IOSA 15 2022
IOSA 15 2022
IOSA Standards
Manual (ISM)
Edition 15
Revision 1
Remote 2
NOTICE
DISCLAIMER. The information contained in this
publication is subject to constant review in the
light of changing government requirements and
regulations. No subscriber or other reader should
act on the basis of any such information without
referring to applicable laws and regulations and/
or without taking appropriate professional advice.
Although every effort has been made to ensure
accuracy, the International Air Transport Associ-
ation shall not be held responsible for any loss or
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or misinterpretation of the contents hereof. Fur-
thermore, the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation expressly disclaims any and all liability to
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publication or not, in respect of anything done
or omitted, and the consequences of anything
done or omitted, by any such person or entity
in reliance on the contents of this publication.
16 Authority................................................................................................................................... INT 8
Table 3.6–Guidance for Development of Operational Control Competency Course Syllabi ...................DSP 66
Table 6.1—Passenger Services, Ramp Services, Load Control Training Elements ..............................GRH 30
Section 1
Organization and Management System (ORG) ORG 1 to ORG 36 December 2021
Section 2
Flight Operations (FLT) FLT 1 to FLT 116 December 2021
Section 3
Operational Control and Flight Dispatch (DSP) DSP 1 to DSP 70 December 2021
Section 4
Aircraft Engineering and Maintenance (MNT) MNT 1 to MNT 54 December 2021
Section 5
Cabin Operations (CAB) CAB 1 to CAB 46 December 2021
Section 6
Ground Handling Operations (GRH) GRH 1 to GRH 30 December 2021
Section 7
Cargo Operations (CGO) CGO 1 to CGO 18 December 2021
Section 8
Security Management (SEC) SEC 1 to SEC 26 December 2021
Record of Revisions
Introduction
Summary of Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies
(These are changes applied addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
throughout this section but not semicolons or spaces
shown below as individual
changes)
4 Applicability of ISARPs, Aircraft • Technical change: note added to define use of the term ‘aircraft’ in
Applicability the ISM
5 Explanation of ISARPs, Notes, • Technical change: description of the <AC> symbol deleted; symbol
Tables and Symbols no longer used in identifiers
13 Conflicting Information • Technical change: ISM publication month revised
IATA Dangerous Goods
Regulation (DGR)
Section 1 (ORG)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • None
Standards Added • Five (5): ORG 1.5.5, ORG 3.3.1 (upgrade), ORG 3.3.3 (upgrade),
ORG 3.3.4 (upgrade), ORG 3.3.5 (upgrade)
Recommended Practices • Four (4): ORG 3.3.1 (upgrade), ORG 3.3.3 (upgrade), ORG 3.3.4
Eliminated (upgrade), ORG 3.3.5 (upgrade)
Recommended Practices Added • One (1): ORG 3.2.2
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this ISM section • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
but are not shown individually typos, addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
below) semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • Editorial change: wording revised for simplification (3rd paragraph)
General Guidance • None
ORG 1.1.1 Guidance • Editorial change: term added to IRM reference per ISM convention
ORG 1.1.2 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.1.3
ORG 1.1.2 Guidance • Editorial changes: terms added to IRM references per ISM
convention (1st paragraph); wording deleted/revised (8th paragraph)
ORG 1.1.3 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.1.4
• Editorial change: use of abbreviation per ISM convention (AOC)
ORG 1.1.4 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.1.12
ORG 1.1.10 Guidance • Editorial changes: term deleted from IRM references per ISM
convention (1st paragraph); unnecessary word deleted (5th
paragraph)
ORG 1.2.1 • Editorial change: wording revised for alignment with Annex 19
• Editorial change: specifications and guidance from previous ORG
1.2.2 incorporated and combined
ORG 1.2.1 Guidance • Technical change: IRM reference added
• Editorial change: wording revised for improved flow (2nd, 6th
paragraphs)
ORG 1.2.2 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.2.3
ORG 1.2.3 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.3.5
Sub-section 1.3 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 1.3.1 and Guidance • Editorial change: wording deleted in note and relocated to guidance
(appropriate location for such wording)
Sub-section 1.4 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 1.4.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.2.1A
ORG 1.4.1 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to describe definition of safety
objectives in SMS Framework (2nd paragraph)
ORG 1.4.2 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.2.1B
• Technical changes: wording revised for alignment with Annex 19;
specifications revised to include safety performance targets (SPTs)
• Editorial change: wording deleted in note and relocated to guidance
(appropriate location for such wording)
ORG 1.4.2 Auditor Actions • Editorial changes: reference to SPTs added for consistency with
revisions in provision (1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th AA steps)
ORG 1.4.2 Guidance • Technical change: addition to IRM reference
• Technical change: reference to SPTS added for alignment with
revisions in provision (3rd paragraph)
• Technical change: wording added to provide description of SPTs (4th
paragraph)
• Technical change: wording added to explain why/when setting SPTs
might not be appropriate (5th paragraph)
• Editorial change: wording deleted from note added to guidance (9th
paragraph)
Sub-section 1.5 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 1.5.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.8.1
ORG 1.5.2 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.6.1
ORG 1.5.3 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 1.6.2
Sub-section 3.2 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 3.2.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.1.2
• Editorial change: wording deleted in note and relocated to guidance
(appropriate location for such wording)
ORG 3.2.1 Effectiveness Criteria • Technical change: wording revised to address quantitative and
qualitive organizational safety risk tolerability (3rd effectiveness
criterion)
ORG 3.2.1 Guidance • Editorial change: wording deleted from note added to guidance (7th
paragraph)
ORG 3.2.2 • Recommenced practice added: specifies process for safety data
analysis to predict future risks to aircraft operation; alignment with
Annex 19
Sub-section 3.3 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 3.3.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.7.1
• Standard added: upgraded from recommended practice
• Technical change: provision and guidance revised with ISM 14,
Revision 1
ORG 3.3.2 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.7.2
• Editorial change: (GM) symbol added
• Technical change: note deleted
ORG 3.3.2 Auditor Actions • Technical change: reference to conformity with ORG 3.3.3, 3.3.4,
3.3.5 deleted (former 5th AA step)
ORG 3.3.2 Guidance • New guidance to address typical elements of conformance
