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GUADALCANAL
C A M P A I G N
1942–43
Japan’s bid to knock out Henderson
Field and the Cactus Air Force
A I R
MARK STILLE | I L LU S T R AT E D B Y J I M L AU R I E R
A I R C A M PA I G N
GUADALCANAL
1942–43
Japan’s bid to knock out Henderson Field and the Cactus Air Force
CHRONOLOGY 9
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES 11
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES 18
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES 34
THE CAMPAIGN 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
INDEX 95
4 Introduction
INTRODUCTION
The Grumman F4F While the battle of Midway fought between June 4 and 6, 1942 is usually viewed as the single
Wildcat was the most decisive battle of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States, the campaign for
outstanding aircraft of the
Guadalcanal campaign. Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943 was much more decisive. Not only did
Though supposedly it subject the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN) to a six-month grinding battle
outclassed by its Japanese of attrition which the IJN in particular could not afford, but it proved that, even under what
counterpart the “Zero”
fighter, the Wildcat more were strategically advantageous circumstances, the Japanese were unable to stop the American
than held its own when it offensive in the Pacific. The campaign for Guadalcanal was a bitter contest in which ground,
was flown using tactics to naval, and air forces were locked into an interrelated struggle. In what became the pattern
maximize its strengths.
(Official Marine Corps for the rest of the war, air power was the deciding factor in this campaign. The airfield on
photo courtesy of Marine Guadalcanal became the fulcrum for the entire battle and American ground, naval, and air
Corps History Division) forces were focused on holding the airfield and keeping it operational. Despite their numerical
advantages, the Japanese were never able to mass their forces to seize Henderson Field or
to knock it out of action for a prolonged period. Possession of the airfield gave the United
States the margin of victory in the campaign and opened the door on the long road to Tokyo.
All of Japan’s First Operational Phase objectives were captured by May 1942 with the
surrender of the last American forces in the Philippines. In the Second Operational Phase,
the Japanese sought to create strategic depth for their new possessions. The Aleutian
Islands in the North Pacific and Midway Atoll in the Central Pacific were potential
targets, but the South Pacific was the area of most future expansion. Potential targets in
the region included eastern New Guinea, the Fijis, Samoa, and “strategic points in the
Australian area.” This was a very ambitious list and was beyond the means of Japanese
forces and the shipping required to support them. The problem of inadequate forces
and shipping was even more pronounced when simultaneous operations in the Central
and South Pacific were considered. The Japanese had no choice but to sequence their
operations.
There were differences within the IJN about how best to proceed and the IJA refused
to write a blank check for potential expansion in the South Pacific since it had higher
priorities for committing its forces. Within the Imperial Navy, the Commander of the
Combined Fleet, Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, wanted to give the Central Pacific
attack priority. He planned an attack against Midway Atoll to draw out the remaining
units of the US Pacific Fleet where they would be destroyed. The Naval General Staff
preferred an immediate advance into the South Pacific to cut the SLOCs between the
United States and Australia. The IJA largely left the direction of strategy in the Pacific up
to the IJN, but it made clear that the commitment of large ground forces was impossible.
This precluded an attack on Australia, but operations against South Pacific islands were
still possible.
In early April, the Naval General Staff and the Combined Fleet came to an agreement
on the phasing of future operations. Just as he had during the debate over his Pearl Harbor
operation, Yamamoto used the threat of resignation to get his Midway plan approved.
However, the price of this approval was a compromise plan in which the Combined Fleet
would conduct a set of tightly sequenced operations in the South Pacific in early May
followed by the main operation against Midway and the Aleutians in early June. The
offensive operations in May included an amphibious operation to seize Port Moresby
on New Guinea and the occupation of Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. This
was a major operation with some 60 ships covered by land-based air units from Rabaul.
Because the United States Navy (USN) had opposed the Japanese landings in March at
Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea with carriers, the Port Moresby operation required the
participation of the Combined Fleet’s main carrier force in case the USN tried to intervene
again with carriers. Accordingly, Yamamoto committed two of his fleet carriers and a light
carrier to support the operation.
Such a large operation did not escape the notice of USN intelligence, which had the
priceless advantage of being able to break a limited percentage of Japanese naval code
traffic. Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Pacific Fleet,
committed two carrier groups to defeat the invasion. This resulted in the battle of the
Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942. Not only was this history’s first carrier battle, but it was
also the first strategic Japanese defeat of the war. When the carrier battle placed all three
Japanese carriers present out of action (one being sunk, another damaged, and the third
had its air group severely reduced), the lack of air cover for the invasion of Port Moresby
forced the cancelation of the entire operation. The seeds for the Guadalcanal campaign
were sown in the Port Moresby operation. During the first phase of the Japanese operation
the island of Tulagi was occupied on May 3 for use as a seaplane base. This first foothold
in the southern Solomons gave strategic depth to the defense of Rabaul located some 560
miles to the northwest.
