Jen as a Living Metaphor in the Confucian Analects

Author(s): Tu Wei-ming
Source: Philosophy East and West , Jan., 1981, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 45-54
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399065

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Tu Wei-ming Jen as a living metaphor in the Confucian Analects

In a recent article surveying Chinese and Western interpretations of jen (hu-

manity), Wing-tsit Chan maintains that Confucius in the Analects was the first
to conceive ofjen as the general virtue "which is basic, universal and the source
of all specific vitues." "Although Confucius' concept ofjen as the general virtue
is unmistakable," Chan further observes, "he never defined it."' Actually
Chan's explanatory remark that in the hierarchy of values in Confucian sym-
bolism jen occupies the central position around which other cardinal virtues
are ordered, although jen in itself is never specified, seems self-evidently true
in light of traditional Chinese and Japanese exegees.
To my knowledge, philosophically the only serious challenge to this inter-
pretive consensus is Herbert Fingarette's focused investigation on li as the
"holy rite" in the "human community." The purpose of this article is to present
a new inquiry into jen as a living metaphor, while bearing in mind Fingarette's
highly provocative reflection on Confucius-The Secular as Sacred, in which
the metaphor of an inner psychic life is thought to be not even a "rejected
possibility" in the Analects and the way of Confucius' jen is understood as
"where reciprocal good faith and respect are expressed through the specific
forms defined in li."2

THE RHETORICAL SITUATION

To the modern inquirer who has been steeped in the art of arg
Confucius may appear to be "a prosaic and parochial moraliz
collected sayings "an archaic irrelevance." This initial response
become an unreflective fixity, if the inquirer is mainly concerned w
gical issues as matters of fact.4 Needless to say, a study geared only to
the stylistic nuances of the original text leaves many questions u
since "unasked questions are unlikely to be answered," the imp
Confucius was an outmoded ethical teacher, the study of whom
torically significant,6 will remain persistent. In what sense can C
understood and appreciated as, for example, in Fingarette's word
with profound insight and with an imaginative vision of man
grandeur to any I know" ?7
To begin, I would suggest that the mode of articulation in the
form of what Wayne C. Booth has forcefully argued for as "the
assent."8 In such a rhetorical situation, the internal lines of com
are predicated on a view of human nature significantly different fr
the scientismic assertion that ideally man is a rational atomic m
a universe that is value-free. Rather, the basic assumptions are
human beings come into existence through symbolic interchan

Tu Wei-ming is Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley.

NOTE: This paper was first presented at the Workshop on Classicial Chinese T
Harvard University, August, 1976.
Philosophy East and West 31, no. 1 (January, 1981). © by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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46 Tu

"created in the process of sharing intentions, values, meanings;

like each other than different, more valuable in our commonalit
idiosyncrasies: not, in fact, anything at all when considered sep
our relations."9 Viewed from this perspective, the whole worl
terms of the polarities "individual" and "society" shifts: "even u
like I, my, mine, self, must be reconsidered, because the border
the self and the other have either disappeared or shifted sharply."
Perhaps, it is in this connection that Fingarette's perceptive
becomes singularly pertinent:

[T]he images of the inner man and of his inner conflict are not
concept of man as a being whose dignity is the consummation
subtlety and sophistication, a life in which human conduct can
in natural terms and yet be attuned to the sacred, a life in which t
the intellectual and the spiritual are equally revered and are h
in the one act-the act of li. 11

Indeed, intent on underscoring the commonality, communicability, and com-

munity of the human situation, the rhetoric of assent affirms not only the mal-
leability of human nature but also the perfectibility of undivided selves through
group sharing and mutual exhortation. Yet this is neither a license for unbridled
romantic assertion nor a belief in dogmatic scientistic manipulation, but an
attempt to establish "a commonsensical defense of the way we naturally,
inescapably, work upon each other,"12 without resorting to the "clean lin-
earity" of an argumentative procedure. Elsewhere, I have used the notion of
"fiduciary community" as opposed to an "adversary system" in describing
this kind of psychic as well as social ethos. 3
The philosophical anthropology predicated on this rhetorical insight main-
tains that "[m]an is essentially a self-making-and-remaking, symbol-mani-
pulating [worker], an exchanger of information, a communicator, a persuader
and manipulator, an inquirer." 14 The symbolic exchange wherein self-identifica-
tion and group awareness in both cognitive and affective senses take place thus
becomes the primary human milieu. Against this background, the dialogical
encounters not infrequently couched in analogical reasoning are by no means
"an unsound form of the inductive argument." 15 For their persuasive power
lies not in the straightness of a logical sequence devoid of emotion but in its
appeal to common sense, good reasons, and a willingness to participate in the
creation of sharable values.

