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OCTOBER 2023
FIIA
BRIEFING PAPER

A POST-WESTERN GLOBAL ORDER IN THE

MAKING?
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF INDIA, TURKEY, BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA

Sinikukka Saari, Toni Alaranta, Bart Gaens, Katariina Mustasilta &

Lauri Tähtinen

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11 OF INTERNATIONAL
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FIIA BRIEFING PAPER OCTOBER 2023 I 373

A POST-WESTERN GLOBAL ORDER IN THE MAKING?

FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF INDIA, TURKEY, BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA

• India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa are striving for a more multipolar, post-Western world
order in which they would not be seen merely as auxiliary powers to the bigger players, but as
independent great powers.

• For them, a key foreign policy goal is to transform global governance institutions. Tey all call for
a permanent seat for their country on the UN Security Council. To achieve that, the states need
backing from more than the Western states – and this logically strengthens the multi-aligned
logic of their foreign policies.

• India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa see Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and the Western
countermeasures from their own perspective. Tey describe Russia’s invasion as a violation of
international law, but see the war primarily as a Western concern, not theirs.

• Although these states are critical towards the West, they are not anti-Western and they all value
multilateral institutions; their foreign policy goals and features ofer opportunities for the EU to
engage with them, but that needs to happen on a more equal footing than what has traditionally
been the case.

SINIKUKKA SAARI TONI ALARANTA BART GAENS

Research Director Senior Research Fellow Senior Research Fellow

Great Power Politics Te European Union Global Security and

and Foresight and Strategic Governance

FIIA Competition FIIA

FIIA

KATARIINA LAURI TÄHTINEN

MUSTASILTA Non-Resident Fellow

Senior Research Fellow Global Security and

ISBN 978-951-769-781-1 Te European Union and Governance
ISSN 1795-8059 Strategic Competition FIIA
Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen
FIIA
Graphics: Miro Johansson
Cover photo: Freepik

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A POST-WESTERN GLOBAL ORDER IN THE MAKING?
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF INDIA, TURKEY, BRAZIL AND SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION and Indonesia. Secondly, there is a more global pow-

er shift comprising several regional centres of power,
Pivot states, global swing states, fence-sitters, poly- including actors such as Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa,
amorous powers… India, Turkey, Brazil, and South Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Teir increased interna-
Africa have been given plenty of labels recently.1 tional status is the sum of many internal and external
Tese labels tend to describe more the way the West developments: a relative increase in their state power,
approaches these states, rather than how they see changing geopolitical constellations, and improved
themselves or their foreign policies. coordination of their policies on the global stage.
This Briefing Paper suggests that the analysis of While these broad power shifts are easy to iden-
these states should be rooted more systematically in tify, it is much harder to measure and quantify state
the context of power transition within the global or- power objectively. Most global power indexes try to
der. While there are great differences in the foreign distil a state’s economic, military, technological,
policies of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa, they demographic, and political power relative to others. In
all share a desire to see a more multipolar, post-West- other words, they attempt to quantify national power
ern world in which their ‘great powerhood’ would be as a resource. Most of these indexes place emphasis on
recognised by others. Tey are not completely aligned technological capabilities and economic might, which
with nor vehemently against the United States or the tend to highlight the capabilities of Western states.2 In
‘West’, but they are not satisfed with being auxiliary the emerging powers’ discourse, however, the empha-
powers to bigger players. Instead, they seek to obtain sis is often put on autonomy of action as a key charac-
an autonomous role of a global power and a permanent teristic of a great power.
seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to Another way to approach power is to analyse how
prove it. states actually exert infuence and power internation-
Tis paper analyses the foreign policy priorities and ally – in other words, what is the size of their political
concerns of these four G20 members, placing them in footprint globally? One could assume that at least in
a comparative light. Te emphasis is on how the states the long run, these two dimensions of power would
themselves defne their international agenda. Te four converge. In reality, this is often not the case: the
states were selected to represent the world’s emerging most important global governance structure, the UN,
powers on the basis of their geographical spread and strongly refects the global order as it was after World
recent international activity, but the selection should War II, not what it is today. Te Western states have
not be seen as defnitive or exclusive. also largely been able to maintain their privileged po-
sition in the global fnancial system and markets.
Tere is also a third perspective to state power: the
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON ‘GREAT POWERHOOD’ quality and characteristics of that power. Typically,
‘great power politics’ is associated with zero-sum geo-
The international system is undergoing a structural political competition, spheres of infuence and military
transition caused primarily by shifts in power balance power. In comparison, ‘middle power politics’ is taken
between diferent states. Firstly, there is an undeniable to mean more ‘benign’ foreign policy: a positive-sum
power shift towards Asia driven by the economic rise logic and the promotion of multilateral frameworks
of China, but also of others such as India, South Korea and cooperation. Middle powers – Canada, Austral-
ia, Germany, South Korea and Japan – are states with
1 See e.g., Matias Spektor (2023) “In Defense of the Fence Sitters. What the West
Gets Wrong About Hedging”. Foreign Afairs, May/June, https://www.foreig-
nafairs.com/world/global-south-defense-fence-sitters; German Marshall Fund
(2023) “Alliances in a Shifting Global Order: Rethinking Transatlantic Engage- 2 On power indexes and measuring state power, see e.g., Pareto Economics’ Global
ment with Global Swing States”, May 2023, https://www.gmfus.org/news/ Power Index at https://pareto-economics.com/global-power-index/; Heim, Ja-
alliances-shifting-global-order-rethinking-transatlantic-engagement-glob- cob L. and Benjamin Miller (2020) “Measuring Power, Power Cycles, and the Risk
al-swing-states; Asli Aydıntaşbaş et al. (2023) “Strategic Interdependence: Eu- of Great-Power War in the 21st Century”. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/
rope’s New Approach in a World of Middle Powers”. ECFR Policy Brief, October research_reports/RR2989.html; as well as Abbondanza, Gabriel and Tomas
2023. https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Strategic-interdepend- Stow Wilkins (2022) Awkward Powers: Escaping Traditional Great and Middle
ence-Europes-new-approach-in-a-world-of-middle-powers-v1.pdf. Power Teory. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 6.

