Civil Procedure 2024-2025
Civil Procedure 2024-2025
J. Reyes Jr.
Facts: Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado (Ma. Rosario), Ruth Librada Agarrado (Ruth), and Roy Agarrado
(Roy) are children of the late spouses Rodrigo (Rodrigo) and Emilia (Emilia) Agarrado, who, during their
lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The
subject property was registered in the name of the spouses Rodrigo and Emilia and was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29842-B. On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo
and their children as her compulsory heirs. Respondents Cristita and Ana Lou is the second family of
Rodrigo where Ana Lou was conceived during his previous marriage to Emilia and was born one month
after its death. On December 8, 2000, Rodrigo died. On January 23, 2003, respondents filed for an action
for partition of the subject land which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City Branch 44
despite the failure to indicate in the complaint the market value of the property.
Issue: Whether the action for partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation justifying the trial court’s
jurisdiction.
Held: No. Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable
of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending
on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended. Consequently, a failure by
the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very
least, in the attachments in the complaint as ruled in Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible because the court
which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be identified.
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is determined by law.
Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.
The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00.
For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).
Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of the
partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the allegations of the
complaint
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45... assailing the Order... of the Regional Trial Court...
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
petitioners Susan Galang and Bernadeth Albino... filed a Complaint[4] for Accion Reivindicatoria...
claiming to be the lawful owners of parcels of land located atBenguet
According to petitioners, moreover, despite the fact that they legally acquired the subject lands as
evidenced by the Deeds of Absolute Sale they presented, respondents... have been intruding into their
land in bad faith and without any color of title.They assert that the documents being used by
respondents to justify their intrusion, particularly Tax Declaration... were fraudulently acquired and are
patent nullities.
MTD
In their Answer and Motion to Dismiss incorporated in their Opposition, the respondents alleged that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because of the fact that the land subject
of the controversy is an ancestral land and that said controversy is among members of indigenous
peoples' groups. As such, the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
RTC
RTC dismissed the complaint on the finding that it is bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
since the case involves a dispute or controversy of property rights over an ancestral land between
members of the IP, jurisdiction properly pertains with the NCIP. The RTC held further that even if it
subscribes to the contention that both the trial courts and the NCIP have jurisdiction over the present
action, still jurisdiction should pertain to the latter under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners and ruled that the parties may litigate
before the NCIP.
petitioners assert that their complaint is an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving an interest in a
real property with an assessed value of more than P20,000.00, which is well within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Issues:NO... whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over their complaint such that it precludes the RTC from
taking cognizance of the case.
Ruling:NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IP only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP
group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if
the real issue involves a dispute over a land which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of
the ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP, but the RTC, which has the power to hear, try and decide the case.
The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either (1)
belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct
customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by
customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and
due process for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct
customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
As the RTC pointed out and likewise alleged by respondents, the parties herein are members of
indigenous groups and that the case involves a dispute among groups of indigenous people.[16] They do
not, however, belong to the same ICC/IP group.
it is the RTC, and not the NCIP, which has jurisdiction over the instant case. This is so even if it was also
found that the subject land appears to be classified as ancestral land.
Besides, it bears emphasis that... the allegations in petitioners' complaint neither alleged that the parties
are members of ICC/IP nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains
of ICC/IP. Rather, the allegations in their complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action
involving an interest in a real property with an assessed value of more than P20,000.00.
A court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter
does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers,
has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically
granted to it by the enabling statutes.
the NCIP's jurisdiction vested under Section 66 of the IPRA is merely limited and cannot be deemed
concurrent with the regular courts.
Thus, only when the claims involve the following matters shall the NCIP have primary jurisdiction
regardless of whether the parties are non-ICC/IP, or members of different ICC/IP groups: (1) adverse
claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (2) cancellation of
fraudulently issued Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title; and (3) disputes and violations of ICC/IP's
rights between members of the same ICC/IP group.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint before us, however, reveals that the present controversy
does not involve these matters cognizable by the primary jurisdiction of the NCIP. Hence, we reiterate
our finding that the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case.
RTC erred in dismissing the complaint before it, being the proper tribunal clothed with jurisdiction to
entertain the same.
