SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE, ISR

AND COUNTER-MEASURES

A.S. BAHAL

If you can be seen, you can be hit

If you can be hit, you can be killed.

—US Army Tactics of the Individual Soldier

The future regional crises and conflicts may require swift reaction in the form of
cold start strategies and unconventional responses. The urgent response itself
may underline the critical need to quickly collect, process, and disseminate
operational and tactical information. Likewise, the enemy’s ability to obtain
information on own force deployments, order of battle, movements, and
logistics, could jeopardise our ability to stage and deploy combat forces and
successfully execute combat operations. Therefore, the capacity to control
information has become decisive in conflict situations.
Over the years, satellite surveillance has been increasingly used in combat
operations and regional conflicts. Satellites gather vital information through
active and passive sensors that exploit the ultraviolet to thermal infrared and
reflected radar wave portions of the electro-magnetic (em) spectrum. They are
invulnerable to attacks except from weapons presently under development.
Furthermore, satellites do not violate the air spaces of sovereign nations. Hence,
they can carry out reconnaissance activities with impunity during peace-time.
Analyses of space employment during the Gulf War 1991, Kosovo Operations

Group Captain AS Bahal, VM, is a senior member of the faculty at the College of Air Warfare, IAF.

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1999 and Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003 clearly highlight that decisive victories
were achieved by synergistically integrating space-based applications, specially
those related to the employment of air power.

INCREASED SYNERGISM BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY

SPACE APPLICATIONS
The growing technical competence of commercial space technology has bridged
the gap between military and civilian space capabilities. The civilian satellite
imagery services that were once restricted to select nations are becoming freely
accessible to all users, including asymmetric fighters, at affordable rates. The
launch of the Space Imagery Co. satellite
The growing technical
(Ikonos) on September 24, 1999, brought the
first high resolution imagery into
competence of
commercial service. Subsequently, Digital commercial space
Globe Inc, with the Quickbird satellite, technology has bridged
provided sub-metre resolution (61 cm). The the gap between military
inherent proficiency of civilian satellites to and civilian space
make available high resolution data capabilities.
provides an opportunity to the military
planners to integrate their employment with combat operations to achieve
information dominance.
Today, nations don’t need to own satellites to obtain information from
space-based systems; they can easily acquire it from numerous international
space agencies. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial imagery was
used for intelligence preparation, mission planning, damage assessment,
diplomacy and coalition building. Interestingly, the US National Imagery and
Mapping Agency contracted Space Imaging for exclusive rights on all
commercial Ikonos imagery of conflict areas in Central Asia, following 9/11,
in a $1.9 million per month deal. Buying available capacity could work then,
but increasing numbers of commercial satellites with high-resolution
capabilities will eventually render this option less useful. It has, therefore,
become imperative that while we retain the ability to collect intelligence

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through space-based assets, we deny the same to our potential adversaries

with the help of passive and active counter-measures.

SATELLITE IMAGING AND RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITIES

The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon
as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving.

— Ulysses S. Grant

There are seven countries in the space race: the USA, Russia, China, Japan, France,
India and Britain; and another three on the periphery: Indonesia, Pakistan and
Australia. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), under the Department
of Space (DOS), is responsible for research,
It has, therefore, become
development and operationalisation of space-
imperative that while we
based systems. The Indian satellites, IRS 1C
and 1D, provide resolution of 5.8 m (multi- retain the ability to
spectral resolution is 23.5m), Cartosat-1 2.5 m collect intelligence
and TES one metre. The Chinese satellites through space-based
such as CBERS-1/ CBERS-2 provide 20 m assets, we deny the same
resolution, Zi- Yuan-2A 9 m and Zi Yuan-2B to our potential
3 m resolution. The People’s Liberation Army adversaries with the help
(PLA) is experimenting with directed energy
of passive and active
weapons (DEW) that can destroy satellites
counter-measures.
and is considering particle beam weapons
that can engage ballistic missiles. The Chinese military is also experimenting with
the use of micro-satellites that can be used as kinetic energy weapons to destroy
other satellites or to render them ineffective when required.
The quantitative measure to establish the imaging capability of a satellite is its
spatial and spectral resolutions. Spatial resolution is the ability to resolve two
objects on the ground and spectral resolution is its ability to differentiate
between different bands of the measured wavelength. Using multiple spectral
bands to observe the same patch simultaneously allows discrimination between