ORG 3.3.3 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.7.5
• Technical change: conditional phrase revised; applicability
predicated on FDA program in accordance with ORG 3.3.1
• Standard added: upgraded from recommended practice
• Technical change: provision and guidance revised with ISM 14,
Revision 1
ORG 3.3.4 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.7.8
• Technical change: conditional phrase revised; applicability
predicated on FDA program in accordance with ORG 3.3.1
• Standard added: upgraded from recommended practice
• Technical change: provision and guidance revised with ISM 14,
Revision 1
ORG 3.3.5 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.7.9
• Technical change: conditional phrase revised; applicability
predicated on FDA program in accordance with ORG 3.3.1
• Standard added: upgraded from recommended practice
Sub-section 3.4 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 3.4.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.1.8
ORG 3.4.1 Guidance • Editorial change: wording deleted as redundant (4th paragraph);
covered in following paragraph
Sub-section 3.5 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised for consistency with the group
of associated provisions that follow
ORG 3.5.1 • Relocation within ORG section; previously ORG 3.3.10
Section 2 (FLT)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • One (1): FLT 1.5.8
Standards Added • One (1): FLT 3.10.8 (upgrade)
Recommended Practices • One (1): FLT 3.10.8 (upgrade)
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • One (1): FLT 3.12.6
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this ISM section • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
but are not shown individually typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
below) semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • Technical change: reference to provisions with an <AC> symbol
deleted
General Guidance • None
FLT 1.1.2 • Technical change: wording revised (2nd sub-spec) for better
consistency with ORG 1.1.3
FLT 1.2.1 • Technical changes: wording in sub-spec (vii), (d) revised to better
describe use of GPS for approaches and sub-spec (e) to add
“ETOPS/EDTO, as applicable”; second note deleted
FLT 1.2.1 Guidance • Editorial change: IRM reference revised (EDTO) for accuracy, new
reference added (ETOPS) to align with provision (2nd paragraph)
FLT 1.4.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 4.2.1
FLT 1.5.8 • Standard eliminated; psychoactive substance use policy now
addressed in ORG 1.5.5
FLT 1.8.1 • Editorial change: wording in sub-spec (iv) revised for consistency
with ORG 2.6.1
FLT 1.10.1 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
FLT 1.10.2 • Technical change: wording revised/re-structured for consistency with
ORG 2.1.5
FLT 1.10.3 • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.1.2
and other sections
FLT 1.10.3 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
FLT 1.10.4 • Editorial changes: wording in core provision and sub-specs (ii) and
(iii) revised for consistency with ORG 2.1.7 and other sections
FLT 1.11.2 • Technical change: note revised; improper reference to ISAGO
deleted
FLT 1.11.3 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
FLT 1.12.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 3.1.1
FLT 1.12.5 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 1.4.1
and 1.4.2; reference to SPTs added
FLT 1.12.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with revisions to
provision; reference to SPTs added (1st, 3rd, 4th AA steps)
FLT 1.12.5 Guidance • Technical changes: addition to IRM reference, wording revised to
address SPTs (multiple paragraphs)
FLT 2.1.27 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording revised to provide additional areas to be
checked for evidence of implementation (4th AA step)
FLT 2.1.27 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide expanded explanatory
information
FLT 2.1.47 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to provide additional explanatory
material (3rd paragraph)
FLT 2.2.14 Guidance • Editorial changes: IRM references corrected
FLT 2.2.24 • Editorial change: <AC> symbol deleted from provision identifier
FLT 2.2.24 Guidance • Technical change: IRM reference added (1st paragraph)
FLT 2.3.1 • Technical change: wording added; (4th sub-spec) to address
inclusion of recency-of-experience requirements in line training
qualification program
FLT 2.3.1 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording added to provide additional areas to be
checked for evidence of implementation (4th and 7th AA steps)
FLT 2.3.1 Guidance • Technical change: IRM reference added (1st paragraph)
• Technical changes: wording added to recency-of-experience in line
qualification program (5th and 6th paragraphs)
FLT 2.4.1 • Technical change: wording added (‘if required’) to improve accuracy
FLT 3.3.7 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to provide additional areas to be
checked for evidence of implementation (6th AA step)
FLT 3.3.7 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to address satisfaction of recency-
of-experience requirements in line qualification program (3rd
paragraph)
FLT 3.3.10 • Technical change: wording revised (2nd sub-spec) to specify
completion of training and evaluation in special skills/knowledge
required to qualify to conduct flights within areas, on routes over
difficult terrain and/or into special airports
FLT 3.7.6 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to provide clarifying information
regarding sub-spec (ii) (a) (3rd paragraph)
FLT 3.8.9 • Editorial change: <AC> symbol deleted from provision identifier
• Technical changes: wording added to address transport of cargo in
passenger cabin without passengers; second note deleted
FLT 3.9.4 Guidance • Technical changes: wording deleted/added to provide expanded
explanatory information regarding onboard weapons
FLT 3.10.2 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised; flight plan information corrected
(2nd paragraph)
FLT 3.10.5 • Technical change: wording revised to specify a policy and/or
procedures (rather than guidance) for monitoring appropriate radio
frequencies
FLT 3.10.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with changes in
provision (1st AA step)
FLT 3.10.8 • Standard added (upgrade): conditional provision; specifies guidance
for flight crews to implement strategic lateral offset procedures
(SLOP); applicable to operators that conduct flights in airspace
where SLOP is used
FLT 3.10.8 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide expanded information
that addresses implementation of SLOP (all paragraphs)
FLT 3.11.5 • Technical change: wording revised to specify a policy and/or
procedures (rather than guidance) for monitoring meteorological
conditions
FLT 3.11.5 Guidance • Technical changes: wording deleted/added to provide expanded
explanatory information regarding monitoring meteorological
conditions
FLT 3.11.7 • Technical changes: wording revised to specify a policy and/or
procedures (rather than guidance) for monitoring fuel during flight;
applicability revised to flight crew (rather than PIC)
FLT 3.11.9 Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised; reference to sub-spec item
corrected
FLT 3.11.10 • Technical change: wording revised to include specific reference to
ETOPS/EDTO.
