Eberhard von Pannwitz, who
became head of the mission in 1937, seemed enthusiastic, but the Foreign
Ministry in Berlin was cautious. Ciano, who seemed to be bribing every other
prominent Albanian, learned of the overture immediately and informed
Mackensen in Rome in no uncertain terms that the Italians considered Alba-
nia to be one of their provinces and that Pannwitz did not seem to appreciate
that fact. Ciano had complained about Pannwitz prior to this incident; his
crimes included an apparent unwillingness to attend Ciano’s parties. Pannwitz
was instructed to cool his ardor. The disappointed German minister reported,
almost sadly, that Germany’s in¶uence was restricted to a modicum of trade
and an occasional scholarship for an Albanian student to study in Germany.
Pannwitz did manage to negotiate a new trade deal in 1938, but by this point
Italian economic control was nearly complete, so the agreement included no
important raw materials. And even this modest agreement came to nothing in
light of the Italian invasion four months later.4 Given this rather distant rela-
tionship, Zog’s appeal to Hitler in March 1939 to protect him from Mussolini
was clearly an act of sheer desperation.5 Because Germany had no particular
interest in Albania, Zog could not have seriously expected the Germans to act
against the Italians on his behalf.
Although it is perhaps not surprising that because of Italian hypersensi-
tivity German knowledge of Albania was limited in 1939, the Foreign Minis-
try had less of an excuse by 1943. Pannwitz, who stayed on as consul general
following the invasion, sent regular reports concerning the deterioration of
Italy’s position.
Although the Foreign Ministry seems to have failed to anticipate an
enlarged German civilian role in Albania, the Wehrmacht was more careful.
Military planners, who feared a possible Allied landing in the Balkans, drew
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 159

up plans for an invasion. While the Germans were aware that Churchill had
pushed for Allied action in the Adriatic at the Casablanca conference in Jan-
uary 1943, they were unaware that General George Marshall had talked him
out of it, and presumably they were also unaware that the idea was ¤nally
dropped at the Tehran meeting in November 1943.6
In anticipation of such an invasion, the Wehrmacht drew up a series of
military plans for action against Italy—code-named “Alarich,” later “Achse“—
and for action against the Italian holdings in the Balkans—code-named “Kon-
stanin.”7 And of a more direct nature, units of German Military Intelligence
(Abwehr) Section II were sent to Mitrovica in April 1943 in an attempt to
gain some in¶uence among the growing number of Albanians disaffected with
the Italians.8 Even more directly, in July and August 1943, the German army
occupied Albanian airports and ports, ostensibly to protect Italian Albania
from the possibility of an Allied invasion. By the middle of August there were
some six thousand German troops in Albania.9
But there had been surprisingly little preparation of a political nature and
a great deal of misinformation. Much of the German problem in this regard
stemmed simply from a lack of sources. Much of what was available in Ger-
many in the 1930s concerning Albania was either super¤cial or catered to the
romantic notion of the Albanians as a vital warrior mountain race, a notion
that appealed to those imbued with Nazi racial theory. Hitler himself thought
of the Albanians in the context of a Karl May novel.
What information the German Foreign Ministry was able to collect was
often inaccurate. Martin Schliep, who replaced Pannwitz, sent reports that
contained numerous important errors, including mistakes concerning the
strength and makeup of the growing resistance groups. These mistakes often
made their way into Foreign Ministry calculations.10 To make matters worse,
in March and June two of the three people in the Foreign Ministry who knew
anything about Albania were relieved. The third, Franz von Scheiger, although
still attached to the Foreign Ministry, was employed in matters not impacting
Albania.11
The ¤rst political move made by the Foreign Ministry prior to the invasion
was the appointment of Hermann Neubacher, a former mayor of Vienna, as
Ribbentrop’s special representative for southeastern Europe. Neubacher, already
active in the Balkans as Hitler’s representative for economic concerns, would
become the key German ¤gure in the Balkans during the second half of the
war.12 Although he was not of¤cially assigned Albania as part of his responsi-
bility until 10 September, he relates in his memoirs that he had at least done
some reading on Albania during the three weeks prior to his appointment.13
160 Chapter 6

Apart from the appointment of Neubacher, the only other concrete political
step taken by the Foreign Ministry—and this on the recommendation of
Schliep—was the dispatch of Major Franz von Scheiger to Mitrovica.
Scheiger had more Albanian experience than anyone else in the Foreign
Ministry, indeed more than anyone else in Germany. Scheiger’s ¤rst exposure
to Albania was as an of¤cer in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War
I. After the war he returned to Albania, learned the language, set up a business,
and eventually came to know many interwar politicians of in¶uence on a per-
sonal basis. From 1936 to 1942 he served in the capacity of German trade
attaché but was eventually relieved after the Italians complained that Scheiger
was becoming too friendly with the locals.14 But rather than being returned
directly to Tirana, Scheiger was sent to German-occupied Mitrovica—where he
was given a military function—so as not to alarm the Italians. He arrived on 2
September—armed with thirteen pounds of gold as well as Portuguese brandy
and coffee—and instructions to contact and in¶uence local Albanian leaders.15
Although the appointment of Neubacher and Scheiger constituted the
extent of German political action prior to the invasion, Ribbentrop did scram-
ble to catch up. He bombarded Schliep with requests for information and
¤nally ordered Schliep to Rome for extensive consultations with Mackensen.
Based upon the sometimes contradictory material Schliep forwarded—a prob-
lem about which Ribbentrop himself complained—the foreign minister
sketched the basis of German policy toward Albania. The Wehrmacht made
it clear to Ribbentrop that Albania was strategically important and had to be
held against an anticipated Allied invasion but that the troops for traditional
military occupation were simply not available.
The rugged terrain of much of Albania, which had for centuries protected
the Albanians from the outside world, further discouraged a traditional occu-
pation. German priorities included direct control of the coast as well as stra-
tegic areas inland, including the major towns and, most important, the major
roads. To make this possible, Ribbentrop suggested that Schliep help draw up
plans for the construction of an independent neutral Albania controlled by a
government friendly to the Germans.16 The foreign minister had few sugges-
tions as to how this might be achieved but indicated that Schliep might start
by identifying, contacting, and in¶uencing “statesmen-like people” who, with
German military and political support, might relieve the German army by
taking control of a signi¤cant portion of internal security. In order for this to
succeed, the Albanian government would need to produce a stable political
system with widespread domestic support.
Schliep gave a general description of the political situation in Albania,
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 161

which though not always accurate still managed to shed light on some of the
problems the political implementation of Ribbentrop’s plan might encounter.
He attested to the popularity of the Germans, maintaining that Albanians,
although the majority no longer believed in the victory of the Axis, were
friendly toward the Germans and had respect for Hitler, but hated fascism
because of its connection with the despised Italians. Schliep concluded, how-
ever, that the plan’s chances for success were really not that good.
The question of a regime under German control presented the ¤rst prob-
lem for Schliep. Libohova’s government was completely compromised because
of its relations with Italy, and the NLM was ruled out because of its commu-
nist connection. Schliep frankly asserted that there were no statesmen of
signi¤cance who had authority and popularity and had remained free of a
connection with the Italians.17 Schliep concluded, sensibly, that the Germans
might be forced to rely on the Kosovars, whom he considered the most trust-
worthy of Albanians. The Kosovars were grateful to have been saved from the
Serbs. Neubacher reinforced this line of reasoning by suggesting that Kosovars
were not only the most politically and militarily united but that they would
stand or fall with Germany and that they would be useful in the occupation of
large parts of Albania.18 It is perhaps not surprising that of the ¤rst two
Albanian leaders Neubacher met in Belgrade just prior to the German inva-
sion, one was the Kosovan bandleader Xhafer Deva, who had been working
with the Abwehr for some time and offered his full support. The other, Vehbi
Frashëri, also with long-standing Abwehr contacts, was the son of Mehdi
Frashëri, who was still interned in Italy.19

The German Invasion

In the midst of this initial planning, the Germans were suddenly faced with
the surrender of the Badoglio government. On 3 September Allied forces
crossed the Strait of Messina and landed on the toe of Italy. On 8 September
General Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the Italian armistice, which Ger-
man radio reported at about 5 p.m. At 4 a.m. on 9 September units of the
German army assigned to group F under Field Marshal Baron Maximilian von
Weichs invaded Albania, carrying out a plan that had been completed only
three days earlier.20 Three divisions of the Twenty-¤rst Corps under General
Hubert Lanz overran Albania with considerable ef¤ciency, encountering only
minimal resistance from the nine Italian divisions stationed in Albania, or
from the various resistance groups.21 The 118th Jäger Division, the only unit
162 Chapter 6

to encounter resistance on 9 September, moved southwest from Niksic. The

100th Jäger Division occupied Elbasan and Struga, while its 92d Motorized
Regiment took the territory between Tepelena and Vlora. The 297th Infantry
Division reached Prishtina and Prizren, according to plan. On the next day the
Germans took Pogradec, Tirana, Durrës, and Kukës. On 11 September the
118th reached the coast while a part of the 297th crossed the Drin River.
These rapid movements were aided by a number of German units already
stationed in southern Albania, plus German security forces the Italians had
requested to assist in holding Albania’s airports at Tirana, Shkodra, Vlora,
Berat, Shijak, and Kërçova.22
Despite substantial numerical superiority, the only resistance offered by
the completely demoralized Italian troops included a minor encounter south
of Durrës and the shooting of a German lieutenant in Tirana. This collapse is
perhaps not surprising given the state of Italian units in Albania and their
status. In describing the Ninth Army under General Lorenzo Dalmazzo,
which occupied much of Albania, a British of¤cer noted that seldom in mili-
tary history could an army have been so badly led and of¤cered as the ninth,
and the troops knew it. The leaders were described as weak, cowardly, and
hesitant, and the of¤cers in general failed to present any example or give any
help to the troops, caring only for their own welfare.23 Morale could hardly
have been lower, and a general terror of Germans was widespread. Further,
apart from vague suggestions to make for the ports, Italian units were com-
pletely without instructions. Badoglio gave no clear orders and did not declare
war on Germany until the middle of October.24 Italian units were on their
own; even worse, they were at the mercy of their of¤cers.
The Germans demanded their surrender. The Italians received instruc-
tions from the Allies as well. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Com-
mander in chief of British forces in the Mediterranean, broadcast a message
encouraging the Italians to either hand over their weapons to the partisans or
at least not to give them to the Germans. The Allied best-case scenario was
to embroil the Germans and the Italians, and British liaison of¤cers (BLO)
were ordered to contact as many Italian commanders as possible in the hopes
of in¶uencing Italian decision making.25 The BLO reports are a good indica-
tion of the chaos in which Albania found itself just prior to and during the
German invasion and the overly optimistic attitude the British harbored con-
cerning Italian cooperation. One of the British of¤cers, Captain George Sey-
mour, entered Tirana in an Italian staff car wearing an Italian great coat to
negotiate with General Dalmazzo’s chief of intelligence. Plans were discussed
for the coordination of Italian, Allied, and partisan efforts to resist the Ger-
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 163

mans. Dalmazzo was to concentrate the entire Ninth Army around Tirana,
then seize Tirana and Durrës in preparation for an Allied landing, while
partisans blocked all German access to Tirana. It was later learned that at the
very moment this conversation was taking place, Dalmazzo himself was in the
next room of Zog’s old palace making arrangements with senior German
of¤cers for the evacuation of himself and his family.26
Similar discussions were taking place elsewhere. Partisan units walked
unopposed into Berat on 9 September to negotiate with the Italians there, but
as talks dragged on the Germans swept in, causing the partisans to ¶ee. The
British put forward a plan involving the Firenze Division, located in Burrel
north of Tirana, which was to join with the partisans in attacking and taking
Tirana, while the Brennero Division, concentrated around Kavaja, was to
protect the Tirana-Durrës road. BLOs, together with Mustafa Gjinishi, talked
with Colonel Caligari, the chief of staff for general Princivalle, the Brennero
divisional commander, who assured the British that the division was ready to
cooperate. The division was still armed after having convinced the Germans
that it would help against the partisans. After playing the Germans off against
the partisans, the Brennero Division double-crossed both, made a dash for
Durrës, abandoned its equipment, found ships, and bolted for Italy.27 As with
the vast majority of Italians, these troops were uninterested in supporting
either side and just wanted to go home.
But the partisans and the other resistance groups did bene¤t somewhat.
Of¤cially, we are told that about 15,000 of¤cers and men surrendered to the
partisans, many from the Firenze Division, the only Italian division in which
large numbers of troops actually cooperated with the Albanians. Of these
15,000, between 1,500 and 2,200 went so far as to constitute a resistance
battalion named after Antonio Gramsci, the Italian communist of Albanian
origin.28
What the BK and the tribes of the north got from the Italians is dif¤cult
to determine. Amery notes that Muharrem Bajraktari occupied Kukës for a
short time before the arrival of the Germans. He certainly would have helped
himself to Italian stores. Italian troops were attacked in northern Albania
during this period, losing a good deal of equipment. It is safe to assume,
however, that the partisans got more arms and equipment than the BK or the
northern chiefs, simply because they were more active. British liaison of¤cers
argue that the partisans could have gotten even more if they had acted more
decisively while the Italians were still in a state of hopeless indecision. Dal-
mazzo had apparently even expressed a willingness to arm the partisans, but
the Germans got to him ¤rst.29
164 Chapter 6

The Germans, it seems, reached most of the Italians ¤rst and avoided what
might have become a dangerous situation. They moved quickly and treated the
Italians as something less than a military threat. Germans in small groups of
two and three were seen disarming large groups of Italians. By 10 September
they had taken both General Ezio Rosi, commander of the Italian Army Group
East, and General Dalmazzo, commander of the Ninth Army. Both generals
ordered their troops to hand over their guns and equipment to the Germans.
Both were immediately evacuated to Belgrade. Most of the rank and ¤le in
Albania complied. The Germans captured some ninety thousand Italians in
Albania, while forty-¤ve thousand avoided capture and disappeared into the
country. The Germans announced that if the surrender and disarmament of
those who had avoided capture were not complete by 24 September, they would
shoot the Italian general staff.30 This can only be interpreted as an indication
that the Germans had no interest in any more Italians surrendering.
Of those who did not surrender or go over to the partisans, some initially
constituted their own resistance unit under the command of General Azzi.
But he proved to be a poor choice. Not only did he fail to organize any action
against the Germans, but he abandoned his men and lived quite comfortably
on the money given to him by the Allies. German documents note that some
blackshirt units put up resistance.31 Many thousands of Italians were shipped
from the Allied staging area “Seaview” and made it back to Italy.32 But most
simply went to ground, some falling into a modern version of serfdom as they
tried to survive in a hostile environment. The majority wandered in search of
food or employment, generally with little success. Soon Albania was host to
thousands of starving Italians, without clothes or boots, lice ridden, and
without leaders. British documents tell us that during the winter of 1943–
1944 the death rate among these unfortunates was estimated at one hundred
a day.33
Italian soldiers continued to be a problem for all the principal parties in
Albania for the remainder of the war. The partisans were on the whole tolerant
toward the Italians—with the exception the members of the secret police,
some of whom were executed. But partisan sources complained that the sheer
number of Italians constituted a signi¤cant drain on scant resources. The
British complained that news of evacuation from their Seaview base caused a
¶ow of Italians toward the coast, including thousands from Greece. This gave
away one of the British SOE headquarters and caused the capture of a number
of British liaison of¤cers by the Germans. The Germans themselves occasion-
ally issued orders for the Italians to surrender. Many, out of desperation did,
only to be turned away because the Germans ultimately could not handle all
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 165

those willing to surrender. At the end of the war as many as twenty thousand
Italian troops were still in Albania.34
The Italian civilian population proved to be less of a problem and was
actually quite useful, ¤rst to the Germans and later to the Albanians. Numbers
are dif¤cult to estimate, but at the time of the Italian armistice there were
perhaps twenty thousand Italians in Tirana alone, which before 1939 had a
total population of well under forty thousand. By mid-December 1943 there
were still one thousand Italian families living in apartments in Tirana.35 Neu-
bacher reported to the Foreign Ministry that he believed there to be approxi-
mately fourteen thousand Italian civilians in Albania, for the most part skilled
workers whom the Germans were anxious to employ.36 Indeed, the Germans
discovered that the Italians were virtually irreplaceable if they hoped to avoid
bringing in specialists from Germany. Many important trades were dominated
by Italians, who constituted most of the auto mechanics, electricians, welders,
and, perhaps most important the most useful road builders.37 Many of these
skilled workers were employed by Italian ¤rms, including Marinucci,
Ferrobeton, Simoncini, Tudini e Talenti, and others, which were persuaded by
the Germans to remain and work without pro¤t.38

The Construction of a German Albania

Before the invasion was complete, German political of¤cials had already de-
scended upon Albania to attempt to implement the Ribbentrop plan. On 10
September Neubacher was ordered to meet the German division at Elbasan,
but discovering that there was no airport in the vicinity he decided on his own
authority to ¶y directly to Tirana. Because the capital was still in Italian hands,
Neubacher sent a company of paratroopers with sixty Abwehr II agents in
three JU 52s. Landing soon thereafter, Neubacher and Scheiger, whom he had
brought along, were met by Schliep. While driving through the city toward the
German mission, Neubacher took notice of thousands of armed Italian troops
who looked rather ¶ustered and confused but showed him deference and
respect because—he assumed—he was wearing an unfamiliar uniform.39
Neubacher found the political situation somewhat more complex than
he had anticipated, but remained con¤dent that he would be able to attract
a large enough group of respectable Albanians to declare independence,
organize a government, and unburden the Germans. He had good reason to
make that assumption, because Germany possessed signi¤cant advantages
over the Italians in attracting Albanian cooperation. To begin with, they
166 Chapter 6

understood the uses of propaganda. First, prior to the invasion, the Ger-
mans had covered the country with lea¶ets announcing that they had come
to Albania to protect the Albanians from the enemy—here they emphasized
the Italians rather than the Allies—and from communism—which was as-
sociated with the Russians and the Serbs. The lea¶ets reassured the Al-
banians that nothing would endanger Albanian independence from Italy
“who robbed you and has betrayed us.” Albanian youths were complimented
for their struggle against fascist Italy.40
Soon after arriving in Tirana a German general took the trouble to make
a speech in which he apologized ¤rst for having occupied the country at all
and second for having done so “without ¤rst knocking at the door“. He went
on to explain that this occupation was necessary ¤rst to obtain possession of
the material, arms, and equipment of the Italian forces in the country and
second to prevent an Allied invasion of Albania and that time did not permit
the usual formalities to be observed.41 The Germans declared that they wished
only the best for Albania, within its ethnic frontiers, a reference to Albania’s
enlarged frontiers.
Further, the Germans bene¤ted from and capitalized on the good impres-
sion left by the Austro-Hungarian troops who had occupied much of Albania
during World War I. Not only had these troops behaved well, but they assisted
the economy. The Austrians had invested heavily in Albania’s infrastructure,
building roads as well as constructing a narrow-gauge Decauville railroad from
Durrës to Elbasan and from Tirana to Durrës, although it was soon completely
neglected and was by 1922 no longer salvageable. Perhaps most important, the
Austro-Hungarians had protected the Albanians from the Serbs, for which the
Albanians remained grateful.42 Taking advantage of this connection, the Ger-
mans whenever possible appointed Austrians to important positions in Albania,
including of course Neubacher and Scheiger, but also the SS chief, SS General
Josef Fitzthum, who before the war had been the chief of police in Vienna.43
German troops, too, had made a good impression on the Albanians, not
only as a result of German victories in other theaters but also as a result of
their rapid success and generally good behavior in Albania. Neubacher noted
in his memoirs, with some exaggeration, that the people of Albania, pleased
that the Germans were in the process of disarming the Italians, committed no
unfriendly acts against the German military. The German record was com-
pared favorably to that of the Italians, who were held in low esteem militarily
for abandoning their Albanian holdings under the pressure of Albanian bands
in 1920, for their mauling at the hands of the Greeks in 1940, and for their
inability to provide basic security during their occupation.
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 167

Although all foreigners made mistakes in Albania out of ignorance, not

only did the Germans seem to make fewer, but they were quick to take advan-
tage of those made by their enemies. Many Allied moves could have been
scripted in Berlin. The Allies, for example, allowed Victor Emmanuel III to
continue referring to himself as “king of Albania” until the beginning of De-
cember 1943. The Albanians themselves had deprived him of the crown six
weeks earlier, with the goodwill and encouragement of the Germans. The
Allies had allowed themselves to be put in a position in which an admitted
wrong to a small nation had been righted with German cooperation.44 Other
Allied blunders included the BBC’s praising known collaborators for their
staunch resistance and the dropping of lea¶ets over Albania in Greek and
Serbian, leaving, not surprisingly, the worst of impressions.45
Although the Italian reputation did not require much tarnishing, the Ger-
mans let no opportunity slip by. They did much to emphasize that Italy had
little to do with the creation of a Greater Albania. Italy’s role was dismissed as
a simple act of colonialist annexation, the culmination of the long-standing
Italian policy of controlling their “¤fth shore.”46 The Germans created the
impression that only now, with the coming of the Germans, would Kosova’s real
union with Albania be achieved. As we will see, the Germans even slightly
enlarged Greater Albania. The Germans did not fail to bring to the attention
of the Albanians that the Allies had been carefully silent on Kosova—indicating
their intention to hand it back to the Yugoslavs—and had failed to recognize
any Albanian government or committee in exile, leaving the entire question of
the existence of an Albanian state in the postwar world unresolved.
Upon his arrival Neubacher immediately hoped to build on these advan-
tages by avoiding the structuring of a conventional military occupation. Rather
than a military governor, a “German General in Albania” (DGA), General
Theodor Geib, was appointed. His of¤cial function was to “represent the
interests of the Wehrmacht to the Albanian government,” although as the
structure took more de¤nite shape, he seemed to have had only limited au-
thority.47 All relations with the Albanians, once a puppet regime was con-
structed, were to be conducted by Schliep, who would later be named German
ambassador. This system won over many Albanians but seemed to exasperate
and infuriate some elements of the German military command. Of¤cers com-
plained incessantly in their reports that there was no clear division of authority,
allowing Albanians to play the German army off against German diplomatic
representatives. The army complained that what they called the ¤ction of
independence made their job, which itself seemed somewhat unclear, a more
dif¤cult one.48 But Neubacher had his goal, and he intended to achieve it.
168 Chapter 6

The Germans, then, had much working in their favor and some of them
expected rapid success. Neubacher was considerably disappointed, then, with
the lukewarm reception with which his schemes were met by the quality of
Albanian leader he hoped to attract. This reluctance stemmed ¤rst from the
obvious connection between Germany and Italy. Many Albanians remem-
bered that Germany had staunchly supported the Italian invasion as well as
the four and one-half years of Italian occupation. The general disdain for the
Italians, as Schliep noted, was due in part to Rome’s attempt to force fascism
down the throats of the Albanians, an ideology clearly associated with the
Germans.49 But Neubacher also credits British propaganda for the cold re-
ception, propaganda that had convinced many Albanians that Germany could
not win the war. British propaganda was also effective, at least for a time, in
keeping the specter of an Allied invasion alive. Even Hoxha believed that it
was a question of when, not if.50 Allied deception with regard to a major
landing in the Balkans was resurrected in 1944 as “Plan Zeppelin,” part of
“Operation Bodyguard,” which was intended to help cover the proposed
landing in Normandy.51
Although disappointed, Neubacher moved ahead and worked with those
who were willing to cooperate at this early stage. While initially he was not in
much of a position to reject any Albanians with administrative experience, he
did make a point of avoiding many who had collaborated with the Italians.
Mustafa Kruja and Eqrem Libohova offered their services and were rejected,
partly because of their Italian connections and partly because of their failure.
Neubacher clearly was attempting to distance himself from the Italian past,
hoping to create a government in which fascism, which he recognized was
unpopular, played only a limited role. This attitude, of course, further restricted
his choices.
But some Albanians demonstrated enthusiasm for the Germans. The ¤rst
to lend the Germans unequivocal support, to no one’s surprise, came from the
new territories of Kosova and Çamëria. In Kosova, Scheiger and Deva, the
latter of whom had returned to Prizren after his meeting with Neubacher in
Belgrade, rallied local leaders through the creation of the Second League of
Prizren, hoping to capitalize on the late-nineteenth-century Albanian nation-
alist organization of the same name. The second league had but one principal
goal: the protection of Greater Albania. Many Albanian leaders in Çamëria,
too, were quick to cooperate with the Germans, since their hopes of becoming
part of the enlarged Albania were as dependent on Germany as were the hopes
of the Kosovars.52 These hopes, however, would never be realized. After con-
siderable delay, Neubacher decided that the only viable solution to the problem
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 169

was an exchange of population with the Greeks of southern Albania,53 but

even this policy was never carried out.
Neubacher believed that Germany’s position would be further enhanced
if he followed strictly constitutional procedures in structuring the new Alban-
ian government. First, he declared that the Libohova government no longer
existed, since Libohova had ¶ed to Italy with Lieutenant General Pariani.54
Some of Libohova’s colleagues had remained and agreed to stand in until a
new government could be formed, although Neubacher was loath to use them
too openly.55 Neubacher’s next move was to convince those Albanians with
whom he had been working, or with whom he had contact, to call for the
creation of a national committee to declare Albania independent and put
together a provisional executive committee. The principals in this process
included Deva, Bedri Pejani, the rather ardent president of the Second League
of Prizren, and Ibrahim Bey Biçaku, a major landowner from Elbasan, as the
primary representative from old Albania. The Italians had tried and failed on
several occasions to tempt Ibrahim Biçaku with the premiership, but he had
consistently declined.56 Although his refusal to collaborate with the Italians
lent him some credibility, it was generally recognized that both he and the
others from old Albania who rallied to the Germans at this early stage were
politicians of the second rank.
Once these individuals had gathered, discussions began but just as quickly
became bogged down. Neubacher, who never shied away from applying a
heavy hand when he considered it appropriate, reminded his friends that they
risked a traditional occupation regime if they could not come up with a gov-
ernment that recognized the necessity of the German presence. While press-
ing on the one hand, Neubacher withdrew to Belgrade on 12 September to
give the impression that the Albanians were doing all this on their own.57
These tactics seem to have succeeded, because on 14 September the
Kosovars and the few politicians from old Albania constructed a national
committee of twenty-two, headed by Pejani, with an executive committee of
six, headed by Biçaku, which functioned as a provisional government. Two of
the six were Kosovars and one, Mihal Zallari, a staunch pro-German. The ¤rst
task of the committee was to declare the independence of Albania. After
carefully reviewing the wording with Neubacher, the committee issued a proc-
lamation that brie¶y examined Albanian history to date, announced the end
of slavery under the Italians, and called for the creation of a representative
government. Neubacher was generally pleased with the declaration but found
it necessary to remove a reference to the desire of all Albanians to expand
Albania’s frontiers to include Mitrovica, to the detriment of Serbia. Neubacher
170 Chapter 6

feared that this would immediately become the goal of all Albanian national-
ists.58 But the Germans did eventually relent and gave the Albanians some
territory around Mitrovica that had been part of occupied Serbia.59
Representatives of the committee delivered the proclamation to Neu-
bacher at the German Consulate, where, we are told, the always attentive
hostess Frau Schliep had prepared refreshments for the “fathers of the Nation.”
Neubacher ¶ew to Belgrade the next day and soon to Germany, where Hitler
“who always had great interest in the last romantic corner of Europe” ex-
pressed himself to be very satis¤ed with developments.60
Again following careful constitutional forms, the committee next called
for the election of a national constituent assembly to draw up a new constitu-
tion. The plan for this step was developed and published in the of¤cial gov-
ernment organ, Kombi, on 19 September. Every community in Albania would
send three representatives, who, together with representatives from the district
towns, would elect one representative per ten thousand people. In cases where
this procedure was deemed not possible, people living in Tirana who had
connections with the local area would act as representatives. The provisional
executive committee would appoint representatives for the clergy, for “political
personalities,” and for the more inaccessible mountain regions.
Since much of the south was still essentially controlled by the resistance,
and since much of the north had reverted to traditional forms of tribal anarchy,
this system naturally could never have worked, particularly in a state with no
democratic tradition. And all of this was scheduled to be completed in two
weeks. The process, of course, allowed considerable room for creative manip-
ulation, much of it left to Scheiger. On 16 October Scheiger duly delivered
243 deputies to Tirana, heavily representative of the north.61 Tirana radio
announced their names, although the Allies were convinced that most of these
people were not actually present, their names being mentioned only to create
the impression of wide support for and cooperation with the Germans.62
Although there certainly was a good deal of subterfuge, by October the
Germans were having much better luck in attracting prominent Albanians.
Circumstances, often beyond the control of the Germans, had convinced many
Albanian politicians to abandon their earlier hesitancy. The fact that the ex-
pected Allied landing had not materialized was important, as was German
military success against the NLM. The removal of many Italian prisoners, too,
left a positive impression, but perhaps the most important factor was the
increasing hostility between the NLM and the BK. BK leaders were convinced
that the Germans would only stay for a short time, but they also recognized
that the Germans were a fact and would not go away immediately. BK leaders
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 171

reasoned that if the situation were handled carefully, the Germans could be
used against the BK’s domestic opponents, but only cooperation with the
Germans would bring this about. Chieftains from the north, including leaders
of the Catholic Mirdita tribe, became less obstructionist for the same reason.63
When the national constituent assembly met in October, then, Neubacher
had reason to hope that his original plan, of attracting prominent Albanians
to form an independent government that would relieve the Germans, could
now go forward. The assembly elected Lef Nosi, a prominent member of the
BK, as president. Nosi, an Orthodox Albanian from a well-to-do Elbasaner
commercial family, had good nationalist credentials. He had participated in
the declaration of Albanian independence in 1912 and served as a minister in
the ¤rst government.

The Council of Regency

Still careful to adhere to traditional constitutional form, the assembly under

Nosi passed a series of decrees that fundamentally altered Albania’s Italian-es-
tablished constitution. The union with Italy was of¤cially dissolved; many of
the laws passed after the Italian invasion were revoked; and Albania was
declared free, neutral, and independent. At the same time, the assembly re-
voked the draft law of June 1940 that declared Albania to be a co-belligerent
with Italy.64 The assembly reaf¤rmed the decrees of 1 September 1928, which
had declared Albania to be a royal dictatorship, a move calculated to attract
Abaz Kupi. While clearly leaving the road open for the possible return of Zog,
the assembly announced that Albania would be governed by a regency of
four—one representative from each of Albania’s four major religious commu-
nities—for the remainder of the war. The Germans, in this instance, were
being quite thorough and quite sensitive. They had created a government
similar to the one that had ruled after the retreat of Prince Wied in September
1914, demonstrating an appreciation for not only Albanian history but also for
Albania’s religious makeup. The Germans, like the Italians before them, would
be less successful in gauging social needs.
Given the uninspiring nature of the national committee and the provi-
sional executive, and the fact that with the restored constitution whatever
power the Albanians would have would be exercised by the regents, the choos-
ing of the regents took on added signi¤cance. Nosi was chosen as the Ortho-
dox representative. Representing the Sunni Moslems, the Germans were able
to attract Fuat Bey Dibra, a landowner from new Albania who, like Nosi, had
172 Chapter 6

a long and distinguished record. He had represented Albania at the Paris

conference in 1920 and was appointed, but never served, as minister of the
interior in the Vrioni government of 1920. Unlike the others, Dibra had served
in the collaborationist cabinet of Mustafa Kruja, but in November 1942 he had
been elected to the central committee of the BK and was therefore something
of a catch for the Germans.65 Albanian Catholics were represented by the prior
of the Franciscans in Shkodra, Father Anton Harapi, who maintained connec-
tions with both the Kosovars and the NLM. Learning of his appointment,
NLM emissaries unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade him from accepting.
Neubacher seems to have developed a warm personal relationship with
Harapi, in part because Harapi had received some of his education at the
monastery school of Meran and Hall in the Tyrol.66
But the biggest prize for the Germans was Mehdi Bey Frashëri, who
agreed to head the Council of Regency. Frashëri, a Bektashi Moslem, was one
of the most respected living Albanians. His career was long and distinguished;
he had served as governor of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, mayor of Durrës
under Prince Wied, and minister of the interior in 1920. During the 1930s he
held a myriad of signi¤cant posts, including prime minister from 1935 to
1936, when he constructed a relatively liberal regime made up of many young
Germanophiles. As we have seen, after the Italian invasion he was interned in
Italy, principally for having publicly castigated Mussolini for his destruction of
Albanian independence. While held in Italy, British documents suggest, he
was chosen as titular leader of the NLM. It is also likely that he was connected
with the BK in its early stages of development.
The Germans were appraised of his signi¤cance—most probably by his
son Vehbi—and began to search for him immediately after the invasion.67 The
venerable Albanian politician was found, and he agreed, on 16 September, to
return to Tirana for talks with Neubacher, Scheiger, and Schliep. Frashëri,
much to the chagrin of Neubacher, would not be rushed and drove a hard
bargain. He made it clear to Neubacher that while he was in sympathy with
the German position in Albania, he was concerned about his credibility with
the nationalists, and at the same time he was under intense pressure from the
NLM not to cooperate. While debating he negotiated for as much indepen-
dence as he could extract and hoped to convince the Germans to recognize
Albania’s full neutrality. Neubacher ¤nally agreed to recognize Albania’s “rela-
tive” neutrality and “relative” sovereignty, congratulating Frashëri on discover-
ing a new category in international law.68 Frashëri had achieved for Albania a
status similar to that of Croatia or Slovakia—the Germans were still clearly in
control, but something had been saved.
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 173

Frashëri, who must certainly be counted as an Albanian patriot, agreed to

serve as regent as well as head the council. The leadership of the council was
originally designed to rotate, but Neubacher tells us that Nosi declined for
health reasons and that Harapi argued that as a Catholic monk he could accept
no position in which he would be forced to sanction the death penalty.69
Frashëri explained soon afterward in a pamphlet published in Tirana that he
had accepted the position fearing that resistance to the Germans and the
growing con¶ict between the BK and the NLM would weaken Albania to the
point that it would become an easy target for neighboring states that coveted
Albanian territory. He and the BK leaders who joined with him also feared
that the NLM had become little more than a communist front designed to
camou¶age the party’s ultimate objective—the seizure of power.70 The Ger-
mans themselves reported that despite his acquiescence, Frashëri’s attitude
toward the Germans remained ambiguous, demonstrated perhaps by the fact
that throughout his tenure he continued to maintain feelers to the West
through Ankara.71

The Government of Mitrovica

Once committed, the regency moved to form a permanent government, which

would begin the process of ending the chaos and stabilizing Albania. Follow-
ing hurried negotiations, on 5 November, a government headed by the
Kosovar Rexhep Mitrovica was introduced. Mitrovica, too, boasted a long
political career, having taken part in the declaration of independence at Vlora
in 1912. A minister in 1921, he was forced to ¶ee Albania in 1924 after
standing with Zog’s Kosovar opponents. He became a leader of the so-called
Paris group, anti-Zog exiles, and then returned to Albania after the Italian
invasion, assuming a relatively minor role as a member of the Council of State.
In 1942 he joined the BK, and he was arrested by the Italians in 1943.72
The small cabinet, most of whom had credentials as nationalists as well as
some German or Austrian connection, included Deva as minister of the interior
and Rrok Kolaj, a Catholic from Shkodra who had studied at the University of
Graz, as minister of justice. The regents announced that the veteran politician
and diplomat Mehmet Konica, still in Rome, had accepted the portfolio of
minister at the reinstated foreign ministry. It seems, however, that he never
actually agreed; nor did he ultimately ever serve. The Austrian-educated Vehbi
Frashëri was appointed provisionally in his stead.73 The Orthodox Elbasaner
Sokrat Dodbiba, the nephew of Nosi, became minister of ¤nance. He had
174 Chapter 6

attended a business school in Vienna and had considerable experience in the

Finance Ministry. Ago Agaj, a Moslem landowner from Vlora, who had studied
agriculture in Austria, became minister of political economy, and Musa
Gjylbegu, a Moslem from Shkodra, became minister of labor. Eqrem Çabej,
who had studied linguistics in Austria and was a leading intellectual and edu-
cator, was offered the position of minister of education, but, like Konica, re-
fused. The vacant post was later ¤lled by Koço Muka, a member of the BK
central committee who had collaborated with the Italians.74
The Germans had done reasonably well. They had attracted some
signi¤cant people, although the group was predominantly from Kosova or
northern Albania. Most also had some connection with the Germans: a full
three-quarters of the government spoke German, most having spent some
time studying either in Germany or Austria. They were, then, primarily
Germanophile northerners and included few representatives of the Tosks in
the south and few people outside the rather narrow landlord class to whom
the Italians had appealed as well. Although far from “national,” then, the
government did include many national groups, including prewar in¶uential
politicians, both pro- and anti-Zog, representatives of the Catholic clergy,
representatives of the Geg tribes in the north, some individuals with BK
connections, and, of course, Kosovar nationalists.
But the nature of the government was perhaps more important than its
makeup. This nature can perhaps best be characterized by a statement issued
by Frashëri and published in the essentially uncensored Albanian press, which
occasionally even published uncensored Allied communiqués. In his New
Year’s address, the head regent, while thanking Hitler for freeing Albania,
announced that his social reforms would be based on “democratic principles
that eliminate all dictatorships.” Here we have a public of¤cial under German
occupation who in the of¤cial press declared his support for democracy and
opposition to dictatorships. This was certainly a far cry from the ingratiating
attempts at fawning on military masters demonstrated by those who collabo-
rated with the Italians. The Germans had succeeded, during a critical period,
in attracting a group of people that included many who had known pro-Allied
and democratic sentiments and who at the same time had rejected with scorn
the chance to collaborate with the Italians.75
Even the Allies registered grudging admiration for this initial German
achievement. Peter Kemp, a British liaison of¤cer in Albania, noted in his
memoirs that “it is a measure of their [the Germans’] success that when they
set up a puppet government, they were able to induce Albanians of high
principles and distinction to serve.”76
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 175

Mitrovica’s government, working through the constituent assembly that

had simply declared itself the new national assembly, proved to be energetic in
the early months of the German occupation. Not blind to the challenges, in his
¤rst address to the National Assembly Mitrovica noted that four and a half years
of Italian domination had left anarchy and chaos in Albania. The pre-1939 state
apparatus had been completely dismantled. The Italians had destroyed the army,
the gendarmerie, the police, and the Foreign Ministry; they had changed the
¶ag, altered personal greetings, renamed cities, and even reassigned family
names. To reestablish the state, Mitrovica set down an ambitious plan that
included reestablishing local government on the pre-1939 basis, gaining foreign
recognition, reorganizing the economy, introducing effective agrarian reform,
and creating a military force.77 The general goal of the government, and this was
repeated at every available opportunity, was to protect Albania’s territorial integ-
rity within its ethnic borders. The principal obstacle was the NLM and more
speci¤cally its communist core, which Mitrovica identi¤ed as un-Albanian. He
argued that the “Albanians, as Aryans of Illyrian heritage, could not ignore
tradition and would be saved from the hydra of communism.”78
Mitrovica’s program was reasonably progressive. Margaret Hasluck, who
advised SOE in Cairo, was moved to exclaim that “the lines of government
policy would meet with our warm approval if we were not at war with the
country whose armed forces now occupy Albania.”79 Mitrovica’s program, had
it been successfully carried out, might have achieved what both the govern-
ment and the Germans had hoped for: a stable regime, with enough popular
support, or at least respect, and a loyal, effective security force to unburden the
Germans. To the great disappointment of the Germans, Mitrovica, and his far
less effective successors, failed in their efforts, ironically, at least partially as a
result of German inaction.
International recognition would have lent the government considerable
domestic legitimacy and might even have favorably impressed the Allies. Ger-
man resistance and obstructionism in this regard showed that they were cer-
tainly fallible in their policy toward Albania, or at least that they were willing
to go only so far. In late November the Albanian government asked the Ger-
mans to help them convince the Bulgarians to extend recognition. Schliep
supported the request, suggesting that Bulgarian recognition would strengthen
the government.80 At the same time, Mehdi Frashëri began negotiations for
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Switzerland and Turkey, which
continued to show a paternalistic interest in its co-religionists in Albania. That
he did so through Bulgaria, without consulting Schliep, caused some alarm at
the German Foreign Ministry. Berlin argued that although the neutral states
176 Chapter 6

should not be approached, perhaps at least those states under German control
might be asked to extend recognition. Neubacher seems to have agreed, but
noted that there was no hurry.81 But after these states were canvassed, the only
regime willing to extend recognition to the Albanians was Ante Pavelic’s
Ustashi regime in Croatia. In the end Neubacher would not even go this far,
arguing that the Croatians had little interest in Albania and that a Croatian
representative in Tirana would only serve as a conduit for bad news. He was
also apparently afraid of offending the Serbs.82
In a related matter, Vehbi Frashëri asked the Germans at the beginning
of November to transform the German Consulate General into an embassy.
In February, while in Berlin, Frashëri repeated his request, but again there
seems to have been little immediate action.83 Schliep was ¤nally elevated to
the level of ambassador, but since this did not happen until July 1944, any
possible good effect the move might have had was squandered.
In the matter of land reform, one of Albania’s most pressing needs, the
Mitrovica government made a start, but ultimately settled for little more than
a token gesture. Mitrovica announced that state land would be sold to twenty-
¤ve hundred “proletarian farmers” at prices they would be able to afford. While
little of this land was actually distributed, the move certainly encouraged many
landless rural laborers to think twice about joining the resistance, for fear of
missing even the slightest chance of becoming one of the fortunate twenty-¤ve
hundred.84 As agrarian reform, however, this was rather pathetic—but realis-
tically, could the Germans have expected more? After all, the government
consisted primarily of men who had little to gain by such a process. The
Germans had attached themselves to the traditional elite, the large landowners
and beys, those people who were the natural enemies of the communists and
who had something in common with the Germans themselves, linguistically
and culturally. The Germans, by tying themselves to the narrow European-ed-
ucated elite, who had no ties to the common Albanian, denied themselves a
knowledge of the needs of the average Albanian.85 The Germans created a
German ghetto and spawned an atmosphere of the “ugly German,”86 similar
to what the Americans created in Southeast Asia in the 1960s.

