D.

Sovereignty – Sovereign Immunity

a. Basis/Theories

# Case Title: RP v Villasor

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor issued an order declaring final and executory a decision WoN Villasor had the No
rendered in a special proceeding confirming an arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40 authority and jurisdiction to
against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), thereby directing the Sheriffs of Rizal order the release of funds as
Province, Quezon City, and Manila to execute the said decision through a corresponding Alias Writ of restitution for damages in a
Execution. Notices of garnishment were served to several banks to cover the said amount. Among suit against the State?
those served with a notice of garnishment were the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine
National Bank where funds therein are appropriated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel, and for the maintenance and operations of the AFP.

The Republic of the Philippines alleged that the said act of Villasor was not in conformity with the
Constitution on the ground that it did not authorize the release of funds.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution says, "The State may not be sued without its consent." Villasor awarded the money belonging to a
component of the government, the military, without the express authorization from Congress. Villasor acted contrary to the Constitution, and
thus acted in excess of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: ―A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.‖ Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it
was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that ―a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to
court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that
constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.‖
Judgment: Petition granted, judgment reversed.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
Constitutional law; State immunity; The State cannot be sued without its consent.—It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends.

Judgment against the State cannot be enforced by

execution.—The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the state of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

# Case Title: China v. Santa Maria

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (CNMEG) and the North Luzon Railways WHETHER OR NOT No
Corporation (Northrail) entered into a Contract of Agreement to initiate the Northrail Project. Thereafter, CNMEG is entitled to
the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Philippine Government entered into a loan immunity from suit
agreement wherein EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount in favor of the Philippine Government in order
to finance the said project.

Respondents then filed a complaint before the RTC alleging that the Contract of Agreement and the Loan of
Agreement were void for being contrary to the (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No.
9184), otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree No. 1445,
 otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code.

CNMEG then filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its
person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject
matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive agreement.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory,
a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory,
the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions.

It is then crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved - whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. Upon scrutiny of the documents executed in relation to the Northrail Project, it was determined that the Northrail
Project was a commercial transaction and that CNMEG initiated the undertaking, not the Chinese government.

On another note, state immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original charter of
the incorporated government agency.

Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese
law. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG cannot be presumed to be immuned from suit.

Also, in Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it
requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the case at bar, CNMEG offers the Certification from the Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of China, stating that the Northrail
Project is in pursuit of a sovereign activity; however, this is not the kind of certification that can establish CNMEG’s entitlement to immunity from
suit, as the determination should be of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.

Even with a DFA certification, however, it must be remembered that this Court is not precluded from making an inquiry into the intrinsic
correctness of such certification.

From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG cannot be afforded immunity from suit.
 “The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not,
per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought
about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the doctrine.”
 "Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized."
 “If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”
 “The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution,
which states that "the State may not be sued without its consent." Who or what consists of "the State"? For one, the doctrine is available to
foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid "unduly vexing the peace of
nations.”

b. Acts of the State

# Case Title: Harvey v Comm

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Whether or not the Yes
Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Respondent’s act to institute
Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the deportation proceedings
Commission of Immigration and Deportation(CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The against petitioners was
“Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard legally within the power
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after vested in her by the State
Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects
confirmed being live-in for sometime now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photonegatives and photos of suspected
child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and
other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988
after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted
for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but
working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988,
deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of
Revised Administrative Code.
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under
the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16
Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section
3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests
of the State.

Doctrine/Legal Principle:
Power to deport aliens is an act of state, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power; Respondent acted in the interest of the
state in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners.·Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory
upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed
itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting
deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

# Case Title: Rubrico v Arroyo

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] No
Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air committed reversible erred
Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy in dropping President Gloria
Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that Macapagal Arroyo as party
there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, respondent.
ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended
party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued
during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
 constitution. It was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
- In David v Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court has made it clear that President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
Separation of Powers; Presidential Immunity; The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution.—Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her
term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of
an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not
be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), a case
likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this
must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

c. When suit is against the state

# Case Title: Begosa v Chairman

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
• Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed he was entitled WON the SC can entertain Yes
under the Veterans’ Bill of Rights. the suit against PVA
• He filed his claim for disability pension on March 4, 1955 but was erroneously disapproved on June
21, 1955 due to his dishonorable discharge from the army. • The Board of Administrators of PVA
finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take
effect on October 5 of that year.
• Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim was disapproved,
and that he is entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9 of RA No. 65) as a
permanently incapacitated person, which was increased to P100 a month when RP 1362 was
amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against PVA in the Court of First
Instance.
• CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.
• Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting
to court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the Government which cannot
be entertained by this Court for lack of jurisdiction because the Government has not given its
consent.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
• Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public
official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suitability may appropriately be invoked.
• However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty
imposed by statue appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff.
• Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the decision, the
actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does not come into play.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES; DOCTRINE OF NON-SUABILITY OF STATE, EXCEPTION.— It is well settled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being
liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit
against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for
the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner

# Case Title: Wylie v Rarang

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer, 1. WON officials of the US Yes
respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office Naval Base inside Philippine
of the Provost Marshal assigned as the Merchandise Control Guard. Territory, in discharge of
their official duties, are
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the ―Plan of the Day‖ a daily publication immune from suit.
that featured among others, an ―action line inquiry‖. On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was published 2. Are US officers who No
saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise commit a crime or tortuous
control inspector and that a certain ―Auring‖ was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being act while discharging official
the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie functions still covered by the
and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry principle of state immunity
was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.) from suit?