The Port Moresby debacle, which removed three carriers from Yamamoto’s order of battle
just before his decisive operation against the USN, did not stop the much larger operation
against Midway and the Aleutians. The reduction of the Combined Fleet’s carrier force,
in addition to incredibly sloppy planning on every level, resulted in the crippling defeat
at Midway when, on June 4, four Japanese fleet carriers were sunk or disabled. The loss of
the fleet carriers impacted Japanese plans in the South Pacific. With their offensive power
blunted, Japanese operations to occupy New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa were postponed
on June 11 and canceled forever in July. The only Japanese offensive operations remaining
in the South Pacific were against Port Moresby. The failure of the seaborne attack forced
7
the Japanese to mount an overland attack over very difficult terrain. This operation was
controlled by the Imperial Army’s 17th Army based in Rabaul.
Since Tulagi was not big enough to support an airfield, the Japanese looked for alternatives.
Only 20 miles to the south was a largely unknown island named Guadalcanal. On June 13,
the Japanese decided to build an airfield on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. Soon
thereafter on July 6, a 12-ship convoy arrived off Lunga Point on Guadalcanal with two
Imperial Navy construction units. Work began immediately and the airfield was planned to
be completed in August. This activity was soon detected by the Americans and immediately
recognized as a threat since long-range aircraft based on Guadalcanal could threaten Allied
supply lines to Australia.
Japanese airfield
400 miles
Japanese seaplane base
Japanese naval base
US airfield
US naval base
Fena Islands
Allied coast-watchers 350 miles
New
Introduction
Rabaul Ireland
Green Islands
New
Britain
St George’s Cape St George
300 miles
Channel
Buka
Buka Passage
Buka
250 miles
Bougainville
Cape Torokina
Empress Augusta Bay
SOLOMON ISLAND S 200 miles
Buin
Shortland Choiseul
Island
150 miles
Solomon Sea
Rekata Bay
Treasury
Islands Vella
Lavella f
Gul
Kolombangara
f
Santa Isabel
ul
la
100 miles
aG
Ve l
Kul
New
Georgia The
Slo
t
Munda
Rendova 50 miles
Island
Segi Point Russell Islands Florida
Tulagi
N
Area under Navy control. King wanted the offensive to commence by August 1 in order to
exploit the victory at Midway. As the pace of planning accelerated, American intelligence
assessed that Japanese construction troops were on Guadalcanal; the island was added as an
objective on July 5. The entire operation was given the codename Watchtower. The codename
for Guadalcanal was Cactus.
The bulk of the Pacific Fleet’s fighting strength, including three of its four carriers, was
allocated to the operation. The principal ground unit earmarked was the 1st Marine Division.
By June, most of the division was in Wellington, New Zealand and on June 26 the division’s
leadership was told of its role in the offensive against Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The ground
part of Operation Watchtower was commanded by Major General Alexander Vandegrift,
commander of the 1st Marine Division and later the South Pacific Marine Provisional Corps.
This formation included any Marine air units and later any Army and Navy air units based
on Guadalcanal. Because his command was spread out, Vandegrift requested a short delay
to launch the attack. This was granted and the new invasion date was set as August 7. On
July 31, the Marines departed the peaceful waters of the Fijis, where they had conducted a
messy rehearsal, and headed for the Solomons. Much of the logistical preparations for the
operation were incomplete, but the first American offensive of the war was under way.
The expeditionary force was commanded by Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher. Air cover for
the invasion was provided by Fletcher’s three carriers, but the admiral was wary of exposing
his carriers to land-based air attack from Rabaul for an extended period. The key to victory
was to get the almost-completed airfield on Guadalcanal operational so it could support
Marine aircraft. Once supported by their own aircraft, the Marines would be in a good
position to defeat any Japanese counterattack and Fletcher’s carriers could be released from
a direct support role. Neither side foresaw that Guadalcanal was to become the focal point
of the decisive battle of the Pacific War and neither side accurately predicted how the battle
was going to be fought. In the first weeks of the campaign, each side quickly understood
that the airfield on Guadalcanal was the key to victory and made every attempt to bring it
under its control.
