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Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
ranks of the assailants pressed them with swords and clubs.[743]
Short as was the distance to the fort, much time was occupied in
reaching it, and hardly a man escaped injury. Alvarado was severely
wounded, while one soldier and a number of allies were slain.

FOOTNOTES
[711] Cartas, 124; Cortés, Residencia, ii. 12. Bernal Diaz confirms that this was
effected long before dawn, while Herrera states that 300 held out till morning; but
he is contradictory. Carrasco, whom he assumes to be free, urged them to fall
upon the attacking party, who were scattered to plunder. But this was not done for
want of a leader. Nor did they favor his advice to plunder the baggage of Cortés,
which was protected only by Indians, and to embark with Diego Velazquez.
Carrasco accordingly proceeded alone to the baggage camp, and securing a
horse and lance he returned and urged them to follow. He had evidently
supernatural means wherewith to penetrate the besieging force. dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
iv. Duran allows Cortés to form ambuscades and leap walls, so that the arms are
secured ere the men of Narvaez can form in defence. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 453. Peter
Martyr disposes briefly of the matter, and assumes that the chief captains of
Narvaez were seduced. dec. v. cap. v.; Castellanos, Varones ilustres de Indias,
71-2; Galvano’s Discov., 144-5.

[712] ‘Cortes se mandò pregonar por Capitan general, y justicia mayor, de ambos
exercitos.’ Carrasco was three days in stocks before he yielded obedience.
Herrera, ubi sup. ‘Y todo esto era de noche, que no amanecia.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 99.

[713] ‘Viua, viua la gala de los Romanos, que siẽdo tan pocos, han vencido a
Narvaez!’ to which Guidelo, the negro jester of Narvaez, added, ‘Behold! the
Romans never performed such a feat.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 99. Herrera
speaks more at length of the sayings of this negro, who was rewarded with a
crown of gold worth 600 ducats. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[714] ‘I saw Narvaez in Spain in 1525, and heard him publicly denounce Cortés as
a traitor. He asked but royal permission to prove it, face to face with his enemy;
furthermore, he was a liar, a tyrant, and an ingrate. Narvaez had been betrayed by
those in whom he confided.’ Oviedo, iii. 316. Still, the chronicler cannot excuse his
carelessness nor his entering into parley with Cortés; and he told him so. iii. 316.
[715] Bernal Diaz mentions fifteen [a misprint of dos for doce makes it only five
deaths among Narvaez’ men, including Captain Rojas, Alférez Fuentes, who was
an hidalgo of Seville, and Carretero, one of the deserters from Cortés’ explorers.
Cortés lost four. Hist. Verdad., 99. Cortés prudently mentions to the king only two
deaths, but leaves it uncertain to what side they belonged. Cartas, 124. Gomara
claims them for Cortés, and states that Narvaez lost his eye, his honor, and
sixteen men. Hist. Mex., 148. Cortés lost two men and one wounded; Narvaez
eleven. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv. Cortés four, Narvaez eleven, besides many
wounded on both sides. Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 138. Solis supposes that
two wounded of Cortés’ army died, making four in all, while Narvaez lost fifteen.
Hist. Mex., ii. 101. One version claims that Narvaez lost fifteen by arms and six by
fire in the burning of the quarters, which is probably an exaggeration. Narvaez lost
all his property, including notes of hand. Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta,
Col. Doc., i. 442. The testimony in Cortés, Residencia, i. ii., varies from twelve to
sixteen for Narvaez.

[716] Oviedo looks on Cortés’ reasons as insufficient to justify his procedure, such
as ordering Narvaez to be seized, and demanding of him to exhibit a royal
commission, ‘as if Cortés had been appointed by the king.’ Velazquez, as the
principal who sent him forth, had every right to remove him. iii. 316.

[717] Bernal Diaz places the number at 1500, while Ceballos raises it to 3000,
under Heredia, and places the arrival a day or two later. Herrera assumes that
they came in time to march with Cortés on Cempoala. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. i.

[718] Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, names Francisco de Lugo as the captain of
this party, but Tirado states that he had been sent back to Mexico as an adherent
of Velazquez. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 6. ‘Dió con los once navios que el dicho mi
parte allí tenia, al través, é les fizo quemar.’ Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta,
Col. Doc., i. 442. Bernal Diaz also intimates that all but two vessels were
destroyed when the army proceeded to Mexico and one afterward. Hist. Verdad.,
109. It is not probable, however, that more than a few were destroyed, because
unseaworthy. Some were wrecked a few months later.

[719] ‘Por Almirãte, y Capitan de la mar ... al qual dizen que le dió primero buenos
tejuelos de oro.’ His baptismal name was either Juan or Pedro. Two vessels were
still expected to arrive. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 100, 113. Caballero was
probably an old friend. ‘Pedro de Maluenda criado de Diego Velazquez, que venia
por mayordomo de Naruaez, recogio y guardo los nauios y todo la ropa y
hazienda.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 148. By Cortés’ order, adds Herrera.

[720] ‘Envié otros docientos hombres á la villa de la Veracruz.’ Cortés, Cartas,

125. Clavigero assumes that Cortés at this time already gave orders for removing
Villa Rica southward, but events interfered with the project. Storia Mess., iii. 120.
[721] ‘Cortés le [Narvaez] tuvo preso con muy ásperas prisiones tres años, poco
mas ó menos, é con guardias que nadie no le pudiese ver; é aquellos pasados, le
quitó las prisiones é le tuvo preso otros dos años.’ So says Narvaez’ agent.
Demanda de Ceballos, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 442-3. The testimony in Cortés,
Residencia, reduces the term to two years, and intimates that several other men
were kept at Villa Rica, under surveillance at least. i. 223, 362-3, et seq.

