Full Insider Risk and Personnel Security An Introduction 1st Edition Martin PDF All Chapters
Full Insider Risk and Personnel Security An Introduction 1st Edition Martin PDF All Chapters
com
https://textbookfull.com/product/insider-risk-and-
personnel-security-an-introduction-1st-edition-
martin/
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-decision-theory-
martin-peterson/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-radiation-
protection-seventh-edition-alan-martin/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/affect-in-mathematical-modeling-
scott-a-chamberlin/
textbookfull.com
The Informed Patient A Complete Guide to a Hospital Stay
1st Edition Karen A. Friedman Md
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-informed-patient-a-complete-
guide-to-a-hospital-stay-1st-edition-karen-a-friedman-md/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/count-down-the-past-present-and-
uncertain-future-of-the-big-four-accounting-firms-second-edition-
ernst/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/cultures-of-witchcraft-in-europe-
from-the-middle-ages-to-the-present-1st-edition-jonathan-barry/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/computational-systems-pharmacology-
and-toxicology-johnson/
textbookfull.com
Animal Assisted Interventions for Emotional and Mental
Health Conversations with Pioneers of the Field Cynthia K
Chandler
https://textbookfull.com/product/animal-assisted-interventions-for-
emotional-and-mental-health-conversations-with-pioneers-of-the-field-
cynthia-k-chandler/
textbookfull.com
Insider Risk and Personnel Security
This textbook analyses the origins and effects of insider risk, using multiple real-life case his-
tories to illustrate the principles, and explains how to protect organisations against the risk.
Some of the most problematic risks confronting businesses and organisations of all types stem
from the actions of insiders –individuals who betray trust by behaving in potentially harmful
ways. Insiders cause material damage to their employers and society, and psychological harm
to the colleagues and friends they betray. Even so, many organisations do not have a systematic
understanding of the nature and origins of insider risk, and relatively few have a coherent and
effective system of protective security measures to defend themselves against that risk. This
book describes the environmental and psychological factors that predispose some individuals to
become harmful insiders, and the most common pathways by which this happens. It considers
how aspects of insider risk have been altered by shifts in society, including our increasing reli-
ance on technology and changes in working patterns. The second half of the book sets out a
practical systems-based approach to personnel security –the system of defensive measures
used to protect against insider risk. It draws on the best available knowledge from industry and
academic research, behavioural science, and practitioner experience to explain how to make
personnel security effective at managing the risk while enabling the conduct of business.
This book will be essential reading for students of risk management, security, resilience,
cyber security, behavioural science, HR, leadership, and business studies, and of great interest
to security practitioners.
Paul Martin
Cover image: Getty © gremlin
First published 2024
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2024 Paul Martin
The right of Paul Martin to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks,
and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Martin, Paul, 1958 May 11– author.
Title: Insider risk and personnel security : an introduction / Paul Martin.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2024 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023031285 (print) | LCCN 2023031286 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781032358536 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032358543 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003329022 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Risk management. | Business enterprises–Security measures.
Classification: LCC HD61 .M377 2024 (print) | LCC HD61 (ebook) |
DDC 658.15/5–dc23/eng/20230818
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023031285
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023031286
ISBN: 978-1-032-35853-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-35854-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-32902-2 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003329022
Typeset in Times New Roman
by Newgen Publishing UK
Disclaimer
Knowledge and practice in protective security are continually changing, as experience and
research reveal more about the nature of the problems and their potential solutions. Professional
practice should evolve in the light of this growing understanding and reflect changes in the
threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. Leaders and practitioners should rely on their own knowledge,
skills, and experience when applying any of the information, methods, or approaches described
in this book. They should obtain specific professional advice that is tailored to their own par-
ticular circumstances. To the fullest extent permitted by law, the author and the publisher accept
no liability for any damage or loss to persons or property, whether direct or indirect, that might
arise from applying the information, methods, or approaches described herein.
Contents
List of illustrations ix
About the author x
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction 1
PART I
Understanding insider risk 5
PART II
Personnel security 63
7 Pre-trust measures 76
8 In-trust measures 89
9 Foundations 105
Figures
1.1 The causal chain that generates security risk 9
4.1 The development of insider behaviour 50
6.1 Theory (holistic security) versus practice (separate silos) 71
6.2 A simple threefold model of a personnel security system 74
9.1 A simple three-step model of security risk management 111
Tables
2.1 Types of insider actions 18
2.2 Types of impact resulting from insider actions 18
3.1 Five key variables for categorising insiders 34
3.2 Types of external threat actors 37
5.1 The components of trustworthiness 53
7.1 Elements of pre-trust security 86
9.1 Questions for leaders 106
10.1 Components of a threefold model of personnel security 120
10.2 Some metrics of insider risk 127
10.3 Some metrics of personnel security effectiveness 128
10.4 Possible metrics of personnel security performance and costs 128
11.1 Barriers to success 134
11.2 Areas of relative ignorance requiring more research 140
Visit https://textbookfull.com
now to explore a rich
collection of eBooks, textbook
and enjoy exciting offers!