CHRONOLOGY
1942 August 8 Uncompleted airfield on Guadalcanal
May 3 Japanese seize Tulagi Island in southern Solomons captured; Japanese air attack from Rabaul on the
invasion fleet is defeated with heavy Japanese losses
June 24 King directs Nimitz to plan for capture of
Tulagi and adjacent islands August 9 Battle of Savo Island results in a severe Allied
naval defeat
July 5 Guadalcanal added to American list of targets
August 12 Guadalcanal airfield completed and named
July 6 Japanese begin work on airfield on Guadalcanal Henderson Field by the Marines
August 7 Americans land on Guadalcanal against August 20 First Marine aircraft arrive on Guadalcanal
minimal resistance
10 Chronology
August 20–21 Battle of the Tenaru River; first Japanese October 16 Fourth Marine fighter squadron arrives on
attempt to seize Henderson Field is repulsed Guadalcanal
August 21 First dogfight between Marine and Japanese October 18 Ghormley relieved by Halsey
fighters results in a defeat for the Americans; first
USAAF aircraft arrive on Guadalcanal October 24–26 Third Japanese ground attack to seize
Henderson Field fails
August 24–25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons; Cactus
Air Force aircraft attacks a Japanese reinforcement October 26 Battle of Santa Cruz; Japanese gain major
convoy, forcing it to turn back victory leaving one USN carrier operational in the
South Pacific
August 28 Cactus Air Force attacks the “Tokyo Express”
and sinks one destroyer and damages two more November 13 First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal;
Americans suffer heavy losses but turn back Japanese
August 30 First major Marine air reinforcements arrive attempt to bombard Henderson Field with battleships
on Guadalcanal
November 14–15 American aircraft sink all but
September 11 First Navy fighter squadron arrives on one of 11 Japanese transports in a convoy bound for
Guadalcanal Guadalcanal
September 12–14 Second Japanese ground attack to November 14–15 Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal;
capture Henderson Field fails USN defeats another Japanese attempt to conduct a
battleship bombardment of Henderson Field
September 14–26 Lull in Japanese raids on Henderson
Field; Japanese land-based air units heavily reinforced; December 11 Last Japanese destroyer run to
losses during first two weeks of September total 34 for Guadalcanal in 1942; Japanese garrison reduced to
the Japanese and 42 for the Cactus Air Force starvation rations
September 28 Large Japanese raid on Henderson Field December 26 Imperial Army and Navy agree to
defeated for second day in a row with heavy Japanese withdraw from Guadalcanal
bomber losses
December 31 Emperor approves evacuation plans
October 3 Japanese air attack defeated with heavy losses
forcing a cessation of air attacks for several days 1943
February 1 First Japanese evacuation run to Guadalcanal
October 9 Third Marine fighter squadron arrives on picks up 4,935 personnel
Guadalcanal
February 4 Second evacuation run picks up another
October 11–12 Battle of Cape Esperance results in a 3,921 personnel
Japanese naval defeat but the Japanese build-up for an
October ground attack continues in full swing February 7 Last evacuation run picks up final
1,972 personnel
October 12 Cactus Air Force sinks two Japanese
destroyers February 9 Organized Japanese resistance on
Guadalcanal ends
October 13–14 Two Japanese battleships bombard and
temporarily neutralize Henderson Field
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
The Emperor’s air power
The IJN began the war with the world’s largest and most powerful naval air force. In The Mitsubishi F1M2
addition to its large carrier-based air force, the IJN was unique in that it possessed a large Navy Type 0 Observation
Seaplane Model 11 saw
and balanced land-based air force with fighter, long-range bomber, and reconnaissance extensive service during
units. This force showed its capabilities early in the war, taking a leading role in the Guadalcanal
operations against American forces in the Philippines, British forces in Malaya and campaign as part of the
R Area Air Force. Not
Singapore, and Allied forces in the Dutch East Indies. It had seen brief action against only did the aircraft
American forces at Wake Island and other Pacific Islands during USN carrier raids in conduct night harassment
January–February 1942 but had not seen serious combat against American land-based missions over
Guadalcanal, it was also
air forces. Now the IJN’s Air Force was called on to play a leading role to crush American used in a convoy escort
air power in the Solomons. role to protect Tokyo
Express missions. Used as
a fighter it was limited by
a weak armament of two
Aircraft units forward-firing 7.7mm
The 11th Air Fleet under Vice Admiral Tsukahara Nishizo was the IJN’s principal land-based machine guns and a rear
firing 7.7mm machine gun
aviation command. Tsukahara was a 1908 graduate from the IJN’s Naval Academy at Eta and a top speed of 200
Jima. He was not an aviator but had held several naval aviation billets including command knots. It was supremely
of an aircraft carrier. He took command of the 11th Air Fleet in October 1941 and led it maneuverable but was
totally outclassed by a
through its string of early-war successes. In August, he fell sick to malaria and then dengue Wildcat. (US Navy
fever. On October 8, Yamamoto replaced him with Vice Admiral Kusaka Jinichi, who was National Museum of
pulled from his job as Commandant at Eta Jima. He also was not a naval aviator and had Naval Aviation)
little background in aviation but was considered an aggressive commander. He ended the war
as commander of all naval forces in the Rabaul and Solomons area and signed the surrender
of these forces in September 1945.
