B
B
Introduc on
The term agrarian structure denotes a framework of social rela onships in which all agricultural ac vi es such as
produc on, marke ng, and consump on are carried out. The ins tu on or the framework of social rela onships
determines how and by whom land is cul vated, what kind of crops can be produced and for what purpose, how
food and agricultural incomes can be distributed, and in what way or in what terms the agrarian sector is linked to
the rest of economy or society (Sahay, 2009). In an agrarian country like India where the majority of popula on s ll
lives in its villages and are directly or indirectly linked with agriculture as a means of livelihood, monopolies over
ownership of land and rural assets con nue along with caste-based discrimina on and oppression. The monopoly
over land, credit and markets are vested with a few individuals leading to a social forma on characterized by a rigid
class structure linked to land and land rela ons. In addi on, the agrarian rela ons in India have been marked by
many struggles of the oppressed class.
Learning Outcomes
1. Understanding of orientalist discourses on agrarian structure and agrarian rela ons during the pre-colonial era in
India and the contes ng views to it.
2. Gaining insights about commodifica on of agriculture, land revenue system and the agrarian classes during the
Bri sh rule in India.
3. Knowledge of the measures taken by the government of India to alter agrarian rela ons between the landlords
and the peasants post-independence.
4. Understanding of the nature of agrarian struggles during pre-independence and post-independence mes and its
impact on agrarian rela ons in India.
Sub-Topics: Agrarian Structure during Pre-colonial Era, Agrarian Structure during the Bri sh Raj, Agrarian Structure
Post-Independence, Agrarian Rela ons in India.
The discourses on the pre-colonial Indian agrarian structure are quite homogenous in terms of the ideas and lessons
that they provide. Sahay (2009) highlights following features of the pre-colonial Indian agrarian structure:
6. Division of agrarian society into self-sufficient, autonomous and isolated village communi es or village as idyllic
li le republics
7. All kinds of rela onships organized around the ins tu on of caste or, to put in different words, caste system as the
basis of self-sustaining and self-producing Indian village communi es
11. General slavery or exploita on of the people directly by the despo c state or king without any rela onship of
dependence and exchange at the lower levels and juridical restraints However, historical research by Indian scholars,
par cularly in post-independent India, has convincingly contested this orientalist understanding of Indian
socioeconomic structure, and proved that:
Everyone had no equal rights over land or land produce. The village did not hold its land in common. Common were
its officials and servants.
The land rights could even be purchased and sold. The agrarian society was internally differen ated in terms of
class, and was unstable and not selfsufficient.
The authori es discriminated between the different sec ons of landowners while fixing the revenue demands. The
large landowners were required to pay less.
Pre-colonial agrarian rela ons were also not free of conflicts and tensions.
The Bri sh colonial rule did many things and introduced many measures to reorganize rural/agrarian society in a
framework that make governance easy, profitable and manageable. Most important noteworthy measures with far
reaching consequences are following:
1) The Permanent Se lement System Under this measure, the intermediary ‘Zamindars’ (the tax collec ng officials in
earlier regime) were granted ownership right over land from which they previously only had the rights to collect
revenues.
2) The Ryotwari System Under this, the actual land llers were given formal property rights over land. The Royat was
a tenant of the state, responsible for paying revenue directly to the state treasury, and could not be evicted as long as
he paid his revenue.
3) The Mahalwari or Malgujari System Under this system, the village was iden fied as unit of assessment. Though an
individual cul vator in a village was made owner of the land, the villagers were asked to pay the revenue collec vely.
A member of the dominant family of the village was generally given the responsibility of collec ng the revenue.
These colonial measures introduced more intensive and systema c exploita on and forced the peasants to become
increasingly involved with the market, even when they did not have the capacity to produce surplus. These measures
brought about major changes in the agrarian structure. The most significant ones are following:
Commercializa on of Agriculture
It means a shi in the agrarian economy from produc on for consump on (food crops) to produc on for market
(cash crops). The demand of raw material in Bri sh industries and the manifold increase in the land revenue
compelled the peasantry to shi to cash crops. One obvious consequence of this shi in cropping pa erns was a
significant increase in the vulnerability of local popula on to famines (Sen, 1976).
Commodifica on of Land
Due to colonial policies land began to acquire the features of a commodity. The moneylender, who un l then lent
keeping a peasant’s crops in mind, began to see his land as a mortgageable asset against which he could lend money.
The influx of cheap goods from England a er the industrial revolu on hastened the process of de-industrializa on by
ruining the village ar sans that also resulted into the massive pressure on cul vatable land.
Land Aliena on
In the past the professional moneylenders generally did not evict the peasant from his land but made him tenant if
he did not pay back the debt, whereas the landlords evicted him from the land and made him landless. Thus tenancy
and landlessness grew significantly (Sahay, 2009).
There is almost a consensus among scholars that while colonial rule destroyed some pre-colonial elements of
agrarian structures, it also preserved many. It broke down earlier structures without recons tu ng them, and the
‘bourgeois property rela ons’ developed without corresponding development of capitalist rela ons of produc on
and forces of produc on in agriculture (Patnaik, 1990). According to Hamza Alavi (1990), the colonial rule brought
about peripheral capitalism in India which generated a disar culated form of ‘generalised commodity produc on’
because the surplus agriculture produce was reinvested not in the local economy but in the metropolitan centers
(cited in Sahay, 2009).
Independence from the colonial rule marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of agrarian structure. The
main objec ve of the Indian state was to transform the stagnant and backward economy and to make sure that the
benefits of transforma on and growth were not monopolized by a par cular sec on of the society. Keeping this in
background the government of India introduced various measures. Significant ones are following:
Land Reforms
Land reforms in independent India finds its raison dêtre in the cons tu on which begins with the Preamble that is
based on the four cornerstones of jus ce, liberty, equality and fraternity, and further strengthened by certain specific
provisions, par cularly the direc ve principles of state policy, which set out that the state shall, in par cular, direct its
policies such that:
1. The ci zens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
2. The ownership and control of the resources of the community are so distributed as to sub serve the common
good; 3. The opera on of the economic system does not result in the concentra on of wealth and other means of
produc on to the common detriment. Land reforms measures were among the most significant efforts of the state to
achieve these goals.
The Government of India directed its states to abolish intermediary tenures, regulate rent and tenancy rights, confer
ownership rights on tenants, impose ceilings on holdings, distribute the surplus land among the rural poor, and
facilitate consolida on of holdings.
A large number of legisla ons were passed by the state governments over a short period of me. The actual
implementa on of these legisla ons and their impact on the agrarian structure is, however, an en rely different
story. Most of these legisla ons had loopholes that allowed the landlords to tamper with the land records, evic ng
their tenants, and using other means to escape the legisla ons (Radhakrishnan, 1989).
The government of India introduced various provisions of Ins tu onal credit to weaken the hold of tradi onal
moneylenders over the peasantry. It asked coopera ve credit socie es and commercial banks to lend to the
agricultural sector on priority basis. However, the studies showed that much of their credit went to the rela vely
be er off sec ons of agrarian society and the poor con nued to depend on the servile exploita ve sources (Jodhka
1995).
This programme, which was pa erned on American experiences, was launched on 2 October 1952, and its objec ve
was to provide the substan al increase in agricultural produc on and improvement in basic services, which would
ul mately lead to overall development of the all sec ons of agrarian society. However, it failed in its objec ve and
resulted in helping only those who were already powerful in the village.
The Green Revolu on
Green Revolu on is an agricultural development project that includes higher yielding variety seeds (HYV) and other
fer lity enhancing inputs i.e. chemical fer lizer, controlled irriga on facili es and pes cides. The components of the
project consisted of providing cheap ins tu onal price incen ves, marke ng and research facili es. The Green
Revolu on led to a substan al increase in the agricultural produc on. However, it did not mean same thing to all
sec ons of the agrarian society. While bigger farmers had enough surplus of their own to invest in the new capital-
intensive farming, for smaller farmers it meant addi onal dependence on borrowing, generally from informal sectors
(Jodhka 1995).
The Green Revolu on also resulted into a totally new kind of mobiliza on of surplus producing farmers who
demanded a be er deal for the agricultural sector (Dhanagare 1991). Did the benefits of Green Revolu on ‘trickle
down’ to agricultural labourers? It has been one of the most debated ques ons in the studies on agrarian change in
independent India. It is an almost accepted fact among the scholars that the Green Revolu on has made the
countryside prosperous in general terms, however, it has also increased economic inequali es in the villages
(Bardhan, 1970).