About the author
Paul Martin, CBE, MA, PhD, FIET, is Professor of Practice at Coventry University’s London-
based Protective Security Lab, a Distinguished Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), an Honorary Principal Research Fellow at Imperial
College London, a member of the UK Police Science Council, and an independent adviser to
various UK government entities and private sector organisations. He is a practitioner with more
than 30 years of experience in the UK national security arena. During a career in UK govern-
ment service from 1986 to 2013 he held a variety of senior positions, including heading his
organisation’s personnel security function, heading the Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI, now NPSA), and leading national security preparations for the London
2012 Olympics. From 2013 to 2016 he was the Director of Security for the UK Parliament, with
responsibility for its physical, cyber, and personnel security.
Paul was educated at the University of Cambridge, where he graduated in Natural Sciences
and took a PhD in behavioural biology, and Stanford University, where he was a postdoctoral
Harkness Fellow in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences. He subsequently
lectured and researched at the University of Cambridge, and was a Fellow of Wolfson College
Cambridge, before leaving academia to join government service. He is the author or co-author
of several books about security and behavioural science including: Measuring Behaviour
(Cambridge University Press, 4th edition 2021); The Sickening Mind (HarperCollins, 1997);
Design for a Life (Jonathan Cape, 1999); Counting Sheep (HarperCollins, 2002); Making Happy
People (Fourth Estate, 2005); Sex, Drugs & Chocolate (Fourth Estate, 2008); Play, Playfulness,
Creativity and Innovation (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Extreme (Oxford University
Press, 2014); and The Rules of Security (Oxford University Press, 2019).
newgenprepdf
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the following people for their generous help and wise advice: Andrew
Glazzard, Bianca Slocombe, Charis Rice, Christina O’Kelly, David McIlhatton, Findlay
Whitelaw, Jordan Giddings, Margaret Wilson, Richard Mackintosh, Sarah Austerberry,
Stacy Snook, and Tara Foulsham. Two figures are reproduced by kind permission of Oxford
University Press.
Introduction
We used to think of security as protecting us from bad things in the world outside. However, the
worst risks can come from within. They stem from people we have trusted, and they require a
different sort of security response. Human behaviour lies at the heart of these risks, making them
the most interesting of all security problems, but also the most neglected.
The most corrosive security risks confronting organisations stem from the actions of insiders –
individuals who abuse their trusted positions by behaving badly. Insiders inflict material damage
on their employers and cause psychological injury to the colleagues and friends they betray.
They are found in every type and size of organisation, from small tech start-ups to multinational
corporations and government departments. Almost all the corporate risks faced by organisations
have a human dimension, which means they can be affected or effected by insiders.
Many insiders know their actions are forbidden and harmful. For some, that is the whole
point. Not all insiders, however, set out to cause harm. Organisations also suffer from unwitting
insiders whose actions stem from recklessness, ignorance, complacency, laziness, misjudge-
ment, or indifference. Many cyber security incidents are caused by unwitting insiders who
inadvertently send data to the wrong recipients or click on attachments loaded with malware.
A conventional reaction to security breaches is to blame people for being the ‘weakest link’.
But that misses the point. The real problem is failing to understand the risk and build the right
defences against it. Unwitting insiders cause persistent low-level harm through poor perform-
ance and small acts of rebellion. However, purposeful insiders with malign intentions have the
potential to cause far greater harm, and they are the primary focus of this book.
The actions of insiders are highly consequential. Insiders steal money, personal data, sen-
sitive information, and intellectual property. They damage reputations, leak secrets, perpetrate
fraud, and sabotage infrastructure. Some have killed colleagues in outbursts of violence; others
have helped criminals, terrorist organisations, or hostile foreign states to do all these things.
Single insider incidents have resulted in financial losses of more than a billion dollars. The
commonest and costliest type of financial crime is insider fraud, with global losses running to
trillions of dollars. More than half of all cyber security incidents are perpetrated by insiders.
The more capable insiders operate in the shadows and remain undetected for years. Some
are never discovered. Their inside knowledge, privileged access, and authority enable them to
cause more harm than the average external threat actor, while making them harder to detect.
Some insiders are self-motivated, while others are manipulated or coerced by external threat
actors like hostile foreign states or criminals, who can be highly proficient at exploiting human
psychology.
Few organisations have a thorough understanding of insider risk or comprehensive security
measures to protect them against it, creating a permissive environment in which insiders can
thrive. Insider risk is less well understood and less well managed than cyber security risk. Cyber
DOI: 10.4324/9781003329022-1
2 Introduction
security attracts much bigger budgets than personnel security, the Cinderella of protective
security. Organisations spend large sums on cyber security and regularly discuss cyber risks
at board level, while taking a piecemeal approach to insiders. Among those facing the starkest
risks are smaller businesses that depend critically on their unique intellectual property.
People are both the sources and the instruments of the most pernicious forms of security risk.