The 11th Air Fleet was broken down into several air flotillas. The 25th Air Flotilla was
the formation assigned to conduct operations in the Bismarck Archipelago and eastern New
Guinea. Its primary bases were at Rabaul on New Britain and Lae on New Guinea. It had
12 Attacker’s Capabilities
ABOVE LEFT forward operating bases at Tulagi for seaplanes and at Buna on New Guinea. It was the 25th
Japanese operations in the Air Flotilla which was preparing to occupy the new airfield on Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal area were
under the overall direction of The 25th Air Flotilla was established in April and had been in constant action against
Admiral Yamamoto, C-in-C United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) units over
of the Combined Fleet. He New Guinea since then. As a result, the unit was under-strength. It was still formidable since
was caught off guard by the
American offensive into the it combined modern aircraft with very well-trained aircrew.
Solomons in August 1942 An IJN air flotilla was broken down into a variable number of air groups. Each air group
and never regained his comprised between three and six chutai, each with nine aircraft. The 25th Air Flotilla’s long-
balance. Yamamoto failed to
synchronize the advantages range bomber air group was the 4th. It was authorized 48 bombers but had only 32 on hand
he had in both surface and on August 7 when the Americans landed on Guadalcanal. That afternoon, the first nine of
air forces and mismanaged 32 bombers from the Misawa Air Groups arrived at Rabaul.
the campaign throughout.
(Naval History and Heritage The 25th Air Flotilla’s fighter unit was the famed Tinian Air Group. This was the
Command) IJN’s premier fighter unit with the IJN’s three top fighter aces (Sakai Saburo, Nishizawa
ABOVE RIGHT Hiroyoshi, and Ota Toshio). The Tinian Air Group had swept the skies of Allied
Vice Admiral Tsukahara was aircraft over the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. It was authorized 69
CO of the 11th Air Fleet. fighters but possessed only 24 on August 7. Because of this aircraft shortage, it used
When the Americans landed
on Guadalcanal, he moved six- rather than nine-plane chutais and it had many more pilots, almost all veterans,
from Tinian to Rabaul to take than aircraft. A small number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft were also assigned
command of the Japanese to this air group.
air forces in the South
Pacific. Even though the 11th The 3rd Air Group was composed of 15 short-range fighters and 16 dive-bombers. None
Air Fleet was numerically of these aircraft had the range to fly from Rabaul to Guadalcanal without refueling so were
superior to the Cactus Air of limited use unless the Japanese could build bases closer to Guadalcanal. The fighters were
Force, he was never able to
make the IJN’s land-based used for base defense at Rabaul.
air forces a decisive The Yokohama Air Group operated a collection of long-range flying boats and float
component of Yamamoto’s fighters. Most were based on Tulagi and were destroyed in the first hours of the campaign.
counterattack to retake
Guadalcanal. (Naval History IJN flying boat units did outstanding work during the campaign locating USN naval forces
and Heritage Command) but were not directly involved in the battles over Guadalcanal.
13
Aircraft
Only two different aircraft types shared the burden of
conducting the Japanese campaign to destroy American
air power at Guadalcanal. These were the Mitsubishi
G4M1 Navy Type 1 Attack Bomber Model 11, which
was the IJN’s mainstay long-range bomber for most of
the war, and the Mitsubishi A6M2 Model 21 Type 0
Carrier Fighter, which also served for the entire war as
the IJN’s principal fighter. Though their Allied reporting
names were not in use during the Guadalcanal campaign,
the bomber became known later in the war as the “Betty”
and the ubiquitous fighter became known as the “Zeke”
or more commonly as the “Zero.” Both will be referred
to by their Allied reporting names for the remainder
of the book.
The Betty was the IJN’s principal bomber having
replaced the earlier G3M “Nell” long-range bomber. The
Betty was an impressive machine, but it did possess a
significant weakness. The aircraft was built as a long-
range strike aircraft to support the IJN’s concept of
attacking and attriting USN fleet units at extended
ranges. It could carry torpedoes to attack maritime
targets or bombs to attack either land or sea targets.
The Betty’s payload was a modest 1,760lb, which proved
to be a disadvantage. The aircraft possessed a long
range of 1,540nm, meaning that it could easily reach
Guadalcanal from Rabaul. It was also relatively fast with a top speed of 231 knots at Vice Admiral Kusaka
13,800 feet. It carried four machine guns and a 20mm gun in the tail for self-protection. Jinichi took over command
of the 11th Air Fleet on
However, its extended range capabilities were gained at the expense of armor protection October 8. Despite a
for the crew and self-sealing gas tanks. The aircraft carried 1,294 gallons of fuel in the reputation for
wings, and when these were hit the result was usually a fireball. The aircraft’s reputation aggressiveness, he was
equally unable to
for turning into a flying ball of fire prompted its crews to call it the “Type One Lighter” neutralize the Cactus Air
and the “Flying Cigar.” Force using Japanese
Protecting the vulnerable Bettys and tasked to gain control of the airspace over land-based air power.