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 Comparison of key political and economic indicators of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa

India Turkey Brazil South Africa

Democracy index (EIU) Flawed democracy Hybrid regime Flawed democracy Flawed democracy
. . .
...............................................................................................................................................................................................
..:
: ..:
: ..:
:

Global Power Index 39 .: 20 .: 54 .: 58

Military Strength Index 4 I...

.:
11 I...
.:
12 I...
.:
33

:. .~ .~
GDP in USD (global ranking) 3,385 billion (5) 906 billion (19) 1,920 billion (11) 406 billion (38)

GDP per capita PPP in USD

!...
.... 36,920 (53)
! ....
... 17,260 (92)
! ....
... 15,570 (98)
8,210 (134)
(ranking)
l.... l.... l....
...............................................................................................................................................................................................
.. .. ..
Aiming for permanent seat
at UNSC
Yes l..... Yes l..... Yes l..... Yes
.. .. ..
..!.. ....~ ....~
... ... ...
Key institutions, security
frameworks
BRICS, Quad, G20, SCO NATO, G20
l..... l..... BRICS, G20, Mercosur
l..... AU, BRICS, G20, SADC
.. .. ..
l.. l.. ...l
Population size (ranking) 1.4 billion (1) . 85.8 million (18) . 216.4 million (7) 60.4 million (24)
I... ...~ ...~

Table 1 . Comparison of key political and economic indicators of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa.
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Pareto Economics, Global Firepower, World Bank, FIIA, World Population Review; all 2022.