They will remain so for the foreseeable future –at least, until technology makes the next big
leap into truly sentient artificial intelligence, at which point all bets are off. Insiders do more
harm because they know more about their victims and have better access than the average threat
actor. Fortunately, there are effective practical remedies to hand. Intelligently designed per-
sonnel security can defend organisations against insider risk.
The purpose of personnel security is to stop bad things from happening by mitigating the
risk from insiders. However, good personnel security brings additional benefits by building
resilience and trust. Organisations that understand and manage their insider risk are better able
to avoid crises and cope with the crises they cannot avoid. The right kind of personnel security
helps to build trust, which is every organisation’s most valuable commodity. No organisation is
safe unless it can trust its people.
Language
Insider risk is complex enough without further obscuring it behind layers of opaque technical
language. My aim has been to simplify wherever possible and to clarify where simplicity
reaches its limits.
Introduction 3
The problems discussed in this book are not unique to any one type of institution. The term
‘organisation’ is used throughout as shorthand for institutions and businesses of all types: public
sector, private sector, small businesses, global corporations, universities, thinktanks, charities,
government departments, intelligence agencies, police forces, and so on. The ways in which the
principles and concepts are applied to protect an organisation must be tailored to its particular
circumstances.
The term ‘insider’ refers to a person who brings heightened security risk to their organisa-
tion by exploiting, or intending to exploit, their legitimate access to the organisation’s assets for
unauthorised purposes. To put it another way, an insider is someone who has been trusted, but
who betrays that trust by acting in potentially harmful ways. Thus, most people are not active
insiders and never will be. But the few who are active insiders can cause immense harm.
Case histories
Real-life case histories are used throughout to illustrate the nature of insider risk and its
underlying principles. The case histories are all in the public domain and the details of
many have been drawn from BBC News, Sky News, The Times, The Guardian, The Wall
Street Times, and other reputable news media. They are based on multiple sources, but
single sources are cited for the sake of brevity.
Part I
Reader’s Guide: This chapter lays the groundwork for the rest of the book by defining key terms
and concepts, including risk, insider, insider risk, and personnel security.
Before attempting to manage complex risks, it is a good idea to understand them. Security prac
titioners and leaders can be inclined to leap into action without pausing sufficiently to consider
the nature of the risks they are trying to tackle. They are unlikely to succeed if they do not under-
stand the risks and cannot communicate clearly about them. So, what is insider risk?
Insider risk is the security risk arising from the actions of insiders.
What is an insider?
There is no universally agreed definition for insider. However, according to one widely cited and
entirely sensible definition:
An insider is a person who exploits, or has the intention to exploit, their legitimate access to
an organisation’s assets for unauthorised purposes.1
Thus, an insider is not just any person with access. To be an insider, they must bring heightened
security risk to their organisation by exploiting, or intending to exploit, their access for purposes
that might cause harm. According to this definition, most people in an organisation’s workforce
are not insiders.2
Viewed through a different lens, an insider is a person who has been trusted with access to
an organisation’s assets, and who betrays that trust by exploiting (or intending to exploit) their
access for unauthorised purposes, thereby potentially causing harm. Hence, an alternative and
equivalent definition is that:
Other definitions are available, but they all say more or less the same thing with more words. By
the same logic, and viewed through the same lens of trust:
DOI: 10.4324/9781003329022-3
Visit https://textbookfull.com
now to explore a rich
collection of eBooks, textbook
and enjoy exciting offers!
8 Understanding insider risk
Trust, trustworthiness, deception, and betrayal are core concepts in personnel security. They are
discussed in Chapter 5.
A person need not be a salaried employee to be an insider. Contractors, business partners,
advisers, suppliers, and other third parties who are trusted with access to an organisation’s assets
are all potential insiders. If a high-security site is guarded by armed police officers, then they are
potential insiders. Similarly, if a business outsources its IT to a supplier, then employees of that
supplier are potential insiders, and so too are people in the supplier’s supply chain, and so on.
Having defined ‘insider’ we should now explain ‘security risk’.
Risk is the amount of harm that is likely to arise if no further mitigating action is taken.
Security risks are risks that arise directly from the potentially harmful actions of threat actors
such as criminals, terrorists, hostile states, and insiders.3
Risk refers to possible future events that might or might not happen. Uncertainty is therefore an
inherent feature of risk.
Security risk is a product of three components:
• Threat: the capabilities and intentions of threat actors such as criminals, terrorists, hostile
states, and insiders.
• Vulnerability: the gaps or weaknesses in the potential victim’s defences that could be
exploited by a threat actor.
• Impact: the harm that would be caused if the risk were to materialise.
The causal chain by which threat, vulnerability, and impact combine to generate a security risk
is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Insider risk is the distinctive type of security risk arising from the actions of insiders. The
concept of security risk is crucial to understanding insider risk and how to defend against it. So,
let us look more closely at its three core components: threat, vulnerability, and impact.
