BRIEFING

The Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The EU's partner in Asia?
SUMMARY
Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often compared with the
EU. Both organisations brought together former adversaries and successfully resolved tensions
through cooperation, helping to bring peace and prosperity to their regions.
However, the EU and ASEAN operate in very different ways. ASEAN is a strictly intergovernmental
organisation in which decisions are based on consensus. While this approach has made it difficult
for south-east Asian countries to achieve the same level of integration as the EU, it has also enabled
ASEAN to accommodate huge disparities among its 10 member states.
In 2003, south-east Asian leaders decided to take cooperation to another level by setting up an
ASEAN Community. To this end, they adopted a charter in 2007, though without fundamentally
changing the nature of the organisation's decision-making or giving it stronger institutions. The
community has three pillars: political-security, economic, and socio-cultural.
ASEAN's impact has been uneven. Barring the contentious South China Sea issue, ASEAN has
become an effective platform for cooperation between its member states and the wider Asia-Pacific
region, and promoted economic integration, even if the goal of an EU-style single market is a long
way off. On the other hand, ASEAN is still perceived as an elite project that has little impact on the
daily lives of south-east Asians.
EU-ASEAN relations span four decades and have steadily deepened, building on common values as
well as booming trade and investment. Both sides have expressed their ambition to upgrade to a
strategic partnership.

In this Briefing
Background
ASEAN institutions
Towards an ASEAN community?
EU-ASEAN relations

The ASEAN flag features 10 rice stalks, one for each member state.

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Martin Russell
Members' Research Service
PE 659.338 – November 2020 EN
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Background
ASEAN member states (population and GDP data source: World Bank)
Country Year of joining ASEAN Population (millions) Per capita GDP (US$)
1984 0.5 31 000
Brunei
1999 16.5 1 600
Cambodia
1967 270.6 4 100
Indonesia
1997 7.2 2 500
Laos
1997 31.9 11 400
Malaysia
1997 54.0 1 400
Myanmar
1967 108.1 3 500
Philippines
1967 5.7 65 200
Singapore
1967 69.6 7 800
Thailand
1995 96.4 2 700
Vietnam

In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, south-east Asia was an unstable region. Most countries
had only recently achieved independence from colonial rule and were still struggling to find their
place in the world. A bloody war was ongoing in
Vietnam, and there was a real fear of communist ASEAN countries and their neighbours
insurgencies spreading to other countries in the
region (in 1965, Indonesia massacred up to one
million suspected communists). A territorial
dispute in Borneo between Indonesia and
Malaysia led to the Konfrontasi, an undeclared
war that dragged on from 1963 to 1966.
In this tense context, in 1967 five south-east Asian
countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore) decided to put aside
their differences. In the Bangkok Declaration, they
established ASEAN and pledged to build peace
and prosperity together.

ASEAN institutions Source: EPRS.

Just two pages long, the Bangkok Declaration sets
vague and general goals of cooperation in fields such as trade, education, agriculture and industry.
The only mechanisms envisaged to achieve cooperation are regular, mostly unspecified meetings
of government ministers, officials and experts. The 2007 ASEAN Charter put cooperation on a
somewhat more formal basis, with more detailed goals and mechanisms.
Although they are partially modelled on the EU, all of the institutions outlined in the charter are
intergovernmental, and all decisions are taken by consensus:
Resembling the European Council, the ASEAN Summit comprises the heads of state or government.
It meets at least twice a year, and is the organisation's supreme policy-making body.
More detailed oversight of ASEAN activities is exercised by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, which
comprises ASEAN foreign ministers and also meets at least twice a year. There are also various
sectoral ministerial-level bodies such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, the ASEAN Economic

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Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN Transport Ministers