signifcant power resources and with a considerable exception of India (see Table 1). India is often seen as a
but typically auxiliary role in international afairs.3 great power due to its possession of nuclear weapons
However, in practice, there is no consensus on and its massive population, yet its global infuence is
which states belong to which group, and diferent ana- still largely confned to South Asia.
lysts and national traditions highlight diferent aspects However, all four states themselves highlight their
of ‘great powerhood’. When it comes to defning ‘great great power role, and their current foreign policies are
powerhood’, the economy-driven or military-capabil- more ‘great power-like’ than those of typical middle
ity criteria are just one way to approach the matter – for powers. Tey are eager to gain wider recognition in-
some states, autonomy of action and willingness to use ternationally as great powers and want to see multi-
military force may be more important in defning great lateral institutions transformed to accommodate their
power status. Some states are content with their respec- enhanced role in world afairs.
tive status and others strive for more power and recog-
nition. Furthermore, a state can seek more recognition
through aggression and risk-taking or through insti- ‘INDIA FIRST FOR GLOBAL GOOD’
tution-building and constructive political incentives.
Te states examined in this paper – India, Turkey, India continues its economic ascendancy. It has the
Brazil and South Africa – are mostly seen as belonging world’s ffth largest economy, which is forecast to ex-
to the ‘middle power’ category in terms of their pow- pand by 7% in 2024 and to grow at least tenfold in the
er resources and/or global infuence, with the partial next 25 years. However, while India has a young and
highly educated population, poverty reduction remains
3 Dong-min Shin (2015) “A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power”. E-In-
ternational relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/04/a-critical-review-of- a challenge – as do the country’s protectionist policies
the-concept-of-middle-power/; Ties, Cameron and Angguntari C. Sari (2018)
“A Role Teory Approach to Middle Powers”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. and absence from regional trade integration eforts.
40, no. 3 (December), pp. 397–421.

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 Security threats arising from Pakistan have been a TURKEY: ‘THE WORLD IS BIGGER THAN FIVE’
constant in India’s foreign policy. Even so, China is ar-
guably New Delhi’s key security threat, not least due to Turkey is a ‘trade regime’ with strong export-orient-
unresolved border/territory disputes in Kashmir and ed companies. It promotes free trade arrangements
Northeast India. China is a major supplier of military and implements de-regulation policies. The EU has
equipment, economic assistance and major infrastruc- remained Turkey’s foremost economic partner, but it
ture projects to Pakistan. Furthermore, China has been is seeking foreign direct investments and technology
expanding its infuence in South Asia and the Indian transfers from all directions. In terms of GDP, Turkey
Ocean region, posing a direct threat to India’s interests ranked as the 19th largest economy in 2022. It cur-
in the region and beyond. In terms of military pow- rently has military bases and troops in seven countries:
er, India has the fourth most powerful military in the Libya, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Northern Cyprus, Qatar,
world, with the third highest defence budget and the and Azerbaijan. It directly occupies Northern Cyprus
second largest standing army consisting of 1.5 million and three enclaves in northern Syria. Turkey has the
military personnel. second largest army in NATO, and has signifcant re-
India aims to become an acknowledged great power gional military capabilities. Its main security threats
in a post-Western multipolar world order. Its ‘India frst are domestically rooted but subsequently trans-nation-
for global good’ policy is grounded in inclusivity, and it alised into organisations such as the PKK (Kurdistan
is wary of Western interference in domestic afairs. India Workers’ Party) and the Gülen movement.
is profling itself as the voice of the Global South, and Turkey is one of the middle powers critically re-
as a bridge between the West and the South. Tis aim is fecting on its status in the current international or-
buttressed by a strong civilisational discourse of India’s der. It sees its traditional relationship with the West
role as a world teacher (Vishwaguru). India is an active as humiliating and aims to increase its room for inde-
proponent of UN reform and a strong contender for a pendent foreign policy. Whereas the West sees the cur-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. rent deterioration of the so-called liberal world order
India has shifted from an active non-alignment as threatening, Turkey perceives it as an opportunity.
foreign policy during the Cold War to pragmatic President Erdoğan’s motto – ‘the world is bigger than
multi-alignment in the emerging geopolitical order. fve’ – is used when criticising the current composition
While the country has enhanced its security alignment of the UN Security Council. Turkey sees itself as an au-
with the West as a member of the Quadrilateral Secu- tonomous actor that does not side exclusively with the
rity Dialogue (the Quad) and closer relationship with West or with the China-Russia axis.
the Australia-UK-US security pact (AUKUS), it also Again, hedging does not fully describe the way in
actively takes part in Brazil-Russia-India-China-South which Turkey conducts its foreign policy: it does not
Africa (BRICS) cooperation and the Shanghai Cooper- avoid risks in its foreign policy, it bargains hard with
ation Organisation (SCO). all partners and often acts independently of others,
From the Indian perspective, its multi-alignment even of its allies. Under President Erdoğan, Turkey has
is not ‘hedging’, meaning avoidance of taking sides in re-narrated its state identity as Islamic, presenting it-
international disputes and reduction of risks by diver- self as the leading Muslim nation. Te rhetorical style is
sifying fallback positions. Rather, it claims, the policy anti-imperialist and often underscores Turkey’s role as
is about ‘strategic autonomy’.4 India will act resolutely the ‘world’s conscience’, allegedly defending the poor
in international issues that are in its interests and pri- and deprived nations.
orities, but not merely because Western states demand Turkey’s foreign policy style is transactional, and it
it. A case in point is India’s ambivalence regarding the claims to be “strong both at the negotiation table and
war in Ukraine. Although India admits that Russia has in the feld”.5 Turkey can cooperatively advance cer-
violated international law, it does not see it as a ques- tain common NATO policies, such as recently sending
tion in which it would need to take sides more active- a peacekeeping force to Kosovo, yet vehemently accuse
ly. Based on its priorities, India has continued trading its allies of arming PKK terrorists or encouraging Is-
with Russia – an important fossil fuel and defence in- lamophobia. Te same compartmentalization applies
dustry exporter for India. to Russo-Turkish relations insomuch as the two coun-
tries’ support for opposing parties, for instance in Syria
4 Bajpaee, Chietigj (2023) “Te G20 showcases India’s growing power. It could
also expose the limits of its foreign policy”. Expert Comment, Chatham House, 5 Hurriÿet Daily News (2020) “Turkey would be front line if not strong in Syria: FM
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/g20-showcases-indias-grow- Çavuşoğlu”, 10 November 2020, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-
ing-power-it-could-also-expose-limits-its-foreign-policy. would-be-front-line-if-not-strong-in-syria-fm-cavusoglu-159883.