(Naval History and
Guadalcanal was the famous Zero. The aircraft was the product of the brilliant designer Heritage Command)
Jiro Horikoshi. By incorporating several new features, he was able to meet the IJN’s
specifications for an aircraft capable of great range, high speed, and still able to meet
the Japanese penchant for maneuverability. With a drop tank, it had a range of 1,200
miles, which made it capable of flying from Rabaul and operating over Guadalcanal.
It must be remembered that the Zero had to carry external fuel tanks to make it to
Guadalcanal and back. These tanks could not be dropped which meant that the aircraft
could not maneuver at full speed for fear of ripping the tanks off. Even with tanks, the
Zeros had only enough fuel for a few minutes of air combat over Guadalcanal. Against
the principal American fighter of the campaign, the Grumman F4F Wildcat, the Zero
was more maneuverable, possessed superior climb and acceleration, and was slightly
faster (top speed 288 knots at 14,764 feet). However, as with the Betty, the Zero had
a fatal weakness. Because of the requirement for great range, the Zero had to be light.
The designer accomplished this at the expense of protective armor and self-sealing fuel
tanks. This made the Zero highly susceptible to battle damage. Another method to reduce
weight was to remove the radios from the Zero. Japanese radios were unreliable, and
pilots removed them to save weight. This also impacted the Zero’s combat effectiveness.
14 Attacker’s Capabilities
The Zero was indifferently armed with two rifle-caliber machine guns and two wing-
mounted slow-firing 20mm cannons.
Weapons
The Betty bomber carried a relatively small bomb load of 1,760lb. This equated to a typical
load of two 550lb and six 132lb bombs. This meant that a typical formation of 18 Bettys
carried only 36 large bombs, not enough to saturate a target as large as Henderson Field.
Since the bombers were dropping from 25,000 feet or more to avoid antiaircraft fire from
the 90mm guns emplaced around the airfield, it was far from certain that even this small
number of bombs would hit their target. The No.25 550lb Land Bombs contained 330lb of
explosives. In the soft earth of Henderson Field, the bombs would often bury themselves deep
into the ground, which meant that even aircraft or personnel close by were undamaged. The
132lb bombs with instant fuzes were often more effective since they could damage aircraft
up to 50 yards away. Bettys sometimes carried 12 of these smaller bombs.
The Bettys flew in groups of nine aircraft (a chutai). Usually, raids consisted of two or three
chutais with as many Zeros as were available to provide escort. The usual bombing altitude
was 25,000 to 27,000 feet. The nine-plane chutais were arranged in a large V formation
This photo shows a group with one chutai in the middle and two on the flanks. Within each chutai, the formation
of Bettys taken from the was broken down into three smaller Vs, each with three aircraft. The escorting fighters were
waist gun position of the
viewing aircraft. The Betty placed above, below, and on the flanks of the bomber formation to cover all avenues of
was a formidable aircraft approach by the Wildcats.
early in the war against
minimal Allied opposition,
but against the Americans
on Guadalcanal the Betty Bases
proved incapable of Almost all the 11th Air Fleet’s aircraft were based at the airfields around Rabaul. Fighters
performing effectively in a
counter-air role. (IJN/ and dive-bombers flew from Lakunai Field, Bettys from Vunakanau Field. Betty operations
Public domain) later moved to Kavieng because it was out of the range of Allied bombers. The fact that the
15
16 Attacker’s Capabilities
major Japanese airbases were in Rabaul was a major factor since these were 565nm from
Guadalcanal. The Japanese failed to address this problem during most of the campaign. Buka
Airfield on northern Bougainville was used as a forward staging base on a limited basis but
was never developed as a major base.
A critical weakness for the Japanese during the campaign was their inability to finish the
airbase at Buin, located on southern Bougainville. Work was begun with the original goal of
completion by August 31. The spot chosen was a bad one with soggy ground made worse by
persistent rains. Completion was delayed until September 17 and then 26. The Japanese tried
using metal mats and stones, but the airfield remained incomplete by the end of September.