Meeting. Furthermore, ASEAN has three ASEAN enlargement
ministerial/senior official-level Community Councils, According to the ASEAN Charter, membership is
coordinating activities in each of the pillars of the open to all south-east Asian states that agree to
ASEAN Community (see below): political-security, abide by the charter and are accepted by all other
economic and socio-cultural. member states. The most recent country to join
was Cambodia, in 1999. The one remaining south-
Rotating presidency: Each member state chairs the east Asian non-member is Timor Leste, which
above decision-making bodies in turn for one year, in applied to join in 2011. Geographically,
alphabetical order (in 2020, Vietnam, to be followed by historically and culturally, the country is part of
Brunei in 2021). As with the EU Council presidency, the region, and it already participates in many
acting as ASEAN chair gives member states an ASEAN activities. However, several ASEAN
opportunity to set the agenda. For example, an countries have expressed doubts about
unusually strong statement on the South China Sea impoverished Timor Leste's capacity to assimilate
after the June 2020 ASEAN summit probably reflects with the bloc and for the time being, its
application process remains in limbo.
Vietnamese concerns about maritime disputes with
China.
The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly – is a platform where south-east Asian
parliamentarians meet and exchange information. However, its status cannot be compared with
that of the European Parliament: it is not directly elected, has no legislative powers or other decision-
making powers, and is ranked by the charter merely as an 'entity associated with ASEAN', rather than
a fully fledged institution.
Administrative support for over 1 000 meetings a year is provided by the ASEAN Secretariat, based
in Jakarta and headed by a secretary-general (currently, Lim Jock Hoi from Brunei). In 2016, the
secretariat had a budget of just US$20 million and 300 staff. Given its small size and limited capacity,
some of the organisational work is done by member state governments, each of which has set up
its own national secretariat for dealing with ASEAN matters. ASEAN's working language is English.

Towards an ASEAN community?

Obstacles to ASEAN integration
At their October 2003 summit, ASEAN leaders decided to take their previously loose cooperation to
another level, and to create an ASEAN Community by 2020 (in 2007, the deadline was brought
forward to 2015). In line with this goal, ASEAN adopted a charter in 2007, together with its motto of
'One Vision, One Identity, One Community'. In 2009, the organisation followed up with a roadmap
comprising blueprints for specific measures in each of the community's three pillars. With progress
towards building the community still ongoing, the roadmap was updated in 2015 and now covers
the period up to 2025.
In practice, however, there is much less integration among ASEAN countries than within the EU.
There are several obstacles to a closely-knit ASEAN community. Above all, south-east Asia is a much
more disparate region than Europe. Singapore's per capita GDP is 50 times higher than that of
Myanmar and Cambodia, whereas the equivalent gap between the EU's wealthiest and poorest
countries is much smaller (about 10 times). Political systems range from absolute monarchy (Brunei)
to multiparty democracy (Indonesia). The Philippines has a mutual defence treaty with the US,
whereas Cambodia and Laos are more closely aligned with China. Such differences make it difficult
for ASEAN countries to find common ground on many issues.
Although the 2007 ASEAN Charter sets ambitious goals, it does not provide the means of achieving
them. The organisation has neither legal powers nor a significant budget. In contrast to the
European Commission, the ASEAN Secretariat is not a supranational institution that represents the
interests of the community vis-à-vis the member states; it merely provides administrative support

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for intergovernmental cooperation. Unlike the EU, ASEAN does not adopt laws that are binding on
its member states; the latter implement and enforce joint decisions – or not – as they see fit.
In view of these constraints, ASEAN has made
uneven progress. The following sections summarise The ASEAN Way
the organisation's impact under each of the three ASEAN's insistence on non-interference and
main headings defined in the ASEAN roadmaps. consensus-based decision-making has become
known as the 'ASEAN Way', also the title of the
Political–security pillar organisation's official anthem. On the one hand,
this approach makes it difficult for ASEAN to
Preserving peace and stability progress beyond rhetoric on contentious issues. On
the other, it enables the region's highly diverse
ASEAN resembles the EU in that from the very start,
countries to find at least some common ground.
one of its main achievements has been to promote
peaceful cooperation, thus bringing stability to a
formerly turbulent region. The significance of this should not be under-estimated: just two years
before signing the Bangkok Declaration, Indonesia and Malaysia were still waging an undeclared
war in Borneo. Though not all territorial and maritime disputes between south-east Asian states
have been resolved, ASEAN has helped to defuse tensions. For example, under Indonesian
leadership, ASEAN played a key role in mediating between Thailand and Cambodia after a 2008
border skirmish. Malaysia has overlapping claims with Singapore and the Philippines, but these have
not caused more than occasional spats.
ASEAN countries' commitment to peace is expressed in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
in Southeast Asia, in which they renounce the use of force in their dealings with one another. Since
1987, the treaty has also been open to non-member states, and its signatories include China, the US
and the EU. In 1995, ASEAN countries declared the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
ASEAN is not a military alliance, and most south-east Asian security cooperation is sub-regional (an
example being the joint Malaysian-Singaporean-Thai patrols to combat piracy in the Malacca Straits)
or with external partners such as the US, rather than on a regional basis. However, annual ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meetings (ADMM) promote regional dialogue. South-east Asian defence
ministers also engage with counterparts from eight 'dialogue partners' (Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the US) in the enlarged ADMM+ format. The latter is a
useful channel of communication between participating countries, and has achieved practical
results, for example, by facilitating the exchange of information on terrorism.