FLT 3.11.10 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised; regulatory reference corrected
(3rd paragraph, 4th, 5th bullet points)
FLT 3.11.20 • Editorial changes: wording revised (1st, 2nd sub-specs) for clarity and
accuracy
FLT 3.11.20 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide expanded explanatory
information regarding provision sub-specs (i), (ii) and (iii) (2nd, 3rd and
4th paragraphs)
FLT 3.11.50A • Technical change: wording revised to specify a policy and/or
procedures (rather than guidance) for flight crews to restrict rate of
descent when operating a low altitudes
FLT 3.11.60 • Technical changes: wording revised/restructured significantly to
specify elements of a go-around policy
FLT 3.11.60 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: AA steps revised for consistency with changes
in provision (4th and 5th AA steps)
FLT 3.11.60 Guidance • Technical changes: wording deleted/added to provide explanatory
information that addresses a go-around policy (all paragraphs)
FLT 3.11.62 Guidance • Technical change: abbreviation AGL revised to AAL for accuracy (1st
paragraph)
FLT 3.11.63 Guidance • Technical change: abbreviation AGL revised to AAL for accuracy (2nd
paragraph)
FLT 3.11.68A • Technical change: wording revised to specify a policy and/or
procedures (rather than guidance) for flight crew landing
performance assessment
FLT 3.11.68B • Technical change: wording ‘above airport elevation’ revised to AAL
for accuracy
FLT 3.12.5 • Technical change: abbreviation AFE revised to AAL for accuracy
FLT 3.12.6 Placeholder • Placeholder deleted
FLT 3.12.6 • Recommended practice added; specifies guidance that addresses
prevention of runway excursions
FLT 3.12.7 • Technical changes: wording revised to specify guidance that
addresses prevention of runway incursions is published or
referenced in the OM and includes policies, processes, procedures
and flight crew actions
FLT 3.12.7 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide intent statement and
expanded explanatory information that addresses risk management
associated with prevention of runway incursion (1st – 4th paragraphs)
FLT 3.13.9 • Editorial changes: <AC> symbol deleted from provision identifier;
wording revised to improve accuracy
• Technical changes: wording revised: 9G specifications deleted;
reference to smoke barrier deleted in note
FLT 3.13.11 • Technical changes: wording revised/added to include opening and
closing of cabin access doors; complements CAB 3.2.4A and GRH
3.2.5
FLT 3.13.11 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: AA steps revised for consistency with changes
in provision (1st and 3rd AA steps)
FLT 3.13.11 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised/added to provide expanded
explanatory information regarding cabin access door
arming/disarming and opening closing (all paragraphs)
FLT 3.15.2 Guidance • Technical change: table of potential reportable flight conditions
revised to include unmanned aerial vehicles (last line item)
FLT 3.15.3 • Editorial change: (GM) symbol added
FLT 3.15.3 Guidance • New guidance material; provides explanatory information regarding
accident/incident reporting
FLT 3.15.4 • Editorial change: (GM) symbol added
FLT 3.15.4 Guidance • New guidance material; provides explanatory information regarding
notification/reporting of emergencies
FLT 4.3.5 • Technical change: note added to specify guidance/procedures that
address additional supplemental oxygen requirements for flights
over high terrain
FLT 4.3.5 Guidance • Editorial changes: wording revised for clarity/accuracy (2nd
paragraph)
Table 2.3 • Technical change: item (iii) revised to include EDTO; item (iv)
revised to delete HUD/EVS
Section 3 (DSP)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • Five (5): DSP 1.5.9, DSP 4.6.2, DSP 4.6.4, DSP 4.6.5, DSP 4.6.6
Standards Added • None
Recommended Practices • One (1): DSP 4.6.3
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • None
Tables added • One (1): Table 3.6
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this ISM section • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
but are not shown individually typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
below) semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • Technical changes: wording revised/added to address conformity
with certain IOSA standards through the use of operational
variations that are approved by the State and developed using safety
risk management (SRM) processes (3rd and 7th paragraphs)
General Guidance • None
DSP 2.3.1 Auditor Actions • Editorial change: word revised for consistency (2nd AA step)
DSP 2.3.1 Guidance • Editorial change: wording added; reference to Table 3.5 (2nd
paragraph)
DSP 2.3.3 Guidance • Editorial change: word revised for consistency (1st paragraph)
DSP 2.3.4 Guidance • Editorial changes: word revised for consistency, ETOPS paired with
EDTO for abbreviation consistency (1st, 3rd paragraphs)
DSP 2.4.1 Guidance • Editorial change: word revised for consistency (1st paragraph)
DSP 3.2.9C Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised; reference to invalid EC regulation
deleted (6th paragraph, 2nd bullet point)
DSP 3.5.2 • Technical change: wording in 1st note revised/deleted to specify that
variations to aircraft tracking automated reporting intervals are
managed using a risk management processes
DSP 3.5.2 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to provide information that
addresses/describes the use of risk management processes
(multiple paragraphs)
DSP 3.5.3 • Technical change: wording in 2nd note revised/deleted to specify that
variations to aircraft tracking automated reporting intervals are
managed using a risk management processes
DSP 3.5.3 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to provide information that
addresses/describes the use of risk management processes
(multiple paragraphs)
DSP 3.6.5B Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised; ETOPS paired with EDTO for
abbreviation consistency (last paragraph)
DSP 3.7.2 • Technical changes: wording revised/restructured to include
requirement to make flight-in-distress position information available
to appropriate organizations as established by the State
DSP 3.7.2 Guidance • Technical changes: IRM reference added; wording revised to
expand information that addresses aircraft distress reporting (all
paragraphs)
Sub-section 4, General Guidance • Technical changes: wording added/deleted to provide expanded
information that addresses/describes processes for the development
of operational variations to specifications in certain IOSA standards
(all paragraphs and table line items)
DSP 4.1.1 • Technical change: wording in note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations
DSP 4.1.1 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, 6th – 8th AA steps)
DSP 4.1.1 Guidance • Technical changes: IRM reference added; wording added to provide
information that addresses/describes development of operational
variations through the use of SRM processes (1st and 6th -10th
paragraphs)
DSP 4.1.2 • Technical change: wording in note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations provided each
variation is subjected SRM processes and safety performance
monitoring
DSP 4.1.2 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.1.2 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses/describes development of operational variations through
the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.8 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.3.8 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses development of operational variations through the use of
SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.9 • Technical change: wording in 2nd note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations
DSP 4.3.9 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.3.9 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses/describes development of operational variations through
the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.10 • Technical change: wording in 3rd note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations
DSP 4.3.10 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.3.10 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses/describes development of operational variations through
the use of SRM processes (2nd – 6th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.11 • Technical change: wording in note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations
DSP 4.3.11 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.3.11 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses/describes development of operational variations through
the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.12 • Technical changes: wording revised to simplify the specifications;
PCO deleted
DSP 4.3.12 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised to address definition of final
reserve fuel requirements in accordance with requirements of the
Authority (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.3.13 • Technical change: wording revised (2nd sub-spec) to address
additional fuel requirements in accordance with the State or operator
• Technical change: wording in note revised to address conformity
with the standard through operational variations
DSP 4.3.13 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised to include actions for
collection of evidence needed to assess conformance through
operational variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.3.13 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added to provide information that
addresses/describes development of operational variations through
the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.4.1 • Editorial changes: wording revised to improve accuracy
DSP 4.4.1 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to identify PIC responsibility for
the carriage of supplemental oxygen
Sub-section 4.5 Header • Editorial change: title wording revised; ETOPS paired with EDTO for
abbreviation consistency
DSP 4.5.1 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised; regulatory reference corrected
(2nd paragraph, 5th, 6th bullet points)
DSP 4.5.2 • Technical change: wording in conditional phrase revised to provide
greater specificity
DSP 4.5.3 • Technical change: wording revised; ETOPS paired with EDTO for
abbreviation consistency
DSP 4.5.4 • Technical change: wording added (3rd sub-spec) to define most
limiting EDTO-significant system time limitation as and EDTO
limitation
• Technical changes: notes added to address conformity with the
standard through operational variations and to provide a reference to
ORG 3.4.1 and DSP 4.5.5 for cargo compartment fire suppression
limitation exceedances
DSP 4.5.4 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps added to include collection of
evidence needed to assess conformance through operational
variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.5.4 Guidance • Technical changes: IRM reference added; wording added to provide
information that addresses/describes development of operational
variations through the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
DSP 4.5.5 • Technical change: wording added (3rd sub-spec) to define most
limiting EDTO-significant system time limitation as and EDTO
limitation
• Technical changes: notes added to address conformity with the
standard through operational variations and to provide a reference to
ORG 3.4.1 and DSP 4.5.5 for cargo compartment fire suppression
limitation exceedances
DSP 4.5.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps added to include collection of
evidence needed to assess conformance through operational
variation(s) (header, multiple AA steps)
DSP 4.5.5 Guidance • Technical changes: IRM reference added; wording added to provide
information that addresses/describes development of operational
variations through the use of SRM processes (3rd – 7th paragraphs)
Sub-section 4.6 Header • Header deleted
Sub-section 4.6, General • General guidance eliminated; information revised and incorporated
Guidance in general guidance for sub-section 4
DSP 4.6.1 Placeholder • Placeholder deleted
DSP 4.6.2 • Standard eliminated; auditor actions and guidance material revised
and incorporated in other individual provisions in sub-section 4
DSP 4.6.3 • Recommended practice eliminated; auditor actions and guidance
material revised and incorporated in other individual provisions in
sub-section 4
DSP 4.6.4 • Standard eliminated; auditor actions and guidance material revised
and incorporated in other individual provisions in sub-section 4
DSP 4.6.5 • Standard eliminated; auditor actions and guidance material revised
and incorporated in other individual provisions in sub-section 4
DSP 4.6.6 • Standard eliminated; auditor actions and guidance material revised
and incorporated in other individual provisions in sub-section 4
Table 3.3 • Editorial change: wording revised (7th sub-spec); ETOPS paired with
EDTO for abbreviation consistency
Section 4 (MNT)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • None
Standards Added • None
Recommended Practices • None
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • One (1): Table 4.14 (i)
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this section but • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
are not shown individually below) typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • None
General Guidance • None
MNT 1.1.2 Guidance • Technical change: addition to IRM reference
MNT 1.1.3 • Technical change: wording revised (1st sub-spec) for better
consistency with ORG 1.1.3
MNT 1.3.2 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised for accuracy; Design Approval
Holder (DAH) instead of Task Card Holder (3rd paragraph)
MNT 1.5.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 4.2.1
MNT 1.6.3 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording revised to improve accuracy (3rd AA
step)
MNT 1.8.1 • Editorial changes: sub-specs wording, order revised, re-ordered for
consistency with ORG 2.6.1
MNT 1.8.2 • Editorial change: wording revised for consistency with ORG 2.6.2
MNT 1.10.1 • Editorial changes: wording in sub-specs (iii) and (iv) revised for
consistency with ORG 2.1.1
MNT 1.10.2 • Editorial changes: wording in core provision and sub-spec (i) revised
for consistency with ORG 2.1.7 and other sections
MNT 1.10.3 • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.1.2
and other sections
MNT 1.11.7 • Technical change: wording revised; reference to external
maintenance organizations for consistency with other provisions in
sub-section
• Editorial changes: word endings revised for consistency with change
to plural term external maintenance organizations
MNT 1.11.8 • Editorial change: wording revised for better consistency with ORG
2.2.2
MNT 1.12.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 3.1.1
MNT 1.12.5 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 1.4.1
and 1.4.2; reference to SPTs added
MNT 1.12.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with revisions to
provision; reference to SPTs added (1st, 3rd, 4th AA steps)
MNT 1.12.5 Guidance • Technical changes: addition to IRM reference; wording revised to
address SPTs (multiple paragraphs)
MNT 2.4.2 • Technical changes: wording revised to improve technical accuracy
MNT 2.4.2 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised/added for consistency with
revisions to provision;
MNT 2.4.2 Guidance • Technical changes: addition to IRM reference; wording revised for
consistency with provision
MNT 2.7.1 • Technical changes: wording revised to improve technical accuracy