The Albanian Economy under the Germans

Economic stabilization remained another unattained goal. Without intending

to, the Germans complicated Albania’s economic picture and added consider-
ably to the day-to-day hardship experienced by the average Albanian. The
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 177

extent to which the Albanian economy had become dependent on Italian

subsidies was evidenced by the last budget under the Italians. Expenditures for
1943 to 1944 were estimated at 147 million francs, with revenues of only 107
million. The de¤cit, one-third of the budget, was to be made up by the
Italians.87 The Germans had no intention of underwriting the Albania econ-
omy. And unlike the Italians, who had maintained their troops almost solely
by the importation of food from Italy, the Germans hoped to live off domestic
resources. The Germans had fewer mouths to feed than the Italians—no more
than thirty-six thousand, a number that steadily decreased during the German
occupation—but Albania had never really been able to take care of its own
needs. The surplus from Kosova helped to avert disaster, but even with Kosova
deliveries, prices rose, causing shortages. Exacerbated by poor weather, Ger-
man policy even caused famine conditions in southern Albania during the
spring of 1944. Although the situation never approached the grim reality of
Greece, the dif¤cult circumstances for which the Germans were at least par-
tially to blame eroded Albanian patience.88
When Hitler was asked by Bulgarian prime minister Dobri Bojiloff what
plans he had for Albania, he answered that he intended to keep its business in
good order.89 Not only did he not keep Albania’s business in good order, but
he did not have a plan. The German occupation of Albania began on a pre-
carious economic footing precisely because the Germans did not have an
economic plan. As with their political program, it was improvised and, as a
result, often caused problems that might have been avoided.
The economic problems began within days of the German invasion. When
the Germans entered Tirana they had hoped to ¤nd enough money in the
National Bank of Albania to pay their troops. This was to be considered a loan.
But they found only thirty million francs, and overhead expenses for the Ger-
man army in Albania proved to be about forty million francs a month. With
some degree of urgency they turned to the German authorities in Rome, where
an SS commando raid had recently captured 120 million francs in notes, the
plates, twenty-three sacks of gold coin, and twenty-nine cases of gold bars from
the main branch of the National Bank of Albania. The gold was sent to Berlin,
and the plates, which later turned out to be defaced, were sent to Belgrade, but
most of the paper money was sent to Tirana.90 The same plane that brought
Mehdi Bey Frashëri back to Albania also carried—without Frashëri’s knowl-
edge—substantial sums, which were immediately transferred to the National
Bank of Albania in Tirana.91 The money was used to pay German troops in
Albania and Montenegro. It was also used to ¤nance German construction
projects, airports, road repair, and coastal gun emplacements.
178 Chapter 6

This seemingly wanton disregard for the Albanian economy soon bore
bitter fruit. As early as 16 October Schliep told the Foreign Ministry that the
money in possession of German troops was threatening the Albanian econ-
omy. The Albanian government complained bitterly that in¶ation was ram-
pant, with prices reported to be some fourteen times what they had been in
1939. The population had begun to resent the Germans, Schliep was told.
Neubacher, who had assumed direction of economic policy in the Balkans
through a direct order from Hitler, responded energetically. He asked the
army, which disclaimed responsibility for Albania’s economic morass, to re-
strict its purchase of domestically produced goods to a bare minimum. The
army simply could not do without items such as oil, fruit, meat, ¤sh, wool, and
leather, and ultimately, of course, the needs of the German military out-
weighed the health of the Albanian economy. Still, the army made a serious
effort to comply, by reducing consumption as well as importing gold (not that
con¤scated in Rome) and manufactured goods, both in short supply in Alba-
nia. The gold was sold on the free market to offset the National Bank of
Albania’s dearth of notes. The most important articles the Germans imported
included sugar, medicine, chemicals, and spare parts.
But neither method satis¤ed Albania’s needs or even paid Germany’s
debts in Albania, once the extensive exportation of raw materials was fully
under way. To make matters worse, the German soldiers suffered from the level
of in¶ation as well—their pay was rarely increased to account for in¶ation
unlike the pay of the German police; the people who worked for the Todt
Organization, a German construction agency active in Albania; and other
civilians. In order to survive, a substantial black market developed, which
German authorities were never able to control successfully.92
In an attempt to prevent the total collapse of the Albanian economy, a
comprehensive agreement was negotiated between the Germans and their
puppet regime in December 1943, which was intended to solve some of the
economic problems the German invasion had caused. The German negotia-
tors and the Albanian government agreed that Germany accept responsibility
for ¤nancing the costs of the German army, for repairing the destruction
caused by the invasion, and for ¤nancing strategic projects—although some
Albanian ¤nancial participation in road construction was speci¤ed. The Ger-
mans admitted the use of 46.5 million Albanian francs during the early
months of the occupation, which they agreed to repay as quickly as possible
with 3 percent interest. (However, this apparently was never done. Indeed the
sums the Germans owed to the Albanian government for support of the army
increased to 81 million francs by August 1944. Some Albanian sources set the
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 179

¤gure for the entire German debt at 430 million francs by November 1944.)93
The agreements also set down some basic principles regulating trade, with
secret protocols dealing with the exploitation of raw materials.94
But the Germans also took some practical steps to stabilize the Albanian
economy. The Reichsbank disgorged more gold—Neubacher maintained at
the Nuremberg trials that the ¤nal amount approached 0.3 tons.95 The Ger-
man military also began selling items such as bandages, medicine, and iron,
which had been taken as spoils from the Italians, as well as large quantities of
sugar taken from German stores. The Germans began growing their own
animal feed, as well as vegetables and potatoes for the troops. The German
army even became directly involved in Albanian light industry, producing
among other things soap, cigarettes, olive oil, beer, cement, explosives, and
various iron products.96
There was some mutual bene¤t from these arrangements. The National
Bank of Albania reported that over the ¤ve months after the agreements were
signed, in¶ation slowed somewhat, with prices increasing from 3,004.1 in
January to 3,378.9 in May, based on a 1939 index of 100.97 Nevertheless, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Germans bene¤ted the most from the ¤nancial
arrangements, particularly in the extraction of raw materials.
The ¤rst problem confronting the Germans in raw material extraction
was the lack of usable geological reports. The Zog regime had done little, and
the Italians had been remiss as well. The Wehrmacht found the Austrian
geologist Dr. Ernest Nowack, who had worked in Albania during World War
I. He was assigned as an of¤cer to the 501st Motorized Battalion and began
work immediately. Still, it was not until May 1944, ¤ve months before the
German withdrawal, that an effective raw material map was ready.98 In the
meantime, of course, the Germans actively exploited existing mines.
The second problem was to avoid the label of colonial exploiter. Neu-
bacher addressed this problem at a meeting with representatives of German
¤rms interested in Albanian raw material that took place as early as September
1943. He told agents from the mining concerns Neuhausen and Südostmon-
tan that although there must be no interruption of raw material deliveries, the
Albanian government must be given letters of credit for everything shipped
since the collapse of Italy. The negotiations with the Albanian government
must be regulated on the basis of the German ¤rms acting as buyers, and all
relations would function in strict accordance with the notion of an indepen-
dent state.99 While there was never a question of the Albanians looking for
other buyers, Neubacher was again carrying out his instructions to the letter.
The ¤ction of independence was maintained.
180 Chapter 6

The Germans expressed an interest in a variety of raw materials and found

important mineral deposits, but transportation problems prevented the exploi-
tation of the copper southeast of Shkodra and the iron ore in the south. The
Germans were able to take advantage of the lignite in Kosova and the zinc and
lead mines in Trepça from which they were able to extract about 40 percent of
their total lead requirements. Other coal sources around Tirana provided the
city and the surrounding area with much of its fuel. High-quality magnesium
was found at Godolesh, and despite the problem of water in the mine and the
ever present transportation problems, signi¤cant amounts were extracted and
shipped to Germany.100
Oil and chrome remained, as they had under the Italians, the two most
important resources. While Albanian oil was less important than the chrome for
the Germans, the Wehrmacht nevertheless maintained that Albanian oil was
second only to Romanian oil in its importance. The ¤rst problem faced by the
Germans with regard to oil was that in September Albania’s most active ¤elds at
Devoll in the south were in partisan hands. But by the end of October the ¤elds
were cleared and technicians from “Oilcompany 33” were sent from the Ostmark
to replace the Italian Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP) technicians.
As the exportation of crude oil was deemed impractical, the next problem
was re¤ning. The Italians had piped the crude to Vlora, re¤ned it in Bari, and
sent the fuel back by ship. As the Allies controlled the Adriatic, this was no
longer an option. The Germans decided to re¤ne it in place. Devoll itself had
only one small primitive re¤nery that produced enough fuel to run the ¤elds.
The Germans decided to build four small Heckmann re¤neries with the hope
that at least the needs of the Wehrmacht in Albania could be met. Because of
the dif¤culty of transporting heavy parts over Albania’s inadequate roads, the
¤rst small re¤nery did not go into operation until May 1944.
It was not until July 1944 that an agreement with the Albanian govern-
ment was worked out as to ownership and payment. The Wehrmacht argued
for some time that the ¤elds should be considered war spoils, since German
troops had recovered and protected the ¤elds. It is clear that not all elements
of the German administration were as enthusiastic as Neubacher about main-
taining the notion of Albanian independence. Still, as usual Neubacher got his
way. The Wehrmacht surrendered control of the ¤elds to the civilian Albanian
Oil GmbH, a subsidiary of Continental Oil GmbH, which negotiated a deal
with the Albanian government. German military sources maintain that during
the period of operation, that is, until the middle of October 1944, approxi-
mately one million tons of crude were pumped, although there are no German
¤gures concerning the amount of actual fuel produced.101 Albanian ¤gures
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 181

suggest that both the needs of the military and the needs of the civilian
population were met. By June 1944 there was apparently even a surplus, but
by July Allied air attacks began to cause considerable damage.102
By far the most important resource the Germans found in Albania was
chrome, indispensable in weapons production. Deposits were located at Bulqiz
and Kukës in the north and Pogradec in the south. In a memo to Hitler in
November 1943, Armaments Minister Albert Speer argued that if for no other
reason, the Balkans had to be held for the chrome. Without it, he continued,
supplies would be depleted in ¤ve or six months, and in another three to four
months, production of aircraft, tanks, submarines, grenades, and artillery would
stop.103 Albanian supplies became even more important after Turkish chrome—
Germany’s principal source—was cut off in April 1944. The Germans found
rich deposits of chrome, enough to satisfy a substantial part of their needs, in
both old and new Albania. As with other Albanian resources, the Germans
were hampered by pricing negotiations with the puppet regime and the peren-
nial transportation problems. Of the two problems, pricing negotiations proved
the less signi¤cant, since mining, often with the use of experienced Italian labor,
and deliveries continued uninterrupted during the talks.
Transportation was a greater problem. The chrome was important enough
for the Germans to contemplate the construction of a railroad from the mines
at Djakova in Kosova to Pec. German planners correctly assumed that ship-
ment by truck, given a lack of trucks and spare parts, not to mention the bad
roads, could never keep pace with production. But a railroad proved impracti-
cal, because the Germans assumed that their stay was limited. Trucks appeared
to be the only option. Neubacher negotiated a complex scheme with the
Albanian government whereby the Albanians would provide funds to improve
the mines and continue with the soon-to-be-abandoned railroad project, in
exchange for 120 trucks and scheduled payments for the chrome. The Al-
banians agreed, but the Wehrmacht refused to give up any trucks. A prolonged
paper war followed between the Foreign Ministry, the Reichswirtschaft min-
ister, and the army, culminating in Hitler’s being informed of the dispute.
Subsequent to a strong letter from the Reichswirtschaft minister to Field
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Albania received sixty trucks. As assumed, trucks
were able to bring out just over half of the chrome being mined, but still, the
Germans were able to export one-sixth of their total chrome requirements
from these Albanian mines.104 The Germans transported away more chrome
than they could pay for, and at the time of the German withdrawal they owed
the Albanians considerable sums. Economically, the Germans did well by the
Albanians; the reverse was rarely the case.
182 Chapter 6

Unlike the Italians, the Germans provided little employment, with the
exception perhaps of the mines, the construction of coastal installations, and
the roads. Although all three were important, the roads were perhaps the
highest priority for the Germans. Given Albanian geography—an extensive
Adriatic seacoast as well as good harbors—Albania had traditionally been
dependent on seaborne transportation. Because the Adriatic was not secure for
the Germans, other forms of transportation were needed. The Germans found
virtually no railroads in Albania, with the exception of a narrow-gauge line
from Struga over Tetovo to Skopje, which had been constructed for the
chrome mines of Pogradec. Kosova possessed a line from Skopje through
Kosova to Belgrade that became important in the German retreat but was of
little signi¤cance in inter-Albanian transportation. There were no usable nat-
ural or arti¤cial waterways with the exception of a short canal connecting Lake
Shkodra to the Adriatic.105
This left only the roads, and taking, holding, and maintaining them be-
came one of the central problems of the entire German occupation. The long
distance roads, mostly built by the Italians, were the ¤rst priority. These in-
cluded the north-south roads Himara-Shkodra over Durrës and Vlora and in
the east from Florina over Korça-Struga to Kosova. The principal east-west
roads ran over the southern line Bitolj-Struga-Elbasan-Tirana and in the
north Urosevac over Prizren to Shkodra. Roads of secondary importance in-
cluded the road to Devoll because of the oil and the Elbasan-Peqin-Kavaja-
Durrës road, which played a crucial role in the German retreat.106
Once again, the Germans experienced relative success. Responsibility for
maintenance and security of Albanian roads was divided between the regular
army and the German military authority in Albania, or DGA. The regular
army was assigned the strategically important thoroughfares, with the German
military administration responsible for the rest. The military administration
of¤cials complained that the corps could and did avail themselves of the
service of the Todt Organization, which had the funds to hire private compa-
nies and pay higher wages. To complicate matters further for the occupation
authorities, when Todt pulled out suddenly in August 1944, it left without
paying a substantial debt, and those owed money, both individuals and ¤rms,
directed their claims to the German military administration and not the reg-
ular army.
Still, the Germans considered their efforts with regard to the roads to be
successful. Although the German military authorities in Tirana had only Al-
banian and Italian ¤rms with which to work, and although their responsibili-
ties were signi¤cantly increased in August 1944, the roads were generally kept
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 183

secure and in good shape when the Germans needed them. This was possible
partly because the Italian construction ¤rms worked without pay and because
of the efforts of the Albanian technical minister in charge, Hifzi Korça. A
German report names Korça as a pro-German with remarkable abilities and
energy.107
Although the principal roads remained basically under German control,
much of the rest of the country did not, despite the best effort of the Germans
and the puppet governments. The latter, for their part, hoped to contribute
through a legal system. The government posted stringent laws against sabotage
and set up a draconian court called the “Court for the Protection of the Nation.”
The court was given wide jurisdiction against what it called espionage and also
against acts in “con¶ict with the orders of the High Council and orders of the
government.”108 But this court could only have been effective with credible
security forces behind it. This was perhaps the most signi¤cant failure of the
Germans and their puppets. This was a crucial goal not only because it aimed
to legitimize the government but also because it aimed to unburden the Ger-
mans, who by the fall of 1943 had even fewer troops to spare.

German Security Plans

The original plan for Albanian security, in Neubacher’s words, was to effect a
“national mobilization against the communists.”109 The Germans hoped to do
this by a number of steps, including arming and using some nationalist bands,
creating and maintaining an Albanian army and gendarmerie corps—some-
thing from which the Italians had shied away—and, ¤nally, creating an indig-
enous SS division in Kosova. The original enthusiasm for these units quickly
died, however, when it became clear that not only were they of questionable
value militarily, but in many cases the Albanian units did much to alienate the
population as a result of brutality and a penchant for plunder.110
The ¤rst part of the German plan, to arm and use existing bands, was set
in motion within days of the German invasion. In the hopes of attracting the
Gegs of the north, the Germans released many of those who had been im-
prisoned by the Italians and essentially allowed the governing of the region—
with the exception of the sensitive coastal areas—to revert to its traditional
state of tribal rule, with its blood feuds and bandit chiefs, no tax collection,
and the only law the ancient code of Lek Dukagjini.111 As we have seen,
Italian neglect of the north encouraged this process as well, but German policy
did so to a greater extent over a greater area. The goodwill produced by this
184 Chapter 6

hands-off policy was exploited by Captain Lange, Neubacher’s military adju-

tant attached to Abwehr II. Lange’s task was to attempt to build something of
a national militia projected at some thirty thousand, to serve as a reserve.
Lange turned to the Catholic Mirdita and to the ever loyal Kosovars. The
Mirdita were chosen for their signi¤cance in the north and because they had
cooperated with the Austrians in World War I and with the Italians in World
War II. Negotiations proved successful, and in exchange for money and weap-
ons the Mirdita secured the crucial Prizren-Kukës-Puka-Shkodra road for the
Germans. The situation in central and southern Albania was much more
complex, although the Germans did win the cooperation of many BK çetas—
often armed with captured Italian weapons—in the drive against the partisans.
But the Germans were initially hesitant to attach themselves too closely to the
BK, with Schliep notifying Berlin that in his estimate the BK were cooperat-
ing only in order to make off with German weapons.112
The most notable militia units proved to be a battalion of six hundred to
seven hundred volunteers from Kosova whom Neubacher hoped, because of
their loyalty, could be relied upon to secure German lines of communication
and perhaps even occupy Tirana.113 These troops, who were trained at Zemun
and led by Lieutenant Colonel Adem Boletini, marched to Tirana at the end
of September 1943 wearing their Italian uniforms.114 Their behavior, however,
did the Germans more harm than good, as they ravaged the countryside like
a conquering army of old. The same was true of the twelve hundred armed
gendarmes that Deva brought from Mitrovica to Tirana in December. With
Fitzthum, the SS chief in Albania, directing operations, the unit “arrested
communists” and “sacked unreliable of¤cials” along the way.115 They became a
thoroughly undisciplined version of storm troopers for the regime. Lange was
able to produce some results bene¤cial to the Germans, but it is questionable
whether the bene¤t was worth the negative impact of Kosovar brutality, or the
14,000 ri¶es and 425 machine guns and extensive supplies and money the
Albanians extracted from the Germans.116
The second phase of the German plans, the construction of a regular
Albanian army and a gendarmerie under German supervision but Albanian
control, proved to be even more dif¤cult. Because nothing of what the Italians
had constructed remained after the German invasion, the Germans were re-
quired to start anew. The task was assigned to General Fitzthum and to
General Gustav Fehn, the commander of the Twenty-¤rst Corps. The project
was doomed from the beginning, partially because Fitzthum, who had been
sent by Himmler to advise the Albanian government on police matters (with-
out an actual command), disliked working with the Albanian authorities.117
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 185

Following considerable reassessment, the Germans decided, in April

1944, that any more than 8,250 troops for the army and 2,400 for the gendar-
merie would be unrealistic. Even this ¤gure proved to be very optimistic, and
far fewer were ultimately enlisted. The problems, aside from Fitzthum’s
attitude, included a lack of instructors, a lack of Albanian of¤cers and non-
commissioned of¤cers, and a failed recruitment program. Finally, those Alban-
ian soldiers who successfully completed the program proved to be highly un-
reliable. After the operation turned into a ¤asco, Fitzthum wrote angrily to
Himmler that one battalion dissolved after being attacked by a few planes and
the rest just disappeared.118
The ¤nal attempt to use Albanians as support troops, equally unsuccess-
ful, was Fitzthum’s notion of creating an Albanian SS division under direct
German command. Himmler took personal interest in this project, recalling
the legendary elite Bosnian-Herzogovinian regiments that had fought for the
Habsburgs in World War I.119 But Neubacher objected, arguing that an SS
detachment was incompatible with the notion of an independent Albania.
With the help of the Foreign Ministry, as well pressure from SS General Ernst
Kaltenbrunner, Himmler was initially dissuaded. By February 1944, however,
because of increasing pressure on the Germans and because the Albanian
government itself favored the plan, Hitler gave Himmler his personal approval
for the creation of the SS “Skanderbeg” Division. Although this formation
would remain under direct German control, its advertised agenda was to re-
main entirely Albanian. The “Skanderbeg” Division was to serve only in
Kosova and was to protect ethnic Albania.120
Although the SS had originally planned a division of ten thousand to
twelve thousand, just over six thousand were recruited. The division ultimately
consisted of approximately ¤fteen hundred prisoners of war, natives of Kosova
who had served in the Yugoslav army, plus remnants of the failed Albanian
army and gendarmerie, volunteers from both old and new Albania, and ¤nally
draftees, from families with more than two sons. Although the division proved
to be the government’s and the Germans’ most useful tool, its success, too, was
limited. Neubacher tells us that the division, during the early stages of training,
was poorly led into an action against the partisans and performed rather badly.
This was followed by some desertions, partially because Serb partisans were
attacking Kosova northeast of Gusinje. Units of the division gained an unen-
viable reputation, apparently preferring rape, pillage, and murder to ¤ghting,
particularly in Serbian areas. The Germans were forced to disarm battalions at
Pec and Prizren, arresting the Albanian of¤cers and sending them to the camp
at Prishtina. One commanding of¤cer was sent to prison in Germany. The
186 Chapter 6

units that remained intact were sent against the Serbs, which is why many had
joined, that is, to ¤ght the hereditary enemy. By October 1944 some thirty-¤ve
hundred, or more than half the original force, had deserted.121 Himmler was
ultimately forced to disband the unit prior to the German exodus from Alba-
nia, with the more reliable members transferred to the 14th SS Mountain
Regiment of the 7th SS Mountain Division.122
Like Neubacher, the Germans on the spot in Albania tended to blame the
Albanians for the failure of their schemes. The German commander of the SS
“Skanderbeg” Division, Major General August Schmidhuber, explained his
failure by suggesting that Albanians had not developed culturally since the
time of Skënderbeg in the ¤fteenth century. In his estimation, they had devel-
oped no concept of “state” or “nation,” indeed, they had vegetated. He argued
that the legend of Albanian military heroics was just a saga and that he
personally could chase them all around the world with a light grenade
launcher. They went on the attack only as long as there was something to
steal.123 The staff of the Twenty-¤rst Corps came to very similar conclusions,
blaming the lack of nation-state traditions and the impetuosity of the Balkan
temperament for the failure to sustain an effective security force. General
Fitzthum, a particularly arrogant racist who had always had trouble interacting
with Albanians, blamed all his troubles on the Albanian of¤cer corps, which
he maintained was not only worthless but ¤lled with pederasts.124
Later, somewhat more detached observers within the Wehrmacht argued
that the principal problem may have rested with the Germans themselves.
Fitzthum not withstanding, many German of¤cials were more than willing to
work with the Albanians but complained that the structure that Neubacher
had set up restricted contact between Germans and Albanians. It would have
been logical, German critics maintained, for the Germans to work with local
of¤cials, from prefects on down, in their efforts to keep the Albanians calm.
But Neubacher’s representatives resisted German interference in Albanian af-
fairs, even as late as September 1944, just two months before the German
withdrawal.125 The German plan to extend a level of autonomy in Albania,
while often successful, clearly was not without its dif¤culties, and it lost the
Germans some indigenous support.
The precise level of support the Germans and their puppet regime en-
joyed in Albania is, of course, dif¤cult to gage. That it was higher than in other
areas of occupied Europe is clear. In Greece, for example, popular support for
the resistance was almost universal. This can be explained by the wretched
conditions German actions produced. Because Greece was of little economic
value to the German war machine, the Germans had little interest in the
The German Invasion and the Construction of a German Albania 187

health of the economy. German troops were allowed to strip the country clean,
and the Allied blockade prevented resupply. The result was famine conditions
in Athens and on some of the islands in 1941 to 1942.126
In Albania the Germans made a genuine effort, often to their own disad-
vantage, to leave the people with the impression that they possessed at least
some level of autonomy. Albania was also spared at least some of the brutality
the Germans in¶icted on most of the remainder of the area under their con-
trol. There was no effort to forcibly recruit labor from old Albania for the
Reich.127 German military authorities complained that an opportunity was lost
here, particularly in light of the fact that more and more Albanians volun-
teered as the security situation degenerated. But this was deemed impractical,
¤rst, because it was incompatible with the notion of Albanian independence
and, second, because the Germans in Albania were ultimately faced with a
labor shortage in signi¤cant areas such as road maintenance. The German
authorities broached the idea of a domestic labor service, but Deva maintained
that it would not work. The Germans ultimately agreed that the coercive
power of the state would not suf¤ce, and the idea was dropped.128
For the most part, the Germans also refrained from hunting, deporting,
and exterminating Jews there. The small Jewish population in old Albania,
estimated at 200 by the Wannsee conference, was protected by the indepen-
dent status the Germans had conferred on the Albanian state.129 Indeed, Al-
bania is certainly the only state in Europe where the Jewish population actually
grew during the Axis occupation; it is estimated that there were 1,800 Jews in
Albania at the end of the war.130 Albania became a haven for small numbers
of Jews who managed to escape the horrors the Jews of Greece and Yugoslavia
experienced.131 Albanians took them in and have since been honored by the
Israeli government for their efforts. This policy did not, however, apply to the
Jews of Kosova, where 281 were arrested by the SS “Skanderbeg” and were
most likely sent to the camp at Prishtina before being transported into the
Reich.132
In the same vain, Mehdi Frashëri was able to negotiate an agreement with
the Germans in February of 1944 that stipulated that Albanian prisoners would
not be transported out of the country. Three camps in old Albania were used,
and a new one in Prishtina was constructed in the summer of 1944.133 Although
the Germans did not always live up to this agreement, particularly near the end
of the occupation, it did make for effective propaganda in early 1944.
Given these considerations, a German historian has estimated that the
¤rst Albanian government under the Germans was received favorably by 25 to
30 percent of the population, leaving 30 to 35 percent neutral and 35 to 45
188 Chapter 6

percent in opposition.134 Numerous Allied sources give evidence of widespread

support for the Germans and their government. In the north and northeast
support was widespread, particularly after the Germans took up the defense of
the area against attacks by the Çetniks of Colonel Draza Mihailovic. In Oc-
tober, for example, the Çetniks attacked Place and Gusinje. The inhabitants
put up ¤erce resistance but were ultimately saved by the Germans. Even in the
south the Germans were not always unwelcome, since they seem to have
treated the Albanians better than had some of their previous Balkan occupi-
ers.135 It is probably not an overstatement to suggest that the German position
actually improved from month to month until the end of June 1944, ¤ve
months before the German withdrawal from Albania.
This surprising level of support inevitably began to erode, however, prin-
cipally because of the continued growth of the resistance and the reprisals the
Germans exacted as a result. The continued growth of resistance was the single
most important factor explaining the failure of German plans at paci¤cation
of the country through the construction of an independent regime with pres-
tige and its own military authority for ¤ghting the NLM.
C H A P T E R 7

RESISTANCE TO THE GERMANS

The story of Albanian resistance to the Germans is one of complexity and

controversy. Although the resistance picture in Albania was by no means sim-
ple under the Italians, the arrival of the German forces contributed to the
further splintering of the movement. And astute German policy did much to
reduce the effectiveness of the many pieces as well as help insure the failure of
various efforts aimed at reconciliation. The Germans succeeded in pitting the
various elements of the resistance against each other, ultimately co-opting all
but the partisans. It is reasonable to argue that in doing so the Germans did
much to insure a partisan victory. But at the same time, German policy also
allowed for the subjugation of Albania with a comparatively small number of
second-level troops, often Russian former POWs. In a military sense, the
strategy of the resistance can hardly be considered successful. In a political
sense, the partisans were able to insure dominance in a postwar Albania.
Resistance to the Germans began rather tentatively, principally because of
the German invasion’s speed and effectiveness. The Italian collapse resulted in
a momentary power vacuum that the resistance groups––partisans, national-
ists, and independent chieftains—seem to have taken advantage of, each grab-
bing as much territory as possible in anticipation of an Allied invasion. Abaz
Kupi took Kruja in the northwest, and Muharrem Bajraktari took Kukës in
the northeast. The partisans, who were much more active, not only consoli-
dated their hold on much of the southern countryside but also occupied Korça,
Gjirokastra, Elbasan, and Berat. The BK, by now somewhat less prepared to
pursue military activity, was active in the area around Vlora.1 But this activity
proved to be little more than a minor obstacle once German forces poured into
Albania. Although the nationalist chiefs and the partisans could occupy virtu-
ally undefended towns, they were less willing to actively resist battle-hardened
German troops.
There seem to have been a number of reasons why this was the case. First,
most Albanians believed that with the Italian collapse, an Allied invasion was
imminent. The Allies did much to spread this idea widely, in what was called
189
190 Chapter 7

operation “Bodyguard,” an attempt to draw attention away from the projected

Normandy landings.2 None of the groups in Albania was willing to expend
scant resources against the Germans, who they assumed would soon be re-
moved by the Allies. And the Albanians had a much higher regard for German
military prowess than they had had for the Italians. It is generally accepted,
therefore, that the German invasion encountered little resistance, precisely
how much will remain in dispute.
Hermann Neubacher maintains in his book, although he certainly is ex-
aggerating, that the Germans encountered no unfriendly act on the part of the
Albanians. He asserted that the BK did not resist the Germans,3 and this is
supported by Schliep, who accepted the assurances of Mithat Frashëri that
although the BK had declared itself against the Axis during the Italian occu-
pation, it would take no hostile act against the Germans.4 While a British
BLO argued that Kupi “fought like a lion,” Neubacher reported that Kupi
remained in the woods.5 It seems, however, that both the BK and Kupi made
some initial limited anti-German moves. Abaz Ermenji, a member of the BK
central council, resisted the Germans brie¶y, and Kupi struck at the Germans
once on 21 September but then decided to await developments before com-
mitting his forces. The discrepancy in accounts likely stems from the fact that
the Germans were often unaware of who their attackers were.
But similar discrepancies can be found regarding partisan resistance. So-
cialist historiography suggests that the partisans ¤ercely resisted the German
invasion, in¶icting some 3,000 dead in one battle on 14 September.6 While
this is certainly an exaggeration, the partisans, as usual, did most of the ¤ght-
ing. The partisans had demonstrated their attitude toward the Germans early
by attacking a German convoy on the road from Korça to Ioannina in July,
prior to the invasion. The Germans responded by destroying the town of
Borova near Korça and killing 107 civilians.7 German documents mention
some further hostile action in September, organized and carried out by com-
munist bands.8
The Germans responded to this scattered resistance, as they had to the
July attack, with swift and brutal reprisals, hoping to quickly discourage fur-
ther resistance prior to the institution of their soft political program. This
brutality was accompanied by the rather naive suggestion that the partisans
simply go home now that the Italians had been ejected. Neither of these
strategies was particularly successful, the resistance continued, although not, to
be sure, in the same fashion and in the same form as it had under the Italians.
The German invasion had a profound impact on Albanian resistance, the
most immediate manifestation of which was a further distancing between the
Resistance to the Germans 191

NLM and other real or at least potential resistance groups, as well as the
splintering of the NLM, a process that began with the failure of the Mukje
Agreements. The BK, which had long since ceased to oppose the occupation
actively as a organization, was ordered on 7 October, by its central council, to
cease hostilities—not to say that there was much—against the Germans, and
most of the BK units complied.9 As under the Italians, the BK hoped to avoid
reprisals, a particular problem for the BK, since many of the strongest BK
centers were in towns and exposed districts of the coastal plain, areas under
strict German control. This, they hoped, would increase their political stock
among Albanians. The BK also hoped that their general attitude would en-
courage the Germans to supply them with weapons for the inevitable show-
down with the partisans.10 At this point, much of the BK slipped into a more
complete collaboration than they had committed to under the Italians. BK
bands ¤rst began to inform on NLM activity to avoid reprisals; then they
began to receive funds from the Germans and were allowed to purchase weap-
ons both from the collaborationist government and the Germans. Soon they
were administering large sections of the country for both. By the beginning of
February 1944 BLOs reported that it was becoming increasingly dif¤cult for
the partisans to attack the Germans because German units were frequently
being screened by the BK and that BK forces—who actively fought the parti-
sans—had become a normal part of any German force.11 This support for the
Germans cannot be explained as an ideological shift. The organization had no
illusions about a German victory, and much of it never disavowed its support
for a democratic regime built on broad social and economic reform. The move
was a calculated, tactical one that turned out to be disastrous.
Although the evidence of widespread collaboration is extensive, to con-
demn roundly all elements of the BK as quislings would be a disservice to
many. The principal danger of explaining BK makeup and policy is the ease
with which almost anything can be proved about them. Most BK members
denounced collaboration and whenever a BK member collaborated, the orga-
nization would either deny that the offending party was even af¤liated with
the BK or denounce them openly, but keep contact with them clandestinely.12
Some in the BK were dedicated to resistance to all invaders. On 21 November
1943 a BK pamphlet, probably the work of Skënder Muço, bitterly attacked
the Germans and Albanian collaborators as the barbaric enemy. Muço, the BK
chief of the Vlora area, and member of the BK council, offered to ¤ght under
direct British orders if London helped to control the partisans. In mid-No-
vember the council itself under Mithat Frashëri gave the British a signed
document, to be discussed later, indicating that the BK would now actively
192 Chapter 7

¤ght the Germans.13 This agreement, as with many others, was never honored
by the BK. From the time of the German invasion, despite a number of
exceptions, the rule for the BK was collaboration.

The Creation of the Legality Movement

Perhaps even more important than the further estrangement of the BK and
the partisans was a break within the ranks of the partisans. In October 1943
Abaz Kupi returned to traditional forms of Albanian politics, which required
that one maintain friendly relations with all sides. While he refused to allow
the construction of NLM administrative units in his area, he still sent people
to NLM meetings. At the same time, however, he consolidated his power base
by organizing his own faction called Legality. Discussions had begun in Sep-
tember, and a Zogist declaration—signed by numerous northern leaders, in-
cluding Muharrem Bajraktari, Cen Elezi, and Fiqri Dine—was issued. A Le-
gality council was formed in October with Zog himself declared as titular
leader.14 Legality established links with the independent northern chieftains,
the BK, the collaborationist government, and the Germans. Kupi’s goal seems
to have been to construct a broadly based nationalistic movement that favored
some role for Zog in an ethnic, independent Albania. Ultimately Kupi cast his
net too far and included many individuals who were compromised by both the
Italians and the Germans.15
Even with this support, Kupi’s numbers remained small. Although there
were widely divergent views on how many men he could raise, even the most
liberal estimates suggested that his maximum strength was under eight thou-
sand, ¤ve thousand of whom came from his own tribal area.16 The leaders were
mostly drawn from former Zogist army of¤cers and of¤cials, and the rank and
¤le included mostly Moslems not particularly interested in politics but at-
tached by bonds of booty, sentiment, and tribal loyalty. Because they were
mountaineers they exhibited a good deal more ¤ghting ability than did the
southerners—at least before the NLM trained its units—although Kupi’s pol-
icy rarely allowed his troops to demonstrate their effectiveness.
Kupi’s policies ran counter to his long history of resistance and proven
patriotism. Indeed, his actions or lack thereof, ran counter to his stated pro-
gram as set down in the newspaper Atdheu, or “Fatherland,” which he founded
to accompany his movement. Kupi’s program, introduced at the ¤rst Zogist
conference in November, included a call for war against the oppressor to free
Albania from foreign occupation; the establishment of an Albanian nation
Resistance to the Germans 193

with all of its ethnic rights (a reference to new Albania); the return of Zog
under a democratic kingdom; and the implementation of signi¤cant social
reforms, including signi¤cant agrarian reform and the institution of a social
insurance system. Zog’s role in delivering Albania from anarchy was empha-
sized, and the German propaganda suggesting that Zog was uninterested in
Kosova was simply denied.17
This was fairly sophisticated stuff, perhaps as some Foreign Of¤ce observ-
ers suggested, the most subtle and clear to appear in Albania during the war.18
Whereas the partisans and the collaborationists blackguarded each other with
eighteenth-century invective couched often in terms of Oriental imagery, Kupi
had presented a progressive coherent program. It is more than likely that Zog,
by now an experienced and clever statesman, rather than Kupi, the illiterate
tribal leader, was responsible for its inception. In any case, Kupi’s program had
the potential to attract wide support. But rather than act on it, Kupi continued
his fence-sitting and non-belligerence.

The Nationalist Chieftains

Apart from Kupi, northern Albania was host to a series of other nationalist
groups involved in constant realignment and maneuvering. Some were indepen-
dent Zogists, like many of the Dibra chieftains. Most followed the traditional
policy of frequently changing their position and attempting to insure their
success by placing members of their families in every rival camp. The powerful
Elezi family serves as a good example. Cen, the head of the family and generally
considered to be a Zogist, accepted the rank and salary of colonel in the govern-
ment forces. His brother Ersat was the principal NLM organizer in north Dibra,
while his nephew was an important partisan commander. His two sons, Gani
and Islam, maintained contact with Kupi and the other nationalists.19
The most important ¤gures among the remaining northern nationalists
were two who had already acquired some prominence: Gani Bey Kryeziu and
Colonel Muharrem Bajraktari. Following the failure of the 1941 united front
opposition, Kryeziu was arrested by the Italians and interned in the concentration
camp at Ventotene. After the collapse of Italy, he was released and immediately
returned to Albania, taking to the mountains to resist the Germans. Gani Kry-
eziu, with his two thousand retainers, continued to work for a united front and
gave valuable assistance to the partisans. Kryeziu was consistently encouraged by
the British to step up his efforts, which he agreed to do after receiving assurances
of British material and political support. He would receive little of either.20
194 Chapter 7

Muharrem Bajraktari was perhaps one of the most colorful of the nation-
alist chiefs and, like many of the other northern tribal chieftains, saw himself
as the future of Albania and hoped to convince all interested parties, in par-
ticular the British, that there really was no alternative to his leadership. Again,
like many of the other northern tribal chieftains, Bajraktari seemed totally out
of touch with wartime conditions both in Albania and abroad. This is perhaps
best illustrated by a curious “report” that he sent to Anthony Eden in January
1944. In it he maintained that Albania would be crucial to the future of British
policy in the Balkans, which he suggested should be anti-Slav, anti-Serb, and
anticommunist. Further, Bajraktari offered to foment a revolution against the
Germans in exchange for an extensive shopping list of weaponry and up to one
million pounds sterling. While this all seemed ludicrous, it is important to
recognize that the only difference between Bajraktari and many of the other
northern chieftains is that Bajraktari committed his thoughts to paper.21
As tribal leader of Lumë, Bajraktari controlled no more than one thou-
sand men. He had fought against the Italians and participated in the founding
of the Legality movement but signed a besa with the Germans that constituted
a nonaggression pact. He upheld this pact until August 1944, when he at-
tacked as the Germans were preparing to withdraw, far too little and far too
late. Nevertheless, following this break with the Germans, Bajraktari was in-
vited to a conference with the partisans, where he was told that he could either
join them or die. He shot his way out of the meeting, losing at least one of his
bodyguards, and returned to the mountains more determined than ever to
pursue his independent and ultimately disastrous policies.22
The German invasion had helped convince Kupi and most of the north-
ern tribal leaders to adopt a policy that most of the BK had adopted under the
Italians: to avoid reprisals and possible destruction, to wait for the defeat of
the Axis before encouraging a national uprising, and to preserve military
strength for the inevitable confrontation with the communists. Kupi and some
of the chiefs actually succeeded in obtaining weapons and material, usually in
only small quantities, from both the British and the Germans. But this was
their only success.
The nationalists, like their counterparts in Greece and Yugoslavia, were
shortsighted in terms of both world affairs and the changing realities in Alba-
nia. They were unaware that anything but unrelenting opposition to the Ger-
mans would doom them in the postwar world. In terms of domestic politics,
they made the mistake of attempting to protect a social order that the war was
rapidly undermining.23 Many of the BK leaders, Kupi, and the other Geg
chieftains constituted the social and political ruling class of the vanishing old
Resistance to the Germans 195

order. All of them felt that they could only pursue military operations as long
as they could insure adequate protection for this order from enemy reprisals.
Failure to insure this protection, they were convinced, would have led to
rejection of their leadership by their own society. Prior to the Italian invasion,
operations might have been possible, but the Italians had constructed an ex-
tensive road network that left few safe harbors into which to withdraw.
To complicate matters further, the highly regional northern nationalists
stuck to their traditional rules of engagement, the basis of which made it nearly
impossible, without a besa, for one leader to withdraw his forces into the terri-
tory of another. Under these conditions, small-scale guerrilla warfare of the
partisan variety seemed out of the question for the Geg chieftains. A general
uprising was really the only option, but as the occupation grew longer and the
conservation of strength became more and more important, Kupi and the
northern chieftains, like the BK, slipped slowly into collaboration. Kupi, like
Bajraktari, eventually signed a besa, a nonaggression pact, with the Germans.24
Whereas the Italians had faced resistance from various quarters, the Ger-
mans, then, had only to contend with the increasingly communist-dominated
NLM. The Germans were by no means unhappy with this situation; indeed,
it was in their interest to threaten the nationalists with the prospect of a
communist Albania. As long as the communist-dominated partisans remained
a force, the nationalists would be coerced, to a greater or lesser extent, to orient
themselves toward the Germans, who did much to protect the interests of the
nationalists. It was, then, in the German interest to keep the partisans rela-
tively strong, although not to the extent that serious damage could be done to
German communications.

The German Winter Offensive

To insure that the partisans did not become too strong, the Germans launched
a series of offensives against the partisans, powerful enough to in¶ict serious
damage on them but not to destroy them completely. At the beginning of
November 1943, when the Germans launched their ¤rst antipartisan opera-
tion, the resistance picture was as follows: northern Albania and Kosova were
quiet; the middle of the country around Tirana was ¤lled with many bands,
including those of the BK, Kupi, Bajraktari, Peza, and the partisans—with
increasing tension between the BK and the partisan units; and much of south-
ern Albania’s land and the town of Berat were controlled by the partisans. The
Germans estimated that the partisans could muster sixteen thousand to eigh-
196 Chapter 7

teen thousand ¤ghters, with the nationalist groups, not as well organized,
controlling perhaps eight thousand.25
Against this background, the Germans in early November launched their
¤rst campaign against the partisans, operation “505.” The Germans did not
squander their resources on unnecessary operations; rather, they con¤ned
themselves to clearing areas potentially dangerous to their communications.
The Germans would seldom molest partisans in areas where they were not
dangerous. Operation “505,” directed against the Peza region close to Tirana,
aimed to remove the possible threat to the roads linking Durrës, Tirana, and
Elbasan. Within eight days the Germans declared the campaign a success,
having killed some 100 “bandits” and Italians and having taken 1,650 prison-
ers, who, by an earlier agreement, were turned over to the Albanian civil
authorities. The Germans also reported the capture of a great deal of heavy
and light infantry weapons.26
This operation, the beginning of what is often referred to as the winter
campaign, had succeeded where the Italians had so often failed, for a number
of reasons. The battle-hardened German troops employed in this operation
proved to be quite effective, some brought in for the purpose from Greece.
Perhaps more important, however, the Germans used tactics that stood a
greater chance of success, given the Albanian terrain. While the Italians had
used larger units—at least partially because they were afraid of the Al-
banians—the Germans used small units, which clearly had a better chance of
maintaining the element of surprise. The Germans usually operated in small
columns of 50 to 150, with light machine guns and small mortars.27 Like the
Italians, the Germans engaged in terror, although it seems to have been some-
what less indiscriminate.
The Peza campaign was quickly followed by two more, “Roter Mann” and
“Edelweiss,” which drove the partisans out of Berat and the area between
Dibra and Peshkopi. In December a further series of operations was initiated,
with the most important being “1828” against the NLM staff and groups of
BLOs and “Bergkessel” against Mehmet Shehu commanding the First Parti-
san Brigade, which was rapidly becoming the elite unit among the partisans.28
Both of these operations, too, experienced some success. Hoxha and other
members of the NLM council were nearly wiped out, only to be saved at the
last moment by Shehu and his ¤rst brigade in something similar to Mao’s
Long March.29 The Germans were able, nonetheless, to shatter and disperse
the partisans as a military and political force north of the Shkumbin River,
where no more that two or three nondescript and poor-spirited partisan çetas
remained in place.
Resistance to the Germans 197

Although they all feared communism, some northern chiefs, in particular

Kryeziu and Bajraktari, gave the remains of the partisans in the north some
shelter. Other northern chiefs at least did not attack them, for various reasons.
Most chiefs believed that the British and the Americans would eventually
arrive to drive the communists out and that it was therefore unnecessary to
expend scant resources against the partisans. Others recognized that not only
were the partisans Albanians but that in many cases the children of tribal
leaders were active in partisan units. The principal motivation for this reticence
to attack the weakened partisans, however, may have been the simple notion
that the chiefs wanted quiet—their prestige depended on it.30
The British, too, were signi¤cantly impacted by the German winter cam-
paigns. In early January 1944 Brigadier Edmund F. “Trotsky” Davies, the com-
manding BLO and highest-ranking British of¤cer to take part in the resistance
struggle, was shot and wounded by a BK band and handed over to the Ger-
mans. Kupi, demonstrating his increasing pro-British line, reacted strongly to
this attack and went so far as to send people to kill Aziz Biçaku, the BK
commander responsible for the attack.31 In addition to Davies’s capture, the
British mission was essentially wrecked by the campaigns.32 This was a serious
blow to British prestige and, because Davies’s diary was captured along with
him, required some shift in plans. It was a blow to the resistance in general, as
it deprived the partisans of needed material. The Germans recognized the
signi¤cance of this event and reported it in the of¤cial Völkischer Beobachter.33
In January and February German ground operations, supported in the air
by ME110s, shifted to the south. The principal goal was the control of the
road network, important to the Germans as a secondary route from Greece,
supplementing the primary road from Thessaloníki up the Vardar Valley to
Skopje. The Germans were content to leave the mountains to the partisans.
Indeed, neither the Germans nor the partisans seems to have seen the south
as a main battle¤eld—the Germans pulled their punches on their attacks, and
the partisans did not go after the roads as much as they might have. They did
not overprovoke the Germans in the winter; they could not afford it.34
One of the principal reasons the partisans were in no position to push the
invaders too hard was their increasingly violent struggle with the nationalists,
another immediate result of the German invasion. Although Hoxha and Al-
banian socialist historians deny that these struggles were anything more than
patriots ¤ghting traitors, less subjective observers describe the clashes as a civil
war. Although perhaps minor in scope, the partisan-nationalist struggle con-
tained the bitterness and ferocity found when members of the same family
¤ght on opposite sides. Traditional ethnic considerations, exacerbated by an
198 Chapter 7

occasional blood feud, quickly fell in line with political differences to make the
war unstoppable. The various groups involved were willing to cooperate only
when they felt unable to assume the responsibilities of power alone.

The Beginning of the Civil War

Prior to the German invasion, the partisan-nationalist struggle had been prin-
cipally con¤ned to a propaganda war, although skirmishes, some of them blood
feud oriented, had occurred as early as March 1943.35 But within weeks of the
Italian collapse, more serious armed clashes were reported between the partisans
and the BK. It seems clear that the principal responsibility for initiating these
clashes must lie with Hoxha, who near the end of October ordered the liquida-
tion of the BK. He assumed that the partisans could ¤nish the BK in several
weeks while holding their own against the Germans and developing a military
presence around Tirana. These estimates proved to be overly optimistic.36 Ini-
tially these clashes were limited in scope and took the form of raids on each
other’s villages, house burnings, and executions. As the struggle became more
¤erce, the Germans began to actively intervene on behalf of the BK. Once the
partisans took a BK village, more often than not, the Germans—if their strategic
interests were involved—appeared and handed it back to the BK. Once the
German winter offensive demonstrated signs of success, BK units began to take
an active part. By February Neubacher estimated that some ten thousand na-
tionalists were aiding the Germans in one way or another, divided into approx-
imately ¤fteen groups, with the BK making up half of that number.37
By late winter, then, the NLM found itself in considerable dif¤culty.
Those units that had escaped the Germans and the nationalists were short on
everything—food, clothing, and ammunition. Not only was the British ground
effort in disarray, with the loss of personal and drop sights, but even if it were
not, the weather would have prevented resupply from the air. The partisans
further suffered from a lack of medicine and the impossibility of keeping
reserves. The desertion rate was reported to be 20 to 30 percent, with many of
these people defecting to Kupi.38 Casualty ¤gures were also quite high. Alban-
ian socialist historiography maintains that the partisans lost more than 1,000
to death in the winter campaign.39 German ¤gures put the number somewhat
higher and report 2,239 dead by the end of January, 401 dead in February, and
236 in March, at which point the Germans maintained that the government
was in control of all prefectures except Gjirokastra in the south.40 It is not
surprising that the partisan ranks suffered considerable disillusionment. In an
Resistance to the Germans 199

unusually candid moment, Hoxha, writing to Nako Spiru in March, conceded

that “the situation is dif¤cult, very dif¤cult indeed. . . . But it is precisely under
such dif¤cult circumstances that we must try not to lose our bearing.”41
Some of the British of¤cers had by this point all but written the partisans
off. In the middle of January the Foreign Of¤ce received a report arguing that
the civil war had ended, that most of the country would go to the BK, and that
Peza and Baba Faya would soon defect from the NLM. Other reports suggested
that Kupi’s fortunes were on the rise. One month later Colonel D. Talbot-Rice
of the Ministry of Economic Warfare minuted that the NLM continued to reap
the consequences of their folly in provoking hostilities with the BK. He con-
cluded that in terms of the resistance picture in Albania as a whole, the north
was completely tranquil, in the middle of Albania resistance had been reduced
to a ¶icker, and in the south the Germans had cleared the road system.42
The nationalists reacted to these events in a number of ways. Some of the
more clear-thinking elements began to show increasing interest in insuring
their future by identifying more closely with the war effort against the Ger-
mans. Some members of the BK even began calling themselves Zogist in order
to distance themselves from the collaborationist BK.43 But the greatest number
of nationalists took the opportunity to move closer to the collaborationist pol-
iticians. The government convinced the Germans to allow for the inclusion of
more members of the BK. Neubacher agreed, although he made the limits of
German tolerance quite clear. The government was able to broaden itself in
January by the co-optation of three prominent BK members, but it was warned
to avoid some of the less trustworthy elements among the BK, in particular
individuals such as Skënder Muço in Vlora. Other neutral groups, including
much of the leadership of the Moslems and the Orthodox Church, also moved
closer to the government. Both the government and the Germans were clearly
pleased. Mehdi Frashëri extended his control by using Deva to ¤nally root out
internal opposition to his regime in some Albanian towns. He also used his new
prestige to increase his credibility among the population at large. He was able
to raise the visibility of his government, which was further enhanced by the
introduction of new, although not particularly effective, land reform programs.44

Partisan Resurgence

But the success of the German winter campaign proved to be quite momen-
tary, and the partisans proved to be much more resilient than the Germans,
the British, or many Albanians had anticipated. Despite the German blows,
200 Chapter 7

the partisans had certain long-term assets. The least tangible, but perhaps the
most important, was described by Margaret Hasluck as “discipline, energy and
clarity of aim.”45 The partisan goal of reestablishing an independent Albania
under a social system based upon equality, which increasingly effective propa-
ganda stressed, was something for which many were willing to sacri¤ce. Con-
versely, few were willing to make similar sacri¤ces for the reestablishment of
the old social system under Zog, which had clearly failed.
More tangible considerations that help to explain partisan revival included
some of the basic tactics of guerrilla war. As in most battles against German units,
the partisans were often routed during the winter campaigns, but they were able
to drift away and regroup. They were able to do this in part because many wore
civilian clothes. This led to a growing German mistrust of civilians as well as
increasing repression and atrocities against unarmed peasants and shepherds.46
As during the Italian occupation, repression swelled the ranks of the resistance.
The government soon began to complain that following a short period of
increasing prestige, its general situation was deteriorating because its credibil-
ity was slowing being undermined. The Germans, who never trusted the new
BK people in the government, did not give the government the weapons they
had hoped for, leading the population to assume, quite correctly, that the
Germans did not trust their puppet regime. The government also complained
that it was not given enough food nor the transportation to distribute it. This
left many regions of Albania, particularly in the south, facing rapidly deterio-
rating conditions. This situation helped to convince the population that the
government was unable to provide for the basic needs of the people, which of
course was the case. The government complained that the Germans were
continuing to ignore its request for foreign recognition, the establishment of a
passport of¤ce, and upgrading Schliep’s consulate to embassy status. The gov-
ernment argued that without the resolution of some or all of these problems,
it could never hope to achieve legitimacy.47
Schliep added that the partisan revival could at least partially be traced to
news from the east, including the signi¤cant German defeat at Stalingrad.
Allied air attacks, which were stepped up in the spring, were helping to un-
dermine the notion of German invincibility, as well as the notion that the
puppet government had the power to protect the people.
The ¤rst Allied air attack from Italy occurred on 13 October 1943 and was
directed principally against the Tirana Airport. Although the bombs damaged or
destroyed eight planes, some fuel depots, and an electrical plant, many civilians
were killed and houses destroyed. Following reports from British liaison of¤cers
that this had left a bad impression on much of the country, even the remote
Resistance to the Germans 201

southwest, and a direct request from Hoxha to avoid a repeat of the October raid,
the British Royal Air Force became more careful. In following raids (seven more
through February 1944) the Allies hit principally military targets. British naval
bombardment of Durrës was also primarily restricted to military installations.48
With the onset of better weather, these raids increased and impacted many of
Albania’s major towns. Schliep told Berlin that now (in March 1944) the raids’
principal effect was to turn the people against the Germans and the collabora-
tionist government, which seemed powerless to prevent them. The collabora-
tionist government was concerned enough to appeal to the Vatican for help,
claiming that a neutral country was unjustly being victimized.49 The British
Foreign Of¤ce took little notice, with Michael Rose, a second secretary at the
Southern Department, minuting “the answer is that the Albanians should kick
the Germans out and then no one will trouble them anymore, except a few
Greeks and a few Yugoslavs who want to swallow all their territory.”50
Another factor that helped to facilitate a partisan revival was a signi¤cant
change in the con¤guration of German troops in Albania. As Germany’s
general military situation continued to deteriorate, the experienced German
troops in Albania were needed elsewhere. The 279th Infantry Division was
withdrawn and sent to the Russian front in early March 1944, and the 100th
Jäger Division was sent to Hungary at the end of the month. While they were
replaced by units composed of nearly as many troops, the quality of the re-
placements was poor. One of the replacement units was the Second Branden-
burg Division brought in from Greece, made up of static garrison troops
containing large elements of Armenians and Moslem troops from Bulgaria,
Russia, and the Caucasus region who had been recruited from POW and
concentration camps. The Second Brandenburg, made up of individuals who
had a reputation for not being particularly happy in the German army, was
supported by a small mixed formation from army group F in Yugoslavia com-
posed of Poles, Czechs, and French from the Rhineland. Although the Ger-
mans had planned further small offensives in April, they were called off par-
tially because of the nature of the troops available.51 It was not long before they
began shooting their of¤cers and defecting to the nationalists or partisans.

