Dr Barry Stocker

Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Boğaziçi University
John Freely Building, South Campus, Room 509
[email protected]

ETHICS
PHIL 341
AUTUMN SEMESTER, 2024

NOTES 04
ARISOTLE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Books III and IV

Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια/Ēthika Nikomacheia, Athens 4th century BCE]

Nicomachean Ethics
Books III and IV

The Summary

Book Three
Virtue is to do with feelings and actions. Voluntary feelings and actions are praised and
blamed. Involuntary actions are pardoned or pitied. Consideration of virtue must be
concerned with what divides the voluntary and the involuntary as virtue belongs to what is
voluntary. This is also signi cant when deciding on law and legal penalties.

What comes from ignorance or force is not voluntary. It is involuntary. What is forced has
an external rst principle so that the person acted upon does not contribute to the
principle. The external rst principle can come from natural force or people with power.
This is very clear.

A less clear decision about what is voluntary or involuntary arises when actions result
from fear of some greater evil or are done for something more noble. The person who
acts because a tyrant threatens their family make act in a way that is voluntary or
involuntary. The same applies to the person who throws things overboard during storm,
acting from the greater good of saving lives. These actions are mixtures of voluntary and
involuntary, though they seem more like voluntary actions because there is choice of
some kind at the beginning. It is in the power of the person concerned to act or not act.
As no one would choose these acts, they are involuntary. We praise those who endure
pain for some noble object and blame them when they endure bad things for a bad or
trivial end.
fi
fi
fi
 Phil 314 Autumn 2024 Notes 01 2
Questions of blame and praise are important for Aristotle with regard to determining virtue
and the possibility of excusing an action to minimise its badness is also signi cant.

What is done through ignorance is non-voluntary. It is involuntary in that the agent is

ignorant of the action, but it is not an involuntary action because the agent doe snot
su er pain. The person who shows regret after the action is an involuntary agent, while
the person who shows no regret is a non-voluntary agent.

At this point Aristotle shows some common ground with Plato on seeing virtue as
dependent on rationality. Aristotle states that every wicked person is ignorant of what he
should and should not do. Ignorance in rational choice causes wickedness. Ignorance of
the universal rule is something where we give blame to people. However, we nd
ignorance of particulars more excusable as here an action may be involuntary. We may
give pity and parson in such cases. Someone completely ignorant of all circumstances of
actions is simply mad, but we cab say they act in an involuntary way when they are just
ignorant o one or a few details of what they are doing or its likely consequences.

A voluntary action is where the rst principle is in the person acting and that person has
full knowledge of all circumstances. Spirit or appetite in a person do not make their
actions involuntary, because if we allow such a causality there will be no noble actions as
these could all be attributed to spirt or appetite. Aristotle suggests that what is voluntary
or involuntary always involved reason.

Not all voluntary actions arise from rational choice though all rational choice is voluntary.
Children and animals act voluntarily, but not through rational choice. Rational choice is
not concerned with what is pleasant or painful. Rational choice is distinct from wish, but
rational choice cannot choose what is impossible, such as immortal life or things that we
cannot control, such as whether an athlete wins a competition. We choose what is
conducive to long term aims such as health as happiness, but we do not choose such
ends.

Deliberation applies to what a sane person has in their thoughts. We do not deliberate
about the universe as it is something eternal and we do not deliberate about
mathematics. We do not deliberate about things that are entirely regular, such as solstices
or the movement of the starts, but we also do not deliberate about unpredictable and
changing things, along with things that happen by pure chance. We do not deliberate
about things we cannot in uence, such as forms of government for a a far away people.

We deliberate about things we bring about and not always in the same way, though they
usually happen in a certain way. This applies to navigation, medicine and navigation.
Deliberation is about means to an end not the end. A doctor deliberates about how to
cure someone, not whether it is right to cure someone. The analysis in deliberation ends
with the rst step in the causes of the object of deliberation. Deliberation applies to what
we can do ourselves, where the rst principle is inside ourself.

Deliberation leads us to the object of rational deliberation and precedes rational

deliberation. Deliberation leads to rational deliberation when deliberation nds the rst
principle inside us.

The object of the wish is the good, but this creates a dilemma about whether the object is
the real good or the apparent good. If the object of the wish is the real good, then the
question remains of what people are wishing for if they do not wish for the real good. If
ff
fi
ff
fl
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
 Phil 314 Autumn 2024 Notes 01 3
the object of the wish is the apparent good, then we have to say that there is no natural
good only what individuals wish. We can resolve the problem by thinking in terms of the
real good being known to people who distinguish between questions of pain and pleasure
and questions of what is noble and pleasant. The majority of the people, the common
people as opposed to the best people, only follow pleasure and pain so are mistaken
about what is the real good.