[722] Narvaez claims to have been robbed of 100,000 castellanos’ worth of

effects, and it is not likely that his property was restored. See Demanda de
Ceballos, ubi sup. Bernal Diaz had to surrender a horse fully accoutred, two
swords, three daggers, and other effects. Hist. Verdad., 100. Santa Clara intimates
that the horses and arms were not as a rule restored. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 169.
If so, compensation was probably given, according to the Relacion hecha por el
Señor Andrés de Tápia, sobre la Conquista de México. This is one of the most
valuable documents extant on the earlier period of the conquest, but it is
unfortunately only a fragment, which takes up the narrative from the eve of leaving
Cuba, and carries it to the capture of Narvaez, relating with rather uneven
completeness the principal incidents of the voyage to Vera Cruz, the march to
Mexico, the stay there, and the operations against the forces of Velazquez. Andrés
de Tápia appears from his own statement to have been a poor nephew of
Governor Velazquez, to whom he presented himself just in time to join the
expedition of Cortés. At this time, says Bernal Diaz, he was about 24 years old, of
good build, with a grave face, slight beard, and somewhat ashy complexion. Hist.
Verdad., 246. He took an active part in the leading wars and expeditions during
and after the conquest, and became one of the most noted among the captains,
favored by Cortés, with whom he was frequently associated, accompanying him
also on a voyage to Spain. Settling in Mexico, he died there peacefully, long after
1539, to judge from his reference to this date. His narrative, as may be supposed,
is a panegyric upon his leader and patron, and some statements have accordingly
to be weighed, but this defect impairs the importance of only a few passages, the
rest being highly valuable, and many of them unique in their testimony. Guided by
a reference in Bibl. de Autores Esp., xxii., Señor Icazbalceta of Mexico obtained,
after great trouble, a copy of the apparent original from the Royal Academy of
History, Madrid, entitled: Relacion de algunas cosas de las que acaecieron al Muy
Ilustre Señor Don Hernando Cortés, etc. This he published in his Coleccion de
Documentos, ii. 554-94. The last three pages form an appendix of brief remarks
on the inhabitants and resources of New Spain.

[723] Gomara, Hist. Mex., 149. ‘Dos dias después de preso el dicho Narvaez,
porque en aquella ciudad no se podia sostener tanta gente ... despaché dos
capitanes.’ Cortés, Cartas, 125. Cortés writes that before leaving for Mexico he
sent Mexican envoys to obtain the friendship and allegiance of the lord of Pánuco.
This was at once offered, and presents were exchanged. Id., 56-7, 125, 144-45.
Cortés was either deceived or he invented the story to counteract Garay’s
schemes. Bernal Diaz names Ordaz for Goazacoalco and Velazquez for Pánuco;
but it has entirely escaped his memory or notes that Velazquez had already been
charged to form a colony in Goazacoalco, for which he was also better fitted, while
Ordaz was more suited for rough warfare in Pánuco. This author gives to each
120 men, twenty of them from the ranks of Cortés, ‘porq̄ teniã mas experiẽcia en
la guerra.’ Hist. Verdad., 100. The 200 allowed by others may include the ship-
crews. Herrera places 300 men under Ordaz. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. iv.

[724] For description of the feast, so as better to understand what follows, see
Native Races, ii. 317-21, iii. 422-8.

[725] Oviedo refers the council and its acts only to the time immediately preceding
Cortés’ departure, iii. 509.

[726] ‘Esto afirmaron muchas mugeres, de las quales se sabia siẽpre la verdad.’
Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. viii.

[727] ‘Nos quitaron la comida e enbiando por ella no nos la quisieron dar e nos
davan de palos a las naborias e estando lavando una yndia de las nuestras la
hahogaron e dezian e publicavan que asy avian de hazer a los españoles.’
Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66. This testimony is confirmed by a number of
his followers.

[728] ‘Con muchas escalas para subir y matar a los españoles.’ Id., 67. Martin, in
Id., 144.

[729] ‘Le prince acolhua Tecocoltzin.’ Brasseur de Bourbourg, Hist. Nat. Civ., iv.
287.

[730] ‘A number of poles were raised in the court-yard, destined, as I was told, to
impale the Spaniards, one taller than the rest upon the pyramid being reserved for
me.’ Alvarado, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 66.