British Aid to the Resistance

The partisan revival was also aided by the resumption of supply drops by the
British. In December 1943 the 334th Wing, the unit responsible for supplying
the Albanians, was moved from Tocra in Cyrenaica to Brindisi, which consid-
202 Chapter 7

erably shortened the distance its C47s (Dakotas) had to ¶y. Despite the short
distance, the weather naturally had an impact and reduced the amount of
material the British could get to the Albanian resistance. In January 25.8 tons
were dropped, of which 6.5 tons went to the nationalists in the north. In
February 20.6 tons were dropped, of which 7.3 tons went to the nationalists.
In March tonnage was increased to 29 and in April 27.8 tons were dropped,
but this constituted a net increase for the partisans since they received all of it.
Because this amount was little in comparison to the total requirements of the
partisans, British material aid cannot be considered decisive. Still, much of it
came at critical times and therefore constituted an important contribution.52
How important it was remains a matter of considerable controversy.
The role played by the British in Albania during the German occupation,
in general, is a matter of considerable dispute. For the British, the principal
problem was determining a cohesive policy toward Albanian resistance, a de-
cision made much more dif¤cult as a result of the German invasion. Under
the Italian occupation, when most resistance groups actually resisted, British
policy was quite simple. McLean was ordered to arrange for the supply of all
those groups resisting the Italians, while attempting to forge some degree of
unity. With the German invasion, not only did Albanian resistance fragment
further, but large sections of it, including groups that had resisted the Italians
and received British supply drops, ceased resisting altogether. The British,
then, found themselves facing the problem of whom to support. This issue was
further complicated by political questions dealing with the future of Albania.
The British and Allied statement of December 1942, which called for the
reestablishment of an independent Albania, remained the basis of British pol-
icy. The question of the nature of this state, its government, and its borders
remained a mystery both to the Albanians and, it seems, to the British. While
the policymakers tried to sort these dif¤culties out, the ambiguity concerning
support and the future of Albania adversely impacted the BLOs on the ground
in Albania. Many began to resent their lack of instructions; in late October
1943 one asked somewhat plaintively of his government, “when will you do
something to help us[?] . . . What is our policy?”53
Aware of these problems, and as a consequence of increasing Balkan
resistance in general, the British chiefs of staff began paying more attention to
the Albanians in October 1943. By this point the role of SOE was somewhat
diminished, however. Changes in command arrangements in the Mediterra-
nean and Balkan areas had transferred air operations and the execution of all
special operations to the regular military and the Balkan Air Force, which had
been created on 1 June 1943. Of course, the Foreign Of¤ce continued its
Resistance to the Germans 203

major role in political policymaking. Although now thoroughly subordinate to

the armed forces, SOE (which frequently changed its name and was known by
different names in different areas) continued to provide technical assistance
and advice, and its channels and agents continued to be used.54
In October 1943 SOE, in its new diminished role, was instructed to send
Brigadier E. F. “Trotsky” Davies, with a large staff, to Albania to make recom-
mendations about whether the recognition of any form of government in exile
might be useful and about how to facilitate unity. In the meantime the British
proposed to back any group that would ¤ght. Davies, who after McLean,
became the second of four British chief liaison of¤cers in Albania, stated, “It
had sounded so simple. In Albania I was to ¤nd the whole matter very com-
plex and dif¤cult.”55
Davies ¤rst contacted Hoxha, who agreed to stop his recently initiated
attacks on the BK if the BK agreed to attack the Germans. Hoxha assumed
that his would never happen, and with Davies’s ¤rst meeting with the BK
leadership it seemed that Hoxha was right. On 8 November Davies made
contact with the BK council, and during their ¤rst meeting it was clear to
Davies that the BK had no intention of ¤ghting the Germans and every
intention of ¤ghting the NLM. The council quickly reverted to traditional
Albanian politics, however, and on 9 November—literally overnight—told
Davies that they had seen the light. The council verbally agreed not to ¤ght
the NLM and produced a written agreement, signed by Mithat Frashëri, that
the BK would now ¤ght the Germans.56 Davies brought this document to
Hoxha, who refused to recognize the pledge, believing it to be little more than
eyewash. Hoxha, of course, was right.
On the basis of these initial meetings and his personal observations, Da-
vies recommended a number of courses of action to British policymakers.
First, he suggested that an outside Albanian committee or government would
be of little use. He gauged the in¶uence of exiled leaders, such as Zog, to be
minimal. Then he suggested that based on his signed agreement with the BK,
the British should continue to support all groups until they demonstrated that
they were unwilling to resist the Germans, which most, of course, had already
done. Davies also issued a list of instructions for the BLOs then in Albania,
which included (1) not intervening in the civil war, (2) assisting in organizing
resistance against the Germans, and (3) gathering of all possible evidence of
BK attacks on the Germans or collaboration with them. The Foreign Of¤ce
cabled back that it would be guided by Davies’s suggestions until he saw ¤t to
make a change.57
Although Davies’s memoirs fail to mention it, by December he did rec-
204 Chapter 7

ommend a complete change in British policy. He wired that it was now im-
perative to denounce the BK and the Zogists. Although he found all sides in
the Albanian resistance to be “incredibly narrow-minded, bigoted, biased, stu-
pid and touchy,” because the partisans had encountered mixed German-BK
units and because Kupi had not moved, Davies recommended that the British
quickly, ¤nally, and openly declare for and exclusively support the partisans.58
Davies was certainly right and he may have forced the Foreign Of¤ce to make
a decision, but this was his last message. Within a week he was a prisoner and
the Foreign Of¤ce was off the hook, refusing to make such a signi¤cant shift
in policy on the strength of one uncon¤rmed message. With the removal of
Davies, the British found themselves back where they had started and Hoxha,
although he did not know it, had lost his best chance to construct a relation-
ship with the British similar to that enjoyed by Tito.
The vacuum left by the capture of Davies was eventually ¤lled by the
of¤cial heads of mission Norman Wheeler and then Alan Palmer, in the south
and by Billy McLean in the north. McLean, an enthusiastic anticommunist,
had by this point developed an intense dislike for Hoxha and a genuine admi-
ration for Kupi, with whom he spent most of his time. Unlike Davies, who
had believed that the civil war was irrevocably started and that the partisans
would certainly win, McLean believed that he had at least a 50 percent chance
of reconciling the NLM and the nationalists and thereby preventing a com-
plete communist takeover. In January 1944, on McLean’s recommendation,
the Foreign Of¤ce decided to refrain from immediately denouncing the BK
and to continue support for the partisans, while at the same time building up
Kupi as a political and military counterweight to the partisans and encourag-
ing him to ¤ght.59 Consensus II, the mission to Kupi, was entrusted to Julian
Amery, David Smiley, and McLean, the latter of whom began to act as some-
thing of an agent for Kupi. McLean and Smiley, who had been withdrawn
after the arrival of Davies, were returned to Albania, along with Amery, in
April 1944.60
Two months earlier McLean might have had a ¶icker of a reason to be
optimistic. On 12 February a meeting took place in northern Albania between
members of most groups involved in Albania’s complex political picture. Sev-
eral northern NLM representatives, who were out of touch with the NLM
command in the south, met with Bajraktari, some Zogists, Kryeziu, and other
band leaders. Before much could become of this, however, the Germans, who
seemed to be aware of this meeting as well as the possible consequences,
moved in and quiet was maintained in the north.61
But by April, when the Consensus II mission arrived, McLean’s policy
Resistance to the Germans 205

was not only unwise but entirely unrealistic. Despite the disasters of the winter,
Hoxha had been able to continue the rapid formation of brigades. By May
SOE (now called Force 266) estimated that partisan strength was close to
20,000, with 13,000 organized into twelve brigades. Hoxha claimed 35,000,
but this ¤gure undoubtedly included the territorials, who were essentially re-
servists. These ¤gures indicate remarkable expansion. Partisan con¤dence was
demonstrated by a complete structural reorganization. In April, perhaps pre-
maturely and certainly for more political reasons than military ones, Hoxha
transformed his partisan çetas into a conventional Albanian National Libera-
tion Army, with traditional ranks, divisions, and corps. Shehu’s ¤rst brigade
became the center of the ANLA’s ¤rst division.62
Not only were there more partisans, but they were also, by April, much
better ¤ghters. The ¤rst British appraisal of the ¤ghting qualities of the parti-
sans was, for the most part, quite negative, similar to the German evaluation of
the nationalists. After witnessing an attack by 880 partisans on a village in 1943,
and the rapid dispersal of those partisans by some 300 Germans, a British
observer complained that the partisans were little more than “a thorough band
of rascals, of no ¤ghting ability whatsoever.”63 Although these comments can
certainly be written off as pompous exaggerations, at least one of¤cial Albanian
socialist view is no less preposterous. Lefter Kasneci, in his book Steeled in the
Heat of Battle, would have us believe that every partisan was “a brilliant sharp-
shooter.”64 But it seems clear that the partisans left the impression in 1943 that
there was room for improvement in their ¤ghting capabilities. This impression
may at least partially be explained, as Harry Fultz does, by the fact that the
partisans often had little to ¤ght with, in terms of guns and ammunition. But
it is also clear that many of the early ¤ghters, with their background as urban
southerners, had little experience with this type of activity.65
Although partisan battle reports were almost always stunning exaggera-
tions, by the spring of 1944 more objective evidence concerning partisan ¤ght-
ing qualities suggested an important increase in expertise. When Philip Leake,
the head of the Albanian section of SOE visited Albania for two weeks in
March 1944, he reported that the ¤ghting qualities and skill of the partisans
had greatly improved. The partisans were now capable of resisting German
drives and could undertake coordinated offensive action. Although he found
the central council of the NLM “inclined to be dilatory and oriental” and the
training of the various brigades to be uneven, the partisans were again threat-
ening German communications.66
Partisan morale and discipline had improved as well, partly because of the
emphasis put on political and social instruction. When a brigade halted in
206 Chapter 7

camp, commanders oversaw military exercises while commissars, the heads of

technical sections, organized educational activity and cultural events. Discipl-
ine, an important part of this educational system, was carried out at all military
levels, and possible punishments included (1) a public analysis of the crime,
conducted by the commissar in a unit assembly, (2) prohibition of the perpe-
trator from singing partisan songs, (3) removal of partisan badge and prohibi-
tion from making partisan propaganda and from joining partisan assemblies,
and (4) death. Extra duty was imposed for minor faults, but only if some form
of public disgrace could not be arranged. Fraternization between men and
women, the latter making up some 9 percent of the partisan forces, was treated
with particular severity. Observers credited this educational activity, propa-
ganda, strict discipline, and emphasis on moral values with causing often
halfhearted recruits to become enthusiastic partisans and with turning peasant
volunteers into ¤ghting units of ¤rst-class morale.67
The revived partisans began demonstrating their presence as early as
March 1944, when Mehmet Shehu, with about two hundred men from the
¤rst brigade, marched into central Albanian regions controlled by Peza and
Kupi. Although little ¤ghting took place, the incursion made it clear that the
NLM had not given up on Albania north of the Shkumbin River and that it
intended to renew the struggle as quickly as possible. This essentially symbolic
act was soon followed by the partisans’ seizing the initiative in various areas in
the south and then, on 15 April and somewhat prematurely, Hoxha’s ordering
the ANLA to take the offensive everywhere. The army made an effort to
comply, and all the brigades began moving: the ¤rst in the mountains west and
north of Korça; the fourth working in conjunction with the ¤rst around
Pogradec and Lake Ohrid; the ¤fth around Vlora; the sixth south of
Gjirokastra; the seventh around Berat. There was even some revival in the
north, with the second brigade putting itself together again in Peza and a çeta
resurfacing in Dibra.68 Schliep reported on 11 April that there was quiet in the
north and in the center to the Elbasan-Struga road. But the partisans again
controlled much of the open country in the south and were pressing Vlora,
Berat, and Korça.69
The government of Mitrovica and the Germans were forced to take notice
and act. That there was concern was ¤rst indicated by stepped-up government
anticommunist propaganda at the beginning of March.70 The Germans stepped
up their efforts as well, relying on the traditional arguments used since the
beginning of the occupation. Of considerable impact was their propaganda line
that while the partisans claimed simply to be reformist or even communist, they
were in fact the advance guard of Pan-Slavism and as such the enemies of all
Resistance to the Germans 207

Albanians. Of course, Kosova continued to be a central feature of German

propaganda. The Germans continued to maintain, and rightly so, that a partisan
victory meant the certain loss of Kosova. When the Germans found it necessary
to pressure the Zogist, their propaganda emphasized the fact—again rightly
so—that Zog had cared little for the future of Kosova. In a global sense, the
Germans maintained that England and Russia would eventually come to blows,
at which point London would make some kind of a deal with the Germans.
Alternatively, England was accused of having sold the Balkans to Tito and
vili¤ed as a traditional supporter of Greece. Albania, with the protection of the
Germans, was independent and neutral and unlike under the Italians enjoyed a
free press and gendarmerie, and the Germans rarely interfered in the daily life
of the Albanians. British liaison of¤cers reported that with the exception of the
partisans most everyone believed German propaganda.71
But effective propaganda alone was not enough. The Germans concluded
that coercive measures were again necessary to protect their positions, which
did much to undermine the effectiveness of this very propaganda. In early
spring 1944, responding to what was perceived as the continuing possibility of
an Allied attack from the Adriatic, the commanding general of the Twenty-
¤rst Corps ordered the complete evacuation of three coastal zones. These
included a small region directly around Vlora, the area behind Durrës—the
port itself had already been evacuated—and an area around Shkodra, effecting
in all some ten thousand Albanians. The Germans coordinated the evacuation
with Deva and Ago Agaj, but left the accommodation and resettlement up to
the Albanian regime. This was not handled particularly effectively, at least
partially because of a lack of resources, and resulted in considerable resent-
ment. Many of those displaced received no help whatsoever, so it should not
be surprising that a signi¤cant percentage joined the partisans.72

The German Summer Offensive

Increased German coercion also took the form of renewed military action
against the partisans. Recognizing that the garrison troops that the Germans
now had in Albania were not equal to the task, the Germans pulled in some
¤rst-class units from Greece. Elements of the First and Twenty-¤fth Moun-
tain Divisions, the 297th Infantry Division, and the 104th Jäger Division
attacked the partisans in the south and in central Albania. Because of the small
number of German troops, the Germans found it necessary to rely on nation-
alist çetas and units of the Albanian army.73 Although the Albanians again
208 Chapter 7

seemed of little use to the Germans, the “Junioperations” were not without
some degree of success. The Germans drove the partisans away from the
north-south roads in southern Albania and pinned large groups of partisans
against the sea.
The ¤ghting was quite ¤erce and was accompanied by considerable atroc-
ity—many civilian deaths and many houses burned. Hubert Lanz, commander
of the Twenty-second Corps ordered the evacuation of all Albanians from
partisan-controlled areas, but it seems that cooler heads prevailed. Still, the
Germans were clearly having a harder time of it. With better organization,
larger numbers, more supplies coming from Italy, and occasional RAF ¤ghter
support, the partisans were able to mount spirited resistance. Although the
partisans suffered heavy casualties, the units were able to avoid the various
encircling maneuvers launched by the Germans.74 As an indication of the level
of partisan sophistication, while the bulk of the partisan forces were being
pressured in the south, the First Partisan Division was able to initiate its own
offensive in central Albania directed against both German positions and, es-
sentially for the ¤rst time, against the heart of nationalist/Zogist Albania,
Mati, and Dibra. The British attempted to forestall this escalation of the civil
war by temporarily cutting off supplies to the partisans. This tactic was as least
temporarily successful and the partisans—for lack of ammunition—withdrew
brie¶y from Mati and Dibra in July.
Despite this momentary respite, the nationalists and the Zogists were
faced with their worst nightmare, a scenario their tortuous policy since the
founding of the Communist Party had been designed to avoid. The appear-
ance of partisans in force in the center and north caused a crisis in the nation-
alist and Zogist camps and escalated an already existing crisis in the collabo-
rationist government.

The Fall of Mitrovica

The government of Rexhep Mitrovica had been essentially paralyzed since

May. While the fortunes of the government seemed to be on the rise during
the ¤rst months of the year—in terms of prestige within Albania—the surpris-
ing and rapid revival of the partisans did much to undermine that prestige. The
government was proving to be unable to in¶uence the security situation or the
economy. Although the north and the center of the country were experiencing
tolerable conditions, life in much of the south by April 1944 can only be
described as desperate. While Albania never experienced the famine condi-
Resistance to the Germans 209

tions that affected much of Greece, times were extremely hard and the gov-
ernment could do little. Agriculture was interrupted, with frequent destruction
of crops and with many of the men and women at war. Herds were depleted
as a result of German, nationalist, and partisan con¤scation. The BK proved
to be particularly obnoxious in this regard, developing what amounted to a vast
extortion ring—demanding money and food under the pain of death from
already hard-pressed peasants in the areas they controlled. This practice began
in early 1943 and continued until the Germans put a stop to it in the summer
of 1944.75 To add to the misery, many villages in the Gjirokastra-Korça area
had been destroyed, leaving thousands without shelter. In May a typhus epi-
demic ran rampant with no medicine and with medical personal limited to a
few Italian nuns. A similarly desperate medical situation existed in Kosova, as
well, because all of the pharmacists were Serb and had been driven out. Ma-
laria, the traditional scourge of Albania, also spread unchecked in the south.
There was no electricity—Gjirokastra was in the dark—and there was little
gasoline. It cost as much as ¤ve hundred Albanian francs to ride in an open
truck to Tirana.76
Little was being done for these people. A committee for aid to war victims
was formed in Tirana and concluded that it needed four million francs a
month just to feed and cloth the desperate in the south. The committee had
little money and no transport facilities. The government did nothing, except
to continue passing laws that attempted to give the impression of normal
conditions and social progress. It was a myth; by May the government had
essentially ceased to function. It could not even pay what of¤cials it had in the
south, since money could not be sent over the roads and checks were useless
because the banks had been closed for ¤ve to six months.
Mitrovica’s popularity in the rest of the country was clearly also in eclipse.
The general economy continued to deteriorate, partially as a result of expen-
ditures on the not-very-effective security forces. The government continued to
employ Italian administrative personnel against the wishes of many. The gov-
ernment was unresponsive to the needs of the people, and it was perceived as
being corrupt.77 As Hoxha had hoped, the integration of the BK members in
February, rather than strengthening the government, had simply weakened the
BK and undermined their in¶uence throughout the country.
Mitrovica could possibly have withstood all of these problems but the
Germans, too, it seems, had ¤nally had enough of Mitrovica and his col-
leagues. Although at least partially to blame for Mitrovica’s failure, the Ger-
mans complained that Mitrovica and his government were doing little or
nothing to keep the south quiet. The Germans had also become dissatis¤ed
210 Chapter 7

with various individual members of the government, many of whom the Ger-
mans, too, accused of corruption. The Germans were particularly critical of
Mitrovica himself, the minister of ¤nance, Ago Agaj; the commander of the
Albanian gendarmerie, Hysni Dema; and—perhaps most disappointing to the
Germans—Deva, their principal support. Deva, the minister of the interior,
was accused of releasing captured communists for money.78
Although quite long in coming, Mitrovica ¤nally resigned in the middle
of June 1944. Neubacher tells us that the principal reason was health related,
and Mitrovica maintained that he was no longer able to work with Mehdi
Frashëri, who constantly interfered with the functioning of his government. In
reality, although Mitrovica was ill he had failed, and as the internal situation
deteriorated, the Germans came to the conclusion that achieving their original
goal of internal paci¤cation carried out by Albanians might no longer be
possible. The Germans hoped, as a backup plan, simply to divide and control
the Albanians, which ultimately led them to continue to co-opt nationalist
elements into the government. The German goal, then, had changed while the
policy essentially remained the same. The policy achieved some success. A
new, broader-based government was formed, although the rather complex
process required a month to complete.
Although negotiations between the nationalists and Zogists (Kupi as well
as Fiqri Dine and the Dibra chiefs) concerning their relationship with the
Germans had been in progress for some time, the month-long period after the
fall of Mitrovica witnessed these negotiations at their most intense. Both the
fall of the government and the rapid increase in partisan activity acted to
increase the urgency of the leaders meeting at the Hotel Dajti in Tirana.
Neubacher, who was in Tirana for most of this period, wrote, “It was unfor-
gettable. . . . Daily there were new combinations, new information, new op-
posing information, in¶uence, counterin¶uence. Politics came in high waves
which continually rolled into my pleasant bungalow.”79 Neubacher believed the
root of the problem to be either the basic nature of the Albanians or a con¶ict
between Frashëri and Deva. The situation was considerably more complex and
left both the Germans and the British, who often did well in discerning the
intricacies of Albanian politics, in the dark.
The question of integrating at least the Zogists into the Mitrovica gov-
ernment was ¤rst broached by regents Anton Harapi and Mehdi Frashëri in
April 1944, after it became clear that the injection of BK members in February
had not been enough to stabilize the situation. Since February, the partisans
were on the rise, famine threatened in the south and some sections of central
Albania, and the BK was nearing collapse due to the immediate effect of
Resistance to the Germans 211

increased collaboration. The regents wanted the Zogists for stability, and the
Zogists were ready to do more than talk to the Albanians in Tirana. They had
been talking with Tirana since the German invasion. Schliep reported that
Kupi met with members of the Mitrovica government on 3 February, and at
the end of March Schliep told Neubacher that Kupi was now in constant
contact with government circles. At the same time talks were held among the
Zogist Dine, Deva, Mustafa Kruja, Vërlaci, and Gjon Marka Gjoni.80
These discussions, particularly those between Kupi and the Albanians
who had collaborated with the Italians, would have been unthinkable several
months earlier, but the rapid resurgence of the partisans made all the
northerners nervous. The failure of the meeting of the various opposition
streams at Bilisht in February was further impetus for Kupi to soften his stance
toward collaborationists. Although McLean and Amery were pushing hard to
convince Kupi and the nationalists to ¤ght the Germans, these groups were
moving closer to the government in the hopes of creating a broad coalition to
oppose the partisans. But in April the Germans themselves were not ready to
include the Zogists in the government. The Germans saw the advantages but
were hesitant, as they had been during the discussions leading to the inclusion
of more members of the BK in February. The Germans considered the Zogists
to be unreliable. Schliep laid down the German line on Kupi in August 1943,
making it clear that Kupi would be treated as an enemy but that he should be
used for German purposes whenever possible.81
But Mehdi Frashëri kept pushing, and the various anticommunist Al-
banians kept talking. A particularly important meeting took place at Tu¤ne at
the end of May, coinciding with the NLM Congress of Përmet. The meeting
seems to have included Mehdi Frashëri, Lef Nosi, Mithat Frashëri, Kupi,
Marka Gjoni, and the Dibra chieftain Fiqri Dine, and they were aimed at
replacing Mitrovica with Dine. Dine had the trust of Kupi and was a Zogist,
yet he was not an active member of the inner circle of Legality, which left
Kupi, or so he thought, with some room to maneuver in the event that the
entire scheme collapsed. Dine as prime minister, so the anticommunist sce-
nario ran, would enable coordination of the military strength of all the non-
communists, including the Albanian army, the remaining active çetas of the
BK, the forces of Kupi’s Legality Party, the Albanians such as Kruja who had
collaborated with the Italians—now calling themselves the National Indepen-
dent Party—and the Dibra nationalist-Zogists.
Unlike in April, the Germans were now more willing to compromise.
Although still distrustful of the Zogists, the Germans by the end of May felt
they were left with few options. The Mitrovica government was moribund,
212 Chapter 7

and the BK was rapidly ceasing to function in the Albanian political landscape,
leaving the various Zogists as the only organized political group in Albania
outside of the NLM. The integration of the Zogist had become unavoidable,
just as the integration of the BK had been in February. The Germans, includ-
ing Fitzthum, who had been the most vocal opponent to Zogist integration,
were in part persuaded by Mehdi Frashëri’s guarantee that in case of the need
for a rapid German withdrawal, Kupi’s Legality Party pledged itself to not only
create no dif¤culties, but actually protect the German withdrawal.82 Because
Kupi at the same time assured Julian Amery that he was about to attack the
Germans, this appears to have been part of his traditional strategy of playing
both sides.
But German acquiescence did not end the government crisis. Dine him-
self was still hesitant, in part it seems, because of the continuing effort by
McLean and Amery to construct some unity among the Zogist-nationalists
and convince them to break their contact with the collaborationists and attack
the Germans. Kupi was the focus of this effort based on the erroneous as-
sumption that he commanded extensive prestige throughout Albania and
could muster—based on his own estimates—some twenty-¤ve thousand
troops. Both of these assumptions might have been true in late 1943, when
McLean left Albania to report to London, but by May through June 1944
SOE was slowly becoming aware that neither assumption was now valid. On
11 May SOE reported to the Foreign Of¤ce that based on their latest infor-
mation, Kupi’s movement was less advanced than had originally been thought
and consisted mainly of former of¤cials of Zog’s regime who had not been
employed by the Italians and of some members of Zog’s government and army
who had originally ¶ed with Kupi. On 9 June SOE further reported that
rather than the twenty-¤ve thousand troops Kupi had claimed to be able to
put into the ¤eld in May, his forces numbered no more than ¤ve thousand and
these were poorly armed and consisted mainly of personal retainers and Ital-
ians. The report concluded that after ¤ve months of attempting to build a
political and military organization, Kupi had failed. The central committee of
Legality was composed of unimportant people, Kupi’s in¶uence was strictly
local, and he was moving closer to collaboration.83
But McLean, Amery, and certain elements within the Foreign Of¤ce
refused to abandon the “Kupi option,” regardless of the increasing ill-will
continued British contact with Kupi was causing in the partisan ranks, partic-
ularly with Hoxha. Sensing that time was running out, McLean redoubled his
efforts to unite the northerners and to convince Kupi to ¤ght. Kupi, also aware
that his position was rapidly becoming desperate, agreed to give up his neu-
Resistance to the Germans 213

trality and participate in the Geg meetings that had been taking place for some
time. Kupi announced to the British that his aim was to bring about a united
uprising against the Germans. Kupi was also willing to reduce his demands on
the British, which had originally included the recognition of an Albanian
government in exile under Zog.84
Now in May, he declared that he was willing to begin operations against
the Germans upon the receipt of ten thousand gold sovereigns and suf¤cient
automatic weapons and mortars to equip eight battalions of 250 men each.
McLean would have been glad to oblige but recognized that the general
British policy of ¤rst resistance, then supply, would not be changed to accom-
modate Kupi. McLean strongly encouraged Kupi to offer some gesture of
good-faith resistance that would strengthen his case with SOE. McLean
¤nally convinced Kupi to help David Smiley destroy the important Gjoles
bridge on the Tirana-Shkodra road on 21 June. This act constituted the ¤rst
anti-German operation carried out by Kupi since October 1943.85
The bridge was duly blown up, but the incident did not have the effect
desired by Kupi and McLean. In the ¤rst instance, it left SOE in Italy entirely
unconvinced about Kupi’s willingness to resist and his eligibility for supplies.
This opinion was reinforced by the discovery that Kupi had agreed to partici-
pate in the operation only if his name not be used in connection with the
incident.86 Clearly, Kupi was hoping not to jeopardize his negotiations with
the collaborationists or the collaborationist negotiations with the Germans.
McLean, by this point, had already appealed directly to Anthony Eden for a
letter from Zog directing Kupi to resist. Some senior Foreign Of¤ce of¤cials
began to tire of the increasingly dif¤cult question. Sir Orme Sargent, super-
vising deputy under the secretary of state, in exasperation questioned the value
of doing anything at all in Albania, arguing that it was a complete backwater,
and even if the entire country was ablaze it would cause very little inconve-
nience to the Germans.87
In general, however, the Foreign Of¤ce continued to push for Kupi, pre-
sumably from a strictly political standpoint, but received very little support from
the British military or SOE in Bari. Smiley later maintained that McLean’s
position had been sabotaged and that certain of¤cers in the Albanian section of
SOE were well intentioned, if led astray by insidious communist propaganda;
others were communist agents. Amery went even further, suggesting that “a
genuine enthusiasm for the Communists and their works infected our head-
quarters, and responsible staff of¤cers reveled with indecent and almost mas-
ochistic glee in the destruction of Chetniks and Zogists.”88 Smiley also charged
that “certain” foreign sections of the BBC became in¶uenced by communist
214 Chapter 7

sympathizers, causing much embarrassment to the BLOs attached to noncom-

munist resistance organizations.89 Conspiracy or not, Kupi got nothing for the
moment, and British policymakers once again avoided making a clear decision
about whom to support in Albania.
Hoxha was of course aware of McLean’s attempt to bring the nationalist-
Zogists into a British anti-German coalition and was determined to under-
mine those efforts. He was able to do so in part by launching an offensive, at
the end of June, spearheaded by the ¤rst brigade of the ¤rst division against
Mati, the heart of Kupi’s territory, and against Dibra, the home of some Zogist
and some independent nationalist chiefs and a strong German garrison. The
British, in response, temporarily cut off supplies to the partisans and sent in
Major Victor Smith to attempt to stop the widening civil war. Smith, with
orders from General Wilson, requested an armistice and talks in Bari between
representatives for the partisans and Kupi. Kupi accepted immediately, as this
would have put him on an equal footing with Hoxha. Hoxha naturally refused
and continued his attack.

The Dine Government

A direct result of the partisan attack on the center and the north was Zogist
Fiqri Dine’s acceptance of the position of prime minister. In the middle of July,
then, Dine became prime minister and constructed what Schliep referred to as
a “moderately-Zogist” government, although Dine’s Zogism was perhaps more
a unifying theory to serve the existing social order in Albania than a deliberate
attempt to bring back Zog himself.90 In any case, if the Zogists and their
nationalist supporters could not convince the British to help them resist the
partisans, they would attempt to use the Germans.
Dine was possessed of a somewhat checkered political career in Albania.
As the nominal leader of the Dibra chiefs, he was a man of some in¶uence
and—as with many other northern chiefs—was offered the rank and salary of
colonel in Zog’s gendarmerie and in 1927 was appointed gendarmerie com-
mander in Tirana. Following the Italian invasion he was co-opted—at least to
a certain extent—and was appointed ¤rst to the Italian-controlled Albanian
Assembly and then became minister of interior in Libohova’s short—one
month—cabinet in early 1943. Dine managed to maintain some credibility,
however, in that he was distrusted by the Italians for his nationalism and his
rather pronounced sympathies for the resistance. He participated in the Ger-
man drive against the partisans in his own area of Dibra at the end of 1943,
Resistance to the Germans 215

but maintained a foot in both camps by informing local BLOs of the German
approach.91 Dine, then, was quite in the Kupi mold and could, in most cases,
be counted as a Kupi adherent.
Although the Germans reluctantly accepted Dine, they refused to accept
his, and Mehdi Frashëri’s, proposed cabinet or Frashëri’s choice to succeed Fuat
Dibra, who died in February, as regent. Mehdi Frashëri hoped to use the crisis
to make a clean sweep of all those he could not control. Following the refusal
of Ibrahim Bey Biçaku to accept the post of regent, Frashëri hoped to appoint
Rexhep Mitrovica, who, although often at odds with the head regent, was now
quite ill and could be easily controlled. On 2 July, the Germans, who were
becoming increasingly weary of Frashëri, forced the Parliament to elect Cafo
Bey Ulqini, a Kosovar who could be counted on to support the Germans.92
Having lost that battle, Frashëri and Dine hoped at least to rid themselves
of Xhafer Deva, whose brutality and corruption were proving to be a consider-
able liability. The two struck while Deva was out of Tirana and announced a
cabinet without even consulting the Germans. Dine’s government was to con-
sist of Zogists, a supporter of the BK, and some members of the National
Independent Party, the group around Kruja and the Mirdita chief Marka Gjoni.
The Germans were incensed that they had not been consulted and be-
cause most of the old BK people and Kosovars were excluded. And despite
their own irritation with Deva, they objected to his exclusion from the new
government. Both Neubacher, who was in Berlin, and Fitzthum would have
none of it. Neubacher bluntly informed Frashëri that the German army rep-
resented the only order in Albania and that Albanian independence had cer-
tain limits, which included the security of the German army and the mainte-
nance of German war aims. Fitzthum saw the move as the creation of a
Frashëri dictatorship with Zogist dominance, which posed a threat to the
creation of SS “Skanderbeg,” for which Deva was recruiting. Schliep, following
Neubacher’s instructions, and Fitzthum both insisted on Deva’s inclusion even
if this drove Frashëri to resign. The Germans were loath to abandon their
divide-and-rule strategy. Frashëri and Dine were again forced to capitulate.93
Having resolved these issues with the Germans, albeit unsatisfactorily,
Frashëri and Dine turned their attention to the main task: the rather far-
fetched and somewhat desperate goal of a Geg coalition. The plan was to
coordinate nationalist and Zogist strength and, in cooperation with the Ger-
mans, drive back the communists. At the same time, they hoped to convince
the Allies that they were acting on behalf of an independent Albania and
therefore deserved, if not direct Allied support, at least a respite from active
Allied resistance. This entire scenario was based upon a series of misconcep-
216 Chapter 7

tions, including (1) the Germans would trust the Dine government to the
extent that they would be willing to provide the government with signi¤cant
military resources, (2) the partisans could be defeated with just one more
serious effort, and (3) the Allies could be convinced that the government of a
country that had been occupied by the Germans for more than one year could
be genuinely neutral.
The ¤rst priority of the new government was to build an effective military
force, coordinate it with the Germans, and attack the partisans. There was
more than a little urgency here, since the partisans were now operating in and
doing considerable damage to the ancestral land and principal residences of
many of the northern chieftains who were cooperating with or actually a part
of the new government. The brigades of the ¤rst division (partisan divisions
in 1944 consisted of approximately four thousand to ¤ve thousand) were op-
erating in the Dibra-Peshkopi area and in Mati. In August the ¤rst division,
now commanded by Shehu, joined with the second division to form the First
Army Corps of the ANLA under Dali Ndreu. This reorganization was more
than smoke and mirrors. The partisans were continuing to grow at a rapid
pace, with many of the new recruits coming from central and northern Alba-
nia, an ominous development for the northern chieftains.
Both Dine and Kupi appealed to the Germans for help, Dine directly and
Kupi using his traditional backdoor tactics. Dine presented to the Germans
what must have been perceived as a fantastic request. Neubacher tells us that
Dine asked the Germans to supply him with enough weapons to form two
mountain divisions to be supported by tanks.94 Both Neubacher and Schliep
saw this as a thinly disguised request from Kupi for arms, which the Germans
believed might easily be used against their own forces. Kupi, meanwhile, had
already made approaches to General Fehn, the commander of the Twenty-¤rst
Army Corps. Through the of¤ces of General Gustav von Myrdacz, an elderly
Austrian of¤cer who had helped organize Zog’s army and who during World
War II served as liaison of¤cer between the Albanian army and the Twenty-
¤rst Army Corps, Kupi hoped to obtain at least some ammunition.
Neither Dine nor Kupi did particularly well. Dine was given small quanti-
ties of equipment. Kupi was given access to transportation and some food. At
the beginning of July, prior to the formation of the Dine cabinet, Kupi was
allowed to move three hundred armed supporters through Tirana in trucks
supplied by the government to engage partisan forces attacking his area.95 At
the same time Tirana bakeries supplied his forces with bread. The Germans
were reluctant to go much further without tangible evidence of real cooperation.
Scheiger tried to convince Kupi to come to Tirana for talks, but Kupi refused,
Resistance to the Germans 217

recognizing that this would hopelessly compromise his position. As a result,

Kupi’s requests for heavy weapons and signi¤cant quantities of ammunition fell
on deaf ears. It is probable, however, that Kupi did receive at least some ammu-
nition and some small arms from the Germans.96 It seems the Germans were
willing to give Kupi just enough to compromise him but not enough to allow
him to either effectively battle the partisans or threaten their own anticipated
withdrawal. There is little question that Kupi was compromised, and as a result,
as with the BK, his in¶uence began to decline accordingly.
This attempt on the part of the government to supply nationalists and
Zogist forces was accompanied by an administrative reorganization of these
forces. Dine and Frashëri decided that a uni¤ed organization should be con-
structed with general command assigned to an Albanian directly responsible
to two individuals: the prime minister and a German liaison of¤cer. Existing
forces would be supplemented by volunteer bands, strengthened by German
of¤cers. Once again without consulting the Germans, the regents on 17 Au-
gust announced the construction of a “General Command of Active Forces.”
This move seems to have been about as successful as the attempt to convince
the Germans to supply the nationalists with tanks. The only demonstrated
result of this move was to enrage Schliep.97
And yet, initial military operations against the partisans were seemingly
quite successful. Germans and Zogist forces, without directly cooperating,
managed to drive the partisans from Mati at the end of July. Mehmet Shehu,
whose ¤rst brigade was operating in Dibra, was driven into Macedonia, har-
ried by the local populous once it became clear that they had been weakened.
The Germans and the nationalist-Zogists were soon to discover, however, that
these victories were much more the result of the partisans’ having exhausted
their supplies and ammunition. The British embargo on supply drops to the
partisans proved to be the most signi¤cant factor explaining partisan with-
drawal from the north.98
Kupi and Dine were soon faced with a resumption of the partisan offen-
sive. British liaison of¤cers attached to the partisans had convinced British
headquarters in Bari that at least the Dibra battle was directed primarily
against the Germans and based upon stated British priorities; this required the
resumption of supply to partisan forces in the area. Much to the chagrin of
McLean, who had rejoiced at the embargo, at the end of July the partisans
were once again receiving drops from Bari. This allowed them to reenter
Dibra, supported by RAF Beau¤ghter attacks on the town itself on 10 through
11 August. On 10 August the partisans also resumed their attack on Mati.
Dine and the Germans began a counteroffensive on 18 August, using two
218 Chapter 7

German regiments and an assorted group of Albanians—government troops;

tribesmen from Mirdita; a nationalist çeta from Dibra led by Halil Alia, who
had collaborated with both the Italians and the Germans; units of the
“Skanderbeg” Division; and eight hundred to one thousand Kupi people, al-
though Kupi once again refused to participate personally.
This operation, called “Fuchsjagd” in German documents, was a failure.99
The collaborationist Albanian units fought badly, and there were simply not
enough Germans. The offensive was halted on 27 August. The Germans were
driven from the town and area around Dibra on 30 August, leaving possibly
as many as four hundred dead as well as a considerable amount of equip-
ment,100 making the two-month Battle of Dibra perhaps the largest and most
successful partisan operation of the war. At the end of the battle, the partisans
were ¤rmly established in central Albania and in a good position to rapidly
overwhelm their domestic opponents. The battle also brought to an end the
military portion of the complex, essentially hopeless plan concocted by Dine,
Frashëri, Kupi, and some of the northern chieftains.
The other part of the plan, to convince the Allies of Albania’s neutrality,
was equally unsuccessful and speaks to the level of desperation and level of
unreality apparent among the Albanian collaborators. Although Mehdi Frashëri
had been unsuccessful in the past, he tried again to sell the concept of Albanian
neutrality and gain some form of international recognition for his government.
Frashëri was only marginally more successful this time. Of the states within the
German orbit, the Croatians were willing to go as far as constructing a Cro-
atian-Albanian society and the Bulgarians established a general consulate and
sent a military attaché. In terms of neutral states, Frashëri was less successful.
He had sent his son Raquip to Istanbul, but this came to nothing. Although
the Germans were concerned that the goals of this trip included establishing
contact with the British and the Yugoslavs, the Germans did not bother to
intervene, being convinced that Frashëri’s attempt would fail.101 It did, as did
the attempts on the part of Dine to explain to the Allies via telegraph that the
government was neutral and that the Germans were there only as a necessity of
war and to prevent anarchy and civil war. The only perceivable impact of this
move was to enrage Ribbentrop personally. The government did, however, ex-
perience one minor success. It ¤nally convinced the Germans to elevate Consul
General Schliep to the status of ambassador. Rrok Geraj, who had been sent by
Zog to treat with the Italians on the day of the Italian invasion and had simply
joined them, was appointed Albanian ambassador to Berlin, but was never to
assume his post. This meager activity was hardly enough to convince anyone of
Albanian independence and neutrality.102
Resistance to the Germans 219

The nationalist-Zogist gamble had failed. A series of ominous interna-

tional events during the last days of August made it abundantly clear to even
the most pro-German Albanians that the German occupation of Albania
would soon end. The rupture of German-Turkish relations had a signi¤cant
impact in Albania, since the Albanians—despite having broken away from the
Ottoman Empire in 1912—maintained close religious, cultural, and political
ties with the Turkish republic. The fall of Romania to Soviet forces on 23
August and Bulgaria’s desperate declaration of neutrality on 26 August were
even clearer signs of impending doom.103
These events also helped to bring down Dine’s government. Dine’s posi-
tion had become untenable. His military-diplomatic plans had failed, and the
German withdrawal from the Balkans was in sight. By the end of August
Dine’s government was essentially nonexistent. Fewer than 10 percent of his
of¤cials were even bothering to report to work.104 Dine quickly recognized the
signi¤cance of all of these events, and following a scant forty days in of¤ce he
resigned on 28 August. His resignation marked the end of the nationalist-
Zogist plan to secure a noncommunist victory in Albania with the help of the
Germans. It also marked the end of Germany’s attempt to maintain order in
Albania through the use of Albanian forces—it marked the end of the German
version of an independent Albania.105
The leaders of the BK resistance movement: from the left Ekrem Peshkopi, Vasil
Andoni, Mithat Frashëri, Ali Këlcyra, Koço Muka. (Amery)

German soldiers parade in Tirana prior to their departure. (Costa)

Street scene from the last stages of the Battle of Tirana, 1944. (Costa)

An American bomber in flyover of Tirana during the victory celebration. (Costa)

Victory celebration in Tirana with large American flag. (Costa)

Rare photo of Hoxha marching into Tirana with (from the right) partisan leaders
Myslim Peza, Mehmet Shehu, Hoxha, and Koçi Xoxe, who was executed and became
a non-person in 1949. (Costa)
C H A P T E R 8

GERMAN RETREAT AND THE

CONSTRUCTION OF A STALINIST ALBANIA

The collapse of Romania and the imminent fall of Bulgaria encouraged the
German high command to ¤nalize plans for the withdrawal of army group E
and part of army group F from the Balkans. Headquarters in Belgrade ordered
all units, including the Twenty-¤rst Corps, to prepare for withdrawal, so as not
to be caught between the advancing Soviets and the growing partisan forces.
As the German military situation became more precarious, the veneer of a
friendly occupation in Albania began to wear away, but only slowly. With
Dine’s resignation, Neubacher continued to insist that at least outwardly the
Albanian political structure remain the same. Mehdi Frashëri declared himself
ready to assist in forming a new government. The old former liberal must have
realized that he was compromised beyond redemption. For his continued co-
operation he did ask that when the time came to leave, he—along with his
family and the other regents—be granted asylum in Germany or some safer
place, along with some ¤nancial security.1 The Germans agreed to his terms
but concluded that Frashëri was more useful to them as regent than as prime
minister.

The Biçaku Government

Following a week of negotiations, Ibrahim Biçaku agreed to lead a pathetically

small and completely isolated new puppet government. Biçaku thereby dem-
onstrated the validity of the German conclusion that although Biçaku was the
perfect friend of Germany, he was nevertheless entirely without political in-
stincts and quite incompetent. Tirana papers noted cynically that he had
headed the provisional executive committee exactly one year earlier, prior to
the construction of the Mitrovica government.2 Biçaku had become, once
again, the front man for the Germans, with very little to do. Julian Amery
commented sardonically that the only remaining evidence of political activity
223
224 Chapter 8

in Tirana was Ambassador Schliep’s daily game of Ping-Pong with Biçaku.3

Biçaku’s government of nonentities is distinguished only by the fact that Lef-
ter Kosova, the new minister of labor, was shot dead in the streets of Tirana
on the day he assumed of¤ce.4 From the beginning of September, then, Al-
banians ceased to play any signi¤cant role in the administration of German
authority in Albania. The Germans estimated that now considerably less than
10 percent of Albanian government of¤cials, whom the Germans character-
ized as being corrupt, lazy, and inef¤cient in the best of times, actually showed
up for work. And because Neubacher’s staff still clung religiously to the doc-
trine of noninterference, Germans were often not allowed to assume the tasks
of the missing Albanian bureaucrats.5 As a result, much simply did not get
done.
But not all German of¤cials were willing to continue following the Neu-
bacher plan. Obersturmführer Fitzthum had always considered it nonsense,
and his power was increasing. The change of government was accompanied by
a rather signi¤cant shift of power within the German camp in Albania. Au-
thority until the fall of Dine had been shared among the German general in
Albania, who did not actually command any troops; the Foreign Ministry, that
is, Neubacher and Schliep; and Fitzthum of the SS. This authority was now
quickly concentrated in the hands of Fitzthum. Amery maintains that the
change dates from the attempt on Hitler’s life at the Wolf ’s Lair on 20 July
1944. Although this event may have had an impact, German documents sug-
gest that the change did not take place until the end of August, which would
suggest that the collapse of Dine’s government itself acted as the principle
motivating factor for the change.
Other contributing factors include the increasing effectiveness of the par-
tisans, who had by now demonstrated an ability to launch coordinated drives
outside their traditional areas. The Germans, of course, were also much con-
cerned about their own deteriorating military situation. Collaborators were
leaving Tirana in large numbers. Prengë Previzi, the commander of the Alban-
ian army, and Hysni Dema, commander of the gendarmerie and originally an
active anti-Italian Zogist, ¶ed, as did Halil Alia, commander of a—until now
reliable—nationalist çeta in Dibra. Alia’s defection was particularly irksome for
Fitzthum, because his çeta had just been given a considerable amount of gold,
weapons, and ammunition. With the exception of a few small units, the army
and the gendarmerie had ceased to exist. Many of the gendarmes simply went
home with their weapons and reportedly shot at both sides during the German
withdrawal.6 The Germans determined that even the Twenty-¤rst SS Division
“Skanderbeg” was by now of little use other than for simple guard duty.
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 225

The Germans, for the ¤rst time in Albania, also had to begin worrying
about the effectiveness of their own troops. By September 1944 most of the
three battalions of former Soviet troops in the 297th Infantry Division—who
had deserted to the Germans or had been captured by them—had deserted
again and gone over to the Albanians or the British. Julian Amery convinced
thirty of these Tajiks, Kazaks, and Uzbegs, most of them Turkish speaking and
therefore having something in common with many older Albanians, to kill
their of¤cers and join the Zogists. Amery expressed some surprise when the
Kazak troops brought with them the ears of the dead of¤cers, wrapped in a
large green handkerchief. Amery was delighted, however, to ¤nally be afforded
the opportunity—somewhat in the tradition of Tamerlane—to ride at the
head of a Turkoman horde.7
The Germans hoped to solve the problem by disarming the remaining
central Asian battalions. But the morale of the German troops was being
effected as well. General Ernst von Leyser, commander of the Twenty-¤rst
Corps, from the end of August began complaining about the undisciplined
troops and a reduction in ¤ghting capabilities. There were instances of Ger-
man soldiers selling their equipment. One of the BLOs was told of a German
who was willing to sell a tank.8 Encouraged by these reports, Wing Com-
mander Tony Neel, one of the BLOs in the north, sent a letter on 29 August
to the divisional commander of the 181st Infantry Division headquartered in
Shkodra. Neel offered surrender terms to the Germans whereby the Germans
would be able to keep their weapons until the British could safely transport
the Germans, with all military honors, out of Albania. He argued that he was
motivated by a concern for German safety. Neubacher laughed this off in his
memoirs, but Schliep advised the Foreign Ministry that it might be useful to
maintain the connection to determine British political goals in the Balkans,
something that seems to have been a mystery to all—all except Hoxha, who
believed that Neel was attempting to develop a joint British-German scheme
to crush the partisans, oddly similar to the contentions of McLean and Smiley,
who believed that elements of SOE were attempting to crush the nationalists.9
The Germans in Albania were not ready to surrender to Neel or anyone
else. Although there were reports that a few German of¤cers had defected,
widespread mutiny or even insubordination did not happen.10 This may at
least partially be explained by a signi¤cant decrease in partisan military activity
in September owing to Hoxha’s increasing concentration on political matters,
to the absence of some partisans units that had been loaned to Tito, and to the
fact that the First Partisan Corps ran out of ammunition during the last two
weeks of September.11
226 Chapter 8