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vegetation and soil, identification of thermal gradients in the ocean, measurement

of surface moisture, and a variety of other tasks. Typically, the more spectral bands
a sensor discriminates, the larger is its spatial resolution. An image produced by a
sensor could consist of one very broad wavelength, a few broad bands or many
narrow wavelength bands. The terms typically used for these three image
categories are panchromatic, multi-spectral and hyper-spectral imageries.
The qualitative measure for assessing the utility of imaging and remote
sensing satellites is timeliness. There are
three variables affecting the timeliness of
The qualitative measure
remote sensing: satellite revisit time, image for assessing the utility of
processing time and image delivery time. imaging and remote
Timeliness, therefore, refers to the time it sensing satellites is
takes from tasking the sensor to exploitation timeliness.
of the product. One variable in timeliness is
the revisit frequency; it is the time taken, usually in number of days, for the
satellite to overfly the same spot over the earth twice.

SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

Orbital Information
The ground coverage of a satellite is predicted by viewing the geometry
parameters of the respective sensors. The Convention on Registration (1976)
requires a party to maintain a registry of space objects it launches and to provide
basic orbital information. This information is available in two open websites,
namely, www.celestrak.com and www.space-track.com. The information is in
the form of a text-file that indicates catalogue number, year of launch, launch
number, which launch, fraction of the day, derivation of mean motion,
coefficient of drag, type of orbit, orbital inclination, perigee, etc. This orbital
information could be used to calculate the revisit time of the satellites. Since the
orbital information is obtained from open websites and can be corrupted, there
is a requirement to have own satellite tracking and monitoring ground stations
to maintain unobtrusive surveillance.

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Manoeuvring of Satellites
Manoeuvring of satellites requires a large amount of fuel and, therefore, it either
reduces the life of the satellites or increases their mass substantially to carry extra
fuel. Generating a velocity change of 2 km/s with conventional propulsion
technologies requires doubling the mass. Generally, satellites are manoeuvred
during conflict situations or on specific occasions. Though advanced nations and
commercial agencies may provide imagery to other countries, it is debatable
whether they would manoeuvre their satellites to provide repeated intelligence
to them. Though the revisit times calculated by interpolating orbital information
would approximately be correct, for precise location of the satellite one would
need to have a space tracking and surveillance system.

Tracking Satellites
There are many commercially available technologies which can be used to
construct systems that detect, identify and track satellites. In fact, there exists a
“Satellite Surveillance Organisation,” a network of amateur satellite observers,
who use maps, personal computers, telescopes/binoculars, and stopwatches to
observe at twilight time, the position of satellites with reference to the starfield.
Another mechanism of space surveillance utilises the charge coupled devices
(CCD) detectors with computer-based software systems to develop an optical
surveillance network.
More expensive space surveillance systems include phased array radars and
the US Navy’s NAVSPASUR system. This system uses powerful radio
transmitters located at different places to detect satellites. Analysis of the signal
provides the orbital parameters of the space objects down to a fraction of a
kilometre. The data from the NAVSPASUR system provides important inputs to
the US Air Force Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS). There is a
need for the Indian Air Force (IAF) to coordinate with Defence Research and
Development Organisation/Electronic Research Development
Establishment/Indian Space Research Organisation (DRDO/LRDE/ISRO) and
develop an effective space surveillance system that could be integrated with
ballistic missile defence (BMD) early warning.