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and Libya, is not allowed to jeopardize their energy and Lula has described the BRICS expansion, for exam-
trade relations. In the case of China, Turkey takes a ple, as a question of geopolitics rather than ideology. 7
realpolitik stance: China’s economic power is taken as Te objective of such pragmatism is the full recogni-
a given and Turkey adjusts its own connectivity pro- tion of Brazil’s global standing through a permanent
jects to those of China accordingly. Turkey’s compart- seat on the UN Security Council. Russia has expressed
mentalization also allows it to ignore the Uyghur issue support for Brazil’s inclusion, and China has come to
with China when necessary. do so too in exchange for an enlarged BRICS, a major
goal for China. Te goal of a UNSC seat helps explain the
“fence-sitter” logic of Brazil’s foreign policy; to fulfl its
BRAZIL’S QUEST FOR GREATNESS grand strategy, Brazil needs to have the simultaneous
support of all fve permanent members of the UNSC.
Brazil is the world’s 11th largest economy and a country
of over 200 million inhabitants. China is Brazil’s largest
trading partner by a wide margin. The United States SOUTH AFRICA: A CHAMPION OF A FAIRER
has sought to balance the resulting Chinese infuence WORLD
on Brazil by designating it as a Major Non-NATO Ally.
Europe is seeking a similar balance with its Mercosur South Africa is the second biggest and the most devel-
trade agreement, still pending ratifcation. oped economy on the African continent. China, the US
Brazil can play an even-handed geopolitical game and Germany are its biggest trading partners. Despite
because it lacks major external security threats. being a regional economic and technological pow-
Criminal networks, especially in the Amazonian bor- er hub, the worsening electricity crisis, corruption,
derlands, qualify as the biggest challenge to its sov- and entrenched inequalities undermine the country’s
ereignty. While Brazil and Argentina continue to economic potential. Tese internal issues constitute
exchange barbs due to the shifting ideological orien- key threats to its stability, alongside regional uncon-
tations of both countries’ leadership, the prospect of ventional security threats such as violent extremism.
actual military engagement is remote. Domestically, South Africa’s military capabilities, which are mea-
Jair Bolsonaro, who served as president from 2019 to gre in comparison to the other states discussed here,
2022, returned the military to the centre of Brazilian are primarily geared towards responding to diverse
politics, from which his predecessors had successfully internal and regional emergencies.8 South Africa ac-
dislodged it during the previous three decades. tively engages in regional and international peace
Brazilian grand strategy points towards a multi- operations.
polar world, a setting in which Brazil could “assume South Africa views the shift towards a post-West-
its greatness”.6 Tis quest for ‘greatness’ came from ern world order as an opportunity. Since its transition
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, now in his third from the apartheid system in 1994, South Africa has
term in ofce, early in his frst term two decades ago. pursued foreign policy with a developmental agen-
This vision includes two different elements. First, da and a quest for a fairer rules-based world. From
Brazil needs to propagate a world that is multipolar, South Africa’s perspective, the merits of the Western-
lowering the entry point to world power to the extent dominated liberal rules-based order are mixed. While
that Brazil makes the cut. Second, Brazil needs to rise, it shares the commitment to democracy, human rights
especially economically, but also as a diplomatic and and international law, it is critical of inconsistently
cultural force, to the extent that others do not question applied rules and norms, and inequality pertaining to
its belonging to such a club of world powers. Tese two global political and economic dynamics. Te institu-
paths, the lowering of the entry point and the elevation tions of global governance and global economic rela-
of Brazil through recognition, can be followed either in tions need to be reformed. While South Africa’s foreign
parallel or alternately. policy prioritizes African development and an iden-
tifcation with the Global South, neither the country