She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to
impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of
the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an
instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties involved.

Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign
country can‘t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
(1) Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging
their official functions.

Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound
by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties.

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.

There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official
functions.

Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may
not be held liable for the questioned publication.

It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.

(2) Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is
that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability
nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
POLITICAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; BASIS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF DOCTRINE. — In the case of United States of
America v. Guinto (182 SCRA 644 [1990]), we discussed the principle of the state immunity from suit as follows: "The rule that a state may not be
sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. . . . Even without such affirmation, we would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership
in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that 'there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.' (Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349) There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added
inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, 'unduly vex the peace of nations.' (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17
Q.B. 171)

PROHIBITED SUITS; GENERAL RULE; EXCEPTIONS; QUALIFICATION OF RULES. — While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded. (Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120) In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. The doctrine is sometimes derisively called 'the royal prerogative of
dishonesty' because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly
fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not
absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued
without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it itself
commences litigation. . . . The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the
medium of a duly enacted statute. (Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470) We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. (United States of America v. Ruiz,
136 SCRA 487) As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief
from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345)"

# Case Title: US v Reyes

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the U.S. Navy Whether or not Bradford No
Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in enjoys state immunity
Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American citizen working as a
manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to the oppressive and
discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of the NEX
JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford searched Montoya’s body
and belongings while the latter was already in the parking area after buying some items NEX
JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had purchasing privileges. Bradford then invoked his non-suability
on the ground of state immunity.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter where the public official is
made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
Here, Bradford acted beyond his authority when he searched Montoya in the parking lot, that is, outside of NEX JUSMAG. Hence, he may be sued
in his private and personal capacity.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
Constitutional Law; Action; Doctrine of State Immunity; While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. —While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such

The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen.— The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them,
the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not
so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
# Case Title: SEAFDEC v Acosta
Topic:
Procedural History:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order, to set aside the order of respondent
labor arbiter that denied herein petitioner’s motion to dismiss the cases subject matter of the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts: Issue Ruling
Two labor cases were filed against Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before Whether or not SEAFDEC Yes
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). enjoys diplomatic immunity

SEAFDEC is an international inter-government organization, composed of various Southeast Asian

countries. It filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking
cognizance of the above cases. It claims to enjoy diplomatic immunity and is hence, outside of the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

Labor arbiter Acosta denied the Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. This was already decided by the court in
the case of Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission.

It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia, Republic of the
Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam. The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of
fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments.

Certain administrative bodies created by agreement among states may be vested with international personality when two conditions concur, to
wit:, that their purposes are mainly nonpolitical and that they are autonomous, i.e., not subject to the control of any state.

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction. The reason for this is that the subjection of such
an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization. Besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

# Case Title: The Holy See v Hon. Rosario G.R. No. 101949238, December 17, 1994
Topic: When suit is against the State
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, Whether the Holy See is Yes
was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land immune from suit insofar as
was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who its business relations
exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence. Said lots were sold through regarding selling a lot to a
an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. private entity.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both
were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright
Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that
respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios,
the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for
annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss
the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation
from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal)
character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

Relevance to the topic:

Public International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; Non-suability; Courts and Practices; A state or international agency requests the Foreign Office of
the state where it is sued to convey to the court that it is entitled to immunity.—In Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the
court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the Philippines, the practice is for the government sovereign or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its
claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.—In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the courts varies.

Statehood; In 1929, through the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican
City.—In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of
the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign
countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81
[1948]).

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City.—The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City “for the
purpose of assuring to 7/19/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 238 the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations” (O’Connell, I International Law 311[1965]).

# Case Title: Lansang v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly Whether or not private No
awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National Parks respondents' complaint
Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of against petitioner Lansang, as
national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks Chairman of NPDC, is in
area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits effect a suit against the state
derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman which cannot be sued
of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with without its consent.
GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the
public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction
against petitioner.

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require
the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule
does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public
officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed
while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is
also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The important
question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such
abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents
were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so,
petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary.
Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.

# Case Title: Calub v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioners are DENR Officers who seized 2 motor vehicles for transporting illegally cut lumber. The Whether or not the case file No
Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources by the owner and the driver
Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles. Constancio Abuganda and Pio will prosper
Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources)
Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.
Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda for violation of Sec. 78, PD 705
as amended by EO 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code (RFC). The owner and the
driver filed a case against them for the recovery of the possession of the motor vehicle.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The case will not propser. Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent.

And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
The acts in question are clearly official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure
carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There
was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. However, it
cannot prosper without the State's consent.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold
the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot prosper without the States
consent.—Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official
acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by
this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In
the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure
carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There
was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State’s consent.

# Case Title: Minucher v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust Whether the Doctrine of Yes
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of State Immunity from suit is
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later applicable herein.
acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of
his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
Heads of diplomatic missions, classified. —The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios
accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to
the ministers of foreign affairs.Comprising the “staff of the (diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the
technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative,
technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.