[731] Alvarado’s statements with regard to reports and signs of revolt, and to the
confession of several natives, is confirmed by a number of witnesses, including
the clergyman Juan Diaz. Id., 66, 113, et seq. Tapia, who is arrayed against
Alvarado, intimates that torture induced the natives to give the confirmation of the
plot as desired by the Spanish captain, and that the interpreter was unreliable.
One witness declares that the uprising was understood to be planned to take
place within ten days; another says on the day following the torture, intimating that
it was to be after the great dances. Id., 37, 150. ‘Alvarado dixo, que luego le auian
de venir a dar guerra ... que lo supo de vn Papa, y de dos Principales, y de otros
Mexicanos.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 102.
[732] Tapia’s testimony to this and other criminating points is particularly valuable,
as he was a bitter opponent of Alvarado. The latter states that Montezuma
declared himself powerless to prevent the premeditated sacrilege to the Christian
images. Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 36-7, 66-7. But this plea, if made,
must, according to other accounts, be interpreted to apply only to pagan
ceremonies, held almost before the images, and which might be regarded as a
sacrilege. Torquemada writes that arms had been collected within the temple and
everything prepared for the day when the Spaniards attended by invitation to
witness the dance of the nobles. At a given signal an evidently simultaneous
attack was to be made on the assembled guests and on the fort, thus taking the
Spaniards at a disadvantage. Jars stood prepared, filled with certain liquids,
wherein to cook their bodies for the feast. i. 489-90. The general inclination of
those who follow the Spanish version, of which Torquemada, usually so stanch for
the natives, is here the best exponent, has been to assume that the attack was
arranged for the day of the great dances; and this is not unlikely, although the
original writers and their commentators appear to be ignorant of or oblivious to
certain features of the festival. Another view has been to place the attack during
the installation of the new image of the war-god. This ceremony belonged to the
preceding day, a fact not as a rule understood, and therefore the source of much
confusion. Brasseur de Bourbourg, who is clearest on these points, assumes that
the raising of the idol would involve the casting forth of the Christian emblems, and
be the signal for attack. But evidences are conclusive that the natives were not
ready on that day. They were too occupied with the celebration, and Alvarado, with
his small force, was not so negligent as to wait till the last moment, when the
enemy was fully prepared. He and several of his men indicate clearly enough that
they attended the temple at the installation. The uprising must therefore have been
appointed for the following or even a later day. See note 25. Vetancurt, Teatro
Mex., iii. 139, is among the authorities who follow the version of Torquemada in
general. One of the fervid-minded witnesses of Alvarado repeats the account of
pots and jars for cooking the Spaniards. Helps supposes that Huitzilopochtli’s
festival had not yet been entered upon, and that Tezcatlipoca’s image is the one in
question; but the Spaniards, who knew the difference between these idols, all
affirm that the celebration of the war-god was now held. See Ramirez, Proceso
contra Alvarado, 69, 113, 130, 137, and 150.

[733] This received support from his neglect to interfere when supplies were cut
down. Even Tapia refers to a change in his disposition, and to Alvarado’s
displeasure thereat, but his words may apply to the stoppage either of supplies or
of presents. Id., 36. Want of power could not be pleaded by Montezuma, because
a few days later, when the natives were far more embittered both against the
Spaniards and against their captive sovereign, the latter was able by a mere
appeal to stay their onslaught. The testimony speaks not only of an undermined
wall and scaling ladders, but of weapons, ‘porras y otras armas,’ and of
conspirators within the fort. Id., 67, 113, et seq. Gomara says that his love for the
Spaniards has been denied by some. Hist. Mex., 154-5; but Bernal Diaz will not
believe Montezuma guilty of conspiracy. Hist. Verdad., 102. The grief of the
Spaniards at his death, and the care taken of his children, indicate that they and
the crown regarded him as loyal.

[734] ‘Los españoles lo requirieron al dicho D. Pedro.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra

Alvarado, 150. Tapia pretends that he objected. Id., 37.

[735] Alvarado and his men in more than one instance indicate the day when the
dough idol was raised. Id., 67, 113, 134. Ixtlilxochitl points to the following greater
day, which he dates May 19th. Relaciones, 412. Sahagun is not so definite, but his
editor accepts the chief day, calling it whitsunday, May 27th. Hist. Conq. (ed.
1840), 99. In another place he says May 25th. Tezcuco en los ultimos tiempos,
274. One of Alvarado’s men states that it was a Thursday. Ramirez, Proceso
contra Alvarado, 131.

[736] The testimony of the conquerors, confirmed by native paintings and records,
leaves no doubt that the dance of the nobles and the massacre took place in the
great temple adjoining the fort. Ramirez, Proceso, 37 et seq. Acosta writes,
however, that they occurred in the palace, Hist. Ind., 522, and he is partly right,
since a massacre was carried out here also. Clavigero follows Acosta, and
assumes that the fort is meant. He argues that the dance was held there so that
the emperor might, as customary, be present, and that a massacre could not have
been undertaken by so few Spaniards in the great temple, where the arsenals
were situated, and where the concourse of people must have been very large.
Storia Mess., iii. 118. The Spaniards had forbidden the use of arms during the
festival, and none appear to have been produced in the temple. Among other
precautions Alvarado appears to have insisted on a small attendance beyond that
of nobles, and most authorities so accept it.

[737] Torquemada says 50 men; the Tlascaltecs are seldom counted.

[738] ‘Que no quedaron sino el dicho Montezuma y quinze o veynte criados,’ says
the charge against Alvarado. Ramirez, Proceso, 4, 20, 37, 43. This generally
ignored part of the massacre finds also indirect confirmation in the diffuse
testimony to the finding of concealed weapons among the attendants of
Montezuma. Alvarado would not have failed to punish them for this.

[739] Ixtlilxochitl, Relaciones, 412. ‘Este bayle es como el Netoteliztli.’

‘Mazeualiztli: que quiere dezir Merecimiento con trabajo.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex.,
150.

[740] See Native Races, ii. 288-9.

[741] ‘Fue al patio donde estava el Oechilobos e vi mucha gente junta para le
subir e defendiendolo venia mucha gente los quales comensaron a pelear con
nosotros.’ Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 67. This is a mere excuse evidently,
which none attempt to support, definitely at least; but it sounded well to say that
the actual fight began on the native side, as had the plotting. One of Brasseur de
Bourbourg’s unique manuscripts states that the first attack by the Spaniards was
upon those who were advancing with the idol. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 287. ‘Este testigo
desfizo el ydolo que los dichos yndios tenian para sobir donde estava Nuestra
Señora.’ Nuño Pinto, in Ramirez, 134.