While ignorance is certain circumstances can excuse our bad actions, this is not always
the case. Laws punish crimes committed under the in uence of intoxication more harshly
because the crime was committed in a state of ignorance, but a state chosen by the
individual. Something similar applies to problems of ill health brought about by our failure
to care about our health. Virtues and vices are voluntary and can never be explained by
our nature, though our nature may have some in uence.

Aristotle moves into an extended discussion of courage. We fear all evils, but the
courageous person only fears vices. The courageous person does not fear a noble death
or immediate death. This person will have courage art sea during storm, which is
di erent from the fearlessness of a member of the crew whose experience lessens fear.
Aristotle refers to other forms of courage, but this seems to be the supreme example of
courage for him.

The courageous will stand their ground in accordance with virtue and reason. The
excessively courageous person fears nothing, including storms at sea and earthquakes.
This is a kind of madness of lack of awareness. The excessively courageous may only be
pretending, as they are rash cowards who talk about courage but lack it in situations that
demand courage. The coward feels excessive pan in relation to danger. Courage is a
mean between rashness and cowardice. Suicide to escape painful situations is
cowardice.

Courage which is not compelled is more virtuous than courage which is compelled.
Courage is greater when there is knowledge of particulars, as Socrates suggests (Aristotle
is referring to passages in Plato’s dialogues including the Protagoras). The noble virtue of
courage and the courage that comes from knowledge of particulars can diverge. The
professional soldier is more likely to run away when the danger is greater than expected
while the citizen solider is more likely to keep ghting to the death. Spirit (that is the
power in the mind between intelligence and appetite according to Plato and Aristotle)
in uences courage, so adds to what comes from knowledge and practical wisdom/
rational choice, which leads us to seek what is noble. It is not real courage to act from
appetite (such as fear of pain) and spirit alone. To be hopeful and con dent because of
past victories is not the same as courage. Character enables us to deal with unforeseen
situations while calculations and reason used in rational choice enable us to deal with
foreseen situations. Ignorance leads us to be appear courageous in situations where we
unaware of the real danger.

Courage endures pain while aiming for a pleasant end which my be obscured by
immediate pain. The virtuous fear death more because they have more to lose in death
than than the less noble, but they still show courage. It is not courage to accept death
easily.

Temperance is a mean concerned more with pleasure than pain. Questions of temperance
and intemperance do not refer to love of things connected to the mind like love of
learning and love of honour, or even lesser things like love of storytelling and gossip,
fl
ff
fi
fl
fl
fi
 Phil 314 Autumn 2024 Notes 01 4
spending the day without any plan or direction. The same applies to pain at losing money
or friends. Even for some pleasures of the senses like looking at paintings and enjoyment
of smells, we do not refer to temperance or intemperance. Aristotle complicates this by
suggesting that we can intemperate in enjoying the smells of cooked food and perfumes.
The smell of cooked food reminds someone of the appetite for food, so the temperance/
intemperance distinction seems to only apply in Aristotle to pleasures connected directly
or indirectly with appetite. Pleasures of touch and taste can be intemperate but not when
we are concerned with distinctions, such as discriminating avours in wine or food.
Where there is grati cation, there is the possibility of intemperance.

Food, drink and sex are connected with natural appetites, which can vary between
individuals in some aspects but apply in some form to all humans. Sex apparently is such
an appetite for the ‘young and blooming’. Excess is possible in these appetites, but not
lack. Those who are intemperate in natural appetites deserve blame for giving too much
weight to the pain experienced when the appetites are not satis ed. The person who has
too little pleasure in the satisfaction of appetites is so unusual that no name exists for
such a person. The temperate person desires what is pleasant in moderation. This person
only desires what is good for health and what can be obtained given circumstance.

Book Four
Aristotle moves onto a discussion of generosity. He de nes it as the mean in relation to
wealth, that is anything that can be measured with money. Excess in generosity is
wastefulness. Lack is stinginess. Wastefulness is the loss of property. Generosity is
concerned with the use of property rather than its possession. It refers to giving to the
right people rather than taking. Giving is noble while taking refers to receiving good or not
doing what is shameful. The characteristics of taking are less noble than those of giving.
Those who give are praised for generosity, those who do not take are praised for justice.
The generous give without pain, because giving is noble. Generosity depends on how
much the giver has to give, so the giver who has little but gives most of it is more
generous than the giver who gives more but only gives a small proportion of what he has.