7 Della Colletta, Ricardo (2023) “Nao estamos colocando ideologia no brics mas
geopolitica, diz Lula”. Folha de S. Paulo, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/
mundo/2023/08/nao-estamos-colocando-ideologia-no-brics-mas-geopoliti-
ca-diz-lula.shtml.
6 Brands, Hal (2010) Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy. Monographs, Books, 8 Cilliers, J., & Esterhuyse, A. (2023) “Is South Africa’s defense force up for new
and Publications. 595. Army War College Press, https://press.armywarcollege. thinking?”. ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/iss-to-
edu/monographs/595. day/is-south-africas-defence-force-up-for-new-thinking.

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 How have India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa reacted to Russia’s war in Ukraine?

Te recent increase in public attention to these middle powers is to a great extent due to their ambiva-
lence about Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Teir “fence-sitting” has been widely criticised, and
has stirred fears of Russia’s increasing global infuence.

All four actors see the war and the Western countermeasures from their own perspectives. Turkey has
systematically voted in favour of the UN resolutions condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Brazil supported the resolution in March 2022 but abstained from the subsequent resolutions, while
South Africa and India have systematically abstained in all UN General Assembly votes on the issue.
Regardless of voting behaviour, all four see Russia’s invasion as a violation of international law, but see
the war primarily as a Western concern.

Turkey, as a Black Sea state, has more at stake than the others. It is a NATO state, and it delivers weap-
ons to Ukraine while maintaining a good political and commercial relationship with Russia – in fact, it
claims to be a ‘strategic partner’ of both Ukraine and Russia. Turkey’s seemingly contradictory position
refects its desire to ensure that there is no single regional hegemon in the Black Sea region. Tis is an
example of Turkey putting its strategic interests at the forefront of its foreign policy, regardless of out-
side perceptions or criticism.

Te four states also share some concerns: they all have a critical approach towards non-UN sanctions,
which they see as primarily hurting developing countries. Some of them share a sense of nostalgia for
the Soviet decolonialisation calls, which benefts Russia. All four states believe that the West is often
hypocritical and applies double standards. India, in particular, blames the West for not supporting ter-
ritorial integrity strongly enough when it has been violated by China (most recently in 2020).