[742] There were from 300 to 400 dancers, nearly all chiefs, and an audience of
from 2000 to 3000, says Tapia; and from the wording of the accusation against
Alvarado it appears that all the chiefs were killed, and a number of the rest,
besides those slaughtered in the fort. Ramirez interprets the native painting to
signify 400, most likely of the nobles only, Id., 4, 37, 286; 400 killed, Cortés,
Residencia, i. 41; over 600 nobles slaughtered in one hour, Cano, in Oviedo, iii.
550; 600 to 1000 nobles and caciques, Gomara; over 1000 nobles, Ixtlilxochitl,
Relaciones, 412, and Brasseur de Bourbourg. ‘Fué tan grande el derramamiento
de sangre, que corrian arroyos della por el patio como agua cuando mucho
llueve.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 100. He gives sickening details of
truncated bodies, of dismembered hands and feet, and of draggling entrails.
Father Duran goes to an extreme in his account, according to which Alvarado
prompted the deed, and Cortés executed it. From 8000 to 10,000 illustrious men
were summoned through Montezuma to assemble in the temple, in order to permit
Cortés to kill them and thus become master in the country. He places ten soldiers
at each gate, and sends in ten to commit the slaughter. Hist. Ind., MS. ii. 456-9.
Las Casas is not so absurd, this time at least, but close behind him in the
estimate, for he states that the slaughter was carried on in different parts of the
city at the same time, and in one place alone about 2000 young nobles fell.
Prescott misinterprets him. ‘Non procul à palatio aberant, duo circiter millia
juvenum nobilium.... Ad hos se contulit Hispanorum Capitaneus, & alios ad
reliquas urbis partes, in quibus hæ choreæ celebrabantur, misit, ... non cessabunt
celebrare & lamentari ... calamitatem,’ etc. Regio. Ind. Devastat., 32.

