Volume 6 Number 6 December 2023 (751-757)

DOI: 10.1016/j.gloei.2023.12.008

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Attack-resilient control for converter-based DC microgrids

Sen Tan1, Juan C. Vasquez1, Josep M. Guerrero1
1. Aalborg University, Fredrik Bajers Vej 7K, Aalborg, 9220, Denmark

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Abstract: In light of the growing integration of renewable energy sources in power systems, the adoption of DC microgrids
has become increasingly popular, due to its simple structure, having no frequency, power factor concerns. However,
the dependence of DC microgrids on cyber-networks also makes them susceptible to cyber-attacks. Potential cyber-
attacks can disrupt power system facilities and result in significant economic and loss of life. To address this concern,
this paper presents an attack-resilient control strategy for microgrids to ensure voltage regulation and power sharing with
stable operation under cyber-attack on the actuators. This paper first formulates the cyber-security problem considering
a distributed generation based microgrid using the converter model, after which an attack-resilient control is proposed to
eliminate the actuator attack impact on the system. Steady state analysis and root locus validation illustrate the feasibility of
the proposed method. The effectiveness of the proposed control scheme is demonstrated through simulation results.

Keywords: Cyber-attacks; DC microgrids; Resilient control

0 Introduction increased connectivity and communication among

distributed generation units, controllers, and sensors present
It becomes increasingly prominent to use DC microgrids a challenge in terms of cyber-security. The interconnections
(MGs) in the power system landscape, driven by the within the microgrid system make it susceptible to malicious
widespread adoption of renewable energy sources (RESs), cyber-attacks on communication links. This vulnerability
energy storage systems (ESSs), and DC loads [1]. Their to cyber-threats highlights the need for robust cybersecurity
significance is further amplified by advancements in measures to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and
information technology and control methods. DC microgrids availability of the microgrid system and its components [3].
offer inherent advantages such as scalability, reliability, and The control strategies implemented in microgrids
resiliency, making them a crucial component of modern heavily rely on accurate measurements obtained from
power systems [2]. sensors to effectively regulate voltage, control frequency,
As microgrid systems become more prevalent, the optimize power sharing, and manage economic dispatch [4].
However, the integrity and reliability of these measurements
can be compromised by malicious cyber-attacks. The
Received: 7 June 2023/Received: 19 September 2023/Accepted: 20
controller’s capacity to guarantee the performance of the DC
October 2023/Published: 25 December 2023 microgrid is compromised when the integrity of the sampled
Sen Tan Josep M. Guerrero
data is tampered with [5]. As a result, the overall operational
[email protected] [email protected] efficiency and reliability of the system are significantly
Juan C. Vasquez impacted [6]. Furthermore, a cyber-attack could potentially
[email protected] compromise the integrity of the microgrid system, enabling

2096-5117/© 2023 Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications
Co., Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http: //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ).

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Global Energy Interconnection Vol. 6 No. 6 Dec. 2023