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LIMITATIONS OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE AND REQUIREMENT

OF INTEGRATED TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE,
RECONNAISSANCE (ISR) ACTIVITIES OVER THE TACTICAL BATTLE
AREA (TBA)
The major advantage of satellites is that they can image large areas without
violating another nation’s air space. However, satellites have their own
drawbacks; they are expensive to launch and maintain, and are limited to fixed
Satellites have their own orbits around the earth. This makes them
vulnerable to deceptive techniques such as
drawbacks; they are
emission control and camouflage. In
expensive to launch and
addition, their view is limited by cloud
maintain, and are limited cover. During the Gulf War, cloud cover
to fixed orbits around the made the difference between utilising seven
earth. available imaging satellites that could have
provided updated pictures after every two hours, and having to rely only on a
single satellite, the Lacrosse. It is a radar imaging satellite that can look through
clouds but has a significantly lower resolution than the optical satellites.
Satellites are difficult to “dynamically retask” for new assignments, and are
very costly. The launch operations too are complex, time-consuming,
manpower-intensive, and expensive. Satellites can cost anywhere from $100
million to $800 million each, and require over $300 million for launch. In
addition, satellites do not provide direct links to the ultimate user and entail
significant processing time by a third organisation, in our case, DIPAC, to
convert data into usable media. This conversion time further delays
dissemination to the operational users.
Another major limitation of the imaging satellites is that they cannot orbit or
maintain station over one point. Hence, real-time tactical applications become
severely restricted, especially those that are time critical. There is a need,
therefore, to synergistically integrate tactical air power elements such as manned
and unmanned aircraft that complement as well as fill the gap created by the
limitations of the imaging satellites. Hence, ISR operations need to be
integrated activities that include space-based systems and air power elements.

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Many of the functions of the reconnaissance satellites could be substituted

cost effectively by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or manned aircraft. The
UAVs can maintain continuous surveillance over vital areas/vital points
(VAs/VPs) for an extended duration of time. They also have the advantage of
operating at approximately one-third the cost of manned aircraft. The UAVs
provide a larger portion of the usable imagery of the target area in a much
shorter timeframe than can be obtained from satellites. The modern UAVs such
as the Global Hawk are designed to fly at 350 miles per hour, at altitudes of
65,000 ft and have endurance of more than 40 hours. The satellites and tactical air
power integration should ideally be carried out in the following manner:
(a) During peace-time, use satellites to image those areas that are beyond the
range of the UAVs/manned aircraft or sensitive locations within the range
of the tactical sensors but those that are heavily protected. Satellites could
also be used to cover island territories periodically to check any
developments there.
(b) The UAVs are severely limited in area surveillance as they take four to five hours
to survey an area as small as 3 km x 3 km. It is here that satellites could be used
during peace-time or conflict situations to ascertain the presence of hostile
elements in an area of interest and thereafter UAVs used to maintain continuous
surveillance or provide precise information about target elements and their
exact locations. This would optimally exploit the strengths of both systems.
(c) Satellites could be used to build strategic data bases, whilst UAVs could be
used to collate target folders.
(d)Satellites could be used to ascertain changes in force deployments or new
constructions that have come up over a period of time and tactical sensors
could be used to identify the exact import of these changes and their detailed
implications.

PASSIVE COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST IMAGING SATELLITES

Passive counter-measures enhance survivability by reducing the enemy’s ability
to detect, identify, and engage own forces and equipment. The Russians define
passive measures or Maskirovka (camouflage, concealment and deception

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[CC&D]) as a series of interconnected organisational, operational and technical