itself nor its continental peers view its foreign policy its refusal to condemn Russia at the UN and its joint
as primarily representing Africa.9 military exercises with Russia and China – has caused
South Africa strives to advance its foreign policy tensions with the West, illustrating the influence of
objectives through issue- and interest-based coopera- historical ties in South Africa’s foreign policy and its
tion with multiple powers rather than by aligning itself quest to act as an autonomous power.10
in either-or fashion between the rival global powers.
Legacies of the apartheid era and the relatively peaceful
democratic transition also continue to infuence South CONCLUSIONS
Africa’s foreign policy, for example in its tradition of
military non-alignment and prioritisation of peaceful Te foreign policies of India, Turkey, Brazil and South
confict resolution. Africa share some key features. All four states are
Tere are, however, signs of shifting emphases in champions of autonomous and pragmatic multi-align-
South Africa’s strategic partnership leanings: politi- ment, a decolonialisation agenda, and the emerging
cal and security partnerships with other BRICS coun- post-Western and multipolar world order. None of
tries and the Global South in general are becoming these states are vehemently anti-Western or anti-
more pivotal, while the West is mainly seen through liberal, and many of them cooperate closely with
the lens of economic relations. Recently, South Afri- Western institutions or frameworks. Their ap-
ca’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – such as proach to foreign policy is interest-driven and of-
ten issue-based. While they all value multilateral
9 Ishmael, Len (2023) “South Africa: Pursuing Multialignment and Striving for
Multipolarity”. Insights, German Marshall Fund of the United States, https://
www.gmfus.org/news/new-geopolitics-alliances-rethinking-transatlan- 10 Du Plessis, Carien (2023) “South Africa’s naval exercise with Russia, Chi-
tic-engagement-global-swing-states/south-africa; Williams, C., & Papa, M. na raises Western alarm”. Reuters, 17 February 2023, https://www.reuters.
(2020) “Rethinking ‘Alliances’: Te Case of South Africa as a Rising Power”. Afri- com/world/south-africas-naval-exercise-with-russia-china-raises-es-
can Security, 13(4), 325–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2020.1871796. tern-alarm-2023-02-17.

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institutions – particularly in regional settings where India and South Africa. Thus far, the grouping has
they have more infuence – they also seek autonomy served the interests of Brazil, India and South Africa
of action when national interests require it. From their fairly well but, as more states join the group, the future
own perspective, they are not ‘balancing’ or ‘hedging’ is more uncertain.11 In any case, the BRICS group is just
in their external relations. Rather, their multi-aligned one vector for pursuing foreign policy for Brazil, In-
foreign policy is an attempt to establish their own cen- dia and South Africa. Tey also cooperate closely with
tres of power. Western frameworks (such as the Quad in the case of
While these states have different historical and India), the US (in the case of Brazil), and the EU (in the
cultural backgrounds, they all see the emerging world case of South Africa).
order as an opportunity to correct humiliation and In sum, this paper has argued that the call for
insufficient international recognition rather than greater global recognition of India, Turkey, Brazil, and
as a threat to their standing. From this perspective, South Africa should be taken seriously by the West and
the multi-aligned approach seems highly rational: the EU. Although these states are critical of the West,
to transform the current international system, these they are not anti-Western, they advocate a multipolar
aspiring great powers need backing from more states world order, and all of them value multilateral insti-
than just the Western states. tutions. Tese features ofer plenty of opportunities for
Together as well as separately, they have been able to the EU to engage with them in international relations.
strengthen their international standing during the past Tis is not to say that the EU sees the four states as easy
decade or so. Moreover, the rise of China has indirectly partners – and they no doubt feel the same way about
improved the bargaining power of these four aspiring the EU. The four states all have their own priorities
great powers. Teir criticism of global governance insti- stemming from their history, geopolitical position and
tutions and Western policies is heard louder and clear- economic features, and there is no single appropriate
er in Western capitals when the fear of “losing them to way of approaching them; the EU needs to engage in
China” is a plausible – however unlikely – scenario. constructive dialogue with each of them to map where
Tis dynamic has been on display in the BRICS. Te interests align. It is in the EU’s interests to advance
BRICS summits and cooperation have contributed to global multipolarity – alongside multilateralism – as
the visibility of the aspiring states’ agenda and con- this also enhances the EU’s own global agency. I
cerns. Internal tensions certainly exist between the
more authoritarian and anti-Western China and Rus- 11 In August 2023, the BRICS group decided to invite Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Ethi-
opia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to become new members of the
sia, and the more democratic and multi-aligned Brazil, group. Turkey has occasionally firted with the option of joining BRICS, but has
not done so up to now.

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