Threat
A security threat exists when a threat actor, such as a terrorist or an insider, has both the intention
and the capability to cause harm. Both ingredients are necessary. Many people harbour malign
intentions but lack the capability to realise those intentions. For instance, some terrorist groups
would slaughter us all if they could, but thankfully do not have the means. Conversely, some
threat actors, like nation states, possess the capability to cause catastrophic harm, but usually
lack the intention. Threat requires intention and capability.
The concept of threat can also be expressed as the probability (likelihood) that a threat
actor will make a credible attempt to cause harm; for example, by attempting to conduct a
terrorist attack or hack into a digital system. Note the word ‘credible’, denoting the element
of capability.
National threat levels for terrorism, like those used by the UK and US governments to com-
municate with the public, convey threat in this same sense of likelihood of a credible attempt, as
What is insider risk? 9
opposed to likelihood of an attack actually occurring. In practice, most terrorist plots are foiled
by the pre-emptive actions of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and consequently the
number of successful attacks does not reflect the much greater extent to which credible attempts
are being made. This explains why the threat level can remain high despite a prolonged absence
of attacks. (The UK government definitions of threat levels are somewhat confusing because
they refer to the likelihood of ‘an attack’ rather than a credible attempt.)
Vulnerability
Threat by itself does not make a risk. A threat actor will only succeed in causing harm if there
are gaps or weaknesses in the security defences of their target, or potential victim. If the target
is completely protected by impregnable defences, then the threat is likely to be deterred or
thwarted. The stronger the protective security, the lower the vulnerability, and the lower the
likelihood of the threat culminating in harm.
The concept of vulnerability can be expressed as the conditional probability of an attack
succeeding if an attack were to be attempted. It follows that the combination of threat and vul-
nerability gives the likelihood of the risk materialising; for example, the likelihood of an insider
defrauding their employer or stealing data.
The terminology of threat and vulnerability has its equivalents in the parallel language of
crime prevention. A criminal is more likely to succeed in committing a crime if they possess
a combination of motive (intention), means (capability), and opportunity. The combination
of motive and means equates with threat, while opportunity equates with vulnerability. This
is sometimes referred to as the COM-B model of crime, where Capability, Opportunity, and
Motive combine to produce criminal Behaviour.
10 Understanding insider risk
Impact
We care about security risks, and spend money trying to mitigate them, because of their
consequences, or impact. Thus, the third component of security risk is impact, which means the
amount of harm that would occur if the risk were to materialise.
The impact of any security risk is multidimensional. An incident or attack will have many
different effects, which unfold over different timescales. For example, the most immediate
consequences of a major terrorist attack would be deaths and physical injuries. However, such
an attack would have many other consequences as well. These are likely to include some com-
bination of psychological injuries, damage to infrastructure, disruption to business and services,
financial costs, and social and political effects. As its name suggests, the aim of terrorism is to
terrorise. A major cyber attack would produce a different array of effects, such as the loss of
sensitive data, disruption to business, financial costs, legal costs, loss of stakeholder confidence,
and regulatory consequences. The point is that the impact of security risks, including insider
risk, cannot be reduced to a simple quantitative metric, like the number of deaths or the finan-
cial cost.
Putting all three components of risk together, we see that Risk (R) is a product of Likelihood
(L) and Impact (I), where Likelihood is a product of Threat (T) and Vulnerability (V):
R =L x I =T x V x I
As noted before, uncertainty is an inherent feature of risk, which relates to future events that
might not materialise. Measuring the size of a security risk is prone to further uncertainty, given
the intrinsic lack of precision in any estimates of its core components of threat, vulnerability,
and impact.
Comparing risks
Insider risks and other types of risks come in different shapes and sizes, so it is useful to com-
pare them. The simplest way is by plotting the various risks on a matrix according to their like-
lihood and impact. An organisation might have a corporate risk matrix showing its top-level
risks, such as loss of competitive advantage, reputational damage, critical staff shortages, infra-
structure failure, and so on. Cyber risk usually makes the cut, but insider risk rarely appears.
The organisation’s internal security function (if it has one) may produce its own, more granular,
matrix of security risks, such as fraud, data theft, terrorist attack, and ransomware. Insider risk
should appear there, even if it is absent from the top-level corporate risk matrix.
Any one type of security risk, such as an insider incident or a terrorist attack, will encompass a
range of credible scenarios that differ in their likelihood and impact. Insider incidents could vary
from a harmless keyboard blunder by an unwitting employee to a catastrophic betrayal by a malign
insider directed by a hostile foreign state. For a risk matrix to make sense, it must compare like
with like. A general convention is to pitch each type of risk at the level of the reasonable worst-case
scenario (as distinct from the most likely scenario or the absolute worst-case scenario).
The conflation of risk with threat is sometimes associated with another problem, which is to
confuse the absence of evidence of a threat with evidence of absence of a risk. The faulty
reasoning goes like this: ‘I have seen no evidence (intelligence) of a threat to this organisation
and therefore it does not need more protective security’. The implicit assumption is that an
apparent absence of security threat denotes an absence of security risk. The assumption is wrong
at two levels.
First, an absence of evidence about security threats means just that –there is no evidence.
