Assignment for Internal Assessment

in Nationalism in India (Semester 5 GE)

Muhammad Yusuf Ghazali

22BHST021
B.A. History honours - III
Date of Submission - 28.10.24

Discuss in detail the factors which led to the Partition in 1947? Explain the role of
communalism in politics in the context.

The Partition of India in 1947 was one of the most momentous events in the history of the
subcontinent, leading to the division of British India into the independent nation-states of
Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. The causes of this gigantic phenomenon
were multifaceted and complex, and its scars run deep into the political, social, economic,
cultural and psychological spaces of post-independence India and Pakistan. This essay shall
discuss the developments and factors which led to the Partition, as well as the presence and
role of communal politics causing it.

Especially after the Revolt of 1857, the British began to perceive Muslims as a significant
and separate political community, and this was reinforced by census operations. Further,
Muslim reformist movements of the nineteenth century with ideological affiliations to West
Asia created a degree of cohesion through the idea of the Muslim ummah even as they
articulated a variety of social and economic resentments. To prevent revolts from the Muslim
lower classes (considered more susceptible to religious revivalism), the British approached
the Muslim landed elite as a natural ally, who too were willing to win British favour. Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who founded the Aligarh Movement and the Muhammadan
Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875, proposed cooperation with the colonisers, and
argued that Muslims and Hindus were two qaums. For this latter contribution, he is
considered to have initiated the two-nation theory and Muslim separatism in India. The
two-nation theory and the widespread of Muslims as a distinct nation was a major factor
leading to the Partition of India.

However, the Muslim community, as Ayesha Jalal points out, remained ‘fractured by class,
region and the rural-urban divide’, and a number of social, economic and political exigencies
led to the Partition. Until the very end of the 19th century, Muslim politics continued to be
shaped by regional concerns rather than an abstract monolithic Muslim identity. In fact, a
Muslim identity as emphasised in publications and the press was only a distinct cultural
entity, rather than being representative of a ‘nation’. Thus, even the ‘Pan-Islamists’ who
idealised the Muslim ummah were not so much anti-national as they were anti-colonial; in
fact most Muslims easily reconciled their extra-territorial loyalties with the creation of a
common Indian nationality. Ayesha Jalal argues that the accusation of Muslim ‘separatism’ is
baseless, since the very idea of an Indian nation was still being constructed and contested.
Further, such an accusation underplays the exclusionary role played by Hindu majoritarian
ideas on the Indian ‘nation’. Muslims demanded sought representation in the nationalist
discourse, along with political accommodations of their cultural difference. Far from
reflecting a neat Hindu-Muslim divide, ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ nationalist narratives were
differentiated by region, class, et cetera.

Separate electorates is a system of election to legislatures which divides voters along the lines
of their religion, where each religious group elects its own representatives. The incorporation
of separate electorates in the 1919 reforms helped the British play the region against the
centre (thus serving British interests) as local politicians became indifferent to calls for
national Muslim unity by the All-India Muslim League. Provincial and local politics
interacted awkwardly with communally compartmentalised electorates, and this was a major
contradiction of Muslim politics in the coming period and eventually lead to Jinnah accepting
the offer of partitioning Punjab and Bengal, as we shall later see. Thus this centre-province
contradiction and the resulting provincialisation of politics can be considered another major
factor causing the Partition.

Instead of creating an all-India Muslim identity, constitutional arrangements only perpetually

led to Muslims being a minority. Local politicians, who were mostly landed notables, focused
on defeating their own co-religionists rather than competing with other Indians or seeking
assistance from political parties, even though the Muslim League existed since 1906. Local
Muslim politicians stayed away from the Muslim League, and its lead was not followed by
the Muslims. In fact, in the United Provinces, Punjab, and Bengal, alliances were created
with other communities. The nation-wide Khilafat Movement did not do to counter the
provincialisation of electoral politics in the 1920s for the Muslim League, as the Khilafatists
rallied behind M K Gandhi and the Congress. The Muslim League, overshadowed by the
Congress-Khilafatist alliance, was near extinction in the 1920s.