HEIRS OF LATE SPS. ALEJANDRO RAMIRO v. SPS. ELEODORO, GR No. 196874, 2019-02-06
Facts: petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45. spouses Bacaron) filed Civil Case... before the
RTC against petitioners.In their amended complaint,[5] spouses Bacaron claimed that the father of
petitioners, the late Alejandro Ramiro (Alejandro), was the registered owner of Lot... that Alejandro and
his wife, Felicisima Llamada (spouses Ramiro), sold the property to spouses Bacaron... that spouses
Bacaron took possession of the property after the sale; that the property, however, was earlier
mortgaged by spouses Ramiro to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); that spouses Bacaron
paid the DBP... and that... petitioners forcibly dispossessed spouses Bacaron of the property.
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the amended complaint, raising the
following affirmative defenses: (a) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case considering that it
involves recovery of possession of the property;
RTC
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court's Decision to the CA. In their appeal, petitioners argued
that the main thrust of the complaint was to recover the property; yet, spouses Bacaron failed to allege
its assessed value. Petitioners, thus, asserted that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case
CA
CA rendered its assailed Decision,[15] dismissing the appeal and affirming the RTC Decision in toto. The
CA upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case.
MR
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA via its assailed
Resolution.
Issues:NO
Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Ruling:
Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
For instance, when the main relief sought is specific performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. When the action, on the other hand, primarily
involves title to, or possession of land, the court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the assessed value of the property.
while respondents claim that their amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as one for the
declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and for specific performance, the averments in their amended
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein reveal that the action primarily involves title to
or possession of real property. An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause
of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person
who owns property and (2) the property itself.
Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the Municipal Trial
Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint filed
before the RTC should be dismissed.
Furthermore, it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action.
DOCKET FEES... whether or not the correct amount of docket fees were paid, it is also necessary to
determine the true nature of the complaint.
Having settled that the action instituted by respondents is a real action and not one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the assessed
value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant.
respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property in their amended complaint. They also did
not allege its estimated value. As a result, the correct docket fees could not have been computed and
paid by respondents
Heirs of Spouses Ramiro v. Spouses Bacaron, G.R. No. 196874, February 6, 2019
FACTS: Respondents filed an action for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale or Specific
Performance, and recovery of possession, damages, attorney’s fees and injunction before the Regional
Trial Court, against the heirs of Spouses Ramiro, who they claimed dispossessed them of their
enjoyment of the subject property sold to them by the deceased spouses Ramiro. Respondents prayed,
among others, that to return unto them the possession of the subject property, and declare and uphold
the validity and effectivity of the sale between them and the deceased spouses. The petitioners, heirs of
the deceased spouses, contended among others that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case
considering that it involves recovery of possession of the property since the respondents failed to state
the assessed value of the subject property. Trial court decided in favor of respondents; CA affirmed said
judgment.
ISSUE: Does the present case involve an action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
Was the failure to state the assessed value of the property fatal in this case?
HELD: 1. NO. The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled
to some or all of the claims asserted therein. For instance, when the main relief sought is specific
performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
When the action, on the other hand, primarily involves title to, or possession of land, the court which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is determined by the assessed value of the property.
Here, while the respondents claim that their amended complaint before the RTC is denominated as one
for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and for Specific Performance, the allegations in their
amended complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein reveal that the action primarily
involves title to or possession of the real property. The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the
recovery of the property through the enforcement of its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro.
Their other causes of action for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in
their name, as well as for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of the property.
2. YES. Since the Supreme Court held that the action filed by respondents primarily involves title to or
possession of the subject property, there is a need for the complaint to allege the assessed value of the
property. Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the Municipal
Trial Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint
filed before the RTC should be dismissed.
Facts:The case stems from a long-standing land dispute between Nicasio Macutay (petitioner) and
Sosima Samoy, Alfredo Granil, Rene Acorda, Noblito Samoy, and Sibirino Roque (respondents). This
occurs over a parcel of land located in Barangay Liwanag, Tumauini, Isabela. Nicasio holds Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-20478 for 12 hectares, tracing ownership to his stepfather, Fortunato
Manuud. Respondents possess 3 hectares of this land, claiming tenancy under Urbana Casasola, the
holder of OCT No. P-4319 and later Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-8058 (issued to Eugenio
Vehemente, Urbana’s heir).
1. **1946-1955:** Urbana filed and later received a homestead patent approved by the Bureau of
Lands, leading to OCT No. P-4319 issuance.
2. **1955-1959:** Fortunato Manuud protested Urbana’s patent issuance. His appeals were dismissed
for lack of prima facie evidence of fraud.
3. **1960:** Fortunato’s heirs filed a certiorari petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI), leading to
a favorable decision but did not pursue the protest.