unauthorized access to manipulate controller commands. attacks into the system is to remove the connections to
This can lead to system malfunctions, physical damage, the corrupted units once an attack is detected [15-17].
and result in significant economic and social losses [7]. However, by disconnecting the affected units, the consensus
Therefore, it is imperative to establish robust cybersecurity control mechanism may be disrupted, which can result in a
measures to protect microgrid systems from such cyber degradation of power sharing among the remaining units.
threats and ensure their reliable and secure operation [8]. To address the disruption caused by isolating compromised
units, various attack mitigation methods have been
1 State of the art developed, focusing on secure state estimation and attack
estimation approaches using Kalman filter [18] or observer
To address the cyber-security challenges in DC [19]. These methods aim to reconstruct reliable signals
microgrids, the development of attack detection and to replace the untrustworthy ones transmitted through
resilience enhancement techniques has emerged as a key compromised communication links.
solution. These techniques aim to detect and mitigate
1.1 Objectives and contributions
cyber-attacks to ensure the reliable and secure operation of
microgrids. Attack detection strategies can be categorized as Based on the above discussions, it can be summarized
cyber-layer detection and physical layer detection [9]. that the current prevalent methods to cope with cyber-
A common approach in the cyber layer is the use of attacks are either by removing the attacked units or by state
data authentication or key-management techniques that reconstruction to correct the tampered data. Moreover, it is
rely on external information to characterize secure signals also a significant approach to address cyber-attacks from a
and identify potential malicious attacks [10]. Various controller design perspective, which allows the development
protocols or low-cost hardware can be employed to of a self-healing elimination strategy to maximize the
analyze the data and determine whether they exhibit the resilience of the system without losing the physical
expected characteristics of secure signals. Any data that connection among DC microgrids.
do not satisfy the relevant characteristics are considered To ensure the continuous operation of microgrids in the
suspicious and indicative of a possible attack. However, presence of cyberattacks, the adoption of resilient control
this approach has some limitations. The use of third-party strategies has become increasingly important. Resilient
detection methods introduces additional computational control involves the use of adaptive controllers that are
processing that can increase the complexity and overhead specifically designed to achieve various control objectives,
of the system. Furthermore, it may introduce latency during such as consensus among distributed components and
data communication, potentially affecting the real-time system stability [20, 21]. These adaptive controllers have
responsiveness of the MG system. These factors need to the unique ability to dynamically adjust their parameters
be carefully considered and balanced when implementing and behaviors in response to evolving cyber threats. For
attack detection strategies in the cyber-layer of DC example, in [22], a novel approach is introduced, utilizing
microgrids [11]. an adaptive controller and a distributed observer to maintain
Cyber-attack detection in the physical layer of DC the tracking error within a boundary. Furthermore, ref
microgrids can be categorized into three primary methods: [23] presents a strategy for distributed resilient control
data-based detection, feature-based detection and model- that involves the integration of a virtual microgrid model,
based detection [12-14]. Despite notable advancements in enhancing the robust frequency synchronization within the
cyber-attack detection within DC microgrids, it remains microgrid.
true that existing methods do not offer comprehensive Therefore, this paper introduces a new resilient control
countermeasures capable of effectively suppressing or approach aimed at ensuring dependable control of DC
eliminating the impact of such attacks. Detection alone microgrids in the face of actuator attacks.
is not sufficient to ensure the security and resilience of
microgrid systems in the face of sophisticated cyber threats.
1.2 Paper organization
Therefore, the development of effective countermeasures The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2,
is crucial to mitigate the potential consequences of cyber- the electrical model of a DC microgrid are described. In
attacks. section 3, the proposed resilient control is constructed for
Three commonly employed methods are widely utilized DC microgrids, followed by the illustration of steady-state
to mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks on microgrid analysis. The simulation results are provided in Section 4,
systems. First, a simple way to prevent the spread of cyber- and the conclusions are presented in the final section.

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 Sen Tan et al. Attack-resilient control for converter-based DC microgrids

2 DC Microgrid 2.2 Resilient control problem

2.1 Microgrid modelling The attack on the microgrid will have a pronounced
The microgrid considered in this paper is composed impact on the voltage and current tracking dynamics.
of multiple distributed generation units (DGU). Fig. 1 According to [24], the consensus tracking errors with
illustrates the connection of each generation unit at the point attacks on microgrid can be described as:
of common coupling (PCC). A constant impedance load and e(t ) = ( L + G )e(t ) + F (t ) (2)
constant current load is considered at each PCC bus. where e(t) is the state errors, L is Laplacian matrix; G
denotes the secondary controller parameters; F(t) is the
v
Ii
PCC
Iij impact of attacks. It can be seen that the consensus can no
v
longer be achieved in the existence of attacks.
riv Li rijl Llij
Vi
RES
uiv Ci r id I id
3 Attack Resilient Control for DC Microgrid

To eliminate the impact of cyber-attacks on the

performances of system, the attack resilient control is
ref
Vi ,
formulated in this section.
Controller
Vj
Attack
(3)
Vi , I vi
3.1 Resilient control
(a) Electrical scheme of a single DGU The resilient control protocols are proposed to enable
voltage regulation and power sharing in the presence of
PCC
actuator attacks shown as:

∑ (V
DC
uiv = m1,iVi + m2,i j − Vi )
DGU i j∈ i
DC
∫
+ m3,i (Vi ref − Vi ) + m4,i ∑ (V
j∈ i
j − Vi ) (3)
DGU k
DC where m1,i , , m4,i denote the controller coefficients; uiv is
the controller output that represents the voltage reference
DGU j
DC command; Vi ref are the voltage and current reference. Fig. 2
depicts the structure of the proposed control scheme.
DGU l
The dynamics of a cyber-physical DC microgrid under
(b) Connections of the DGU
actuator attack can be described by combining the model (1)
Fig. 1 Electrical scheme of an MG and the proposed controller (2) as:
 .
d −1
[C ] V = I − [r ] V − I − β I l
The model of converter i can be represented in Eq. (1): v d

  Vi  v v
[ L ]I = ([m1 ] − I n )V − [r ]I + z − [m2 ]V + F
v v v v
CiVi = I i + − d − I i − ∑ βij I ij
v d (4)
 ri 
 v v  z v = [m3 ]V ref − [m3 ]V − [m4 ]V
 Li I i = ui − Vi − ri I i
v v v (1) 
 Ll I = −r l I + β (V − V )
 ij ij ij ij ij i j Vi
kl,i

where Vi is the i-th PCC bus voltage. For the grid forming Viref
Viref – Vi k4,i
converter, I iv and uiv are the filter current and control input; + +
Vj ziv uiv
+
riv and Lvi represent the resistance and inductance of the Vj – Vi  k5,i
 +
converter. Ci denotes PCC bus capacitor. Moreover, I ij is the + +
k3,i
line current flowing between converter i and j; rijl and Llij are liv
k2,i
the line resistance and inductance. β is the incidence matrix
Fig. 2 Structure of proposed resilient controller
of DC MG graph, whose elements βij shows the direction of
the line current I ij. βij = 1 or βij = −1 when the line current
flows from or into MG i; otherwise, βij = 0. where V = [V1 , V2 , , Vn ]T and I v = [ I1v , I 2v , , I nv ]T are the

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Global Energy Interconnection Vol. 6 No. 6 Dec. 2023

PCC bus voltage and filter current of the DC, respectively, 1500

d l v
I is the current load, I is the line current, F is the actuator 1000
attack vector, and z v is the controller state.
500

Imaginary Axis
3.2 Steady-state analysis
0

Given the MG (1), the equilibrium point x in (4) 500

without actuator attacks can be described as by making state
variables equal to zero: 1000
T
x =  V ,[I ]T ,[z ]T ,[I ]T 
T v v l
(5) 1500
  400 300 200 100 0
where Real Axis

V = (I n + [m3 ]−1[m4 ])V ref (6a) (a) Pole locus with C ranging from 1 to 3 mF

v
I = [r d ]−1 V + β [r l ]−1 β T V + I d (6b) 1500

l ref
I = [r l ]−1 β T V (6c) 1000

v v
z = −([m1 ] − I n )V + [r v ]I + [k 4]V (6d) 500

Imaginary Axis
The error system dynamic of DC MG can therefore be 0

obtained by combining (4), (5) and (6) as: 500

x (t ) = Ax (t ) + Bf (t ) (7) 1000

where f (t ) = F are the actuator attacks, x (t ) = x(t ) − x is the
v

error vector. The matrices A, B are given in the Appendix. 1500

500 400 300 200 100 0
The solution to error can be obtained as: Real Axis
t
∫e
A (t −τ )
x (t ) = e At x (0) + Bf (t )dτ (8) (b) Pole locus with Lv ranging from 1 to 3 mH
0
Furthermore, the steady state of the error system can be Fig. 3 Pole locus of the system
derived as follows:
t Table 1 DC MG parameters
∫e
A (t −τ )
lim x (t ) = Bf (t )dτ
t →∞ 0 Modules Parameters Values
(9)
t
≤∫ e A (t −τ )
BΓdτ = − A −1BΓ Sampling frequency 10 kHz
0 DC MG
Control frequency 10 kHz
where Γ is the boundary of the actuator attacks.
Next, by combining with matrix (14), we obtain Bus capacitance 2.2 mF
LC filter
T
0 0 I 0  Inductance 1.8 mH
A −1B =   (10)
0 0 0 0 
where I is unit matrix. The stability analysis of the system with varying
From (8) and (9), it is evident that the steady-state errors system parameters while keeping the controller coefficients
of the voltage and current state variables of the system are constant reveals that the system remains stable. This
maintained at zero. This implies that the system can achieve observation highlights the robustness of the controller in the
voltage and current tracking performance at steady state face of modeling uncertainties.
regardless of the presence of actuator attacks.