But regardless of the actual level of danger to the German position,

Fitzthum felt that more brutal measures were called for, but then when dealing
with Albanians, Fitzthum always thought that brutal measures were called for.
Fitzthum relieved the last DGA, General Otto Gullmann, sending him off to
Bulgaria, and also had General Gustav Fehn of the Twenty-¤rst Corps re-
placed. In conjunction with Neubacher’s new special representative in Albania,
Oberführer Dr. Karl Gstöttenbauer, Fitzthum rapidly reorganized the Ger-
man administrative structure in Albania. This reorganization included the
consolidation of the four ¤eld commands into one German ¤eld command in
Albania, which conformed to the reality of the shrinking area of German
control as well as to the fewer and fewer people with whom the Germans had
to work.12
This consolidation was accompanied by an increase in terror directed
against the civilian population in the hopes that this might ensure an orderly
and painless German withdrawal. Some local of¤cials participated with enthu-
siasm, including the prefects of Vlora and Durrës, Vizdan Resilia and Mehmet
Çela respectively, and the police chief of Shkodra, Hasan Isu¤. Through indis-
criminate terror, these of¤cials managed to maintain some order in their
areas.13 Fitzthum applied similar methods, although somewhat less indiscrim-
inately, in those areas under his direct control. Amery tells us that among the
¤rst victims of this harder line were some forty pro-British members of the
BK who were arrested and sent to the concentration camp of Semlin in occu-
pied Yugoslavia. Skënder Muço, the BK çeta leader and central council mem-
ber who had consistently pushed for active opposition to the Germans, was
simply shot.
Kühmel argues that Fitzthum had always used terror, as evidenced by the
Wehrmacht complaints in August. Regular army of¤cers decried Fitzthum’s
rash of arrests as well as the transport of some 400 Albanian prisoners out of
Albania, directly contravening existing agreements that Mehdi Frashëri had
signed in February 1944.14 And yet it seems clear that a general shift in
German policy did take place after the promotion of Fitzthum. Beginning in
September the Wehrmacht itself turned to increased terrorism. Prisoners were
transported out of old Albania to a newly constructed concentration camp in
Prishtina—instead of remaining interned in the three camps in Albania.
While no de¤nitive ¤gures are available, the numbers could have been large.
On the night of 17 to 18 September alone, some 600 Albanians were trans-
ported from Shkodra to Prishtina. To secure the Elbasan-Tirana road, all
houses within three hundred feet were burned down and a section of the
Tirana-Shkodra road was entirely evacuated. More seriously, Schmidhuber of
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 227

the SS “Skanderbeg” issued orders to increase the burning of villages and

killing of people. In keeping with these orders, between 19 September and 23
October 131 NLM prisoners—including women, which constituted a partic-
ular affront to Moslems—were shot or hanged in Kosova.15 The image of the
friendly occupation protecting the Albanians from their enemies had seem-
ingly outlived its usefulness.
And yet at the same time German repression increased, cooperation with
certain northern chieftains increased as well. Although all Albanians had rea-
son to be apprehensive about the future, the nationalists and the northern
chieftains were clearly in the most dif¤cult position. As German evacuation of
Albania became increasingly near, the nationalists remained disunited, their
inactivity was undermining their authority even among their own followers,
and the NLM had demonstrated its ability to strike at and hold any territory
in Albania not considered vital to the Germans. To make matters worse, at the
end of August, SOE (now called Force 399) signed military agreements with
the NLM. Following protracted negotiations in Bari, in which Hoxha hoped
but failed to extract some degree of political recognition, SOE, represented by
Lord Harcourt, of¤cially stated what had been clear for some time, that the
NLM constituted the only force ¤ghting the Germans in Albania. The agree-
ment also included a series of operational decisions and Allied commitments
in terms of further material support for the NLM.16 This was an important
document and lent the NLM some long-sought and much-needed legitimacy.
With good reason, the nationalists began to panic and many concluded
that the only course of action open to them was to attack the Germans in the
hopes of gaining the support of the British, who might protect them from the
NLM. Mithat Frashëri, Hasan Dosti, Koço Muka, and Dine, along with Abaz
Ermenji, left Tirana to join Kupi and created the so-called Mountain Govern-
ment, a desperate organization destined to survive for approximately two
weeks. Mithat Frashëri became prime minister and Kupi the military com-
mander, the ¤rst instance of close coordination between the BK and Kupi.17
Hurried meetings were held with McLean, the only British representative the
nationalists could reach. On 8 September the BK leaders Abaz Ermenji and
Mithat Frashëri, representing this new organization, met with McLean and
offered to begin immediate operations against the Germans on the under-
standing that the Allies might be willing to reconsider their attitude toward
the BK.18 McLean has argued that he received assurances from SOE on 29
August that reconsideration toward the nationalists was still possible. On 5
September, SOE instructed him, once again, “to make Kupi ¤ght.”19 McLean
redoubled his efforts and Kupi, recognizing that time was running out, decided
228 Chapter 8

to attack the Germans. On 8 September, a Zogist band under Kupi’s son Petrit
attacked and overran the headquarters of a German battery killing ten and
capturing some material. Zogist forces apparently carried out further opera-
tions over the next few weeks. Ermenji, with a force of two hundred, is re-
ported to have attacked a German convoy on 10 September.20 On the same
day, Gani Kryeziu, who had been operating against the Germans for some
time, attacked the chrome mines at Zogaj and Qafa e Rrërësit and captured
them.21 Muharrem Bajraktari, too, moved against the Germans in early Sep-
tember. The nationalists and Kupi asked that their efforts be registered by
McLean and that he also transmit their requests for quantities of guns and
money.
McLean was, of course, willing to oblige. His pleas came to nothing,
however, principally because the various operations launched by the national-
ists came to little. The Germans—based on their documents—never actually
discovered that they were being attacked by the nationalists. The attacks were
assumed to be of partisan origin and apparently failed to do much damage in
any case. The British in Bari were suspicious, with some of¤cers wondering if
Kupi’s reduced numbers constituted much of a threat to the Germans, and
whether the actions reported by McLean could not actually be considered
British operations supported by some Zogist troops.22 It seems that the pro-
NLM wing among British policymakers was ¤nally gaining the upper hand in
a process that frequently left the of¤cers in the ¤eld bewildered and embar-
rassed. In the midst of this renewed nationalist activity, on the same day as the
Ermenji attack, SOE Bari sent McLean a message making it clear that no
supplies would be sent to the nationalists and that he and Smiley were to
withdraw and report to headquarters in Bari. Amery, as interim head of the
mission, was to remain with Kupi but only in the capacity of a neutral observer
and was not to encourage Kupi to ¤ght. McLean was more than reluctant to
give in just as his heretofore failed mission was beginning to produce results,
however meager. But once his instructions were con¤rmed twice by subse-
quent messages, McLean had no choice but to comply.23
Hoxha had by this point lost patience with McLean. Summoning Cap-
tain Marcus Lyon of the British mission attached to partisan headquarters, he
complained that Consensus II was operating in conjunction with collaborators
against the interests of the partisans. He ordered that McLean, Smiley, and
Seymour (who had left Albania some two months earlier) evacuate within ¤ve
days or face arrest and trial before a partisan military court. The British in Bari
acted forcefully, requiring Hoxha to back down or face the cancellation of a
recently signed military agreement between the British and the partisans.
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 229

Hoxha prudently retracted his allegations and threats, noting that they were
made in a moment of anger, though the anger at this event may have been a
falsehood, upon hearing of the death of Mustafa Gjinishi.24

The British Decide

Following years of indecision, which served to alienate most of the Albanian

groups involved, particularly the NLM, British policymakers ¤nally decided to
accept what had been obvious to most liaison of¤cers in Albania for some
time—that the NLM constituted the only ¤ghting force in Albania and that
it was more than likely that the NLM would soon be in control of the entire
country. On 19 September Foreign Of¤ce, War Of¤ce, SOE, and MI6 (mili-
tary intelligence) chiefs in London met and grudgingly accepted this inevita-
bility in an obscurely written memorandum.25 Anthony Eden explained this
new policy in a somewhat over-optimistic minute to Churchill on 26 Septem-
ber in which he concluded that “our policy should be to accept the probability
of an FNC [NLM] government and on strengthening our position with them
in order to offset Russian in¶uence.”26
While the nationalist cause had been lost for quite some time, these
pronouncements and the fact that no weapons would be forthcoming sealed
its fate. Many nationalists were willing to accept the probable outcome; some
were not. By the third week of September a state of panic had seized many of
the nationalists and collaborators, convincing many to ¶ee Albania.27 Mithat
Frashëri and some one hundred leading members of the BK—including Ali
Këlcyra, Hasan Dosti, Kadri Cakrani, and Koço Muka—managed to escape to
Italy in a boat provided by the Abwehr.28 Kupi had a more dif¤cult time.
When McLean reluctantly told Kupi that he had been ordered out, Kupi
received the news rather stoically, without recrimination. Interpreting Alban-
ian politics in his traditional narrow tribalism he said, “Perhaps it is only just
that they [NLM] should come to power. We Gegs have exploited the Tosks
for 1,000 years, now it is their turn to exploit us.”29 Kupi concluded that only
two options were open to him—either he could ¤ght the partisans alongside
the Germans, or he could disband his movement.30 He considered the latter
to be the only honorable course, and by the end of September had begun the
process. Having done this he asked for some help from the British in evacu-
ating himself, his two sons, and three close supporters.
McLean had hoped to bring Kupi out with him when he evacuated but
was prevented from doing so by direct command of SOE Bari. Amery tells us
230 Chapter 8

that SOE Bari went so far as to send security of¤cers along with the rescue
vessel to insure that McLean did not try to bring Kupi along, fearing that this
might further damage the rapidly deteriorating British relations with Hoxha.31
McLean and Amery, believing that their personal honor and the honor of
the British government was at stake, made the rounds of senior British of¤cials
in Italy to arrange some help for Kupi. Both Harold MacMillian, the resident
minister, and General Wilson agreed that something had to be done to help.32
But elements within the Foreign Of¤ce argued that Kupi’s record spoke
against him, agreeing with elements of SOE Bari that any aid would compro-
mise the British position with Hoxha. The issue was ¤nally decided by
Eden—to whom McLean had addressed angry telegrams. The foreign secre-
tary ordered Kupi’s rescue—which McLean was to personally conduct—
“without it appearing that His Majesty’s Government have been involved in
the operation.”33 But once again, the British were too late as the ever re-
sourceful Kupi had by this time managed to ¤nd his own way out, arriving in
Brindisi during the ¤rst week of November.
Hoxha, of course, did all he could to facilitate the disintegration of the
nationalists and the strengthening of his own position. Hoxha, too, like the
Germans it seems, became more ruthless. This is perhaps best demonstrated
by the death of Mustafa Gjinishi. Gjinishi had begun his resistance to the
invader earlier than Hoxha and had demonstrated his courage in battle.
Gjinishi had also consistently taken the line that some of the nationalists could
be co-opted into the NLM. Indeed, Gjinishi himself had a hand in winning
over some, such as Cen Elezi, who, along with other principal Dibra chiefs,
joined the NLM in September 1944. Gjinishi certainly constituted a serious
challenge to Hoxha’s leadership within the NLM and the party.
At the end of August while on a march with Victor Smith, Gjinishi was
“picked off accurately in two bursts of ¤re.”34 While Albanian socialist
historiography argues that the Germans or the pro-German Albanians were
to blame, both Schliep and the British BLOs believed that Gjinishi was assas-
sinated by his own.35 Hoxha, who rails against Gjinishi in his memoirs, was
certainly well rid of him, and following his death the NLM established a
harder line on the nationalists. At the beginning of September the general staff
of the NLM issued orders that those nationalists not yet compromised would
either be integrated into the NLM or liquidated. Under this new hard line,
Muharrem Bajraktari, in a conversation with Shehu, was presented with these
options. Bajraktari refused to submit and barely escaped with his life, turning
to the Germans for protection. On 12 October the chiefs of twelve Geg clans,
including Muharrem Bajraktari, with Marka Gjoni of Mirdita as the central
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 231

¤gure, joined together in what they called the Mountain League, an organiza-
tion supported and armed by the Germans.36 The presence of Gjoni in this
organization is perhaps not surprising, since he had been cooperating with the
occupation authorities since the Italian invasion—cooperation that increased
after the First and Fourth Partisan Brigades attacked his base at Orosh and
burned down his house. But Bajraktari’s adherence to this group was a political
coup for Hoxha because one of the last remaining independent chieftains was
now thoroughly compromised. Gani Kryeziu, too, in conversation with the
head of the Second Partisan Brigade, was presented with the same options—
his brother Said Kryeziu was arrested by the partisans along with the BLO
assigned to Gani’s headquarters. McLean reported that by the middle of Oc-
tober, Gani Kryeziu’s organization had been suppressed.37 Gani Bey and the
remnants of his forces joined the NLM.
The Germans had by this point already begun evacuating nonessential
personal and all women, an operation not without its problems. On 5 Septem-
ber a column of trucks carrying women civilians was attacked by partisans some
twenty miles from Prizren. Of the forty women, twenty-two were killed or
wounded—with the ambassador’s wife among the wounded—and three were
captured. Deva maintained that this act was retribution for the execution of
women partisans in Kosova. For the release of the three captured women, the
partisans ¤rst demanded one hundred pieces of gold for each plus the release of
all communists in Kosova. Following German agreement to these conditions,
the partisans decided they wanted Brigadier General Davies, who was in Ger-
many. Negotiations dragged on, and the situation seems not to have been
resolved by war’s end.38 A high-level German high command commission re-
ported to Field Marshal Alfred Jodl, chief operations of¤cer, who reported to
the Foreign Ministry, that the commander of the convoy, Lieutenant Parisius,
a veterinarian, would be court-martialed for failing to resist. The report also
blamed both the German military personal in Tirana as well as the embassy for
failing to adequately protect knowledge of German convoy movements.39
The episode had a signi¤cant impact on the relations between Fitzthum
and Schliep, since they blamed each other. Of the two, Fitzthum proved to be
the most experienced in¤ghter and he ultimately eclipsed Schliep in in¶uence.
By cooperating, Neubacher’s representative Gstöttenbauer further augmented
Fitzthum’s already-increased power. But Fitzthum had but little time to enjoy
his empire. On 2 October, the Germans received orders to evacuate Albania
and General Ernst von Leyser automatically assumed complete command. On
9 October Albania was declared an operational zone, and the Germans began
moving their forces north. By the middle of October southern Albania had
232 Chapter 8

already been abandoned south of Berat, although German units from Greece,
marching along the Florina-Korça-Struga road, entered Albania with little
dif¤culty. In mid-October the Germans still controlled Korça, Elbasan,
Struga, and Tirana as well as most of the towns and large territory in the
north. But Gjirokastra and Berat were liberated in September, and the NLM
moved its headquarters to the latter on 15 October. Prizren was liberated on
4 October and Vlora on the 15 October.40
On a number of occasions, British ground forces, which began small and
limited action in Albania in June, participated directly in the partisan ad-
vance. The largest and most controversial of these actions involved the taking
of the southern coastal town of Saranda on 9 October, an operation destined
to become another milestone in the growing hostility between Hoxha and the
Western Allies. The British were interested in Saranda primarily because of
its location directly across the straits from Corfu, which could have afforded
an escape route for the Germans on Corfu. Under Brigadier Tom Churchill
(without informing Hoxha’s headquarters) British commandos, with cooper-
ation from local partisans under Islam Radovicka, took the town on 9 Octo-
ber and considered taking advantage of the success and pushing north to
Vlora. Hoxha’s headquarters—afraid that the British intended to maintain a
permanent foothold—complained that British soldiers had looted Saranda.
Once this issue had been resolved, the British HQ for land forces in the
Adriatic decided not to pursue the matter further. The commandos were
withdrawn, although some Long Range Desert Group patrols remained in
Albania.41
Albanian socialist historiography presents several versions of this incident,
ranging from the partisans’ having taken Saranda well before the British ar-
rival, to Hoxha’s own version in which the partisans did most of the major
¤ghting, having cleverly hemmed the British in. Hoxha, we are told, at this
point handed the British an ultimatum to withdraw, which they did “with
shame” ending their “diabolical intentions.”42 Much of this account is clearly
inaccurate. Still, as with many of their dealings with the Albanians, the British
might have handled the situation differently. They might, for example, have
found some way to either inform Hoxha or the BLOs attached to him that
the operation was planned. The fact that it came as a surprise did little to
assuage Hoxha’s fears of British designs. Perhaps more seriously, British War
Of¤ce documents indicate that Greek Zervas forces took part in the Saranda
operation, raising fears that the British, whose preference for the Greeks was
clear to all Albanians, were attempting to establish Greeks in areas of southern
Albania, which Greek nationalists claimed as rightfully theirs.43 Although
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 233

Albanian fears were probably exaggerated, the British seem to have done
everything in their power—inadvertently—to in¶ame them.
The partisan advance, of course, was made possible by the continuing
German withdrawal. By the middle of October, German garrisons everywhere
were shrinking. While the Twenty-¤rst Corps had about sixty-¤ve thousand
men at its disposal, most of these troops were not in Albania but in Monte-
negro and others parts of the former Yugoslavia. And of those who remained,
few were experienced ¤ghters. The units of the Twenty-¤rst Corps in Albania
were mostly older, insuf¤ciently armed, and without battle experience—mili-
tarily this was not the German army that had invaded Albania in September
1943.44 Nevertheless, the evacuation proceeded smoothly and at remarkably
little cost to the Germans. Much of the credit, or blame, for the successful
withdrawal must go to the northern nationalists, who protected vital roads as
well as large pieces of territory. Although the partisans certainly scored a
political victory by driving northern chiefs ¤rmly into the German camp, it
was the Germans who scored the military victory. Units of the 297th Infantry
Division with its HQ in Tirana secured old Albania to the area of Shkodra.
But Shkodra—particularly important to the Germans, because they planned
to leave in that direction—and the area south of the line Puka-Kukës were
held—since the end of September—by Muharrem Bajraktari, Gjon Marka
Gjoni, Halil Alia, elements of the BK, and small groups of Kupi supporters,
all supported by the 181st Infantry Division. Most German observers agreed
that without the pro-German clans of northern Albania, the northern route—
the only way out—would have been closed to the Germans.45

The Battle of Tirana

The situation in Tirana during these last weeks of the occupation became
increasingly desperate, and it is here that the largest battle of the war in Albania
was fought. Amery, who ventured disguised into Tirana in September, leaves us
a good description of the Germans in the capital: “We passed small groups of
German of¤cers and soldiers, hurrying to their of¤ces with bulging brief-cases,
or strolling towards the shops and cafes. Boyish in their tropical knit, pestered
by peddlers and jostled by the oriental throng, they reminded me irresistibly of
British troops in the Middle East. It is a new and perhaps healthy experience to
see an army of occupation from the native’s point of view.”46
And now what had been the safest place in Albania for both the Italians
and the Germans was under attack. Since the end of August, the capital had
234 Chapter 8

acted as a magnet for partisan forces, requiring tightened security. Following

the not-altogether-successful evacuation of nonessential personal, the German
army proceeded to construct something of a fortress. Certain sections of the
city were blocked off, and a large security area was designated with the Ger-
man mission at its center.47
Although the Germans continued to believe that Albanian political coop-
eration remained essential, collaborators in the capital were becoming increas-
ingly dif¤cult to ¤nd. On 7 September the prefect of Tirana, Qazim Muletti—
whom German documents refer to as absolutely unreliable—panicked and ¶ed
to Germany. The position of mayor, after the ¶ight of Omer Fortuzi to Al-
lied-occupied Italy, was turned over to someone entirely unquali¤ed. The Ger-
man military authorities in Tirana suggested to Gstöttenbauer that the posi-
tions of mayor and prefect be united and given to Resilia, the prefect of Vlora,
who had demonstrated his loyalty to the Germans, or to Mehmet Çela, prefect
of Durrës, who was also considered reliable and effective. Gstöttenbauer re-
jected this suggestion and instead, in conjunction with Fitzthum, created a
three-headed control committee for Tirana made up of General Gustav von
Myrdacz, Previzi, who some Germans thought was a communist, and the head
of the Albanian secret police. The plan failed, as the seventy-year-old general
was captured and later shot by the partisans; the head of the secret police ¶ed
to Shkodra; and Previzi, once he had learned enough about German strength
and tactics to make himself useful, defected to the partisans.48
Tirana remained without any effective Albanian authorities. Soon this
was of little consequence for the Germans, however, since they too began to
¶ee. On 15 October the German Ministry in Tirana was dissolved, and
Schliep and Scheiger were evacuated to Germany. Within the next few days
Fitzthum and Gstöttenbauer moved their headquarters to Prizren until
Kosova, too, needed to be evacuated.49 The German military command, part
of the staff of the Twenty-¤rst Corps, transferred its headquarters to Shkodra,
where by the end of the month the bulk of the remaining German troops in
Albania could be found, estimated at some ¤fteen thousand men.50
On the day before the corps staff left Tirana, the last Albanian collabora-
tionist government of Biçaku, as well as the council of the regency, resigned.
Radio Tirana issued a simple statement, noting that “the threats that existed
when this government was formed, for various reasons within and without
Albania have increased to the extent that they cannot be overcome, thus the
High Council of Regency and government resigned on October 26. . . . All
civilian of¤cials and soldiers are advised to continue their duties.”51
The orders for this act came from Gstöttenbauer and were delivered to
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 235

the government, somewhat reluctantly, by the chief of staff of the Twenty-¤rst

Corps. German military authorities questioned both the constitutionality and
the wisdom of this act. The same military of¤cials who criticized the Foreign
Ministry for adhering too rigidly to the notion of an independent Albania and
respecting its neutrality now complained that the reckless dismissal of the
government and regency was against stated policy, was carried out without
reference to the military authorities, and constituted a black mark against the
Germans. The military authorities were particularly concerned about the effect
the dismissal of the government would have on order in the country. Perhaps
giving Biçaku too much credit, the military authorities blamed the disintegra-
tion of authority and resulting anarchy on the removal of the government.52
An attempt to rectify the situation—the construction of a National Commit-
tee in Shkodra, which included the former regent Harapi—predictably came
to nothing.53
In the midst of the often unimpeded withdrawal, Hoxha determined to
launch a ¤nal assault on Tirana, almost as if he felt it necessary to get in a few
shots before all the Germans had gone. In October partisan forces had reached
some forty thousand, and Allied airdrops were at a high as well, in excess of
two hundred tons.54 With new strength and con¤dence, Mehmet Shehu’s ¤rst
division—made up of the ¤rst, fourth, and twenty-third brigades—launched
an all-out attack on the city on 29 October. Providing what proved to be
valuable service were Stan Eastwood and his long-range desert patrols, who
brought in RAF airstrikes. As a further indication of continuing deterioration
of relations between the British and the Albanians, considerable dispute arose
concerning the strike targets.55 Nevertheless, on one day the RAF committed
twenty-eight rocket-¤ring Beau¤ghters, which did considerable damage to the
forti¤ed barracks and gun positions the Germans had constructed.56
As the Germans were not yet ready to leave, the struggle for Tirana
proved to be one of the longest and largest battles between the Germans and
the Albanians during the war. Because of its signi¤cance in terms of the
rapidly developing partisan legend, ¤gures relating to the number of comba-
tants and casualties vary widely. German documents suggest that the German
garrison at the beginning of the attack consisted of between ¤ve hundred and
seven hundred of¤cers and men and some of the staff of the 297th Infantry
Division, as well as some ¤ve hundred wounded. Albanian socialist sources are
somewhat more vague concerning the number of German troops in Tirana,
using terms such as “a reduced division.”57
The ¤rst phase of the battle began when the partisans attacked from the
south with some two thousand ¤ghters, supported by artillery and armored
236 Chapter 8

cars. The Germans immediately withdrew to prepared positions in New Tir-

ana, leaving the old city to the partisans. German military of¤cials maintain
that the partisans failed to take New Tirana and suffered heavy casualties in
the process.58
The second and decisive phase of the battle began on 11 November. As the
partisans renewed the attack, a German relief column from the south ap-
proached. Between 13 and 15 November the column—units of the Twenty-sec-
ond Corps, which came from the direction of Struga-Elbasan and consisted of
two thousand to three thousand supported by artillery—was itself attacked in
the vicinity of the Kërraba Pass by units of the ¤rst and eighth brigades. While
socialist Albanian sources maintain that the column was wiped out, German
sources maintain that it was saved by the arrival of a small number of street
tanks stationed in Tirana.59 In either case, it was time for the German garrison
to make for the north on the coastal road to Shkodra if it hoped to keep to the
overall timetable for the withdrawal. After cleaning out the bank, on the morn-
ing of 18 November the ¤rst attempt to break out of what by now had become
encirclement failed. Hoxha argues that the Germans in Tirana were completely
smashed.60 But German and British sources tell us that by the afternoon of 18
November battalions of the 297th Infantry Division from Durrës, with heavy
artillery broke through to Tirana. The evacuation was certainly hurried. The
British BLO who accompanied the partisans into the city noted that some
intact vital installations were found.61 Still, the ¤nal evacuation from Tirana
seemed orderly, and with the German contingent from Durrës, the Tirana
garrison continued north to Shkodra without signi¤cant losses.
German documents fail to mention casualty ¤gures for the Battle of
Tirana. Albanian socialist historiography maintains that two thousand Ger-
mans were killed and ¤ve hundred captured.62 Although these ¤gures are
doubtless somewhat exaggerated, the ¤ghting did constitute some of the heav-
iest in the war. There was heavy damage in those places where the Germans
had strong points that were manned. But with the exception of extensive
pockmarks from small arms ¤re, the city seems to have suffered little in the
struggle. Zog’s palace, for example, survived almost entirely intact—the only
visible damage was a hole through the drawing room wall caused by an RAF
Beau¤ghter.63
The Battle of Tirana ended on 18 November. The Germans remained in
Albania for approximately another two weeks. By 20 November it was clear to
the 297th Infantry Division command in Shkodra that the original plan to
break out over Mostar was now impossible because of the growing strength of
Montenegrin partisans. Instead, the command decided to march northeast
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 237

through Visegrad to Sarajevo. This route, too, initially was blocked, but with
the help of the Albanian nationalists, the troops had little dif¤culty reaching
Montenegro-Bosnia. Once they arrived in Bosnia, further progress was made
possible by help from blackshirt units and Montenegrin çetniks. The ¤nal push
was facilitated by sending the Twenty-second Infantry Division from the other
direction. In January 1945, following heavy mountain ¤ghting and frequent air
attacks—complicated by an early and hard winter, with considerable loss of
men and equipment—the remnants of the German occupation forces in Al-
bania joined the bulk of the remaining German forces in the Balkans in
Sarajevo.64 The German occupation of Albania had come to an end.
As a ¤nal act the Germans did what they could for some of the Albanians
who had compromised themselves and could expect execution if captured by
the partisans. In December 1944 the German Foreign Ministry opened a
special of¤ce in Vienna to deal with those people. Mehdi Frashëri and Xhafer
Deva were provided with aid to settle in Italy. Others relied on their own
resources as Abaz Kupi had. The chief of the Mirdita and his sons were offered
asylum by the pope. Mustafa Kruja and Said Kryeziu—following his release
by the partisans resulting from British pressure—also found their way to
Rome. Fiqri Dine and Prengë Previzi—although the Germans assumed the
latter had been taken in by the partisans—escaped to Greece.65 Many others,
including Anton Harapi and Ibrahim Biçaku, failed to heed the German
advice to withdraw. Neubacher tells us that Biçaku, impractical to the end,
could not decide which of his opera records to take with him: he delayed too
long and was taken.66 Both Harapi and Biçaku were tried and executed by the
new Stalinist government.

The War in Kosova

The war in old Albania had come to an end, except in the north, where forms
of resistance to Hoxha continued well into the 1950s. But ¤ghting persisted
in Kosova, where Albanian partisans continued the struggle against the Ger-
mans and the nationalists. Because of Kosova’s unique status, resistance to the
Germans there grew much more slowly. Most Kosovar Albanians were willing
to overlook the fact that German aggression had been responsible for their
union with old Albania. Many Kosovar Albanians were principally preoccu-
pied with driving out the Serbian minority, particularly those who had arrived
since 1919. This attitude was at least partially in retaliation for the poor
treatment they had received from the Serbs while Kosova was part of interwar
238 Chapter 8

Yugoslavia. The wholesale expulsion of Serbs by the Albanians created special

problems for the occupation, however, since the Serbs had performed import-
ant functions in Kosova. The Serbs had run most of the businesses, the mills,
the tanneries, and the public utilities. Once the Serbs had gone, there were no
pharmacists in Kosova. Serbian peasants, somewhat more technologically pro-
gressive than their Albanian counterparts, were responsible for much of the
surplus agricultural production for which Kosova was so useful.67 By April
1944, German documents tell us, 40,000 Serbs had been forced to leave, and
Neubacher anticipated that the Germans might have to deal with as many as
150,000 Serbs leaving Kosova.
Neubacher complained that Bedri Pejani and the Second League of Priz-
ren were at least partially responsible for these excesses. The formation of the
league, in late 1943, had originally been welcomed by Neubacher because it
provided the Germans with a Germanophile organizational focal point with
which to deal. The excesses of Pejani and his group, however, were too much
even for the Germans. Neubacher ultimately refers to Pejani as being mad or
crazed, particularly after receiving Pejani’s request for 150,000 weapons. Neu-
bacher assumed, with good reason, that these weapons would be used to
launch a modern St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre of Serbs and Montenegrins.
Neubacher was driven to the point of attempting to convince the regency that
it would be in everyone’s interest if Pejani were arrested.68 Conscious of the
support the league had in Kosova, the regency refused.
Because Pejani’s rabid nationalism was far from unpopular among the
Albanians of Kosova, it is not surprising that a communist or pro-Allied
resistance movement was a long time in surfacing. Would-be resistance
¤ghters had the additional challenge of the SS “Skanderbeg” Division, which
operated principally in Kosova. Although hardly an observer sympathetic to
the Albanians, the communist organizer Svetozar Vukmanovich-Tempo de-
scribes the problem quite accurately: “Conditions for armed resistance in
Kosovo and Metohije were worse than in any other region of the country. . . .
The Albanian population . . . had an unfriendly attitude towards the partisans.
. . . Power is in the hands of the Albanians . . . and this is all they see today.”69
Under these adverse circumstances, the ¤rst conference of the People’s
Liberation Committee for Kosova-Metohija (or Kosmet) was not held until
December 1943 to January 1944 at the town of Bujan. The meeting, chaired
by Mehmet Hoxha and directed by Fadil Hoxha (neither related to Enver
Hoxha), brought together some ¤fty delegates, mostly Albanian and mostly
communist, although some nationalists hostile to the puppet Albanian regime
were also in attendance. The conference adopted a resolution to ¤ght on the
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 239

side of the Allies on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, which guaranteed the
right of national self-determination.70 Those present clearly understood that
without support for at least the prospect of an Albanian Kosova, the Kosmet
committee stood little chance of gaining any level of popular support.
The declaration was essentially in line with Enver Hoxha’s of¤cial posi-
tion, which was to delay dealing with these delicate issues until the end of the
war. But the conference further determined to send representatives to both
Tito and the NLM. This move undermined what little support the declaration
engendered. Indeed, the movement apparently was never strong enough and
never received enough indigenous support to actually conduct any anti-Ger-
man operations within its own area—although it was able to operate outside
of Kosova and on the edges. Lack of supplies must also have been a major
factor.71 The British did send a liaison of¤cer, Lieutenant Andy Hands, who
was present at the Bujan meeting. Hands, however, was unable to supply much
material and was ordered by Bari to con¤ne his attention to operations within
old Albania and to break off contact at the ¤rst sign of political complications
and ¶ee to territory controlled by Yugoslav partisans.72
Kosova, therefore, remained solidly within the Axis camp and was liber-
ated with some dif¤culty. And it is fully understandable why it was in Kosova
that Fitzthum and Gstöttenbauer made a last desperate attempt to forestall
the inevitable. The two lent their support to the construction of an anti-
communist Albanian government in Kosova under Xhafer Deva. While the
political movement predictably led to nothing, the material support with
which Deva was provided had signi¤cant later repercussions. Fitzthum and
Gstöttenbauer apparently deposited large caches of weapons, ammunition, and
food—and they have also been accused of leaving German agents behind—to
support continued opposition to the NLM’s and Tito’s partisans. According to
Yugoslav sources, these supplies were instrumental in the uprising of thou-
sands of Kosovar Albanians.73
By September 1944, the Fifth Brigade, together with bolder units of the
Kosmet group, were active against the Germans on the vital Kukës-Prizren
road.74 This brigade moved freely across the old frontier well before of¤cial
socialist Yugoslav and Albanian histories suggest that, in response to an invi-
tation from Tito, it crossed into Kosova; the of¤cial histories tell us that it was
not until 13 October, following Tito’s formal invitation, that the Third and
Fifth Brigades entered Kosova to assist the Yugoslav partisans. At the end of
November, the Twenty-¤fth Brigade also moved into Kosova, joining with the
Third and Fifth Brigades to form the Fifth division. Following the German
retreat from Shkodra, these units were joined by the newly formed, and con-
240 Chapter 8

siderably less effective Sixth Division, which engaged the Germans around
Podgorica and went on to participate in the liberation of Montenegro and
Bosnia. While socialist Yugoslav sources of the 1950s tended to ignore the
Albanian contribution to the liberation of Kosova and other areas of prewar
Yugoslavia, socialist Albanian sources maintain that some three hundred Al-
banians were killed in the struggle.75
Why Tito, whose movement was considerably stronger than that of the
NLM, needed Albanian participation for the clearing of Kosova is still de-
bated. It is dif¤cult not to conclude that his reasons were cynical. Tito was
certainly aware of the unpopularity of his partisans in Kosova and assumed
correctly that Albanian partisans would face somewhat less opposition from
the local population. The Albanian units proceeded as usual to construct na-
tional liberation councils, at which point the Yugoslav General Staff ordered
them north into Montenegro and Bosnia, where they certainly were not
needed. Yugoslav partisans then replaced the Albanian partisans in Kosova,
dismantling the councils they had constructed and proceeding administratively
to reintegrate Kosova into the new socialist Yugoslavia. Once this was accom-
plished, the Albanian divisions were sent back to old Albania, without reen-
tering Kosova.76 Hoxha did not object, and his critics argue that he was so
willing to give up Kosova because it is Geg and its incorporation would have
meant an overwhelming Geg dominance in postwar Albania.77 Yugoslav
troops in Kosova treated the Albanians there like Axis collaborators, resulting
in a full-scale revolt, which lasted from November 1944 to May 1945. It was
only with dif¤culty, and some thirty thousand troops, that Tito was able to
crush this uprising.78 In a certain sense, of course, at least the spirit of the
uprising continues to this day.

Zog’s Final Attempt to Form a Government in Exile

As the war drew to a close in Albania, the question of a postwar political

settlement—arguably the principal preoccupation of all Albanian groups dur-
ing the entire wartime period—became even more acute. Zog, as the last
legitimate ruler, who still controlled considerable ¤nancial resources, was cer-
tainly a contender for power. Although Zog had failed to convince the British
to actively use him in the resistance, he never abandoned his claim to be
Albania’s rightful ruler. Despite the British insistence that he refrain from
politics of any kind, Zog never entirely abstained, recognizing that if he did so
his chances of returning to Albania after the war would be jeopardized. Zog
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 241

did as much as he could, within the rather strict limitations imposed on him
by the ever vigilant Foreign Of¤ce.
Zog’s problem was one of legitimacy. No government of¤cially recognized
him either as the leader of an established government in exile or as the leader
of the Albanian people. Zog hoped to solve this problem by convincing the
British to change their policy, assuming that once the British had done so
other Allied states would follow suit. Zog’s campaign to convince the Foreign
Of¤ce to change its mind included maintaining and expanding his contacts
with Albanian groups both in and out of the country, rallying in¶uential
supporters in Great Britain and the United States, and taking advantage of
opportunities—no matter how remote—whenever they happened to arise.
Examples of the latter include his appeal in 1942 to individual partici-
pants of a London wartime conference. He and his agents approached Cana-
dian, American, Belgian, and Czech delegates to obtain help in gaining rec-
ognition. While the ¤rst two remained cool, the Belgians and the Czechs
proved to be somewhat more receptive—presumably because they too had
been forced out of their countries by Axis troops. But little came of this. The
Belgians sent a sympathetic reply, and Eduard Benes went so far as to send a
cordial one. Geraldine tells us that Benes became a frequent visitor at the Ritz,
where Zog and his party were staying.79 Although these people undoubtedly
wished Zog well, none was willing to expend his own limited political capital
to further the cause of Zog.
As the war progressed, Zog’s schemes became more desperate, perhaps
the most remarkable coming to light in an interview with members of the
Anglo-Jewish Association in January 1944. Zog offered to sponsor a plan for
a Jewish settlement in Albania if the Anglo-Jewish Association agreed to help
him regain his throne. The association reported the interview to the Foreign
Of¤ce and seems to have taken no other action in this regard.80
Zog seemed to be somewhat more successful recruiting in¶uential non-
governmental foreign supporters, many of whom had served in the diplomatic
corps in Albania during Zog’s reign. Albania appears to be one of those states
that casts something of a spell on those who come in contact with it, particu-
larly Westerners. Few of these people seemed to be able to put Albania aside
entirely. Many became directly involved as publicists for Albanian causes,
including the resurrection of the monarchy under Zog. The former American
minister Charles C. Hart serves as a good example. He organized a small
group of Albanian enthusiasts called the Friends of Albania.
The most in¶uential groups of this type, however, were active in London.
The ¤rst group to devote its efforts to the cause of Albania during the war was
242 Chapter 8

the Friends of Albania (not connected to Hart’s American group). This group,
despite that it was formed under the auspices of Zog’s rather obsequious secre-
tary Qazim Kastrioti, nevertheless attracted some in¶uential persons, including
the philanthropist Miss Tildsley, as well as Harry Hodgkinson, a military orga-
nizer under Percy. This group was obviously very pro-Zog and ultimately co-
operated with the larger and more in¶uential Anglo-Albanian Association,
founded by the Albanologist Aubrey Herbert. Following his death, the associ-
ation went dormant but was revived by Herbert’s widow in March 1943. Its
membership included Viscount Cecil—who had played an important role in
Western recognition of the new state of Albania—Jocelyn Percy, H. Hodgson,
and the Albanologist Edith Durham. The secretary, Sir Edward Boyle, also
served as the chairman of the Balkan Committee, a pro-Albanian, pro-Bulgar-
ian, anti-Greek group with Lord Noel Buxton as president.81
Of the émigré Albanian groups, all of which founded Zogist committees,
the largest communities could be found in the United States, Egypt, and
Turkey. The latter two were of particular signi¤cance to Zog because they were
located in states with Moslem governments quite sympathetic to him. This
sympathy was such that Zog was allowed to maintain his old legations in
Istanbul and Cairo, which provided him with a strong claim to legitimacy.
While these legations accomplished little in practical terms, Zog was always
willing to send them considerable sums of money for maintenance costs be-
cause of their symbolic importance.
The Albanian community in the United States—centered in Boston and
Detroit—was also of considerable signi¤cance for Zog. The community was
quite large—thirty thousand according to the Albanians themselves, ¤fteen
thousand according to the U.S. Census Bureau.82 The community contained
some important ¤gures, including Zog’s long-time opponent Fan Noli, whose
nominally democratic, Western-oriented government had been overthrown by
Zog in 1924. Noli, founder and bishop of the Albanian Orthodox Church in
the United States, was recognized as a principle community leader. The same
held true for Zog’s independently minded former minister to Washington,
Faik Konica, who founded the Vatra organization and controlled the mildly
republican newspaper Dielli. With Konica’s death in December 1942, he was
replaced by Peter Kolonja, an honest and quiet individual who was, however,
considerably less astute politically than Konica had been. Kolonja quickly was
completely taken in by Zog and began carrying out Zog’s instructions, includ-
ing his rather naive announcement to the State Department in January 1943
that he had been instructed to reopen the Albanian mission in Washington.
The State Department had no interest in even discussing the possibility.83
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 243

The third principle force among the Albanians in America, and the most
intransigent, was K. A. Çekrezi, a sworn opponent of Zog. During the 1920s,
Çekrezi had been publisher of the Telegraph, one of Tirana’s early newspapers.
In that capacity he had become a virtual spokesman for Zog. By the 1930s,
however, Çekrezi had turned against Zog and was arrested in 1932 in conjunc-
tion with a conspiracy to overthrow the king. Released in 1935, he im-
mediately became involved in another more serious plot, and when it collapsed
Çekrezi ¶ed the country.84 Once in the United States he organized a small,
intensively anti-Zogist organization called the Free Albania Movement, with
Tajar Zavalani, an Albanian employed by the BBC in London, as vice-presi-
dent. Çekrezi founded his own newspaper, the Liria, and hurled invective
against Zog and all those who would treat with him. Noli had a rather poor
opinion of Çekrezi, noting in a letter that “Çekrezi is an irresponsible, unprin-
cipled, unscrupulous juggler . . . who now represents a negligible misinformed
minority in the United States and can be taken seriously as a champion of
Albanian republicanism only by people who have no sense of humor.”85 The
old Albanian adage that it is easier to collect a sack full of ¶eas than it is to
¤nd two Albanians who agree, seemed to have taken on a new meaning among
the Albanians in the United States. Zog played an active role by funding
Kolonja and Dielli, as well as sending three hundred dollars a month to Bishop
Noli.86
Zog also attempted to maintain contact with Albanians of various politi-
cal persuasions within Albania. How much actual contact there was is dif¤cult
to determine, but Zog told Ryan in 1941 that this group included many of his
erstwhile staunchest opponents as well as some who had cooperated with the
Axis. Among those who agreed to work with him, Zog counted Gani Bey
Kryeziu, the powerful Kosovar chieftain, and Maliq Bushati, who had been
minister of the interior in Vërlaci’s ¤rst post-invasion government.87 Zog’s
principal supporter, of course, was Kupi and his Legality movement, which
constituted Zog’s single most important claim to legitimacy in Albania.
In order to strengthen his claim among the émigrés and among the Allied
powers, Zog hoped to do two things: ¤rst he hoped to create some degree of
unity among the émigré groups, and then he hoped to be allowed to create
some form of of¤cial government in exile. Both of these tasks proved to be
signi¤cant challenges. In terms of Zog’s ¤rst goal, he actually enjoyed some
success. He was able to effect coordination between the Anglo-Albanian As-
sociation and the Friends of Albania in Great Britain. He was also able to
convince Vatra and Noli to cooperate with him. Considering past relations
between Noli and Zog, winning over Noli was a signi¤cant coup for Zog, and
244 Chapter 8

he was able to do so partly as a result of cash payments and partly as a result

of Zog’s declaration in Paris in 1940 and again in London in 1942 that once
Albania was freed, a national assembly, elected freely and democratically,
would be summoned to decide Albania’s social and political future.88 Zog,
though naturally reluctant to make such a guarantee, seems to have had little
choice.
Noli, for his part, had no illusions about Zog. He was described by Larry
Post, the assistant editor of Liria, as considering Zog to be necessary only up
to the peace conference, at which point Noli would conclude, “I’ve got across
the river, to hell with you now.” Noli apparently also recognized that Zog’s
money would be useful, noting that “At least we’ll make him spend his stolen
funds on a good cause.”89 In exchange, Noli expressed his willingness to coop-
erate with Zog in a united Albanian front, but he himself, because of his
American citizenship, would only serve in an advisory capacity. Noli further
suggested that some sort of of¤cial role be assigned to Çekrezi in order to gain
his cooperation.90
Zog was willing to do this, but Çekrezi, it seems, found it dif¤cult to
forget the time he spent in Zog’s jails. Çekrezi did, however, eventually soften
his stand, motivated possibly by rumors that Zog’s supporters circulated in
Washington in the summer of 1942 to the effect that the British were on the
verge of recognizing Zog.91 Çekrezi was also being pressured by elements
within his own small Free Albanian Movement to come to some accommo-
dation with Noli and Zog, and he reluctantly relented.
Nothing came of this fragile unity, however, since Zog and Çekrezi failed
to agree on the course the united front was to follow. Çekrezi suggested the
formation of an Albanian national committee, consisting of Zogists, anti-
Zogists, and guerrilla chiefs. Guerilla chiefs would act as minister of war and
commander in chief, and Noli would be designated as honorary president.
Zog rejected this plan, arguing that the proposed committee was not a gov-
ernment, and Albania would in effect be giving up what he considered to be
its legal rights. This, Zog suggested, was incompatible with Albania’s national
interests.92
Zog wanted more. He hoped to rescue what Noli insisted he should
demand, namely, of¤cial recognition as the legitimate and logical head of the
Albanian government in exile, entitled to a seat at the peace conference.93
Boyle, Percy, and Hodgson also encouraged Zog to act, suggesting that he
attempt to play the Allies off against each other and appeal to Washington for
recognition in light of the Atlantic Charter.94
But once the British government was informed of Zog’s increased activi-
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 245

ties, he was quickly stopped. Ironically, it was Zog himself who informed the
British of his plans, laying the whole scheme out for Ryan during one of their
frequent conversations. Once the plans were out in the open, the Foreign
Of¤ce acted quickly. Of¤cials were sent to Boyle, requesting that he cease to
encourage Zog. Zog himself was told that the government would not allow
such activity on its soil and that Zog had violated his pledge not to become
involved in politics.
Zog complained bitterly that Albania was being discriminated against and
that he needed to do something, since he was being criticized by some Al-
banians in Istanbul for inactivity. Further, Zog argued, a small government was
necessary as a focal point for the legations still open, for the Albanians abroad,
and for those who had remained loyal in Albania proper.95 The unfortunate
Ryan was left to explain British policy to the embittered king. Ryan stated that
the British government would not recognize Zog, because it had legally ac-
knowledged the invasion and because Zog had not headed a democratic gov-
ernment. Britain, as a result, planned to preserve liberty of action.
A clear statement of British policy toward Zog was made in a Foreign
Of¤ce minute in March 1943. The British government would not recognize a
provisional government under Zog even if all Albanians in the United States
and Great Britain united behind Zog, because (1) such an organization would
not stimulate resistance, and it might even have the opposite effect because of
Zog’s unpopularity; and (2) it would create serious problems in British-Greek
relations. The memo concluded that the British would not exclude Zog if the
Albanian people expressed a desire for his return after the war.96
Because the Americans followed the British lead with regard to most
Albanian matters, Zog had little hope. The Foreign Of¤ce was further rein-
forced in its decision by Brigadier Davies’s report in December 1943 in which
he concluded that an Albanian committee abroad would have no appreciable
effect on the resistance situation within the country. The ¤nal blow to Zog’s
hopes came in early 1944 when the Foreign Of¤ce was told by BLOs that the
strength of Kupi’s movement had been signi¤cantly overestimated.97 Zog
would not be allowed to lead or join in a government in exile. This left only
Enver Hoxha and the communist-dominated NLM and insured a communist
takeover. As with many other aspects of Albania at war, this communist take-
over was unique. It had no parallel in the other Balkan or Eastern European
states where communism was installed, because Albania was not directly lib-
erated by the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviets nor Tito’s partisans sent war
material or troops. Hoxha’s revolution was the most indigenous of all.98 And
it had been very carefully prepared.
246 Chapter 8