Covert threat actors like insiders, spies, and fraudsters try to conceal their true intentions, which
means that reliable information about security threats is hard to obtain. That is why the advanced
capabilities of intelligence agencies are needed to discover what is really going on; and even
then, the picture is always incomplete. An absence of intelligence does not signify an absence
of threat, let alone an absence of risk. The only safe way to conclude that a threat actor poses no
threat would be by acquiring firm evidence to that effect.
The second mistake lies in conflating threat with risk. Even if the threat component of a
security risk is known to be low, the risk would still be substantial if the vulnerability and
impact components are large, in which case protective security would be advisable. Suppose,
for example, that reliable intelligence suggests the terrorist threat to a critical infrastructure site
is low, but the site is vulnerable, and the consequences of an attack would be severe. The risk
would be significant, and the site should be protected. By the same logic, an absence of evidence
of a threat from insiders categorically does not prove that the insider risk is low or that there
is no need to bother with personnel security. It may just show that the organisation is poor at
detecting the risk.
Part II of this book describes how to design a coherent personnel security system (with an
emphasis on the word ‘system’).
Vague terminology can be a pitfall here as well. ‘Vetting’ is a widely used but ambiguous term.
Some practitioners regard ‘vetting’ as synonymous with personnel security, in the broad sense
defined above. For most people, however, ‘vetting’ refers only to pre-employment screening. As
we shall see, there is much more to personnel security than pre-employment screening, so these
two connotations of ‘vetting’ are very different. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
safer to assume that when someone talks about ‘vetting’, they mean only the pre-employment
part of personnel security.
The ‘insider risk’/‘insider threat’ and ‘personnel security’/‘vetting’ confusions are not the
only terminological hazards. Personnel security should not be confused with ‘personal security’
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
‘Besides,’ he added, ‘the book comes first with me always. Nothing
else matters.’
She ruminated upon that thought for several seconds. The
bluntness, the ungraciousness of it at once repelled and attracted
her. She could not but admire Edward’s capacity for impersonal
enthusiasm; it made him great; and she found something fascinating
in his indifference to lesser things. Among those lesser things she
was content, for the moment, to include herself. To be his tool, to
help him in his work: such service, she felt, would be its own
sufficient reward.
Noting her silence, ‘That seems to you inhuman?’ he asked.
‘It seems to me superhuman,’ answered Sheila. ‘Perhaps that’s the
secret of fine living: to subordinate all personal things to some great
impersonal passion.’
‘That’s just how I feel,’ he said.
Sheila continued. ‘Unless we’re content to be miserable and useless,
we must have a consuming passion, if it’s only for collecting beetles:
something that doesn’t depend on anybody else.... Persons change,’
she added sadly.
‘You’re thinking of Hypatia,’ he suggested.
‘Hypatia, yes. And someone else. It’s like building your house on
sand, you know, ever to rely on persons.’
‘Still,’ said Edward, ‘if a person’s rational and consistent—and there
are consistent persons.’
‘Yes, and there are clockwork toys. A perfectly consistent person
must be very much like them, I should think.’
‘But surely you agree that man is just that: a mechanical toy in the
hands of Necessity. The illusion of freewill is only disguised
mechanism.’
‘How dreadful!’ Sheila exclaimed. ‘Then Henley’s lines:
I am the master of my fate;
I am the captain of my soul—
are meaningless to you?’
‘The man who thinks that he is master of his fate is the most
enslaved of all persons,’ said Edward. ‘For he is not even master of
the facts.’
‘That’s a quotation from your book, I believe,’ said Sheila. And the
young man blushed.
This was the beginning of a long and animated discussion, the first
of many. In Edward Sheila discovered that reliability which she had
thought could be attributed to no person. His mind was keen and
critical: it worked with a certain deadly precision that was as
impressive and at times almost as terrifying as a piece of gigantic
machinery. He had doubts and hesitancies indeed: the hesitancies of
one aware of the subtleties, the baffling complexity, of problems
which less careful minds deemed simple; but once he had reached a
definite decision, nothing short of overpowering ratiocination, no
consideration of comfort or sentiment, could shake him from it. And
while her sense of poetry revolted against a certain aridness in his
philosophy, the very magnitude and the shattering presumption of
his attempt to rationalize the universe overpowered her imagination
and thrilled her with a sense of great adventure.
ALL roads led to Edward Fairfield. His atheism, his sister, Aunt
Hester’s opposition, all conspired to fling Sheila into the polite
dispassionate arms of that rational young graduate from Cambridge.
Kay had offered romance without intellectual comradeship: Edward
offered a kind of business partnership in the propagation of rational
atheology, and this proved an irresistible bait for a spirited girl
hustled by disaster into premature cynicism. Edward concerns us no
further, save that he married her, respected her, and practised upon
her the editorials that appeared week by week in his own paper The
Iconoclast. Everything that he did was in perfect taste and supported
by a perfect reason. When, for example, she declared their marriage
a failure, he provided her with a pair of admirable rooms in his own
well-appointed house, and lived thereafter in contented celibacy. He
was just to the point of inhumanity; but she, a disappointed woman,
was not just. The efficient elegance of her home afflicted her. It
seemed a mere piece of machinery for the daily manufacture of well-
bred happiness. Her two rooms, until she had transformed them,
seemed sleek, complacent: they announced to her, with the patient
smile and in the incisive tones of a secularist lecturer, the supremacy
of Reason. In herself, reason was far from supreme.