Of course, as Wayne Booth observes, "we have no reason to assume that

the world is rational in the sense of harmonizing all our 'local' values; in fact
we know that at every moment it presents ... sharp clashes among good rea-
sons."'16 Actually, there is no assumption in the Analects like the one found
in the objectivists' claim that "all truly reasonable men will always finally
agree." 17 On the contrary, it is taken for granted that reasonable men of
diverse personalities will have differing visions of the Way. As I have pointed

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47

out in my reflection on the Confucian perception of adulthood, "[s]ince the

Way is not shown as a norm that establishes a fixed pattern of behavior, a person
cannot measure the success or failure of his conduct in terms of the degree
of approximation to an external ideal."18 Consequently, "[e]ven among
Confucius' closest disciples, the paths of self-realization are varied. Between
Yen Hui's premature death and Tseng Tzu's longevity, there are numerous
manifestations of adulthood." 19
However, the multiplicity of paths in realizing the Way is not at all in conflict
with the view that the pursuit of the Way necessitates a continuous process
of symbolic exchange through the sharing of communally cherished values
with other selves. The self as a center of relationships rather than as an isolatable
individual is such a fundamental premise in the Analects that man as "an
ultimately autonomous being" is unthinkable, and the manifestation of the
authentic self is impossible "except in matrices of human converse."20
The conversations in the Analects so conceived are not merely instructive
sayings of the Master but intersubjectively validated ideas, communal values
exemplified by life experiences of the speakers in the act of li. Since the act of
li entails the participation of the others, the rhetorical situation in the Analects
is, in an existential sense, characterized not by the formula of the teacher
speaking to the student but by the ethos in which the teacher answers in response
to the student's concrete questioning. And the exchange as a whole echoes a
deep-rooted concern, a tacit communal quest, for self-realization as a collabora-
tive effort. Understandably, in the Confucian tradition, teaching (chiao) and
learning (hsiieh) for both the teacher and the student are inseparable, indeed
interchangeable.

THE SEMIOTIC STRUCTURE: JEN AS A SIGN

It is commonly accepted that etymologically jen consists of two pa

simple ideogram of a human figure, meaning the self, and the other w
horizontal strokes, suggesting human relations.21 Peter Boo
"Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," obviously fo
this interpretive tradition, proposes that jen be rendered as "co-hu
And, based upon a phonological analysis of related words in ancien
pronunciation, he further proposes that a root meaning of jen sh
softness, weakness, and, I presume by implication, pliability.22
Boodberg's claims, far from being a novel reading of the classic
substantiated by the vast lore of Chinese and Japanese scholarshi
subject. According to a recent study on the evolution of jen in pre-
times, the author summarizes her findings by identifying the original
of jen in terms of two semiotic foci: (1) as the tender aspect of human
namely, love and (2) as an altruistic concern for others, and, thus
manifestation of mananity.23 But in either case, jen functions as a
virtue, often contrasted with other equally important virtues, such