4. **1972:** Nicasio secured OCT No. P-20478 without further legal pursuit of Fortunato’s claims.
5. **2007:** Nicasio filed an “Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages,” which was dismissed by the RTC
for lack of possession evidence. On appeal, the CA also denied relief based on laches.
### Issues:
1. **Whether the validity of Nicasio’s Torrens title can be assailed in this case.**
– **Ruling:** The Supreme Court held that there was no collateral attack on Nicasio’s title. In the
context of an accion publiciana, which centers around possession rights rather than ownership disputes,
any incidental discussions regarding ownership remain provisional.
Facts:1997, Angelita Lagmay... acting as representative and attorney-in-fact of her daughter Annabel...
filed a complaint before the Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija.
sum... of P350,000.00 that Annabel sent to Michael... agreed to jointly invest their financial resources to
buy a truck.sent Michael the amount of P350,000.00... after... relationship has ended Michael allegedly
refused to return the money to Annabel The kasunduan was signed by Angelita Michael. When Michael
failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back to the Barangay, but the Barangay
Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a Certification to File Action.
After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or on January 15,
1999, Angelita filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Nueva Ecija, a Motion for Execution of the
kasunduan. Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that the MCTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in prematurely deciding the case.RTC... upheld the MCTC decision... arguing... the RTC granted
Michael's Motion for Reconsideration
Issues: Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless
of the amount involved
Ruling: In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan
The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction... to enforce the kasunduan regardless of the amount
involved.Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from
the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court.
Section 417 made no... distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue
involved.there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the...
amount.A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation where the words of a statute are clear,' plain and free from ambiguity.
Title: **Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System**
Facts:T he legal dispute began with the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS) filing
an unlawful detainer case against Orlando A. Villareal (and others claiming rights under
him) concerning premises in Quezon City. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), in its
decision dated October 30, 2000, dismissed the case for being prematurely filed and lacking
cause of action. MWSS appealed, and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 96 reversed the MeTC’s
judgment on September 27, 2002, ordering Villareal and others to vacate the premises and pay
compensation.The RTC decision became final and executory on December 15, 2002. However, a writ
ofexecution was only requested by MWSS years later, on May 17, 2004. Orlando Villareal’sopposition to
this request, citing compliance with the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, delayed action
further. It wasn’t until July 28, 2014, that the MeTC issued an ordergranting the motion for execution,
followed by the actual writ of execution on October 26, 2015. Daniel A. Villareal Jr., acting on behalf of
Orlando, then filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC Branch 215, challenging the delayed execution
as violating the five-year rule under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This petition was dismissed
by the RTC in decisions dated February 9, 2017, and a following order on May 17, 2017, upholding the
writ of execution.
Issues: The principal legal issue revolves around the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court—specifically, whether the execution request made by MWSS more than twelve years after the
RTC decision became final and executory was valid.
Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court granted Villareal’s petition, emphasizing the proper application of
rules concerning the execution of judgments. The Court highlighted a two-fold requirement: for a writ of
execution to be valid, the motion for its issuance must be filed within five years from the entry of
judgment, and the court must issue the writ within the same period. The Court pointed out that MWSS
filed the motion within the required time frame but the execution(issuance of the writ) took place well
beyond the five-year limit, rendering it null and void.
Doctrine:
© 2024 - batas.org | 2
The key doctrine reiterated in this decision centers on the execution of judgments as
executed by motion within five years from the entry of judgment; beyond this period,
execution must proceed by independent action. The case distinguishes between the
responsibilities of the judgment obligee and the court regarding these timelines,
emphasizing that any execution action taken beyond this period without proper filing for
Class Notes:– **Key Components**: Unlawful detainer, writ of execution, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
action), and the distinctions between direct execution within five years versus revived
execution by action after the five-year period and within ten years.