The Zero was also the Not until about October 10 did operations begin from Buin Airfield. This base had the
principal fighter of the potential to bring Japanese air power to within about 365nm of Guadalcanal, which would
IJN’s land-based fighter have been a major force multiplier. It would have allowed the Japanese to employ the A6M3
groups, like these aircraft
here photographed on Model 32 Zeros over Guadalcanal, which did not have the range to reach the island from
Rabaul. Flying at great Rabaul. The new base would have other benefits for the A6M2 Zeros like increasing their
distances from Rabaul to loiter time over Guadalcanal and decreasing pilot fatigue and mechanical problems caused
Guadalcanal, the Zeros
operated at a by the long missions from Rabaul.
disadvantage. With the Work began on another airfield at Munda on New Georgia Island in the central Solomons
relatively few Zeros on November 24. This was a mere 175 miles from Henderson Field. By December 5 the
available early in the
campaign, the Japanese Americans discerned that the airfield was largely complete despite elaborate camouflage
were unable to clear the to hide the extent of progress. By December 14 the field was completed, and revetments
airspace over finished for 30 Zeros. Final preparations were finished by December 19. Beginning on
Guadalcanal of American
fighters. (IJN/Public December 12, the airfield was bombed almost daily by American aircraft. On December
domain) 23 and 24, the Cactus Air Force destroyed or damaged the 24 Zeros which had arrived
17
on the 23rd. By December 27, Kusaka saw Munda as more of a drain, and pulled the The Aichi D3A1 Navy
remaining aircraft back to Rabaul. Type 99 Carrier Bomber
Model 11 (Val) was the
IJN’s standard early-war
dive-bomber, equipping
Tactics both land-based and
carrier units. Despite its
Having to fly from Rabaul was a major factor shaping Japanese tactics. It forced the outdated appearance it
Japanese to adhere to a pattern of operations which the Americans quickly understood was an accurate dive-
and exploited. Since few aircrew were experienced in night operations, the Japanese bomber and sank more
Allied ships than any other
had to avoid taking off too early from Rabaul or returning too late to land in the dark. Japanese aircraft. It
Since it was a four-hour flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, this meant that the Japanese played a minor role in the
arrived over Guadalcanal between 1130 and 1430hrs. It also meant that only one sortie Guadalcanal campaign
since it lacked the range
per day was possible. The flight down was exhausting and left the escorting Zeros with to fly from Rabaul to
a limited time to conduct air combat. When the airfield at Buin was finished late in the Guadalcanal and return.
campaign, the Japanese developed new tactics built around a morning fighter sweep (IJN/Public domain)
combined with the usual afternoon bombing attack in hope of catching the American
fighters on the ground.
Another major factor in the outcome of the air campaign was the survival rate of Japanese
pilots who were shot down. Betty aircrew did not even carry parachutes, so their survival
was extremely unlikely. Few Zero pilots put their parachutes on since to use them could lead
to potential capture, which was a fate worse than death. If Japanese aircrew did survive the
destruction of their aircraft, few ever returned to duty.
Japanese aircrew
Aircrew training in the IJN was based on the Japanese intent to produce a small number of
elite pilots who would sweep all before them. This succeeded in producing an extremely well-
trained group of pilots, but this low-output, high-quality model could not be maintained in
high-intensity combat. Nevertheless, the IJN Air Force still retained a large core of highly
trained fighter and bomber pilots in mid-1942 who were sent to battle the Americans in
the South Pacific.
Heavy losses during the campaign resulted in a significant drop in the average skill level of
Japanese pilots. This was observed by the Americans and was so obvious to the Japanese that
they took measures to address the problem. After the November battles, Admiral Kusaka sent
half of his bomber force to Tinian for remedial training. A significant number of the newly
arrived Zero pilots were sent to Kavieng for the same purpose. Most of these pilots had never
flown a Zero before arriving at the front. The chief of staff of the 11th Air Fleet assessed that
the proficiency level of the new fighter pilots was only a third of that of the men they replaced.