A woman with love must bestow it somewhere: Sheila poured it
without stint upon her dream of Kay. Ten years divided them, and
more, before that dream was finally destroyed. Sophie, his wife,
gave birth to a child, and Sheila, impelled by who knows what
medley of motives, visited her. They sat and talked about nothing in
a room pervaded by yellow. A pale-brown flower perpetuated itself
at intervals on the walls; a small occasional table set in the middle of
a dark yellowish carpet was covered by a buff cloth; a gilt-framed
oval mirror surmounted the mantelpiece. There were photographs
on the mantelpiece of Sophie’s father, of Sophie’s child, of Sophie,
and one of Kay standing stiffly with a book in his hand—a cruel
photograph, courageously signed by the photographer. Sheila gave
no second glance to it.
She interrupted a remark of Sophie’s about the chapel Dorcas
Society by saying, ‘Oh I forgot to ask—you don’t mind Bernard being
here, do you?’
‘Bernard?’ Sophie was mystified.
Sheila pointed to the Irish terrier that was frisking round her.
A little ripple of merriment came from Sophie.
‘Do you call the dog Bernard? How funny! I love dogs, but father
doesn’t care for them.... But of course he won’t mind yours,’ she
added hastily.
Sheila tried to puzzle out how Mr. Dewick could even have a chance
of objecting to her dog, but just then a diversion was created by the
entry of a rather plump old-young man in a morning coat rubbing his
hands together and making an indeterminate noise in a vague
endeavour to be hospitable. He wore a little brown moustache and
short side-whiskers near the ears. His hair had receded considerably,
more especially where the parting was, and had left an expanse of
shining brow.
‘Well, well,’ he said, nervously cheerful. ‘How are you after all this
while? I’m sure we’re very pleased.’
Sheila recognized him instantly, although there seemed indeed
nothing of the old Kay left to recognize. Yet this was Kay. This was
he who years ago under the moon had whispered to her, with eyes
full of dreams, his boyish love. Shades of the meeting-house had
closed on that boy for ever.
Almost sick with disappointment, she shook hands with him, and
quickly sought refuge in responding to the terrier’s still frantic
demonstrations.
‘I hope you like my dog,’ she remarked to Kay, shy of using his
name.
‘Yes, yes, fine fellow,’ responded Kay. ‘Come on, good dog, good
dog!’
He patted the dog awkwardly.
‘We call him Bernard,’ explained Sheila, afraid of the smallest hiatus.
‘George Bernard, because he’s Irish and vivacious.’
Kay looked puzzled. ‘But why ... do you call him George Bernard? I
didn’t quite catch....’
‘After Shaw, you know,’ Sheila explained. ‘We suspect Bernard of
having been a distinguished playwright in a previous incarnation.’
‘Oh I see!’ said Kay, his brow clearing.
But it was knitted again the next moment.
‘What was it the Reverend Aitken was saying about Shaw last
Sunday, mother?’
‘I remember something,’ Sophie answered. ‘I think he said he was a
mountaineer, didn’t he?’
‘Mountaineer,’ murmured Kay. ‘I think not. Ah no, mountebank! That
was the word.’
Here Sheila joined the conversation in a mildly argumentative vein,
but Kay sidetracked by waxing indignant over the attempted
introduction of a liturgy into divine service. He had set his face
against that, he assured them: every true nonconformist at the
church meeting had set his face against that, and right feeling had
ultimately triumphed over the incipient popery. It appeared indeed
that the cosmos was being conducted in an entirely proper manner,
except for the wanton behaviour of the east wind. He considered the
east wind very dangerous. He became impressive and told a long
story about a man of his acquaintance who ventured out in an east
wind without his overcoat, caught a chill, developed pneumonia, and
had to take to his bed.
‘Dead in a week!’ finished Kay, dramatically and with relish.
Except for an appreciative murmur from his wife, the story was
received in silence. Sheila with a stunned sensation was telling
herself: ‘I would never have let him get like this.’ But Kay,
misinterpreting the silence, began another story. It concerned
another man who ventured out in an east wind without his overcoat.
This man had a similar series of adventures, his experience differing
from the first man’s only in that he lingered for two days and then
died, leaving a widow and five children. Kay could not remember
whether there were three boys and two girls, or three girls and two
boys. He began naming them on his fingers. There were Horace and
George, Margaret and Vera. That made four. He was sure there was
another one—he remembered the child perfectly as a baby, but he
could not for the life of him recall its sex. He felt sure that its name
began with F.
He became perplexed.
‘Mother, can’t you remember?’ he asked. The question was an
accusation.
‘Remember what, dear?’ inquired Sophie in her gentle way.