measures to conceal from the enemy, objects, forces and equipment, thereby
misleading them to obtain accurate information about the presence,
disposition, composition, actions, intentions and plans of own forces. The type
of measures used and their scale would determine the level at which they are
carried out, viz strategic, operational or tactical. The definition itself highlights a
need for an integrated command and control structure that develops and
integrates passive counter-measures at all levels of war.
The primary aim of CC&D is to avoid detection. During the Gulf War, Iraq
used Maskirovka to effectively hide its capability of surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) (Scuds) in the face of persistent Coalition attacks. The camouflage and
deception techniques employed in the Kosovo War were extremely effective.
They used wooden decoys as well as phased out aircraft, surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), armour and tracked systems. They also used thermal decoys such as
burning tyres close to major targets to confuse thermal imagers. The successful
use of CC&D highlights the growing requirement of low cost, cheap and ready-
to-use passive counter-measures to defeat not only reconnaissance devices but
also precision strikes. The last 10-15 years have seen the emergence of new
CC&D techniques for signature control and for concealment of mobile objects.
A number of satellites use CCD detectors. A CCD is an extremely small
silicon chip, which is light sensitive. The essential principle of a CCD is that it
converts impinging light into electricity. The number of elements per unit length
determines the spatial resolution of the camera. In layman terms, we call that
pixel size. Multiple band sensing can be achieved by using filters to select
wavelength intervals that individually are associated with a CCD array.
Presently, a majority of the CCD systems are in visible and near IR (VNIR) bands.
High-resolution photography satellites usually travel around the earth in low
altitude polar orbits to take advantage of a good sun angle. Hence, CC&D
techniques are most effective in the visual portion of the electro-magnetic
spectrum. The three limiting factors that affect optical surveillance by satellites
are darkness (night), cloud cover and camouflage. The passive counter-measures
that could, therefore, be employed against satellite reconnaissance are:

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(a) Manoeuvre and evasion.

(b) Concealment and hiding.
(c) Camouflage.
(d)Deception.
(e) Smoke screens/obscurants.
(f) Radio/radar silence.
(g) Radar reflectors.

Manoeuvre and Evasion

Normally, revisit times of reconnaissance satellites are known, hence, mobile assets
could be moved to prevent detection. Further, there would be periods when no
satellite observes our area of interest and this is the time to move these assets or
accomplish those activities that one intends to hide such as the May 1998 Shakti series
of nuclear tests. It would be very difficult to keep track of mobile forces from space
as it takes approximately 18-24 hours to complete the targeting process that involves
obtaining reconnaissance information from low earth orbit (LEO) satellites
performing imagery analysis and integrating the identified targets with command air
tasking orders. If critical target systems are moved after 10-12 hours, a high degree
of survivability in relation to satellite reconnaissance could be factored. It is here
that the side carrying out reconnaissance would need to take a holistic view and
integrate satellite reconnaissance with tactical reconnaissance elements of air power.

Concealment and Hiding

Reconnaissance sensors cannot pick objects located inside built-up areas or
underground structures. Objects that cannot be seen are difficult to identify
and target. Crucial equipment, components or weapons, therefore, need to be
kept in underground structures/buildings and should be moved in
coordination with the revisit time of different satellites. If one intends to
conceal sensitive ballistic missile or nuclear weapon programmes, then one
would need to conceal these structures within other built-up structures to hide
obvious signatures of these programmes. In addition, to time their overt
activities, keeping in mind the revisit times.

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Camouflage
Prior to the space era, camouflage and concealment measures were mainly
adopted during crisis situations and during hostilities. With satellite
reconnaissance, these measures would need to be adopted throughout the year
and especially during the revisit time of potential hostile satellites. The optical
band of the em spectrum in daytime is between 0.38-0.76 microns, electronic
through night vision 0.38-2 microns, photography 0.38-0.9 microns, UV 0.1-0.38
microns, TV 0.38-2.0 microns, laser 0.38-10.6 microns, heat 2-15 microns, MMW
1-10 microns, thermo microwave 0.3-21 cm, specialised radio 0.01-100 m and
sound 20-20,000 Hz. The present generation of synthetic camouflage nets and
painting schemes provide protection usually up to one micron wavelength. They
are adequate to conceal small objects from space sensors but may not be able to
conceal large objects such as runways, refineries and power generation systems.
However, critical sub-systems like pumping stations, command and control
centres and oil pipelines can and must be camouflaged or concealed. The
camouflage techniques used should cater to visual/radar/IR signatures.
Visual reflectance is characterised by colour and contrast. The longer the
range, the less important colour becomes as it tends to merge into a uniform tone.
It is here that reducing contrast would considerably reduce target visibility.
Effective camouflage must ensure that patterns are not created. This can be done
by minimising target contrast with its background. However, very few
camouflage materials or techniques provide broad band protection. Natural
camouflage materials matching local colours and textures are perhaps the most
effective against both direct and photographic observation. Planted rapid-
growing weeds, grasses, vines, bushes, and small trees could be used to conceal
permanent and semi-permanent installations. The controlled mowing of grasses
is another technique sometimes used in the camouflage plans of airfields and
rear-area installations. The aim should be to blend target features with the
environment/terrain conditions. Natural blending camouflage is the best
option to conceal assets of value.
Two important considerations for camouflage are choice of position and
camouflage discipline. The choice of position relates to selecting a background,