In the constitutional negotiations of the early 1930s, no single party could claim to represent
all Indian Muslims. All Muslims agreed on the principle of Muslim political dominance in
Muslim-majority provinces through separate electorates based on population proportions,
though Lala Lajpat Rai warned that this might entail a partition of the provinces as Hindus
would not be willing to endure Muslim tutelage, and this was important in eventually
necessitating the Partition. With the Communal Award of 1932 and the Government of India
Act of 1935, separate electorates for Muslims continued in Punjab and Bengal, Muslims were
given more seats than any other community in the provincial assemblies, and provinces were
given full autonomy. Muslims considered this last change to be detrimental to their interests
which required the presence of British officials in the provincial assemblies, especially in the
Muslim-minority provinces. In this situation, some Muslim politicians from the minority
provinces turned to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a lawyer-turned-politician who led the League
from 1934 onwards. The League, being a national party, sought to reverse the
provincialisation of politics that had occurred in the 1920s by garnering the support of the
Muslim-majority provinces in northwest and northeast India and using it in negotiations at
the centre. However, the British were reluctant to dilute their power at the centre.
The 1936-37 elections thoroughly discredited any claims by the League of representing all
Indian Muslims. Provincial politicians focused on their own individual and local concerns,
and all Muslim provinces in the northwest thoroughly rejected the League, which won a mere
4.4 per cent of the total Muslim vote cast. The performance of the Congress, on the other
hand, was extraordinary. Thus, the Muslim league became redundant both at the centre and in
the provinces. However, the League could still claim to be the most representative
organisation of Muslims by raising all-India Muslim issues and by granting concessions to
the Muslim-majority provinces while also emphasising its authority over them. Fortunately
for the League, the 1920s and 1930s saw a hardening of Muslim opposition to the prospect of
an all-India centre dominated by the Congress, as Muslims feared that the Congress would
‘grab the whole cake’ in an independent India. Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazlul Haq, the
premiers of Punjab and Bengal respectively (Muslim-majority), supported the League, a
Muslim party, over the Congress.

However, it was anticipated that Muslims would only have a marginal role in independent
India as long as they remained a minority. To resolve this problem, Sayyid Ahmed Khan’s
idea of Indian Muslims being a nation (entitled to equal treatment with the Hindu nation) was
used, and in December 1930, Muhammad Iqbal urged the council of the League to endorse
the demand for a Muslim state in northwest India that would include Punjab, Sind, the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan. While his plan was within the limits
of all-India, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali, a Cambridge student, envisaged a Muslim state linked to
all the Muslim countries in West and Central Asia which would be called Pakistan. By the
late 1930s, these ideas had been rejected by most Muslims because of their irredentist nature
and the requirement of massive Muslim migration. However, the idea of Muslims being a
nation and not a minority stayed and spread. In March 1940, the Muslim League made a
formal demand for independent Muslim states in northwest and northeast India in its Lahore
session. The decision on whether such a state would seek a confederation with ‘Hindustan’ or
would only have treaty arrangements with it could be made once this demand had been met.
It was hoped by the League that the new Muslim state would remain part of a larger all-India
whole and have an equitable share of power at the centre, and Muslims in Hindustan would
be protected by similar provisions as Hindus in this new state.

In order for this scheme to materialise successfully, the Muslim League had to prove their
support in the Muslim-majority provinces (that were to become part of this prospective
Muslim state). This required that the League’s programme be sufficiently broad to reconcile
the Muslim populace with the landed oligarchs who dominated politics. To ensure this, the
League turned to religion. This, according to Ayesha Jalal, had nothing to do with Jinnah’s
ideological convictions, but was the most practical way of uniting and mobilising the Muslim
community. Jinnah’s real aim was to negotiate a power sharing arrangement between
Pakistan and Hindustan. He wanted autonomy of the Muslim majority provinces in a loose
federal structure and the Hindu Muslim parity at the centre. This turn to religion, however,
was a powerful rallying call, and it proved to be a major factor in causing the Partition.
While the remaining years of the Second World War saw a spectacular rise in the popularity
of the idea of Pakistan among Muslims, there was a lack of a political organisation to work
for its attainment. Further, this Muslim demand further worsened relations between
communities in Punjab and Bengal. This was an obstacle for Jinnah who could not claim the
undivided territories of Punjab and Bengal without the tacit agreement of the non-Muslims
there. The failure of the Cripps Mission of 1942, that offered provinces the option of opting
out of the Indian union, further worsened relations. In 1944, C R Rajagopalachari offered
Jinnah a ‘Pakistan’ carved out of the Muslim-majority districts of Punjab and Bengal, which
would still have to discuss matters of defence, communications and commerce with the rest
of India (the ‘Rajaji formula’). However, the League realised that Pakistan could not be at par
with Hindustan without the non-Muslim-majority districts of the two provinces, and thus
Jinnah refused the scheme. Both Cripps and Rajagopalachari revealed an important point:
creation of Pakistan could entail partitioning Punjab and Bengal, as the idea was deeply
resented by non-Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces.