The wages of agricultural labour has gone up but, due to increase in the prices, their purchasing power has gone
down (Bagchi, 1982). The Green Revolu on also helped in making the agricultural labour free from rela ons of
patronage and ins tu onalized dependency (Breman, 1974). Overall, it has been assessed that due to the Green
Revolu on benefi ed a smaller class of big peasants established dominance over the larger class of agriculture
labour.
Agrarian Rela ons and Agrarian Struggles: From pre-independence to pos ndependence periods
Agrarian unrest is not a recent phenomenon. Indian history records a number of agrarian insurrec ons, riots and
revolts of varying intensi es in many parts of the country. Quite a few models have been developed to explain the
agrarian unrest in the countryside.
Peasant struggles of the pre-independence period, wherever they occurred, were generally related to the semi-
feudal land tenure system of the colonial power or the 'jagirdari' system of the na ve states. The protec ve a tude
of the landlords towards the tenants got lost in the new scheme of integra on of these classes into capitalist legal
order by the Bri sh raj. Extension of market for primary commodi es also played a crucial role. What used to be a
diffuse and flexible rela onship that provided subsistence insurance in poor years grew more explicit and rigid and
was blind to good and bad years (Sco 1976). This transforma on was basically seen as power poli cs where the risk-
taking master was shi ing his risk on the poor tenants. Supported by a colonial state, the landlords felt a decreasing
need to concern themselves with subsistence of the peasant cul vators.
In the subsistence economy, the status of the tenant cul vator was no be er than that of the agricultural labour.
While the agricultural labour suffered and survived between harvests on credit, landlords and moneylenders - their
masters kept personal stocks of food. Even those middle- peasants suffered as they were required to pay certain
'fixed rent' while made no allowance for the varia on for the weather dependent output (Roff, 1992). The middle and
rich peasants sought modera on of the tradi onal agricultural class structure, which had limited their par cipa on in
commercial agriculture. As both the poor and rich/middle-peasants were affected by the revenue and commercial
policy of the colonial power, certain common understanding brought them together in their struggle against the
landlords. Hence, the poli cal economy of the agrarian unrest o en seemed to give broad resemblances of certain
'class' character, i e, peasants vs landlords.
The unholy alliance between landlords and the colonial power, however, managed to ensure that the peasant revolts
were localised and by such isola on used brutal force to suppress the agita on (Chandramohan, 1998). In the post-
independence period while the legacy of old system con nued, certain new developments like green revolu on (GR),
commercialisa on of agriculture, land reforms, spread of literacy and general awareness and the emergent powerful
farm lobbies in the parliament and state legislatures gave new dimensions to the agrarian rela ons in the
countryside. The 'size-neutral' but 'resource-biased', seedfer liser technology of GR made remarkable success in the
regions endowed with assured irriga on facili es. Regions which were be er endowed cornered dispropor onate
share in public investment in agriculture besides, ea ng away major chunk of current expenditure in the form of
subsidies for fer liser, electricity, irriga on and credit.
By the me the GR was poised for the second phase, there emerged certain realignments in the countryside. While
the big landlords were able to corner the lion's share in the input subsidies, public investments in irriga on and
remunera ve prices, the middle peasants, were also able to gain substan ally though not propor onately. The
surplus genera ng peasant castes and classes consolidated their dominant social status in the rural society and in the
process emerged as a powerful in dependent factor in Indian poli cs (Bhambhri, 1996).
Caste affilia ons and common interest provided the binding force behind the realignment of middle peasants with
landlords. Therefore, unlike the past, the interest of the middle peasants broadly tended to coincide with that of the
big landlords in the post-GR period. The notable contrast is that, the broad resemblances of 'class' character of the
past gradually dissolved into 'caste' denomina ons.
Perhaps, this is not a surprising development when abject poverty and landlessness got concentrated among certain
sec ons of popula on, that is, the scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and other weaker sec ons who
cons tute a major chunk of agricultural labour. In the 'semi-feudal democracy', the landlords con nued to usurp the
monopoly of violence and controlled local resources including land, labour and credit, government funds spent
locally, use of administra ve and police powers and o en private armies. It was noted that 'these simply resembled
as an extension of tradi onal powers exercised through caste domina on against subordinate castes'.
The poor peasants generally found the authori es in their own locality against the law and on the side of the
economic power-holders. As a reciprocal, the dominated sec on of the agrarian communi es got organized too o en
in the name of caste/community solidarity. It is argued that even when caste taboos and community exclusiveness
broke down at the level of individual social behavior, they were enabled to reassert themselves at the poli cal level
(Bagchi, 1993). Another per nent contrast observed is that unlike the earlier radical peasant struggles (Telengana)
which witnessed intense wave of grass roots struggles and subsequent larger poli cal manifesta ons at other levels,
agrarian conflicts of pos ndependence period exhibit organiza on and interven on from above even in the ini al
stages. There has been sizeable growth and spread of militant peasant organiza ons. For example, while the
landlords have found 'Savarna Libera on Army', the counter force 'Kisan Sabha' has come to existence for the
peasants in U ar Pradesh (Misra, 1993). With the organiza on of 'self-defence squads' the militant peasant
organisa ons were on 'land grab movement' and 'dhan ka ' (forcible harves ng of landlord's crop) agita on in
retalia on to the threats posed by various senas of the landlords (Ghosh, 1993).
The conflict between radicalism and conserva sm, the inability of the landlords to appreciate the demands of poor
peasants and landless labour, landlords' zeal to safeguard their interest and the sheer habit of ge ng things done
through force caused tension in the countryside. To conclude we might say there are certain con nui es as well as
changes in agrarian rela ons from pre-independence to post-independence phase.
In other words, on the one hand, certain shades of semi-feudalism con nue to exist in the rela ons between the
landlords and the peasants. Also, the commercializa on of agriculture that began under the Bri sh has reached new
heights in the post-independence phase which has worsened the condi on of poor farmers and landless agricultural
labourers.
On the other hand, the middle and rich farmers who have been able to reap the benefits of GR in some states have
found a poli cal voice. However, the focus of agricultural rela ons has shi ed from class-based inequali es to the
caste dimension. Moreover, the rise in militancy and violence in agrarian struggles has worsened the situa on. In
current mes, an environment conducive for a massive peasant movement dominated by the landless labour, small
and marginal farmers from backward classes with greater degree of par cipa on of women, to assert poli cally and
have their righ ul claim on fruits of development, already exists in the conflict prone states. Hopefully, increasing
poli cisa on of agriculture workers movement, if permi ed by an op mis c state, might gradually bring these
extremists to mainstream poli cs.
Summary
Agrarian rela ons in India need to be understood in the light of the agrarian structure and the changes it has
undergone over different periods of me. The changes in the agrarian structure of India can be broadly divided into
three phases, namely, the precolonial phase, the colonial phase and the post-colonial phase. During the pre-colonial
phase, the ownership of land rested was absolutely with the state or the king, however the possession and use of
land was on communal basis.
Thus, according to the orientalist understanding, the Indian agrarian society during the pre-colonial phase was
divided into self-sufficient, autonomous and isolated village communi es. All kinds of rela ons in these village
communi es were organized around the ins tu on of caste. However, during the colonial phase, the Bri shers
introduced a new land revenue system under which agriculture was commercialized.
This new land revenue system created two social classes, namely, the landlords and the peasants. The rela ons
between these two classes were oppressive, wherein the former were the oppressors and the la er oppressed.
Overall, the colonial rule brought about peripheral capitalism in India which generated a disar culated form of
‘generalised commodity produc on’ because the surplus agriculture produce was reinvested not in the local
economy but in the metropolitan centers.
In the post-colonial phase, efforts were made to both increase agricultural produc vity and alter the oppressive
social rela ons between the landlords and the toiling rural masses (the peasants). The most significant step taken by
the government was introduc on of land reforms. It was envisioned that land reforms would lead to aboli on of
intermediaries, tenancy reforms, land ceiling and consolida on of disparate landholdings.