18 Defenders’ Capabilities
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
The Cactus Air Force
over Guadalcanal. At the start of the campaign, he was 57 years old. After getting a law ABOVE LEFT
degree, he joined the Marine Corps and graduated flight school in 1917, becoming the 49th Vice Admiral William
Halsey, shown here on the
naval aviator. He was a very hands-on commander and had flown all aircraft in the Marine left conferring with Major
inventory. Geiger was a very demanding leader who drove his men hard, but he drove himself General Alexander
just as hard and set an example for his airmen to follow. He quickly grasped the situation Vandegrift, took over
responsibility for directing
on Guadalcanal and ruthlessly exploited the advantages he held. Geiger’s headquarters was the Guadalcanal campaign
a short distance from the airfield and he shared all the hardships of the other Marines on right before the Japanese
the island. When morale sagged in September, he drove his men harder by ordering more October offensive. His
arrival immediately
offensive missions and issuing an admonishment to do all they could. On September 22, energized the defenders
Geiger flew a Dauntless on a combat mission to set the example for the younger men. Much and resulted in much more
to his chagrin, Geiger was ordered to give up his command in early November because of support for Vandegrift’s
Marines. (Naval History
extreme fatigue. and Heritage Command)
In the first week of November, Brigadier General Louis E. Woods took over from the
exhausted Geiger. Woods had been an aviator since 1922 so was well acquainted with all
ABOVE RIGHT
aspects of Marine aviation. He brought fresh energy and a killer instinct to the decisive Rear Admirals McCain
November air battles. (left) and Fitch pictured on
Guadalcanal. Fitch
relieved McCain as
COMAIRSOPAC on
Aircraft units September 21. McCain’s
departure was mourned
The South Pacific air command was under-resourced and suffered from a lack of aircraft and
by the Marines on
facilities. On August 7, the command had 282 aircraft spread out to cover the SLOCs from Guadalcanal, but Fitch
the United States to Australia with relatively few aircraft earmarked directly for Operation was much more effective
in rendering support to the
Watchtower. Chronic shortages existed of replacement aircraft, aircrew, parts, engines, and
Cactus Air Field. (Official
mechanics. Marine Corps photo
In particular, the supply of fighters for Guadalcanal was very limited. The bulk of the air courtesy of Marine Corps
History Division)
combat was handled by the F4F Wildcat but there was only a limited number of Wildcats
in the entire Pacific theater. One potential source was the USN carrier squadrons, but since
the protection of the carriers was Nimitz’s highest priority, these were off limits for duty on
Guadalcanal. Ghormley had three Marine Wildcat squadrons but these were retained on the
various islands on SLOC protection duties.
The source for the first aircraft based on Guadalcanal was Marine Air Group 23. This
unit was formed on May 1 on Oahu. It consisted of two fighter squadrons and two dive-
bomber squadrons. The fighter squadrons were VMF-223 and VMF-224. As late as July,
they were equipped with the obsolete Brewster F2A-3 Buffalo. This was the aircraft which
made up most of the defending Marine fighters at Midway in June. Of the 18 Buffalos
committed against the attacking Zeros, only five survived. In July, the two squadrons were
20 Defenders’ Capabilities
FAR LEFT
Major John Smith,
commander of VMF-223,
was the most important
fighter commander in
Cactus Air Force history.
Not only was he a skilled
fighter pilot with 19 kills, but
he also trained and led
VMF-223 into a crack
squadron which claimed 83
kills during the campaign.
Perhaps most importantly,
he devised tactics that
maximized the Wildcat’s
capabilities, decimated the
IJN’s vulnerable Betty
bomber force, and
preserved the Wildcat force
from excessive attrition by
engaging the Japanese
Zeros. In February 1943,
he was awarded the Medal
of Honor for his exploits on
squadrons. The arrival of the 24 Wildcats from VF-5 on September 11 was a big morale Guadalcanal. (Naval
boost. The dive-bombers of VS-3 were a welcome addition with their skills in over-water History and Heritage
Command)
navigation and ship recognition. The Avengers of VT-8 gave the Cactus Air Force its first
torpedo attack capability. From Wasp came VS-71. In November, most of Air Group 10 from
LEFT
Enterprise was temporarily based at Henderson Field, which allowed the carrier to be moved Major Richard C. Mangrum
out of the range of aircraft from Rabaul. was to the Cactus Air
Force’s dive-bomber force
what Smith was to the
fighter force. He arrived on
The USAAF Guadalcanal on August 20
General Henry Arnold, commander of the USAAF, placed the South Pacific into the as commanding officer
(CO) of VMSB-232. When
greater context of the Army Air Forces’ global requirements. To him, the South Pacific he was evacuated from
ranked as a low priority compared to the upcoming invasion of North Africa, the build-up Guadalcanal on October
in England for the strategic bombing of Germany and the invasion of Europe, and the 14, he was the only pilot in
VMSB-232 not killed,
defense of Australia and Hawaii. This meant few resources for the South Pacific. Despite wounded, or previously
pleas from Nimitz for long-range P-38 fighters, the first did not reach Guadalcanal until evacuated for sickness.
November 12. For the first half of the campaign, the sole USAAF unit on Guadalcanal was During his tenure on the
island, he flew 28 missions,
the 67th Fighter Squadron. This squadron had many experienced pilots but was saddled including ten strikes, an
with inferior aircraft. These were the P-400 and P-39 single-seat fighters. On August 21, indication of the grueling
five P-400s reached the island. Nine more P-400s arrived on August 27. Later in the pace maintained by the
original squadrons of the
campaign, five other fighter squadrons reached the island, including the 339th Fighter Cactus Air Force. (Official
Squadron with the long-range P-38 fighter. On November 14, the 70th Squadron arrived Marine Corps photo
at Henderson Field with ten B-26 medium bombers. Three fighter squadrons (12th, 68th, courtesy of Marine Corps
History Division)
and 70th) arrived in December and a second squadron of B-26s in the 69th Bombardment
Squadron arrived before the end of the year.