[743] Tapia, and others, in Ramirez, 38, 67, 131. Torquemada assumes that the
arms used by the assailants were those which had been collected for the outbreak
in the houses adjoining the temple, i. 490. As regards the motives for the
massacre, the Spanish authorities seek as a rule to justify them, while the native
accounts are equally inclined to ascribe them to greed or to wanton cruelty.
According to Sahagun the celebration was held at the instance of Alvarado, who
slaughtered the devotees without known cause. Hist. Conq., 27 (ed. 1840), 100.
Duran, who is as prejudiced as he is blundering, dates the massacre after the
return of Cortés from the coast. Alvarado persuades him to secure the submission
of the country by killing all the lords and chiefs, and they are accordingly allured to
their death. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 456-7. Las Casas inclines to a similar motive; ‘quo
magis cresceret, & augeretur in his provinciis formido illorum crudelitatis.’ Regio.
Ind. Devastat., 30. Nearer the truth comes Ixtlilxochitl, who, while disposed to
credit his countrymen, dares not accuse the Spaniards, and so takes the prudent
middle course of casting the blame on the Tlascaltecs. Prompted by the hatred
bred of former wrongs inflicted by Mexicans, and by greed for spoils, they invent
charges of treason and speedy revolt. Alvarado, being also avaricious, is readily
induced to believe them, and considers it besides a good opportunity to obtain
control by dispatching the assembled chiefs, unarmed as they are. Hist. Chich.,
300; Relaciones, 389, 412. Ixtlilxochitl is not to blame for his assumption, since his
admired guide, the biographer of Cortés, does not attempt to defend Alvarado, but
merely mentions that he was influenced either by reports of a proposed uprising or
by avarice. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 151. The commentator Chimalpain says bluntly
that the latter motive ‘es mas de creer.’ Hist. Conq., i. 281; Benzoni, Mondo
Nuovo, 94; Pizarro y Orellana, Varones Ilvstres, 92. Vetancurt rather condemns
Alvarado for acting on insufficient evidence. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 139-40. Cortés’
silence respecting the cause may be attributed to his usual prudence in
suppressing unpleasant facts. He states, however, that Montezuma supplicated
him not to be annoyed at what had happened, since he regretted it as much as the
Spaniards. This implies that the Indians were regarded as originators of the
trouble. The severity with which he treated the emperor on his return to Mexico,
notwithstanding the efforts made by him to save the Spaniards, indicates still more
strongly that Cortés was convinced of Mexican treachery. Cartas, 126 et seq. In
the letter of the army to the emperor the uprising is attributed to Narvaez’ plots.
Carta del Ejército, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 429. Herrera notices the native
versions, particularly that which accuses the Tlascaltecs of having trumped up
charges against the Mexicans, but he affirms, ‘la verdad fue, que pensaron matar
los Castellanos.’ He thereupon enumerates proofs of the plot. dec. ii. lib. x. cap.
viii. Torquemada, who is more fully acquainted with native accounts, condemns
them as unreliable, and states that Sahagun accepted them without investigation,
i. 489-91. The charge that Alvarado was influenced by avarice is promptly rejected
by Bernal Diaz. ‘No lo creo, ni nunca tal oí, ni es de creer que tal hiziesse.’ His
motive was to inspire terror and inflict such injury as to prevent the Indians from
attacking him. That they intended to attack, Bernal Diaz fully believes. Hist.
Verdad., 102. Solis is quite indignant at the supposition that avarice impelled the
Spaniards. Hist. Mex., ii. 117. According to Oviedo the intention of the natives was
to kill also Cortés on his return. He inserts without comment the version of Cano,
married to Montezuma’s daughter, that avarice was the motive, iii. 510, 550.
Acosta, who generally adheres to native versions, does not apparently find them
reliable in this case, since he merely says that a ‘chastisement’ was inflicted, but
that it was excessive. Hist. Ind., 522. This is also the opinion of Clavigero, who
believes that the Spaniards were deceived by Tlascaltec stories of a plot, and
wished to anticipate it, on the principle that ‘chi assalisce vince. Checchessia, la
sua condotta non può scusarsi d’imprudenza, e di crudeltà.’ Storia Mess., iii. 119.
This view has been widely adopted, even by the modern Mexican historian
Carbajal Espinosa, plagiarist though he be. Hist. Mex., ii. 339. His confrère
Bustamante, as editor of Sahagun, is inclined to magnify even the exaggerations
of the latter. Prescott wavers between Clavigero’s views and disbelief in Alvarado’s
apology. But in expressing his opinion he misconstrues Bernal Diaz and raises
some meaningless questions. Mex., ii. 284-6. There is no doubt that the Indians
were bent on mischief. A large faction had been hostile to the Spaniards ever
since their arrival, as intruders who menaced the existing politic, economic, and
religious order. This feeling had been steadily spreading under the threatening
attitude assumed by the unbidden guests in seizing the emperor, in extorting
tribute, and in assuming mastery. With the occupation of the temple by the
Christian emblems the climax was reached; and now the whole population
became possessed with a desire to avenge not only the outraged idols, but
themselves and their sovereign, and to uphold the tottering throne. The
observations of the Spaniards and the reports of their informers were correct in
pointing to an uprising, to take place during the gathering of pilgrims for the war-
god festival, when the reduced number of the Spanish garrison favored the
design. The confession of several natives, whether extorted by torture or not,
confirmed the charges and justified belief. Alvarado could not as a prudent
commander ignore them, and duty required him to use prompt measures for the
protection of his force, and of the interests of his king and the expedition. It might
be urged by those who seek to defend this kind of thing that seizure of the victims
for hostages would have been equally effective and more humane; but from the
precedence established by the general himself at Cholula the conduct of the rash
Alvarado is scarcely to be wondered at. Cortés’ object had been to strike terror as
the only effective lesson for a people who seemed to recognize no other sway,
and if this was regarded as necessary with the Cholultecs, Alvarado must have
held it to be doubly so now. His position was far more critical than that at the
former city, for his resources were smaller, the prospect of aid was hopeless, and
escape was cut off. He had to strike promptly and strike well. Here were the
leaders, and here the temple, wherein a punishment would apparently have
greater effect. It was natural to suppose that the installation of the war-god would
be attended by the leaders or representative men of the enemy; and to level the
blow at this class must be considered as less cruel at least than to strike the
multitude, as at Cholula. Perhaps the recognition of this was a reason for the
silence of Cortés. All this discussion, however, as to the minor motives prompting
a dastardly deed I do not regard as very relevant. I am very sure that the motives
of the Spaniards in this massacre were not plunder. They were playing for a higher
stake, for the whole country, and, in case they won, all in it would be theirs. The
present heavy blow was but one of the points in the game.
 CHAPTER XXIII.
UPRISING OF THE AZTECS.

May-June, 1520.

Character of the Aztecs—Spanish Quarters—The City in Arms—Growing

Hatred toward the Invaders—Perilous Position of Alvarado—
Montezuma Called to Interfere—Failing Provisions—Miraculous Water
—Cortés to the Rescue—Rendezvous at Tlascala—The City and its
People—The Army Joins Alvarado—Desperate Encounters.