• Editorial change: sub-specs (i) and (ii) exchanged for ordering
accuracy
MNT 2.7.1 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action steps revised/added for consistency with
revisions to provision;
MNT 2.8.1 Auditor Actions • Technical change: ETOPS paired with EDTO for abbreviation
consistency (3rd AA step)
MNT 2.9.1 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to improve technical accuracy
(1st, 6th paragraphs); wording added to address FDR/CVR
operational checking in the absence of requirements from the
Authority and manufacturer
MNT 2.9.2 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to improve technical accuracy
(2nd, 5th paragraphs)
• Editorial changes: wording revised to improve grammar (2nd
paragraph)
MNT 3.2.2 Auditor Actions • Technical change: missing AA step added (2nd AA step)
MNT 4.2.2 Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised; verb added to provide complete
sentence (1st paragraph)
Table 4.11 (vii) • Technical changes: ELT specifications; wording revised for
alignment with Annex 6; note restored to address ELT equipage for
certain international flights
Table 4.11 (xiv) • Editorial changes: CVR specifications and note; reference to Table
4.12 relocated from note to requirement column; word ‘utilized’ in
note replaced by ‘used’ for ISM word usage consistency
• Technical change: AI option expired; AI note deleted
Table 4.11 (xv) • Editorial change: DLR note: symbol for Active Implementation (AI)
corrected
• Technical change: AI option expired; AI note deleted
Table 4.11 (xix) • Technical change: wording added to improve accuracy (3rd column,
Applicability)
• Technical changes: passenger seating specifications revised to
provide a minimum number of required megaphones (4th column,
Requirements)
• Technical change: AI note deleted; no longer applicable (5th column)
Table 4.11 (xxx) • Technical changes: ADT system specifications and note; individual
aircraft CoA date revised to 1 January 2023 for alignment with Annex
6; AI expiry date in note revised to 1 January 2025
Table 4.12 (iii) • Technical change: PBE installation guidance; wording added to
explain the meaning of the term ‘adjacent’
Table 4.12 (xv) • Technical change: DLR guidance; wording added to define the term
‘applicable data link messages’
Table 4.12 (xiii) • Editorial change: cargo compartment fire detection/suppression
system specifications; wording deleted to eliminate duplication
Table 4.12 (xix) • Technical change: wording added to provide an intent statement,
address possibility of a more restrictive regulatory requirement (2nd
paragraph)
Table 4.14 (i) • Recommended practice added; specifies an automatic ELT carried
on board all aircraft
Table 4.14 (iv) • Editorial change: flight deck door specifications; word ‘utilized’
replaced by ‘used’ for ISM word usage consistency
Table 4.14 (v) • Technical change: DLR specifications; wording added for alignment
with Annex 6
Table 4.14 (vi) • Technical change: ADT system specifications and note; individual
aircraft CoA date revised to 1 January 2023 for alignment with Annex
6; AI expiry date in note revised to 1 January 2025
Table 4.15 (v) • Technical change: wording added to define the term ‘applicable data
link messages’
Section 5 (CAB)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • Two (2): CAB 1.2.6, CAB 3.4.3
Standards Added • None
Recommended Practices • None
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • One (1): CAB 3.2.4A
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this section but • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
are not shown individually below) typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • None
General Guidance • None
CAB 1.1.2 • Technical change: wording revised (3rd sub-spec) for better
consistency with ORG 1.1.3
CAB 1.2.4 Guidance • Editorial change: word revised for consistency in ISM word usage
(2nd paragraph)
CAB 1.2.6 • Standard eliminated; psychoactive substance use policy now
addressed in ORG 1.5.5
CAB 1.3.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 4.2.1
CAB 1.7.1 • Editorial changes: wording in sub-specs (iv) and (vi) revised for
consistency with ORG 2.6.1
CAB 1.9.1 • Editorial change: wording in sub-specs (iii) revised for consistency
with ORG 2.1.1
CAB 1.9.2 • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.1.2
and other sections
CAB 1.9.2 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
CAB 1.9.3 • Editorial changes: wording in core provision and sub-spec (iii)
revised for consistency with ORG 2.1.7 and other sections
CAB 1.10.1A Auditor Actions • Technical change: improper audit step deleted (4th AA step)
CAB 1.10.2 • Technical change: note revised; improper reference to ISAGO
deleted
CAB 1.10.4 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
CAB 1.11.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 3.1.1
CAB 1.11.5 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 1.4.1
and 1.4.2; reference to SPTs added
CAB 1.11.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with revisions to
provision; reference to SPTs added (1st, 3rd, 4th AA steps)
CAB 1.11.5 Guidance • Technical changes: addition to IRM reference, wording revised to
address SPTs (multiple paragraphs)
CAB 2.2.1 • Technical change: wording added to specify cabin crew training in
basic subjects as part of the cabin crew initial training course
• Technical change: conformance applicability table deleted
CAB 3.2.4A • Recommended practice added; specifies procedures for opening
and closing of cabin access doors; complements FLT 3.13.11 and
GRH 3.2.5
CAB 3.2.4B • Editorial change: Suffix ‘B’ added to provision identifier
CAB 3.3.1 Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised with reference to provide greater
specificity (last paragraph)
CAB 3.3.2 Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised with reference to provide greater
specificity (2nd paragraph)
CAB 3.4.3 • Standard eliminated; specifications integrated in CAB 3.4.13
CAB 3.4.13 • Technical changes: wording revised/restructured; specifications from
eliminated CAB 3.4.3 integrated
CAB 3.4.13 Guidance • Technical change: wording deleted/added to provide expanded
information related to procedures for cabin crew delivery of oxygen
to passengers (all paragraphs)
CAB 3.4.14 • Technical changes: wording revised to add non-acceptance to
specification for policy that addresses passengers that have the
potential need for supplementary oxygen
CAB 3.4.14 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised/expanded for consistency with
changes in the provision (1st, 3rd AA steps)
CAB 3.4.14 Guidance • Editorial changes: wording deleted/revised for simplification (1st, 3rd
paragraphs)
Section 6 (GRH)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • None
Standards Added • Two (2): GRH 3.2.6A (upgrade), GRH 3.2.6B (upgrade)
Recommended Practices • Two (2): GRH 3.2.6A (upgrade), GRH 3.2.6B (upgrade)
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • One (1): GRH 3.2.5
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this section but • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
are not shown individually below) typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • None
General Guidance • None
GRH 1.1.2 • Technical change: wording revised (3rd sub-spec) for better
consistency with ORG 1.1.3
GRH 1.1.2 Auditor Actions • Editorial change: wording added to tailor action step to ground
handling operations (2nd AA step)
GRH 1.2.1 Auditor Actions • Technical change: evidence discovery focus statement added (3rd
AA step)
GRH 1.2.2 Auditor Actions • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency of terminology
(1st, 3rd AA steps)
GRH 1.3.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 4.2.1
GRH 1.6.4 Guidance • Technical change: DGR reference corrected.