‘The name of Tomlinson’s youngest. You remember Tomlinson.’
‘I don’t believe I do,’ said Sophie.
Sheila sat silent, limp under the burden of her disillusionment. She
felt something like fear when Sophie, with a rapturous cry, ‘She’s
awake!’, rose and darted from the room to fetch her little girl. To
hide her nervousness she said, ‘Such an unusual name you gave her,
didn’t you? What made you think of Robina?’
While Kay was losing himself in explanations Sophie came back,
leading her baby daughter by the hand. The mother’s face was
shining.
‘Oh!’ A passionate cry broke from Sheila. In a moment she was on
her knees gazing with adoration at the flaxen-haired, elf-like child.
For from the big dreaming eyes her vanished Kay looked at her; the
wonderful boy dead and buried in a prematurely old man, lived
again in this two-year old girl. Hungrily Sheila kissed the tiny face ...
and once again she felt his arm about her and heard his boyish
whispers.
‘Oh, give her to me!’ she cried, looking up over the child’s head at its
father.
Kay’s face lit up.
‘I’ve got it now. I remember,’ he said triumphantly.
‘What?’ asked Sophie, troubled by Sheila’s emotion, and yet gratified
by it.
‘Why,’ said Kay, ‘the name of Tomlinson’s youngest. It was Freddie. I
told you it began with an F.’
He looked round with modest pride, and was surprised to see Sheila
burst into tears.
So that was the solution of the problem. The beauty of life was only
for the young, the very young. In a child’s heart and nowhere else
the kingdom of heaven was to be found, a frail gossamer thing
vanishing with the years. This was the common lot: by contact with
the world to rub the down of paradise off our souls, to grow drab
and dull in spirit, drab and dull in mind, even before that waning of
physical strength which alone could assuage the bitterness of the
process. In Kay youth had died; in Edward—Edward had never been
young; but in herself youth lived and craved more life. Yes, it lived
still, but now it was stricken and dying.
It flashed upon her then that she too could renew her youth. In a
child she could live again.
But a child had been denied her.
She deemed her life to be already virtually finished. She would age
from this moment: after a brief fever her mind would dim and even
the desire for beauty would sink into oblivion. She tried to hope it
would be soon, but the struggling youth in her cried out against the
hope.
The struggling youth in her cried out, and, years later, the cry was
answered. Beauty became incarnated in the person of Stephen
Redshawe, whose son she later encountered in the house at Maadi.
The past rose in sad loveliness, enveloping her with the fragrance of
pressed flowers; but of all the memories that surged in her, this one
alone broke in pitiless splendour over her consciousness. In that
moment Stephen Redshawe lived again, less as a man and a lover
than as a gleam, an ecstasy, a chord of divine music, a symbol of all
that she had longed for and lost. Other things she could recall
minutely, but Stephen remained a vague splendour. She recalled
how, in her little cottage near Mundesley, she had waited for his
promised coming; how she had looked again and again, in wonder,
to find in her mirror the face he had called lovely. It was a face
ravaged less by her thirty-three years than by discontent. His sisters
and his mother she remembered only as so many bundles of
feminine hostility. They disapproved of her, and no wonder: was she
not a married woman, holiday-making alone, who yet suffered gladly
the admiration of an infatuated boy? They called her adventuress, no
doubt, and she, even in the midst of the adventure, made
allowances for them. She had neither the strength nor the will to
renounce the fairest gift that life offered.
‘May I come in?’ Stephen’s tall figure filled the doorway.
‘You must,’ Sheila answered, with a smile. ‘I’m not going to give you
any tea while you stand there keeping the sunshine out.’
‘This is our last meeting,’ blundered Stephen. ‘I want to tell you....’
Suddenly dreading to hear the words for which she longed, Sheila
fended them away. ‘Eat your pretty cake,’ she admonished him.
After tea they went out into the sandy paddock and talked for an
hour of indifferent things, of trains, of luggage, of books and bad
music ... until a stillness fell, heralding dusk. Evening became
personal and urgent to enfold them: they could hear in the wash of
the water, rhythmically plashing the sand, the rise and fall of her
bosom; they could feel her breath sweeter than apples in the
autumn air. And all the skies that during the past weeks of stolen
companionship they had seen together, all the tides they had
watched moving upon the shore, became fused with that sky, with
that tide; all the hours of their comradeship were gathered up into
that hour. They surrendered themselves to the embracing arms of
silence.
To Sheila it was as if infinity had been spilled into time: the moments
throbbed by, brimming with beauty, until the silence that these two
guarded became a music, a poem, a flower of loveliness. It was a
flower that budded and blossomed till their vision dimmed with the
glory of it, a flower that burst and fell scattering pollen and perfume.
He bent towards her, with cheeks flaming. ‘You know, don’t you?’ he
said, and for a moment could not go on. To Sheila life was become
exquisitely unreal, a work of art. ‘You must know,’ he said brokenly,
‘that I adore you.’
Compassionately she laid her cool hand on his.
‘Yes,’ she said, in a low tone tenderly soothing.