A Stalinist Albania

Since the founding of the Albanian Communist Party in November 1941,

Enver Hoxha’s moves and those of his party had been as much political as they
had been military. His goal, although often hidden from the Western Allies,
was to encourage the Germans to speed their withdrawal and then to insure
the construction of a Stalinist state in Albania. As it became more and more
clear that the Axis would be defeated, the political program consumed more
and more of Hoxha’s time and attention and by September 1944, a signi¤cant
lull in partisan military activity occurred which can be attributed partly if not
principally to Hoxha’s preoccupation with politics.99
While Hoxha’s most important wartime political moves were saved for
1944, the groundwork, fashioned principally on the Yugoslav model, was laid
much earlier. The important milestones include Hoxha’s bold stroke at Peza in
September 1942, when he became a national ¤gure by creating a national front
of resistance in the NLM. This move, as with many others, corresponded with
the policies of Tito and the Comintern. The meeting at Peza was a big step;
because the communists were the only organized political party at the meet-
ing, they were able to dominate. The History of the Party of Labor of Albania
tells us that the Peza Conference laid the foundation for the new state
power.100 Apart from the general council, regional and local councils were
constructed, which did much to spread Hoxha’s in¶uence, while at the same
time gathering food and clothing for the ¤ghters.
Parallel to the united front meetings, Hoxha convened meetings of the
party to strengthen his own internal position. After receiving Comintern ap-
proval, Hoxha called the ¤rst national conference of the ACP in March 1943
at Labinot. Tito had sent a letter to the Albanian central committee, and its
contents became the agenda for the conference. The letter, which summarized
a message from the Comintern, instructed the Albanian party to beware of
internal traitors, choose reliable leadership, and follow the Comintern popular
front strategy by reaching out to the middle class and the peasants.101 With
these instructions, the conference condemned heresy and elected a permanent
central committee with Hoxha continuing as ¤rst secretary. The conference
also called for the creation of a regular army of national liberation to be
controlled by the communists.102 The General Council of the NLM quickly
agreed, and Hoxha became the principal political commissar with the commu-
nist Spiro Moisiu as overall commander.
Although Yugoslav in¶uence in the Albanian party increased as a result
of this conference, this in¶uence was still not strong enough to allow Tito’s
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 247

roving ambassador Vukmanovic-Tempo to convince the Albanians to accept

his Balkan general staff idea. The communists in Greece, and even the weak
communist organization in Bulgaria, also rejected the idea as a transparent
attempt on the part of the Yugoslavs to gain control of all of the Balkan
resistance movement.103
The next major step, in September 1943, was the second conference of
the NLM at Labinot. Carefully monitored by the Yugoslavs, the NLM at
Labinot rejected the Mukje Agreements and strengthened and expanded the
local and regional councils, which, because of the collapse of the Italians, were
brie¶y given the opportunity to function in urban areas, principally Gjirokastra
and Kruja. Hoxha argued that while the tenure of these urban councils was
limited, the experience was important because rather than being faced with
confusion, Albanians were shown what the future leaders of the country could
do. The councils went beyond their original function of collecting aid for the
partisans and—at least in some areas—began to govern the towns and the
districts. At the Peza conference, the councils had emerged as the nuclei of
the future organs of state administration; at the Labinot conference, the tasks
and activities of the councils were increased and were proclaimed to be the
only people’s power.104
As Axis defeat and the withdrawal of German troops from Albania be-
came increasingly certain, Hoxha stepped up his political activity. At the end
of May 1944 Hoxha called an NLM congress at Përmet, in a hard-hit area of
the south that had traditionally remained under partisan control and where he
was welcomed by the people. This would be one of the most important ses-
sions prior to the end of the war. Motivated at least in part by the ultimately
unsuccessful British efforts to bring about unity and resistance among the
noncommunist Albanian groups, Hoxha hoped to use the congress ¤rst to
insure his control over the NLM.105 He also used the opportunity to move an
important step closer to the formation of a government. We are told that some
186 delegates attended “a representative body democratically elected within
the possibilities permitted by the war circumstances.”106 A new NLM council
was elected, which was invested with executive and legislative powers. This
group of 115 was declared provisional until a national election for a constituent
assembly could be held. The council chose a standing committee of thirty,
which, with Omer Nishani at its head, elected a committee of twelve, with
Hoxha as president and supreme commander of the armed forces. This stand-
ing committee was said to possess “all of the attributes of a provisional gov-
ernment.”107 Hoxha tells us that a regular provisional government was not yet
formed, because a good part of the country was still under German occupa-
248 Chapter 8

tion, by May 1944 there was not yet a complete network of administrative
organs, and the Allies would not have recognized the move.108
The congress changed the name of the NLM to the NLF (National
Liberation Front), since Albania now had a government, and the movement
ceased to perform executive functions.109 The congress also approved a series
of far-reaching decisions that in part comprised the basis of the future Alban-
ian state constitution. The decisions included the following: (1) Albania was
to have a democratic and popular government, according to the will of the
Albanian people as expressed in the Anti-Fascist Council of National Libera-
tion, the sole national authority to have arisen from the national liberation
struggle; (2) King Zog was forbidden to return to Albania; (3) the formation
of any other government in Albania or abroad was not to be recognized; and
(4) all treaties and agreements concluded by the Albanian government with
other countries before 1939 were to be examined and declared null and void
if found to be incompatible with the people’s needs.110 Hoxha was not yet
ready to liquidate the monarchy for fear of Allied reaction—a groundless
fear—and in keeping with his pledge to allow the people as a whole participa-
tion in the decision on the future nature of the state.
In an attempt to reassure the citizens of Përmet that the worst was over,
that he was ¤rmly in control, and that peaceful pursuits were soon to return,
Hoxha decreed that the congress end with a series of cultural events. Although
the theater turned out to be of the socialist-realist variety, the songs and dances
contributed to a lighter atmosphere. It was clear that the end of Albania’s
wartime experience was not far off.
Hoxha’s committee did what it could to look like a government. Although
the German summer offensive effectively hindered the normal business of the
standing committee, once the German push receded in July, decisions and laws
were again promulgated by the committee from its new base in Helmës, deep
in the southern Ostrovica mountain range. These decisions concerned the
organization and revival of the economy, education, and health services. In an
attempt to demonstrate that the standing committee was more than just a
paper authority, it began to register and administer the national assets, to bring
into production those few industrial projects Albania possessed, to open
schools, and wherever possible to provide the liberated areas with needed
personal such as teachers and doctors.111 Although these initial steps were
undoubtedly extremely limited and had little real impact, their propaganda
value was certainly important.
It was only a matter of months before Hoxha decided that another major
step towards the creation of a new government was necessary. Hoxha relates
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 249

that he was motivated by the fact that by October, with some three-quarters
of the country free of Germans, a more permanent political structure was
needed. Hoxha was certainly also concerned about the possibility of an Allied
landing; the British had landed in Greece in October and were quickly fol-
lowed by the Greek government in exile. The Yugoslavs again played a critical
role at this juncture. Tito, too, was worried about the possibility of an Allied
landing in Albania and urged Hoxha to confront the Allies with a provisional
government.112
Berat, one of Albania’s principal cities, in the center of the country, and
with ancient historical traditions, was chosen. The city had been evacuated by
the Germans only a few weeks earlier, and because it had suffered little during
the war it presented a picture of normalcy. Hoxha, who was enthusiastically
received, tells us about the shops being full and the restaurants and cafés
remaining open late into the evening.113
In order to provide continuity, the meeting was called the second session
of the congress of Përmet. The decisions taken, again closely following the
Yugoslav model, were certainly as important, however, and included the trans-
formation of Hoxha’s committee into a provisional government. The most im-
portant members included Hoxha as prime minister; Moscow-trained Sejfulla
Malëshova as minister of press, propaganda, and culture; and Koçi Xoxe, the
creature of the Yugoslavs and the only worker in the top leadership, as vice-
president of the council. Only two of the eleven members of the provisional
government were noncommunists, although Hoxha made an attempt to dis-
guise the fact, aware that Allied recognition would be jeopardized by overtly
communist acts and that nationalists made up perhaps 25 percent or more of
partisan forces.114 Hoxha was not altogether unsuccessful here, with OSS agents
reporting to Washington in December 1944 that Hoxha was not a communist.
William Donovan, the OSS chief, was convinced and urged the state depart-
ment to adopt a more encouraging attitude toward Hoxha because, Donovan
reported, the Albanian leader was neither a communist nor a fellow traveler and
was sincerely anxious to establish a Western-oriented democracy.115
The eight-point program which the provisional government released was
the picture of reasoned Western democracy. The program included the follow-
ing points: (1) after the complete liberation of Albania and after the situation
is stabilized, the democratic government of Albania shall hold free elections
on a democratic basis for a constituent assembly, which shall lay down the
form of the state and promulgate a constitution; (2) the democratic govern-
ment shall ensure and defend all the civil rights of its citizens (followed by an
enumerated declaration of the rights of citizens); (3) the democratic govern-
250 Chapter 8

ment of Albania shall try to promote cooperation with the great allies: Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States; and (4) the democratic
government of Albania shall seek recognition as the sole government of Alba-
nia from the allied powers—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
States—as well as from all other participants in the Anti-Fascist Coalition.116
Although this was little known either outside of or in Albania at the time,
for clearer glimpses of Albania’s future it was more important to watch the
internal functioning of the Communist Party. Hoxha remained in Berat for a
month after the Berat congress, and it was there, at the end of November, that
the party held its important second plenum. At that point, divisions within the
party, in conjunction with the growing dif¤culties between Hoxha and the
Yugoslavs, threatened to oust Hoxha from his leadership role. Prior to the
plenum, the pro-Yugoslav elements within the politburo—in particular Koçi
Xoxe—had forced Hoxha to agree to allow Tito’s representative to take part
in politburo discussions.
Once in, Colonel Velimir Stojnic ardently pursued Yugoslav aims. These
included transforming the Albanian party into a miniature version of its Yu-
goslav counterpart; weakening Hoxha, who had demonstrated determined na-
tionalism; and pushing for the construction of some sort of confederal link
between Albania and Yugoslavia. Stojnic, Xoxe, and Malëshova criticized
Hoxha for sectarianism, for alienating important segments of the popula-
tion—including noncommunist opposition groups, in¶uential members of the
bourgeoisie, and the churches—all of whom, according to the then current
Yugoslav line, should be brought into the NLF.117
Hoxha argued that the ultimate goal of those orchestrating these deter-
mined attacks was his removal. He survived because of the support he had
among many of the ¤ghting cadres, some of whom were added to the polit-
buro in Berat. Although Hoxha was certainly correct in his fears, it would have
been surprising had his opponents succeeded in their goal in the midst of the
wartime victory.118 These attacks did, however, succeed in two things. First,
they turned the next four years, until Hoxha was able to liquidate most of the
pro-Yugoslav faction following the Soviet-Yugoslav break, into a trying time
for Hoxha, a time when his position could never be considered fully secure.
Second, and perhaps more important in the long run, Hoxha’s experience in
the last months of 1944 further encouraged him to jettison that part of him
that contained liberal and Western elements. His rise to power had occurred
during a time of struggle—he had maintained his position in late 1944 in light
of that struggle.119 He seems to have decided that to maintain his power, he
must perpetuate the mentality of struggle and to perpetuate the notion of
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 251

enemies everywhere, externally and internally. The state-of-siege mentality

(similar to that used by the puppet Albanian governments under the Germans)
that characterized Hoxha’s regime until his death in 1985 can be traced, in
part, to this plenum.
Immediately following the end of the plenum, Hoxha traveled to Tirana—
which the Germans had evacuated on 17 November—in order to enter the
capital on ¶ag day, 28 November. Although his reception was somewhat less
warm than those received in southern towns, Hoxha and his movement were
¤rmly in control of most of the country. He moved rapidly to insure the con-
tinuance of that control, and through these ¤rst moves observers were able to
identify some of the principal elements of the character of the regime to come.
Although the tasks of constructing an entirely new state, rebuilding the
economy, and forming the basis of a new social order were daunting, Hoxha
had advantages his predecessor Zog had not had. When Hoxha came to
power, he had a relatively free hand as a result of the traditional right of
conquest and by virtue of the growing partisan army. Equally as important, the
war had either destroyed or completely discredited the traditional ruling
classes in Albania. Either they had collaborated outright or had at least done
nothing for the resistance.
Hoxha bene¤ted from a number of other advantages as well. He had the
example of Zog, which occasionally allowed Hoxha to avoid mistakes. To
shape his policies Hoxha also had the legacy of failed interwar capitalism, the
wartime fascist experience, and the sometimes manufactured but frequently
real specter of capitalism encirclement.
Hoxha, then, was faced with the task of rebuilding Albania on the foun-
dation, or what was left of it, laid by Zog. Like Zog, his main goal was
predetermined. In its simplest sense Hoxha’s principal task was the creation of
a viable independent nation-state and what he colorfully described as “the
monolithic unity . . . of the Albanian people.”120 Because his goals were often
similar to those of Zog, it is perhaps not surprising that his policy priorities
were often similar as well. Despite the violent Stalinist rhetoric Hoxha
adopted and did follow through on to a certain extent, he essentially had little
choice at the same time to become as ardent a nationalist as Zog had been,
not particularly dif¤cult for Hoxha, since he had strong nationalist tendencies
in any case. Indeed, given the narrow base of the communist movement’s
support, extreme nationalism was the only means (added of course to the army
and other security forces) by which Hoxha could remain in power and progress
toward a modern Stalinist state. Nationalism proved to be the principal ele-
ment in all of his policies.
252 Chapter 8

The ¤rst priority—to gain legitimacy—was to construct an adequate po-

litical system rapidly. Building on Përmet and Berat, Hoxha used both intel-
ligence and savage brutality to achieve his goal. The initial steps included the
physical removal of those forces considered a danger to the construction of the
new Stalinist state, forces initially identi¤ed only by the somewhat generic
term war criminal. This was done in a number of stages, including the im-
mediate execution of an undetermined number of people, estimated at forty to
sixty, as soon as the provisional government established itself in Tirana in
November 1944.121 In December 1944 and January 1945 a number of Special
People’s Tribunals were established, the most notable of which was the Special
People’s Court of Tirana, headed by Koçi Xoxe, who was assigned to the task
of dealing with the major war criminals in a series of show trials. As long as
of¤cials still hoped for Allied recognition, the work of these courts was rea-
sonably circumspect. Despite the fact that neither Xoxe, nor the president of
the court, nor any of the judges had any legal training, British military observ-
ers maintained that the accused, most of whom appeared to be genuine col-
laborators, received more justice than they might have expected.122
But once Allied recognition seemed less likely and after the West refused
to extradite a long list of enemies, including Kupi, Hoxha allowed his courts
more leeway. The terms war criminal and noncommunist rapidly became syn-
onymous. While ¤gures vary, the number of victims executed or imprisoned
during these early years was certainly in the thousands. That signi¤cant ex-
cesses took place is clear. Hoxha himself related the story of an innocent
Albanian who was tortured and put to death during this period. Hoxha in-
dicted Xoxe, who was later purged and executed, for this crime, and he further
suggests that these incidents were frequent.123
By these means Hoxha was able to eliminate or silence the remaining
elements of the pre-war political elite. The general population was discouraged
from opposition by the superior force of partisan security. Rather than demo-
bilize the army at the end of the war, Hoxha rapidly increased the size of the
armed forces, so soon Albanian security forces made up 3.5 percent of the
population and cost between 10 and 11 percent of the GNP.124 Other means of
control included rigid checking of movement, billeting of large numbers of
troops in private houses, and periodic raids on homes. Control was further
enhanced by keeping partisan brigades on the move, requiring civilians to report
at various times, and when necessary carrying out purges followed by imprison-
ment.125 Despite these rigorous security measures, however, partisan troops gen-
erally behaved correctly, even in the north where they were never popular.
With the enhanced personal security these measures provided, Hoxha
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 253

slowly moved toward the creation of a permanent government. While democ-

racy and free elections had constituted an important part of Hoxha’s propa-
ganda, once he ascended to power these promises became considerably less
important.126 Provisional foreign minister O. Nishani, speaking to a member
of the British mission, explained why: “These people do not understand de-
mocracy as you know it. . . . They have not yet received suf¤cient education
to vote as you vote.” He went on to say that voting would continue to be
controlled by the army.127 The outcome of the ¤rst postwar election, then, was
not left to chance. Like the Yugoslavs, Hoxha had created a democratic front,
as the successor to the NLF, but it was, of course, dominated by the commu-
nists. Unlike in much of the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Albania
did not experience a coalition government, principally because no government
in exile had ever been recognized.
Because only of¤cial Democratic Front candidates could run for of¤ce
stand, the Front swept into of¤ce with 90 percent of the vote. When the new
national constituent assembly met early in 1946, it formally abolished the
monarchy, proclaimed Albania to be a people’s republic within its prewar
frontiers, and approved a new constitution along Stalinist lines, similar to the
one in Yugoslavia.128 Although much of Albania’s Ottoman tradition re-
mained, Hoxha had nevertheless succeeded in constructing, in a short time, a
highly personal, reasonably stable regime, as totalitarian as any regime in Al-
bania could be in 1945. Hoxha held the posts of general secretary of the party,
president of the Democratic Front, prime minister, foreign minister, defense
minister, and commander in chief. Although his dangerous rival Koçi Xoxe,
who did much to insure the continuance of close ties to Yugoslavia, controlled
the crucial post of minister of the interior, Xoxe’s tenure came to an abrupt
end in 1948, when he was shot during the early stages of the Soviet-Yugoslav
break. This event allowed Hoxha to free himself from Tito and turn to Stalin,
and it did much to cement Hoxha’s extremism.
This new government and its developing state-of-siege mentality based
on hard-line revolutionary ideology allowed Hoxha to turn quickly to reshape
Albania’s economic and social foundations. When Hoxha came to power, he
faced the most dif¤cult internal economic conditions in Eastern Europe. By
1944 Albania’s economic condition had changed little since the mid-1920s. In
1938 industry accounted for only 4.4 percent of the national income.129 Agri-
culture and stock-breeding methods remained primitive. Transportation and
communication were still arduous. In 1939 there were still no railroads and
only ¤ve hundred miles of roads, most of which were generally in a state of
disrepair. Albania still found it necessary to import all needed manufactured
254 Chapter 8

goods, as well as signi¤cant quantities of wheat, corn, and rice.130 The war and
Axis occupation did not substantially alter Albania’s economic condition.
Hoxha moved with speed and ruthless determination in addressing these
problems. Initial government operating expenses were obtained through the
con¤scation of the property of “enemies,” the levying of a crippling war-pro¤ts
tax on the larger merchants, and forced subscription to internal loans. Many
resisted and had their entire holdings nationalized, whereas others made every
effort to make the ¤rst installments in the hopes that the regime would either
change or soften its demands.131 Hoxha, of course, did not soften his demands,
with little regret. Because the small merchant class represented the alienated
classes, he could easily afford to offend its members.
Further, in a sweeping resolution passed in December 1944, the govern-
ment con¤scated the goods of all Germans, Italians, and political refugees, and
in effect it nationalized all goods of value. The decree declared that all indus-
tries and ¤rms had become the property of the state; all food supplies and
other needed material would be requisitioned after a fair payment. All trained
persons were declared mobilized, and the exportation of metals of industrial
value, precious stones, gold, jewelry, and ornaments was prohibited.132 By 1947
nearly 100 percent of nationalization of industrial production had been
achieved, dispersing the prewar archaic economy and ultimately destroying the
remains of the prewar middle class.133
An even more important priority, given the overwhelming agrarian nature
of the Albanian economy, was agrarian reform. Gaining some support among
the essentially hostile peasant majority was crucial to the survival of the re-
gime, and once again Hoxha moved quickly. His ¤rst steps in the direction of
reform included cancellation of debts and a 75 percent reduction in rents,
quickly followed in August 1945 by extensive land reform. Land belonging to
individuals with other sources of income was expropriated outright, thereby
destroying the economic power of the prewar landowning class. The expropri-
ated land was redistributed among seventy thousand landless or poor families.
All forests and pasturelands were nationalized. In the ¤rst year of reform some
50 percent of Albania’s arable land was redistributed, thereby doing much to
neutralize the peasant class’ hostility toward the communists.134 Although
Hoxha would eventually follow Stalin and fully collectivize agriculture, he felt
it prudent not to go too far too soon.
Possibly the greatest obstacle to the creation of a modern nation-state in
Albania was its diverse religious and social structure and its primitive level of
education. Apart from the Geg-Tosk division, Albanians adhered to four prin-
cipal religions. But disunity was perhaps primarily fostered by the coexistence
German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist Albania 255

of three con¶icting stages of civilization: the illiterate mountain clansmen in

the north, who were primarily Geg and Moslem; the feudal beys and their
repressed peasants in the south; and the more educated and urbanized popu-
lation of the Orthodox Hellenic and Catholic fringes. Hoxha saw religion as
not only divisive but also as a force for the perpetuation of foreign in¶uence.
Hoxha began his religious repression with the Catholics. They were sin-
gled out because many Catholics had either collaborated with the Italians or
at least had vigorously opposed the communist takeover. Hoxha subsequently
determined that the Catholic Church was controlled by—as he de¤ned them
—reactionaries, subversives, and antinationalists, each of whom represented
foreign interests. Even before the end of 1944 Hoxha attempted to close
Catholic schools, associations, and periodicals in Shkodra, Albania’s Catholic
center. Because of the resistance these moves provoked, however, the orders
were withdrawn, and Hoxha decided to move much more slowly.135 By 1945
Hoxha had regained his nerve, and the persecution progressed. The church
leadership was either executed; imprisoned, with the rank-and-¤le clergy pen-
sioned off; or retained as carefully controlled civil servants.136
But Hoxha saw education as the principal means of weaning Albanians
from their archaic social system and encouraging them onward in the struggle
for the creation of monolithic unity and a Stalinist state. Hoxha had begun his
crusade to eradicate Albania’s 85 percent illiteracy rate during the war. When
not ¤ghting, the men and women of the partisan movement received instruc-
tion, including the basics of reading and writing, and some political education.
Instructors connected all those not in the movement with fascism, and they
blamed capitalism for the failed prewar economic system. They were careful,
however, to avoid certain aspects of Marxism that simply would not be ac-
cepted in Albania, including Marxist internationalism.137
Once the war was over, education and culture received more serious at-
tention. The major themes indicate the depth of Hoxha’s nationalism. Ex-
treme reverence was paid to the heroes of Albanian nationalism, whether or
not they were politically acceptable. Skënderbeg received prominent attention
but so did the meeting of the League of Prizren in 1878, the linguistic con-
gress at Monastir in 1908, and an event in which Zog played a major role, the
removal of the Italians from Vlora in 1920.138 Particular homage was paid to
Ismail Kemal Bey, who declared Albanian independence on 28 November
1912, despite being the head of one of Albania’s great feudal families that later
produced many reactionaries and collaborators.139
Despite this emphasis on history, the central focal point for education and
culture continued to be, until Hoxha’s death in 1985, the liberation struggle
256 Chapter 8

against the invader.140 Although a cult of partisan warfare took hold every-
where in the Balkans except Greece, only in Albania did it reach feverish
proportions. Textbooks, traditional histories, literature for children, general
literature, drama, and ¤lm, were all limited to variations on the same theme.
Albania’s wartime experience, although lasting only about ¤ve years, became
the focal point of Albanian existence for the next half century.
CONCLUSION

Albania’s wartime experience began with the Italian invasion of April 1939
and ended with the German withdrawal of November 1944 and the construc-
tion of the Stalinist republic. The intervening ¤ve and a half years produced
three different “Albanias“—Italian, German, and Stalinist—all of which were
built, to a certain extent, on elements of arti¤ciality. The war also produced
considerable suffering and hardship, which were not soon forgotten. Even had
the Albanians wanted to, Enver Hoxha would not have allowed it. He saw it
in his interest to overemphasize the war to the point of creating a national
myth, like the one from 1920, of Albanian arms having driven the Italians into
the sea. Albanians were told that they had defeated the Italians and the Ger-
mans. They did not, although this should not re¶ect poorly on the Albanians;
there were too few of them, and they did not have the equipment necessary
for such an enormous undertaking.
But the war experience resulted in much more as well. In the process of
pursuing their own goals, the Italians and the Germans produced a profound
transformation and acceleration in social, economic, and political change. King
Zog had begun the process of slowly forcing Albania out of the mists of the
¤fteenth century. The war forced the Albanians to speed up this process and
insured that no return was possible. Whether the Albanians were perceivably
better off for this change must be examined elsewhere. But everything had
changed.
When Mussolini ordered the invasion of Albania in 1939 he was moti-
vated by several considerations. In the short term he hoped to repay Hitler in
kind for his lack of courtesy concerning the stationing of troops in Romania.
In the longer term Mussolini hoped to add what he was convinced would be
a grateful Albanian people to his enlarging new Roman empire, as well as gain
a foothold on the Balkan Peninsula in anticipation of further expansion.
Count Ciano also convinced Mussolini that Albania offered almost limitless
economic bene¤t. Not only was there extensive mineral wealth to exploit—
Ciano’s Carthaginian ¤gs1—but Albania also offered extensive cheap labor and
257
258 Conclusion

agricultural wealth to sustain perhaps millions of Italian settlers. The invasion

itself—relatively nondestructive because it was not resisted—encouraged
Ciano and Mussolini to believe that their assumptions were correct, that tak-
ing Albania would provide a myriad of bene¤ts with little cost. The Italians
were to be disappointed.
Tens of thousands of settlers and workers ¶ocked to Albania, many to
escape the economic chaos over which Mussolini presided in Italy. But their
numbers remained a tiny fraction of the millions that Ciano, with his usual
overcon¤dence, had predicted. Nor would Albania, with its still primitive
agriculture, have been able to sustain that number. Albania as a receptacle for
Italy’s excess population was a myth. Albania’s mineral wealth came closer to
ful¤lling Italian expectations, but here again the gap between actual export and
Ciano’s optimistic assessment was wide. The exploitation of Albanian iron ore,
bitumen, and copper was limited because of an inadequate transportation
network. The Italians did somewhat better with oil, although transportation
problems and the poor quality of Albanian oil made exploitation of it expen-
sive. Most estimates suggest that Albanian oil never made up more than 10
percent of Italy’s requirements. The Italians, however, were able to bene¤t
extensively from Albanian chrome deposits, which provided 100 percent of
Italy’s needs.
In general, economic bene¤ts for the Italians in Albania were meager
when compared to the costs. In the four and a half years of Italian occupation,
Rome committed itself to spending in Albania close to three times what it had
spent between 1922 and 1939, when Mussolini was desperately attempting to
subjugate the Albanian economy. Although Italian-owned companies earned
some 142 million francs in pro¤t during the occupation, the Italians imported
into Albania a surplus of goods valued at some 640 million francs.2
The Italians also found it necessary to import considerable quantities of
food to make up domestic shortages and even more to feed the army of
occupation, quite the reverse of the anticipated surplus that Albanian agricul-
ture under enlightened Italian direction was intended to produce. The Italian
occupation failed economically and politically. Even the addition of Kosova
did not produce the expected political capital. The Italians were unable to win
the hearts and minds of the Albanian people. And in a broader sense,
Mussolini’s Albanian policy did much to hasten the collapse of fascist Italy.
Denis Mack Smith goes so far as to suggest that the Italian invasion and
occupation helped to bring together the coalition that would defeat fascism in
general.3
A number of factors help to explain Italian failure, including a general,
Conclusion 259

mutual lack of respect. The Italians in Albania made poor imperialists. After
an initial burst of activity following the invasion, Italian administration suc-
cumbed to disorganization, super¤ciality, and corruption. The Albanian econ-
omy became a plantation economy in the 1930s, as Albania was incorporated
into Italy’s drive for self-suf¤ciency. With the invasion it was fully integrated
into the Italian war economy, but Albania remained essentially a poorly organ-
ized, corrupt plantation. The extensive sums Italian of¤cials in Albania could
spend attracted the worst of Italy’s adventurers and con men. Financial cor-
ruption in Albania reached the highest levels of the Italian government. Many
Italians involved in Albania during the war added arrogance to their corrup-
tion, considering the Albanians—including the traditional landowning elite to
whom the Italians attached themselves—to be inferior in every respect.
Whereas some, such as Ciano, adopted a paternalistic attitude and treated the
Albanians like children, others, such as Giovanni Giro, did little to hide their
contempt.
And these sentiments were more than reciprocated by many Albanians.
At least since the period following World War I, Albanians had viewed the
Italians as being cowardly, dishonest, and unmanly. These views stemmed from
Italy’s rapid withdrawal from Albania in 1920 and from the impression left by
the hundreds of Italians abandoned in Albania, often in poverty. During the
interwar period, Albanians, always somewhat xenophobic, believed that Italian
negotiators and specialists were there principally to prey upon them. By 1939,
Albanian attitudes toward the Italians ranged from indifference, to suspicion,
to passive antipathy, to hatred. The war years did much to reinforce the last of
these sentiments.
This was particularly true as the occupation wore on. As the economic
advantages of the early period slowly dissipated, even those who had welcomed
the Italians for strictly venal reasons began to turn away. As the Italians began
to compound their errors with the various excesses of fascism—as with the
imposition of the new ¶ag—more and more Albanians became alienated,
leaving perhaps only a small minority of Catholics in the north as willing
collaborators. Even the faith of these last supporters was shaken, however,
when the Italians invaded Greece in October 1940. The Greek campaign, a
disaster from its inception, did much to destroy what little goodwill the Ital-
ians had purchased in Albania since the 1939 invasion. The failed campaign
resulted in the ¤rst Albanian military and civilian casualties of the war, apart
from the few who died resisting the invasion of 1939. The Italian invasion of
Greece and the rapid Greek counterattack also devastated parts of southern
and central Albania, constituting the ¤rst extensive war-related destruction in
260 Conclusion

Albania. The invasion further dislocated the Albanian economy, which was
already showing signs of shortages and in¶ation. The Greek war ruined much
of what Italy had done in Albania and decisively ended the period of relative
stability of the early period of the occupation. Overall, the Italian invasion of
Greece constituted the beginning of the end of the Italian occupation of
Albania; resistance, which had been only sporadic until late 1940, increased
signi¤cantly. While this post-invasion resistance may have been little more
than a minor irritant to the Italians, it added to the growing insecurity, partic-
ularly in the countryside, which further emphasized to the average Albanian
the failure of Italian occupation policy.
Ultimately, the Italians spent much more than they received, and their
continuing military adventurism destroyed what goodwill they were able to
buy. Italian puppet governments were ridiculed from their inception. Musso-
lini hoped that the addition of Kosova would appeal to the growing national-
ism of the Albanians—a sentiment for which Zog had been at least partially
responsible. Indeed, many Albanians did rejoice in the annexation of Kosova.
But Mussolini seems to have underestimated growing nationalism in general,
a curious failing for a fascist. The same sentiment that encouraged many
Albanians to welcome their conationals in Kosova home worked against the
Italians. Growing nationalism—particularly among students, intellectuals, and
many town dwellers—led these people to reject foreign occupation no matter
what bene¤ts that occupation brought. The Albanians were slowly becoming
aware that perhaps it was better to be ruled badly by one’s own. This rejection
of the Italians grew in intensity from verbal opposition to armed insurrection
directed primarily by the budding Communist Party. The Italians had assumed
incorrectly that rudimentary Albanian nationalism was so weak that it could
either simply be repressed or that it could at least be directed. The Italians had
underestimated Zog’s greatest, and perhaps only, achievement: the creation of
an environment ideal for the growth of an Albanian national consciousness. It
is perhaps not surprising that Zog was able to achieve this partly as a result of
his resistance to interwar Italian economic and political penetration.
Although the more than eight divisions the Italians had stationed in
Albania by 1943 were suf¤cient to withstand any military challenge from the
resistance, Italian policy had clearly failed. The Italians had refused to give
their Albanian puppet regimes enough authority to play a genuine role in the
administration of the country. And the Italian carrot-and-stick policy had
failed to win the Albanians over themselves. Italian efforts ended ignomini-
ously with the collapse of Mussolini’s regime in 1943.
The overthrow of Mussolini and the Italian collapse forced the Germans,
Conclusion 261

essentially against their will, to invade and occupy Albania. The Germans had
one major motive, and that was to prevent, with a minimum of troops, an
Allied landing in Albania, which had the potential to threaten the German
position in Eastern Europe as a whole. The military operation itself—involv-
ing fewer than three divisions—was much quicker and more ef¤cient than the
Italian invasion had been, despite that in this instance there was some actual
resistance, even though the groups themselves were still in the formative stages
of organization. Once this resistance was quickly and often brutally brushed
aside, the Germans proceeded with their plan to reduce the required number
of occupation troops to the barest minimum. The collapse of Italy had strained
the already overburdened Wehrmacht, which could not spare the number of
troops required for an effective occupation. The German high command de-
cided that it could afford no more than two and a half divisions of second-level
troops to protect the Adriatic coast and the vital Straits of Otranto.
These goals and the policy to achieve them were broadly laid out by
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who recognized that given German needs inter-
nal security would have to be left to the Albanians themselves. The only way
this could be achieved was with the construction of an independent, neutral,
yet friendly government that would create a stable political system and a
reliable security force, thereby engendering widespread domestic support. Rib-
bentrop instructed Schliep and Neubacher to ¤nd “statesmenlike people” to
carry out this policy.4
Once the rumors of an imminent Allied invasion had subsided, and it
became clear to the Albanians that the Germans intended to remain for a
time, Neubacher was able to ¤nd the cooperation he was looking for. The
Albanians of Kosova, not surprisingly, were the ¤rst to cooperate, motivated
by Allied promises to return Kosova to a reconstructed Yugoslavia. But even-
tually some distinguished ¤gures from “old Albania” came forward to offer
their services or were persuaded by German threats and bribes to cooperate.
To hold people of the caliber of Mehdi Frashëri and to present the image of
continuity, the Germans agreed to a governmental structure—the resurrection
of the 1928 monarchist constitution with a council of regency serving in place
of King Zog—which left considerable authority in the hands of the Albanians.
And Neubacher took great pains to live up to this ¤ction of an independent
Albania, even at the cost of disputes with German military authorities in the
Balkans and with Heinrich Himmler. Berlin had created the unique situation
of a German occupation regime that enjoyed virtual freedom of the press and
was without any overt signs of fascism. It was a good beginning for the
Germans, and like Ciano they too expected that their policy might work.
262 Conclusion

Neubacher seemed willing to make most of the concessions necessary to

give his ¤rst prime minister, Rexhep Mitrovica, the chance to establish actual
Albanian authority in Albania. Mitrovica, who was not blind to the challenge,
presented an ambitious program, which even some in the British camp reluc-
tantly admitted they would support. With this program—which included land
reform for the peasants—and very effective German propaganda emphasizing
the return of Kosova, the Germans managed to extract considerable support
for their puppet regime. If 30 percent of the Albanian people supported the
Mitrovica regime, as B. Kühmel suggests, this was a remarkable achievement.
And it allowed the Germans some time to take advantage of Albania’s natural
resources.
In this arena, too, the Germans proved to be more successful than the
Italians. Granted that Italian planning was long term, the Germans bene¤ted
far more from their arrangements with the Albanians. The Germans began by
commissioning a raw materials map, ¤nding Italian studies completely inade-
quate. Prior to its completion the Germans exploited what was readily at hand,
including coal from Kosova, coal sources near Tirana, and magnesium at
Godolesh, but primarily oil and chrome. As we have seen, the Germans im-
ported portable re¤neries with which they were able to satisfy the needs of the
Wehrmacht in Albania—always the ¤rst priority—and the needs of domestic
consumption moreover, in June 1944 they even produced a surplus.
Chrome, of course, was the big prize, and despite the mounting transpor-
tation problems the Germans were for a time able to extract and ship to
Germany one-sixth of their total requirements. The Germans did well by the
Albanians, at least in an economic sense. Unlike the Italians, they certainly
took far more than they contributed, and when they withdrew, not only did
they leave a debt but naturally they also kept Albania’s gold reserves.5
But although the Germans reaped these economic bene¤ts, they began to
realize that their original political plan was not working out as they had hoped.
Mitrovica’s remarkable level of support began to erode quickly due to a num-
ber of factors. Despite its early popularity, the Mitrovica government failed to
extend its legitimacy either at home or abroad. Because of German obstruc-
tion, no foreign state recognized Albanian independence. The domestic econ-
omy deteriorated. The collaborationist government, made up principally of the
traditional landowning elite, had little to gain from land reform, which re-
mained, as a result, on paper. To add to this disappointment, the German
troops—who numbered some thirty-six thousand at the height of the German
occupation—unlike the Italians who depended on imports, hoped to survive
without extensive imports. This drove up prices and created shortages, which
Conclusion 263

in some areas of the south resulted in famine conditions. Under the circum-
stances, Mitrovica’s government not only lost its credibility and was faced with
increasing armed opposition, but it could not raise and maintain an effective
security force.
The Germans were not unaware of these problems and began to shift
their policy as soon as it became clear that success through a collaborationist
government was unlikely. When faced with failure in Albania, the Italians had
tended to apply more of the same. The Germans proved to be more ¶exible.
The new German strategy included occasional offensives against the partisans,
which in the spring nearly succeeded in destroying the movement, although
its complete destruction was probably never a German goal. The partisans
proved quite useful to the Germans as a threat for extracting cooperation from
Albania’s noncommunists. Politically, the Germans began to emphasize a more
traditional divide-and-rule strategy. Although this policy had been initiated as
early as September of 1943, it gained momentum once it became clear to the
Germans that their preferred option was essentially out of reach. The Ger-
mans realized that resistance would continue and that they could not—with
their limited manpower—¤ght the NLM, BK, Zogists, and the chiefs. The
British, too, understood this and as a result struggled for resistance unity, while
the Germans worked to attach one group after another to their cause.6
The Germans were quite successful in their endeavors, using all the means
at their disposal. They threatened to institute direct German control of the
government in Tirana; they threatened more extensive use of the German
army against the Albanians. But the Germans also bribed and cajoled. Their
propaganda line, fear of communism and the loss of Kosova, was effective.
Assiduous use of gold and weapons, mostly from what the Italians left, also
proved quite effective.7 Although they had initially fought harder than the
çetniks of Yugoslavia ever did, one after another the BK, the Zogists, and many
of the independent northern chieftains were seduced and corrupted by the
Germans. They either collaborated outright—with some joining the puppet
government—or at least failed to resist the Germans—hoping to use the
Germans to obtain an arsenal for ¤ghting the communists once the Germans
had left. This was old-style Albanian politics, which proved disastrous for the
Albanian noncommunists. One of the important results, of course, was that all
of these groups lost their credibility and that the partisans—appealing to bud-
ding Albanian nationalism—continued to grow in strength. It is perhaps ironic
that the so-called nationalists, like the Italians, seemed to misunderstand Al-
banian nationalism.
The policy had some drawbacks for the Germans as well. First, many of
264 Conclusion

the nationalists who entered the puppet regimes—such as Dine—could not

really be trusted by the Germans; their pro-Allied sympathies were known to
all. Second, as soon as these groups had fully been compromised, they lost all
credibility and support and were as a result worthless to the Germans to use
against the partisans, who were increasing in strength.8 The Germans, too, like
the Italians and the nationalists failed to fully appreciate the growth of Alban-
ian nationalism.
Ultimately, of course, the Germans, too, had to fail. If the central point of
German policy was the paci¤cation of Albania through the construction of an
independent regime with prestige and its own military authority, then the
Germans fell short of their goal. The Mitrovica government gained a degree
of acceptance and was certainly taken more seriously than the regimes under
the Italians, but those that followed his government failed to exert anything
more than regional in¶uence. So the Germans were unsuccessful, but this
failure was not unquali¤ed. The ¤rst priority, after all, had been to hold Alba-
nia with a small number of troops. Not only was the German army able to do
this, but during the course of 1944 more troops were transferred out than
replaced. And the German army was able to withdraw from Albania with only
moderate losses.
So what explains the partial success the Germans enjoyed, and why did
they do better than the Italians? There are a number of possible explanations.
Divergent goals, of course, played a role. Ciano planned for outright annexa-
tion with a sham government that was to attempt to placate the Albanians.
The Germans genuinely hoped that the Albanians would be able to administer
themselves—naturally within the context of German wartime interests—and
as a result, the Germans were initially perceived in a much more positive light.
The Italians declared their occupation as permanent, whereas the Germans
announced that they were essentially just passing through. The Germans were
also able, through a better grasp of propaganda tactics, to take advantage of
Italian and even British blunders. And then there was the element of percep-
tion. Albanians traditionally viewed the Germans with admiration and some
awe. German military victories were respected—particularly in light of the
addition of Kosova to old Albania. Many of the German troops, at least the
invasion force, made a good impression. Omer Nishani, Hoxha’s provisional
foreign minister, suggested to a British of¤cer in early 1945 that the Germans,
while occupying Albania, behaved themselves, on the whole, very correctly. In
Tirana they caused little trouble. Nishani said the Germans did get nasty when
turned out of villages and then resorted to looting and shooting, but he con-
cluded that unlike the BK’s deportment, German behavior was not that bad.9
Conclusion 265

These advantages were augmented by a policy that even the Allies argued was
applied with imagination, skill, and vigor.10
But like the Italians, the Germans made mistakes, often even similar to
those made by Rome. Like the Italians, the Germans failed to understand the
needs of the average Albanian. The Germans, like their predecessors, attached
themselves to a small Westernized elite, most of whom spoke German. Be-
cause no more than ten of the tens of thousands of Germans involved in the
occupation spoke Albanian, German contact with locals was severely re-
stricted. The Germans created a German ghetto, which helped to create the
notion of the “ugly German.”11 The Germans, too, failed to understand the
importance of growing nationalism. And in a postmortem written by a
Wehrmacht of¤cial in early 1945, German policy was faulted for having held
on to the ¤ction of an independent Albania too long, and then within the last
month of the German occupation for having abandoned it too abruptly.12
Both Italian and German policy contributed signi¤cantly to the victory of
the communists, although there were certainly other factors involved. Socialist
historiography argues that the liberation and communist victory were achieved
by the Albanian people led by the party. Although this is certainly an over-
simpli¤cation, that the communists contributed signi¤cantly to their own vic-
tory is clear. They gave direction and leadership to the resistance movement.
They built an army, whose leadership they controlled, to resist the invader and
destroy the enemies of the movement. The communists and the NLM con-
tributed the only important resistance to the Axis powers, even though they
could not engage the Germans in the open ¤eld or take and hold forti¤ed
objectives. And even though the partisan army might not have done extensive
damage to the Axis, it was the only organized force once the Germans had
gone. Like its Yugoslav counterpart, it was able to easily step into the vacuum
and seize power. The communists were also the only indigenous group to
develop and effectively use propaganda, both to in¶uence the membership of
the NLM and the people as a whole. Finally, the communists recognized the
importance of developing a political, social, and economic program that dif-
fered signi¤cantly from Zog’s failed interwar system. Moreover, they devel-
oped the institutions that began implementing aspects of this program even
before the end of the war.13
Nicholas Pano reminds us that external factors were equally important in
explaining Hoxha’s victory.14 Hoxha, once he broke with the West, was willing
to recognize Red Army victories as an external contributing factor, but that
was a far as he was willing to go.15 This is by no means far enough. Other
important external factors include the failure of the Allies to recognize Zog or
266 Conclusion

some other government in exile. This made Hoxha’s task simpler than the one
faced by Tito. Although Hoxha was certainly loath to admit it, organizational
help from the Yugoslavs plus the success of the resistance in Greece played
important roles in the formation of the party; the formation of the NLM; and
the organization, strategy, and tactics of the NLM.16
Hoxha also bene¤ted from a series of military and strategic decisions
made by the Allies during the course of the war. Included in this category are
the decisions of the Tehran Conference of late 1943, which rejected
Churchill’s planned second front at the head of the Adriatic; the agreement
between Britain and the United States of late 1944 to forbid the use of Allied
troops in Italy in any second country other than Greece; and the August 1944
recommendation by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that American troops should
be used in Albania only in connection with relief and rehabilitation.17
The moral and material backing of the United States and to a greater
degree the British also played a signi¤cant if highly controversial role in Hoxha’s
victory. While lavish with his praise for British material deliveries during the
war, once the cold war set in Hoxha either completely ceased to mention British
aid or referred to it as the so-called aid or as the “insuf¤cient, not to say
non-existent” aid.18 The aid the British supplied was certainly insuf¤cient to
maintain the rapidly growing partisan forces. To suggest that it was of no
consequence, however, is unrealistic. At the high point of British drops, be-
tween mid-July and the end of August 1944, the partisans received between 150
and 160 tons of supplies as well as a considerable portion of the some thirty-two
thousand gold sovereigns that the British distributed in Albania.19 The amount
of material the British gave Hoxha was certainly insuf¤cient to determine the
outcome of the war in Albania, and it is therefore a mistake to suggest—as
many of the British liaison of¤cers in their memoirs do—that Hoxha was
brought to power by British weapons, supplies, and money.20
Nevertheless, the British contribution was important, particularly in three
instances. First, the British supplied Hoxha with the material and the training
for the ¤rst brigade in 1943, and it is from here that Hoxha was able to begin
the construction of a power base. The second instance in which British aid
played a particularly important role was during the German winter offensive,
at which point the leadership of the NLM was almost captured and the
movement itself was nearly destroyed. Without the gold sovereigns supplied
by the British, Hoxha would have required much longer to recover. And ¤nally,
British material played a crucial role during the Battle of Dibra. The partisans
had been forced to suspend their offensive because of a lack of ammunition.
This situation was recti¤ed as a result of increased British deliveries, allowing
Conclusion 267

Hoxha and Shehu not only to make a good showing against the Germans, but
also to virtually destroy their nationalist-Zogist rivals in the north.21 British
deliveries certainly shortened the civil war, but the partisans would have won
in any case, because of their signi¤cant base of support in the south and
because of the strength of their Yugoslav allies.
British material and moral aid cannot be considered decisive then, but it
nevertheless played an important role. The British inadvertently contributed to
Hoxha’s rise in at least one other way. Britain’s rather confused policy with regard
to Albania and its inability to make a clear decision about whom to support even
after BK collaboration were clear to all and allowed Hoxha to solidify his claim
to being a nationalist. At the same time, British refusal to denounce the BK in
a timely manner discredited those opposition groups that perceived themselves
to be pro-Western.
The most important factor, external or internal, leading to the victory of
communism was the policy of the Germans. Although the Germans clearly
bene¤ted from their divide-and-rule policy, so did the partisans. Each time the
Germans won over another group, one more obstacle to Hoxha’s rise to power
was removed. In the fall of 1943 the communists were a signi¤cant but not
overwhelming power group in the midst of a number of power groups—in-
cluding the BK, the Zogists, and the independent central and north Albanian
and Kosovar chieftains. By attracting each of these power groups in turn, the
Germans destroyed their political credibility and what military effectiveness
they might have had. As each of these groups moved closer to the Germans,
and budding Albanian nationalism did its work, they were removed from
serious contention for power in the postwar setting. First, the BK was attracted
to the Germans, then the Zogist—which allowed the communists to attack
the Zogist even in the face of protests from the British. And these attacks
helped the Germans to organize an anticommunist coalition among the inde-
pendent chieftains, allowing the Germans to withdraw essentially unmolested
in November, despite the more brutal policy German forces had followed
vis-à-vis the Albanian population since September. In November 1944, then,
the communist-dominated NLM remained the only antifascist group with
political credibility. They had fought the Germans more or less consistently
and often under dif¤cult conditions, although they had by no means defeated
the Germans. And the partisans had, by this time, a reservoir of of¤cers with
experience and were no longer restricted to a few former Zogist of¤cers and a
handful of Spanish Civil War veterans.22
The Albania Hoxha was handed by the Germans had changed consider-
ably since the beginning of the war. The war had brought death, destruction,
268 Conclusion

famine, and hardship to Albania. Casualty ¤gures vary rather widely. One of
the ¤rst postwar Albanian newspapers, Luftari, estimated Albanian dead at
17,000.23 This ¤gure was later revised upward by of¤cial Albanian government
estimates and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA) to between 28,000 and 30,000, mostly from the south, out of a
total population of about 1,125,000, or about 2.58 percent of the population.
Some 13,000 were left as invalids.24 The loss of life was tragic, but the totals
are well below the number of casualties in¶icted on Albania’s Balkan neigh-
bors. Greece lost some 7 percent of its population, with Yugoslavia losing an
estimated 11 percent, more than half of those killed by other Yugoslavs.25
While Albanian per-capita losses were lower, as with the Yugoslavs, most of
the casualties suffered were in¶icted by other Albanians.
Axis casualty ¤gures in Albania have been estimated by Albanian socialist
historiography to be as high as 26,500 dead, 21,000 wounded, and almost
21,000 captured. These ¤gures are credible only if all Italian losses to the
Greeks are included. The Greeks claim 6,000 Italian battle casualties, with a
much higher number—some 13,000 Italian soldiers succumbing to trench foot
and the “white death” or “dry gangrene” of frostbite.26 Elizabeth Barker, who
during the war was attached to the British Ministry of Economic Warfare,
suggests that the Germans lost between 6,000 and 7,000 killed and 500 cap-
tured.27 Postsocialist Albanian sources suggest that the ¤gure for German dead
is closer to 3,600, with some 2,400 identi¤ed.28
The economic effect of the war on Albania was profound. Albania as a
whole was, of course, an economic disaster area in 1944. Although the Ger-
mans were in Albania for only a little more than a year, they were responsible
for by far the most economic damage. The Italians built and spent, whereas
the Germans extracted and destroyed as they withdrew. One modern Albanian
observer, a minister of ¤nance in a 1991 transitional government, has even
called 1936 to 1943 the golden age of the Albanian economy.29 While this may
be, at the end of the war Albania was in serious dif¤culty. The International
Center for Relief to Civilian Populations, headquartered in Geneva, concluded
that Albania, though not as badly off as Greece, was one of the most seriously
devastated countries in Europe. The center observers reported high infant
mortality, widespread malnutrition, and poor health care facilities. After visit-
ing Greece, Yugoslavia, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and parts of Russia
in April 1947, General Lowell Rooks, general director of the UNRRA, re-
ported that Albania had the worst hunger conditions.30 Although many of
these conditions existed before the war, and while Hoxha’s policy toward the
UNRRA is responsible for exacerbating the situation (see the following dis-
Conclusion 269

cussion), the war clearly contributed. During the war, herds were reduced by
as much as one-third, and much of the small amount of farming equipment
was destroyed. Of Albania’s minute industrial base little survived, and that
which did lay idle for lack of raw materials. Mines and oil wells were damaged.
Harbors, in particular Durrës, and bridges had been destroyed. Roads were
damaged, one-third of Albania’s houses were destroyed, and Albania’s gold
reserves, which might have helped in the recovery, were in Berlin later to be
transferred to the Bank of England.31
But the destruction caused by the war varied from region to region. The
south suffered disproportionately, principally because this area witnessed most
of the ¤ghting. We have seen that the Italian invasion of Greece and the
subsequent Greek conquest of nearly one-third of Albania turned the south
into a battleground. And since the NLM operated principally in the south,
Italian and German reprisals did most of their damage there. We have been left
with a representative picture of the devastation by an Albanian-speaking OSS
agent who traveled in the region for over a month in late 1944. His travels
included visits to Kurvelesh, Tepelena, Përmet, and the Gjirokastra area. Some
areas had been completely devastated—particularly in the Kurvelesh region,
where food supplies were limited due to livestock herds left unattended while
the people hid in the mountains during heavy partisan, BK, and German troop
activity. In the Tepelena area the food situation was also desperate, partly be-
cause the Germans had allowed horses and mules to graze on planted ¤elds.
Përmet seemed less desperate, and German prisoners were being used to har-
vest crops, which were subject to requisitioning from all sides.32
The agent reported that in the areas he visited—particularly in the villages—
many houses had been burned. Pilur, a village of 60 houses, was completely
burned. Kuç, a village of 250 to 300 houses, was also completely burned, although
Gjirokastra, with its 1,000 houses, was virtually untouched. While most of the
destruction was caused by the Germans, the Italian-Greek war, Italian reprisals,
and BK brutality contributed substantially to the misery of the south.33
The center and the north, however, were much less effected. We have seen
Hoxha’s own description of Berat in October 1944 with its late-night restaurants
and its full shops. British reports from December 1944 indicate that not only
was there little damage done to Tirana but the food situation—except for a
shortage of wheat—was not really bad. Butcher shops were said to be full, and
the sale of fresh meat was unrationed and the prices controlled.34 This must have
been quite a surprise to English of¤cers, who would have to deal with rationing
in Great Britain well into the 1950s. In Shkodra, in the extreme north—with
the exception of communications—there was little sign of war damage. The
270 Conclusion