3.3 Robustness against modeling errors

4 Performance Validation

To assess the controller’s robustness in the face of Simulation tests were conducted to demonstrate the
parameter uncertainty, the pole locations of the system are theoretical analysis and evaluate the performance of the
analyzed with variations in the capacitance, resistance, and proposed controller. The test model consists of four grid
inductance parameters of the converters. The controller forming converters and four grid feeding converters with
parameters remain unchanged throughout the analysis. The a meshed electrical topology, as depicted in Fig. 4. The
results, depicted in Fig. 3, provide insights into the stability power ratio for the four grid feeding converters rated
and performance of the system under parameter variations. capacity is I1r : I 2r : I 3r : I 4r = 2 : 3 : 3 : 2. Table 1 provides the

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 Sen Tan et al. Attack-resilient control for converter-based DC microgrids

MG 1 MG 2 MG 3 MG 4
DGU 1 DGU 2 52

50

Voltage/V
48

46
DGU 3 DGU 4
T1 T2 T3 T4
44
Fig. 4 DC MG circuit scheme
10

Current/A
parameters for the microgrid (MG) and converters used in 5
the simulation. The control parameters for the converters are
determined as follows: T1 T2 T3 T4
0
m1 = −0.5, m2 = 1, m3 = 10, m4 = 0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
(11)
(a) With the proposed resilient controller
4.1 Voltage/current tracking test under ramp-
type attacks MG 1 MG 2 MG 3 MG 4
52
The study conducted in this case showcases the voltage
50
and current tracking performance of the proposed controller
and its resilience against ramp-type cyber-attacks. To Voltage/V 48

demonstrate the advantages of the proposed controller, a 46

comparison of results is performed across different control T1 T2 T3 T4
44
strategies. Fig. 5 displays the voltage and current dynamics
in the presence of ramp-type attacks. 10

Initially, the four DGUs are interconnected and

Current/A

functioning as a microgrid. At time T1, the voltage reference 5

values increase to 49 V, and at time T2, the current reference
T1 T2 T3 T4
values for DGU 1 and DGU 4 change from 4 A to 6 A, 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
while for DGU 2 and DGU 3, the current reference values
change from 6 A to 9 A. The figures demonstrate that the (b) With the traditional controller
voltages and currents of the microgrid quickly converge to Fig. 5 Voltage and current dynamics under ramp-type attacks
the new reference values after the changes were made.
Furthermore, ramp-type cyber-attacks were initiated the presence of sine-type cyber-attacks.
at T3 on grid forming converter 1 of DGU 1 and at time As the same as the cases in previous study, the
T4 on the grid feeding converter of DGU 3. Fig. 5(a) converters are interconnected in the beginning. At T1, the
demonstrates that the system achieved accurate voltage voltage reference values are raised to 49 V, and at T2, the
and current tracking at a steady state. In contrast, Fig. 5(b) current reference values for DGU 1 and DGU 4 are adjusted
shows the dynamic responses of grid voltages and currents from 4 A to 6 A, while for DGU 2 and DGU 3, the current
using conventional control methods, revealing oscillations reference values are changed from 6 A to 9 A. The obtained
and significant tracking errors at steady state. These results results show the rapid convergence of voltages and currents
indicate the resilience of the proposed controller against to the reference values.
attack signals, confirming its effectiveness in maintaining At T3, a sine-type cyber-attack was launched on the grid
stable and accurate operation of the system. forming converter 1 of DGU 1, while at time T4, a similar
attack is carried out on the grid feeding converter of DGU 3.
4.2 Voltage/current tracking test under sine-type These attacks introduce gradually changing disturbances to
attacks the system, characterized by varying values.
The study conducted in this case showcases the voltage The results presented in Fig. 6(a) highlight the precise
and current tracking performance of the proposed controller voltage and current tracking performance by the system
and its resilience against sine-type cyber-attacks. Similarly, at steady states. In contrast, Fig. 6(b) depicts the dynamic
the simulation results are compared under different control responses of grid voltages and currents when conventional
strategies. Fig. 6 shows the voltage and current dynamics in control methods were employed, revealing oscillations and