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48 Tu

priety), hsin (faithfulness), i (righteousness), chih (intelligence),

(bravery). Therefore, it is quite conceivable that a man of jen could be
brave nor intelligent, for his tenderness may become a sign of wea
his altruistic concern for others, an obstacle in achieving a realistic app
the objective conditions.
The author then concludes that the concept of jen in the Analects
have been a crystallization of these two trends in the early Spring and
period. In her words, the creative synthesis of Confucius skillfully
jen as "ai-jen" (love and care for others) andjen as "ch'eng-jen" (fully hu
adult in the ethical sense).24 Thus, in the Analects, jen is elevated to
virtue, more embracing than any of the other core Confucian virtues.
"love" remains a defining characteristic of jen, but as the scope ofjen b
qualitatively broadened, it is no longer possible to conceive of jen m
localized value. Indeed, a man of jen is necessarily brave and intelli
though it is not at all impossible that a brave man or an intelligent
short of being a jen man. In a deeper sense, through the general virtue
such values as bravery and intelligence are being transvaluated. Br
intelligence as contributing elements in the symbolic structure ofjen m
be understand as courage and wisdom.
Genetic reasons aside, this quantum leap of intellectual sophisti
perhaps the main reason jen, in the Analects, appears to be discou
complex. Methodologically, it seems that one problem is particularly
to the complexity of the semiotic structure ofjen: let us call it the pro
linkage. Before undertaking a brief analysis of this problem, however,
be noted from the outset that the lack of a definitional statement abou
is in itself in the Analects must not be construed as the Master's deliberate
heuristic device to hide an esoteric truth from his students: "My friends, I
know you think that there is something I am keeping from you. There is nothing
at all that I keep from you. There is nothing which I do that is not shown to
you, my friends" (7:23). On the contrary, Confucius seems absolutely serious
in his endeavor to transmit the true sense of jen, as he understood and experi-
enced it, to his students. After all, as numerous scholars have already stated,
it isjen rather than chih, yung, or li that really features prominently and uniquely
in the Analects.

Although Confucius "rarely spoke of profit, fate, orjen," (9: 1) his recorded
remarks onjen by far surpass his comments on any other virtues in the Analects.
Of course, each recorded articulation on the subject is but a clue to the all-
inclusive virtue, or in Waley's words, the "mystic entity." 25 Among the hundred
and five references to jen in 58 out of 499 chapters of the Analects,26 there are,
to be sure, statements that appear to be conflicting or paradoxical assertions.
A mechanistic cataloging of these statements is not likely to develop a coherent
interpretation ofjen. A more elaborate strategy is certainly required.
First, we must not pass lightly over what seem to be only cliche virtues

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49

ascribed to those who are thought to manifest jen: "courteous," "diligent,"

"faithful," "respectful," "broad," and "kind" (13:19, 14:5, 17:6). For these
traditional virtues provide the map of common sense and good reasons on
which jen is located.27 However, the tenderness of jen, to be sharply differen-
tiated from the accommodating and compromising character of the hyper-
honest villager (hsiang-yiian), is also closely linked with such virtues as "brave,"
"steadfast," and "resolute." Accordingly only those of jen know how to love
men and how to hate them (4:3), for the feelings of love and hate can be im-
partially expressed as fitting responses to concrete situations only by those
who have reached the highest level of morality.28 This is predicated on the
moral principle that those who sincerely strive to becomejen abstain from evil
will (or, if you wish, hatred); as a result, they can respond to a value-laden
and emotion-charged situation in a disinterested but compassionate manner.
The paradox, rather than obscurity, is quite understandable in terms of Con-
fucius' characterization of the hyperhonest villager as the spoiler of virtue
(17: 13). A man ofjen refuses to tolerate evil because he has no evil will toward
others; his ability to hate is thus a true indication that he has no penned up
hatred in his heart.29
The problem of linkage is particularly pronounced when jen is connected
with two other important concepts, chih and ii. Our initial puzzlement over the
precise relationship of jen to chih or li can be overcome, if jen is conceived
of as a complex of attitude and disposition in which the other two important
concepts are integral parts or contributing factors. In other words, jen is like
a source in which symbolic exchange comes into existence. By implication,
it is in jen's "field of influence,"30 so to speak, that the meanings of chih and
li are shaped. They in turn enrich jen's resourcefulness. Without stretching
the point, I would suggest that the relationship of jen to chih or to li is ana-
logous to the statement that "a man of jen certainly also possesses courage,
but a brave man is not necessarilyjen" (14: 5). To be sure, in the courts of com-
munal exchange, as exemplified in the rhetorical situation of the Analects,
the presence of jen without li and chih is illegitimate. However, the examples
of li as ritualism and chih as cleverness clearly indicate that li or chih without
jen, while deplorable, is nevertheless conceivable. Thus, a man who is not jen
can have nothing to do with li (3:3), because the true spirit of li is always
grounded injen.
Whether jen and chih are like "two wings, one supporting the other,"31
in the Confucian ethical system, the two frequently appear as a pair (4:2, 6:21,
9:28, 12:22, 15:32, 14:30). It is true that the contrast between mountain,
tranquility, and longevity symbolizing the man of jen on the one hand, and
water, movement, and happiness symbolizing the man of chih, on the other
(6:21), does give one the impression that jen and chih seem to represent two
equally significant styles of life. Confucius' preference, however, becomes
prefectly clear when he asserts that withoutjen, a man cannot for long endure