Tyrants often give more than they possess. Giving more than you possess or giving so
much you have very little left is not generosity. It is easy to cheat the generous person.
Giving too much is foolish not wicked and such people can still be praised, though this
seems to be limited to cases where the giver does not become ruined. Giving should be
to the right kind of people and not people who deserve to be poor. They often give money
to sycophants or spend it on pleasure. Wastefulness is easier to cure than stinginess
which is very frequent and old age and corresponds to the habits of the common people
more than generosity, since they prefer giving to receiving. Stinginess can just mean not
giving and not taking, but it can also mean taking in a addition to not giving, particularly
where the taking is very low in character, such as making money from a brothel or lending
small amounts of money at high interest, playing dice, petty theft. Stinginess does not
seem to apply to people who commit more grand crimes. Stinginess is a greater evil than
wastefulness and it is right that it should be regarded as the opposite of generosity.

Aristotle now moves onto a discussion of magni cence. Like generosity this is concerned
with wealth, but much higher levels of wealth. The lack of magni cence is niggardliness;
the excess of magni cence is vulgarity or lack of taste. Magni cence depends on taste
and appropriate expenditure. The greatest possession is the most valuable thing which şs
gold. Magni cence aims at nobility, greatness and honour. It creates admiration.
Magni cence applies to religious bodies and public a airs. It might also apply to private
a airs which are occasional such as marriage (presumably we can take a wedding of rich
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
fl
fi
fi
fi
 Phil 314 Autumn 2024 Notes 01 5
people as a public a air if the expenditure is magni cent and it becomes a community
event).Magni cence depends on the wealth of the giver, trying ton give magni cently
beyond the giver’s means is foolishness. Vulgarity is high expenditure where it is not
appropriate, adding expensive things to ordinary occasions. The niggardly care only
about reducing costs.

Aristotle now moves onto greatness of soul. The great souled person believes himself to
be worthy of great things. To think we are worthy of greater things than we really are is
vanity. It is small souled to think we are less worthy than we are. The greatest external
good is honour and that is what belongs to the great souled. The great souled person is
good and just. Then great souled person is moderate in reaction to good fortune and
misfortune. The great souled person regards honour and things which may bring honour
like power and wealth as unimportant. Power, wealth and good birth may lead to people
giving honour but are less important than being good.

The great souled are perfectly virtuous. Those who have good fortune but are not virtuous
become violent and uncontrolled. Then great souled person is entitled to look down on
others, but the common people are not. The great souled person prefers to give rather
than to receive. Giving makes us superior, receiving makes us inferior. The great souled
person does not try to appear superior to people of middling station. He is open in his
likes and dislikes. He only acts for great reasons. He does not praise or Balme much. He
does not like to be dependent except with regard to a friend.He is more concerned with
self-su ciency than pro t. His actions and speech are slow and calm. Excess in relation
to the great souled is to think we are worth more than we are, which is vanity. The lack şs
to think we worse than we are which is small souled. They are regarded as timid and they
refrain from great acts they could undertake. Smallness of soul is further from the great
soul than vanity and is worse than vanity.

Seeking honour is related to being great souled as generosity is related to magni cence.
The mean has no name so that excess and lack in seeking honour are often taken to be
opposed to each other when they are both opposed to honour seeking. There is mean
with regard to anger, which we should stick to rather than risking too much or to little
anger. Something similar applies to what comes between obsequiousness and
obstructiveness in our behaviour towards others. The mean is something like friendship,
but applies to all people not just our friends. We accept causing pain in our relations with
others, if it is necessary for a noble cause. To be pleasant all the time is to be obsequious
and to seek advantage all the time in our relations is to be a atterer. There is an unnamed
virtue which is the mean. Truth telling is the mean between boastfulness and self-
deprecation. Socrates was self-deprecating but in important things, as opposed to the
humbug who is insincerely self-deprecating in small things.In humour the quick witted are
the mean between bu oons who try to joke and create laughter too much and boors who
never enjoy jokes. The quick witted are showing a movement of their character.

KEY POINTS
Virtue arises with regard to where we blame or praise people.
Praise or blame depends on the voluntary nature of actions, so virtue belongs to voluntary
actions.
This in uences law makers with regard to what should be punished.
Courage is a virtue related to civic responsibility.
Courage can come from character or knowledge. They do not always lead in the same
direction.
fl
ffi
fi
ff
ff
fi
fi
fl
fi
fi
 Phil 314 Autumn 2024 Notes 01 6
Deliberation leads to consideration of possible actions. It is necessary to rational choice.
Deliberations shows us where we have choice, the rst principle within us.
Involuntary actions comes from ignorance or external compulsion and are not worthy of
blame.
Ignorance that is self-in icted as where someone becomes drunk is blameworthy.
Virtue includes magni cence and being great souled, are virtues which are expressed
through grand actions and contributions to the communal good.
Magni cence is an extension of generosity as being great souled is an extension of
seeing honour.
In seeking the good, we may be mistaken but we should still see seeking the good as
concerned with the real good, not as seeking the appearance of good.
Some virtues are tired to being a superior kind of person.
It is better to give than to receive or to be dependent.
Dependency may be less objectionable when tied to friendship.
fi
fi
fl
fi