However, land reforms were not implemented effec vely and therefore failed to improve the condi ons of the
peasants in many states of India. Besides, certain other measures such as introduc on of modern technology and
provisions of credit were ini ated. But overall the ineffec ve implementa on of land reforms could not alter the
agrarian rela ons significantly. Time and again this ignited peasant uprisings and movements in different parts of
India. These were retaliated by the landlord castes through use of power most of the mes through ins tu onal
means and some mes through violence. But the contras ng feature of agrarian structure in independent India was
that caste affilia ons came back into the agrarian rela ons and played a significant role in the agrarian struggles post-
independence.
UNIT 4 LAND AND AGRARIAN RELATIONS DURING THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD Structure 4.0 Objec ves 4.1
Introduc on 4.2 Ownership of Land During the Pre-Bri sh Period 4.2.1 Land Revenue System 4.2.2 Intermediaries
and Land Rights 4.3 The Village Community 4.4 Advent and Impact of Bri sh Rule 4.4.1 Land Revenue System 4.4.2
Eastern India: Permanent Se lement of 1793 4.4.3 Northern and Central India: Zamindari/Mahalwari Systems 4.4.4
Western and Southern India: Ryotwari System 4.5 Commercialisa on of Agriculture 4.5.1 Impact of the Depression of
1930s 4.5.2 Indebtedness and Land Transfers 4.6 Agrarian Structure and Tenancy 4.6.1 Agricultural Labourers 4.6.2
Agricultural Growth 4.7 Let Us Sum Up 4.8 Key Words 4.9 Suggested References for Further Reading 4.10
Answers/Hints to Check Your Progress Exercises 4.0 OBJECTIVES A er reading this unit, you will be able to: outline
the system of ownership of land as it prevailed during the Pre-Bri sh period; discuss the changes in the land
revenue system, dis nguishing them for interregional differences, as they prevailed during the period of Bri sh rule
in India; explain the concept of ‘commercialisa on of agriculture’ and the factors that contributed to its erosion
during the period of 1900s; and describe the inter-rela onship that existed between the agrarian and landtenure
structures with its consequences on agricultural growth in India during the Bri sh period. Indian Agriculture :
Ins tu onal Perspec ves 6 4.1 INTRODUCTION Technological factors such as fer lizers, new varie es of seeds,
controlled irriga on and scien fic implements play an important role in agricultural development. But ‘ins tu onal
factors’ such as owner or tenant cul va on, absentee landlordism, burden of land revenue, indebtedness of the
cul vators, etc. also play a significant role in s mula ng or obstruc ng agricultural growth. In fact, applica on of
technology in agriculture itself substan ally depends upon the kind of ins tu ons which exist in a par cular region.
Further, the more successful forms of peasant agriculture have emerged where owner-cul va on was dominant.
Also, since the exis ng land and agrarian structure is the result of gradual process of evolu on (influenced by social,
poli cal and economic factors), it is essen al to get a historical perspec ve on the evolu on of tenurial structure in
India. It is in this perspec ve that the present unit is included in the beginning of second block so as to help
appreciate the contents of the subsequent unit on the corresponding developments in the post-independence
period. 4.2 OWNERSHIP OF LAND DURING THE PREBRITISH PERIOD An important ques on discussed by the
economic historians is on who owned the land in the earlier mes: is it the peasant, or some intermediaries or the
king? Most scholars today agree with the view that the king was not the owner. Numerous mughal government
documents refer to private persons (called maliks) as owners. But the crux of the ma er is whether in substance, i.e.
not merely in name, the peasant’s right was such as to deserve the applica on of the term ‘proprietary’ in its strict
juridical sense. In fact, there was general recogni on of the peasant’s tle to permanent and hereditary occupancy of
the land he lled. In cases where the peasant holding the tle to the land was found incapable of cul va ng land (or
had abandoned it altogether), then the land was given to another peasant for cul va on. But if at any me, the
original owner recovered his ability to cul vate it (or came back), the land was to be restored to him. On the other
hand, there was no ques on of real free aliena on (i.e. the peasant had no right to sell the land), which is an
essen al feature of modern proprietary right. The readiness with which authori es recognized the peasant’s right of
occupancy and the anxiety they showed to prevent him from leaving the land were both natural in an age when land
was abundant and peasants scarce. Sale of land was also not so much an issue because there was no scarcity of land.
In fact, the rights which in essence cons tute ownership, were not as a rule vested in one person, but were
distributed among the various par es (like tenant, land owner, share cropper, etc.) connected with the land. 4.2.1
Land Revenue System During the mughal period, the land revenue system mainly depended on the crops grown and
its assessed value in quan fied terms. The value of the produc on of each crop was es mated based on the ‘yield
per unit of land at the current harvest’ mul plied by the ‘quan ty of area under that crop’. Land revenue was then
calculated on the basis of a propor on fixed for the purpose. Since this method le some discre on with the officials,
the systemwas modified to a method of no fying a standard schedule for different crops. As the major aim of the 7
Mughal administra on was to take away the bulk of the peasant’s surplus, the methods evolved were such as to
ensure not only the highest revenue but also the binding loyalty of the peasant to the king. 4.2.2 Intermediaries and
Land Rights While theore cally, the king was the sole claimant to the land revenue, in prac ce, the assessment and
collec on of the revenue was made by the members of a small ruling class. These were intermediaries who were of
two types viz. the jagirdars and the zamindars. The Jagirdars The jagirdars were the king’s officers enjoying land-gi s.
They held certain ranks (called mansabs) granted by the emperor. Each rank en tled its holder (i.e. mansabdar) to a
par cular amount of pay. The pay was to be realised by collec ng the revenue from a certain amount of land given
by the king (as Jagir). The land so given had an es mated value based on its poten al to grow/yield agricultural crops.
It was the responsibility of the jagirdars to collect the revenue from the peasants from out of the crops grown on the
land. The surplus, over and above the amount of pay fixed by the king to the jagirdars, was to be turned over to the
state i.e. the king. The ranks given to the jagirdars were not inheritable though in normal prac ce the kins of higher
rank-holders were allowed to con nue with their tles. The temporary character of Jagir strengthened the control of
the emperor over the jagirdars. The Zamindars The zamindar is a Persian term which means holder of land (zamin).
The basic right of zamindar was his claim to impose certain levies on the peasants over and above the land-revenue
assessment like house tax, forest produce tax, water tax, etc. These were specified in the sale deeds among the rights
transferred to the zamindars. The zamindars, like the jagirdars, were supposed to collect the tax from the primary
cul vators, in return for an allowance of one-tenth of the collec ons, given either in cash or by way of allotment of
revenue-free land. The zamindari right was like a property inherited according to the laws and customs governing the
inheritance of other proper es. Thus, during the mughal period two groups of revenue extractors viz. jagirdars and
zamindars, whose involvement in direct agricultural produc on was almost nil, were of enormous importance. While
what the producer was supposed to pay was fixed in law, what was actually taken depended on the powers and
inclina ons of jagirdars and zamindars. During the declining days of the Mughal empire, this system became quite
oppressive. 4.3 THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY A notable feature of village life in pre-Bri sh period was the combina on
of agricultural work with manufacturing. Produc on was mainly for direct use and the surplus a er payment of
revenue was marketed. Rela onship of the village with town was largely one way i.e. it hardly received anything in
return (except salt and kerosene) and provided for almost all of its needs from within the village. Normally, the
peasants of the village claimed the same ancestry and so belonged to the same Land and Agrarian Rela ons During
the PreIndependence Period Indian Agriculture : Ins tu onal Perspec ves 8 brotherhood (bhaichara). This fraternity
feeling, deep rooted to the social system of the village by blood- es, bound the peasants in unity in a far stronger
manner than could be expected from mere neighbours. Authority in the village was exercised by a group of elders,
tradi onally a council of five persons, called the panchayat. Contrary to the view that peasants had common
ownership in land, many scholars have opined that the individual families had their separate holdings and only the
forest and grazing grounds were commonly held. Views also differ over the homogeneous nature of peasantry as
economic differen a on within the peasantry had reportedly emerged during the mughal period. It is pointed out
that in northern India, as also in other parts of the mughal empire, there were some large cul vators raising crops for
the market and there were many small peasants who could barely produce food-grains for their own subsistence.
Also, beyond this differen a on among the peasantry, there were sharper divisions on the basis of upper and lower
castes. Depending on their resources in seed, ca le and money, peasants could cul vate larger or smaller plots.