execution of judgment, distinguishing between the obligations of the filing party and the
adjudicating court to act within prescribed time limits. It further emphasizes the nullity of
Historical Background:
This case reflects ongoing challenges in the execution phase of judicial proceedings,
justice, illustrating the complexity of cases that hinge on procedural technicalities and the
Facts: Manotok Realty, Inc. filed an unlawful detainer case against Maria Perez; the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) in Manila ruled in favor of Manotok Realty on March 31, 1998. A Motion for Execution
was filed by Manotok Realty, Inc. and granted on July 27, 1998, with a writ of execution issued on
October 1, 1998. Maria Perez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 47 in Manila to nullify the proceedings. The RTC issued an order on
March 9, 1999, to hold actions on the case but did not grant a temporary restraining order.The parties
reached a Compromise Agreement on April 20, 1999, which the MeTC approved on July 15, 1999. Perez
later violated this agreement.The MeTC granted a motion for execution on May 4, 2001, and a writ of
execution was issued. On July 6, 2004, the Sheriff served a Writ of Execution and a Notice to Vacate to
Perez, which was not implemented due to communication from her counsel. The RTC Branch 47
dismissed Perez's petition on May 10, 2004, and the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed her appeal on
March 23, 2007.Perez's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on December 28, 2007, and
her petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 2, 2008. Following the finality of
the dismissal, Manotok Realty, Inc. filed a Motion to Enforce Writ of Execution on April 28, 2010,
granted on October 1, 2010.An Amended Order correcting the case title was issued on January 5, 2011.
Perez's motion for reconsideration was granted by the MeTC on March 15, 2011, setting aside the
earlier resolution. Manotok Realty, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 30, 2011, and
the RTC Branch 26 reversed the MeTC's decision on July 23, 2012.
Perez's petition for review was denied by the CA on January 14, 2014, affirming the RTC's decision,
with her motion for reconsideration also denied.
Issue: Whether Manotok Realty, Inc.'s right to execute the July 15, 1999, judgment has expired.
Whether the judgment in favor of Manotok Realty, Inc. can be executed by mere motion after five
years.
Ruling : The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari, affirming the Decision dated
January 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated November 28, 2014, of the ...
Ratio:Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a final and executory judgment can
be executed by motion within five years of its entry. Afterward, it may only be enforced by action before
being barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court acknowledged exceptions where execution by motion is permissible after five years on
meritorious grounds, particularly where delays are due to the judgment debtor's actions or other
uncontrollable circumstances.
Maria Perez's numerous petitions and appeals interrupted the enforcement of the judgment,
effectively suspending the five-year period for execution by motion.
The Supreme Court stressed the importance of finality in litigation, emphasizing that the prevailing
party should not be deprived of the judgment's benefits due to mere technicalities.
Decision Date
Nov 9, 2016
A group of occupants file a complaint to protect their improvements on a parcel of land in Manila,
claiming it belongs to the City of Manila, but the court dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to establish their legal or equitable title to the property.
lack of jurisdiction
legal title
equitable title
Concise
Comprehensive
Facts:
The case "Salvador v. Patricia, Inc." involves petitioners Guillermo Salvador, Remedios Castro, and
others.
They filed a complaint to protect their improvements on land along Juan Luna Street, Gagalangin,
Tondo, Manila.
Petitioners claimed the land belonged to the City of Manila and sought to prevent Patricia, Inc. from
evicting them.
They applied for a preliminary injunction pending the resolution of the quieting of title.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila.
The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, appointed three geodetic engineers to resolve the boundary dispute.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, permanently enjoining Patricia, Inc. from
evicting them and from collecting rentals.
The CA reversed the RTC's decision on June 25, 2010, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and failure to establish the petitioners' legal or equitable title.
Issue:
Did the CA err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction?
Did the petitioners have the necessary legal or equitable title to maintain a suit for quieting of title?
Was the joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title proper?
Ruling:
The CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners did not have the necessary legal or equitable title to maintain a suit for quieting of
title.
The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was improper....
Ratio: Jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value of the property as alleged in the
complaint.
The petitioners' complaint lacked any averment of the assessed value, leaving the trial court
without a basis to determine jurisdiction.
The RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment due to lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be vested by any act or omission of any party.
Petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit for quieting of title.
They did not claim ownership of the land and did not show any legal basis for their occupation.
The authenticity of the titles of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed by the
petitioners.
Petitioners could not expect any right in the property other than that of tolerated occupants.
Joinder of Actions:
The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was disallowed by the Rules of
Court.
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of special civil actions with ordinary
suits.
The RTC should have severed the causes of action and tried them separatel
GUILLERMO SALVADOR v. PATRICIA, GR No. 195834, 2016-11-09
Facts:This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied
by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective
improvements along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint
pending the quieting of title on the merits.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A
Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs.
Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging that he was similarly
situated as the other plaintiffs.
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and respondent
Patricia, Inc., the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as
commissioners,... the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc.,
permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective
premises, and from collecting any rentals from them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of
the commissioners who had found that the land belonged to the City of Manila
On appeal, the CA,... reversed the RTC's judgment... and dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that
the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for
quieting of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the
commissioners; opined that the RTC should have conducted hearings on the reports of the
commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for
quieting of title
Issues:The petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand either injunction or
quieting of title
Ruling:Even assuming that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for quieting of title, the
petitioners failed to allege and prove their interest to maintain the suit. Hence, the dismissal of this
cause of action was warranted.