GRH 1.6.5 • Technical change: wording added to complement intent of GRH
1.6.4; provision applicable to operator that does not transport
dangerous goods ‘as cargo’
GRH 1.6.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised to be consistent with
specifications in the provision (1st, 4th AA steps)
GRH 1.6.5 Guidance • Technical changes: wording added/revised to provide explanatory
information relevant to an operator that does not transport
dangerous goods as cargo
GRH 1.6.6 Guidance • Editorial changes: wording added to improve clarity (2nd paragraph)
GRH 1.6.7 Guidance • Technical change: IGOM reference revised
GRH 1.6.8 Guidance • Technical change: IGOM reference revised (last paragraph)
GRH 1.6.9 • Editorial change: ORG repeat symbol deleted
GRH 1.6.9 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with provision;
reference to IGOM gap analysis checklist and associated video
tutorial added (1st, 3rd paragraphs)
GRH 1.7.1 • Editorial change: wording in sub-spec (vi) revised for consistency
with ORG 2.6.1
GRH 1.7.2 • Editorial change: wording revised for consistency with ORG 2.6.2
and other sections
GRH 1.9.1 • Editorial change: wording revised in sub-spec (iii) for consistency
with ORG 2.1.1
GRH 1.9.2 • Editorial changes: wording in core provision and sub-specs (i) and
(iii) revised for consistency with ORG 2.1.7 and other sections
GRH 1.9.3 • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.1.2
and other sections
GRH 1.10.1A Auditor Actions • Technical change: improper audit step deleted (4th AA step)
GRH 1.10.2 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
GRH 1.10.3 Auditor Actions • Technical change: evidence discovery focus statement added (3rd
AA step)
GRH 1.10.3 Guidance • Editorial change: ORG reference re-located for consistency (last
paragraph)
GRH 1.11.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 3.1.1
GRH 1.11.5 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 1.4.1
and 1.4.2; reference to SPTs added
GRH 1.11.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with revisions to
provision; reference to SPTs added (1st, 3rd, 4th AA steps)
GRH 1.11.5 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to address SPTs (multiple
paragraphs)
GRH 2.1.1 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 2.2.1 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step added; examination of re-qualification
training records (5th AA step)
GRH 2.1.3 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 2.1.4 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd AA step)
GRH 2.2.3 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 2.2.4 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 2.2.5 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 2.2.6 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording added to include requalification training
(3rd and 4th AA steps)
GRH 3.1.2 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step added; examination of reports of
prohibited dangerous goods possessed by passenger (4th AA step)
GRH 3.1.2 Guidance • Technical change: IGOM reference revised
GRH 3.1.3 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step added; examination of documents of
accepted battery-operated mobility aids (4th AA step)
GRH 3.1.6 Guidance • Technical change: IGOM reference added (last paragraph)
GRH 3.2.1 Guidance • Editorial change: wording deleted as repetitive (former 3rd
paragraph)
• Technical change: IGOM reference revised (5th paragraph)
GRH 3.2.3 Guidance • Technical changes: one IGOM reference deleted (1st paragraph);
wording added to provide explanatory information regarding the post
aircraft arrival exterior inspection procedure
GRH 3.2.5 • Recommended practice added; specifies procedures for opening
and closing of cabin access doors; complements FLT 3.13.11 and
CAB 3.2.4A
GRH 3.6.3 Guidance • Technical changes: IGOM reference revised; AHM references
added.
GRH 3.6.4 Auditor Actions • Technical change: evidence discovery focus statement added (3rd
AA step)
GRH 3.6.5 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step added; examination of dangerous
goods accident/incident reporting records (4th AA step)
GRH 3.7.1 • Editorial change: wording revised for terminology consistency
GRH 3.7.2 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording revised to include aircraft security
searches for locating prohibited items; evidence discovery focus
statement added (1st AA step)
GRH 3.7.3 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised to better align with
specifications in provisions (1st, 3rd AA steps)
GRH 3.7.5 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step added; examination of records that
describe PIC notification of weapons on board (3rd AA step)
GRH 3.7.6 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action step added; identified/assessed methods
used to notify the PIC for passengers on board that are the subject of
judicial or administrative proceedings (2nd AA step); wording revised
to better align with specifications in provisions (3rd AA step)
GRH 3.7.7 Auditor Actions • Editorial change: wording revised to improve intent (4th AA step)
GRH 4.1.2 • Technical changes: wording revised to better align with Annex 17;
(2nd sub-spec) to expand the specification of qualified persons on
board the aircraft
GRH 4.1.2 Guidance • Technical change: wording revised for accuracy (4th paragraph)
• Technical changes: wording added to provide expanded information
regarding the roles/responsibilities of operational personnel
potentially involved during aircraft fueling with passengers on board
(6th, 7th paragraphs)
GRH 4.1.7 Auditor Actions • Technical change: wording revised for accuracy (1st AA step)
GRH 4.2.1 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: evidence discovery focus statements added (1st,
3rd, 4th AA steps)
GRH 4.2.3 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: evidence discovery focus statement added (3rd
AA step)
GRH 4.2.4 Auditor Actions • Technical change: action step revised; examination of
records/reports resulting from monitoring/supervision of aircraft
de-/anti-icing and an evidence discovery focus statement (4th AA
step)
GRH 4.2.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: action step added; examination of
records/reports of quality control inspection and evidence discovery
focus statement (3rd AA step)
Section 7 (CGO)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • None
Standards Added • None
Recommended Practices • None