ASEAN as an international player beyond south-east Asia

ADMM+ is one of several formats set up by ASEAN to engage with partner countries from across the
world. Other formats include ASEAN Plus Three (with China, Japan and South Korea, since 1997) and
the annual 18-member East Asia Summit (since 2005). The importance of the latter as a forum for
strategic dialogue on the Indo-Pacific region is reflected in the eagerness of partners from outside
the immediate south-east Asian neighbourhood – Russia, the US and the EU – to join. The ASEAN
Regional Forum, which mostly meets at foreign minister level, is even larger (27 countries), although
with so many members it risks becoming a mere talking shop.
Thanks to such formats, ASEAN plays a central role in many aspects of the south-east Asian countries'
relations with the rest of the world – a notion referred to as ASEAN centrality. Given ASEAN's non-
aligned status, these platforms are also a useful channel for communication between non-ASEAN
states, which would be less comfortable with dialogue led by more powerful, but also more
contentious players, such as the US or China. For example, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
('Quad') between the United States, Japan, India and Australia was launched at a meeting held on
the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2007; after several years of inactivity, it was revived at
a second meeting ahead of the 2017 East Asia Summit in Manila.

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ASEAN and the divisive South China Sea issue

However, ASEAN has not been equally successful in forging a common position on all issues.
Beijing's expansive claims in the strategically important South China Sea, overlapping with those
of five south-east Asian countries (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia) are
particularly divisive. China has built military infrastructure on disputed islands, harassed south-east
Asian trawlers, and disrupted offshore oil and gas prospecting.
As each ASEAN country struggles to hold onto sovereignty without upsetting their powerful
neighbour, they have adopted widely divergent positions. While Vietnam and the Philippines (at
least, until 2016) are more assertive, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia downplay their differences with
Beijing, and Cambodia and Laos block any direct criticism of China at ASEAN level. In 2012,
disagreements on this issue blocked the ASEAN summit from issuing a joint statement. By contrast,
the declaration adopted at the June 2020 summit expressed concerns about tensions in the South
China Sea, but still did not name China.
In an effort to defuse tensions, in 2002, China and the ASEAN countries declared their intention to
negotiate a code of conduct for the South China Sea. In 2018, they announced a 'Single Draft'
negotiating text. However, final agreement is still a long way off, as crucial questions such as the
geographical scope of the code of conduct, its binding or non-binding nature, and the applicability
of international law (e.g. the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) have yet to be settled.

Economic pillar of the ASEAN Community

South-east Asia has huge economic potential. The ASEAN countries have a combined GDP of
US$3 trillion, making them the world's 5th biggest economy in 2019 if considered as a single entity,
growing at an annual average rate of close to 5 %. To fully unlock this potential, ASEAN's 2009
roadmap set the goal of creating an ASEAN economic community (AEC). Like the EU's single market,
this is to be based on free – or at least freer – movement of goods, services, capital and persons.
Although the 2015 deadline has long passed, the AEC remains a work in progress.
Some of the biggest progress has been on tariffs. Already in 1992, the ASEAN free trade area
eliminated or reduced most tariffs between ASEAN countries. Many of the remaining tariffs were
phased out under the AEC, and by 2017, 70 % of intra-ASEAN trade was duty free. ASEAN has also
liberalised trade with the wider Asia-Pacific region, having concluded free trade agreements with
China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. It has almost completed negotiations
to create a regional comprehensive economic partnership, set to become the world's largest free
trade area that will include five of these countries (India decided not to participate for now).
By contrast, although ASEAN countries are aligning technical standards and customs procedures,
the number of non-tariff trade barriers remains stubbornly high, and may even be rising.
Free movement of people is not a realistic prospect for south-east Asia, given the huge income
disparities in the region. Even with strict migration controls, richer countries such as Singapore and
Malaysia already have huge numbers of migrants from their poorer neighbours. Only limited steps
have been taken to facilitate skilled labour migration, for example, through mutual recognition of
professional qualifications. Even with these arrangements, it is still very difficult for south-east Asian
doctors (for example) to get their qualifications recognised in other ASEAN countries.
South-east Asian countries also lack transport and other connecting infrastructure, a gap that
China is eagerly filling by investing heavily in this sector through its Belt and Road Initiative.
Furthermore, ASEAN's own Infrastructure Fund has approved US$500 million in loans since 2011,
but this is not nearly enough to finance the estimated US$100 billion a year the region needs to
achieve seamless connectivity.
ASEAN countries trade much less with one another than with the rest of the world. In 2018, intra-
ASEAN trade represented just 23 % of the region's total international trade – a slightly larger share

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than in 1993 (19 %), but still very low compared to the EU, where around two-thirds of trade is within
the bloc. To some extent, this reflects the types of goods exported by ASEAN countries. For example,
Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam are all major textiles exporters; their main export markets are in
Europe and North America rather than other south-east Asian countries. However, this low level of
trade also highlights the lack of real economic integration. A 2019 survey of European companies
operating in the region points to a similar conclusion: just 4 % felt that ASEAN had achieved its goal
of a single market and production base, while only 3 % were satisfied with the pace of integration.

Socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community

Adding a human dimension to ASEAN?
The third pillar of the ASEAN Community covers policy areas such as environmental protection,
education, culture and human rights, to complement the emphasis on security and the economy in
the first two pillars. However, ASEAN's achievements in these areas are unimpressive, with a lack of
specific targets, binding measures and funding. One of ASEAN's few environmental instruments
is the 2002 Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, aimed at curbing the recurrent problem
of smoke from Indonesian forest fires, which cause economic disruption and premature deaths in
Indonesia and neighbouring countries. The agreement has not led to more than a few isolated
actions, nor has it brought measurable improvements; 2015 was one of the worst years ever. On
climate change too, the region's response is almost entirely driven by national efforts.
Set up in 1997, the ASEAN Foundation promotes
people-to-people contacts in the fields of ASEAN response to coronavirus
education, culture and media. However, it cannot
South-east Asian countries coordinate with each
be compared with EU programmes such as
other and partners (e.g. China and Korea), on shared
Erasmus+; whereas over 850 000 participated in challenges, such as keeping vital supply chains open,
EU educational exchanges in 2018 alone, ASEAN through ASEAN ministerial meetings and summits.
Foundation projects between 2014 and 2019 In April 2020, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to set
reached just 18 000 young people. up a Covid-19 ASEAN Response Fund. However, as of
September 2020 contributions to the latter had
Human rights are an area of particular weakness
reached only US$2.3 million, not enough to have
for ASEAN – unsurprisingly, given that Laos, more than a marginal impact. South-east Asia’s
Vietnam, Cambodia, Brunei and Myanmar are response to the disease has mostly been shaped by
among the world's more repressive countries, decisions taken at national level, with individual
according to Freedom House's 2019 ranking. In countries adopting widely differing approaches.
line with ASEAN's principle of non-interference in
internal affairs, south-east Asian countries avoid
public criticisms even of gross human rights abuses (one of the very rare exceptions to this rule
occurred in 2017, when then Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, denounced Myanmar's
treatment of the Rohingya minority).
ASEAN's 2012 Human Rights Declaration relativises human rights by setting them against the
individual's 'performance of corresponding duties' and making them conditional on 'the national
context'. The declaration was drafted by ASEAN's Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights,
a weak institution that has no mandate to investigate individual human rights cases. Comprising 10
members nominated by member state governments and acting by consensus, the commission even
failed to speak out on the alleged genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya. The resolutions of ASEAN's
Interparliamentary Assembly also avoid contentious human rights issues.

Southeast Asian public perceptions of ASEAN

ASEAN has a flag, an anthem, and it observes 8 August as ASEAN Day. Such symbols have helped to
create a common identity; in a 2018 survey, over 90 % of south-east Asian respondents perceived
themselves at least partially as ASEAN citizens. Overwhelmingly, they are aware of ASEAN, and are
positive about its achievements and prospects. However, despite such positive feelings, public

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understanding of the organisation rarely goes beyond general awareness of its existence. The same
survey shows that barely one-fifth have heard of the ASEAN Community and its three pillars. These
results can be explained by the fact that only a few of ASEAN's achievements (one of them being
visa-free travel for visits of up to two weeks between south-east Asian countries) have made a
tangible and immediately understandable difference to ordinary people's daily lives.

EU-ASEAN relations
Fundamental differences and similarities
ASEAN and the EU are very different organisations. ASEAN's insistence on intergovernmental,
consensus-based decision-making and non-interference contrasts with the EU countries' transfer of
sovereignty to supranational institutions. South-east Asian countries cooperate through ASEAN but
have not achieved deep integration. Whereas human rights and democracy are part of the EU's DNA,
they are an area of weakness for ASEAN.
In spite of these differences, there are also many obvious parallels. In an increasingly geopolitical
world, both the EU and ASEAN are committed to peace, stability and the multilateral rules-based
order. Both have successfully resolved regional tensions through cooperation in a wide range of
fields. On the international stage, ASEAN and EU countries have a stronger voice collectively than
they would on their own.
Building on these similarities, the EU- ASEAN relations have deepened over time. Informal contacts
began in 1972, leading to the launch of formal relations in 1977 and a cooperation agreement in
1980. Since 2015, the EU has had a dedicated mission and ambassador to ASEAN, based in Jakarta.