In June 1945, Churchill allowed Viceroy Wavell to begin negotiations with Indian leaders, as
Wavell anticipated that post-war India would become unmanageable by force. Wavell
believed immediate constructive action was essential to keep India within the British
Commonwealth. During a London visit, he persuaded Churchill of the need for a
Congress-League coalition to prevent post-war crises. Wavell then held the Simla Conference
(June 25 - July 14, 1945) to discuss forming an Indian executive council with equal
representation for caste Hindus and Muslims, along with separate Scheduled Caste
representation. However, the conference failed due to Jinnah's insistence that the Muslim
League exclusively nominate all Muslim members, which Congress rejected as it implied
Congress was solely a Hindu party. Consequently, Wavell ended the talks, as a coalition
government without the League was unviable.

By the mid-1940s, Pakistan came to represent a ‘peasant utopia’ which would liberate
Muslim peasants from the Hindu zamindars and moneylenders. The idea of Pakistan also
appealed to the Muslim middle classes, especially the students. Jinnah led a widespread
campaign to promote the idea of Pakistan in rural Punjab. He gained support from
discontented Unionist Party members, young activists in the Punjab Muslim Students
Federation, and influential sajjad nishins (Sufi shrine custodians). Aligning even with the
Communist Party, Jinnah expanded his reach. The rural pirs issued fatwas, framing support
for Pakistan as a religious duty for Muslims. As the 1946 elections neared, Punjab’s entire
Muslim power structure—from wealthy landowners to rural peasants—shifted their
allegiance from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League. Over time, the Muslim League and
idea of Pakistan became ‘everything to everyone’. The widespread support for Pakistan
among Muslims in Punjab and Bengal along with the increasing popularity of the Muslim
League was another factor leading to the creation of Pakistan.

In the 1945-46 elections, the League won all the Muslim seats to the central assembly, and
polled 75 per cent of the total Muslim vote cast in the provincial assembly elections. Muslims
had been electrified by the slogan for a ‘Pakistan’, but they attached various meanings to the
term and its geographical boundaries. Further, the elections had been won by local leaders
who had allied with the League. This victory was a significant factor furthering Pakistan as
Jinnah presented this victory as a mandate for a ‘Pakistan’ composed of an undivided Punjab
and Bengal. However, this claim was flawed because Sikhs and Hindus were preparing for a
‘holy war’ against Muslims in Punjab and Bengal.

The Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 prescribed a three-tiered system with a compulsory
grouping of provinces at the second tier, which offered the League the hope of a centre to
help discipline the provinces and negotiate at the top which would deal only with defence,
foreign affairs and communications. The Congress, however, demanded that all real power be
vested in the centre. In fact, the Congress’ reluctance to share power at the centre was a major
factor eventually leading to the Partition. The League faced the option of an undivided
federal India without a guarantee of a Muslim share at the centre, or a sovereign Pakistan
without eastern Punjab and western Bengal. Though the League initially accepted the former
option, comprising a three-tiered structure, it soon realised that only a sovereign Pakistani
state could control the Muslim provinces, and such a state needed to include undivided
Punjab and Bengal if it was to receive a large share of the centre’s assets or have bargaining
power at the centre.