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • None
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this section but • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
are not shown individually below) typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
semicolons or spaces
Applicability Box • None
General Guidance • None
CGO 1.1.2 • Technical change: wording revised (3rd sub-spec) for better
consistency with ORG 1.1.3
CGO 1.2.2 Auditor Actions • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency of terminology
(1st, 3rd AA steps)
CGO 1.3.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 4.2.1
CGO 1.7.1 • Editorial changes: wording in sub-specs (iv) and (vi) revised for
consistency with ORG 2.6.1
CGO 1.7.2 • Editorial change: wording revised for consistency with ORG 2.6.2
and other sections
CGO 1.9.1 • Editorial change: wording revised in sub-spec (iii) for consistency
with ORG 2.1.1
CGO 1.9.2 • Editorial changes: wording in core provision and sub-specs (ii) and
(iii) revised for consistency with ORG 2.1.7 and other sections
CGO 1.9.3 • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.1.2
and other sections
CGO 1.10.1A Auditor Actions • Technical change: improper audit step deleted (4th AA step)
CGO 1.11.1 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured for consistency
with ORG 3.1.1
CGO 1.11.5 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 1.4.1
and 1.4.2; reference to SPTs added
CGO 1.11.5 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with revisions to
provision; reference to SPTs added (1st, 3rd, 4th AA steps)
CGO 1.11.5 Guidance • Technical changes: wording revised to address SPTs (multiple
paragraphs)
CGO 2.2.2 Guidance • Editorial change: wording revised to correct typo (3rd paragraph)
CGO 3.2.17 • Technical changes: wording revised/re-structured to reflect changes
to dangerous goods reporting requirements; alignment with DGR
• Editorial change: (GM) symbol added
CGO 3.2.17 Auditor Actions • Editorial changes: wording revised for consistency with revised
specifications in provision (1st, 3rd AA steps); (GM) symbol added
Section 8 (SEC)
Summary of Revisions
Standards Eliminated • One (1): SEC 3.4.2
Standards Added • None
Recommended Practices • None
Eliminated
Recommended Practices Added • None
Revisions
Area Changed Description of Change(s)
Group Revisions • Technical changes: revision/update of numerous references to
(Changes that are applied multiple individual ORG provisions resulting from ORG section restructure
times throughout this section but • Editorial changes: correction of grammatical discrepancies, minor
are not shown individually below.) typos; addition/deletion of commas, periods, hyphens, apostrophes,
semicolons or spaces
Applicability box • None
General Guidance • None
SEC 1.2.1 Guidance • Editorial change: word revised for consistency in ISM word usage
(6th paragraph)
SEC 1.4.1 • Technical changes: wording revised for consistency with ORG 4.2.1
(not a repeated ORG provision)
SEC 3.1.3 Guidance • Technical changes: IRM reference added (1st paragraph); wording
added to include authorized supernumeraries (2nd paragraph)
SEC 3.3.1 • Technical change: word ‘passenger’ deleted; onboard weapon policy
applicable to all flights
• Editorial change: wording revised for alignment with complementary
FLT provision
SEC 3.3.1 Guidance • Technical changes: wording deleted/added to provide expanded
explanatory information regarding onboard weapons (1st – 5th
paragraphs)
• Editorial change: wording revised; use of ‘shall’ replaced for
consistency in ISM word usage (last paragraph)
SEC 3.3.3 • Technical change: wording added (1st sub-spec) to specify that the
passenger is authorized to declare a weapon not loaded
SEC 3.3.3 Guidance • Editorial changes: wording revised; typo corrected, non-relevant
wording deleted (1st paragraph, 4th, 5th bullet points)
SEC 3.4.1 • Technical change: note added; states supernumeraries that require
a flight reservation are subject to security screening in accordance
with the specifications in the provision
SEC 3.4.1 Auditor Actions • Technical changes: wording added; reference to supernumeraries
included for consistency with changes to specifications in provision
(1st and 2nd AA steps)
SEC 3.4.2 Placeholder • New placeholder
SEC 3.4.2 • Standard eliminated: security screening of supernumeraries now
addressed in new note in SEC 3.4.1
SEC 3.4.6 Guidance • Technical change: wording added to provide information on behavior
detection methods (3rd paragraph)
• Editorial change: wording revised for consistency in ISM word usage
(3rd paragraph)
SEC 3.6.6 guidance • Technical change: wording revised; information expanded for
alignment with specifications in provision (2nd paragraph)
1 Purpose
The IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) is published in order to provide the IOSA standards, recommended
practices (ISARPs), associated guidance material and other supporting information necessary for an operator
to successfully prepare for an audit.
The ISM is the sole source of assessment criteria to be used by auditors when conducting an audit against
the ISARPs.
The ISM may also be used as a guide for any operator desiring to structure its operational management and
control systems in conformity with the latest industry operational practices.
2 Structure
The ISM is organized as follows:
• Section 1 → Organization and Management System (ORG);
• Section 2 → Flight Operations (FLT);
• Section 3 → Operational Control and Flight Dispatch (DSP);
• Section 4 → Aircraft Engineering and Maintenance (MNT);
• Section 5 → Cabin Operations (CAB);
• Section 6 → Ground Handling Operations (GRH);
• Section 7 → Cargo Operations (CGO);
• Section 8 → Security Management (SEC).
Each section in this Manual is assigned an associated 3-letter identifier (in parentheses above). The
reference number for every standard or recommended practice within a section includes the specific 3-letter
identifier for that section (e.g. ORG 1.1.1).
4 Applicability of ISARPs
Applicability Guidance
To provide guidance to operators, an Applicability box is found at the beginning of each section of this
manual. Within the box is a general description of the applicability of the ISARPs contained in the section.
The applicability of individual standards or recommended practices is always determined by the auditor. As a
means to assist with the interpretation of individual application, many ISARPs begin with a conditional phrase
as described below.