The Spaniards had mistaken somewhat the character of the

Aztecs. Ground to the dust by political despotism and bloody
superstition, their features had assumed a melancholy cast and their
form the attitude of humility. Yet beneath all slumbered a ferocity the
most blood-thirsty among the Nahua nations. And now, though their
nature might be as cold and impassive as the stone of the pavement,
the iron heel of the conqueror had struck fire from it.
Before the fort the angry throng increased, until the whole city
seemed to have gathered there. On the roofs and in the courts fell
showers of arrows, stones, and darts, and charge after charge was
made at the entrances. Attempts were also made both to scale and
undermine the walls, and some resorted to battering, until it seemed
to the besieged as if the whole habitation was coming down upon
their heads.
 The structure consisted of a vast irregular pile of stone buildings,
one story in height, and raised, like most of the pretentious edifices,
on a pyramidal foundation, which was low and difficult to undermine
or beat down. An occasional tower relieved the monotony of the
outline and offered a view over the neighborhood. Beside the smaller
courts inclosed by the buildings, a larger yard appears to have been
formed by a stout wall, within which the allies had erected temporary
shelter. This was the weakest point, and here the battering parties
were chiefly collected. The flanks and curtains of modern fortification
were wanting, and the protection of the wall face depended on the
turrets which rose here and there, and on the parapets, with their few
embrasures.
Though attempting no sortie beyond the immediate vicinity of the
gates, the Spaniards were not sparing of powder and arrows, and
picked off the more presumptuous assailants, while their pikes and
swords did good service at the parapets and openings. The cannon,
however, loaded as they were with small shot and scraps, which
brought down a dozen or more at a time, were the only weapons that
could hold the enemy in check. On one occasion, when a charging
party had approached in a somewhat wavering column to carry the
main entrance, the cannon charge failed to explode, owing to
dampness. This the assailants were quick to observe, and with yells
of encouragement they rushed forward, and were soon in a hand-to-
hand conflict with a party which had sallied to break the first column.
The Spaniards plied their swords and pikes with desperation,
supported by a desultory fire from the musketeers and archers of the
fort, but without effect. The gaps made by their weapons were
quickly filled with fresh warriors, and the sallying party was obliged to
fall back with the loss of two soldiers, who were captured alive and
devoted to sacrifice. It was a critical moment, for the enraged horde
was about to follow them into the quarters. Just then, as if touched
by invisible fire, the powder ignited, sending from the cannon its
death-dealing missiles, mowing a path through the crowd of
pursuers. The Mexicans were appalled and speedily thrown into
disorder, of which the Spaniards were not slow to take advantage.
Nor was this the only miracle of the day; for it is alleged that the
virgin, and he of the dazzling white steed, both appeared fighting on
the side of the Spaniards, and bringing defeat and confusion upon
their assailants, as at Tabasco and Tlascala.[744]
Thus closed the first day of Alvarado’s chivalrous doings, during
which a large number were wounded, although there were but six
killed,[745] not including allies. A portion of the quarters, with a
quantity of ammunition and supplies, had been burned, and a large
breach made in the wall. The brigantines were also burned, the
bridges raised, and barricades erected in different parts of the city;
while the supply of provisions was cut off. Even after darkness had
stilled the fury of the warriors the unhappy people remained before
the Spanish quarters, and with outstretched arms and dishevelled
hair they lifted up their voices, crying, “You are doomed, you vile
things! But for your thunder and your fortress walls, curses on them,
you would now be killed and cooked. And you shall be, unless you
instantly release Montezuma and depart. You shall meet with holy
death, and be cooked with chilmole, and be given as food to the
eagles and the beasts, for your flesh is bitter, as we have found, and
not fit for men to eat. Why does not the earth swallow you alive? Oh
ye gods! ye gods! unmoved all, all but the devilish gods of these
devilish men. But our mighty ones, whom you have outraged, shall
yet give you your deserts. If they do not, we shall; nor shall they
escape, the despicable ones of Tlascala, your slaves, who serve you
as women and hire out the wives of their lords!” Thus raved the
heart-broken.
So critical had become his condition on the second day that
Alvarado appealed to Montezuma to exert his influence to stay the
assailants, intimating that if the Spaniards perished so would the
Aztec king. Montezuma’s overtures were not received with
enthusiasm by the people; nevertheless aggressive operations were
reduced to desultory attacks.[746] Water was greatly needed by the
besieged, and again the good fortune of the Spaniards, which hardly
ever forsook them, came to their aid. Digging, under inspiration or
desperation, they struck fresh water within the fortress,[747] and
offered thanksgiving.
Communication was shortly after established between Alvarado
and Cortés. Several Tlascaltecs and Cholultecs were despatched by
different routes to the coast, and a courier arrived from Cempoala
and gained entrance to the fort.[748] Ordering Velazquez and Ordaz
to abandon their mission and direct their march to Tlascala, Cortés
hastened preparations to join them there. A garrison of one hundred
men was left at Villa Rica, under Rodrigo Rangel, a relative of the
general,[749] and about thirty men remained at Cempoala to take
charge of the sick and wounded, and some baggage, with orders to
follow as soon as possible.
The route to the plateau lay partly through a bleak and desert
country, and the inhabitants being beside less friendly than before,
the army would have found it difficult to obtain supplies; but Cortés
had gathered experience from his previous march, and Tlascala was
entered in the middle of June.[750] A hearty reception was accorded,
and more encouraging news obtained from Mexico, showing that the
siege maintained its passive character. Reinforcements were
nevertheless urgent, since a fresh outbreak might at any time occur.
A message was again sent to gladden the garrison with promises of
speedy relief.[751]
Including the troops under Velazquez and Ordaz the muster-roll
showed about eleven hundred men, with some eighty horses, one
hundred cross-bows, and eighty fire-arms, besides several cannon,
and a large quantity of ammunition.[752] The heart of the company,
however, was the veterans of Cortés, whose superior discipline and
familiarity with native warfare made them doubly reliable. Eager for a