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which visually absorbs the target elements. In this, natural cover and defilade are
desirable. Proximity to landmarks should be avoided as they attract attention to
themselves. Sometimes, an appropriate choice of background would not require
any construction or camouflage work at all. Camouflage discipline implies
avoiding those activities that reveal the presence of objects of interest. For
example, tracks, waste products and debris are some of the common signs that
give away the presence/location of critical target elements. The methods
employed for camouflage are as follows:
(a) Blending. An object and its camouflage materials are concealed by blending it
with the environment in a manner that it merges with the background.
(b) Hiding. It conceals the identity of the object with the help of a screen.
(c) Deceiving. It changes the visual/IR/ radar signature of the objects.

Deception and Decoys

Deception masks the real intent of combat operations and aids in achieving
surprise. Deception counter-measures can delay effective enemy reaction by
disguising information about friendly intentions, capabilities, objectives, and
locations of vulnerable units and facilities. On the other hand, decoys are
imitations of real objects and they could be used to deceive the enemy in terms
of numbers and location of the assets. Large scale production of decoy aircraft,
tanks, artillery guns and air defence (AD) weapon systems that provide nearly
the same visual and IR signatures needs to be undertaken. Dummy radar and
communication antennae could also be used to confuse the enemy.
Decoys should be located in those areas that place them very close to where
the actual target systems would be deployed. For example, aircraft decoys
should be placed at tarmacs, operational readiness platforms (ORPs) and aprons.
If fighter aircraft decoys are placed on soft ground, they could easily be
identified as decoys. Presently, inflatable balloons that closely resemble an
aircraft’s visual signature are commercially available in India. Decoys made of
fibre glass turrets and gun tubes made out of steel/ PVC pipes are also available
to simulate realistic tanks. Inside these decoys, burning charcoal could be kept to
create appropriate thermal signatures.

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A panchromatic image can identify spatial variations in the visual properties

of surface materials but it cannot perform spectral discrimination. Therefore, a
decoy painted realistically could easily fool an interpreter of a panchromatic
image, if it conforms to a realistic environment. Hyper-spectral systems record
a large number of narrow contiguous bands starting from the blue visible part of
the em spectrum to nearly 2,500 nm. The military applications of this technology
include detecting and identifying hidden targets in an operational theatre.
Hyper-spectral sensing has the ability to discriminate between wooden/
inflatable decoys and metallic objects. However, high resolution commercial
applications of this technology are still in the developmental stage. Further, life
expired equipment/ weapons could be used as realistic decoys to counter this
technology. Hence, the key to convincing an enemy that it has found the real
target are as follows:
(a) Decoy fidelity (realism), which refers to how closely the multi-spectral decoy
signature represents the actual target signature.
(b) Deployment location, which refers to whether or not a decoy is deployed
correctly and the enemy recognises it as typical for that target type.

Smoke Screens/Obscurants
Smoke and obscurants can block or degrade the spectral bands used by an
enemy’s target acquisition and weapon designation systems. Recently developed
obscurants are able to degrade non-visual detection systems such as IR imaging,
selected radars and laser systems. High value assets, for example, supporting
infrastructure of aerostat radars, command and control centres and
communication nodes could be hidden by smoke screens during the revisit of the
imaging satellites. Since the satellites travel at approximately 7 km/sec, the
satellite would observe the area for a very short period of time. Hence, smoke
screens and obscurants may help. However, IR defeating obscurants and
chemical resistant paints may be able to break up IR signatures but may not be
able to defeat IR sensors. Also, the smoke screens do not completely hide all the
target elements. Hence, at best, it is only a measure that supplements existing
passive measures.