Larger land holdings were linked to, and o en resulted from, superior posi on or status secured either as headmen
or as members belonging to dominant elements of the village. Check Your Progress 1 (Answer in 50 words in the
space given below) 1) Do you think that, during the pre-Bri sh period, the peasants who were actually lling the land
enjoyed the ‘ownership rights’ in the strict juridical sense?
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........................................................................................................................ 2) How was the value of produc on of
crops es mated during the pre-Bri sh period?
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........................................................................................................................ 3) Name the two types of intermediaries
who collected the land revenue during the pre-Bri sh period? What was the major difference between the two?
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........................................................................................................................ 9 4) What were the major factors that
kept ‘the village community’ unified as one ‘single self-contained en ty’ during the pre-Bri sh period in India?
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........................................................................................................................ 4.4 ADVENT AND IMPACT OF BRITISH
RULE As we noted above, before the Bri sher’s invaded India, the village community was a self-contained place with
a mix of agriculture and manufacturing ac vi es. During the Bri sh rule there was widespread destruc on of village
industries leading to shi ing of ar sans to agriculture mostly to work as agricultural labourers. Some of its immediate
consequences were: (i) forma on of land market, (ii) rising rents, (iii) indebtedness, (iv) forma on of layers of
intermediaries, (v) frequent famines, (vi) impoverishment of a sec on of the popula on, etc. We shall, in this sec on,
take a look at the major impact of Bri sh rule on some selected areas of economic importance to the agricultural
development of India. 4.4.1 Land Revenue System A number of modifica ons were introduced in the land revenue
system during the Bri sh Period. For instance, the East India Company took over the financial rights of Bengal, Bihar
and parts of Orissa in the year 1765. The company’s sole interest was to collect maximum revenue to: (i) finance its
trade and commerce, and (ii) maintain the army for strengthening and expansion of its rule in the country. To realize
higher land revenue, the zamindaris were auc oned to the highest bidders. This policy greatly altered the
composi on of landed society as many old zamindars could not compete in the new system. The highest bidders at
the auc on were invariably people having associa on with the new administra on through par cipa on in trade and
commerce. The peasants were thus kept totally out of this change and were also literally robbed by the unscrupulous
zamindars. This reckless process, which con nued ll the permanent se lement in 1793, resulted in frequent
famines and loss of human life. Large areas of land were rendered waste. 4.4.2 Eastern India: Permanent Se lement
of 1793 The Permanent Se lement of 1793 in Bengal and Bihar declared the zamindars ‘proprietors of the land’ and
fixed their dues to the state. This move was considered to ensure not only the security of revenue but also the
prosperity of the company’s commerce. The me period coincided with the me of Industrial Revolu on in Britain
for which a thriving commerce from India, with agriculture in par cular providing a variety of goods for export, was
considered important. The crea on of private property in land was expected to establish the right condi ons for
investment in agriculture by the rich na ves with ownership of large stretches of land. An associated objec ve was
the crea on of a class of loyal supporters (i.e. zamindars) to provide greater stability to the Bri sh rule. However, the
expecta ons were only par ally fulfilled. As far as the crea on of a class of loyal supporters was concerned, the
Bri sh substan ally succeeded. But Land and Agrarian Rela ons During the PreIndependence Period Indian
Agriculture : Ins tu onal Perspec ves 1 0 the zamindars, new (i.e. those who became zamindars to get the benefit of
Bri sh patronage) as well as old (i.e. who were already func oning as such and con nued to do so), failed to become
agrarian capitalists but turned into feudal landlords. Thus, capital was invested not for agricultural development but
for purchasing land. Further, in course of me a long chain of intermediaries came into existence between the state
and the ller. The zamindars were expected to pay a fixed sum as revenue (i.e. the permanent se lement) to the
government which in 1793 amounted to 90 percent of the revenue collected by the zamindars. With increase in
prices, the value of the income of zamindars got further eroded. The state also lost as its revenues in money terms
were fixed. As rents were not regulated, the peasants were the worst hit and any increased value of agricultural
produce was appropriated by the zamindars. The Bengal model was, therefore, not replicated in Orissa and Assam as
the Bri sh realized that freezing the land revenue by a permanent se lement affects them the most with revenue
from land being the most important of all its sources of income. In view of this, in Orissa and Assam se lements, the
revenue demand from land was not kept fixed but increased from me to me. 4.4.3 Northern and Central India:
Zamindari/Mahalwari Systems The revenue system followed in Northern India was a mix of both the zamindari and
mahalwari systems. While the basic unit for revenue assessment in the zamindari system was the ‘primary cul vator’,
in the mahalwari system the unit of revenue assessment was the ‘village’. Ini ally, the Bengal type of permanent
se lement was followed in the Northern region. A er 1811, considera ons of enhancement of revenue led to the
abandonment of fixed revenue system. However, the mahalwari system was experimented in some parts of Punjab
and ‘united provinces’ making the payment of revenue the joint responsibility of both the individual cul vator and
the village proprietary body (i.e. the gram sabha). In the central parts of India, in the early decades of Bri sh rule, a
policy of ‘excessive assessment’ was adopted. Under this, the lands were assessed so high that payment of revenue
became impossible. This rendered many people impoverished. Following strong protests and condemna on, in 1834,
a longer se lement for twenty years was made which con nued ll the early 1860s. Later, under a new se lement in
1864 in the Central Provinces, revenue-payers were recognized as the proprietors of the land with a right to sell or
mortgage their property. Tenancy rights were also conferred on the cul vators. Further, a system of land revenue,
limited to one-half of the rental of estates in principle, was implemented. However, in prac ce, it was rarely adhered
to at the me of assessment/collec on. 4.4.4 Western and Southern India: Ryotwari System The system of revenue
collec on adopted in the western province was the ‘ryotwari system’. Under this, the se lement was normally for a
fixed period of 30 years. Under the ryotwari se lement, the ‘ryo cul vator’ was recognized as proprietor and the
land revenue was fixed permanently based on the es mated value of the gross produce. The cul vator was allowed
to sub-let, mortgage or transfer the land either by gi or by sale deed. Further, a ‘ryot’ (i.e. the ller-cul vator) could
not be evicted as long as she/he paid the revenue. Likewise, even in the Madras Presidency (excluding coastal Andhra
where permanent zamindari system was 1 1 introduced) the ryotwari system was ins tuted. All uncul vated lands
were deemed to be under the control of the state which could let them out to be cul vated at freshly assessed rates.
Though the system favoured peasant proprietorship, it also accommodated large land owners, as was the case in the
Malabar region of Kerala. Check Your Progress 2 (Answer in about 50 words in the space given below) 1) What were
the immediate consequences on ‘the village community’s’ cohesive character on account of the Bri sher’s policy on
village industries? ........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
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........................................................................................................................ 2) What were the two basic mo ves
behind the collec on of land revenue from the agricultural class by the Bri sh? What was the approach adopted for
the realisa on of these objec ves? ........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................ 3) Why was the Bengal model of
‘permanent se lement’ for revenue collec on not followed in Orissa and Assam?
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................ 4) What were the basic units of revenue
assessment under the zamindari and the mahalwari systems? As compared to these two systems, under the ryotwari
system, what were the basic rights conferred on the ‘ryot- ller’?
........................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................
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........................................................................................................................ 5) What were the two expecta ons of the
Bri sh behind the crea on of ‘private property’ in land? To what extent was this realised and why?
........................................................................................................................
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........................................................................................................................ Land and Agrarian Rela ons During the
PreIndependence Period Indian Agriculture : Ins tu onal Perspec ves 1 2 4.5 COMMERCIALISATION OF
AGRICULTURE Commercialisa on (see Key Words) of agriculture during the Bri sh rule was rendered possible with
the coming of railways. Peasants were allowed to produce both for sale in distant markets and export. The period
was also marked for major changes of both qualita ve and quan ta ve dimensions. Qualita ve changes (besides the
introduc on of railways) included: (i) removal of constraints such as market imperfec ons in the form of mul plicity
of weights and measures; (ii) improving the obsolete/risky transporta on systems; and (iii) minimizing the extensive
use of barter as a method of trade. These measures enabled closer integra on of global, regional and local markets.
