Various Accounts on the Cavite

Pardo de Taveras’s Account of the Cavite Mutiny

The event is just a simple mutiny since up to that time the Filipinos have no intention of
separation from Spain but only secure materials and education advancements in the country.
However, the mutiny was used at a powerful level. Also, in this time, the central government
deprived friars of the powers of involvement in civil government and in governing and handling
universities.

This resulted in the friars afraid that their leverage in the Philippines would be a thing in
the past, took advantage of the mutiny and reported it to the Spanish government as a broad
conspiracy organized throughout the archipelago with the object of abolishing Spanish
sovereignty. The Madrid government without any attempt to investigate the real facts or extent
of the alleged revolution reported by Izquierdo and the friars believed the scheme was true.

Montero’s Account of the Cavite Mutiny

His account focuses on how the event was an attempt to overthrow Spanish Government
in the Philippines. Due to the removal of privileges enjoyed by the laborers of the Cavite arsenal
such as exemption from the tribute and forced labor.

The democratic and republican books and pamphlets, the speeches and preaching of the apostles
of these new ideas in Spain and the outburst of the American publicists and the cruel policies of
the insensitive governor whom the reigning government sent to govern the country. Filipinos put
into action these ideas where the occurring conditions which gave rise to the idea of achieving
their independence.

II. Controversies and Disagreements

The execution of Gomburza remains as one of the most controversial issues deeply embedded in
Philippine history. However, their tragic end led to the dawn of the Philippine Nationalism in the
19th century, intensified by Dr. Jose P. Rizal, in dedicating his second novel entitled El
Filibusterismo which condemned the Spanish rule and the elite Filipinos.

In his novel, Rizal wrote "To the memory of the priests, Don Mariano Gomez (years old),
Don Jose Burgos (40 years old), and Don Jacinto Zamora (55 years old). Executed in Bagumbayan
Field on 25th of February, 1897. The church, by refusing to degrade you, hasp laced in doubt the
crime that has been imputed to you; the government, by surrounding your trials with mystery and
shadows causes the belief that there was some error, committed in fatal moments; and all the
Philippines, by worshiping your memory and calling you martyrs, in nonsense recognizes your
capability.

In so far, therefore, as your complicity in the Cavite Mutiny is not clearly proved, as you may or may
not have been patriots, and as you may or may not cherish sentiments for justice and for liberty, I
have the right to dedicate my work to you as victims of the evil which I undertake in combat."
It must be noted, however, that Rizal's account was erroneous in detail as the execution took place
on 17 February 1872, not on 28 February 1872, as Rizal mistakenly mentions. Additionally, the ages
of the priests were listed down in accurately. At the time of the execution, Gomez was 73 years
old, Burgos was 35years old, and Zamora was 37 years old. Their deaths were facilitated in a public
execution at Bagumbayan (Luzon) using a garrote due to false accusations charged against them
by Spanish authorities. Their alleged crimes included treason and sedition for being the supposed
masterminds of the insurrection of Indios (nativeFilipinos)working in the Cavite arsenal.
 Furthermore, according to the Spanish military tribunal, they were believed to have been
a part of a clandestine movement aimed to overthrow the Spanish government, making them a
threat to the Spanish Clergy. The execution has since been labeled the Terror of 1872, and is
recognized as a pivotal event contributing to the later Philippine Revolution from 1896 to 1898.

III. Resolution of the Issue

At this stage of the controversy, the garrison of the Cavite Arsenal mutinied. The ringleaders of the
clerical dispute, offended because their claims had not been fairly met, were beyond any doubt,
said their enemies, also the ring leaders of the insurrection and, as such, they. Were condemned
to death. The trial was held amid great mystery and secrecy; the sentence was hastily carried out;
afterward it was forbidden to speak of the affair; and for these reasons no Filipino believed, or now
believes, in the guilt of the executed priests.

Although Burgos and his companions, Gomez and Zamora, had worked for the rights, of a
particular class and not of: the people as a whole, yet had they asked for justice, and died for having
asked. True, already on the scaffold, Burgos still could not understand why he should die, being
innocent; which proves that he had not before then thought it possible that he should have to
sacrifice his life for the cause he defended.
But these were Christian priests, and they died like Christ, slandered by the friar-scribes, because
they had sought to take away from the friars the administration of the parishes, the seat of their,
power and influence over the masses and the principal source of their wealth. So, it is that the
Filipinos keep them in grateful and imperishable memory, and the people venerate the mas
martyrs to justice.