Diplomatic Immunity; Only “diplomatic agents”, under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and
criminal suits.—Only “diplomatic agents,” under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. The Convention defines “diplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the
same privileges from all others.

Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.—It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and
navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and
administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason
that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a
person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Exception; The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.—(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or
in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

# Case Title: RP of Indonesia v Vinzon

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Whether or not the Republic Yes
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and of Indonesia can invoke the
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was doctrine of sovereign
to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the immunity from suit.
position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory
and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian
Embassy terminated the agreement. The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was
arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking
immunity from suit.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.

The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance
agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.

Doctrine/Legal Principle
International Law; State Sovereignty; Immunity from Suit; Consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States; All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.—International law is founded largely upon the principles
of reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. As enunciated in Sanders v. Veridiano II, the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be
no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations.”

The immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.—The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to
enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of
sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act
jure imperii or jure gestionis.—Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign
State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this
case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

The State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living
quarters of its agents and officials.—There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State
does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and
upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and
the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
# Case Title: Phil v Trinidad
Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioners are Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) and its President and Chief Executive Officer Would the doctrine of non- No
Michael De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers suability of the State find
which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its application in this case?
then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer
space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and
the satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI).
Petitioners filed an action against the new DOTC Secretary Lichauco for allegedly having awarded the
orbital slot to an unknown awardee.

The first cause of action, for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153º East
Longitude should be enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to PASI.
The second cause of action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the award to the
unknown bidder is null and void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits
against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but
merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the
nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action,
the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

Legal Principle/Doctrine
The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it
has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances.”

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine
of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

# Case Title: RP v Sandiganbayan

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other WON the Republic can No
properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or invoke state immunity.
of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement
incases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal
agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private
respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the
monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to be put into an
auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic
and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general
release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the227 NOGCCI
shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s capacity to acquire the same shares out
of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the
recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto
filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying,
inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned,
delivered or paid to him as part of the parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted
but the shares were ordered to be put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG
was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any
justifiable grounds. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG,
invokes state immunity from suit.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity
from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of
a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and
obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part
gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity
from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of
a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and
obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign
descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part
gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

# Case Title: DOH v Phil

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
 On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO) No. 27 series of 1995 was issued by then WHETHER OR NOT DOH, in Yes
Department of Health Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez. AO 27 sets the guidelines and procedure for this circumstance, is under
accreditation of government suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the the mantle of state
public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but subject to annual review; immunity.
 On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10 series of 2006 which amended AO 27.
Under Sec 7 of AO 10, accreditation period for government suppliers of pharmaceutical products was
reduced to 2 years. Also, accreditation of Pharmaceutical companies may be recalled, suspended or
revoked after due deliberation and proper notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its
Chairman;
 Sec 7 of AO 10 was later amended by AO 66 series of 2008 which stated that the 2 year
accreditation may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice
by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman;
 On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-C which provided for a list and
category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers. In line with Memorandum
No. 171-C, the DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued Memorandum
No. 209 series of 2000 inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein
respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000;
 During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled “Report on
Violative Products” issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which detailed violations or
adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products. PPI’s products were included
as BFAD found that PPI’s products sold to the public were unfit for human consumption;
 The companies were directed to submit their respective explanations on the findings within 10
days. PPI did not submit its reply on time. Instead, it submitted a letter stating that it is referring the
matter to its lawyers for preparation of a reply but with no indicated date of compliance which DOH
Usec Galon found untenable, thus, she informed PPI thru a letter that its accreditation had been
suspended for two years in accordance with AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI thru a letter,
demanded that Usec Galon cease and desist from enforcing the suspension under pain of legal
redress;
 PPI then filed a complaint to declare certain DOH issuances (AO 10, Memorandum No. 171-C, Usec
Galon’s suspension order, and AO 14, Series of 2001) null and void for being in violation of Section
26(d), Republic Act 3720, with prayer for injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later DOH
Secretary Dayrit. It claimed that its accreditation was suspended without due notice and hearing. It
prayed that it be awarded moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit;
 The respondent DOH officials filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it gave PPI the opportunity to
explain but it did not do so in a timely manner. The suspension was necessary to stop the distribution
and sale of substandard products. In a Manifestation and Motion, the DOH officials further moved to
dismiss the case as it was a suit against the State; the complaint was improperly verified; and the
corporate officer lacked the authority to file the suit. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case,
holding that the suit is against the State, thus the principle of immunity from suit is applicable;
 On appeal to the CA by the PPI, however, the latter reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
According to the CA, it was premature for the RTC to have dismissed the case, as the cause of action
was sufficiently alleged in the complaint. It added that it was apparent from the Complaint that
petitioners were being sued in their private and personal capacities for acts done beyond the scope
of their official functions. Thus, the issue of whether the suit is against the State could best be
threshed out during trial on the merits, rather than in proceedings covering a motion to dismiss.
 Thus, the DOH officials, herein petitioners, elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that
PPI’s prayer for damages should be considered a suit against the State for it would require the
needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s claim for damages should it win. In issuing the assailed DOH
issuances, they acted within the scope of their authority, hence should not be made to account
individually. Petition was granted.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
1. In this case, DOH, being an unincorporated agency of the government which performs functions of governmental character has not
consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued.
As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is
express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a
contract or it itself commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean
that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may
be implied. "Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of
sovereignty."