India thus began specializing in agricultural exports. Quan ta ve changes, on the other hand, included:
(i) increase in value of exports by nearly 500 percent between 1870 and 1914;
(ii) non-manufactured goods accoun ng for 70-80 per cent of total exports from India;
(iii) increase in the area cropped in most regions during the period 1870-1920;
(iv) growth in marketable crops like wheat, co on, oilseeds, sugarcane, and tobacco; etc.
As a result of these, not only the agricultural prices rose but even the rent, both in nominal and real terms, increased.
Thus, commercializa on of agriculture not only led to increase in the scale of land transfers and land prices, it also
increased the number of credit transac ons.
The benefits of commercialisa on of agriculture once again reached only to some influen al segments of the society.
In the process, it created a wider gulf between the poor peasants and the rich landlords. For instance, commercial
expansion of agriculture during the later years of 20th century gave way to new crops, new transport networks and
increased market ac vity. Developments in these required access to resources like credit, power, storage/transport
facili es and markets. Owing to the protec on that the colonial government gave to influen al class of agriculturists
and landlords, the control over these resources could be dominated by these groups enabling them to reap
maximum benefits/profits. Tenancy legisla on, such as the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, which gave occupancy rights
to those who had held tenancies for twelve or more years, with the right to sublet, strengthened the posi on of this
important stratum of rural society. Economic success thus became a privilege of those who could use their posi on in
society to secure favoured access to credit, markets and infrastructure.
The benefits of commercialisa on in agriculture began its decline during the period of Great Depression. Export
prices fell more sharply than import prices turning the terms of trade against agriculture. This led to increased export
of privately owned gold, most it as distress selling, to meet the demands for rent and land revenue. It was also
influenced by the bankruptcy of traders and indigenous bankers whose business had suffered due to liquidity crisis.
This led to a rise in the real cost of capital with even the rich farmers forced to cut down on capital intensive
methods/ prac ces. Labour cost also increased forcing the families having large land holdings to cut down on hired
labour. Due to similar condi ons elsewhere, employment opportuni es outside agriculture also was lacking.
Depression, thus strengthened the power of rich landlords even more. Thus, proper ed class could gain from the
consequences of depression whereas the poor peasants suffered badly.
(i) buying food before harvests (par cularly by the peasants growing non-food crops);
(iv) financing the higher input costs of commercial crops like sugarcane, co on and tobacco; etc.
Amidst these developments, there were crop failures leading to cul vators, and some mes even zamindars, finding
themselves unable to repay loans. These led to distress sale of land holdings. Such sales increased in number over
the years. Indebtedness thus forced the conversion of many peasants to become poor agricultural labourers.
Land ownership and tenurial structure underwent important changes during the Bri sh period. Agrarian structure in
different regions displayed considerable diversity. In Eastern India, landlords owned the bulk of land. In Ryotwari
areas of Madras and Bombay presidencies, considerable peasant proprietorship existed. Elsewhere, condi ons
ranged between these two types of situa ons. The thrust of the Bri sh revenue se lements had o en been to
consolidate middlemen’s claims into landlord-ship. Commercialisa on reinforced this impulse. As agricultural prices
rose, landlords and moneylenders bought peasant held lands. The peasants who thus lost land were not, necessarily,
driven out of land. The old peasants cul vated their sold plots as tenants on a crop sharing basis.
During the later half of the nineteenth century, in South India, the area under cul va on increased faster than the
popula on. Large irriga on works were completed on the Godavari and the Krishna. The cul va on of cash crops like
co on, groundnut and oilseeds increased. Between 1881-82 and 1915-16, prices of agricultural commodi es
increased faster than other prices and the terms of trade moved in favour of agriculture. The burden of land revenue
fell. The cul vator was able to invest in land. Progress was rapid in some regions, notably in the Krishna-Godavari
delta. This led to tremendous increase in prices of land. The rich peasants widened the sphere of their ac vi es and
invested in rice mills, mica and other industries. They extended their money lending business and went into banking.
In Western India, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was rise of the rich peasantry leading to
increased stra fica on of the peasantry class. Here also, the cul va on of cash crops such as sugarcane, tobacco,
groundnut and co on expanded. The small sec on of the cul vators who had a surplus to market sale, made large
profits and invested them back in agriculture. The investments were made in irriga on, buying carts and seeking
be er markets for their grains outside their local area. These rich farmers, who had been able to seize the new
market opportuni es, o en replaced the tradi onal moneylenders as sources of credit in the village. They also
purchased the land of small cul vators who were o en in heavy debt. In Eastern India, the zamindars commi ed
such excesses that the government Land and Agrarian Rela ons During the PreIndependence Period Indian
Agriculture : Ins tu onal Perspec ves 1 4 was forced at mes to intervene to stop a possible revolt.
Two major tenancy acts were enacted in Bengal a er the Permanent Se lement: the Rent Act of 1859 and the Bengal
Tenancy Act of 1885. Under the tenancy Act, occupancy rights were conferred on those ryots who had been in
possession of any land for twelve consecu ve years. Such ‘occupancy ryots’ did not necessarily cul vate their
holdings on their own and many of them, especially some big ryots, further leased out their lands on share-cropping
basis. This was mainly mo vated by the difference in the rents paid by the occupancy-tenants and share-cropping
tenants which yielded a huge profit to the former. This was possible as there was no legal protec on against increase
of rent by the non-occupancy tenants. The situa on was so bad that in 1948, the Zamindari Aboli on Commi ee
Report stated that in the North-Western provinces greater part of land (i.e. more than half of total) was held by such
a small group of large landholders amoun ng to just 1.3 percent of the total popula on.
Agricultural Labourers
Contrary to the view that in the tradi onal village economy of pre-Bri sh India, there was a much smaller segment of
persons working solely as agricultural labourers on the lands of others, the census data suggested a significant
increase in the propor on of ‘wage labourers’ in the agriculture. Two factors iden fied to have contributed to this
were:
Further, the landless labourers mostly came from the lower castes. Despite the increase in the number of agricultural
labourers, the agricultural wages remained stable. Factors which contributed to this included:
All these factors also contributed to an improvement in the social status of the depressed castes to which most of the
agricultural labourers belonged. The element of compulsion and force in their employment became weaker and
various forms of social oppression (such as enforced dress codes and codes of conduct with respect to upper castes)
became weaker too. Migra on within and outside agriculture (e.g. planta ons, mines, urban services, public works,
etc.) increased. The situa on of agricultural labourers thus improved to a great extent.
Agricultural Growth
The network of rela onships among the various groups of persons depending for their livelihood from land was such
that it was not providing incen ves to invest in land. Substan al propor on of agricultural produc on was reserved
for the parasi c right holders who received income without par cipa on in agricultural work. No surplus/incen ve
was le with actual cul vator for investment. The cul vators also avoided risk and resisted change due to their poor
economic status and lack of incen ves.
This complex network of legal, economic and social rela ons served to produce an effect, which Daniel Thorner
termed as ‘Built-in-Depressor’. The net result was that agricultural growth varied from low growth to near stagna on.
During the period of 1891 to 1947, agricultural output rose by just 0.37 percent per annum significantly lower than
the popula on growth rate of 0.67 percent per annum. In par cular, growth rate of food grains output was a mere
0.11 percent. A er 1921, popula on growth accelerated to over 1 percent per annum but food grains output could
not grow fast enough. As a result, the per capita output fell markedly. Commercial crop output, however, increased
rapidly - nearly doubling 1 5 its output over the period. In general, the output growth was higher in ryotwari and
mahalwari areas.
Greater Bengal was the area where land tenure structure was most retrogressive. There were layers of parasi c
intermediaries living on rental incomes. Though in Punjab also area under tenancy was quite high, tenants were
mostly small owners who leased land from landowners and lived in the village supervising their cul va on. Tenancy
in Punjab was basically a method of labour mobilisa on by those owners whose holdings were bigger than what
could be cul vated with family labour. An important source of agricultural growth in Punjab was the expansion of
irriga on works and total area under agriculture.
Though in India as a whole the Bri sh were neglec ng irriga on works, yet in Punjab there was a tremendous
investment in irriga on. More specifically, the area irrigated by government canals during 1901-02 to 1939-40 in
Punjab increased from about 4.5 million acres to 12.5 million acres and the area in agriculture from 23 million acres
to 31 million acres during this period. In areas where agricultural growth was stagnant, two factors are iden fied as
responsible for it. These are:
(b) resource endowments. In the zamindari areas, the benefits of commercializa on weighed more heavily in favour
of renters who did not cul vate land directly.