Desperate to achieve Pakistan, the Muslim League called for a ‘Direct Action’ day on 16
August 1946. This brought the communal tensions to a head, as the ‘great Calcutta killing’
which began that day and lasted until 20 August, killed a few thousand Hindus and Muslims
dead. In October, Muslim peasants attacked Hindu landlords in Noakhali and Tippera in east
Bengal. The ‘great Calcutta killings’ marked the intensification of Hindu-Muslim tensions,
which had been brewing due to divisive mobilisation by both the Muslim League and Hindu
Mahasabha. The violence spread across Bengal and India, including severe riots in
Chittagong, Noakhali, Bihar, Bombay, and the North-West Frontier Province. Rising
nationalist groups like the Muslim National Guard and the Hindu RSS mobilised communal
sentiment, leading to widespread unrest. In Punjab, communal violence escalated by early
1947, driven by civil disobedience, property attacks, and retaliations. Ultimately, as partition
approached, Punjab faced devastating communal carnage, with substantial property
destruction and loss of life across all communities. Soon after, brutal violence was
perpetrated against the Muslim minority in Bihar. Increasing uncontrolled violence further
narrowed the options of those negotiating at the centre, and thus proved to be another major
factor in causing the Partition.

Facing escalating communal violence and diminishing resources, British leaders considered
various withdrawal strategies. In 1946, Viceroy Wavell proposed a “Breakdown Plan” to
withdraw to Pakistan’s provinces if consensus failed, but it was initially rejected as
dishonourable. By January 1947, Attlee announced a transfer of power by June 1948, and
appointed Lord Mountbatten to expedite withdrawal. Mountbatten’s “Plan Balkan” proposed
power transfer to provinces, risking India’s fragmentation. Rejected by Nehru and Jinnah,
Mountbatten proposed partition into India and Pakistan, a plan accepted on June 3 with an
accelerated transfer date of August 15, 1947.
Partition, however, created anxieties among minorities, particularly Sikhs in Punjab who
feared losing their cultural and religious centres. Since the 1930s, the Akali Dal had
advocated for Sikh autonomy, suggesting a separate “Azad Punjab” or “Sikh state.” With
Pakistan’s creation looming, they sought alliances to protect Sikh interests, ultimately calling
for Punjab’s partition, which Congress accepted. In Bengal, a proposal by H.S. Suhrawardi
and Abul Hashim for a “United Sovereign Bengal” gained local support, but Hindu leaders
saw it as a ploy for a “Greater Pakistan” that would include Calcutta. The Hindu Mahasabha
and local Congress pushed for Bengal’s partition, establishing Hindu-majority West Bengal
within India, supported by both elite and non-elite groups who feared Muslim domination in
Pakistan.

By early 1947, the first priority of the British was to get out of India before anti-colonial
politics or communal violence worsened. There were reports of peasant, labour and youth
unrest, and the communal situation in Punjab was steadily deteriorating from January 1947
after the incidents in Bengal and Bihar. The various conflicts based on class and community
led to an understanding between the Congress high command and London, and on 20
February 1947, the British prime minister Clement Attlee announced that the British would
depart from India by 30 June 1948. The Hindu Mahasabha immediately demanded the
partition of Punjab and Bengal, and this demand was echoed by the Congress under the
leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel. Voting was carried out separately
among the legislators of Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority districts of Punjab and
Bengal to decide whether their provinces should be partitioned. The majority in both
provinces rejected partition, but the simple majority in East Punjab and West Bengal, acting
under the Congress whip, supported the Partition. Thus it was decided that Punjab and Bengal
would be divided. Jinnah, unsure of his own following and mistrustful of the Congress,
acquiesced.

Communalism in politics played an essential role in causing the Partition at both the top level
and among the masses. As we saw, the two nation theory was a major tool used by the
Muslim League to claim concessions, by claiming that Muslims were a distinct nation and
not just a minority. This infused a sense of separateness and distrust between communities.
Secondly, the Muslim league used religion in order to create a common programme that
would unite the landowners as well as the masses in the Muslim-majority provinces. Both the
Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League fanned communal tensions, especially in the ‘great
Calcutta killings’ following Direct Action Day. For the Congress, the Partition did not entail a
division of India into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu Hindustan, but only meant that some
Muslim-majority areas had decided to ‘opt out’ of the ‘Union of India’. The existence and
continuance of the Union of India, including both Hindus and Muslims, was a decisive
rejection of the ‘two-nation’ theory.