The other principal USAAF unit involved in the campaign was the 11th Bombardment
Group (Heavy). The group comprised four squadrons, each flying the four-engine B-17
heavy bomber. The group flew from Espiritu Santo, not Henderson Field, so was not part
of the Cactus Air Force. The B-17s occasionally operated from Henderson Field but these
operations were minimal because of the desire not to risk the aircraft at a forward base and
because of the B-17’s extensive logistical requirements. The B-17 had a formidable reputation
for accurate bombing but proved almost totally ineffective during the campaign against
maritime targets. The 11th Bomb Group was a stalwart during the campaign performing
mainly in the reconnaissance role. It was under the command of Col. Laverne G. Saunders.
22 Defenders’ Capabilities
interception and on Guadalcanal it was challenging to keep both operational. One was The Cactus Air Force’s
the supercharger for the engine and the second was the oxygen system for the pilot. If principal striking weapon
was the Douglas SBD-3
either failed, the aircraft could not reach high altitude and the wise pilot took his plane Dauntless. It served in
out of the fight. both Marine and Navy
The principal USAAF fighter for most of the campaign was the P-400. The P-400 dive-bomber squadrons
and proved to be a
was the export version of the P-39. This was a second-line fighter and exemplified the rugged and potent
USAAF’s prioritization for the South Pacific. Without an operational oxygen system (it aircraft. It was a stable
had been built for export and thus was fitted with a British high-pressure oxygen system, dive-bombing platform
which could carry 1,000
and bottles for this were not available in the South Pacific), the P-400s could reach or 500lb bombs. (Official
14,000 feet but could not operate there on a sustained basis. Since they were not suitable Marine Corps photo
for high-altitude operations the P-400 was unable to attack the high-flying Bettys and courtesy of Marine Corps
History Division)
it made fighting the Zero almost suicidal. The P-400 made only a handful of air-to-air
missions until heavy losses on August 30 relegated the fighter to ground support and
reconnaissance missions. The P-400s possessed a heavy armament, which made them
well suited for ground attack missions. The P-400s were augmented by the P-39K, which
had a maximum altitude of 27,000 feet but this still made the aircraft unsuited for air
combat with the Zero.
BELOW LEFT
The so-called “Pagoda” Just as important as the Wildcat to American fortunes on Guadalcanal was the Cactus Air
was a structure built by the Force’s principal strike aircraft, the Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bomber. The Dauntless
Japanese. It served as the was a two-place single-engine aircraft noted for its ruggedness and its ability as an accurate
headquarters of the 1st
Marine Air Wing until it bombing platform. The SBD-3 was the latest version with a dual machine gun for the rear
was damaged in October gunner and improved armor and self-sealing fuel tanks. The Dauntless had a mediocre top
1942 and was then speed but could carry a 1,000lb bomb out to some 225–250 miles or a 500lb bomb and
demolished by orders from
Geiger, who feared it was conduct scouting missions out to about 325 miles.
being used as an aiming The Grumman TBF-1 Avenger was even more rugged than the Dauntless. It had just
point by the Japanese. entered service as the USN’s (and later the Marine Corps’) standard torpedo bomber.
(Official Marine Corps
photo courtesy of Marine Unfortunately, the Mark XIII torpedo was unreliable, but the aircraft could also carry two
Corps History Division) 1,000lb bombs or four 500lb bombs. The Avenger carried three machine guns.
BELOW RIGHT
An air raid warning alarm
on Henderson Field made
The Cactus Air Force air defense system
from the former nose cone The Japanese faced a four-hour flight from Rabaul before they arrived over Guadalcanal.
of a Japanese 14-inch shell. During this flight they overflew several other Solomon Islands where Australian coast
The Americans depended
on early warning of watchers were located. In March 1942, these coast watchers were activated as part of the
Japanese raids from a Allied Intelligence Bureau. These included Jack Read on the northern tip of Bougainville
system of coast watchers Island overlooking Buka, Paul Mason on the southern part of Bougainville overlooking
and radar, which could
provide up to 1 hour 40 Buin and the Shortlands, and D. G. Kennedy at Segi Point on New Georgia Island in the
minutes’ warning before the central Solomons.
arrival of the Japanese Once they spotted Japanese air activity, the coast watchers radioed an alert to Guadalcanal.
bombers. This was enough
to get all personnel into If the central Solomons coast watchers spotted the Japanese headed southbound, this
shelters and the Wildcats up provided a 45-minute alert. This was enough time for the Wildcats to take off and reach
to their interception altitude. their interception altitudes and for the other operational aircraft to get off the ground to avoid
(Official Marine Corps
photo courtesy of Marine Japanese bombs. Eventually, the Japanese figured out the locations of the coast watchers and
Corps History Division) took evasive courses to fly around them.
25
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