Writing Sample Barrow
Writing Sample Barrow
In contemporary world politics today, one of the central questions has been whether or not
global governance is democratically legitimate. It is clear that with the scope of geographical
locations that international organizations encompass, it is difficult for direct democratic
deliberation and decision-making to be supported. In addition, most international organizations
lack platforms or institutions through which to hold direct electoral accountability mechanisms as
national political systems do (Moravscik). Due to these aspects, “international institutions should
not be compared to ideal democratic systems (p 337)” when determining whether or not there is
a democratic deficit in global governance. In fact, the question might be whether or not it is
necessary for global governance to be held to the same standards as national democratic
systems. Such national systems derive their legitimacy and are held accountable through
democratic ideas, however international organizations can derive legitimacy and be held
accountable in other ways.
Those who claim that there is a democratic deficit in global governance tend to base this
conclusion on comparing the functioning of international organizations to normative ideals of
democracy. In other words, “each invites a comparison between international institutions and an
ideal form of perfectly participatory, egalitarian, deliberative politics (Moravscik).” The problem
with this is that such ideals are not only utopian, they are not realized anywhere today. For this
reason, it is useless to use this metric to show that an international organization is illegitimate.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, it is impossible for global governance to be democratic.
On one hand, there is no sense of a “global public” today, or “transnational community of people
who share a sense of common destiny and are in the habit of communicating with one another
about issues of public policy (Grant and Keohane)”.
There is no legal institution that defines a public with global authority, and there is also no
sociological global public, as very few people identify themselves transnationally. Without a
public, proposals for global participatory institutions are futile; who would be entitled to
participate, and on what issues? On the other hand, even if there was a global public, many
citizens do not have foreign affairs knowledge, so policy elites take action without the
accountability of a majority of citizens. Even in their own countries, it is difficult for citizens to
have any sort of control over foreign affairs issues; there is thus no grounds for thinking that
citizens in different countries engaged in international systems can ever attain any major degree
of influence over decisions. Finally, it is next to impossible to find a good system of participatory
representation when the size and population of each country involved varies so much, and
determining the general good is hard when the international population is not homogenous
(Dahl).
Once it has been determined that international organizations cannot be democratic, the
question becomes whether or not this takes away from their legitimacy. According to Dahl, even
though international organizations are not democratic, this does not mean they are undesirable.
There are still ways to measure the legitimacy of international organizations, despite their
possible costs to democracy. In order to determine the legitimacy of international organizations
in a democratic era, “mechanisms for appropriate accountability need to be institutionalized”; at
a minimum, “institutions of governance should
limit and constrain the potential for abuse of power (Grant and Keohane).” Those who claim
there is a democratic deficit in global governance often cite lack of accountability as one major
issue amongst international organizations. The reality is, however, that there are in fact
accountability mechanisms in place, they are simply not limited to those emphasized in
participatory models of democracy.
Power wielders in the international arena are held accountable to standards of legitimacy
deriving from informal norms, including human rights norms, codes of conduct articulated in
transnational civil society, and international law (Grant and Keohane). There are two forms of
accountability according to Grant and Keohane: delegation (giving power to someone) and
participation. Hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, and legal mechanisms of accountability rely on
delegation; for example, in the hierarchical mechanism, leaders of organizations hold
subordinate officials accountable. Market, peer, and reputational mechanisms involve
participatory accountability. For example, people will not buy goods from companies with bad
reputations. By looking at accountability mechanisms beyond “democratic accountability,” we
can see that multilateral organizations are in fact accountable, “more accountable in many
respects than powerful states (Grant and Keohane).”
In conclusion, the question whether or not there is a democratic deficit in global governance is
irrelevant, as it is impossible to use classic participatory democracy as a point of comparison
with global governance. The former requires a clear cut public, as well as a forum for
participation, both which the later cannot ever establish. Despite this, however, international
organizations can maintain legitimacy by controlling abuses of power through the application of
various kinds of accountability systems, “based on an appreciation of the competing and
complementary possibilities within democratic theory (Grant and Keohane).”