An action to quiet title or remove the clouds over the title is a special civil action governed by the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, an action for quieting of title is
essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to put things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the
benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
To determine whether the petitioners as plaintiffs had the requisite interest to bring the suit, a resort to
the allegations of the complaint is necessary.
The petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself, and did not show their authority or other legal
basis on which they had anchored their alleged lawful occupation and superior possession of the
property. On the contrary, they only contended that their continued possession of the property had
been for more than 30 years; that they had built their houses in good faith; and that the area had been
declared an Area for Priority Development (APD) under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended. Yet,
none of such reasons validly clothed them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting
of title. For one, the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and Patricia, Inc. was not disputed but
was even admitted by them during trial. As such, they could not expect to have any right in the property
other than that of occupants whose possession was only tolerated by the owners and rightful
possessors. This was because land covered by a Torrens title cannot b e acquired by prescription or by
adverse possession.
Moreover, they would not be builders entitled to the protection of the Civil Code as builders in good
faith. Worse for them, as alleged in the respondent's comments,... which they did not deny, they had
been lessees of Patricia, Inc. Such circumstances indicated that they had no claim to possession in good
faith, their occupation not being in the concept of owners.
the Court observes that the fact that the area was declared an area for priority development (APD)
under Presidential Decree No. 1967, as amended, did not provide sufficient interest to the petitioners.
When an area is declared as an APD, the occupants would enjoy the benefits provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing
Machinery Thereof). In Frilles v. Yambao,... Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the occupants
of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true only if and when the owner of the property
decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first refusal accrue. Consequently, the right of
first refusal remained contingent, and was for that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable,
in the petitioners. Moreover, the CA's adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action
to quiet title was concerned was correct. The main requirement for the action to be brought is that
there is a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is alleged
and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their admission of the genuineness and
authenticity of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or
proceeding that was invalid, and thus the action must necessarily fail.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular
act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which
case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the
defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2)
the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Particularly, in actions
involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right
thereto by a proper action for the purpose.
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The records show,
however, that they did not have any right to be protected because they had established only the
existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any violation of the
boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the right of action in favor of the City of Manila only.
The dispute did not concern the petitioners at all.
Principles:WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED
Heirs of Dragon vs. The Manila Banking Corp.
Case
G.R. No. 205068
Decision Date
Mar 6, 2019
The Supreme Court dismisses the Complaint filed by Manila Banking against the Heirs
of Renato P. Dragon due to insufficient payment of filing fees, ruling that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and cannot rule on the issues of novation and
prescription as they are questions of fact not cognizable under a petition for review on
certiorari.
insufficient payment of filing fees
promissory notes
demand letters
Concise
Comprehensive
Facts:
The case involves the Heirs of Renato P. Dragon, represented by Patricia Angeli D.
Nubla, as petitioners, and The Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Banking) as the
respondent.
From 1976 to 1982, Renato P. Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking,
evidenced by four promissory notes totaling P6,945,642.00.
Each note stipulated interest, penalties, and attorney's fees.
In 1987, Manila Banking was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.
Several demand letters were sent to Dragon, the last dated August 12, 1998, demanding
P44,038,995.00.
Dragon failed to pay, leading Manila Banking to file a complaint for collection on
January 7, 1999.
Dragon claimed partial payment and novation of the debt, arguing that Kalilid Wood
Industries Corporation had assumed his obligations.
He also claimed that the action had prescribed.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Manila Banking, ordering Dragon to
pay the principal amount plus interest, penalties, and attorney's fees.
Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.
The Heirs of Dragon then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing insufficient
payment of docket fees by Manila Banking, which they claimed deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
1. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the complaint despite the alleged insufficient
payment of docket fees by Manila Banking?
2. Was there novation of Dragon's obligations to Manila Banking?
3. Had Manila Banking's cause of action prescribed?
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint due to the insufficient payment of docket fees by Manila Banking.
2. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of novation as it is a question of fact not
cognizable under a petition for review on certiorari.
3. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of prescription as ...
Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the payment of the correct amount of filing fees is
essential for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a case.
The Court found that Manila Banking only paid P34,975.75 based on the principal
amount of P6,945,642.00, while the total amount claimed, including inte