“The State’s consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. x x x
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it
enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, x x x is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function
and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.”

The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos is relevant, viz: “An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality
of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the
agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.”

2. Also, the Complaint seeks to "impose a charge or financial liability against the state," which then the defense of non-suability may be
properly invoked.
In the event that PPI succeeds in its suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an imposition or financial
charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the national treasury which is precisely the situation which the
doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the state from.

3. Lastly, it must be stressed that the mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the
performance of their official functions.
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and
whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. If yes, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith."

Legal Principle/Doctrine
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied
consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.”—As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it
consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must
be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its nonsuability. The State “will be deemed
to have impliedly waived its nonsuability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied.” “Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity
are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”

The Department of Health, being an “unincorporated agency of the government” can validly invoke the defense of immunity from suit because it
has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the Department of Health is an unincorporated agency which performs
functions of governmental character.—In this case, the DOH, being an “unincorporated agency of the government” can validly invoke the defense
of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency
which performs functions of governmental character. The ruling in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36 (2011), is relevant, viz.: An
unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and
one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or
incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
but was essentially a business.

If a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the state,” the defense of nonsuability may be properly invoked. —It is settled
that if a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the state,” the defense of nonsuability may be properly invoked. In this
case, PPI specifically prayed, in its Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries Romualdez and
Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI succeeds in its suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an
imposition or financial charge in the form of damages. This would require an appropriation from the national treasury which is precisely the
situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the state from.

The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and
whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government.”—As regards the
other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity
extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. “The
suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether
the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government.” Otherwise stated,
“public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.” Moreover, “[t]he rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state x x x. In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the [C]omplaint on the ground that it
has been filed without its consent.”

# Case Title: Deutsche v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified and Whether or not the GTZ is No
agreement which lead to the Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) immune from suit.
program wherein the program seeks to provide health care to Filipino families, especially the poor.
The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing corporation for the program, while
the Philippines designated the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation. Private respondents, as employed by GTZ for the implementation of the SHINE, had a
misunderstanding with the Project Manager of SHINE. This lead to an exchange of letters which was
interpreted to be the resignation of the private respondents. Private respondents then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. GTZ contends that it is immune from suit as it is
the accredited agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
GTZ cannot invoke State immunity from suit even if their activities performed pertaining to SHINE project are government in nature. The principle
of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the
State may not be sued without its consent. In this case, GTZ’s counsel described GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, however it does not automatically mean that it has the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. They had failed
to adduce evidence, a certification from Department of Foreign Affairs which could have been their factual basis for its claim of immunity. At the
same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that
Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government.

The apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine
government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the
Corporate Code states that every corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity to sue and be sued in its corporate name.
The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit
generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity
remains the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our
Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining
to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this
decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency

# Case Title: Shell v Jalos

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine Can Shell invoke state No
of state immunity without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, immunity, as agent of the
on the basis that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent Republic of the Philippines?
of the Philippine government in the development of the Malampaya gas
reserves.

Petitioner’s main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to “Perform all

petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and finance”
as well as other connected services to the Philippine government. As
defined under the contract, petroleum operation means the “searching
for and obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines”, including the
“transportation, storage, handling and sale” of petroleum whether for
export or domestic consumption. Petitioner’s primary obligation under
the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the
purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual
commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of
the State. Consequently, it is not an agent of the Philippine government,
but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya
Natural Gas Project. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized
that petitioner could be sued in relation to the project. This is evident in
the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Shell cannot invoke state immunity because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is just a service contractor for the exploration
and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to conduct petroleum
operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the State’s
“agent” within the meaning of the law.

((An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent
or authority of the latter. The Essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations between the
latter and third persons.)) Shell’s primary obligation under the Service Contract 38 is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose
of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the
state.

Hence, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government but a provider of services, technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas
Project; it is not immune from suit and it may be sued for claims even without the State’s consent. The Phil. Government recognized that Shell
could be sued in relation to the project.

# Case Title: PTRI v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
E.A. Ramirez, a construction company engaged in electrical works, filed before the RTC a Complaint Whether or not PTRI et al are No
for Breach of Contract with Damages against Philippine Textile Research Institute (PTRI) and a immune from suit
number of its employees. It alleged that sometime in 2012, it entered into a Contract of Works for
the Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants with PTRI. Soon
thereafter, the consultant of the project requested for a meeting with Ramirez, who allegedly told
the latter that he was tasked by PTRI to demand P500,000 as purportedly standard amount “for the
 boys.” Ramirez did not give in, and thereafter, E.A. Ramirez started encountering difficulties in
completing the project. On account of some delays caused by the changes implemented by PTRI, E.A.
Ramirez asked that the deadline for the completion be extended. PTRI not only failed to act on the
request for extension, but also terminated the contract. Accusing PTRI of acting in bad faith in
terminating the contract, E.A Ramirez filed its Complaint, praying that PTRI, et al. be made to pay
jointly and solidarily the amount of P1,957,025.85 in actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. PTRI,
through the OSG, filed a Motion to Dismiss, invoking the privilege of state immunity from suit, as an
agency of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). PTRI alleged that the immunity
extended to the impleaded employees of PTRI since they were sued while performing official or
governmental functions.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA found PTRI’s Rule 65 Petition meritorious and ordered
the dismissal of the civil case.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The PTRI was created under Resolution NSDB 246 R.3 in accordance with R.A. 4086. Under E.O. 700, the PTRI was
transferred from the National Science Development Board to the then Ministry of Industry. The PTRI was tasked to
directly assist the textile industry specifically in the field of training for the textile industry personnel in line with the
industry’s rationalization program. Subsequently, E.O. 292 identified the PTRI as an institute of the DOST. Hence, being
an unincorporated government agency that exercises a governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity
from suit. Further, the employees of PTRI acting in their official capacity likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as
“public officials may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of their
authority.”