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Other Passive Techniques

Other passive counter-measures include radio/radar silence to defeat
commercial intelligence/electronic intelligence (COMINT/ELINT) satellites and
use of radar reflectors that enhance the radar signal reflectance thereby
distorting the objects shape and size. Radar reflectors could also be used on
decoys. However, such measures would be more applicable against satellites
using synthetic aperture radars for imaging purposes and satellites carrying
early warning detectors.

ACTIVE COUNTER-MEASURES
Active counter-measures could be used during hostilities or conflict situations.
James G. Lee, a US Air Force (USAF) officer, whilst carrying out studies for his
master’s degree in the Advanced School for Air Power Studies, identified
certain operational centres of gravity in the orbital, communication and ground
segments of satellite operations that could be targeted to render satellites
ineffective. Crucial vulnerabilities in the orbital segment identified by him
include the satellite itself or its sub-systems that are vital for task achievement
such as satellite altitude control and mission sensors, uplink/downlink
antennae, and power generation systems.
The crucial vulnerability in the communication segment is the
communications link, the radio frequency
used to pass information to and from the
The crucial vulnerability
satellite. Attacking the downlink, rather in the communication
than the uplink, is usually easier and more segment is the
reliable for disrupting a space system. communications link, the
Successfully attacking the downlink directly radio frequency used to
attacks information flow and has a more pass information to and
immediate effect. The crucial vulnerabilities
from the satellite.
in the ground segment include satellite
launch facilities, command and control centres and processing stations. The
entire ground segment is vulnerable to attack from various means such as
clandestine operations and air and ground attacks.

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Kinetic energy weapons cause physical destruction of the orbiting

satellites. The examples include fragmentary and guided non-explosive
warheads. DEW could also be employed to achieve a hard kill, a non-
destructive soft kill or a non-lethal temporary disruption or degradation.
Examples of DEW are lasers and high-power microwave weapons. Lasers use
electro-magnetic radiation (light) for both lethal and non-lethal attacks.
Depending on their power, lasers could damage, disrupt, or destroy a satellite
by overheating its surface, puncturing the outer surface of the spacecraft to
expose internal equipment or blinding critical onboard mission or control
sensors.
On the other hand, high-power microwave weapons employ radio frequencies
to damage satellite electronics. Unlike kinetic energy and laser attacks, high-power
microwave weapons achieve satellite sub-system failure rather than vehicle
neutralisation. It is possible today to construct a microwave radiation weapon with
a satellite soft kill capability of about 500 km. In addition, microwave radiation at
lower power levels can be effectively used for satellite jamming.
The value of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon is not only as an offensive
weapon intended to conduct an attack against an opponent’s satellite systems,
but it also acts as a weapon deployed to
deter attacks on own space systems. If The value of an anti-
deterrence fails, the ASAT could then be satellite (ASAT) weapon is
employed to restore the balance by counter- not only as an offensive
attacking the enemy’s satellites. The very weapon intended to
fact that LEO satellites can be accurately conduct an attack against
tracked and that too at relatively short an opponent’s satellite
ranges, makes it possible to use any of the
systems, but it also acts as
following active counter-measures:
a weapon deployed to
(a) Large fluxes of energy focussed on the
satellites could damage/spoil the deter attacks on own space
sensor/image since the very functioning systems.
of the sensors depends on concentrating bursts of incident light on small
sensitive detectors. An example is the tests carried out by the US Army in