The Archbishop of Manila refused to defrock them, and ordered the bells of every church
to toll in honor of their deaths; the Sword, in this instance, denied the moral justification of the
Cross. The martyrdom of the three secular priests would resonate among Filipinos; grief and
outrage over their execution would make way for the first stirrings of the Filipino revolution, thus
making the first secular martyrs of an ascent national identity. Jose Rizal would dedicate his second
novel, El Filibusterismo, to the memory of GomBurZa, to what they stood for, and to the symbolic
weight their deaths would henceforth hold.
The Official Report of Governor Izquierdo on the Cavite Mutiny of
1872 Primary Source
Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering (BSCE)

The Official Report of Governor Izquierdo on the Cavite Mutiny of 1872

by Gov. General Rafael Izquierdo

“From the summary of information received—that is, from the declaration made before the
fiscal—it seems definite that the insurrection was motivated and prepared by the native
clergy, by the mestizos and native lawyers, and by those known here as abogadillos. Some are
residents of manila, others from Cavite and some from the nearby provinces.

The instigators, to carry out their criminal project, protested against the injustice of the
government in not paying the province for their tobacco crop, and against the usury that some
(officials) practice in (handling) documents that the Finance department gives crop owners
who have to sell them at a loss. They encouraged the rebellion by protesting what they called
the injustice of having obliged the workers in the Cavite arsenal to pay tribute starting
January 1 (1872) and to render personal service, from which they were formally exempted.

To seduce the native troops, they resorted to superstitions with which the indios are so
prone to believe; persuading them that the Chief of State (hari) would be an ecclesiastic and
the rest or the clergy who backed the uprising would celebrate daily for its success. Thus the
rebellion could not fail because God was with them; and those who would not revolt they
would kill immediately. Taking advantage of the ignorance of those classes and the propensity
of the Indio to steal, they offered (to those who revolted) the wealth of the Spaniards and of the
regular clergy, employment and ranks in the army; and to this effect they said that fifteen
native battalions would be created, in which the soldiers who revolted would have jobs as
officers and chiefs. The lawyers and abogadillos would direct the affairs of government, of the
administration and of justice.

Up to now it has not been clearly determined if they planned to establish a monarchy
or a republic, because the Indios have no word in their language to describe this different form
of government, whose head in Tagalog would be called hari; but it turns out that they would
place at the head of the government a priest; and there were great probabilities—nay, a
certainty—that the head selected would be D. Jose Burgos, or D. Jacinto Zamora, parish
priests of S. Pedro of Manila.

All the Spaniards, including the friars, would be executed except for the women; and
their belongings confiscated. Foreigners would be respected.

This uprising has roots, and with them were affiliated to a great extent the regiments
of infantry and artillery, many civilians and a large number of mestizos, indios and some
ilustrados from the provinces.

To start the revolution, they planned to set fire to the district of Tondo. Once the fire
was set and while the authorities were busy putting it out, the regiment of artillery with the
help of the part of the infantry would seize Fort Santiago of this capital (they would then) fire
cannons to inform the rebels of Cavite (of their success). The rebels in Cavite counted on the
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artillery detachment that occupied the fort and on the navy helped by 500 natives led by the
pardoned leader Camerino. This person and his men, located at the town of Bacoor and
separated from the fort of San Felipe by a small arm of the sea, would cross the water and
reach the fort where they would find arms and ammunition.

The rebels (in Cavite) made the signals agreed upon by means of lanterns, but the
native civilians (in Bacoor) although they tried it, failed because of the vigilance of (Spanish)
navy that had placed there a gunboat and armed vessels.

Loyalists who went to arrest the parish priest of Bacoor found an abandoned vessel
loaded with arms, including carbines and revolvers.

The uprising should have started in Manila at midnight abetted by those in Cavite, but
the rebels of this city went ahead of time. The civil-military governor of Cavite and the
commanders of regiment 7 took very timely precautions; they knew how to keep the soldiers
loyal (although these had been compromised) and behaved with valor and gallantry, obliging
the rebels to take refuge in the fort of San Felipe.

Such is your Excellency, the plan of the rebels, those who guided them, and the means
they counted upon for its realization. For a long time now, through confidential information
and others of the vaguer character, I have been told that since 1869—taking advantage of a
group that had left behind plans for an uprising, but was not carried out because of the
earthquake of 1862—there existed in Manila a junta or center that sought and found followers;
and that as a pretext they had established a society for the teaching of arts and trades. Months
ago I suspended it indirectly, giving an account to Your Excellency in my confidential report
No. 113 dated August 1, (1871) to which Your Excellency has not yet replied.

It has also been said that this center or junta received inspiration from Madrid, where
newspapers of advanced ideas flourish; to sustain them subscriptions are (locally) solicited; in
effect, newspapers such as El Eco Filipino were sent here from Madrid which were distributed
by persons now imprisoned, whose articles thundered against everything that can be found
here.

As in the case of my worthy predecessor, I have continuously received anonymous

letters, but because I was confident that I could put down and punish any uprising, I gave no
credit (to these reports) in order not to cause alarm; and instead continued a vigilant watch
wherever possible within the limited means at my command. I had everything ready (for any
untoward possibility), taking into account the limited peninsular force which composes the
army.

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