However, the State may be sued with its consent. The State’s consent to be sued may be given either expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general or a special law. The general law waiving the immunity of
the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon
any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.” (Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission)

It is not disputed that PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities and Three Pilot
Plants with E.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A. Ramirez’s Complaint is alleged
breach of the subject Contract. PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from a contract. Hence, the
general law on the waived or immunity from suit finds application.

Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when the State enters into a
contract. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which
is done in its proprietary capacity.

The subject Contract was not executed in the exercise of PTRI’s governmental function of aiding the textile industry. It
dealt solely with the rehabilitation works of the electrical facilities of PTRI’s buildings.

d. Consent to be Sued

1. How Given

# Case Title: Veterans v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
 The Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) filed a complaint with the RTC WHETHER OR NOT VMPSI’s Yes
praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and in due time, a writ of preliminary complaint against the PC
injunction to enjoin the Chief of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Philippine Constabulary Supervisor Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit
Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies (PC-SUSIA) from committing acts that would result in the against the State without its
non-renewal of VMPSI’s license. consent?
 Further, VMPSI demanded for awards on actual and compensatory damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, among others.
 The RTC issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioner but was later on lifted by the CA,
hence VMPSI’s petition for review in the SC.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, seeks for actual and compensatory
damages, exemplary damages, and payment for attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

Also, the acts of the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith,
hence, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.

The Court held in Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713:

"While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded."

Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris
(Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act.
Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is
obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suits at the instance
of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the
government."

Legal Principle/Doctrine:
POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT
OF THE STATE. — The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not
be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to
act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the
same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims
may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE ACTS, AMONG OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR.
— A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this
case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them
in their private capacities.

CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LEGISLATIVE ACT. — Waiver of the State’s immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty,
will not be lightly inferred, but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

REASONS BEHIND. — The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and danger which would flow from a
different rule. "It is obvious that public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to
suits at the instance of every citizen, and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration
of the government" (Siren v. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129, as cited in 78 SCRA 477).

# Case Title: DA v NLRC

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by Whether or not the doctrine No
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan of non-suability of the State
Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said applies in the case.
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security
agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security
agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter
issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The
petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of
execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived
its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” n this case,
The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract;
nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims.

Relevance to the topic:

 The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition
of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts.
It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
 The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the
claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

# Case Title: City v Phuture

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Phuture was incorporated in 2004. In May 2005, its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) was amended to, Whether or not the
among others, include the operation of lotto betting stations and/or other gaming outlets as one of petitioners have given their
its secondary purposes. Phuture applied with the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation consent to be sued.
(PAGCOR) for an authority to operate bingo games at the SM City Bacolod Mall (SM Bacolod), as well
as with SM Prime Holdings (SM Prime) for the lease of a space in the said building. Phuture was
issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA) by PAGCOR, subject to compliance with certain
requirements, and received an Award Notice from SM Prime. Phuture processed, completed and
submitted to the Permits and Licensing Division of the City Mayor of Bacolod City its Application for
Permit to Engage in Business, Trade or Occupation to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod and paid
the fees therefor. It was then issued a claim slip for its permit on February 19, 2007, which was to be
claimed on March 16, 2007. Phuture commenced bingo operations at SM Bacolod prior to the
issuance of the actual hard copy of the mayor's permit. However, respondent learned that its bingo
outlet was padlocked by agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and that a copy of a Closure
Order was posted at the entrance of the bingo outlet. Phuture thus filed a Petition for Mandamus
and Damages against the City of Bacolod, et.al. and alleged that the closure of its bingo outlet at SM
Bacolod is tainted with malice and bad faith and that petitioners did not have the legal authority to
shut down said bingo operations, especially since P AGCOR itself had already issued a provisional
GOA in its favor. The RTC conducted a summary hearing where the Petitioners (City of Bacolod)
alleged that Phuture applied for the renewal of its mayor's permit with "professional services, band/
entertainment services" as its declared line of business, with address of the business at "RH Building,
26 Lacson Street, Barangay 5" instead of SM Bacolod, petitioners found discrepancies in Phuture's
 submitted requirements, wherein the application form was notarized earlier than the amendment of
its AOI to reflect the company's primary purpose for bingo operations, respondent failed to pay the
necessary permit fee/assessment fee under the applicable tax ordinances of the City of Bacolod and
without waiting for the release of the mayor's permit, respondent started the operation of its bingo
outlet at SM Bacolod. This prompted the former City Legal Officer to issue a Closure Order pursuant
to City Tax Ordinance.The RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary mandatory order
and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals partially granted the
appeal by affirming the trial court's denial of the application for a temporary mandatory order but
reversing the dismissal of the suit for damages and ordering the case to be reinstated and remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Petitioners cannot be made liable to pay damages. Petitioners have not given their consent to be sued. The principle of immunity from suit is
embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which states that "[t]he State cannot be sued without its consent." The
purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a result of the time and energy it would require to defend itself
against lawsuit. Consent may be express or implied, such as when the government exercises its proprietary functions, or where such is embodied
in a general or special law. In the present case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter's refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo operations
and for closing its business on account of the lack of such permit. While the authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is granted by the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government units with corporate powers, one of which is the
power to sue and be sued, this Court has held that the power to issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the
government's proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. No consent to be sued
and be liable for damages can thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to issue business permits and licences.
Waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred

The City of Bacolod as a government agency or instrumentality cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
Estoppel does not also lie against the government or any of its agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal acts of public officers. We cannot hold
petitioners stopped from invoking their immunity from suit on account of having raised it only for the first time on appeal. The requirement that
this defense should be raised at the trial is only to give the plaintiff a chance to cure the defect of his complaint, but if, as in this case, the lack of
consent of the state cannot be cured because it is a matter of judicial notice that there is no law allowing the present suit, (only Congress that can
give such consent) the reason for the rule cannot obtain, hence it is clear that such non-suability may be raised even on appeal. After all, the
record on appeal can be examined to find out if the consent of the state is alleged in the complaint. The waiver cannot be made other than the
Congress. as a matter of public policy, the law must be understood as insulating the state from such undesirable contingencies and leaving it free
to invoke its sovereign attributes at any time and at any stage of a judicial proceeding, under the principle that the mistakes and omissions of its
officers do not bind it.

2. Express Consent

a. Money Claims arising from Contracts

# Case Title: Sayson v Singson

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
"In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the WON the mandamus suit of No
repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer Fernandez, and the Requisitioning the respondent (Singson)
Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and involving a money claim
Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an against the government,
exception to the telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and predicated on a contract is
Communications." ... So, a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The committee valid
on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently,
it was approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to
immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a
purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement
Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806
reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the
reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and
the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarroa representative of the Bureau of Supply
Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of
20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising
Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to
Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor
Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of
excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already
submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for
appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting
papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila,
particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in
the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less
than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the
Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a
telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is more, charges for
malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the failure
of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit
below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as
entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this
appeal by certiorari
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of
such claim against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to
approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the
State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or
claims, other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period
aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal
is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from
receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her
sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a
private person or entity. "Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to
require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if
thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to
which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.

# Case Title: RP v Purisima

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a WON the respondent’s No
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged decision is valid
breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the
leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting
as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53
other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not
be sued without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is
a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering
the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed
to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to
judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance

DECISION: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the
charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of
interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it
has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance
Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on
 the government

b. Incorporation of GOCC

# Case Title: NHA v Heirs

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
On February 23, 1999 the NHA called the alleged claimants of the the land they intend to develop as WHETHER OR NOT writs of
a socialized housing project, namely the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. execution and garnishment
may be issued against the
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (respondents) filed a Manifestation stating state in an expropriation
that they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. The wherein the exercise of the
plaintiff has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of the defendants who are heirs of Isidro power of eminent domain
Guivelondo and the court appointed three Commissioners to ascertain the just compensations. will not serve public use or
purpose.
Commisioners submitted their reports amounting to P11,200.00 per square meter. Both parties filed
a motion for reconsideration about the compensation but was denied by court. A motion for
execution was filed by the respondents and was then granted by the court.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Yes. Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls with the confines of "public use". The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in
any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has fixed. It was also stated that the funds of such government-owned
and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment. This is so
because when the Government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation.

Legal Principle/Doctrine
Garnishment; Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law .—The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

The funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation are not exempt from garnishment.—Having a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government, the funds of such government owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public
in character, are not exempt from garnishment. This doctrine was applied to suits filed against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
(PNB vs. Pabalan, et al., 83 SCRA 695); the National Shipyard & Steel Corporation (NASSCO vs. CIR, 118 Phil. 782); the Manila Hotel Company
(Manila Hotel Employees Asso. vs. Manila Hotel Co., 73 Phil. 374); and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA
314).

# Case Title: SSS v CA

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages whether or not the No
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the Regional Trial Court can
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, enjoin the Social Security
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business System Employees
with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which Association (SSSEA) from
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS striking and order the
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be striking employees to
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants return to work.
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that Collaterally, it is whether
the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: or not employees of the
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check- Social Security System
off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of (SSS)
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted
certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The court ruled that Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under
Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect
after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

Legal Principle/Doctrine
Judgment; Appeal; Finding of the lower court that themortgagedebtors have not in fact violated their contract becauseSSS accepted their
installment payments although given late willnot be disturbed on appeal.—The first issue revolves around thequestion of appreciation of the
evidence by the lower Court asconcurred in by the Court of Appeals. The appraisal should be leftundisturbed following the general rule that
factual findings of theCourt of Appeals are not subject to review by this Court, thepresent case not being one of the recognized exceptions to
thatrule. Accordingly, we are upholding the finding of the Court ofAppeals that the SSS application for foreclosure was not justified,particularly
considering that the real estate loan of P48,000.00obtained by the Cruzes in March, 1963, was payable in 15 yearswith a monthly amortization of
P425.18, and that as of July 14,1968, the date of the first notice of foreclosure and sale, theoutstanding obligation was still P38,875.06 and not
P10,702.58,as published.