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50 Tu

either adversity or prosperity and that those who are jen rest con
those who are chih pursuejen with facility (4:2). The necessity forjen t
chih and the desirability for chih to reach jen is shown in a crucial pas
"even if a man's chili is sufficient for him to attain it, without jen to
will lose it again" (15:32).
Suggestively chih in the Analects may occasionally be put in a negati
to mean fragmented or nonessential knowledge (15:33); sometimes
of chih can convey a sense of receptivity and flexibility (9:7), and even
site, yii (stupidity or folly), may in extraordinary situations be a
a demonstration of inner strength (5:20). Jen, by contrast, is always u
as "Goodness" (Arthus Waley), "Human-heartedness" (E. R. Hughes),
"Love" (Derk Bodde), ."Benevolent Love" (H. H. Dubs), "Virtue" (H. G.
Creel), and "Humanity" (W. T. Chan). The practice of qualifying jen with
such adjectives as "false" (chia) and "womanish," (fJ-jen chih jen) which do
appear in later writings in ancient China, is completely absent in the Analects.
In the light of the preceding discussion, it seems that, while jen and chih do
appear as mutually complementary virtues in Confucian symbolism, jen is
unquestionably a more essential characterization of the Confucian Way.
Therefore, it may not be farfetched to suggest thatjen is in a subtle way linked
up with virtually all other basic Confucian concepts. Yet its relation to any of
them is neither obscure nor mystical. I believe that a systematic inquiry into
each occurrence of the linkage problem should eventually yield the fruit of
a coherent semiotic structure of jen. The matter involved is no less complex
than what the scholarly tradition of ko-i has demonstrated. But through
"matching concepts" or more dramatically, through a series of wrestlings
with the meanings of each pair of ideas in terms of comparative analysis, jen's
true face should not be concealed for long.
At the present juncture, we may tentatively conclude: Confucius refused
to grant jen to Tzu-lu despite his talents in political leadership and to Jan
Ch'iu despite his virtuosity in state rituals (5:7); he also resisted the temptation
to characterize the loyalty (chung) of Tzu-wen and the purity (ch'ing) of Ch'en
Wen Tzu as jen (5:18), not because jen implies "an inner mysterious realm"
but because jen symbolizes a holistic manifestation of humanity in its com-
monest and highest state of perfection.

THE SEMANTIC LOCUS: JEN AS A SYMBOL

When we shift our attention from the linkage problem to focus o

problem in itself, we are easily struck by the assurance that jen is imm
present if desired: "Isjen far away? As soon as I want it, there it is righ
(7:29). Also, we are told that although it is difficult to find one w
loves jen, each person has sufficient strength to pursue its cours
relying upon external help (4:6). This sense of immediacy and infall
sumes a new shape of meaning when, in Tseng Tzu's imagery, jen b

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51

heavy burden to be shouldered throughout one's entire life (8:7). Indeed, jen
can be realized only after one has done what is difficult (6:20).
The paradoxical situation in which jen presents itself both as a given reality
and as an inaccessible ideal is further complicated by a group of passages in
the Analects, orienting our thoughts to the absolute seriousness with which
jen is articulated. Thus, the chiin tzu (profound person) is instructed never to
abandonjen "even for the lapse of a single meal"; instead, "he is never so harried
but that he cleaves to this; never so tottering but that he cleaves to this" (4:5).
Jen must come before any other consideration (4:6); it is a supreme value more
precious than one's own life and therefore an idea worth dying for (15:8).
Yet the pursuit of jen is never a lonely struggle. It is not a quest for inner
truth or spiritual purity isolatable from an "outer" or public realm. From the
jen perspective, "a man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character,
also establishes the character of others, and wishing to fully manifest himself,
also helps others to fully manifest themselves. The ability to take what is near
at hand as an example may be called the method of realizing jen" (6:28). For
the task of jen, far from being an internal, subjectivistic search for one's own
individuality, depends as much on meaningful communal inquiry as on self-
scrutiny.
Tseng Tzu's daily self-examination is a case in point. The effort of personal
cultivation certainly suggests a spiritual-moral dimension not reducible to
social considerations, but the three areas of concern-loyalty to others, faith-
fulness to friends, and commitment to learning (1:4), are so much an integral
part of the "symbolic interchange" mentioned earlier that Master Tseng's
message is clearly in the realm of human relations. The self so conceived is a
kind of value-creating field in which the fiduciary community exists and is
realized by a tradition of selves in continuous interaction with selves. It is in
this connection, I believe, that Confucius insisted that true learning be specified
as learning for the sake of the self (14:25).
However, an essential characterization of jen impels us to go beyond the
behavioristic approach, no matter how comprehensive it purports to be. In
fact, the reason jen seems to be "surrounded with paradox and mystery in the
Analects" 32 is also relevant here. The four-word phrase, "ke-chifu-li," wrongly
rendered by Arthur Waley as "he who can himself submit to ritual,"33 clearly
shows that the attainment of jen involves both self-mastery and returning to
ritual. The interpretation that "the man who can submit himself to li is jen"
misses the point in a fundamental way.34 And, by implication, the portrayal
of jen as a disposition "after one has mastered the skills of action required by
li" is probably an inadequate view of the linkage problem.35 Jen is not simply
"a matter of the person's deciding to submit to li (once he has the objective
skill to do so);" 36 rather, it is a matter of inner strength and self-knowledge,
symbolizing an inexhaustible source for creative communal expression.
The primacy of jen over li and the inseparability of li from jen, a thesis I