Areas of cooperation
Relations are largely dominated by economic aspects. Taken as a whole, ASEAN is the EU's third-
largest non-European trade partner after the US and China, while the EU is ASEAN's second largest
trade partner after China. The volume of trade has almost tripled over the past two decades,
reaching close to US$300 billion in 2019. Fast-growing ASEAN markets, located at the heart of the
dynamic Asia-Pacific region, are highly attractive for European investors. The EU is already south-
east Asia's largest foreign investor, and this trend is likely to continue, with businesses relocating
from China due to a trade war between Washington and Beijing.
In 2007, the EU and ASEAN launched talks on a free trade agreement but failed to make much
headway. The EU has therefore opted for a bilateral approach, though a region-to-region deal is still
the long-term goal. So far, the EU has trade and investment agreements with two countries
(Singapore and Vietnam), and is negotiating with Indonesia (talks with Thailand, Malaysia and the
Philippines are currently on hold).
The EU's 2018 Connecting Europe and Asia strategy sees connectivity as an area of cooperation
with ASEAN. As a practical result of such cooperation, the EU hopes to conclude a comprehensive
air transport agreement with ASEAN, its first ever region-to-region aviation agreement. This will
give EU airlines access to south-east Asian markets and vice-versa, as well as aligning safety and
other standards. Reportedly, negotiations are close to completion.
The two sides cooperate on many other issues of common interest. In 2019, EU officials met
members of ASEAN human rights bodies for their third human rights policy dialogue. In March 2020,
there was an EU-ASEAN ministerial-level video-conference on the coronavirus pandemic.
In addition to bilateral development aid for south-east Asian countries (€3 billion in the 2014-2020
period and an additional €800 million of special 'Team Europe' funding to help them deal with the
consequences of the coronavirus pandemic), the EU also provides regional aid for ASEAN
integration (nearly €200 million for 2014-2020, up from €70 million for 2007-2013). The latter
includes the ARISE Plus programme, which supports south-east Asian economic integration and

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connectivity. Drawing on the success of Erasmus+, the €10 million SHARE programme promotes
increased cooperation and student mobility between the region's universities. The EU has projects
in support of sustainable forestry and urbanisation, and an EU-ASEAN dialogue instrument (E-READI)
to finance interregional dialogue. In addition, the EU supports the ASEAN Secretariat through
training and technical assistance for ASEAN officials working on issues such as economic integration.

Towards a strategic partnership?

The European Commission's 2015 communication on 'The EU and ASEAN: A partnership with a
strategic purpose' expresses the ambition of moving from an enhanced partnership with ASEAN to
a strategic one. Exactly what this would mean is not defined – arguably, the two organisations are
already strategic partners in all but name – but one of the objectives set out in the communication
is to build a more rounded relationship that includes security as well as economic cooperation. At
the 22nd EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting in January 2019, EU and ASEAN foreign ministers agreed in
principle to work towards the goal of a strategic partnership.
For the EU, ASEAN is a force for stability in the Asia-Pacific region and a potentially important security
partner. The EU has been a party to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation since 2012, and
participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum. However, it has not yet been invited to join the ASEAN-
led East Asia Summit, widely seen as a more important platform for security dialogue. Of ASEAN's
10 official dialogue partners, it is the only one to be excluded from the East Asia Summit – a
symbolically important barrier to the two sides declaring themselves strategic partners.
Several factors explain this reserve on the part of ASEAN. In contrast to ASEAN non-interference, the
EU is openly critical of serious human rights abuses in several ASEAN member states. Moreover, palm
oil is a major bone of contention for the EU, especially with Indonesia and Malaysia; indeed, in 2019
Malaysia identified it as the reason why the EU and ASEAN did not yet have a strategic partnership.
The European Parliament (EP) and ASEAN: The Parliament's October 2017 resolution on EU political
relations with ASEAN supports efforts to achieve south-east Asian regional integration and recommends
that relations be upgraded to a strategic partnership. The Parliament has observer status at the annual
meetings of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, where it is represented by its Delegation for
relations with the countries of south-east Asia and ASEAN (DASE). It also plans to open a liaison office in
Jakarta to manage EP-ASEAN relations. In September 2020, DASE chair, Daniel Caspary (EPP, Germany),
proposed to upgrade parliamentary relations with ASEAN parliaments, by holding annual interregional
meetings on specific policy issues of joint concern.

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