In the ryotwari se lements, a sec on of the peasantry tended to benefit more. Thus, an adverse combina on of
superior rights and non-agricultural background was responsible for lower investment and lower increase in land
produc vity. The resources - water, land, and people - were unequally distributed across space, owing to both natural
and manmade factors. The rice-growing regions like Bengal, Bihar, and eastern UP were having high popula on
densi es whereas southern rice regions like Cauvery delta and the Godavari-Krishna delta did well commercially.
Both these areas of south shared two points of dis nc on viz.
(a) good irriga on which made it possible to combine rice with dry-season crops, and
(b) lower popula on densi es. Millet-growing dry regions had land in plenty. When canal irriga on made lands
cul vable (as in Punjab and Western UP), the dry areas were be er placed in terms of average land per peasant.
These condi ons enabled diversifica on into cash crops, such as wheat and co on, in areas hitherto specialized in
millets. Such manmade condi ons of progress, however, became available only on a limited scale.
LET US SUM UP
The unit began with a brief overview of the situa on that prevailed on the land ownership and tenancy structures
during the mughal period. It subsequently dealt with the issues and circumstances which shaped the Indian
agriculture during the period of Bri sh rule. The contents bring forth the fact that development of agricultural sector
was more directed to suit the interests of the imperial government and in its process created and le behind deep
social divisions in the Indian polity. A significant evidence of this self-serving mo ve of the Bri sh is seen in the
deliberate destroying of industries that co-existed in the pre-Bri sh mes making the tradi onal village economy of
those mes a self-supported holis c economic en ty. However, conferring the proprietary rights to the ller-
peasants, expansion of the non-farm sector like railways, marke ng networks, etc. to make the agricultural sector
commercially develop, suppor ve investment in irriga on made in some provinces, etc. are examples of posi ve
steps taken to promote agricultural development in the pre-independent years. Nonetheless, poor peasants have
had to endure suffering to the point of impoverishment, mainly due to the patronage extended to the rich landlords
by the Bri sh, despite the significant profits generated from the agricultural sector. The ryotwari system, as an
ins tu onal alterna ve, have fared be er than the zamindari system with the mahalwari system also appearing to
have done reasonably well. Bengal as a region or province has had a rela vely less progressive status which has been
termed by some writers as retrogressive. The unit has served to provide the background needed to understand the
nature of inheritance in respect of the large agricultural economy by the pos ndependence policy makers in the
country.
KEY WORDS
Mahalwari system : A system of revenue assessment/collec on in which the unit of assessment was ‘village’. Under
this system, the payment of revenue was the joint responsibility of the primary cul vator and the village heads i.e.
gram sabha.
Ryotwari system : This is a system in which the ‘ryot’ i.e. the cul vator is recognised as the proprietor of land. In this
system, the land revenue was fixed permanently based on the es mated value of the gross produce. Though the
system favoured peasant-proprietorship, it also accommodated large land owners.
Jagirdars/Zamindars : Two class of intermediaries who collected land revenue to the mughal kings by the cul vators.
Commercialisa on : The word has acquired different meanings at different mes and has evolved in response to
different s muli. Earlier, growing of cash crops like co on, sugarcane, jute, tobacco, etc. (that were grown exclusively
for the market i.e. outside of self-consump on) had been considered synonymous with commercialisa on. Over
me, even food grains were produced for the market due to cash needs of the farmers. This transi on has been
hastened by the green revolu on which increased the marketable surplus. Favourable price policy for food grains has
also contributed to this transi on.
Land Reforms in India: Pre and Post-independence
Agriculture's contribu on to a country's economic growth and development has long been recognized. Agriculture is
viewed not just as a source of food and industrial raw materials but also as a source of income for many people.
The land is the most important resource base in the agricultural sector, serving as a source of produc on, a valuable
asset, or a tool of social, economic, or poli cal power.
Land reform may be defined as a deliberate effort to alter the process of owning agricultural lands, the methods of
cul va on used, and the establishment of a rela onship between agriculture and the economy. As an ins tu onal
interven on, land reforms may significantly impact allevia ng poverty, rec fying social dispari es, safeguarding the
status of impoverished landholders, and organizing and enabling them to reap the fruits of their work. Land reform is
regarded as a crucial step toward social jus ce since it tries to eliminate the exploita ve a tude of wealthy
landowners toward insecure farmers.
To redistribute land to create a socialist form of society. Such an a empt will minimize inequi es in land
ownership.
To guarantee a land cap and remove surplus land for distribu on to small and marginal farmers.
It has been no ced that land ownership becomes a determining element in the produc on process that combines
land and labour. This, in turn, impacts the amount and distribu on of agricultural goods. Land reforms aim to
improve the socioeconomic posi on of the agriculturally dependent popula on in many ways. The key to
development for na ons with a substan al agricultural base is the quality and quan ty of agricultural lands that are
used produc vely. Land reform in India tried to establish fairness in land distribu on by shi ing ownership from
affluent to poor people. Large discrepancies and anomalies in the organiza on of agricultural fields in India caused
unhappiness and unrest among rural people.
Since its Independence, India has taken several steps to enact land reforms to empower farmers.
Tenancy reforms to recognize tenants' occupa on of land and to regulate rent structure.
Ini a ve and plea to landowners to give produc ve agricultural areas to benefit people and society.
Transparency in land ownership declara ons through the Na onal Land Records Moderniza on ini a ve
Background
Since Bri sh rule, the land policy has been a major topic of government policy discussions in India. During the various
pre- Colonial regimes, land taxes received by the state established its tle to land produce and that it was the
exclusive owner of the land. Following in the footsteps of this system, Bri sh rulers permi ed the existence of non-
cul va ng intermediaries.
The existence of these parasi c intermediaries served as an economic tool for extrac ng high revenues as well as
maintaining the country's poli cal hold. Thus, at the me of Independence, the agrarian structure was characterized
by parasi c, rent-seeking intermediaries; dispari es in land revenue and ownership across regions; a small number of
landholders owning a large share of the land; a high density of tenant cul vators, many of whom had insecure
tenancies; and exploita ve produc on rela ons.
A commi ee was established shortly a er Independence to inves gate the land issue, and the late Shri J. C.
Kumarappa, a prominent Congress leader, served as its chairman.
Measures for comprehensive agrarian reform were advised in the Kumarappa Commi ee's report. In the decades
following Independence, legisla ve efforts to address the problems iden fied by the Kumarappa Commi ee
dominated India's land policy.
A substan al volume of legisla on was adopted, much flawed, and li le seriously implemented.
A small number of people controlled a large por on of the land, and many intermediaries had no incen ve to
encourage self-cul va on. Leasing out the land was a common prac ce.
The lease arrangements were expropria ve in character, and tenant exploita on was prevalent.
Land records were in disarray, resul ng in a flood of lawsuits. Ironically, the Supreme Court of India stated in
1989 that revenue records are not legal tle documents.
Land policy in India has undergone broadly four phases since Independence.
o It was characterized by land reforms that included three major efforts: the aboli on of
intermediaries, tenancy reform, and land redistribu on through land ceilings. The elimina on of
intermediaries was rela vely successful, but tenancy reform and land ceilings were not.
o Focused on disputes regarding the requirement to con nue with land law and a empts to enhance
land tax administra on, par cularly clarity in land records.
Considering India's breadth, variety, and numerous poli cal, economic, and social influences from successive rulers
and foreign conquerors throughout its history, it is not unexpected that land tenure and administra on methods
differed substan ally across the subcon nent at the me of Independence.
They all had in common that land policies were influenced by rulers' efforts to extract land revenue or tax from those
who worked on the land.
Over most of the na on, monarchs employed Zamindars, or tax collectors, who were hired to collect land income for
a specific wide region and pay the government predetermined sums (but o en extracted as much as they could from
the landholders and pocketed the difference).
Since tenurial circumstances vary greatly by loca on, the various tenures may be divided into two major categories:
the Zamindari
o One or more property rights ers dis nguished the Zamindari system between the state and the real
landholder.
Rayatwari systems
o There were no intermediaries in the Rayatwari (or peasant proprietorship) system by design; they
only materialized during the opera on.