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Global Energy Interconnection Vol. 6 No. 6 Dec. 2023

52
MG 1 MG 2 MG 3 MG 4 Acknowledgements
50
This work was supported by VILLUM FONDEN,
Voltage/V

48 Denmark under the VILLUM Investigator Grant (No.

46
25920): Center for Research on Microgrids (CROM).
T1 T2 T3 T4
44
Declaration of Competing Interests
10

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Current/A

Appendix
T1 T2 T33 T4
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Matrices A and B are expressed as
(a) With the proposed resilient controller
A=
MG 1 MG 2 MG 3 MG 4
52  −[C ]−1[r d ]−1 [C ]−1 0 −[C ]−1 β 
 v −1 
50 [ L ] ([m1 ] − I n − [m2 ]) −[ Lv ]−1[r v ] [ Lv ]−1 0 
 
−[m3 ] − [m4 ]
Voltage/V

48  0 0 0 
 l −1 T
[L ] β −[ Ll ]−1[r l ]
46  0 0
T1 T2 T3 T4
44 T
0 [ Lv ]−1 0 0 
B=  (12)
10
 0 0 0 0 
Current/A

5
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cyber-attacks detection for multiple DC microgrid clusters. automation and the M.S. degree in control
Applied Energy, 310: 118425 engineering, from Northeastern University,
[12] Zhou Q, Shahidehpour M, Alabdulwahab A, et al. (2020) A China, in 2014 and 2017, Ph.D. degree in
cyber-attack resilient distributed control strategy in islanded energy technology from Aalborg University,
microgrids. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 11(5): 3690-3701
Denmark, in 2022. He is currently working as
[13] Yan J, Guo F, Wen C (2020) Attack detection and isolation
Post Doc. with the Department of Energy
for distributed load shedding algorithm in microgrid systems.
Technology, Aalborg University, Denmark.
IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Industrial
His research interests include cyber-security, distributed control in
Electronics, 1(1): 102-110
microgrid and power management system.
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based cyber-attack detection model for wireless sensor networks
Juan C. Vasquez (M’12-SM’14) received
in microgrids. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics,
the B.S. in Electronics Engineering from
17(1): 650-658
the Autonomous University of Manizales,
[15] Beg O A, Nguyen L V, Johnson T T, et al. (2018) Signal
Manizales, Colombia and the Ph.D. in
temporal logic-based attack detection in DC microgrids. IEEE
Automatic Control, Robotics, and Computer
Transactions on Smart Grid, 10(4): 3585-3595
Vision from the Technical University of
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Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain in 2004 and
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Transactions on industrial informatics, 13(5): 2693-2703 2009, respectively. Since 2019, he has
[17] Abhinav S, Modares H, Lewis F L, et al. (2018) Resilient been a full professor with the Department of Energy Technology,
cooperative control of DC microgrids. IEEE Transactions on Aalborg University, Denmark. His current research interests
Smart Grid, 10(1): 1083-1085 include operation, advanced hierarchical and cooperative control,
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of microgrids. IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica, 5(2): generation in AC/DC microgrids, maritime microgrids, advanced
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for DC microgrid system under DoS and impulsive FDI attacks. and the Ph.D. in Power Electronics from the
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 12(5): 3742-3754 Technical University of Catalonia, Barcelona,
[21] Liu X, Wang S, Chi M, et al. (2024) Resilient secondary control in 1997, 2000, and 2003, respectively. Since
and stability analysis for DC microgrids under mixed cyber- 2011, he has been a full professor with the
attacks. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, 71(2): 1938- Department of Energy Technology, Aalborg
1947 University, Denmark. His research interests is oriented toward
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control framework of nonlinear CPSs against DoS attacks energy storage systems, hierarchical and cooperative control, energy
with application to power sharing of AC microgrids. IEEE management systems, smart metering, and the Internet of things
Transactions on Cybernetics, 52(6): 5255-5266 for AC/DC microgrid clusters and islanded minigrids. Recently,
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distributed secondary control strategy for islanded microgrids. vessels, ferries, and seaports.
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 12(3): 1929-1938
(Editor Yajun Zou)

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