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1997 using mid-infrared advanced chemical laser (MIRACL) against an

orbiting air force satellite.
(b) Direct ascent (ASAT) weapons can be fired from mobile launchers. However,
such technologies are still in the developmental stage.
(c) Certain DEW are in various stages of research, development, testing and
evaluation. However, weapon quality lasers require a large amount of power
to prevent diffusion and absorption.
(d)Jamming or spoofing measures could be used against satellite or ground
station signals. Jamming could be carried out by blocking the transmitted
signal and by overpowering it with noise. Spoofing could be carried out by
deliberate alteration or replacement of the signal. A satellite system could also
be made inoperative by manipulating the telemetry, tracking and control
system. However, these measures would require jammers to be located in the
near vicinity of the ground stations. Destruction of ground stations during
hostilities could be a method of direct attack. It may require covert measures
with special agents or direct action by using SSMs/fighter aircraft.
(e) The Chinese have developed nano-parasitic satellites. These are in the testing
stages. They could be attached to an orbiting satellite and could either disrupt
the functioning of the satellite or could destroy it when required, and
activated from the ground.

CONCLUSION
Aerospace power could be defined as synergistic application of air, space and
information systems. This synergistic combination has an overwhelming
influence on the economic and military power of a nation. Satellites can collect
valuable information through active and passive means in much of the electro-
magnetic spectrum, from ultraviolet wavelengths to thermal infrared and
reflected radar waves. However, there are limitations to satellite reconnaissance
and, hence, the ISR operations need to be integrated activities that encompass
space-based systems and air power elements.
Various passive and active measures can be taken to prevent/neutralise
imaging of objects of interest. The passive measures comprise manoeuvre and

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evasion, concealment and hiding, camouflage, deception, obscurants, etc.

However, the most effective measures include hiding overt activities when
the satellite passes over areas of interest, concealing important objects within
constructed structures, constructing underground infrastructure for command
and control centres as well as for sensitive programmes and moving objects after
the satellite has made its pass. The active measures include kinetic energy
weapons that cause physical destruction of the orbiting satellites or directed
energy weapons that could cause hard kill, a non-destructive soft kill or a non-
lethal temporary disruption or degradation.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations would significantly assist in countering satellite
recconnaissance:
(a) DRDO/LRDE/ISRO and the IAF should work towards establishing a viable
space surveillance network and towards counter-space measures. Further,
these systems could be integrated with the BMD Early Warning and
Aerospace Command, as and when it comes up.
(b) There is a need to evolve an aerospace
doctrine that enumerates There is a need to evolve
various
defensive and offensive counter-space an aerospace doctrine that
tasks. The inter-relationship between enumerates various
counter-space and counter-information defensive and offensive
should clearly emerge in the counter-space tasks.
recommended counter-space construct.
The doctrine should relate to a national space policy that has been worked out
jointly with the armed forces. Some work towards this end has been carried
out by the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS).
(c) There are limitations to satellite reconnaissance and, hence, there is a need to
put in place an integrated space and air power ISR network. An Aerospace
Command would be an inescapable necessity to effect this coordination. An
effective command and control structure needs to be set up.
(d)The effective passive counter-measures include carrying out covert activities

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 A.S. BAHAL

There are limitations to

when satellites are not visiting the area,
hiding objects within buildings or satellite reconnaissance
underground structures and moving the
and, hence, there is a
overground elements after the satellite
need to put in place an
has passed over that area.
(e) Identify camouflage nets and materials
integrated space and air
that provide wide band protection. power ISR network.
Blend the objects by using terrain and natural cover to maximum effect or
merging the objects with their background. Maintain camouflage discipline to
prevent giving away target locations.
(f) Do not attempt to camouflage everything as it would be very costly, time
consuming and impractical. Discriminate between the important and critical,
and camouflage only the critical objects. The theme should be to give some
information so as to hide what is critical. Further, camouflage on some
unimportant equipment should also be carried out for deception purposes.
(g) Procure realistic decoys of critical target elements. Preferably, use old and
discarded equipment that is realistically painted and is able to give a similar
visual and IR signature. In fact, all life expired aircraft/equipment should be
used to make cost-effective realistic decoys.
(h) The development of KALI (kinetic attack loitering interceptor) and DURGA
(directionally unrestricted ray gun) should be progressed to their logical
conclusion.
(j) Nano-satellites developed by ISRO should be experimented towards ASAT
technology.

101 AIR POWER Journal Vol. 3 No. 2 SUMMER 2006 (April-June)