The masses were divided along lines of class, caste, region, et cetera. The provincial leaders
pursued their own local interests and were not concerned with national ‘Muslim’ goals.
However, the creation and perpetration of the idea that Muslims were united as a nation that
was under the tutelage of the Hindu nation made the masses prioritise their religious identity.
The very demand by the Muslim League, which had gradually begun to become the
spokesperson of the Indian Muslim community, of a separate Muslim community angered the
Hindus and Sikhs. The League’s decisive victory in the 1946 elections further seemed to
suggest that the Muslim ‘nation’ demanded a separate Pakistan. Fanned by organisations like
the Hindu Mahasabha, Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab and Bengal refused to let their provinces
join Pakistan undivided. As the Muslim League and its supporters, fearing national
Congress-Hindu tutelage after independence, was adamant on its demand for a separate
Muslim state, and the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and their supporters refused to let
undivided Punjab and Bengal join Pakistan, partition became necessary.

While communalism served important political purposes in furthering the demand for
Pakistan (for the League) and preventing the transfer of undivided Punjab and Bengal into
Pakistan (for the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha), it must be remembered that religion
was largely used as a political tool. It was an important rallying cry which violently mobilised
the masses among the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, leading to the massacre of millions during
the saga of Partition, as communal rhetoric fomented fear, mistrust and resentment. The
British were also important in infusing politics with a communal tone, as can be seen in their
introduction of separate electorates, their use of the Muslim landed elite to control the
Muslim masses, and their support of the League’s demands in order to counter the Congress’
demands for independence during the War. In fact, as Winston Churchill said, Hindu-Muslim
tensions were the British Empire’s last ‘bulwark’ in India.

Ayesha Jalal argues that Jinnah’s goal for a united Muslim state failed due to provincial
particularisms overriding a unified Islamic sentiment, which forced him to accept a limited
Pakistan. Partition, she suggests, stemmed more from Congress's reluctance to allow
substantial provincial autonomy than from separatism. Asim Roy attributes India’s division to
Congress, but this view is criticised for overstating Jinnah’s role. Mushirul Hasan highlights
internal divisions within the League, challenging the notion of a unified Muslim demand for
Pakistan. Ian Talbot and Taj Hashmi show how the Pakistan movement became mass-based,
resonating with the Bengali Muslim peasantry and moving beyond elite circles. The rise of
Hindu communalism is seen in the growth of the RSS in the Hindi belt, responding to
Partition’s communal context. Leftist historians like Bipan Chandra emphasise Muslim
communalism from 1937 and Congress’s failure to unify Muslim support. Sumit Sarkar
argues that Congress chose Partition over harnessing grassroots harmony. Subaltern scholars
like Gyanendra Pandey shift focus from causes to the traumatic experience of Partition,
exploring its effects on identity and inter-community relations in South Asia.

Thus we see that a number of factors contributed to causing the Partition. In terms of
stakeholders, the main factors were the British policies, the intransigence of the Congress, as
well as the political ambitions of Jinnah and the Muslim League. The two-nation theory and
the increasing identification of Muslims as one distinct, separate nation vis-a-vis the Hindu
nation was another factor. Another factor was the socio-economic challenges of various
groups which saw in Pakistan a utopian solution to all their problems. Communalism was a
major factor, as the situation could have been salvaged if not for the widespread communal
antagonism that had gradually developed among the masses. Widespread communal violence
and mass intransigence necessitated the creation of a separate Muslim state by partitioning
Punjab and Bengal. Thus, a number of political, social, economic, cultural, psychological and
other factors led to the Partition. Whether it was unavoidable or not is a question that requires
deeper analysis.
__________

References

1. Bandyopādhyāẏa, Śekhara. From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India.

New Delhi: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 2015.
2. Bose, Sugata, and Ayesha Jalal. Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political
Economy. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2023.

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