‘Ah!’ His breath fluttered. She gave him her trembling lips.
They kissed, first, like boy and girl, timidly; then like comrades
united after a long parting; again, and a red splendour flamed
through the throbbing world. He lifted her into his arms, and divine
madness seized her. He carried her with strong unfaltering stride into
the house.
And this day, which they had called the end, was really the
beginning. She returned on the morrow to Edward’s house and
confided to her husband that she wished him to divorce her. Edward
listened patiently, like the disinterested friend he was; but his
disinterestedness made her pride wince, and the old hated
surroundings were bleak about her. Yet on that night of her return,
in the sanctuary of her bedroom, she undressed with a new joy. She
stood nude before the wardrobe mirror and gazed with awe upon
the pure rounded loveliness of her own form. She stroked gently her
white velvet skin. Her body, so long disdained, had become sacred
to her again. As she laid her head, that kingdom of heaven, upon
her pillow, and murmured Stephen’s name, Stephen himself, in a
suburb fourteen miles away, posted his weekly letter to the girl—no
adventuress, she—who was to become his wife and the mother of
his only son. For Stephen, too, was back in the old routine, enfolded
and pressed close to the bosom of his family, conscious of his
mother’s eyes watching him with an angry solicitude. Not without a
struggle did he succumb. To Grace, whose pretty simplicity no longer
held him, he hinted dire things; but at the first gesture of suffering
from her he winced, and surrendered. And he wrote to Sheila in his
best literary style. She carried the letter, as she had carried its
predecessors, into the summer-house, that she might commune with
her lover undisturbed.
‘Darling,’ she read, ‘the thought of how I must hurt you is hell to me.’
She caught her breath, looked once upon the sky, and then bent her
eyes again to receive the blow....
With mind benumbed she looked up from the fastidious caligraphy to
find Stephen himself standing, like a whipped dog, before her. For a
moment they strangely stared.
‘Why have you come?’
He broke out into self-pity. ‘Oh, I can’t bear it. Don’t for God’s sake
look like that.... I couldn’t leave you without a word from your lips.’
She tried to harden her heart. ‘Is that all?’
His hands made a helpless gesture. ‘I’m such a despicable coward.
I’ve lived always among dreams. Real life is too hard for me—I’d be
better dead.’
‘Why have you come?’ she asked. ‘Have you anything to add to this?’
She held out his letter. ‘Why not leave it at that?’
‘I had to see you,’ he said. ‘I had to ask your forgiveness. I hoped to
get here before that thing. Oh, how detestable I am!’
He dropped on to the seat beside her and sat, hunched and shaking,
a figure of desolation.
‘Never mind,’ said Sheila firmly. ‘Don’t cry over spilt milk. You’re quite
free now to go back to her. And you’ve done me no harm.’
He stammered in amazement. ‘You can say that! Don’t you see how
contemptible I am! I would like to kill myself!’
He brooded on that thought. Death was the only escape from his
own insufferable egoism. Then he began to perceive that he was
extracting enjoyment even from the savour of his own self-loathing.
He was rolling the bitterness round on his tongue till it had a certain
sweetness for him. He was indulging in an orgy of painful emotions
that was delicious to the very egoism it wounded. He was
discovering hitherto unplumbed depths in his nature and being
fascinated by the stupendous spectacle of his own soul’s suffering.
And he knew that the experience was far too morbidly interesting to
drive him to suicide.
The perception of his self-pity afflicted Sheila with a new and more
sickening pain. Something of this change must have been visible in
her face, for with a manifest effort he became calm, and began
speaking in more normal tones.
‘Perhaps we shall be glad afterwards,’ he said slowly. ‘The scandal
would have killed my mother....’
Sheila winced. ‘Oh, Stephen, are you trying to make me hate you?
Why did you say that?...’
‘Why——’
‘Why do you talk in that unreal way? Why do you pretend ... try at
the last moment to blind me with false pious reasoning!’
‘But what I said about my mother——’
‘—Was false as water. You didn’t mean a word of it. You are too
dreadfully sorry for yourself to care about your mother. You’re
breaking faith, and because it hurts you you’re trying to feel good
about it. God knows I haven’t disputed your decision—nor even
blamed you for it. But now, please go!’
He rose. ‘I am not to come back?’
‘No, no. Go away.’
‘But, Sheila——’
‘Why will you torture me so?’ she cried. ‘It’s your own choice. If only
you’d never come to-night—it would have been so much kinder.’
‘Oh, I can’t bear this!’ He trembled towards her.
She rose, to confront him with lustreless eyes.
‘Are you made of straw? Can you neither take me nor leave me?...
Good-bye.’
‘God, how you hate me now!’ he murmured, as she swept past him.
She paused to say: ‘That should be nothing to you. But it’s not true.
You have done me no harm. I had never known happiness before
you came ... but,’ she added, with his child in her womb, ‘I shall
soon forget, and you will have made no difference. None at all.’
She stumbled out into the hateful sunlight and went, half-running,
towards the house.