food situation was described by the head of the new British military mission as
being very satisfactory. Bread was plentiful and cheap.35 Certainly, the general
situation outside of the major towns was considerably more dif¤cult, but rarely
could one ¤nd the level of misery prevalent in the south.
It is perhaps telling that Hoxha was able to reject UNRRA food aid for
months until he could get it on his own terms. The UNRRA, headed in
Albania by Colonel Dayrell Oakley-Hill, offered to provide aid if its own
of¤cials—the organization assumed that hundreds would be required—dis-
tributed the aid throughout Albania. Hoxha was suspicious both of Oakley-
Hill and the UNRRA and insisted that no more than ¤fteen agents were
needed. He also refused to give the British information about petroleum re-
serves. Finally, he hoped to use the UNRRA to push for long-awaited recog-
nition. The British were aghast—their reaction can best be summed up by a
margin note of O. T. Pink, a Foreign Of¤ce of¤cial, who minuted, “It seems
to me absolutely intolerable that a pack of Communist Albanian brigands who
are offered relief supplies free, gratis and for nothing, should have the im-
pertinence to say that they will only accept our help subject to their own
conditions. I should dearly like to leave them to starve.”36
Hoxha was often willing to sacri¤ce the well-being of his people for his
own political ends. But he also seems to have concluded that he did not need
the aid that urgently. It was a full six months before the disagreement was
resolved, only after both sides demonstrated a degree of ¶exibility and Hoxha’s
predicament became more serious. The UNRRA ultimately was responsible
for crucial assistance, amounting to some twenty-six million dollars between
August 1945 and early 1947. This included not only food, clothing, and med-
icine, but also livestock, vines to help the recovery of the wine trade, seed,
fertilizer, and machinery.37
So the situation in Albania at the end of the war was bad, but it certainly
could have been worse. This was the conclusion of the Paris Reparation Con-
ference, to which Hoxha submitted a request for 1.5 billion dollars. Albanian
socialist historians in the 1960s revised the bill upward to 1.6 billion, a ¤gure
that included some 8 million dollars for the maintenance of the ANLA during
the war.38 Albania was ultimately awarded 5 million dollars.39 It is clear that
politics were involved in this decision, but it is equally clear that the conference
considered Hoxha’s estimate to be somewhat high.
While the war resulted in considerable suffering, as with other periods of
violent change some bene¤ts accrued as well. The immediate bene¤ts included
thousands of relatively high-paying jobs, mostly in construction; a signi¤cant
increase in the availability of health service; and ¤xed prices on rents, food, and
Conclusion 271

utilities. As a British observer resident in Albania noted at the end of April

1939, there was a great improvement in the condition of the people, at least
those with whom she came in contact in Tirana. The addition of Kosova to
old Albania in 1941, although only temporary, contributed not only substantial
mineral wealth (which certainly did not signi¤cantly impact the average Al-
banian) but also some badly needed agricultural goods. With the German
invasion, Albania took advantage of tens of thousands of Italian workers and
many Italian ¤rms. Although these people had to be fed, the country bene¤ted
from considerable free agricultural, manual, and skilled labor. Hoxha would
not allow the most vital workers to return home until they had completed the
projects upon which they were working.40
There were also some long-term bene¤ts, although many were perhaps
less tangible. The Italians and the Germans—using their own and local labor
—built hundreds of miles of roads and dozens of bridges, which opened up
hither-to-inaccessible areas of Albania. The invaders enlarged harbors, en-
larged existing airports, and built new ones of each. Government buildings and
tourist hotels were built. Swamps were drained to control malaria and provide
agricultural acreage for the landless—although this last contribution was per-
haps more of a public relations stunt; certainly more could have been done in
this respect. Wells were drilled for oil extraction, and the Germans went so far
as to bring in portable re¤neries. Mines were enlarged and modernized for
mineral extraction. There is little doubt that the occupation was bene¤cial for
Albania’s mining capacity.41 The Italians also began pipeline and railroad con-
struction to facilitate the export of Albania’s mineral wealth. While a good
many of these projects were destroyed during the war, including most of the
bridges, it is generally less dif¤cult and costly to repair than it is to build from
the ground up. With the glaring exception of houses—tens of thousands,
perhaps as many as sixty thousand,42 were damaged or destroyed—much of
what the Italians and the Germans had constructed was quickly put back in
order once the war had ended. It is not without some degree of justi¤cation
that the Italian of¤cial responding to Albania’s reparations claims argued that
the occupation was not without its economic bene¤t.
The war did much to drag Albania out of the mists of the ¤fteenth
century in a social sense. Although the Italian occupation was of longer dura-
tion, its impact, as with economic destruction, was considerably less signi¤cant
than that of the German occupation. In 1943, when the Germans arrived,
Albania was still ¤rmly in the grip of tribal-feudal social traditions. Zog had
ruled in cooperation with the Geg chieftains of the north. Even so, he had
been able to lessen their in¶uence somewhat by extending the power of the
272 Conclusion

central government, at least in terms of taxation, military recruitment, and the

rule of law, to areas that had long and successfully resisted this type of central
power intrusion.
The Italian occupation in many ways enhanced Albania’s tribal-feudal
traditions. Not only did the Italians rely almost exclusively on tribal leaders
and feudal beys for leadership in their puppet governments, but they were
comfortable with the existing political and social structure and therefore did
little to change it. Indeed in many areas of the north, social retrogression took
place. Because the Italians seemed to have little interest in maintaining order
in some areas, Zog’s expansion of central authority was often reversed. Large
parts of Albania reverted to the traditions of isolation and blood feud justice,
particularly in those areas of little military value to the Italians, where the
construction of roads was considered unnecessary.
It was German policy that did much to destroy traditional Albania, both
in a political and a social sense. The Italians had compromised some chieftains
and some of the feudal Moslem landowners by including them in puppet
regimes. But a general appreciation that collaboration was not in Albania’s
national interest grew slowly along with the armed resistance. Once the Ger-
mans assumed control of Albania, this idea—that collaboration was anti-Al-
banian—became more and more clear, and those who participated were roundly
condemned. Under the Germans this meant not only the tribal chieftains and
feudal beys whom the Italians had attracted, but virtually all noncommunist
opposition groups as well. Each group that the Germans attracted —the col-
laborationist chiefs, the beys, the prewar liberals, the BK, the Zogists, and the
independent chiefs—were in turn compromised and removed from contention
for power in a postwar Albania. Albania would never be the same. Hoxha came
to power at the head of a party and army inspired by a militant foreign ideology
that rejected and ridiculed the old ways. Hoxha’s followers came from the
traditionally disenfranchised; they were principally Tosk and principally young.
The average age of the partisans was twenty, and the average ages of the party
Politburo and Central Committee memberships in 1948 were thirty-¤ve and
thirty-two respectively. Hoxha, who was thirty-seven in 1945, was one of the
oldest of the party leaders.43 The partisans were also about 90 percent peasant
and contained a relatively high percentage (9 percent) of women.44
The women did much more than tend to the sick and wounded. They
were active ¤ghters and in the process took a step toward loosening Albania’s
rigid patriarchal and traditional Moslem society. Hoxha and his ideology em-
phasized equality for women, but it would be a dif¤cult struggle, particularly
because important individuals in his own movement, such as Myslim Peza,
Conclusion 273

were opposed to what they considered to be unnecessary radicalism. Hoxha

would complain some thirty years later that Albania had a long way to go
before real equality in the mind of the average Albanian would compliment
the legal equality that the new regime had granted women. Still, the war
pushed Albania down the road toward equality, away from the 1920s, when
the custom of simply shooting faithless wives was still common and generally
went unpunished.45
The war also impacted such basic indexes as urbanization, which jumped
from 15.4 percent in 1938 to 21.3 percent in 1945, indicating that the rate of
urban growth had almost quadrupled from ¤fteen or twenty years earlier. This
signi¤cant trend can be explained by problems in the agriculture sector, in-
creased industrial expansion, and, one can assume, increasing insecurity from
growing guerrilla warfare.46 Less tangible but equally as important was the new
self-image that Albanian peasants, and many Balkan peasants in general, de-
veloped during the course of the war. The partisan forces were essentially
peasant armies, and they were told, again and again, that they had defeated
the Axis powers. This new self-worth the peasants gained as a result would
complicate the various agricultural collectivization programs that the Stalinist
government instituted in the 1940s and 1950s.
Certainly one of the most important results of the war was the impact on
Albanian nationalism. Modern nationalism in Albania is essentially a twenti-
eth-century phenomenon, and King Zog did much to ingrain the concept into
his fellow Albanians. Socialist historiography dismisses Zog as a completely
negative force.47 Although his achievements were certainly limited, this verdict
is politically and ideologically motivated. Despite his many failures, by the
1930s the central government was recognized in most parts of the country.
The political stability that resulted, though relative, created the environment
necessary for the growth of a national consciousness. Zog’s resistance to Italian
economic and political penetration provided a focus, if negative, for this grow-
ing consciousness, which by the end of his reign had grown to the extent that
the Axis invaders underestimated its signi¤cance.
The experience of World War II in Albania served both to reinforce and
to submerge this growing nationalist sentiment. The ordeal of foreign occupa-
tion did much to reinforce Albania’s distinctiveness, but it also had a divisive
effect. Following the invasion and occupation, the Italians sought to integrate
the traditional Albanian elite into Mussolini’s new Roman empire. Some Ital-
ian efforts failed—particularly the creation of the Albanian Fascist Party. Still,
many elements of the prewar political and social elite compromised themselves
by cooperating with the fascists and thereby contributing to what had been
274 Conclusion

called the process of denationalization.48 The partial success of this fascist

policy fostered class division, because many middle-class Albanians—a rela-
tively small group—and many peasants resented Italian, and after 1943, Ger-
man occupation. Further, the division between north and south was accentu-
ated by the formation of resistance groups with regional agendas. So while
nationalism continued to grow, the pace of growth was slowed, and much of
Zog’s work was at least jeopardized.
When Hoxha came to power he was faced with the task of rebuilding
Albania on the foundations—or what was left of them—laid by Zog. Like
Zog, his main goal was predetermined and was, in its simplest sense, the
creation of a viable independent nation-state and the “monolithic unity” of the
Albanian people. Hoxha did this with blood—perhaps less blood than Tito
and probably even Milovan Djilas. But the difference is that Djilas saw the
error of his ways, and even Tito mellowed. Hoxha’s extremism and paranoia
increased.49 But despite the violence and violent rhetoric of Stalinism to which
Hoxha would eventually resort, he had no choice but to become as ardent a
nationalist as Zog had been. Indeed, given the narrow base of support the
communist movement had, and given Hoxha’s need to downplay the Kosova
issue, extreme nationalism was perhaps the only means by which Hoxha could
remain in power and progress toward a modern Stalinist state. Nationalism
proved to be the principal element in all of his policies. He could not do
otherwise, for the war had determined that state-of-siege nationalism, sup-
ported by the myth that Albanian arms had defeated the fascist invaders,
would become the focal point of his regime. It is for the postcommunist
democratic forces in Albania to determine whether the nationalism built on
Zog’s foundation and further inspired by Hoxha—as a direct result of
Albania’s wartime experience—will become a positive or negative force in the
Balkan region.
NOTE ON SOURCES

The task of attempting to grasp even the basics of Albania at war is not a
simple one. Albania’s Stalinist past has made the researcher’s work dif¤cult. A
basic problem is that the Albanian archives remained closed to foreign scholars
until the early 1990s. Further, Enver Hoxha reports that what existed in the
archives prior to 1944 was destroyed in the Battle of Tirana, although this is
perhaps an exaggeration.1 Though now open, the archives still suffer from
extensive organizational dif¤culties that only time, money, and a great deal of
effort can correct. Still, since this work does not bene¤t from that material, it
cannot claim to be the de¤nitive work on the subject. That work will have to
come from Albania’s new generation of historians who are now able to work
outside of the rigid bounds of political correctness that until recently was
required of all Albanian historians who dealt with this crucial period in Alban-
ian history.
Documents from interested states, both published and unpublished, are,
however, extensive and are an important source for this study. Perhaps the
most useful are the British Foreign Of¤ce, War Of¤ce, and Cabinet Papers,
because of Great Britain’s long-standing interest in the area and because of the
often high quality of foreign service personnel. Foreign Of¤ce ¤les are useful
for information on the invasion and the early period of occupation, as the
British government recognized the annexation and replaced its minister with
a consul-general. The reports from the minister on the invasion and the re-
275
276 Note on Sources

ports from the consul-general on the construction of the ¤rst occupation

regimes are extremely useful. British Cabinet Papers are also of some use,
although the Albanian situation was certainly not high on the cabinet’s list of
priorities.
By necessity, there is a gap in British documents from the beginning of
the war through the end of 1942, because the British no longer had of¤cial
representation in Albania. Once Albania became a ¤eld of operations for the
British in early 1943, Foreign Of¤ce and War Of¤ce records are again ex-
tremely useful. The Special Operations Executive, which became the primary
outside source of supply for the various Albanian resistance groups, sent
weekly situation reports to both the Foreign Of¤ce and the War Of¤ce. Al-
though some SOE ¤les in Great Britain are still closed, and likely will remain
so for some time, some of these closed ¤les are obtainable at the National
Archives in Washington D.C., since some of this material was shared with the
Americans and has been released. Many SOE reports can also be found in
Foreign Of¤ce ¤les, because there was some coordination between the two
services.
The National Archives also contain the U.S. diplomatic and intelligence
holdings, which are less useful, as much of what the Americans in Albania
reported seems to have come directly from British sources. The American
minister seems to have been less well informed about the invasion than the
British minister, and his reports are on occasion simply copies of British re-
ports. The United States clearly considered Albania to be a post of little
importance, in light of the quality of American ministers. American docu-
ments do not cover the earlier period of the occupation at all because the
United States refused to recognize the occupation and therefore withdrew its
minister in July of 1939. The Of¤ce of Strategic Services (OSS) did run a
series of intelligence-gathering operations during the course of the war,
manned by Albanian-American ¤eld agents who were the only Americans in
Albania until the United States reestablished a physical presence in Albania
with the formation of the American military mission under Harry Fultz in
1945. Their reports, and the research and analysis papers to which these re-
ports contributed, are quite interesting and provide some general information
and numerous summaries of various aspects of Albania at war.
German diplomatic and military documents are particularly useful for the
last two years of the war in Albania. German material for the earlier period is
useful but spotty since the Germans were careful not to arouse Italian suspi-
cions by collecting too much data. German military and Foreign Ministry
documents covering the German occupation period are voluminous and thor-
Note on Sources 277

ough, and they rank second only to the British material in terms of usefulness.
As evidence of the seriousness of purpose with which the Germans ap-
proached the collection and maintenance of documents, a faceless (and unfor-
tunately anonymous) Wehrmacht bureaucrat pounded out a one-hundred-
page report on all aspects of the German occupation of Albania in March 1945
as Berlin burned. These documents are available on micro¤lm in England and
the United States.
Many Italian documents are available, in the United States and also, of
course, in Italy. Although they are often extremely useful the researcher must
be careful, since their reliability is often questionable. When Count Ciano
became Italian foreign minister and took control of the Palazzo Chigi in 1936,
he introduced a new policy called the “Tona Fascista,” which was intended to
infuse new energy and a new spirit into the Italian diplomatic corps. The net
result, unfortunately, was to encourage the traditionally thorough Italian dip-
lomats, who before the fascists had had a good reputation, to report primarily
those pieces of information Ciano wanted to hear. Oddly enough, Ciano, in
his diaries, complained that the reports he received from Tirana often did
more to obfuscate than to illustrate. While this was not always the case, it
seems to have occurred with enough frequency to call into question the verac-
ity of many of the available Italian military and diplomatic records. Given this
quali¤cation, however, Italian records, particularly those of the Comando Su-
premo and the Ministero della Guerra (some are available at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C.) are invaluable for the period of 1939 to 1943.
Extensive published documents are also available. Useful from the Alban-
ian perspective is La lutte anti-fasciste de liberation nationale du peuple albanais,
1941–1944: documents principaux, which, however, ignores the period prior to
the formation of the Albanian Communist Party. Of particular interest, when
the originals are not available, are the United States Diplomatic Papers, British
Documents on Foreign Policy, the German Akten aus dem Auswärtigen Amt,
and the Documenti diplomatici italiani. Needless to say, the material relating
to Albania is limited, and the respective usefulness of these documents tends
to mirror the unpublished records. The American documents concentrate on
the invasion, whereas the others are more general and more useful. Because
Albania played a small role in the war in Europe, the number of documents
in these collections that touch on aspects of the war in Albania is not great.
Of the general literature available, the numerous diaries and memoirs are
the most interesting and the most useful. Perhaps the most remarkable are the
diaries of the Italian foreign minister Ciano, which count as perhaps the single
most useful source on high-level Axis decision making in World War II.
278 Note on Sources

Because the invasion and occupation of Albania became Ciano’s special proj-
ect, Albanian questions ¤gure prominently in Ciano’s works, principally The
Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943, and Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 1937–1938. Although
Ciano does, of course, try to present himself as the one sane voice in the
wilderness—along the lines of Albert Speer in Inside the Third Reich—the
material he includes on the decision-making process is invaluable. Undoubt-
edly not intending his diaries for publication, Ciano seems to have been frank
and objective, a side of himself he rarely displayed.
In general, the memoirs are less useful because the writers inevitably use
them as a forum to justify their actions, demonstrate that theirs was the correct
policy all along, or overemphasize their personal role in the momentous events
of World War II. Indicative of this unfortunate genre is the work of Francesco
Jacomoni, who served ¤rst as Italian ambassador to Albania and then as lieu-
tenant general—amounting to ruler—of Albania until shortly before the Ital-
ian collapse. Jacomoni not only carried out the orders of Mussolini and Ciano
but was responsible for much of Italy’s policy in Albania. His testament, La
polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa, could have been illuminating but instead we are
left with a self-serving, inaccurate, and very general treatise that sheds very
little light on the invasion and occupation.
The exhausting memoirs—in all some ¤fty volumes—of Enver Hoxha,
the partisan leader and Stalinist dictator of Albania, must be considered in the
same vain. These memoirs were, of course, produced not as an accurate record
of Hoxha during World War II but rather to serve a political purpose. This is
perhaps best re¶ected by the fact that the memoirs have often been rewritten
to conform to political changes in postwar Albania. Major players were written
in or out, according to the shifting of Albania’s rather violent political winds.
The case of Mehmet Shehu, the chief military commander of the partisans
and the prime minister of Stalinist Albania until his removal and still-myste-
rious death in 1981 stands as the most extreme example. The price of disagree-
ment with Hoxha proved to be his position, his role in history at least as he
appears in Hoxha’s memoirs, the freedom of his family, and possibly his life.
Finally, as Jon Halliday points out in his interesting book Enver Hoxha, the
Artful Albanian, a one-volume condensation of some of the Hoxha memoirs,
it stretches the imagination to believe that after an interval of some twenty
years Enver Hoxha could reconstruct ¤ve years of conversations word for
word.2 Still, the memoirs are of some use, certainly at least as a clear indication
of the ever-changing of¤cial position concerning events in Albania during
World War II. This attribute also applies to the various memoirs of Albanian
soldiers involved in the war, the most prominent of whom was Mehmet
Note on Sources 279

Shehu, the commander of the ¤rst partisan division and author of On the
Experience of the National Liberation War and the Development of Our National
Army, among other works.
Also useful are the memoirs of foreigners involved in the Albania’s polit-
ical and military events during the war. Although there are many, the most
useful include Hermann Neubacher’s book Sonderauftrag Südost, 1940–1945:
Bericht eines ¶iegenden Diplomaten. Neubacher, who was Ribbentrop’s personal
representative in the Balkans, was responsible for carrying out Germany’s
unique occupation policy from 1943 to 1944. He glosses over some of the
dif¤cult moments he had dealing with the Byzantine Albanian political situ-
ation as well as some of the serious disagreements between the German polit-
ical and military authorities with regard to dealing with the Albanians, but his
perspective is, of course, valuable. It would have been more valuable, however,
had he been somewhat more frank. One often comes away with the impres-
sion, reading Neubacher’s book, that the Germans were invited guests who
enjoyed Albanian hospitality for a little over a year and then decided to go
home. The only published record of a German common soldier’s experiences
in Albania is Hermann Frank’s Landser, Karst und Skiptaren, Bandenkämpfe in
Albanien. Unfortunately, this work does little but emphasize the continuing
confusion regarding Albania’s political and social makeup and development
that seemed common among many Germans who spent time there.
From the Italian side, besides the works of Ciano and Jacomoni, there is
considerable military memoir and diary material available. At the command
end we have the memoirs of Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World
War: Memories and Documents, which give us some insight into Comando
Supremo decision making. Most of the stories of common soldiers come, not
surprisingly, from Italians. Although they are interesting from the point of
view of trial and survival, what they add to our general understanding of the
period is of a highly personal nature.
British participants have produced a considerable amount of interesting
memoir material that invariably re¶ects the political orientation of the author
and must, therefore, be used with some caution. Sir Andrew Ryan, the last
British minister in Albania, includes in his book The Last of the Dragomans a
chapter on his experience in Albania. Most of the British memoir material,
however, comes from British of¤cers who served as liaison of¤cers attached to
the Albanian resistance. The most useful and interesting is Julian Amery’s Sons
of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War and Approach March: A Venture in Autobi-
ography. Brigadier E. F. “Trotsky” Davies, the ranking British of¤cer in Alba-
nia, has produced a memoir called Illyrian Venture: The Story of the British
280 Note on Sources

Military Mission in Enemy-Occupied Albania, which if nothing else

demonstrates the weakness of such material. Davies’s reports to the Foreign
Of¤ce cataloguing nationalist collaboration with the enemy strongly encour-
aged the British to throw the full weight of their support behind the partisans,
and yet Davies, in his book, ignores what many see as a signi¤cant turning
point for which he was responsible. His motivation, presumably, stems from a
desire not to be remembered as the British of¤cer responsible for the commu-
nist victory in Albania.
Also of note are Peter Kemp’s No Colour, No Crest and David Smiley’s
Albanian Assignment. The latter, although written by an of¤cer with a strong
conservative orientation, serves as the British counterpart to the stories of
adventure that many Italian soldiers produced. The principal problem with the
memoirs of British of¤cers is that all of them are written by individuals at-
tached to the noncommunist movements in the center and north, none with
the partisans. Their approach tends to mirror the approach of their Albanian
contacts, dealing principally with the civil war.3 As a result, these works are less
than objective and most erroneously blame the British government, because of
its material support for the partisans, for “losing” Albania to the communists.4
The only presently available exception to this trend in the ¤ne book by Sir
Reginald Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory.
Essentially a combination of personal memoir and careful research of princi-
pally English language resources, Hibbert’s book is of immense value.
For the secondary source published material it would be useful ¤rst to
consult the two excellent bibliographies available. Armin Hetzer and Viorel S.
Roman, in Albanien, ein bibliographischer Forschungsbericht mit Titelüber-
setzungen und Standortnachweisen, list documents, books, and articles written
in Albanian as well as in Western languages. William B. Bland’s Albania
though more limited in scope because of its principal concentration on English
language material, includes a brief and useful abstract on each item listed.
Bland’s book was recently revised and expanded by the Albanian specialist
Antonia Young. Also very useful is Klaus-Detlev Grothusen ed., Südosteuropa-
Handbuch: Albanien.
While the secondary source material is by no means overwhelming, it is
still extensive and therefore only the most useful for this study will be men-
tioned here. Given that the war experience is central to socialist Albanian
literature, socialist Albanian historians have, of course, produced a consider-
able amount of material, much of which is available in translation. The quality
of the material is, however, inconsistent. As one might expect, there is fre-
quently an overemphasis on the central themes of postwar political reality,
Note on Sources 281

including a need to (1) focus on and overemphasize the forces arrayed against
the Albanians, (2) overemphasize Albania’s ability to confront these forces and
overwhelm them without outside aid, and (3) delineate domestic politics in
black-and-white terms, that is, the correct position of the party as opposed to
the “traitor” organizations that refused to cooperate with the communist-
dominated national liberation councils during the course of the war. Perhaps
it is safe to say that Stalinist Albania has produced good historians but not
always good history. The political climate in Albania under Enver Hoxha, who
ruled Albania from World War II until his death in 1985, did little to encour-
age a balanced approach to history.
Most notable among these Albanian historians are Ndreçi Plasari and
Shyqri Ballvora as military historians and the excellent historians Aleks Buda,
Stefanaq Pollo, Arben Puto, and Luan Omari for the political aspects of the
war. The military historians, however, pay scant attention to the noncommu-
nist resistance and seem consistently to overestimate the strength of the Ger-
man units against which the partisans fought. The political historians tend to
focus narrowly on the organization and struggle of the party. One of the
central themes here seems to be oversensitivity to the question of foreign,
particularly Yugoslav, involvement in the organization of the Albanian Com-
munist Party in 1941. Several other general problems are consistently evident.
As the German historian Bernhard Kühmel has pointed out, Albanian
historiography argues that by the fall of 1943 two clearly de¤ned blocks had
developed in Albanian politics.5 The partisans represented the progressive
elements, and all other political groups, referred to as the “reactionary ele-
ments,” supported the German invader. This was not the case. Even Michael
Schmidt-Neke, who comes as close to the politically correct position as a
serious Western scholar should, ¤nds problems with socialist Albanian
historiography. He complains that socialist Albanian historiography tends,
when dealing with people, to see things in black-and-white terms. When a
person is considered positive, that is, patriotic and progressive, many transgres-
sions are overlooked. For example, many of the reactionary feudal elements
who opposed King Zog for personal reasons are lauded simply because of their
opposition to Zog.6 Often this tendency reaches curious proportions. By way
of illustration, the otherwise excellent historian Arben Puto in his book From
the Annals of British Diplomacy: The Anti-Albanian Plans of Great Britain during
the Second World War according to Foreign Of¤ce Documents of 1939–1944 berates
the British liaison of¤cers McLean and Amery for pursuing an “inglorious
odyssey, . . . that was going to take them into the odious swamps and gloomy
dens of reaction and treason.”7 Treason against whom? one might ask. In the
282 Note on Sources

same book Puto refers to British material aid to the Albanian partisans, which
reached an average of one hundred tons a month and without which the
partisans would have been hard pressed to continue effective resistance, as the
“so called” British aid.8
Despite occasional ¶aws, socialist Albanian secondary source material is
of considerable interest. Among other works, Shyqri Ballvora has produced an
interesting work on the German occupation called Das nationalsozialistische
Besatzungsregime in Albanien, and Lefter Kasneci has made a valuable contri-
bution in Steeled in the Heat of Battle: A Brief Survey of the History of the
National Liberation War of the Albanian People, 1941–1945. Luan Omari’s most
recent useful work is The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State
Power. Stefanaq Pollo and Arben Puto, have written, among other works, The
History of Albania: From Its Origins to the Present Day. Perhaps the most useful
and exhaustive Albanian secondary source is the four-volume collective work
produced by the Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste Pranë KQ të
PPSH called Historia e Luftës Antifashiste Nacionalçlirimtare të popullit shqiptar.
This work is often quite candid but once again lacks objectivity when it comes
to questions relating to the noncommunist resistance and Western involve-
ment. Many of these works were, of course, revised as wartime communist
leaders—Mehmet Shehu is the most prominent example9—fell out with
Hoxha and were purged. This problem in often illustrated, quite literally, in
the of¤cial photographs of wartime partisan units that often accompany these
works in which the heads of the subjects rarely match the bodies.
Western historiography is of course less extensive. For the period prior to
the Italian invasion of April 1939, German historian Michael Schmidt-Neke
has produced a ¤ne book called Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in
Albanien (1912–1939) The book is well researched but relies perhaps too
heavily on published Albanian sources. Although Schmidt-Neke is aware of
and indeed mentions the propensity of socialist Albanian historians to see
political ¤gures in polarized terms, it seems that he himself at least partially
falls into the trap in his overly critical interpretation of King Zog. For this
early period and for the Italian invasion, also see Bernd Fischer King Zog and
the Struggle for Stability in Albania. Of mild interest for this early period, and
for the years of Zog’s exile, is Gwen Robyns’s authorized biography Geraldine
of the Albanians. Robyns, however, falls rather completely into the familiar trap
of accepting Zog’s wife’s verbatim recollection of conversations that took place
¤fty years earlier. The queen’s perspective, not surprisingly, is less than objec-
tive. It is, in fact, liberally laced with exaggerations and inaccuracies.10 One is
left with the impression from this book that World War II was actually cen-
Note on Sources 283

tered around King Zog and his family. In a conversation with me, the queen’s
sister—with Geraldine in fervent agreement—once con¤ded that King Zog
was the modern Napoleon.11 Although the queen is a very pleasant person, her
material is useful principally for an occasional anecdote.
A number of notable works have appeared that deal with the Italian
invasion and occupation of Albania. The noted English historian Denis Mack
Smith has produced a several works that include important material on Alba-
nia, including Mussolini, and Mussolini’s Roman Empire. The American histo-
rian MacGregor Knox, in his book Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics
and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, includes a very useful chapter on Italy’s
Albanian adventure. Knox con¤rms, ampli¤es, and adds considerable new
material to support the argument that Italy’s war-making capacity was exag-
gerated and able to overwhelm King Zog’s wretched Albanian army only by
the sheer weight of its numbers.
British strategy and participation, which is of particular signi¤cance be-
cause of the crucial role played by the British in serving as quartermaster for
the resistance, is ably described and analyzed by several historians. David
Stafford, in his book Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945: A Survey of
the Special Operations Executive, describes the formation and organization of
SOE, which was to coordinate and carry out the supply of Albanian resistance
¤ghters. Elizabeth Barker, in her book British Policy in South-East Europe in
the Second World War, provides us with the unique perspective of the insider
involved in British policymaking. Barker spent much of the war as an em-
ployee of the political warfare branch of the British Foreign Of¤ce.
Although the Albanians themselves, including Ballvora, have produced
considerable material on the German period, the most balanced and complete
account to date was produced by Bernhard Kühmel. Kühmel, in his unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation “Deutschland und Albanien, 1943–1944: Die Aus-
wirkungen der Besetzung und die innenpolitische Entwicklung des Landes,”
describes—in often excruciating detail—the course and impact of the German
occupation on internal Albanian politics. And ¤nally, a very useful recent
addition to the literature is the soon-to-be published doctoral dissertation of
Hubert Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien (1939–1944):
Eine historische Analyse des kulturellen Musters von Freund und Feind.”
While suffering from stylistic and organizational problems, and narrower in
scope than this work, Neuwirth’s book is unique in that it is the ¤rst Western
study of collaboration and resistance in Albania that makes use of Albanian
archival sources, plus a small collection of selective British documents collected
by the historical institute in Tirana. That study is important in that it encour-
284 Note on Sources

ages us to give more prominence to the early noncommunist resistance move-

ments. It also helps to con¤rm what Western scholars have argued for some
time—that the of¤cial Albanian socialist view of the war is politicized to the
extent that it is of only limited value. Though these are but a few of the sources
I found useful, they are the most important.
It is hoped that the information contained herein might be of use to later
scholars of Albanian history who are able to take full advantage of the Alban-
ian archives, in particular the new generation of Albanian historians.
NOTES

Chapter One: Count Ciano’s Invasion of Albania

1. For a brief survey of Italian interest in Albania see Bernd J. Fischer, “Italian
Policy in Albania, 1894–1943,” Balkan Studies 26, no. 1 (1985).
2. Christo Dako, Albania (Boston: E. L. Grimes, 1919), p. 104; E. L. P. Dillion,
“Albania,” Contemporary Review ( July 1914), p. 125.
3. Giovanni Zamboni, Mussolinis Expansionspolitik auf dem Balkan (Hamburg:
Helmut Buske Verlag, 1970), p. xxvi.
4. For the full text of the declaration, see Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a
Kingdom (London: Unwin Brothers, 1929), pp. 369–370.
5. Bernd J. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania (Boulder,
Colo.: East European Monographs and Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 89–92.
6. League of Nations, League of Nations Treaty Series: Publication of Treaties and
International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League (Lausanne: Im-
primerie Reunies, 1927), vol. 60, pp. 16–21.
7. Zamboni, Mussolinis Expansionspolitik auf dem Balkan, p. lxxxi.
8. Michael Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien
(1912–1939) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1987), pp. 266–267. The author quotes
the German minister in Albania in the 1930s who drew up a list of eighteen sources
of Italian in¶uence in Albania.
9. Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (London: Longman, 1976), p.
141.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., pp. 140–141.
12. Ibid.
285
286 Notes to pages 9–15

13. USDS 765.75/366: Rome, no. 349, 4 May 1937.

14. Count Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 1937–1938 (New York:
Dutton, 1953), p. 4.
15. Ibid., p. 94. (The Anschluss refers to the German annexation of Austria in
March 1938.)
16. Ibid., p. 107.
17. Marcia Fishel Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determi-
nation in Fascist Italy, January 1939–June 1940” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University,
1977), p. 17.
18. Galaezzo Ciano, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers: Being a Record of Nearly 2000
Conversations Held during the Years 1936–1942, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge (London:
Odhams Press, 1948), p. 207; Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy De-
termination,” p. 17; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 150.
19. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 17.
20. Ciano, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, p. 207; Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign
Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 17.
21. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 18.
22. Ibid., pp 18–19.
23. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, p. 107.
24. Ciano, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, p. 204.
25. Ibid.
26. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, p. 125.
27. Ibid., p. 114.
28. Conversations with Her Majesty Queen Geraldine of the Albanians, July
1981, Casa Ponderosa, Costa del Sol, Spain.
29. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr.4 362, Tirana, 15 April 1939; Schmidt-Neke,
Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 340.
30. Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, p. 202.
31. Ibid., pp. 184–185, 205.
32. Conversations with Queen Geraldine, July 1981, Costa del Sol, Spain; Gwen
Robyns, Geraldine of the Albanians (London: Muller, Blond, & White, 1987), p. 81.
33. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, pp.
271–272.
34. FO 371/12710 R725/725/90, Durrës, 23 February 1939, FO 371/23710
R1272/725/90, Durrës, 22 February 1939, and FO 371/23714 R4454/1335/90,
Durrës, 18 May 1939; CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 362, Tirana, 15 April 1939.
35. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 272.
36. FO 371/23711 R2065/725/90, Durrës, 16 March 1939; Mack Smith,
Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 149.
37. Leften Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Win-
ston, 1958), p. 725.
38. Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1945 (New York: Double-
day, 1945), p. 31; FO 371/23711 R2065/725/90, Durrës, 16 March 1939.
39. Conversations with Queen Geraldine, July 1981, Costa del Sol, Spain.
40. Ciano, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, p. 271.
41. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 23.
Notes to pages 15–24 287

42. Jacob Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941 (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1962), p. 126.
43. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 23.
44. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 26;
Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 151.
45. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 28.
46. Ibid., p. 47; Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determina-
tion,” p. 29.
47. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 53.
48. Ibid., p. 51.
49. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 33.
50. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 52.
51. FO 371/23714 R4454/1335/90, Durrës, 18 May 1939.
52. FO 434/6 73262, p. 172.
53. Ibid.
54. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 54, 56.
55. Ciano had little con¤dence in his commanders, as evidenced by his ridiculing
Guzzoni for wearing a bad toupee.
56. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 51, 55, 56.
57. USDS 765.75/444: Tirana, 6 April 1939.
58. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 57.
59. USDS 765.75/444: Tirana, 6 April 1939.
60. The Germans became aware of the plan even before the Italian army was
informed.
61. David B. Funderburk, “Anglo-Albanian Relations, 1920–1939,” Revue
Etudes Sud-Est Européennes 13, no. 1 (1974), p. 6.
62. USDS 765.75/444: Tirana, 6 April 1939; FO 371/23714 R2951/1335/90,
Durrës, 11 April 1939.
63. USDS 765.75/444: Tirana, 6 April 1939; FO 371/23714 R2951/1335/90,
Durrës, 11 April 1939; American Council on Public Affairs, The Greek White Book,
Diplomatic Documents Relating to Italy’s Aggression against Greece (Agence D’Athenes:
1943), p. 25.
64. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 37.
65. FO 371/23713 R2953/1335/90, Rome, 13 April 1939.
66. WO 208/62, Report on Albania, chap. 9, Armed Forces; Hubert Neuwirth,
“Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien (1939–1944): Eine historische Analyse des
kulturellen Musters von Freund und Feind” (Ph.D. diss., University of Graz, 1997), p. 36.
67. FO 371/23713 R2953/1335/90, Rome, 13 April 1939.
68. USDS 875.00/520: Tirana, 24 May 1939.
69. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 62.
70. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 153.
71. Ibid., p. 152.
72. FO 371/23714 R3060/1335/90, 14 April 1939, Whipple.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 152.
75. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 154.
288 Notes to pages 24–31

76. USDS 765.75/459: Tirana, 8 April 1939.

77. Conversations with Queen Geraldine, July 1981, Costa del Sol, Spain. Zog
himself maintained on more than one occasion that Yugoslavia was prepared to invade
Albania; see FO 371/22110 R1799/867/90, 14 March 1942. Gwen Robyns repeats this
version in her authorized biography of the queen.
78. Robyns, Geraldine of the Albanians, p. 89.
79. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 362, Tirana, 15 April 1939.
80. Luan Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State
Power (Tirana: Nëntori, 1986), p. 17.
81. Stephen Peters, “Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania,” in
Thomas Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1975), p. 274.
82. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 62.
83. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 171–172.
84. FO 371/23713 R2657/1335/90, Rome, 8 April 1939.
85. FO 371/23713 R2755/1335/90, Durrës, 11 April 1939
86. FO 371/23713 R2927/1335/90, Durrës, 16 April 1939.
87. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 64–65.
88. George M. Self, “Foreign Relations of Albania” (Ph.D. Diss., University of
Chicago, 1943), p. 178.
89. Times (London), 7 April 1939, p. 3.
90. Ibid.
91. New York Times, 4 April 1939, estimated that Italian investments in Albania
during the interwar period approached 1 billion lire. H. Gross suggests that between
1928 and 1939 the Italians contributed 280 million Albanian francs. See H. Gross,
“Albanien zwischen den Machten: Ein Beitrag zur Erschliessung unentwickelter
Gebiete,” Wirtschaftsdienst 6 (1949), p. 4.
92. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” pp. 42–
43; FO 371/23717 R2333/1335/90, Rome, 4 April 1939.
93. FO 371/23717 R2333/1335/90, Rome, 4 April 1939.
94. FO 371/23713 R2759/1335/90, Budapest, 11 April 1939; FO 371/23717
R3219/3219/90, Durrës, 18 August 1939.
95. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 362, Tirana, 15 April 1939.
96. FO 371/23712 R2447/1335/90, Berlin, 8 April 1939, and FO 371/23712
R2449/1335/90, Berlin, 8 April 1939.
97. FO 371/23712 R2484/1335/90, Foreign Of¤ce Minute, 8 April 1939.
98. FO 371/23712 R2487/1335/90, Paris, 8 April 1939.
99. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence
Community (London: William Heinemann, 1985), p. 590.
100. FO 371/23785 R2473/1/22, Rome, 8 April 1939; CAB 23/98 18A, 19
April 1939.
101. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 61–62.
102. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 726.
103. Funderburk, “Anglo-Albanian Relations, 1920–1939,” p. 7.
104. Jon Halliday, The Artful Albanian: The Memoirs of Enver Hoxha (London:
Chatto Press, 1986), p. 21.
Notes to pages 31–37 289

105. FO 371/23711 4816/725/90, League of Nations, Events in Albania: Vari-

ous Communications Addressed to the Secretary-General, A.14, 1939, VII, 10 June
1939.
106. MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in
Fascist Italy’s Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 41.
107. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 156.; USDS 741.68/28 GDG:
Athens, 10 April 1939.

Chapter Two: The Construction of an Italian Albania

1. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, pp. 727–728; Wayne S. Vucinich, “Com-
munist Gains in Albania (I),” Current History 221, no. 122 (1951), p. 212.
2. Örjan Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1991), p. 32.
3. Nicholas Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1968), p. 13.
4. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 729.
5. Ibid.
6. Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania, p. 34.
7. Julian Amery, Approach March: A Venture in Autobiography (London: Hutchin-
son, 1973), pp. 370–371.
8. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 730.
9. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 28.
10. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 387, Tirana, Political Circular, 10 April 1939.
11. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 40.
12. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 62; FO 371/23712 R2471/1335/90, FO Min-
ute, 8 April 1939.
13. FO 371/23712 R2489/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 9 April 1939.
14. FO 371/23712 R26631/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 10 April 1939.
15. FO 371/23712 R2712/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 11 April 1939.
16. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 63; Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania
and the Question of State Power, p. 18.
17. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 277.
18. Francesco Jacomoni, La polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa (Roca San Casciano:
Cappelli Editore, 1965), p. 133.
19. FO 434/6 R6606/6606/90, Durrës, Ryan, 16 August 1939.
20. Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951), pp.
336–338.
21. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 25, Tirana, 12 April 1939.
22. FO 434/6 R6606/6606/90, Letter from Ryan to FO, Report on Leading
Personalities, 16 August 1939, and FO 371/23714 R3075/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 14
April 1939.
23. Ibid.
24. FO 434/6 R3517/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 25 April 1939, and FO 371/23714
290 Notes to pages 37–43

R3824/3824/90, Durrës, Ryan, 3 May 1939; WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July
1944–February 1945.
25. Anton Logoreci, The Albanians: Europe’s Forgotten Survivors (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1977), p. 67
26. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. xvii.
27. Ibid., p. 64.
28 Ibid., p. 349.
29. Ibid., pp. 64–65.
30. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 14, 31.
31. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 99.
32. FO 434/6 p. 188, Durrës, Ryan.
33. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 66–67.
34. Ibid., p. 65.
35. FO 371/23715 R5009/5009/90, Durrës, Ryan, 13 June 1939.
36. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 92–93.
37. Robert M. W. Kempner, “The New Constitution of Albania: a Model Con-
stitution for European Vassal States,” Tulane Law Review 15 (1941), p. 434.
38. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 427, Tirana, German Legation, 13 May 1939.
39. FO 371/23715 R5009/5009/90, Durrës, Ryan, 13 June 1939.
40. The king had so little to do with the constitution that he ¤rst asked Ciano
who had drafted it and then complained that the new Albanian ¶ag did not include a
heraldic symbol of the dynasty. Ciano told Mussolini, who went into another of his
many tirades against the monarchy; the Duce argued that the king “is a small man,
grumpy and untrustworthy. . . . It is a monarchy which, by its idiotic gassing, prevents
the ’Fascisti¤cation’ of the Army.” Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 93.
41. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 391, Tirana, 26 April 1939.
42. FO 434/6 R3517/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 25 April 1939.
43. FO 371/23113 R2767/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 11 April 1939.
44. FO 371/23715 R6243/1335/90, Athens, Palairet, 24 July 1939.
45. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 101.
46. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” p. 45.
47. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, No. 772, Survey of Albania, 15 July
1943.
48. For a complete translation of the text of the statutes, see Lemkin, Axis Rule
in Occupied Europe, pp. 267–271.
49. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power,
pp. 25–26.
50. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 105.
51. Ibid.
52. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 23.
53. FO 371/23716 R4659/2066/90, Durrës, Ryan, 6 June 1939; Ciano, The
Ciano Diaries, p. 87.
54. FO 371/23717 R5013/2066/90, Durrës, Ryan, 19 June 1939, and FO
371/23717 R5420/2066/90, Durrës, Ryan, 27 June 1939.
55. FO 371/23717 R9376/2066/90, FO Minute, Margin Note, 27 October 1939.
Notes to pages 43–53 291

56. WO 208/62, Report on Albania, chap. 9, Armed Forces.

57. FO 434/6 R4385/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 19 May 1939.
58. FO 371/23715 R5419/90, Durrës, Ryan, 27 June 1939.
59. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p.
21; Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 100.
60. FO 371/23714 R4377/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 22 May 1939, and FO
371/23715 R5419/90, Durrës, Ryan, 27 June 1939.
61. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p.
24; Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 102.
62. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, No. 772, Survey of Albania, 15 July
1943; FO 371/37135 R4069/39/90, FO Research Department, 5 May 1943.
63. FO 371/23113 R2711/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 11 April 1939.
64. Stavro Skendi, Albania (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 61.
65. See chapter 1.
66. FO 371/23714 R3824, Durrës, Ryan, 3 May 1939.
67. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p. 103.
68. FO 371/23715 R5800, Durrës, Ryan, 11 July 1939, and FO 371/23714
R3824, Durrës, Ryan, 3 May 1939.
69. FO 371/23715 R5800, Durrës, Ryan, 11 July 1939.
70. WO 208/62, Report on Albania, 14 May 1940.
71. OSS, Research and Analysis, No. 1202, n.d.
72. FO 371/24866 R6098/503/90, Athens, 10 May 1940.
73. FO 434/6 R3182/1384/90, Durrës, Ryan, 22 April 1939; CGR, roll
T120/313, Nr. 431, German Legation, Tirana, 10 May 1939.
74. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 431, German Legation, Tirana, 10 May 1939.
75. Ibid.
76. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 155.
77. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 71.
78. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 420, German Legation, Tirana, 3 May 1939.
79. FO 371/24868 R4027/1427/90, Durrës, 16 March 1940; OSS, Research and
Analysis, No. 1202, 8 November 1943; and FO 371/23715 R4530, Durrës, Ryan, 25
May 1939.
80. Jacomoni, La polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa, p. 183; Lemkin, Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe, pp. 103–104.
81. FO 371/33118 R8936/7557/90/1942, Foreign Of¤ce, Research Depart-
ment, 22 March 1944.
82. FO 371/13560 C2310/2310/90, Durrës, 26 March 1929.
83. FO 371/14304 C5425/5425/90, Durrës, 30 June 1930.
84. FO 371/18341 R2465/2465/90, Durrës, 3 April 1934.
85. See David J. Kostelancik, “Minorities and Minority Language Education in
Inter-war Albania,” East European Quarterly 30, no. 1 (spring 1996).
86. FO 371/23717 R6150, Durrës, Ryan, 17 July 1939.
87. FO 371/13560 C2310/2310/90, Durrës, 26 March 1929.
88. FO 371/13561 C1988/565/90, Belgrade, 13 March 1929.
89. Vandeleur Robinson, Albania’s Road to Freedom (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1941), p. 98.
292 Notes to pages 54–65

90. FO 371/12847 C2557/2557/90, Durrës, 27 March 1929, and FO

317/12844 C1351/146/90, Durrës, 3 February 1928.
91. FO 371/12068 2074/946/90, Durrës, 25 February 1927.
92. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 64.
93. FO 371/24868 R4027/1427/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 16 March 1940.
94. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3185, Rome, 4 December 1941.
95. FO 371/33118 R8936/7557/90/1942, Research Department, Foreign
Of¤ce, 22 March 1944.
96. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 30.
97. FO 371/23717 R3219/3219/90, Durrës, Ryan, 18 April 1939.
98. FO 371/23716 R10123/1384/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 7 November 1939.
99. FO 371/24868 R2856/2856/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 22 February 1940.
100. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 19.