fray with the detested Aztecs, and desirous of excusing their refusal
of men a month before, the Tlascaltecs offered not only supplies but
large reinforcements, of which only two thousand were accepted,
besides a small number from Cholula and Huexotzinco.
The more northerly route by way of Calpulalpan, recommended
already on the former march as the easiest, was this time selected,
partly with a view to obtain provisions more readily.[753] As the lake
region was approached evidences were seen of the revolt in
deserted villages and in the sullen demeanor of the few Indians who
showed themselves. The contrast was chilling indeed as compared
with the reception accorded on the former occasion, when the
journey resembled the triumphal march of gods. Oppressed with
misgivings the army entered Tezcuco, the seat of the Acolhua kings,
a few leagues north of Mexico, on the border of the same lake.
It was one of the most ancient cities of the country, ranking since
the early half of the eighth century as the capital of a dominion
founded by Tezcatlipoca, the later supreme deity of the Nahuas.
After the fall of the Toltec empire it took the leading position in
Anáhuac, as the centre of Chichimec power. The new dynasty
fostered the inherited culture in every way, and made the city not
only the political capital, but the Athens of the country. The rise of the
Aztecs gave it a rival in Mexico, which in course of the fifteenth
century assumed the political sceptre, but Tezcuco still maintained
the precedence in culture and elegance. It was said to contain one
hundred and forty thousand houses, distributed among different
suburbs, and extending with their smiling gardens from the border of
the lake to a distance of from three to four leagues. The six divisions
of the city were crossed by a series of fine streets lined with tasteful
and costly buildings. Among the finest structures were the two
palaces, which are claimed to have excelled those of Mexico. The
older, the Huetecpan, wherein the poet-king Nezahualcoyotl held his
court, formed a magnificent monument of his artistic taste. It lay
upon a triple terrace bathed by the lake, and was surrounded by an
immense wall, from fifteen to twenty-five feet high, inclosing two
large squares. Within this precinct were the council-chambers, the
halls for various arts and sciences, and the royal apartments. The
pleasure-grounds, almost hedged by cedars, were filled with shady
groves, traversed by labyrinthian paths, and interspersed with well
stocked ponds and aviaries, baths, and sparkling fountains. The new
palace, which occupied a smaller space, excelled in imposing
architecture and in comforts of the most varied character.
Beside these there were a number of summer resorts in the
neighborhood, conspicuous among them the fine palace of
Tezcocingo, a prototype of Chapultepec, and like it overlooking the
capital from a hill, two leagues to the east. An aqueduct of stone
supplied two reservoirs on the summit, whence the water was
distributed over grounds intersected by canals with meandering
currents and picturesque cascades. The palace lay almost hidden
within groves of gigantic cedar and cypress, revealing to the rapt
beholder pavilions of marble, tessellated pavements, and playing
fountains with statuary of unique form.[754]
The Spaniards found none to welcome them, but were allowed
unmolested to take up their quarters in the palace. Shortly afterward
a canoe arrived from Mexico[755] with an imperial messenger and a
Spaniard,[756] bearing the cheering news that everything had been
quiet in the capital for some time, and that supplies, which had been
scantily furnished only against heavy payments, had now become
more liberal. Montezuma sent word that the city would return to its
normal condition the moment Cortés entered it, and he expressed a
hope that no ill-will would be entertained toward him for what had
happened, since this had been beyond his control, and had grieved
him as much as the Spaniards. Reassuring messages were
forwarded to Villa Rica.
After a stay of four days the army proceeded from Tezcuco by
the northern shore of the lake, and camped for the night at
Tepeyacac, the terminus of the northern causeway from Mexico.[757]
On entering this place the horse of Solis, Casquete, stepped into a
hole on the bridge and broke a leg, throwing its rider into the water.
This was looked on as a bad omen, particularly by an astrologer
soldier named Botello, but Cortés made light of it, saying, “Troubles
at St John’s festival bring peace for the year.”[758] The following
morning, St John’s day, the army entered the capital. On all sides an
ominous silence prevailed. The streets were deserted, the houses
apparently abandoned, and the solitary native occasionally seen
hovered in the distance like a shadow.[759] It was also noticed with
apprehension that many of the canal bridges were removed. On
approaching the Axayacatl palace the arrival was heralded by
trumpet blasts, which called forth responsive shouts from the
garrison. Throwing open the gates, the besieged received their
deliverers with the most extravagant demonstrations of joy.[760] For
greater accommodation a part of the troops were quartered in the
great temple adjoining the fort.
The unpleasant aspect of affairs, so apparent during the last
days of the march, had ruffled the temper of Cortés, and his
treatment of Alvarado was not altogether cordial. Still, as he had
ever been a close friend, and as he was an invaluable officer, brave
and influential, he deemed it prudent to go no further than to express
a curt disapproval of his rashness.[761] Indeed, an inquiry into the
causes and results of the massacre could criminate Alvarado no
further than the Cholula affair did himself. The captain had acted in
full accord with his party, and whatever blame might attach must be
shared by all. Dissension would never answer, and so the matter
was dropped. But the ill-temper which the general dared not wreak
on his own men found a ready object in Montezuma. The conduct of
Cortés in this respect was most ungenerous. It shows the several
sides of humanity: how odious in some respects are those who
appear to the best advantage in other respects. This poor king had a
superstitious sympathy, a maudlin affection for the captain, who,
considering his own infamous conduct toward him, might at least
have saved the captive unnecessary mental suffering. As Cortés
entered the fort Montezuma stepped out of his apartment to
welcome him. The cavalier passed by the king in lofty disdain,
ignoring his presence. Cut to the quick, the monarch shrank back,
apparently more stunned by this treatment than by the late terrible
slaughter of his subjects.[762] He retired deeply chagrined to pour his
sorrow into Olmedo’s ear. “What can I do?” he cried; “he loves gold
and fame, and I will give him a life-size equestrian statue of himself
in gold if he will but be kind to me.”
With the arrival of the main forces supplies were stopped, as if in
protest, and Cortés became only the more irritated. Accordingly,
when two chiefs appeared on behalf of the emperor to ask for an