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52 Tu

tried to develop in my study on "li as process of humanization,

substantiated by Confucius' response to Lin Fang who asked about
dation of li." After having noted the importance of the question,
recommended that "in ceremonies, be thrifty rather than extravagan
funerals, be deeply sorrowful rather than shallow in sentiment" (3:4).
the emphasis is not on role performance but on "the raw stuff of hu
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the Master was very pleased
hsia when he understood that "just as the painting comes from
groundwork, ritual comes afterwards" (3:8).
The centrality of self-mastery to the practice ofjen can be shown in
remark that "a man who is strong, resolute, simple, and slow to s
to jen" (13 :27). In fact, notwithstanding the danger of psychologizing
lects, it is vitally important to note that the text contains many idea
that the mature personal stance is determined not merely by soci
but more importantly by personal integrity, as in freeing oneself from
ness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinacy, and egoism (9:4). Accord
positional qualities resulting from spiritual-moral cultivation, suc
ality, frankness, courteousness, temperance, and deference, are th
bases upon which proper human intercourse should be condu
This particular concern for self-improvement clearly underlies
suggestion that looking out for faults is a way of recognizingjen (4: 7
to say, the vigilant way of overcoming one's moral and spiritual
is none other than constantly "looking within" (12:4).
It is in this sense, I think, that the controversial notion of yu (sorro
trouble, anxiousness) in the Analects does signify a "subjective s
provable or demonstratable by ordinary hard tests.38 In fact it is a r
of personal knowledge or inner awareness, comparable to wh
Polanyi calls a kind of indwelling.39 Surely, yu is related to "the
objective uncertainty and unsettledness with possible ominous i
but it is much more than a matter of objective comportment. The
ization that the man of jen is not yu (9:28, 14:30) suggests, at le
surface, that yu is the opposite of jen.41 However, Confucius ma
that leaving virtue without proper cultivation, ignoring the task o
inability to change according to the words of the righteous, and
rectifying faults are example of his yu (7:3).
The context in which "the man of jen is not yu" occurs should put t
in proper perspective. The two passages conveying essentially the
have a parallel syntactical structure: The wise are not perplexed
are not fearful; the jen are not yu. To be sure, the brave are not f
Confucius instructed the fearless Tzu-lu that his "associate must be able to
approach difficulties with a sense of fear and eventually manage to succeed
by strategy" (7:10). Similarly, since the person who is aware of his ignorance
really knows (2:17), the wise is he who can put aside the points of which he

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53

is in doubt (2:18). Along the same line of thinking, Confucius can speak of
himself as so joyful and eager in learning and teaching that he forgets yu and
that he is unaware of the onset of old age (7:18), precisely because he is yu with
regard to the Tao and not to his private lot (15:31).42
The absence of the language and imagery of a purely psychological nature,
or for that matter of a purely sociological nature, should not trouble us in the
least. After all, recent developments in psychology and sociology as well as
in philosophy in the West have already rendered the sharp contrast between
"individual" and "society" not only undesirable but empirically unsound.