Chapter Three: Italian Greater Albania

1. FO 371/23713 R2806/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 13 April 1939.

2. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 62–63.
3. Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, p. 333.
4. FO 371/23714 R3824/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, Mitchell Letter of 26 April
1939, 3 May 1939.
5. FO 371/23714 R4451/1335/90, Rome, Dixon, 24 May 1939.
6. FO 371/24866 R503/503/90, Information from the Former Albanian Consul
in Constantinople, 5 January 1940.
7. FO 371/23710 R2712/1335/90, Rome, Perth, 11 April 1939, and FO
371/23710 R2767/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 11 April 1939.
8. Lavine, “Count Ciano: Foreign Affairs and Policy Determination,” pp. 40–41.
9. FO 371/23715 R6492/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 7 August 1939.
10. Ibid.
11. USDS, 875.00/507: Tirana, Grant, 6 May 1939.
12. FO 371/58482 R3068/191/90, Ryan to Slater, 21 February 1946, and in
conversation with Queen Geraldine of the Albanians, July 1981, Costa del Sol,
Spain.
13. FO 371/23714 R3825/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 3 May 1939.
14. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 65.
15. FO 371/23715 R6848/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 23 August 1939.
16. FO 371/23715 R5592/1335/90, Rome, Chancery to Southern Department,
5 July 1939.
17. FO 371/23715 R6492/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 7 August 1939, and FO
371/23715 R8487/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 25 September 1939.
18. FO 371/23717 R6150/6150/90, Durrës, Ryan, 17 July 1939.
19. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 620, Tirana, 10 July 1939.
20. Jacomoni, La polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa, p. 186; FO 371/23715
R6242/1335/90, Athens, Palairet, 24 July 1939.
Notes to pages 65–71 293

21. Jacomoni, La polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa, p. 184.

22. FO 371/23715 R8487/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 25 September 1939.
23. FO 371/24868 R2855, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 15 February 1940.
24. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 65.
25. Giornale d’Italia, 12 October 1939.
26. Michael Kaser, “Economic System,” in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, Südosteuropa-
Handbuch, Albanien (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993), p. 299.
27. According to socialist Albanian statistics, Albania did not become self-
suf¤cient in bread grains until the mid-1970s, and even this achievement was short
lived.
28. FO 371/23737 R3900/2068/90, Phipps, 10 May 1939, and FO 371/25116
R4057/1385/90, R. Moore, 24 April 1939; Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p.
157.
29. FO 371/23715 R9525/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 24 October 1939. Gamble
mentions a comment made by Jacomoni to Ryan in March 1939 in which he said that
Italian exploitation of oil in Albania was a ¤nancial disaster and would always remain
unremunerative.
30. FO 371/33118 R8956/7557/90, London, 22 March 1944; Ciano, The Ciano
Diaries, p. 69. Ciano notes that he protested against the sum to be spent, although he
does not tell us whether he believed it to be too high or too low.
31. FO 371/23714 R3824/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, Mitchell Letter, 3 May 1939.
32. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 620, Tirana, Pannwitz, 10 July 1939.
33. FO 371/23714 R4451/1335/90, Rome, Dixon, 24 May 1939.
34. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 81; FO 371/23715 R8487/1335/90, Durrës,
Grafftey-Smith, 25 September 1939.
35. FO 371/24866 R6808/6586/90, Hodgkinson Report, 19 June 1940.
36. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 427, Tirana, Pannwitz, 13 May 1939.
37. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 157.
38. FO 371/24868 R2854/1426/22, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 10 February 1940;
CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 3821, Tirana, Pannwitz, 4 June 1940.
39. Lefter Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle: A Brief Survey of the History of
the National Liberation War of the Albanian People, 1941–1945 (Tirana: Naim Frashëri,
1966), p. 9; WO 204/9529, Various Files, Italian in¶uence in Albania; Derek Hall,
Albania and the Albanians (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 105.
40. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 620, Tirana, Pannwitz, 10 July 1939; FO
371/23715 R5204/1335/90, Athens, Palairet, 17 June 1939.
41. FO 371/23715 R5417/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 26 June 1939.
42. FO 371/24868 R5906/1426/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 29 April 1940.
43. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 254.
44. FO 371/24868 R1426/1426/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 19 January 1940.
45. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 93.
46. Ibid., pp. 69, 254.
47. Ibid., pp. 69–70.
48. Ibid., p. 112.
49. FO 371/23715 R5266/1335/90, Athens, Palairet, 28 June 1939, and FO
371/23715 R5416/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 24 June 1939.
294 Notes to pages 72–77

50. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 33, Tirana, Pannwitz, 20 August 1939; FO
371/23715 R6599/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 17 August 1939, FO 371/23715
R6621/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble, 18 August 1939, FO 371/23715 R6625/1335/90,
Durrës, Gamble, 20 August 1939, FO 371/23715 R6738/1335/90, Durrës, Gamble,
Conversation with Greek Minister, 23 August 1939, FO 371/23715 R6846/1335/90,
Durrës, Gamble, 23 August 1939, and FO 371/23715 R8916/1335/90, Durrës, Gam-
ble, 11 October 1939.
51. FO 371/24866 R4452/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 1 April 1940.
52. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 254; FO 371/24868 R6153/6153/90, Rome,
Loraine, 19 May 1940.
53. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 421, Tirana, Pannwitz, 20 June 1940.
54. DDI, 9th Series, Vol. 5, No. 139, p. 122.
55. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 106–107.
56. Ibid., pp. 169–170.
57. Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan
Identity (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 207.
58. Ibid., p. 170.
59. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 657, Berlin, 13 August 1940.
60. FO 371/29843 R399/138/19, Athens, Palairet, Report on Greek White
Book, 20 December 1940.
61. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 283. For more on the Italian invasion of Corfu
in 1923, see Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, pp. 5–6, 18, 48; and James Barros,
The Corfu Incident of 1923 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).
62. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 171; Robert Lee Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time
(New York: Norton, 1967). p. 148.
63. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 283.
64. Ibid., p. 284.
65. DDI 9th Series, Vol. 5, No. 442, 443, pp. 424–426.
66. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 176.
67. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 300.
68. DDI 9th Series, Vol. 5, Nos. 443, 642.
69. Pietro Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War (London: Oxford University
Press, 1948), p. 27; Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 301.
70. Jacomoni, La polìtica dell’Italia in Albanìa, p. 346.
71. DDI 9th series, Vol. 5, No. 728, pp. 700–701; Knox, “Fascist Italy Assesses Its
Enemies, 1935–1940,” in Ernest May, ed., Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment
between the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 361.
72. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 233; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed,
p. 212.
73. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 303–304.
74. FO 371/29843 R399/138/19, Athens, Palairet, 20 December 1940.
75. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 212.
76. Hanson W. Baldwin, The Crucial Years, 1939–1941 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1976), p. 188. For an extensive account of the Italian invasion of Greece, see
Mario Cervi, The Hollow Legions: Mussolini’s Blunder in Greece, 1940–1941 (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971).
Notes to pages 77–80 295

77. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 233.

78. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 233.
79. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 751.
80. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 1 (Lon-
don: H. M. Stationary Of¤ce, 1979), p. 376.
81. Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History (New York: Holt,
1989), p. 143.
82. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 318.
83. Ibid., p. 328.
84. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 269–270.
85. WO 208/691, Cables from British Military Mission in Athens, 0200 to War
Of¤ce, 7 February 1941; Baldwin, The Crucial Years, p. 270.
86. Cervi, The Hollow Legions, p. xxiv.
87. Hitler e Mussolini: Lettere e documenti (Milan: Rizzoli, 1946), pp. 11–19;
Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 307.
88. See Bernd J. Fischer, “Albania and the Italian Invasion of Greece, October
1940,” in Greece and the War in the Balkans, 1940–1941 (Thessaloníki, Institute for
Balkan Studies, 1992).
89. WO 208/62, War Of¤ce Report on Albania, Armed Forces; Stefanaq Pollo
and Arben Puto, The History of Albania: From Its Origins to the Present Day (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 227; FO 371/29940 R6219/218/22, BBC Com-
municated, Benito Mussolini Speech, 17 June 1941.
90. FO 371/29940 R6219/218/22, BBC Communicated, Benito Mussolini
Speech, 17 June 1941.
91. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2159, Rome, 27 November 1940; Badoglio, Italy
in the Second World War, p. 28; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 233.
92. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 227.
93. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, Maitland Report, 21 Decem-
ber 1940.
94. The Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the
Party of Labor of Albania, History of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirana: Naim
Frashëri, 1971), p. 76. This book and other similar material make much of the aid that
Albanian communists gave to the Greek military.
95. Laird Archer, Athens Journal, 1940–1941 (Manhattan, Kans.: MA/AH Pub-
lishing, 1983), pp. 9–10; John Bitzes, Greece in World War II to 1941 (Omaha: University
of Nebraska Press, 1981) p. 94.
96. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, Maitland Report, 21 Decem-
ber 1940.
97. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, Maitland Report, 21 Decem-
ber 1940, and FO 371/24868 R6153/6153/90, Rome, Loraine, 19 May 1940.
98. FO 371/24868 R8924/6586/90, Athens, Palairet, 14 December 1940, and
FO 371/29711 R111/111/90, Athens, Palairet, 21 December 1940.
99. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, 21 December 1940.
100. FO 371/29710 R47/47/90, Cummings, BBC, Dixon Margin Note, 16
December 1940.
101. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, 21 December 1940.
296 Notes to pages 80–85

102. CGR, roll T120/5580, Tirana, Pannwitz, 19 April 1941.

103. FO 371/29712 R442/149/90, Athens, Palairet, 21 December 1940, and FO
371/29710 R47/47/90, Cummings, BBC, 16 December 1940; Archer, Athens Journal,
p. 34.
104. Archer, Athens Journal, p. 34.
105. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 319.
106. WO 208, 691 dispatch 1508, to Commander in Chief, Middle East, 1
February 1941.
107. FO 371/29924 R29/28/22, Madrid, Hoare, 28 December 1940, FO
371/29924 R72/28/22, Berne, F. Savery, 30 December 1940, FO 371/29924
R148/28/22, Belgrade, Campbell, 4 January 1941, and FO 371/29924 R518/28/22,
Bucharest, 30 November 1940.
108. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 316.
109. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 232.
110. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 340.
111. Ibid., p. 314; Badoglio, Italy in the Second World War, p. 30.
112. Bernhard Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien, 1943–1944: Die Aus-
wirkungen der Besetzung und die innenpolitische Entwicklung des Landes” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Bochum, 1981), pp. 89–90.
113. CIR, roll T821/207, Comando Superiore Forze Armate Albania, uf¤cio
operazioni, 4 December 1940.
114. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2159, Rome, Rinteln, 27 November 1940.
115. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 232.
116. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 273.
117. Charles B. Burdick, “Operation Cyclamen: Germany and Albania, 1940–
1941,” Journal of Central European Affairs 19 (1959/1960); Kühmel, “Deutschland und
Albanien,” p. 91.
118. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.
289–290.
119. CGR, roll T120/1299, Tirana, Peiffer, 3 May 1941.
120. Population ¤gures are very dif¤cult to determine because Serbian ¤gures
are unreliable. The ¤gures quoted here come from Skendi, Albania, p. 18, and Sjöberg,
Rural Change and Development in Albania, p. 34.
121. CGR, roll T120/5580, Tirana, Peiffer, 19 April 1941.
122. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 93.
123. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 133, Tirana, Schliep, 3 March 1944, and CGR,
roll T120/340, Nr. 263, Tirana, Schliep, 22 April 1944; Barbara Jelavich, History of
the Balkans, Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.
257.
124. OSS, Research and Analysis, No. 968, A Pocket Guide to Albania, 6 July
1943; see also Michael Schmidt-Neke, “Geschichtliche Grundlagen,” in Klaus-Detlev
Grothusen ed., Südosteuropa-Handbuch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1993),
vol. 7, Albanien, p. 51.
125. WO 204/9558, H. Hodgkinson Report, July 1944; Schmidt-Neke, En-
tstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 333.
Notes to pages 86–93 297

126. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3081, Rome, 26 November 1941.

127. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 93.
128. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 21, Tirana, 13 November 1941.
129. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3018, Rome, 21 November 1941.
130. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 403; CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3170, Rome,
24 November 1941.
131. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3170, Rome, 24 November 1940.
132. FO 371/33116 R8171/1335/900, Berne, Censored Letter to Edith Dur-
ham, 30 October 1942.
133. Alex Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, The Saga of Kosovo: Focus on Serb-
ian-Albanian Relations (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 123;
CGR, roll T501/258, Abschlussbericht fur Albanien, and CGR, roll T120/340, Nr.
246, Fuschl, Neubacher, 25 April 1944.
134. Malcom, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 292.
135. Sabrina P. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning
of the Great Transformation (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 175. An
interesting report called “The Expulsion of the Albanians” on Serbian policy in Kosova
was drawn up by Professor Vaso Cubrilovic in 1937 and presented to the government
of Milan Stoyadinovic.
136. Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe, p. 175.
137. WO 204/9558, Hodgkinson Report, July 1944 and War Of¤ce objections
to Hodgkinson’s conclusions.
138. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 228.

Chapter Four: Italian Repression and the Beginning of Resistance

1. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 620, Tirana, Pannwitz, 10 July 1939.

2. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 157.
3. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 48, Tirana, Pannwitz, 20 January 1940; FO
371/24866 R784/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 9 January 1940.
4. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 254.
5. CGR, roll T120/5580, Nr. 624, Tirana, Pannwitz, 16 July 1941.
6. FO 371/23715 R4530/90, Durrës, Ryan, 25 May 1939.
7. FO 371/23715 R12113/1335/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 20 December 1939.
8. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 3821, Tirana, Pannwitz, 4 June 1940.
9. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 287, Tirana, Pannwitz, 20 April 1940.
10. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 92–93.
11. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 23, Rome, Pfeiffer, 17 November 1941.
12. Kühmel, Deutschland und Albanien, p. 46.
13. See chapter 2.
14. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, p. 304; Pano, The
People’s Republic of Albania, p. 13; Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 226.
15. Raymond Hutchings, “Albania’s Inter-war History as a Forerunner to the
298 Notes to pages 93–101

Communist Period,” in Tom Winnifrith, ed., Perspectives on Albania (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 118.
16. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 67.
17. FO 371/24868 R2855/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 15 February 1940.
18. FO 371/24866 R5903/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 27 April 1940.
19. FO 371/24868 R2855/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 15 February 1940.
20. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 1172, Rome, Pfeiffer, 16 September 1942.
21. FO 371/24868 R4454/1426/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 2 April 1940, and
FO 371/24866 R5807/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 4 May 1940.
22. Ramadan Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians (London: C. Hurst, 1975), p. 42.
23. FO 371/24868 R2855/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 15 February 1940.
24. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 41g/41, Tirana, Pannwitz, 16 October 1941.
25. CGR, roll T120/1299, Rome, Pfeiffer, 4 June 1941.
26. Ibid.
27. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 41g/41, Tirana, Pannwitz, 16 October 1941.
28. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, pp. 729–730; Skendi, Albania, p. 152;
WO 204/9558, Hodgkinson Report, July 1944.
29. Nicholas J. Costa, Albania: A European Enigma (Boulder, Colo.: East Euro-
pean Monographs and Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 44–45.
30. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1646, Berlin, Steengracht, 21 August 1943, and
Nr. 185, Rome, Mackensen, 10 May 1939.
31. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 64.
32. Ibid.,p. 81.
33. FO 371/23715 R5204/1335/90, Athens, Palairet, 17 June 1939.
34. FO 371/24866 R783/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 30 December 1939.
35. Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 67.
36. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 202–203.
37. FO 371/24866 R1636/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 3 February 1940,
and FO 371/24866 R2020/503/90; Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 6 February 1940; Kasneci,
Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 13.
38. FO 371/24866 R2020/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 6 February 1940.
39. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 40.
40. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 287, Tirana, Pannwitz, 20 April 1940; FO
371/24866 R6993/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 12 August 1940; WO 204/9558,
Hodgkinson Report, July 1944.
41. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 13.
42. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 38.
43. Ibid.
44. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 226.
45. Ibid., p. 227; Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 48.
46. FO 371/24866 R6271/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 14 May 1940.
47. WO 204/9477, Military Report on Albania, 24 September 1941.
48. Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania (Tirana: 8 Nëntori,
1982), p. 25.
49. FO 371 24866 R6891/507/90, Manchester Guardian, 11 August 1940.
Notes to pages 102–8 299

50. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 52–55.

51. Elizabeth Wiskemann, “Albania, 1939–1945,” in A. and V. Toynbee, eds.,
Hitler’s Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 674.
52. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 353.
53. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 43.
54. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2159, Rome, Rintelen, 27 November 1940;
Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 106.
55. Reginald Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory
(London: Pinter, 1991), p. 31; Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 23.
56. For more on this, see Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 30;
and FO 371/24866 R7677/503/90, Broad, Ministry of Economic Warfare, 13 Septem-
ber 1940, and FO 371/24867 R8992/503/90, Broad, Ministry of Economic Warfare,
19 December 1940.
57. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 105–114.
58. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
59. For more on Kupi, see Bernd J. Fischer, “Abaz Kupi and British Intelligence,”
in John Morison, ed., Eastern Europe and the West (London: Macmillan, 1992); and FO
371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
60. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
61. FO 371/24866, Section P Memorandum, 25 August 1940. Richard Clogg
mentions that a Greek doctor was caught smuggling dynamite into Albania for SOE
in July 1940. See Richard Clogg, “The Special Operations Executive in Greece,” in
John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, N.H.: University
Press of New England, 1981), p. 110.
62. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 54.
63. As quoted in Basil Kondis, “A British Attempt to Organize a Revolt in
Northern Albania during the Greek-Italian War,” in Greece and the War in the Balkans,
1940–1941 (Thessaloníki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1992), p. 114.
64. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 294–296.
65. FO 371/24868 R6817/6586/90, FO Minute, 12 July 1940.
66. FO 434/6 R6606/6606/90, Durrës, Ryan, 16 August 1939.
67. FO 371/24868 R8270/6586/90, Ryan Conversation with Zog, 8 November
1940, FO 371/24868 R6817/6586/90, FO Minute, and FO 371/24868 R8270/6586/90,
Athens, 4 November 1940, 23 November 1940; Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollabora-
tion in Albanien,” p. 61.
68. For more on SOE, see David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance,
1940–1945: A Survey of the Special Operations Executive (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1980); and Elizabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second
World War (London: Macmillan, 1976).
69. Kondis, “A British Attempt to Organize a Revolt in Northern Albania
during the Greek-Italian War,” p. 115.
70. FO 371/29714 R1804/187/90, Athens, Palairet, 25 February 1941; Bernd J.
Fischer, “Albania and the Italian Invasion of Greece,” p. 100.
71. FO 371/24868 R8270/6586/90, Athens, 4 November 1940, and 23 Novem-
ber 1940.
300 Notes to pages 108–17

72. FO 371/24868 R8639/6586/90, Dixon Minute, 26 November 1940, and

Broad Minute, 23 November 1940.
73. Robyns, Geraldine of the Albanians, p. 121.
74. Conversations with Queen Geraldine, July 1981, Costa del Sol, Spain.
75. FO 371/24868 R8639/6586/90, Cairo, 29 November 1940, and Belgrade, 4
December 1940.
76. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 53.
77. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 46.
78. FO 371/24868 R8639/6586/90, FO Minute, 11 December 1940.
79. FO 371/29711 R2906/111/90, Belgrade, Campbell, 22 March 1941.
80. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 24.
81. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945; Barker,
British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 54; Hibbert, Albania’s
National Liberation Struggle, p. 46.
82. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
83. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 79.
84. Nicholas Costa, “Invasion—Action and Reaction: Albania, a Case Study,” in
East European Quarterly 10, no. 1 (spring 1976), p. 59.
85. New York Times, 28 October 1941.
86. FO 371/24868 R2855/1426/90, Durrës, 15 February 1940.
87. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 81.
88. FO 371/23715 R5419 1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, 27 June 1939.
89. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 62.
90. CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 620, Tirana, Pannwitz, 10 July 1939.
91. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 26.
92. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 13.
93. FO 371/33116 R4917/3592/90, Censorship, 25 July 1942.
94. FO 371/33116, Political Memorandum, Source: Albanian Legation in Istan-
bul, 15 November 1942.
95. OSS, Research and Analysis, No. 1202, Albanian Gauleiters, Quislings, and
Traitors.
96. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 3158, Rome, Mackensen, 4 December 1941.
97. FO 371/24866 R2018/503/90, Durrës, Grafftey-Smith, 26 January 1940.
98. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 366.
99. An uncle of Zog’s, Esad Pasha played a signi¤cant, yet entirely self-serving,
role in the early years of the new state. He was assassinated in Paris in 1920 by Avni
Rustemi, who was later assassinated on the orders of Zog.
100. FO 371/10654 753/48/43, Durrës, Eyres, 31 December 1924.
101. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 405.
102. Ibid., pp. 421–423.
103. Ibid., p. 449.
104. Ibid., p. 481.
105. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 107.
106. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 118, Tirana, Schliep, 30 January 1942.
107. Ibid.
108. Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 70.
Notes to pages 121–31 301

Chapter Five: The Growth of Resistance and the Collapse of Italy

1. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2159, Rome, Rintelen, 27 November 1940; Kühmel,
Deutschland und Albanien, p. 106.
2. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 11–12.
3. Nicholas C. Pano, “Albania,” in Joseph Held ed., The Columbia History of
Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
pp. 28–29.
4. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, pp. 226–229.
5. Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 218.
6. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, pp. 72–76;
Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 229.
7. Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 217.
8. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 16–17.
9. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 82.
10. Skendi, Albania, p. 19.
11. Costa, “Invasion—Action and Reaction: Albania, a Case Study,” p. 61.
12. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, p. 43.
13. Peter R. Prifti, “The Labor Party of Albania,” in Stephen Fischer-Galati,
Communist Parties of Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 17.
14. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 13.
15. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 72.
16. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 230.
17. Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 219.
18. Peters, “Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania,” p. 281.
19. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 99.
20. Ibid., pp. 118–119.
21. Ibid., p. 97.
22. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 795.
23. Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, p. 302.
24. CGR, roll T120/296, Nr. 986, Tirana, 2 October 1941.
25. CGR, roll T120/296, Nr. 986, Tirana, 2 October 1941.
26. CGR, roll T120/5580, Nr. 385, Rome, 23 March 1942.
27. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 1172, Rome, 16 September 1942, and CGR, roll
T120/5580, Nr. 385, Rome, 23 March 1942.
28. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 21.
29. Ibid.
30. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 71–77.
31. There is some disagreement concerning this point. Neuwirth quotes an
Italian source that seems to indicate that Mehdi Frashëri had in¶uence in the creation
of the nationalist group, the BK. See Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in
Albanien,” p. 102.
32. FO 371/43549 R17877/39/G39, Rice, 12 January 1944.
33. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 124.
34. Ibid., p.125.
35. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 25.
302 Notes to pages 132–42

36. Ibid., p. 27.

37. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 73.
38. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 129.
39. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 20.
40. Neuwirth mentions some shadowy nationalist organizations, such as “Oso
Shqipnija,” that distributed anticommunist lea¶ets under the appreciative eye of the
Italians. See Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 96–97.
41. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 131.
42. Milovan Djilas, Rise and Fall (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985),
p. 4.
43. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 56–57, and for a complete text of
both plans, see page 570.
44. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 21.
45. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 60.
46. Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 213; Neuwirth, “Widerstand und
Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 162–163.
47. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 111.
48. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 58.
49. Pano, “Albania,” p. 31.
50. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 41.
51. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 133.
52. FO 371/33108 R9044/184/90, FO Minute, 29 December 1942.
53. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1, Tirana, Wegner, 3 January 1943.
54. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 529, Rome, Bismarck, 3 February 1943, and CGR
roll T120/340, Nr. 703, Rome, Mackensen, 13 February 1943.
55. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 156;
Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, pp. 38–39.
56. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 41; Hibbert, Albania’s National Lib-
eration Struggle, p. 23.
57. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 455–571.
58. Ibid., p. 455.
59. Ibid., p. 521.
60. Ibid., p. 571.
61. CGR, roll T120/324, Nr. 1172, Rome, 16 September 1942.
62. Ibid.
63. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 234.
64. CIR, roll T821/250, Comando Supremo, 2 March 1943.
65. Ibid.
66. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, p. 555.
67. Ibid., p. 570.
68. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 180–185.
69. Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, pp. 577–578.
70. Ibid., p. 578.
71. Ibid., p. 579.
72. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1285, Rome, Mackensen, 2 May 1943.
73. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2031, Rome, Mackensen, 19 March 1943.
Notes to pages 142–47 303

74. CIR, roll T821/128, Pariani Letter to Mussolini, 11 March 1943.

75. WO 204/9440, War Establishment General Policy, September 1943; Pollo
and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 233.
76. Wiskemann, “Albania, 1939–1945,” p. 676.
77. BK survivors and their supporters deny its existence. Neuwirth is skeptical
but considers the existence of such an agreement likely. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und
Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 118–119.
78. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 140.
79. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 234.
80. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1285, Rome, Mackensen, 2 May 1943.
81. FO 371/37144 R1465/1067/90, Reuters Agency Communicated, 13 May
1943.
82. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 2273, Rome, Mackensen, 15 May 1943; FO 37144
R1463/1067/90, Reuters Agency Communicated, 13 May 1943.
83. FO 371/34144 R9236, FO Research, Review of Foreign Press, 14 September
1943.
84. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 25.
85. FO 371/33113 R2125/2125/90, FO Minute, Dixon, March 30 1942.
86. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 31.
87. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 39.
88. The declaration provoked a violent reaction from vice-premier M. Can-
ellopoulos, the representative of the Greek government in exile in Cairo. Canellopoulos
argued that the declaration was a mortal blow to the Greek government’s authority and
prestige. He was just restrained from resigning. Eden, in exasperation, minuted that
“this young man needs spanking.” See FO 371/33108 R8608/184/90, FO Minute, 15
December 1943; Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p.
176; Arben Puto, From the Annals of British Diplomacy: The Anti-Albanian Plans of Great
Britain during the Second World War according to Foreign Of¤ce Documents of 1939–1944
(Tirana: 8 Nëntori), pp. 88–91; and CAB 66 WP 42 (555).
89. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 40.
90. Ibid., p. 41.
91. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 25.
92. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 174.
93. David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945, pp. 104–105.
94. For a worldwide breakdown of subversive operations, see Stafford, Britain
and European Resistance, 1940–1945, pp. 89–90.
95. Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (London: I. B. Taurus,
1995), p. 153.
96. SOE changed names a number of times: Force 133, 266, 299, and so on. The
cover for the Middle East branch of SOE was MO4; see David Smiley, Albanian
Assignment (London: Chatto Press, 1984), p. 7.
97. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 35.
98. Amery, Approach March, p. 328.
99. As elsewhere in the Balkans, resistance in Greece was split between commu-
nists (EAM) and the nationalist (EDES). For a good brief description, see Stavrianos,
The Balkans since 1453, pp. 785–795.
304 Notes to pages 147–58

100. FO 371/43550 R/7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944; Smiley,

Albanian Assignment, pp. 11–13, 29.
101. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 27.
102. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 53.
103. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 52.
104. The Institute of Marxist Leninist Studies’s History of the Party of Labor
maintains that the ¤rst brigade consisted of 800 ¤ghters, Krasneci 500, and the British
about 150.
105. Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 52.
106. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 36.
107. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 48–49.
108. Ibid., p. 53.
109. FO 371/43549 R1787/39/G39, Rice to FO, 12 January 1944.
110. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 53–54.
111. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, The History of the Party of Labor, pp.
165–166.
112. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, p. 51; Hibbert, Albania’s National
Liberation Struggle, p. 56.
113. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945;
Wiskemann, “Albania, 1939–1945,” p. 676.
114. Pano, “Albania,” pp. 31–32; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 110;
Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste–Leniniste Pranë KQ të PPSH, Historia e Luftës Anti-
fashiste Nacionalçlirimtare të popullit shqiptar, vols. 1–4 (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1986–1989),
vol. 1, pp. 502ff.
115. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, The History of the Party of Labor, p.
167; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 114–115.
116. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, The History of the Party of Labor, p.
166; Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 236.
117. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 25.
118. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 56–57.
119. Ibid., p. 59.
120. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 114.
121. OSS, 154, box 14, Harry Fultz report to Philip Adams, 24 February 1944.
122. Nicholas C. Pano, “The Last Bastion of Stalinism,” in Milorad
Drachkovitch, ed., East Central Europe: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (Stanford, Calif.:
Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 193.

Chapter Six: The German Invasion and the Construction of a German

Albania

1. For more on Prince Wied, see Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability
in Albania, pp. 7–10.
2. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 79.
3. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 244–246.
Notes to pages 158–63 305

4. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 82.

5. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, p. 270.
6. Pano, “Albania: The Last Bastion of Stalinism,” p. 195; Kühmel, “Deutschland
und Albanien,” p. 126; Wolf, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 249.
7. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 126.
8. Paul Leverkühn, German Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld and Nich-
olson, 1954), p. 152.
9. Martin Seckendorf, Die Okkupationspolitik des deutschen Faschismus in
Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Albanien, Italien und Ungarn, 1941–1945 (Berlin: Hüthig
Verlagsgemeinschaft, 1992), p. 77; Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Al-
banien,” p. 139.
10. Pannwitz was ¤nally replaced on the repeated insistence of Ciano. Pannwitz,
like so many other Westerners to come in contact with Albania, had essentially “gone
native.” He was certainly not the only diplomat to do so. The U.S. representative
Charles C. Hart is another example.
11. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 126.
12. Christoph Stamm, “Zur deutschen Besetzung Albanien, 1943–1944,”
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2 (1981), p. 102.
13. Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, 1940–1945: Bericht eines
¶iegenden Diplomaten (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956), p. 105.
14. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 128.
15. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 4193, Tirana, Schliep to Ribbentrop, 23 August
1943, and CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 4193, Wolfschanze, Sonnleithner, 1 September
1943, and Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 141.
16. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1250, RAM to Schliep, 21 August 1943. A similar
occupation strategy had already been implemented by both the Germans and the
Italians, with varying degrees of success, in much of the rest of Europe.
17. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 4893, Tirana, Schliep to RAM, 23 August 1943.
18. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 942, Tirana, Neubacher, 12 September 1943.
19. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 106.
20. Neuwirth presents a good brief overview of the German command structure
in the Balkans. Weichs was the principal military commander, commanding Army
Group F. Subordinate to Weichs was Army Group E, commanded by Alexander Löhr
in Thessaloníki, whose responsibility included Greece and Serbia, and the Second
Panzer Army under Lothar Rendulic in Belgrade, whose responsibility included
Croatia, Montenegro, and Albania. Weichs also directed the activities of various mili-
tary representatives, including the “German General in Albania.” Neuwirth,
“Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 140–141.
21. Albanian sources say seventy thousand German troops participated in the
invasion, although this estimate is certainly too high.
22. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 151–152.
23. FO 371/43553 73862, B8/1/264, SOE Report, 24 August 1944.
24. Martin Clark, Modern Italy, 1871–1982 (London: Longman, 1984), pp.
303–304.
25. FO 371/37144, SOE Report, Nr. 60, 16 September 1943.
26. FO 371/43553 B8/1/277, SOE Report, 26 August 1944.
306 Notes to pages 163–69

27. Ibid.
28. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 173;
Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 237; WO 9529, Report, Italian In¶uence in
Albania, April 1945; Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 60.
29. FO 371/43553 73862, B8/1/264, SOE Report, 24 August 1944.
30. FO 371/43553 73862, B8/1/277, SOE Report, 26 August 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 157.
31. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
32. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (New York: Time, 1964), p. 383.
33. WO 9529 B8/14/PL/302, Report on Italian Troops in Albania, 26 February
1944.
34. WO 9529 B8/14/PL/302, Report on Italian Troops in Albania, 26 February
1944, Report on Italians in Albania, 21 December 1944, and Report on Italian
In¶uence in Albania, April 1945.
35. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May
1944.
36. CGR, roll T120/340. Nr. 942, Belgrade, Neubacher, 12 September 1943.
37. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
38. WO 204/9529, Report on Italian In¶uence in Albania, April 1945.
39. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 106.
40. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Nr. 1475, Survey on Albania, p. 20,
December 1943; Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State
Power, p. 50.
41. FO 371/43553 B8/1/277, SOE Report, 26 August 1944.
42. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 108; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Al-
banien,” p. 80; CGR, roll T120/313, Nr. 652, Tirana, Pannwitz, 13 September 1940.
43. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 418.
44. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May
1944.
45. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May,
1944, and FO 371/33108 R8770/184/980, 21 December 1942.
46. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 50.
47. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 110.
48. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania, and CGR, roll
T120/340, Nr. 1000, Belgrade, Neubacher, 23 September 1943.
49. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 166–167.
50. Ibid., p. 164.
51. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 942, Belgrade, Neubacher, 12 September 1943;
Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945, pp. 146–147.
52. For more on this, see Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 168–170.
53. Hagen Fleischer, “Kollaboration und deutsche Politik im besetzten
Griechenland,” in Werner Röhr, ed., Europa unterm Hakenkreuz: Okkupation und
Kollaboration (1938–1945), p. 387.
54. Pariani was quickly sent by Badoglio to assume the rather sensitive position
of Italian ambassador in Berlin.
55. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 33, Tirana, Schliep, 10 September 1943.
Notes to pages 169–77 307

56. OSS, Research and Analysis, Nr. 1475, The Problem of Albania, 20 Decem-
ber 1943.
57. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 109.
58. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1466, Westfalen, BRAM, 19 September 1943;
Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 173.
59. Schmidt-Neke, “Geschichtliche Grundlagen,” p. 55.
60. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 110.
61. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 194.
62. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Nr. 1475, The Problem of Albania, 20
December 1943.
63. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 192.
64. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 51.
65. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 333.
66. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, pp. 120–121.
67. CGR, roll T120/340, Rome, Ritter, 11 September 1943.
68. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 113.
69. Ibid., p. 112.
70. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, p. 54
71. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
72. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, pp.
345–346; CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 9, Tirana, Scheiger, 9 November 1943.
73. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 198; CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 755,
Rome, Moellhausen, 8 December 1943.
74. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 9, Tirana, Scheiger, 9 November 1943; Bashkimi i
Kombit, 8 February, 1944.
75. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May,
1944; OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Nr. 2500.1, German Military Government
over Europe, Albania, 1 December 1944.
76. Peter Kemp, No Colours, No Crest (London: Cassell, 1958), p. 131; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 206.
77. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 53.
78. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 200–201.
79. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 64.
80. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 179, Tirana, Schliep, 24 November 1943.
81. CGR, roll T120/340, Berlin, Vermerk, 28 November 1943.
82. CGR, roll T120/340, Belgrade, Neubacher, 6 March 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 394–396.
83. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 144, Tirana, Schliep, 8 November 1943, and Nr.
365, Belgrade, Neubacher, 18 February, 1944.
84. FO 371/43550 R7779/38/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
85. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
86. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 456.
87. FO 371/43550 R7779/38/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
88. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 212–213, 345; CGR, T120/340,
Nr. 88, Tirana, Schliep, 16 October 1943. Money was requested for ¤fty-seven thou-
sand troops, but some for troops outside of Albania.
308 Notes to pages 177–86

89. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 313.

90. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 23, Rome, Ritter, 16 September 1943; FO 371
48093 R744/361/6/90, OSS report, 21 December 1944.
91. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 227–228.
92. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 229.
93. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 247–248. M. Kaser quotes a lower
¤gure of just over 200 million Albanian francs using Albanian socialist sources. See
Kaser, “Economic System,” p.299.
94. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 249.
95. Ibid., p. 326.
96. Ibid., p. 329.
97. Ibid., p. 317.
98. Ibid., p. 238.
99. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1060, Belgrade, Neubacher, 30 September 1943.
100. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
101. Ibid.
102. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 341.
103. Stamm, “Zur deutschen Besetzung Albaniens,” p. 114.
104. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 330–336.
105. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. FO 371/43550 R7779/38/G90 FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
109. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 214.
110. Bernd J. Fischer, “German Political Policy in Albania, 1943–1944,” in
Richard Spence and Linda Nelson, eds., Scholar, Patriot, Mentor: Historical Essays in
Honor of Dimitrije Djordjevic (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1992), p.
226; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 220.
111. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
112. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 220.
113. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 941, Belgrade, Neubacher, 2 September 1943.
114. FO 371/43550 R7779/38/G90, FO Minute, Bawker to Howard, 9 May
1944.
115. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1490, Belgrade, Ringelmann, 9 December 1943.
116. Ibid.; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 220.
117. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania, and roll
T120/340, Nr. 1702, Sonderzug for Neubacher, 25 October 1943.
118. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 303–305.
119. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 116.
120. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Nr. 2500.1, German Military Gov-
ernment over Europe, Albania, 1 December 1944; Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p.
116; Fischer, “German Political Policy in Albania,” p. 227.
121. Stamm, “Zur deutschen Besetzung Albaniens,” p. 111.
122. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945; Samuel W.
Notes to pages 186–91 309

Mitcham, Jr., Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle, World War II (New York:
Dorset Press, 1985), pp. 461–462.
123. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 452.
124. Ibid., p. 205.
125. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
126. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 786.
127. Although many Albanians from Kosova seem to have been transported to
Germany for work, reliable ¤gures are unavailable.
128. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
129. Ibid.; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 504.
130. Illyria, 6–8 February 1995; and see WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos
July 1944–February 1945, for material on Jewish refugees from Yugoslavia in Korça.
131. For more on the Jewish experience in Albania, see Katherine Morris, ed.,
Escape through the Balkans: The Autobiography of Irene Grünbaum (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996); and Harvey Sarner, Rescue in Albania (Cathedral City, Calif.:
Brunswick Press, 1997). The ¤rst of these two accounts leaves the reader with the
impression that the war had a limited impact on the lives of many urban Albanians.
132. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 504.
133. Ibid., pp. 421–422.
134. Ibid., p. 448.
135. Robert T. Brewer, “Albania: New Aspects, Old Documents,” East European
Quarterly 26, no. 1 (March 1992), p. 34; FO 371/43549 R39/39/G90, Steel to South-
ern Department, 24 December 1943.

Chapter Seven: Resistance to the Germans

1. Logoreci, The Albanians, pp. 76–77; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,”

pp. 155–156.
2. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945, p. 171.
3. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 108.
4. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 124; CGR, roll T120/340, Tirana,
Neubacher, 8 October 1943.
5. Fischer, “Abaz Kupi and British Intelligence in Albania,” p. 131; Hibbert,
Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 61.
6. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 52.
7. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 125; Schmidt-Neke,
“Geschichtliche Grundlagen,” p. 55.
8. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 49, Tirana, Neubacher, 25 September 1943.
9. FO 371/43549 R63/39/G90, Cairo, Lord Killian, 1 January 1944. This cen-
tral council order was con¤rmed at the ¤rst BK Congress in Berat in January 1944. See
Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 161.
10. Fischer, “German Political Policy in Albania,” pp. 228–229.
11. FO 371/43549 R1718/39/G90, 22 January 1944, and FO 371/43549
R7167/39/G90, 7 February 1944.
310 Notes to pages 191–200

12. FO 371/43553 B8/1/277, SOE Report, 26 August 1944.

13. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
14. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 169–170.
15. FO 371/43550 R4244/39/G90, 1 March 1944.
16. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 148, Tirana, Schliep, 9 November 1943; FO
371/43551 R12381/39/G90, 1 August 1944.
17. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 257–262.
18. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
19. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 88, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 16 October
1944; FO 371/43553 R14615/39/G90, 24 August 1944.
20. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
21. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 100.
22. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 148, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 9 November
1944; FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
23. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 63.
24. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 148, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 9 November
1943; FO 371/48079, R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
25. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 148, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 9 November
1943.
26. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 165, Tirana, Schliep, 13 November 1943.
27. FO 371/43553, B8/1/264, SOE Report, 24 August 1944.
28. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 267–269.
29. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 80.
30. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
31. FO 371/43550 R3684/39/G90, SOE Review, 19 February 1944.
32. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 81.
33. Völkischer Beobachter, 18 April 1944.
34. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 81.
35. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” pp. 106–107.
36. FO 371/43553 B/8/1/277, SOE Report, 26 August 1944; Hibbert, Albania’s
National Liberation Struggle, p. 116.
37. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 227, Belgrade, Neubacher, 1 February 1944.
38. FO 371/45550 R3684/39/G90, SOE Review, 19 February 1944, and FO
371/43549 R1718/39/G90, SOE Report, 22 January 1944.
39. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 191.
40. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 161, Tirana, Schliep, 16 March 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 271.
41. Ibid., p. 120.
42. FO 371/43549 R1289/39/G90, Steel to Southern Department, 14 January
1944, and FO 371/43550 R2806/39/G90, Rice, 18 February 1944.
43. FO 371/43550 R3684/39/G90, SOE Review, 23 February 1944, and FO
371/43550 R4244/39/G90, SOE Review, 1 March 1944.
44. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 276–278.
45. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 120.
46. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 292–293.
Notes to pages 200–209 311

47. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 230, Tirana, Schliep, 17 April 1944.
48. FO 371/37145 R12213/1067/90, Pearson to Howard, 20 November 1943,
and FO 371/43549 R364/39/G90, Djakova Letter, 4 January 1944.
49. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 161, Tirana, Schliep, 16 March 1944, and CGR,
roll T120/340, Nr. 230, Tirana, Schliep, 17 April 1944; FO 371/43557 R279/279/90,
Holy See, Osborne, 1 January 1944.
50. FO 371/43557 R279/279/90, Rose Minute, 1 January 1944.
51. WO 204/9453, Brocklehurst’s Report, April 1944, and Hibbert, Albania’s
National Liberation Struggle, p. 121.
52. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 113.
53. FO 371/37145 R10812/1067/G90, Boxhall to Rose, 28 October 1943.
54. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945, p. 170.
55. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 178.
56. FO 371/37145 R12213/1067/G90, Pearson to Howard, 20 November 1943.
57. Ibid.
58. FO 371/37145 R12213/1067/90, Pearson to Howard, 20 November 1943;
Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 178. Neuwirth
tells us that Zogists in contemporary Albania blame Davies for their fate (see Neuwirth,
“Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 240), a position that is hardly support-
able given that British policymakers did not listen to Davies.
59. Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940–1945, p. 172; Barker, British
Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 179.
60. For more on the Concensus II mission, see Smiley, Albanian Assignment,
chap. 8.
61. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 356–357.
62. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, pp. 151–163.
63. FO 371/43550 R7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 452–453.
64. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 29.
65. OSS, 154, box 14, Fultz to Philip Adams, 24 February 1944; FO 371/43550
R7779/39/G90, Bawker to Howard, 9 May 1944.
66. FO 371/43551 R8574/39/G90, Boxhall to Rose, 24 May 1944.
67. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 146.
68. Ibid., pp. 119–122.
69. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 230, Tirana, Schliep, 17 April 1944.
70. FO 371/43550 R4283/39/G90, SOE Report, 8 March 1944.
71. FO 371/43561 R9003/1474/90, McLean on Propaganda, 7 June 1944.
72. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1619, Athens, Neubacher, 28 May 1944, and
CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
73. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, 152, maintains ¤fteen thou-
sand Germans, but Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 387, maintains that there
were fewer. Albanian socialist historians, as usual, produce the least credible ¤gures,
maintaining that in excess of ¤fty thousand Germans took part. Institute of Marxist-
Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 213.
74. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 386.
75. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 162.
312 Notes to pages 209–24

76. WO 204/9453, Brocklehurst Report, April 1944, WO 204/9558, H.

Hodgkinson report, July 1944, and WO 204/9446, Intelligence Reports, 1944–1945.
77. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945.
78. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 373.
79. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 117.
80. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 346–347.
81. Ibid., p. 392.
82. Ibid., pp. 375–376.
83. FO 371/43551 R8718/39/G90, Bari, Broad, 11 May 1944, and FO
371/43551 R9175/39/G90, Rice, 9 June 1944.
84. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 159.
85. FO 371/43551 R10289/39/G90, Bari, 28 June 1944, and FO 371/48079
R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
86. FO 371/43551 R10061/39/G90, SOE Report, 22 June 1944.
87. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 160.
88. Amery, Approach March, p. 403.
89. Smiley, Albanian Assignment, pp. 27, 152.
90. FO 371/43551 R12381/39/G90, Deakin, 1 August 1944.
91. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 333;
WO 204/9446, Intelligence Report, 1944–1945.
92. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 380.
93. Ibid.
94. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 118.
95. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 391.
96. Ibid., pp. 391–392; FO 371/43551 R12650/39/G90, Bari, Broad, 8 August
1944.
97. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 388.
98. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 180.
99. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 389–390.
100. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 189.
101. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1163, Ankara, Fusch, 1 June 1944.
102. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
103. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 403.
104. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
105. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 404.

Chapter Eight: German Retreat and the Construction of a Stalinist

Albania

1. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 410.

2. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 411.
3. Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerrilla War (London: Macmillan,
1948), p. 270.
Notes to pages 224–31 313

4. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 411.

5. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
6. Ibid.
7. Amery, Approach March, p. 382.
8. FO 371/43553 73862, B8/1/264, SOE Report, 24 August, 1944.
9. CGR, roll T120/762, Nr. S155, Tirana, 8 September 1944; Neubacher,
Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 118; Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 154;
Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 432.
10. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 414.
11. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 211.
12. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
13. Ibid.
14. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 421.
15. Ibid, pp. 422–423.
16. For text, see FO 371/43553 R14317/39/G90, Bari, 30 August 1944.
17. Neuwirth, “Widerstand und Kollaboration in Albanien,” p. 194.
18. FO 371/43553 R14412/39/G90, Bari, 14 September 1944.
19. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
20. FO 371/43553 R14412/39/G90, Bari, 14 September 1944; FO 371/43553
R15054/39/G90, Bari, 15 September 1944; Amery, Approach March, p. 385.
21. FO 371/43553 R/15054/39/G90, Bari, 15 September 1944.
22. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 203.
23. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
24. Smiley, Albanian Assignment, pp. 135–136; Hibbert, Albania’s National Lib-
eration Struggle, pp. 199–200.
25. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 206.
26. FO 371/43555 R16104/71/90, FO Minute, Eden to PM, 26 September
1944. The NLM was renamed the FNC in May 1944 in conjunction with the Congress
of Përmet, which created a national assembly and a government.
27. FO 371/43553 R15131/39/G90, Bari, 21 September 1944.
28. FO 371/48091 R269/269/90, Bari, Deakin, 14 December 1944, and FO
371/48091 R2678/269/90, FO Minute, 7 February 1945.
29. FO 371/48079 R4145/46/G90, McLean Report, 23 February 1945.
30. FO 371/43566 R16503/9513/90, Bari, 10 October 1944.
31. Amery, Approach March, p. 400.
32. Ibid., p. 403.
33. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, p. 181;
FO 371/43566 R17390/9513/90, to Bari, 28 October 1944.
34. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 201.
35. Ibid.; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 426; Amery, Sons of the Eagle,
p. 266.
36. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 429–430.
37. Ibid., p. 427; FO 371/43564 R16955/2179/90, Bari, 13 October 1944.
38. CGR, roll T120/762, Nr. s.144, Tirana, 5 September 1944, and CGR, roll
T120/762, Nr. 2151, Belgrade, Neubacher, 22 October 1944, and CGR, roll T120/762,
Nr. 2151, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 26 October 1944.
314 Notes to pages 231–38

39. CGR, roll T120/762, Tirana, Schliep to Neubacher, 26 October 1944.

40. FO 371/43554 R16502/39/G90, Bari, 18 October 1944, and FO 371/43553
R14938/39/G90, Bari, 18 September 1944.
41. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 215; and see WO
204/9486, “top secret plan for landing in Albania,” 1 October 1944.
42. Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 85; Hibbert, Albania’s National Lib-
eration Struggle, p. 215; Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, p. 346.
43. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945.
44. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
45. Ibid.; Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 430.
46. Amery, Approach March, p. 373.
47. CGR, roll T120/762, Tirana, Schliep, 31 August 1944.
48. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
49. CGR, roll T120/762, Nr. 213, Tirana, Schliep, 10 October 1944, and CGR,
roll T120/762, Nr. 233, Tirana, Gstöttenbauer, 16 October 1944; Kühmel, “Deutsch-
land und Albanien,” p. 433.
50. FO 371/43554 73862, HQ, Force 399, 10 November 1944.
51. FO 371/4356 R16733/1471/90, PWE, 18 October 1944.
52. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
53. FO 371/43561 PWE/44/24/5, PWE to BBC, 24 November 1944.
54. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 216. Some Albanian
sources claim the number to be seventy thousand, but these ¤gures probably include
reservists.
55. Brewer, “Albania: New Aspects, Old Documents,” p. 46.
56. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 215.
57. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 241.
58. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
59. Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste Pranë KQ të PPSH, Historia e
Luftës Antifashiste Nacionalçlirimtare të popullit shqiptar, vol. 4, p. 799; Enver Hoxha,
Laying the Foundations of the New Albania (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1984), p. 512; Kasneci,
Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 89; CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on
Albania.
60. Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, pp. 503–515.
61. FO 371/43554 R19192/39/G90, Bari, 22 November 1944.
62. Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste Pranë KQ të PPSH, Historia e
Luftë Antifashiste Nacionalçlirimtare të popullit shiqiptar, vol. 4, p. 807.
63. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania; FO 371/48078
R1781/46/90, Black Report, 11 January 1945.
64. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 434–435.
65. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p.438.
66. Neubacher, Sonderauftrag Südost, p. 120.
67. CGR, roll T120/340, Neubacher to Tirana, 25 April 1944, and CGR, roll
501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
68. CGR, roll T120/340, Neubacher to Tirana, 25 April 1944, and CGR, roll
T120/340, Salzburg, Neubacher to RAM, 2 May 1944.
Notes to pages 238–46 315

69. Dragnich and Todorovich, The Saga of Kosovo, pp. 140–141.

70. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945; S. Repishti,
“The Bujan Resolution,” Illyria, 14–16 February 1994.
71. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945.
72. Ibid.
73. CGR, roll T120/762, Nr. 213, Tirana, Schliep, 10 October 1944; Kühmel,
“Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 436–437.
74. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 211.
75. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 225;
Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 243; Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the
New Albania, p. 515.
76. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 212–213.
77. Lyman H. Legters, Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution, 1945–
1991 (Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1992), p. 529.
78. Vickers, The Albanians, p. 161.
79. Robyns, Geraldine of the Albanians, p. 134.
80. FO 371/43559 R1219/616/90, FO Minute, 21 January 1944.
81. WO 204/9440, War Establishment, September 1944.
82. WO 204/9428, Reports and Memos, July 1944–February 1945.
83. FO 371/37136 R1161/52/90, Chancery, Washington to Southern, 27 Janu-
ary 1943.
84. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, pp. 138–140, 235,
241, 300.
85. FO 371/37136 R93/52/90, Censorship, 18 December 1942.
86. FO 371/37136 R2783/52/90, Censorship, 18 March 1943.
87. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, p. 298.
88. FO 371/37136 R3231/52/90, FO Minute, Laskey, Zog Telegram to Peter
Kolonja, 8 April 1939.
89. FO 371/37136 R2817/52/90, Censorship, 15 March 1943.
90. FO 371/37137 R5945/52/90, Censorship, Noli to Martini, 1 July 1943.
91. FO 371/29709 R5733/390/90, Washington, 24 August 1942, FO
371/22110 R4497/867/90, Washington, 8 July 1942, and FO 371/33109
R4470/390/90, FO Minute, 3 July 1942.
92. WO 204/9440, War Establishment, September 1943.
93. FO 371/37136 R93/52/90, Censorship, 18 December 1942.
94. FO 371/29709 R4190/390/90, FO Minute, 25 June 1942.
95. FO 371/33110 R4493/867/90, Ryan Conversation with Zog, 6 July 1942.
96. FO 371/37138 R2127/61/90, FO Minute, 9 March 1943.
97. FO 371/43559 R5595/616/90, FO Minute, 8 February 1944, FO
371/43559 R7439/616/90, FO Minute, 8 May 1944, and FO 371/43559
R21222/616/90, Ryan Conversation with Zog, 12 December 1944.
98. Peters, “Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania,” p. 292.
99. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 211.
100. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 211.
101. Peters, “Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania,” p. 276.
102. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 50–51.
316 Notes to pages 247–56

103. Ibid., pp. 277–278.

104. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 63.
105. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, pp. 55–56.
106. Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and the Question of State Power, p. 74.
107. Ibid., pp. 76–77.
108. Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, p. 481.
109. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 147.
110. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 56.
111. Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, p. 476.
112. Peters, “Ingredients of the Communist Takeover in Albania,” p. 288.
113. Ibid., p. 485.
114. FO 371/43571 R17111/13194/90, Bari, 21 October 1944.
115. FO 371/43554 R20087/39/G90, Halifax, 4 December 1944.
116. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 56.
117. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 220.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Hoxha, Laying the Foundation of the New Albania, p. 5.
121. FO 371/48079 R3670/46/90, Caserta, 13 February 1945; Logoreci, The
Albanians, p. 81.
122. FO 371/48079 R3670/46/90, Caserta, 13 February 1945.
123. Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, p. 53.
124. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 70.
125. FO 371/48079 R3174/46/90, Caserta, 5 February 1945.
126. FO 371/4356 R1471/1471/90, Political Warfare Executive, 24 November
1944.
127. FO 371/48079 R1970/46/90, Bari, 13 February 1945, and FO 371/48079
R3174/46/90, Caserta, 5 February 1945.
128. Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 86.
129. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, p. 13.
130. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, p. 729. Immediately following the war,
Hoxha complicated the food situation by signi¤cantly delaying and then accepting only
limited quantities of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA) food. He was motivated by his growing hostility to the West.
131. FO 371/48081 R9255/46/90, Tirana, 29 May 1945.
132. FO 371/48078 R320/46/90, Bari, 22 December 1944.
133. FO 371/43561 R1471/1471/90, London, 24 November 1944; Peter Prifti,
Socialist Albania since 1944 (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), p. 53.
134. Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 85; Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania, p. 61.
135. FO 371/48078 R321/46/90, Bari, 22 December 1944, and FO 371/48078
R463/46/90, London, 8 January 1945.
136. Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, p. 76; Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 154.
137. FO 371/48078 R1919/46/90, Bari, 12 January 1945.
138. Prifti, “The Labor Party of Albania,” p. 8.
139. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 302.
140. As an example, see Ismail Kadare, Doruntine (New York: New Amsterdam
Notes to pages 257–68 317

Books, 1988), Chronicle in Stone (New York: New Amsterdam Books, 1987) and others.
The major theme of these books relate to with the dangers of foreign entanglements.