With a few important changes, the Bri sh authori es maintained exis ng land-revenue regula ons and processes.
Most notably, the Bri sh transformed tax collectors become owners of the estates over which they had tax collec on
obliga ons.
Regre ably, it changed the once-proprietors into insecure renters. During this me, many Zamindars delegated their
land-revenue collec on responsibili es to one or more levels of middlemen who were also allocated property
holdings. The historical crea on and con nua on of intermediaries aimed to administer land income and exercise
poli cal control over subsequent kings, but their numbers grew.
They rented out enormous tracts of land to tenants at exorbitantly expensive rents. This provided a disincen ve for
tenant cul vators to improve the land, influencing produc vity. Hence, to successfully govern the na on, the Colonial
Government made no significant adjustments to the land-revenue system but instead promoted the class of non-
cul va ng middlemen.
At the me of Independence, India faced significant difficulty restoring the agricultural system promised during the
freedom movement.
The first duty assigned to India's first parliament was to handle land policy. Because India had a highly populated
agrarian economy, nearly all previous developmental projects included land as a major and complicated problem, as
it plainly expressed social standing rather than merely the means of produc on.
Although acknowledging the necessity for land reforms in the country, Ar cle 39 of the Indian Cons tu on stated
that:
Ownership and control of the country's material resources should be dispersed so that they best serve the
general interest;
The func oning of the economic system should not lead to concentra ons of wealth and means of
produc on to the detriment of the general public.
The Indian Cons tu on also made land a state (provincial) subject. As a result, only state legislatures have the
authority to ini ate and execute land-reform legisla on. Nevertheless, due to its cons tu onal responsibility in social
and economic planning, the central government had a considerable consulta ve and financial role in land policy (a
role held concurrently with the states). To fulfil this social and economic planning responsibility, the Government of
India formed the Na onal Planning Commission shortly a er Independence.
Since 1951, the Planning Commission has produced a succession of Five-Year Plans. The land policy has been
integrated into all plans as an important component. The First Five-Year Plan outlined land reform policies. The plan
intended to minimize income and wealth dispari es, eradicate exploita on, provide renters with security, and
accomplish social change through equality of status and opportuni es for diverse popula on segments to engage in
development projects.
Earlier stages of land reforms focused on food produc on, expanding technology, and elimina ng regressive
ins tu ons; poverty needed to be addressed. Land-reform measures were divided into four categories by Raj
Krishna:
Libera ng
o The libera ng measures a empted to free the real llers of the soil from the landlord's oppression.
This was accomplished by gran ng the renter land ownership or occupa on rights. Rent fixing was
done in a few states, such as West Bengal's "Opera on Barga," where the tenancy was documented.
Distribu ve
o The distribu ve measures were intended to do this by providing tangible resources to the poor, as
guaranteed by the Indian Cons tu on, par cularly those who required land as a produc ve
resource. This was accomplished by dispersing land ownership from major landholders to the
landless, par cularly from socially disadvantaged groups.
Organiza onal
o In the mid-1960s, organiza onal changes aimed at selec ng and execu ng a specific type of
agricultural produc on prac ce were implemented with the support of technical advancement.
Developmental
o Developmental reforms addressed addi onal concerns related to land policy, which influenced the
en re agricultural industry's growth.
Raj Krishna said the tenancy reforms and landholding ceilings were libera ng and distribu ve policies.
Although Raj Krishna authored this chapter around the start of the first phase of land reforms.
Soon a er Independence, four key components of land reform were seen as crucial policy interven ons in land policy
development. They included
All four components are part of the overarching distribu ve and development programs launched soon a er
Independence.
By 1960, the en re process of legalizing the aboli on of middlemen had been finished. This was the most frui ul
aspect of the land reform project.
The main tenancy reform pillars were security of tenure, evic on, landlord reinstatement of personal cul va on, rent
control, and affirma on of ownership rights.
The following ini a ves were given to state governments in the na onal guidelines for inclusion in state
legisla on:
The real farmer will get the security of the tenancy.
Landowners may be allowed to cul vate the land for personal use.
The landlord-tenant connec on will be severed in certain areas, and the tenant cul vator will be brought into
direct contact with the state.
Allowing handicapped people, military members, and others to lease their land;
If landlords can evict tenants to con nue cul va on, "personal cul va on" should be explicitly defined.
Ceilings on holding
Land distribu on was significantly skewed at the me of Independence. Seven per cent of landowners controlled 53
percent of the land, while 28 percent of landowners with submarginal and marginal holdings owned roughly 6
percent. The alloca on of land between states was also significantly skewed. It was believed that landholding ceilings
were necessary due to three economic impera ves:
1. There was strong evidence indica ng an inverse size - produc vity rela onship, implying that aggregate
produc on efficiency is hampered when land is held in large holdings;
2. There was some evidence that large holders of land le large areas fallow, perpetua ng uneconomic land
use; and
3. A sizable sec on of the popula on was land-based and impoverished, desiring land as an economic resource
for subsistence. It was believed that extra land might be handed to such impoverished individuals. The broad
support for land limita ons was focused mostly on promo ng social jus ce and fairness rather than raising
produc vity and growing agriculture.
Despite li le effec veness in redistribu ng excess agricultural land, ceiling regula ons have been effec ve in limi ng
the concentra on of land in the hands of a few.
Consolida on of holding
Because of the date of its a empted implementa on and its poli cal process, the consolida on of holdings has
go en the least a en on of all land-reform components.
Several landowners were found to have many fractured plots distributed among the revenue villages in the early
1970s. This was an easy way out of the Land Ceiling Act, so an individual's landholding should be consolidated.
Several states passed consolida on legisla on to eliminate inefficiencies in opera ons and farming. Most of this
legisla on and related consolida on programs have failed to fulfil their objec ves due to a lack of poli cal will and
administra ve problems. The legisla on was tough to dra and ignored the reali es of the caste structure inside
farming communi es and local poli cal processes.
Consolida on programs have had li le effect, except in Punjab, Haryana, and U ar Pradesh. Although legisla ve
measures for consolida on were approved in 15 states, these statutes had far too many excep ons. For example,
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal only allow for voluntary consolida on; Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, and
Maharashtra are comparable. Considering its significance and the program's dismal performance, it is cri cal to
assess the effec veness of the law and reconsider an ins tu onal solu on.
Land in India has long been related to social status and historically controlled by specific social groups.
In India, social stra fica on is substan al and is based on the caste system.
The four major caste groupings are Brahmin, Vaishya, Kshatriya, and Shudra, with hundreds of subcastes inside each.
Certain communi es, par cularly tribals and other groups with limited access to produc ve resources, are excluded
from this categoriza on.
Because castes are related to dis nct jobs and ac vi es, they may be divided into land-associated castes and other
castes.
Regarding caste, the social system aimed to segregate groups engaged in farming, trade, teaching, clergy, and other
ac vi es. This social structural division was linked to the poli cal base and the country's land ownership pa ern. This
social isola on benefited the power rela onship, and the country's poli cal power growth may be easily related to
caste groupings. Although land reforms became a prominent post-independence policy ini a ve, land-associated
caste groups wielded significant poli cal power a er Independence, so the interests of those responsible for
lawmaking were linked with the implementa on of the land reforms. As a result, the land reform legisla on either
needed to be fully implemented or twisted with the assistance of administra ve en es.
In recent years, the government's land policy interven ons have concentrated on the correc on and computeriza on
of land records, the improvement of the land survey process, and the enhancement of land quality through the
reclama on of degraded wastelands and forests.
Indeed, the key policy debates revolve around whether some land-reform ini a ves should be reversed, including
whether land caps should be raised and tenancy restric ons should be relaxed. Land marginaliza on and land
governance are also big concerns.
Enabling larger holdings would result in economies of scale, and that large farms would a ract more investment in
the agriculture industry. This is required before producing an exportable surplus and effec vely engaging in the global
market is feasible. Pooling small farms together to establish official or informal producer groups for marke ng might
be one approach to achieving this aim. Growing rose onions and gherkins for export was a successful experiment in
Karnataka.
The concept that loosening tenancy limits will benefit the poor has gained trac on. It is expected that small and
marginal farmers would benefit the most from tenancy liberaliza on. Currently, most hidden tenancies do not
protect the tenant or the landlord. Moreover, informal (or hidden) renters cannot access funds from banks or
financial organiza ons.