THE INTERPRETIVE TASK

It should become obvious by now that "the deepest meaning of th

of Confucius and, paradoxically, its application to our time" is yet
cerned by a systematic and open-minded inquiry into the Analects
a corrective to nor as a confirmation of what is believed to be the newest de-
velopments in Anglo-American philosophy. Fingarette is certainly right in
concluding that "[t]he noble man who most perfectly having given up self,
ego, obstinacy and personal pride (9:4) follows not profit but the Way."43
Nevertheless, I cannot help wondering whether such a man, having come to
fruition as a person, is really a "Holy Vessel."44 I would rather contend that
it is precisely in the recognition that "the noble man is not a vessel" (2:12)
that the interpretive task of true humanity in the Analects begins.

NOTES

1. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations of Jen (Humanity)," Journ

Chinese Philosophy 2 (1975): 109.
2. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius-The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 19
p. 42.
3. Ibid., vii. Of course, Fingarette makes it clear that this initial response of his to the Analects
was short-lived.
4. The word "philological" is used here simply to designate the methods of linguistic analysis
in the Ch'ien-Chia tradition of Ch'ing scholarship. I am aware that "philology" in terms of the
principles of Bockh's Philologie, signifying "the re-cognition of that which was once cognized,"
can be philosophically meaningful. I am indebted to Masao Maruyama for this insight. See his
Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, trans. Mikiso Hane (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1974), xx.
5. Fingarette, Confucius, ix.
6. It is important to note that "historically significant" in the Levensoniar. sense is comparable
to the idea of "traditionalistic," which means that the "heritage" in question has little modern
relevance, because it is no longer a living tradition.
7. Fingarette, Confucius, vii.
8. Wayne C. Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Chicago, Illinois: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1974). I am indebted to my colleague, Leonard Nathan, for calling my
attention to this seminal work.
9. Ibid., p. 134.

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54 Tu

10. Ibid. Also, Confer Fingarette, pp. 72-73.

11. Fingarette, Confucius, p. 36.
12. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 141.
13. Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Chung-Yung (Hon
The University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 52-99.
14. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 136.
15. Based on Monroe C. Beardsley's Thinking Straight (New York, 1966), pp
quoted in Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 141.
16. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 110.
17. Ibid., p. 111.
18. Tu Wei-ming, "The Confucian Perception of Adulthood," Daedalus 105, no
1976): 110.
19. Ibid., 121.
20. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 132. Also, see Fingarette, Confucius, p. 34.
21. I am aware that this etymological reading of the sign, traceable to the Han lexicographer
Hsii Shen, may itself have been influenced by the Confucian tradition. See Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese
and Western Interpretations," 108-109.
22. Peter Boodberg, "The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," Philosophy
East and West 2, no. 4 (October, 1953): 317-332. For Chan's critical remarks on Boodberg's
phonological analysis ofjen, see Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations," 125.
23. Fang Ying-hsien, "Yiian-jen lun-tzu Shih Shu chih K'ung Tzu shih-t'ai kuan-nien chih
yen-pien," Ta-lu tsa-chih 52, no. 3 (March, 1976): 22-34.
24. Ibid., 33.
25. Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938), p. 28.
26. Based upon Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese and Western Interpretations," 107.
27. Cf. Fingarette, Confucius, p. 41.
28. Ibid., p. 40.
29. Thus, I cannot go along with Fingarette's observation that "it becomes all too evident that
the concept jen is obscure." See ibid.
30. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 126n.
31. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1973), p. 30.
32. Fingarette, Confucius, p. 37.
33. Waley, p. 162. See my critique of Waley's interpretive account, "The Creative Tension
between Jen and Li," Philosophy East and West 18, no. 2 (April, 1968): 30-31.
34. Fingarette, Confucius, p. 42.
35. Ibid., p. 51.
36. Ibid.
37. "Li as Process of Humanization," Philosophy East and West 22, no. 2 (April, 1972): 188.
38. Booth, Modern Dogma, p. 116.
39. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (New York:
Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 173, 344, 378.
40. Fingarette, Confucius, p. 46.
41. Ibid., p. 43.
42. It is in this sense that I must take issue with Figarette's interpretive position, see ibid.,
pp. 45-47.
43. Ibid., p. 79.
44. Ibid.

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