Conclusion

1. See chapter 1.
2. Kaser, “Economic System,” p. 299.
3. Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, p. 156.
4. CGR, roll T120/340, Nr. 1250, Wolfschantze, Ribbentrop, 21 August 1943.
5. The gold was transferred to London at the end of the war and kept by the
British, who refused to return it unless Hoxha’s government paid the ¤nes imposed by
the World Court for its role in the sinking of British vessels in the Corfu Channel. The
gold was ¤nally returned to Albania in 1996. See Illyria, 24 February 1996.
6. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 458.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp. 472–473.
9. FO 371/48078 R1781/46/90, Deakin to Howard on Views of Captain Black,
4 January 1945.
10. OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, No. 1475, Survey of Albania, 20 De-
cember 1943.
11. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 456.
12. CGR, roll T501/258, Final Wehrmacht Report on Albania.
13. Pano, “Albania: The Last Bastion of Stalinism,” p. 192.
14. Ibid.
15. Soviet historians maintain that the Albanians would not have been able to
defeat Italian and German troops in Albania. Albanian socialist historians accuse Soviet
historians of slander. As an example, see Omari, The People’s Revolution in Albania and
the Question of State Power, p. 102.
16. A good deal of controversy surrounds this question. For the Yugoslav posi-
tion, see Vladimir Dedijer, “Albania, Soviet Pawn,” Foreign Affairs 30 (1951), pp.
103–111.
17. Pano, “Albania: The Last Bastion of Stalinism,” pp. 194–195.
18. Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania, p. 497.
19. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 193 and appendix 4.
20. Hibbert, in ibid., pp. 236–238, suggests that most of those who wrote mem-
oirs—including Smiley, Amery, and Bethal—spent the war in the north among the
nationalists and saw only the nationalist perspective. Smiley argues that their efforts
were sabotaged by communists in SOE.
21. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, pp. 193, 238.
22. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” p. 473.
23. FO 371/48082 R13586/46/90, Caserta, Broad, 3 August 1945.
24. Logoreci, The Albanians, p. 83; Kasneci, Steeled in the Heat of Battle, p. 91.
25. Singleton maintains that Yugoslavia lost 1.75 million, and Stavrianos main-
tains that Greece lost 500,000. See Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New
318 Notes to pages 268–81

York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 86; and Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453,
p. 787.
26. Baldwin, The Crucial Years, p. 270.
27. Barker, British Policy in Southeast Europe in the Second World War, p. 183.
28. Illyria, 25–27 May 1995.
29. Kaser, “Economic System,” p. 298.
30. E. E. Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the
Present ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarlan, 1995), pp. 426–427.
31. Pollo and Puto, The History of Albania, p. 247.
32. OSS, ¤le 120, GB2129, 20 October 1944; Brewer, “Albania: New Aspects,
Old Documents,” pp. 32–33.
33. Brewer, “Albania: New Aspects, Old Documents,” p. 33.
34. FO 371/48078 R1781/46/90, Deakin to Howard on Views of Captain
Black, 4 January 1945.
35. FO 371/48081 R8567/46/90, Caserta, Broad, 6 May 1945.
36. WO 204/9471, Termination of Military Liaison in Albania, 5 July 1945; FO
371/48096 R1147/1101/90, Caserta, MacMillian, 15 January 1945.
37. Vickers, The Albanians, pp. 166–167.
38. Shyqri Ballvora, “Die Kriegsschaden Albaniens, 1939–1944,”
Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa 20, no. 1/2 (1981), p. 35.
39. FO 371/58473 R757/24/90, Caserta, British Military Mission report, 6–8
January 1946.
40. FO 371/23714 R3824/1335/90, Durrës, Ryan, Mitchell Letter of 26 April
1939, 3 May 1939.
41. Adi Schnytzer, Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice: The Case of Albania
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 17.
42. Jacques, The Albanians, p. 426.
43. Pano, “Albania,” p. 35.
44. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, History of the Party of Labor, p. 221;
OSS ¤le 120, GB2129, 20 October 1944.
45. See Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania, p. 103.
46. Sjöberg, Rural Change and Development in Albania, pp. 34–35.
47. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 302.
48. Arshi Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-political Aspects (Boulder, Colo.: East
European Monographs and Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 3.
49. Legters, Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution, 1945–1991, p. 526.

Note on Sources

1. Costa, Albania: A European Enigma, p. 121.

2. Halliday, The Artful Albanian, p. 4.
3. Hibbert, Albania’s National Liberation Struggle, p. 185.
4. Ibid., pp. 236–238.
5. Kühmel, “Deutschland und Albanien,” pp. 9–10.
Notes to pages 281–83 319

6. Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur in Albanien, p. 302.

7. Puto, From the Annals of British Diplomacy, p. 190.
8. Quoted in Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War,
p. 157.
9. Mehmet Shehu was the most gifted Albanian partisan commander during
World War II, eventually becoming commander of the ¤rst division. As part of Hoxha’s
small trusted inner circle, Shehu eventually rose to become prime minister and hoped
to succeed Hoxha. But Hoxha harbored doubts about Shehu’s capability to lead the
nation and had him purged in 1981, resulting in the death of Shehu and many in his
family.
10. Geraldine’s account includes, for example, the assertion (page 121) that while
in exile in Great Britain, Zog had several meetings with Winston Churchill. I can ¤nd
no reference to such meetings. On page 122 Geraldine argues that the Greek strong-
man General Metaxas asked that Zog be ¶own to Greece to take part in the war.
Metaxas, who hoped to annex parts of southern Albania, would never have done such
a thing. Even more remarkable is the assertion, on page 121, that Greek soldiers
¤ghting the Italians in Albania were given pictures of King Zog.
11. Conversations with Queen Geraldine, July 1981, Costa del Sol, Spain.
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Newspapers

Albania
Bashkimi i Kombit, Fashizmi (later Tomori), Kombi, Luftari, Zëri i Popullit
France
Ere nouvelle
Germany
Völkischer Beobachter
Great Britain
Manchester Guardian, Times
Hungary
Pester Lloyd
Italy
Giornale d’Italia, Lavoro fascista, Popolo di Roma
United States
Illyria, New York Times
Vatican
Osservatore romano
INDEX

Abid, Mehmed, 31 194, 197, 200–205, 208, 225, 227–30, 232,

Abwehr, 159, 161, 165, 184, 229 233, 249; Albanian Communist Party,
“Achse,” 159 121, 123–29; early communism, 121–23;
Adriatic Sea, 1, 9, 15, 28, 31, 159, 180, 182, 207 organized resistance to Italians, 129–39,
Agaj, Ago, 174, 207, 210 142, 143, 147–49; relations among resis-
AGIP technicians, 180 tance groups, 134–36, 149–52, 198, 199;
Agostinucci, Christino, 43 collapse of Italy, 152, 153, 247; German in-
Agricultural Bank, 48 vasion, 159–65, 194; government under
Agushi, Iliaz, 87, 141, 143 Germans, 165–76, 186–88, 208–12, 214–
“Alarich,” 159 17, 223, 224; organized resistance to Ger-
Alarupi, Vasil, 14 mans, 170–73, 188–91, 199–208, 212,
Albania/Albanians, 25–29, 57–58, 63, 73–75, 213, 216–18, 235–40; German economic
77, 80–83, 121, 140, 141, 219; WWI, 5, 6; involvement, 176–83; in German military,
Italian economic involvement, 6–8, 11, 47, 183–86, 215–18; German collaboration
48, 56, 57, 65–70; Ciano plans invasion, 8– with resistance, 191, 192, 198–200, 203,
20; relations with Italy, 14, 18; Italian inva- 209–14, 227; splinter resistance groups,
sion, 21–25, 31, 122, 133, 150, 195, 214, 192–95; German reaction to resistance,
218, 231; Zog’s attempts to re-establish 195–98, 206–8, 217, 218; German decline,
control, 31, 105–10, 240–45; sentiment 223–27; German retreat, 231–35, 237,
after invasion, 26, 27; international reac- 239, 240, 246, 247, 249, 251; Hoxha as-
tions, 29–32; resources, 33, 34; social con- sumes control, 246–51; under Hoxha, 248,
ditions, 34; government under Italy, 35– 249, 251–56; notes on sources, 275–84
46, 141–44; education, 49, 51; religion, Albanian Communist Party (ACP), 111, 121,
52–57; social development, 62–65; irreden- 123, 124, 127, 128, 137, 150–52, 246,
tism, 70–73, 83–85; anti-Italian sentiment, 250, 277, 281
86–97, 126, 132, 140; in Italian military, Albanian Fascist Party, 42, 45, 46, 49, 79, 97,
75–80; relations with Germans, 89, 92, 96, 114
157, 158; non-violent resistance to Ital- Albanian National Committee, 244
ians, 97–100; armed resistance to Italians, Albanian National Liberation Army
101, 102, 104, 107, 109, 111–15, 129, 202; (ANLA), 147, 205, 206, 216
relations with British, 102–11, 144–50, Albanian Oil GmbH, 180

329
330 Index

Albanian Orthodox Church, 26, 242 209–12, 215, 217, 226, 227, 229, 233;
Albanian Parliament, 37, 43, 45, 58 photograph of, 220
Albanian Synod, 52, 53 Ballvora, Shyqri, 281–83
Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 49 Bank of Italy, 47
Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 15 Bank of Naples, 48
Ali, Ramiz, 100 Bari, 64, 180, 213, 214, 217, 227, 228, 230,
Alia, Halil, 218, 224, 233 239
Alizoti, Fejzi Bey, 37, 49 Barker, Elizabeth, 283
Allies, 6, 73, 83, 126, 136, 145, 150, 152, “Battaglioni Scanderbey,” 64
161, 162, 164, 166, 167, 170, 174, 175, Battle of Leskovik, 137
180, 189, 200, 201, 215, 216, 218, 227, Battle of Metsovo, 77
232, 239, 244, 246, 248–50 Battle of Stalingrad, 136, 152
“Altesse Serenissme,” 41 BBC, 80, 108, 110, 136, 167, 213, 243
Amery, Julian, 163, 204, 211–13, 223, 225, Beca, Andon, 37
226, 228–30, 233, 279, 281 Bektashi, 55
Anfuso, Filippo, 23 Belgians, 241
Anglo-Albanian Association, 242, 243 Belgrade, 25, 53, 71, 86, 101, 109, 110, 161,
Anglo-Jewish Association, 241 164, 168–70, 177, 182, 223
Ankara, 32, 173 Benes, Eduard, 241
Anschluss, 9, 10, 12, 67 Benini, Zenone, 41, 66, 116
Anti-Fascist Coalition, 250 Berat, 66, 68, 137, 162, 163, 189, 195, 196,
Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation, 206, 232, 250, 252
248 “Bergkessel,” 196
Apulia, 18 Berlin, 75, 158, 167, 175–77, 184, 201, 215,
Archbishop Vissarion, 26, 39, 53, 54, 56, 101 218, 277
Archer, Laird, 81 Biçaku, Aziz, 169, 197
Armenians, 201 Biçaku, Ibrahim Bey, 215, 223, 224, 234, 235,
Arta, 84 237
Aryans, 175 Bilisht, 85, 211
Atdheu, 192 Bishop Victor, 53
Athens, 32, 72, 79–81, 85, 107, 187 Bitol, 84
Atlantic Charter, 239, 244 Bitolj-Struga-Elbasan-Tirana road, 182
Austria/Austrians, 6, 47, 67, 98, 103, 158, BK. See Balli Kombëtar
166, 173, 174, 184 Bland, William B., 280
Austro-Hungarians, 160, 166 Bojiloff, Dobri, 177
Avenol, Joseph, 31 Boletini, Adem, 184
Axis, 80, 83, 126, 134, 136, 140, 152, 161, Bonaparte, Napoleon, 104, 283
187, 190, 194, 239, 241, 243, 246, 277 Boris, King of Bulgaria, 85
“Azienda Strada Albania,” 66 Borova, 190
Azzi, 164 Bosnia, 237, 240
Bottai, Giuseppe, 71
Badoglio, Pietro, 18, 71, 75–77, 82, 153, 161, Boyle, Sir Edward, 242, 244, 245
162, 279 “Brennero” division, 163
Bajraktari, Muharrem, 102, 111, 163, 189, Brindisi, 23, 201, 230
192–97, 204, 228, 230, 231, 233; photo- Britain/British, 16, 22, 30–32, 43, 69, 101–
graph of, 155 10, 121, 144–50, 157, 162–64, 168, 172,
Balilla, 51 191, 193, 194, 197–99, 201–4, 208, 210,
Balkan Air Force, 202 212–14, 218, 225, 227–30, 232, 233, 235,
Balkan Committee, 242 239, 240, 241, 243–45, 249, 250, 275–77,
Balkan Communist Federation, 121 279–81, 283, 284. See also England
Balkans, 5, 10, 30, 31, 34, 52, 72, 73, 75, 96, British Chiefs of Staff, 146
107, 135, 142, 144, 146, 151, 158, 159, British Consul-General, 91, 94, 99, 101, 110
168, 178, 181, 194, 207, 219, 223, 225, British Liaison Of¤cers (BLO), 162, 163,
237, 253, 256, 279 190, 196, 197, 200, 202, 203, 214, 215,
Balli Kombëtar (National Front, BK), 132– 225, 230–32, 236, 245
36, 141–43, 149–52, 163, 170–74, 184, British Royal Air Force (RAF), 201, 208,
189–92, 194, 195, 197–200, 203, 204, 217, 235, 236
Index 331

Buda, Aleks, 281 Concensus, 147

Budapest, 10 Concensus II, 204, 228
Bujan, 238, 239 Conference of Ambassadors, 6, 70
Bulgaria/Bulgarians, 37, 43, 83–85, 95, 98, Conference of Peza, 129, 130, 132, 145
175, 201, 218, 219, 223, 226, 242, 247 Congress of Berat, 52
Bulquiz, 181 Congress of Permët, 211, 249
Burrel, 101, 163 Constitution of 1876, 40
Bushati, Maliq Bey, 37, 141–43, 243 Corfu, 30, 32, 74, 76, 142, 232
Buxton, Lord Noel, 242 Council of the League, 31
Croatia/Croatians, 46, 172, 176, 218
Çabej, Eqrem, 174 Curri, Bajram, 121
Cairo, 108, 109, 146, 175 Cvetkovic, Dragisa, 15, 16
Cakrani, Kadri, 229 Cyprus, 108
Caligari, 163 Cyrenaica, 201
Çamëria, 70, 72–75, 79, 85, 168 Czechoslovakia/Czechs, 17, 47, 201, 241
Çami, Skënder, 128
Campbell, Sir Ronald, 101, 109, 110 Dalmazzo, Lorenzo, 138, 142, 162–64
Canadians, 241 Dalmazzo-Këlcyra Agreement, 142
Canevari, Emilio, 24 Davies, E. F., 197, 203, 204, 231, 245, 279,
Captain Lange, 184 280; photograph of, 156
Carabinieri, 95, 96, 99 Declaration of the Rights of Citizens, 249
Carrara, 90 Deda, Nijaz, 114
Casablanca, 146, 159 Dema, Hysni, 210, 224
Casablanca Conference, 146 Democratic Front, 253
Catholics, 51–57, 63, 84, 95, 96, 101, 172, 255 Deva, Xhafer, 161, 168, 169, 173, 184, 187,
Caucasus region, 201 199, 207, 210, 211, 215, 231, 237, 239
Çekrezi, K. A, 243, 244 Devoll, 66, 180, 182
Çela, Mehmet, 226, 234 DGA, 182, 226
Central Council, 42 Dibra, 84, 134, 193, 196, 206, 208, 214, 216–
Central Council of the Corporative Econ- 18, 224
omy, 42 Dibra (tribe), 102, 136, 139, 149, 193, 210, 214
Çetniks, 188, 213 Dibra, Fuat Bey, 134, 171, 172, 215
Chamber of Fasces and Corporations, 28, 78 Dielli, 242, 243
Chamberlain, Neville, 20, 30 Dine, Fiqri, 192, 210–12, 215–19, 223, 224,
Churchill, Tom, 232 227, 237
Churchill, Winston, 108, 159, 229 Dino, Xhemil, Bey, 37, 40, 43, 85
Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 30, 31, 33, 39, 40, Directorate of the Albanian Fascist Party, 42
48, 57, 69, 75, 79, 90–92, 97, 115, 140, Dishnica, Ymer, 129, 150–52
141, 152; background, 7, 8; plans inva- DiVecchi, 75
sion, 8–20; disappointed with invasion, Dixon, Pearson, 80, 105, 144–46
23, 26, 27; explanations, 28, 29; attitude Djakova, 181
toward Albanians, 34, 62, 85, 91; creates Djilas, Milovan, 133
political structure, 35, 36, 39, 41–43, 112, Dodbiba, Sokrat, 173
116; disappointed with new government, Donovan, William, 249
37, 38; Albanian Fascist Party, 45; and Dopolavoro, 13, 41, 62; photograph of build-
Moslem community, 55; attempts to win ing under construction, 118
over Albanians, 61–65, 68, 70–72, 83, 84; Dosti, Hasan, 116, 134, 150, 227, 229
analyses Albanian resources, 65, 66; plans Drin River, 162
invasion of Greece, 73–76; invasion of Drita, 49
Greece, 77, 78; blame for failure of inva- Dukagjin, 54
sion of Greece, 81–82; problems with Dukagjini, Lek, 183
Germans, 85–87, 158; beginning of resis- Duke of Bergamo, 41
tance, 98, 99, 102; reaction to resistance, Durham, Edith, 242
112, 113, 137–39; resigns, 141; notes on Durrës, 14, 19, 21–24, 26, 27, 34, 36, 61–68,
sources, 277–79 82, 94, 101, 103, 110, 128, 142, 162, 163,
Comando Supremo, 138, 153, 277, 279 166, 172, 182, 196, 201, 207, 226, 234,
Comintern, the, 121–23, 135, 150, 246 236; photograph of reconstruction, 118
332 Index

EAM, 147 Friends of Albania, 241

Eastwood, Stan, 235 Friends of Albania (London), 242, 243
Ecole Normale (Elbasan), 50 “Fuchsjagd,” 218
Ecumenical Patriarchate (Patriarch), 52, 53 Fultz, Harry, 152, 205, 276
“Edelweiss,” 196
Eden, Anthony, 109, 145, 194, 213, 229, 230 Gabrielli, 107
Egypt, 92, 106, 108, 109, 112, 242 Gayda, Virginio, 28
“1828,” 196 Gegs, 34, 174, 183, 194, 195, 213, 215, 229
Eisenhower, Dwight, 161 Geib, Theodor, 167
Elbasan, 37, 50, 65, 68, 111, 128, 146, 162, Geloso, Carlo, 73
165, 166, 169, 182, 189, 196, 232, 236 General Command of Active Forces, 217
Elbasan-Peqin-Kavaya-Durrës road, 182 Geraj, Rrok, 24, 35, 113, 218; photograph of,
Elbasan-Struga road, 206 59
Elbasan-Tirana road, 226 Geraldine, Queen of the Albanians, 9, 12–14,
Elezi Family, 193 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 62, 63, 108, 158, 241;
Elezi, Cen, 192, 193, 230 photograph of, 59
Elezi, Ersat, 193 Germany/Germans, 10, 11, 13, 47, 63, 69,
Elezi, Gani, 193 75, 87, 98, 102, 110, 111, 123, 142, 146,
Elezi, Islam, 193 152, 194, 209, 219, 227, 229, 230, 247,
England, 105, 106, 207. See also Britain 254; relations with Zog, 14; relations
“Ente Assistenza Fascista,” 46 with Italy, 16, 20, 29, 76, 78, 82–86, 158,
“Ente Turistico Alberghiero Albania,” 68 159; relations with Albania, 89, 92, 96,
Epirus, 75, 80 157, 158; collaboration with resistance,
Ere Nouvelle, 30 130, 191, 192, 198–200, 203, 211; inter-
Ermenji, Abaz, 190, 227, 228 est in Albania, 157, 158; invasion of Al-
Ethiopia, 17, 41, 89 bania, 159–65, 194, 202, 211; govern-
Europe, 277, 283 ment, 165–76, 186–88, 209–12, 215–18,
223, 224; resistance, 170–73, 188–91,
Falo, Dhimitër, 134 193, 195–201, 205–8, 213, 216–18, 227,
Fashizmi, 49, 63, 67, 69, 72, 113, 115 235–40; economic policy, 176–83; Alban-
Faya, Baba, 199 ian military, 183–86; relations with Brit-
“Federazione della Gioventu Albanese del ish, 197, 202; decline, 224–27; retreat,
Littorio,” 51 231–37, 239, 240, 246, 249; notes on
Fehn, Gustav, 184, 216, 226 sources, 276, 277, 279, 281–83; soldiers,
Ferrobeton, 100 photograph of, 220
“Firenze” division, 163 Giornale d’Italia, 28, 43
Fischer, Bernd, 282 “Giovenezza,” 99, 100
Fitzthum, Josef, 166, 184–86, 212, 215, 224, “Gioventu Femminile del Littorio,” 51
226, 231, 234, 239 “Gioventu Italiana del Littorio,” 64
Florina, 84, 85, 182 “Gioventu Universitaria Fascista,” 64
Florina-Korça-Struga road, 232 Giro, Giovanni, 11–14, 18, 45, 90, 91, 114
Foggia, 83 Gjinishi, Mustafa, 104, 111, 126, 129, 130,
Fortuzi, 234 150–52, 163, 229, 230
France/French, 16, 30, 32, 43, 69, 78, 105, Gjirokastra, 62, 65, 68, 78, 80, 124, 126, 134,
111, 123, 133, 146, 201 137, 189, 198, 206, 209, 232, 247
Franciscans, 50, 172 Gjoles bridge, 213
Frank, Hermann, 279 Gjoni, Gjon Marka, 141, 143, 211, 230, 231,
Frashëri, Mehdi Bey, 27, 113, 130, 133, 157, 233
158, 172, 173, 175, 177, 187, 199, 210– Gjylbegu, Musa, 174
12, 215, 217, 218, 223, 226, 237 Gleiwitz, 75
Frashëri, Mithat, 133, 150, 190, 191, 203, Godolesh, 180
211, 227, 229; photograph of, 220 Göring, Hermann, 28
Frashëri, Raquip, 218 Graftey-Smith, Lawrence, 110, 112
Frashëri, Vehbi, 161, 172–74, 176 Gramsci, Antonio, 163
Free Albania Movement, 243, 244 Gramsh, 136
French Communist Party, 125 Grandi, Dino, 8, 78
Index 333

Grant, Hugh, 21, 24 Hoxha, Mehmet, 238

Grazzi, Emanuele, 76 Hristic, Bozko, 15
Greater Albania, 84, 86, 88, 116, 167, 168 Hungary/Hungarians, 10, 201
Greece/Greeks, 6, 25, 31, 32, 43, 46, 51–53,
70–85, 88, 91, 96–98, 100, 104–11, 117, Illyrians, 175
134, 137, 142, 144, 147, 149, 152, 153, Institute of Albanian Studies, 49
164, 166, 169, 177, 186, 187, 194, 196, Instituti I Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste
197, 201, 207, 209, 232, 237, 247, 249, Pranë KQ të PPSH, 282
256 “Instituto Fascista Albanese pegli infortuni
Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev, 280 sul Lavoro,” 68
Gstöttenbauer, Dr. Karl, 226, 231, 234, 239 “Instituto Nazionaleper i cambi con I’estero,”
Gullman, Otto, 226 47
Gusinje, 185, 188 Ioannina, 84, 85, 190
Guzzoni, Alfredo, 18, 21, 23, 24, 26, 35, 44, Istanbul, 52, 53, 103, 107, 162, 218, 242, 245
91, 141; photograph of, 59 Isu¤, Hasan, 226
Italy/Italians, 10, 15, 25, 30, 39, 46, 54, 58,
Halliday, Jon, 278 61, 73–75, 86, 106, 116, 117, 122, 140,
Hamid II, Abdul, 40 142, 146, 148, 150, 153, 161, 168–71,
Hands, Andy, 239 174, 175, 177, 182–84, 189–91, 193–96,
Harapi, Fr. Anton, 172, 173, 210, 235, 237 207, 211, 212, 214, 218, 230, 233, 234,
Hart, Charles C., 241, 242 237, 254, 255; motivation for invasion, 5,
Hasluck, Margaret, 146, 175, 200 6; economic involvement in Albania, 6, 7,
Helli, 72 11, 47, 48, 56, 57, 65–70; Ciano’s plan for
Helmës, 248 invasion, 8–13, 15–20; relations with Al-
Herbert, Aubrey, 242 banians, 13, 18; preparations for invasion,
Hetzer, Armin, 280 18–21; propaganda, 21, 23, 24, 27, 48, 49,
Hibbert, Sir Reginald, 149, 280 62, 63, 143; invasion of Albania, 21–24,
High Council of Regency, 234 28, 31, 111, 133, 150, 158, 171–73, 195,
High Court of Justice, 13 214, 218, 231; explanations, 28–30; rela-
Himara-Shkodra road, 182 tions with Germans, 29, 30, 75, 78, 82–
Himmler, Heinrich, 75, 184–86 87, 158, 160–62, 164–68; creation of Ital-
Hitler, Adolf, 8, 12, 14, 17, 32, 73, 75, 78, 82, ian Albania, 34–46; education, 49–51,
83, 85, 87, 110, 152, 158, 159, 161, 170, 119 (photograph); religion, 52, 55–57; so-
174, 177, 178, 181, 185, 224 cial development, 63–65; irredentism, 70–
Hodgkinson, Harry, 242 72, 84, 85; invasion of Greece, 76–83;
Hodgson, H., 242, 244 anti-Italian sentiment, 79, 86–97, 112,
Hotel Dajti, 34, 210 126; non-violent resistance, 97–99; armed
House of Savoy, 17, 37, 38, 41, 92, 116 resistance, 101–3, 107, 109, 112–15, 129,
Hoxha, Daout, 72, 75 136–39, 143, 163, 164, 202; Greece, 104,
Hoxha, Enver, 31, 101, 104, 110, 111, 123, 106; government, 115, 116; relations with
132, 145, 146, 168, 197, 199, 203, 209, communists, 126–29; collapse, 135, 141,
212, 227, 235, 236, 238, 239; Albanian 143, 146, 150, 157, 164, 165, 171, 179,
Communist Party, 124–26, 129; back- 189, 193, 247; notes on sources, 276–80,
ground, 124, 125; National Liberation 282, 283
Movement, 129, 130, 196; relations with Italian Fascist Grand Council, 38
Balli Kombëtar, 133, 135, 136, 149–51, Italian Fascist Party, 45, 68
198; National Liberation Army, 137, 205– Italo-Albanian Skënderbeg Club, 49
7; relations with British, 147–49, 201, Iulia, 77
204, 214, 225, 228–30, 232, 249, 252; re-
jects Mukje agreements, 151, 152; harsh Jacomoni, Francesco, 11–14, 16, 18, 19, 40–
tactics, 230, 231, 251, 253; assumes con- 44, 47, 49, 55, 56, 65, 71, 73–76, 78, 79,
trol of Albania, 245, 251; government, 82, 84, 91, 97, 115, 116, 136–41, 278, 279
248, 249, 251–56; advantages over Zog, Jerusalem, 172
251, 252; notes on sources, 275, 278, 281, Jesuits, 50
282; photographs of, 156, 222 Jews, 46, 187
Hoxha, Falil, 238 Jodl, Alfred, 231
334 Index

Juka, Musa, 14 197, 198, 204, 206, 210–18, 227–30, 233,

237, 243, 245, 252; photograph of, 154
Kaloshi, Murat, 102 Kupi, Ibrahim, 101
Kaltenbrunner, Ernst, 185 Kupi, Petrit, 228
Kasneci, Lefter, 205, 282
Kastrioti, Qazim, 106, 242 Labinot, 246, 247
Kavaja, 163 Laçi, Vasil, 102
Kazaks, 225 Lake Ohrid, 206
Keeble, 146 Lake Prespa, 85
Keitel, Wilhelm, 181 Lake Shkodra, 182
Këlcyra, Ali, 133, 142, 229; photograph of, Lampson, John, 109
220 Lanz, Hubert, 161, 208
Kemal, Ismail, 255 Lavoro Fascista, 28
Kemp, Peter, 174, 280 League of Nations, 7, 31
Kërçova, 162 League of Prizren (1878), 255
Kërraba Pass, 236 Leake, Philip, 205
Kissi, Bishop Kristopher, 53, 56, 57, 96 Leka, Crown Prince of Albania, 24
Koçi, Jak, 12, 13 Lenin, V. I., 130
Kodheli, Marco, 27 Leshi, Haxhi, 102
Koka, Sami, 24 Leyser, Ernest von, 231
Kolaj, Rrok, 173 Lezhë, 11
Koliqi, Ernest, 37, 40, 51, 64, 71 L’Humanité, 125
Kolonja, Peter, 242, 243 Libohova, Eqrem Bey, 113, 140, 141, 143,
Kombi, 170 161, 168, 169, 214
Konica, Faik, 242 Libya, 64
Konica, Mehmet, 173, 174 Liria, 243, 244
“Konstanin,” 159 List, Siegmund, 83
Korça, 50, 51, 62, 65, 68, 71, 77–80, 99, 111, London, 8, 30–32, 37, 91, 105, 110, 229, 241,
122–25, 128, 136, 137, 142, 189, 190, 244
206, 232 Long Range Desert Group, 232, 235
Korça, Hifzi, 183 Lord Glenconner, 145, 146
Korça-Struga road, 182 Lord Halifax, 30, 106, 108, 109
Kosmet, 238, 239 Lord Harcourt, 227
Kosova/Kosovars, 15, 29, 70–73, 84, 86–88, Lord Perth, 8, 29, 30, 35
95, 103, 107, 109, 110, 122, 123, 133, Luckwald, Erich von, 158
134, 144, 151, 161, 167–69, 172–74, 177, Lumë, 111, 194
180–92, 184, 193, 195, 207, 209, 215, “Lupi di Roma,” 13
227, 231, 234, 237–40, 243, Lyon, Marcus, 228
Kosova Committee, 122
Kosova, Lefter, 224 Macedonia, 70, 77, 84, 85, 217
Kota, Kostaq, 116, 158 Mackensen, Hans Georg von, 20, 86, 87,
Kotor, 53 102, 158, 160
Kruja, 101, 104, 111, 117, 149, 150, 189, 215, Mack-Smith, Denis, 283
247 MacMillian, Harold, 230
Kruja, Mustafa, 13, 20, 115–17, 128, 129, Madrid, 20
134, 136, 139, 140, 168, 172, 211, 237; Malëshova, Sejfulla, 249, 250
photograph of, 154 Mao Zedong, 196
Kryeziu, Ceno Bey, 103 Marinucci, Ferrobeton, Simoncini, Tadini e
Kryeziu, Gani Bey, 103, 104, 109, 110, 193, Talenti, 165
197, 204, 228, 231, 243; photograph of, Marko, V., 52
155 Markovic, Jovan, 71
Kryeziu, Said, 103, 104, 231, 237 Marshall, George, 159
Kühmel, Bernard, 149, 226, 281, 283 Martanesh, 111
Kukës, 62, 109, 162, 163, 181, 189, 233 Martaneshi, Baba Mustafa (Baba Faja), 111,
Kukës-Prizren road, 239 112, 130
Kupi, Abaz, 22, 27, 101, 103, 104, 111, 117, Marxism, 255
129, 130, 149, 152, 171, 189, 190, 192–95, Mati, 63, 208, 214, 216, 217
Index 335

Mborja, Te¤k, 45, 46, 114 Ndreu, Dali, 216

McLean, Neil (Billy), 146–49, 202–4, 211–14, Near East Foundation, 81
217, 225, 227–31, 281; photograph of, 156 Neel, Tony, 225
Mediterranean Sea, 145, 162, 202 Neubacher, Hermann, 159–61, 165–69, 171–
Menton, 77 73, 176, 178–81, 183–86, 190, 198, 199,
Meran & Hall school, 172 210, 211, 215, 216, 223–26, 231, 237,
Metaxas, John, 72, 76, 80, 81, 107–9 238, 279
Metohija, 238 Neuhausen, 179
Metsovo, 77 Neuwirth, Hubert, 283
Middle East High Command (Br.), 104 New Tirana, 236
Mihailovic, Draza, 129, 134, 188 New York Times, 112
Military Intelligence (R) (Br.), 102, 104 Nigris, L., 56
Ministero della Guerra, 277 Niksic, 162
Mirdita, 63, 101, 112, 140, 141, 171, 184, Nishani, Omer, 247, 253
230, 237 Noble, Sir A., 29, 30
Mirdizu, 17 Noli, Fan, 45, 52, 115, 122, 242–44
Mitchell, Ruth, 61, 67 Normandy, 168, 190
Mitrovica, 86, 87, 92, 159, 160, 169, 170, 184 North Africa, 101, 145, 152
Mitrovica, Rexhep, 84, 133, 173, 175, 176, Nosi, Frederick, 81
206, 208–14, 215, 223 Nosi, Lef, 171, 173, 211
Moisiu, Spiro, 137, 246 Novi Pazar, 84
Monastir, 255 Nowack, Dr. Ernest, 179
Montenegro/Montenegrins, 6, 70, 84, 95, 98, Nuremberg, 179
128, 177, 233, 236–38, 240
Moscow, 128, 249 Oakley-Hill, Dayrell, 110, 111
Moslem Bektashi, 111, 114 Observatore romano, 29
Moslems, 34, 52, 54–56, 84, 92, 93, 128, 192, Ohrid, 84, 85
199, 227, 255 “Oilcompany 33,” 180
Mostar, 236 Omari, Luan, 57, 58, 281, 282
Mountain League, 231 “Operation Bodyguard,” 168, 190
Muço, Skënder, 191, 199, 226 “Operation Cyclamen,” 83
Mugosa, Dusan, 123, 125, 135 “Operation 505,” 196
Muka, Koço, 174, 227, 229; photograph of 220 Orosh, 231
Mukje, 149, 151, 152 Orthodox, 39, 52–54, 56, 57, 79, 84, 96, 110,
Mukje Agreements, 150, 151, 191, 247 128, 199, 255
Muletti, Qazim, 234 Ostmark, 180
Mussolini, Benito, 5–11, 13–17, 20–22, 24, 28– Ottomans, 5, 6, 40, 103, 172, 219, 253
41, 45, 46, 51, 55, 61, 62, 64–66, 68, 70,
72–76, 78, 80–82, 84, 89, 90, 99, 100, 110, Palairet, Sir Michael, 107, 109
113, 115, 116, 138, 141, 142, 152, 153, Palandri, Enrico, 44
158, 172, 278, 283; photograph of, 120 Palazzo Chigi, 8, 43, 277
Myrdacz, Gustav von, 216, 234 Palestine, 108
Palmer, Alan, 204
National Archives, 276, 277 Pannwitz, Eberhard von, 67, 73, 82, 158, 159
National Assembly, 175 Pano, Nicholas, 124, 149, 151
National Bank of Albania, 47, 48, 94, 177– Papagos, Alexandros, 77, 80
79. See also Albanian National Bank Pariani, Alberto, 18, 20, 23, 143–44, 169
National Committee, 235 Parini, Piero, 73, 91
National Independent Party, 211, 215. See Paris, 13, 30, 31, 122, 123, 125, 133, 173, 244
also Party of National Independence Paris Conference (1920), 172
National Liberation Army, 137 Parisius, 231
National Liberation Movement (Lëvizje Partisans, 131, 132, 135, 137, 139, 141, 147,
Nacionalçlirimtare, NLM), 130–37, 143, 148, 150, 162–64, 184, 185, 189–201,
147–51, 153, 161, 170, 172, 173, 175, 204–8, 210, 211, 214, 216–18, 224, 228,
188, 191–93, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203–6, 229, 231–40, 245, 247, 278–82. See also
211, 212, 227–32, 239, 240, 245–48. See National Liberation Movement
also Partisans Paul, Prince of Yugoslavia, 15, 83
336 Index

Pavelic, Ante, 176 43, 45, 54, 55, 63, 65, 67, 68, 74, 83, 84,
Pec, 181, 185 90, 102, 113, 116, 139, 157, 158, 160,
Pejani, Bedri, 84, 169, 238 168, 177, 178, 237
Percy, Sir Jocelyn, 105, 107, 242, 244 Roosevelt, Franklin, 32
Permët, 137, 247, 248, 252 Rose, Michael, 201
Peshkopi, Ekrem, 196, 216; photograph of, Rosi, Ezio, 164
220 “Roter Mann,” 196
Pester Lloyd, 29 “Royal Guard of Finance,” 44
Peza, 139, 196, 206, 246, 247 Russia/Russians, 146, 166, 201, 207
Peza, Myslim, 102, 111, 117, 129, 130, 149, Ryan, Sir Andrew, 14, 18, 27, 29, 36, 40, 45,
195, 199, 206; photograph of, 222 61, 106, 107, 243, 245, 279
Piedmont, 71
Place, 188 Sarajevo, 237
Plan Zeppelin, 168 Saranda, 21, 62, 232
Plasari, Ndreçi, 281 Sargent, Sir Orme, 213
Podgorica, 84, 240 Sazan, 5
Pogradec, 78, 99, 162, 181, 182 Scheiger, Franz von, 159, 160, 165, 166, 168,
Poland/Poles, 75, 201 170, 172, 216, 234
Pollo, Stefanq, 100, 143, 281, 282 Schliep, Martin, 159–61, 165, 167, 168, 172,
Popolo di Roma, 28 175, 176, 178, 184, 190, 200, 201, 206,
Popovic, Miladin, 123, 125, 129, 132 211, 214–18, 224, 225, 230, 231, 234
Porto Edda, 62, 68, 78 Schmidhuber, August, 186, 226
Post, Larry, 244 Schmidt-Neke, Michael, 281, 282
Prague, 16 Scotland, 20, 30
Prasca, Sebastian Viscounti, 73–78, 81, 82 Scots Grey Regiment, 146
Prevesa, 85 “Seaview,” 164
Previzi, Prengë, 224, 234, 237 Second League of Prizren, 168, 169, 238
Princivalle, 163 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 30, 103
Prishtina, 87, 162, 185, 187, 226 Section D (Br.), 103, 104
Prizren, 162, 168, 169, 182, 184, 185, 231, Selenica, 100
232, 234 Semlin, 226
Prizren-Kukës-Puka-Shkodra road, 184 Serbia/Serbs, 6, 15, 64, 70, 87, 98, 128, 151,
Puka, 233 161, 166, 167, 169, 176, 185, 237, 238
Puto, Arben, 100, 143, 281, 281 Serreqi, Zef, 27, 35, 40
Servizio Informazioni Militare (SIM), 113,
Qafa e Rrërësit, 228 140
Qyku, Faik, 134 Shehu, Mehmet, 137, 148, 196, 205, 206,
216, 217, 230, 235, 278, 279, 282; photo-
Radio Athens, 108 graph of, 222
Radio Tirana, 234 Shëngjin, 15, 21, 22
Radovicka, Islam, 232 Sherko, Mihal, 27, 35
Ramadan, 92 Shijak, 162
Ravenna, 64 Shkodra, 14, 15, 38, 50, 52–54, 62, 68, 99,
Reichsbank, 179 100, 115, 122, 123, 162, 172–74, 180,
Reichswirtschaft minister, 181 182, 225, 226, 233, 234–36, 239, 255
Reislia, Vizdan, 226, 234 Shkumbin river, 196, 206
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 85, 159–61, 165, Shtylla, Tahir, 116
218, 279 Shtypi, 49
Rinia Balliste, 134 Sicily, 152
Rinteln, Enno von, 82 Simopoulos, Charolambos, 29
Ritz Hotel, 106, 241 “Skanderbeg” division, 185–87, 215, 218, 224,
Roatta, Mario, 76 227, 238
Robyns, Gwen, 282 Skënderbeg Foundation, 49
Roman, Viorel, 280 Skënderbeg, Gjergji Kastrioti, 5, 86, 150,
Romania/Romanians, 32, 43, 46, 75, 86, 219, 186, 255
223 Skendi, Stavro, 124, 149
Rome, 5, 6, 14–16, 19, 20, 25, 27, 29, 38, 41, Skopje, 182, 197
Index 337

Slovakia, 172 180, 182, 184, 195, 196, 198, 200, 209–
Smiley, David, 146–48, 204, 213, 225, 228, 11, 214–16, 223, 224, 227, 231–36, 243,
280; photograph of, 156 251, 252, 275, 277; photographs of, 221,
Smith, Victor, 214, 230 222
Soddu, Ubaldo, 78 Tirana-Durrës Road, 163
So¤a, 85 Tirana-Shkodra Road, 213, 226
Soviet Union/Soviets, 123, 124, 126–28, 145, Tito, 130, 135, 151, 204, 207, 225, 239, 240,
146, 219, 223, 245, 250. See also Rus- 245, 246, 249, 250, 253
sia/Russians Tocra, 201
Spahiu, Bedri, 147 Todt Organization, 178, 181
Spain, 89 Tomori, 49, 55, 114, 115, 128, 138
Spanish Civil War, 16 Tomori Battalion, 77, 78
Special Operations Executive (SOE), 107, Toptani, Esad Pasha, 115, 116
109, 145, 146, 164, 175, 202, 203, 205, Tosks, 34, 174, 229
212, 213, 225, 227–30, 276, 283 Toynbee, Arnold, 144
Special People’s Court of Tirana, 252 Treaty of London, 6
Special People’s Tribunals, 252 Trepça, 86, 87, 180
Speer, Albert, 181, 278 Tripartite Pact, 83
Spiru, Nako, 199 Tu¤ne, 211
SS, 166, 177, 183–87, 224, 227 Turkey/Turks, 30, 37, 43, 46, 64, 92, 93, 102,
Stafford, David, 283 103, 106, 112, 175, 219, 242
Stalin, J., 126, 253, 254 Tyrol, 172
Stalingrad, 200
Starace, Achille, 45 Ulqini, Cafo Bey, 215
Statuto Fondementale, 40 Uniate Movement, 56, 96
Stefani News Agency, 41, 49, 72 United States/Americans, 43, 50, 52, 69, 106,
Stirling, Wilfred, 109 145, 197, 241–43, 245, 250, 276, 277; in
Stojadinovic, Milan, 13, 15 Tirana, photographs of, 221, 222
Stojnic, Velimir, 250 University of Graz, 173
Straits of Messina, 161 University of Montpellier, 124
Straits of Otranto, 5 University of Rome, 40, 81
Struga, 162, 182, 232, 236 Unthi, 17
Struga-Dibra Highway, 137 U.S. Census Bureau, 242
Südostmontan, 179 U.S. Of¤ce of Strategic Services (OSS), 146,
Sunni, 52, 171 152, 249, 276
Superior Fascist Corporative Council, 42 U.S. State Department, 242, 249
SVEA, 7 Ustashi regime, 176
Switzerland, 173 Uzbegs, 225

Tajiks, 225 Valle, Giuseppe, 26

Talbot-Rice, D., 199 Vardar valley, 197
Tamurlane, 225 Vatican, 54, 55, 201
Tapisa, 150 Vatra organization, 242, 243
Taraboshi, 78 Venice, 12
Tashko, Koço, 122, 126, 129 Ventotene, 193
Tehran Meeting, 159 Vërlaci, Shefqet, 37–40, 44, 45, 47, 48, 73,
Telegraph, 243 86, 115, 116, 140, 141, 243; photograph
Tepelena, 14, 128, 137, 162 of, 120
Tetovo, 182 Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, 12, 17,
Thesprotia, 85 35, 36, 38–40, 45, 51, 55, 80, 84, 92, 99,
Thessaloniki, 15, 46, 107, 197 100, 102, 152, 167; photographs of, 60,
Tirana, 8, 9, 19–22, 25–29, 34–36, 38, 41, 42, 120
49, 50, 53, 55, 62, 63, 65, 66–68, 73, 77, Vienna, 71, 140, 159, 166, 174, 237
81, 82, 86, 87, 91, 92, 94, 98–102, 104, Vienna Awards, 85, 87
107, 111, 113, 114, 117, 122, 123, 125, Viscount Cecil, 242
127, 129, 138, 139, 149, 150, 160, 162, Viscount Halifax, 30
163, 165, 166, 170, 172, 173, 176, 177, Visegrad, 237
338 Index

Vitetti, Leonardo, 17 Yugoslavia/Yugoslavs, 13, 15, 16, 25, 28, 29,

Vlora, 5, 21, 22, 34, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 99, 31, 43, 70–73, 83, 84, 86, 103, 104, 109–
100, 112, 136, 139, 149, 162, 173, 174, 11, 123–25, 134, 142, 149, 151, 167, 187,
180, 182, 189, 191, 199, 206, 207, 226, 194, 201, 218, 226, 233, 238, 240, 246,
232, 234, 255 247, 249, 250, 253, 281
Völkischer Beobachter, 29, 197 Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY), 121, 123,
Vrioni, Qemal, 49, 140, 172 124, 151
Vukmanovic-Tempo, Svetozar, 151, 238, 247 Yugoslav General Staff, 240

Wannsee Conference, 187 Zallari, Mihal, 169

War Of¤ce (Br.), 102, 105, 107 Zara, 115
Washington, 242, 244, 249, 276, 277 Zavalani, Tajar, 243
Wavell, Archibald, 109 Zemun, 184
Wehrmacht, 157, 158, 160, 167, 179–81, 186, Zëri i Popullit, 129
226, 277 Zervas, Napoleon, 134, 232
Weichs, Baron Maximillian von, 161 Zjarri, 123, 126, 133
Weltanschauung, 89 Zog, King of the Albanians, 9, 10, 16, 31, 33,
Wheeler, Norman, 204 35–37, 41, 42, 44–46, 49, 67, 68, 73, 76,
Wilhelm II of Germany, 157 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 98, 101, 103, 104, 111–
William of Wied, 86, 157, 171, 172 13, 115, 122, 124, 125, 129, 130, 133, 135,
Wilson, Sir Henry Maitland, 162, 214, 230 140–42, 144, 145, 153, 157, 163, 171, 173,
Wilson, Woodrow, 6 179, 200, 203, 212–14, 218, 236, 251, 255;
Wiskeman, Elizabeth, 149 rise to power, 6, 57, 242; relations with
World War I, 5, 6, 34, 52, 89, 103, 160, 166, Italians, 7, 12–15, 17–20, 24, 158; appeals
179, 184, 185 to Germans, 14, 158; Italian invasion, 19–
World War II, 121, 184, 277–79, 281, 282 21, 24, 25; as object of blame, 26–28, 35;
attempts to re-establish control of Albania,
Xhuli, Reuf, 27 31, 105–10, 240–45; early political success,
Xoxe, Koçi, 151, 249, 250, 252, 253; photo- 34; ¤nancial success, 48; education, 50, 51;
graph of, 222 religion, 51–56; anti-Zog campaign, 62,
XXI Corps, 161, 184, 186, 207, 216, 223, 63, 117; irredentism, 70, as head of Legal-
225, 226, 233, 234, 235 ity movement, 192, 193; exiled from Alba-
XXII Corps, 208, 236 nia, 248; notes on sources, 281–83; photo-
graph of, 59; palace, photograph of, 119
Young, Antonia, 280 Zogai, 62
Ypi, Xhafer Bey, 26, 35, 36, 99; photograph Zogaj, 228
of, 60 Zogists, 225, 244