interview they were repulsed with the insulting epithet of ‘dogs!’
Velazquez and other officers remonstrated against the policy of this
rudeness to one who had interfered to save his troops. “What
consideration can I have for a dog?” was the dastardly rejoinder.
“Was he not willing to treat with Narvaez, and does he not now seek
to starve us?” Persuaded presently of the necessity for imperial
interposition, he addressed the chiefs roughly, “Tell your master,
Montezuma, to order markets to be held at once, or there will be
trouble.” His tone and gesture were sufficient indications to the chiefs
of the insults offered to them and their august lord, and they failed
not to give them full force in their report. In answer to the demand
Montezuma said that he and his chief officials were prisoners, and
that nothing could be effected without the release of one among
them. Cortés saw the necessity, and, without considering the result,
released Cuitlahuatzin, lord of Iztapalapan, the emperor’s brother,
and generalissimo of the army, a man whose hostility to everything
Spanish was well known. According to Aztec law he was the most
probable successor to the throne, and therefore particularly
dangerous.[763]
Cortés was becoming foolhardy. Whether the brothers were in
accord upon the measures to be adopted is uncertain; but
Cuitlahuatzin, who was not only bold, but ambitious, had evidently
determined on his course. If the Mexicans had hoped for better
prospects with the arrival of Cortés that hope was now dissipated,
and bitter indignation filled their breasts. Cuitlahuatzin was
welcomed as a liberator. His constant efforts in the imperial council
to oppose the admission of the Spaniards, by force if necessary, and
his services for the cause of liberty and religion in connection with
the Cacama revolt, were sufficient to endear him to his brother
patriots. Strongly urged, he accepted the leadership of the
insurgents, a position for which his experience and success as a
general had well fitted him. He began by ordering war material and
erecting barricades. The value of the Chinantec pikes introduced by
Cortés had not been lost on him, and a number were provided,
barbed with the vitreous iztli. Arrangements were made with
adjoining towns and provinces for a supply of provisions and
reinforcements to carry on the holy war.[764]
The Spaniards soon learned what was brewing, and first in this
way: Ojeda and Marquez, when out foraging early in the morning of
the day following their arrival, observed several suspicious
circumstances, among others broken bridges, which in one place
obliged them to fill up a canal before crossing it. Here and there they
saw large collections of slings and other weapons, and presently
they came on a priest with dishevelled hair shouting with wild
gesticulations to a crowd of armed men. They hurried back to inform
the general, guided through intricate cross-streets by a Tlascaltec.
Antonio del Rio, who had been despatched for Villa Rica the same
morning, returned at a gallop in less than half an hour, excited and
bleeding. The streets, he said, were full of warriors, who had raised
the bridges and were apparently prepared to attack. Had it not been
for his trusty sword and swift horse he would have been slain. At this
moment the sentinels in the towers announced the approach of a
vast multitude from different directions, with gleaming iztli weapons,
and speedily the neighborhood was alive with warriors, whose yells
rose high above the shrill shell and doleful drum.[765] Even if they did
not inspire the full measure of dread intended they presented a
striking picture in their painted bodies, grotesque with patterns and
brilliant colors, with no covering among the rank and file save the
raw cotton on the head and the universal maxtli round the loins.
They were protected in part by the chimalli, or shield, a slight
bamboo frame covered with gaudily colored skin or reed-grass,
chiefly oval and round, and often large enough to cover the whole
body. Secured to the arm it left the hand free to hold the bow or
stone, while the right managed the arrow or the sling. The latter was
an implement of great effect with the Aztecs, who could impel the
stone with wonderful precision and force. The maza, or club, with its
knotty head, and the macana, or sword, toothed with iztli, were well
represented, while high above gleamed the obsidian or copper
points of the spear. One of the most dreaded weapons was the
tlacochtli, or javelin, often provided with three points, and attached to
a cord by which it could be recovered for a fresh cast. Conspicuous
among the warriors were the nobles, those that were left of them, in
lofty quetzal plumage on a head-dress of green feathers set in tiger-
skin, or in a gold or silver band, which gave the appearance of metal
helmets. The body was covered in corselets of red, green, or yellow
feathers, worked with gold, and so arranged as to indicate the
company or district to which the wearer belonged. Beneath gleamed
occasionally cuirasses of gold or silver. The limbs were covered with
wood or leather armor set with feathers or gold plates. A more
common body armor was the cotton tunic, one or two fingers in
thickness, which extended to the knees and elbows. It was almost
equivalent to the quilted cotton protector used on the eastern coast,
whose efficiency against native weapons had caused the Spaniards
to adopt it. The tunic was adorned with feathers, which corresponded
to the uniform in color and arrangement, usually in the form of an
animal. Many were distinguished by casques in the form of eagle-
heads, and in armor spotted like a tiger-skin, indicative of the two
orders of Quauhtin and Ocelome, eagles and tigers. At the head of
the different columns appeared officers with small drums, painted
and adorned with feathers, with which they directed the march.
Beyond, in the centre of the masses, could be seen banners, with
devices in various colors and forms, which the Tlascaltecs pointed
out as belonging to different wards and to cities on the mainland, a
sign that an extensive body of troops had been enlisted for the war.
[766]

As the forces drew near, slingers and bowmen appeared on the

roofs of the neighboring buildings, who, together with those below,
began to send stones, arrows, and darts in showers upon the fort.
The Spaniards responded with a series of volleys, the number of
cannon being increased to twelve or more. The effect was merely to
startle them for a moment, and on they pressed over dead and
dying, amid encouraging shouts, till they reached the sides of the
wall, where the dreaded cannon, at least, could not destroy them. All
attempts to scale the wall proved futile, and soon their efforts were
confined to effecting breaches. With their rude implements this was
slow work, but they persevered with reckless obstinacy, reinforced at
frequent intervals, while the main body kept up a galling discharge of
missiles, and occupied the attention of the besieged with continual
charges at different points.