Legalizing tenancy will also enable small and marginal renters to gain access to ins tu onal finance. If the tenant is
granted legal standing, there may be less opportunity for flaws in the tenancy market, such as disguised tenancy and
unilateral determina on of land rent. The opening of the leasing market is also expected to encourage much-needed
private investment in agriculture.
Way forward
The NITI Aayog and several industry organiza ons are now advoca ng for large-scale land leasing to allow
landowners with unviable holdings to lease out land for investment, resul ng in higher revenue and
employment in rural regions.
Digi za on of land records, for example, is a contemporary land reform policy that must be adopted as
quickly as prac cable.
Agrarian Structure: Exploring Land Dynamics, Social Change, and the Path to Economic Transforma on
Agrarian structure refers to the organiza on and distribu on of land, resources, and produc ve ac vi es
within a society that is primarily based on agriculture. This structure encompasses various elements,
including land ownership pa erns, land use prac ces, tenancy arrangements, and the social
rela onships embedded in agricultural produc on. Changes in agrarian structure can have profound
implica ons for social, economic, and poli cal dynamics within a society.
Agrarian structure and social change are intricately linked, as altera ons in the way land is owned,
cul vated, and u lized o en lead to broader transforma ons in social rela onships, power dynamics, and
overall community life.
Land Distribu on Dynamics: Dispari es, Poverty, and Gender Bias in Rural Agrarian Regions
Unequal Distribu on of Land in Rural Regions: Agricultural land, being the prime property in rural regions, is
unequally distributed.
o The disparity in landholdings is stark, with some areas having up to 40 to 50 percent of families
landless, making them reliant on agricultural labour or other jobs for survival.
o This setup leads to a few wealthy families, while most hover around the poverty line.
Gender Disparity in Land Ownership: Women o en find themselves excluded from land ownership due to
the patrilineal kinship system and inheritance modes prevalent, despite legal provisions for equal share of
family property.
Irriga on and Agricultural Intensity: Regions with assured irriga on, either through abundant rainfall or
ar ficial irriga on systems (like the rice-growing areas in river deltas, exemplified by the Kaveri basin in Tamil
Nadu), required more labor for intensive cul va on.
Development of Agrarian Structures: In these high-produc vity areas, highly unequal agrarian structures
emerged, characterized by a significant por on of landless laborers. O en these laborers were ‘bonded’
workers predominantly from the lowest castes.
Land Access Dynamics: Shaping Rural Class Structure, Dispari es, and the Tenancy Predicament
The Crucial Role of Land Access: Access to land fundamentally shapes the rural class structure and agrarian
society.
o Medium and Large Landowners: These sec ons generally have be er incomes from cul va on.
o Agricultural Labourers: In contrast agricultural labourers face below-minimum wage payments and
insecurity, seasonal employment, o en resul ng in underemployment.
Tenancy Challenges: Tenants who lease land from owners end up with lower incomes as they part with a
significant por on of their crop income, ranging from 50 to 75 percent, as rent to landowners.
Caste-Class Dynamics: Power Structures, Historical Labor Rela ons in Rural Agrarian Structure
Caste and Class Interplay: The intertwining of caste and class in rural regions adds complexity to the
agrarian structure.
Dominant Cast: It is a caste that has more people than other castes and also has a lot of economic and
poli cal power.
o Dominant castes, o en the major landowning groups, wield significant economic and poli cal
power.
o Although higher castes are presumed to have more land and income, this is not a straigh orward
rela onship, as demonstrated by Brahmins, who aren’t major landowners in many regions.
Dominant Castes and Land Ownership: Dominant landowning groups, like Jats, Rajputs, Vokkaligas,
Lingayats, Kammas, Reddis, and Jat Sikhs, mostly from middle or high-ranked castes, essen ally control the
rural economy by owning the majority of land and resources
They also established a reliant labour force from lower caste groups, including the Scheduled Castes/Tribes
and Other Backward Classes, who historically were prohibited from land ownership.
Historical Labour Exploita on: Prac ces like ‘begar’ or free labour were common, with low caste groups
providing labour to landowners, some mes under ‘hereditary’ labour rela onships.
Although legally abolished, such exploita ve prac ces persist in several areas, reflec ng the entrenched
caste-class dynamics in the rural agrarian structure.
Transi on in Agrarian structure Realms: Pre-Colonial Dynamics and Bri sh Colonial Impacts on Land
Ownership
Pre-Colonial Agrarian Dynamics: Before colonial rule, dominant castes were mainly cul vators but not direct
landowners.
o The ownership was concentrated with local kings or zamindars, who were usually of high castes
like Kshatriya, and they had poli cal sway in their regions.
o Peasants worked the lands and surrendered a significant part of the yield to these ruling groups.
The Impact of Bri sh Coloniza on on Agrarian Structure: With the advent of Bri sh colonisa on, the
agrarian structure saw a marked change.
Landownership and Revenue Collec on: In the zamindari system, the zamindari of a par cular area
were treated as landowners and used to collect land revenue.
Bri sh Empowerment of Zamindars: The Bri sh empowered the zamindars further by gran ng them
property rights and ruling through them in many areas.
o They imposed he y land revenue on agriculture, leading to zamindars extrac ng maximum produce
or money from cul vators.
Socioeconomic Challenges: This zamindari system under Bri sh rule resulted in agricultural stagna on or
decline due to oppressive landowner prac ces, frequent famines, wars, and mass flight of peasants from
the lands.
Peasant Land Ownership and Direct Taxa on: In the Raiyatwari System the peasants were considered as
landowners and tax was collected directly from them.
o Unlike the zamindari system, some regions under direct Bri sh control adopted the raiyatwari
system, where the actual cul vators, or o en landlords, were taxed directly by the colonial
government instead of through zamindars.
Raiyatwari System’s Impact: This system lessened the tax burden and incen vized cul vators to invest in
agriculture, making these areas compara vely more produc ve and prosperous.
Evolu on of Agrarian Structure: The shi s from pre-colonial to colonial and post-independence periods have
evolved the structure, with roots tracing back to the zamindari and ryotwari systems of the colonial era.
Nehruvian Era: Pioneering Land Reforms and Agricultural Transforma on in Post-Independence India
Nehruvian Vision: Post-independence, under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, a development plan was set in
mo on targe ng agrarian reform and industrialisa on to address the grim agricultural scenario marked by
low produc vity, reliance on imported food grains, and widespread rural poverty.
o The focal point was a substan al reform in the landholding system and land distribu on to foster
agricultural advancement.
Land Reforms in Post-Independence India: Between the 1950s and 1970s, various land reform laws were
enacted both na onally and state-wise aiming for a transformed agrarian structure.
Aboli on of Intermediaries: The ini al significant legisla on was the aboli on of the Zamindari system to
eradicate the intermediary layer between cul vators and the state.
Empowering Local Landholders and Cul vators: This law emerged as probably the most effec ve, weakening
the economic and poli cal power of zamindars and thus for fying the posi on of actual landholders and
cul vators at the local level.
Aboli on of Tenancy: Subsequent major reforms were the tenancy aboli on and regula on acts, aiming to
either prohibit tenancy or regulate rents for tenant security.
Limited Impact: However, the effec veness of these laws was mostly limited, except in West Bengal and
Kerala where radical agrarian restructuring accorded land rights to tenants.
Land Ceiling Acts in Post-Independence India: Aspira ons and the Quest for Equitable Land Distribu on
The Land Ceiling Acts: Cons tu ng another major category of land reform laws, imposed an upper limit on
land ownership per family, with ceiling varia ons based on land type and produc vity.
Redistribu on Agenda: The inten on was to iden fy and redistribute surplus land to landless families and
specific social categories like SCs and STs.
Implementa on Challenges: Nonetheless, the implementa on of these acts largely faltered due to
numerous loopholes enabling landowners to evade surplus land takeover by the state, with some resor ng
to decep ve prac ces like ‘benami transfers’ to circumvent the laws.
Regional Dynamics: Agrarian structures and the progress of land reforms have exhibited considerable
variance across Indian states.
Persistent Inequality: Despite substan al changes from the colonial era, the agrarian structure con nues to
harbor high inequality, which hampers agricultural produc vity.
Call for Reform: There remains a pressing need for effec ve land reforms to spur agricultural growth,
alleviate rural poverty, and foster social jus ce.