Social Security Act; Damages; Action; The Social SecuritySystem has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued fordamages. The SSS does not
enjoy immunity from suits by expressstatutory consent.—We come now to the amendability of the SSSto judicial action and legal responsibility for
its acts. To ourminds, there should be no question on this score considering thatthe SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It
hascorporate powers separate and distinct from the Government.SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and besued in Court.
These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civilprocess incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that theSSS, as it claims, enjoys
immunity from suit as an entityperforming governmental functions, by virtue of the explicitprovision of the aforecited enabling law, the
Government must bedeemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, althoughit does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law
hasgiven to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement andprotection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required tosubmit to the
jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right tointerpose any lawful defense.

Contracts; Insofar as it lendingoperations are concerned its activities are for profit and thus itmay be sued thereon.—The proposition that the SSS
is not profit-oriented was rejected in the case of SSS Employees’ Associationvs. Hon. Soriano. But even conceding that the SSS is not, in themain,
operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far ascontractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned,the SSS enters into them
for profit considering that the borrowerspay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus othercharges.

Attachment; SSS funds may begarnished.—Moreover, drawing a parallel with the NASSCO andthe Virginia Tobacco Administration, whose funds
are in thenature of public funds, it has been held that those funds may evenbe made the object of a notice of garnishment.

# Case Title: NHA v Roxas

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and -controlled corporation (GOCC) created under Whether or not the No
Presidential Decree 757, is tasked with the development of the Dagat-dagatan Development Project money judgment
(Project), among others. Incidental to such development, NHA sold part of the commercial lots in the awarded to Roxas,
project to Ernesto Roxas, herein respondent, for the use of his business of buying and selling gravel. particularly the
secondary relief which
The initial notice of award of sale of the lots in favor of Roxas on December 27, 1985, included a total of was the P30,000.00
176 sq.m priced at P1500/sq.m. On December 20, 1991, Roxas completed the payment. Meanwhile, after attorney’s fee, could be
conducting a final subdivision project survey, the area of the subject lot sold to Roxas increased by 144 recovered by motion
sq.m. NHA informed Roxas of such addition in the lot area and again awarded the sale of the additional 144 for execution without
sq.m to him, this time at P3500/sq.m. having been first filed
in the COA.
While Roxas showed interest in acquiring the additional 144 sq.m, he wanted to purchase it at P1500/sq.m
which is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the original award of sale. When
NHA rejected the request, Roxas filed an action to the RTC to compel NHA to comply with the terms and
 conditions of the original award of sale.

RTC granted the prayer of Roxas and also ordered NHA to pay Roxas an amount of P30,000.00 for
attorney’s fee. Roxas also filed his motion for the issuance of the writ of execution to compel the NHA to
sell the lot at P1500/sq.m and pay for the P30,000.00 attorney’s fee. To prevent the execution, NHA
brought up the case to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of RTC. CA likewise observed that NHA’s
funds, as a GOCC, were not exempt from garnishment or execution; and ruled that Roxas did not need to
first file his claim in the Commission on Audit (COA).
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The Supreme Court ruled that the NHA possessed the legal competence and authority to directly afford the main relief adjudicated which was the
decree of specific performance as to the right of Roxas to acquire the subject lots at P1,500.00/sq.m as stated in the original agreement between
the parties without Roxas needing to first submit to the COA the contract of sale for review and approval. However, the settling or paying off of
the secondary relief for the attorney’s fees of P30,000.00, being a monetary obligation of the NHA, would not be in the usual course of the
activities of the NHA under its charter. That such relief was the consequence of the suit that granted the main relief did not matter hence Roxas
should first bring it to the COA prior to its enforcement against the NHA.

It must be remembered that GOCCs may sue and be sued for performing merely ministrant function but upon rendering judgement, execution
does not automatically follow. If the judgment may result to any monetary claim, such monetary judgment must first be passed upon by COA.
The power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered because government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to writs of
execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services of the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their legitimate and specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law.

Administrative Agencies; National Housing Authority; Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 757, which was its charter, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) could sue and be sued.—The mantle of the State’s immunity from suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being a
government-owned and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue and
be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of Roxas.

Section 26 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445 specifically vested in the Commission on Audit (COA) the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due from or owing to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters. —Settling or paying off the secondary relief for the attorney’s
fees of P30,000.00, being a monetary obligation of the NHA, would not be in the usual course of the activities of the NHA under its charter. That
such relief was the consequence of the suit that granted the main relief did not matter. Pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
Roxas should first bring it to the COA prior to its enforcement against the NHA. Indeed, Section 26 specifically vested in the COA the power,
authority and duty to examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due from or owing to the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters.

Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) extends to all government-owned or -controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, as well as to all nongovernmental
entities subsidized by the Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or government share, or for
which the Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the Government.—As the text of the legal provision plainly shows,
the audit jurisdiction of the COA extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and other self-governing
boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, as well as to all nongovernmental entities subsidized by the Government, or funded by
donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or government share, or for which the Government has put up a counterpart fund,
or those partly funded by the Government. There is no distinction as to the class of claims. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos.
Indeed, a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. Corollary to this rule is
the principle that where the law does not make any exception, the courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason to the contrary.

Immunity from Suit; The universal rule remains to be that the State, although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law, may
limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution.—There is no question that the NHA could
sue or be sued, and thus could be held liable under the judgment rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be that the State,
although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law, may limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution. In other words, the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered because government funds and
property may not be seized pursuant to writs of execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services of
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their legitimate and specific objects, and as
appropriated by law. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriation as required by law.

c. torts committed by special agent

# Case Title: Meritt v Government
Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in 1. Whether or not the State
favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause. Plaintiff was is immune from suit.
involved in an accident concerning him and a General Hospital ambulance resulting in him being
incapacitated. He sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. Act No. 2457 was 2. Whether or not the
enacted in his favor which reads: government is liable for the
negligent act of the driver of
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and the
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. ambulance.

"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;

"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the
amount of damages, if any , to which the claimant is entitled; and "Whereas the Director of Public
Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr.
E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be
decided: Now, therefore,

"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and
the attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the
trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the same.

"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
The accident was due to the negligence of the ambulance’s chauffeur. As the negligence was committed by an agent or employee of the
government involving tort, the inquiry arises whether the government is legally liable for damages. The State is not liable for the torts committed
by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend his liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge
of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches in the public service and in the appointment of its agents. The responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim.

Note:
Special Agent - in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.

This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of
Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

Damages sought:
 The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for
permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing
his occupation.

We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court
so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and
twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that
the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months.

The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his
home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the am

3. Implied Consent

# Case Title: US v Guinto

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber W the cases should be
services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Private respondents who have been dismissed on the ground of
concessionaires inside Clark for years submitted their bids. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. immunity from suit - YES.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop
concessions.

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of
America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of
the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation
Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It was found during investigation that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers.
Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators, who
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of the PACAF Clark Air Force
Base effected his dismissal. Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio.

Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John
Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued
that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.

Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the
enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement, and that they were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts
complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States
without its consent.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
General Principles: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that
we have adopted as part of the law of our land under the constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In
the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of
a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."

In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the
RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows:
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment,
use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of the
territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate for their
control.
It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in
the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as
agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has
entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
such waiver may be implied.
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United
States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts
are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held
answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they
conducted the buy-bust operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they
apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would
seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States government should be liable for their
torts.
But the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued
through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as inthe case at bar. No less important,
the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine
government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise
undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a
perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen;
on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it
a point to visit John Hay for this reason.
So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will
not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For
that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract
with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises
operated by private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by
the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave
(as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a
fee.
Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed
commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title: Fontanilla v Maliaman

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration Whether or not NIA is a Yes
(NIA), a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was government agency with a
held liable for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose juridical personality separate
and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and distinct from the
and NIA was ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; government, thereby
P3,389 for hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary opening it up to the
damages, and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award. possibility that it may be held
liable for the damages
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and caused by its driver, `who
primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental was not its special agent.
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special
agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1990. NIA believes this
bases this on:
PD 552 – amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)
The case of Angat River Irrigation - System v. Angat River Workers’ Union Angat Case: Although the
majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function
because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to “bring to the
Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit”, a strong dissenting opinion held that
Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions.

The Angat dissenting opinion:

Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were
necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five
years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid
cause.

The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet
been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the
latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.

The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a
service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a
"government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national
irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the
irrigation of lands.

NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the
Corporation Law.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides:

Sec. 1. Name and Domicile — A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall
be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have
representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis).

Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems
constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance
and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to
recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to
a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof; Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first,
upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land,
and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the
National
Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f):. . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in
general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.

DISPOSITION: The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it
may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.

# Case Title: Dept. v Onate

Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title: EPG v Vigilar

Topic:
Procedural History:
Facts: Issue Ruling
(1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH,constructed 145 housing units Whether or not the Principle
but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcontracts was only for 2/3 of each housing of State Immunity is
unit. Through the verbal request andassurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook applicable in the case at bar.
additional constructionsfor the completion of the project, but said additional constructions were not
issued payment by DPWH.With a favorable recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for
LegalAffairs, the petitioners sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not
object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then
DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM releasedthe amount for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH
Secreatry Vigilar denied themoney claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus
before the RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this petition.Among others, respondent-secretary
argues that the state may not be suedinvoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State also known as the RoyalPrerogative of Dishonesty
Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning
Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability
of the State, otherwise, known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty. Respondent’s argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State
Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled
exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. “the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.” It is just as important, if not
more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.

To be sure, this Court – as the staunch guardian of the citizens’ rights and welfare – cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow
itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit be shred
in this particular instance, and that petitioners–contractors be duly compensated – on the basis of quantum meruit – for construction done on
the public works housing project.

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning

# Case Title:
Topic:
Procedural History:

Facts: Issue Ruling

Rule(s) Applied and Reasoning