Systemic Applicability
When making a determination as to the applicability of individual ISARPs, it is important to take into account
operations (relevant to the individual standard or recommended practice) that are conducted within stations
and locations throughout the operator's network.
Aircraft Applicability
Note: The term aircraft as used throughout the ISM refers to fixed wing aircraft (airplane, aeroplane).
The ISARPs as published in this version of the ISM are applicable only for the audit of an operator that
operates a minimum of one (i.e. one or more) multi-engine, two-pilot aircraft with a maximum certificated
takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb) to conduct:
• Passenger flights with or without cabin crew.
• Cargo flights with or without the carriage of passengers or supernumeraries.
ISARPs may not be applied or used for the Audit of an operator that either:
• Does not operate a minimum of one aircraft as specified above, or
• Has all aircraft operations conducted by another operator.
ISARPs may not be applied or used for the Audit of operations that are conducted with:
• Aircraft that have a maximum certificated takeoff mass of 5,700 kg (12,566 lb) or less;
• Single engine aircraft;
• Piston engine aircraft;
• Single pilot aircraft;
• Helicopters;
• Seaplanes.
During an audit, ISARPs are applied only to those aircraft that are of the type authorized in the Air Operator
Certificate (AOC) and used in commercial passenger and/or cargo operations. Certain ISARPs are also
applicable to non-commercial operations, and such application is indicated in a note that is part of the
standard or recommended practice.
Other owned or leased aircraft that are not of the type authorized in the AOC and/or not used in commercial
air transport operations will not be evaluated during an audit. However, the existence of such aircraft will be
referenced with an explanation in the IOSA Audit Report (IAR).
Systems and Equipment Applicability
Aircraft that meet the above-specified aircraft applicability criteria are assessed for conformity with the
applicable aircraft and cabin systems and equipment specifications contained in ISM Section 4 (MNT),
Table 4.11 to Table 4.14.
5 Explanation of ISARPs
ISARPs contained in this manual have been developed for use under the IOSA program and contain the
operational criteria upon which the audits are based. ISARPs are not regulations.
ISARPs Identifiers
All ISM provisions (i.e. the ISARPs) are preceded by an identifier that consists of the three-letter section
abbreviation and a string of three numbers separated by two decimal points (e.g. ORG 1.1.1).
Stabilization of the ISARPs identifiers is an important goal, primarily for facilitating use of the ISARPs by
operators, auditors and others, but also for the purpose of ensuring an accurate statistical basis. Therefore,
when revising the ISM, every effort is made to minimize any re-numbering of the ISARPs.
In certain instances, new provisions must be inserted into an existing series of ISARPs. Normally this is done
when it is important that the new provision has a logical locational relationship with another existing provision.
When this occurs, an additional upper-case letter is attached to the identifier of the applicable provisions as
the means of avoiding the re-numbering of other ISARPs that follow in the series.
For example, when a new FLT provision was developed to address AQP/ATQP, its logical location was
immediately following the existing FLT 2.1.1, which contains the core flight crew training program
specifications. The new provision was inserted immediately under FLT 2.1.1, and the two provisions became
FLT 2.1.1A and FLT 2.1.1B. The addition of upper-case letters to the identifiers of those two provisions
precluded the need to renumber all of the other ISARPs that follow in that series.
Standards
IOSA Standards are specified systems, policies, programs, processes, procedures, plans, sets of measures,
facilities, components, types of equipment or any other aspect of operations under the scope of IOSA that
have been determined to be an operational necessity, and with which an operator will be expected to be in
conformity at the conclusion of an audit.
Standards always contain the word “shall” (e.g. “The Operator shall have a process…”) in order to denote that
conformance by an operator being audited is a requirement for IOSA registration.
During an audit, determination of nonconformity with specifications contained in an IOSA Standard results in
a Finding, which in turn results in the generation of a Corrective Action Report (CAR).
To close a Finding, an operator will develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP), and then implement corrective
action in accordance with the CAP.
Recommended Practices
IOSA Recommended Practices are specified systems, policies, programs, processes, procedures, plans,
sets of measures, facilities, components, types of equipment or any other aspects of operations under the
audit scope of IOSA that have been determined to be operationally desirable, but conformance is optional by
an operator. Recommended Practices always contain the italicized word “should” (e.g. “The Operator should
have a policy…”) to denote conformance is optional.
During an audit, a determination of nonconformity with specifications contained in an IOSA Recommended
Practice results in an Observation, which in turn results in the generation of a CAR.
An operator is not obliged to close an observation with corrective action but, as a minimum, must provide the
root cause analysis (RCA) portion of the CAP. However, if an operator chooses to close an Observation, it
will require subsequent implementation of corrective action in the same manner as is required to close a
Finding.
Conditional Phrase
Certain provisions (i.e. standards or recommended practices, or sub-specifications within certain provisions),
begin with a conditional phrase. The conditional phrase states the conditions (one or more) that serve to
define the applicability of the provision or sub-specification to the individual operator being audited. A
conditional phrase begins with the words “If the Operator…”
When assessing an operator against a provision or sub-specification that begins with a conditional phrase,
the Auditor will first determine if an operator meets the condition(s) stated in the conditional phrase. If the
operator meets the stated condition(s), the provision or sub-specification is applicable to the operator and
must be assessed for conformance. If the operator does not meet the condition(s), the provision or sub-
specification is not applicable to that operator, and such non-applicability will then be recorded as N/A.
Parallel Conformity Option (PCO)
A Parallel Conformity Option (PCO) may be included in a limited number of provisions in this ISM. A PCO
provides an optional means for an operator to be in conformity with an IOSA provision that contains a basic
operational specification (typically derived from ICAO standards), which, due to technical, logistical regulatory
or other relevant factors, cannot be implemented by a large segment of the industry.
Where a PCO is included in an IOSA provision, it will be clearly identified by a [PCO] symbol and described in
an informational note (see Notes and Symbols below). If the PCO has an expiration date, the note will also
include the expiration date.
Within a provision, the basic operational specification(s) will always be stated first and the identifiable PCO
specification(s) will immediately follow thereafter.
Each PCO is subject to approval under the IOSA Standards Change Management Process. If a PCO
includes an expiration date, such date will be reviewed on a regular basis to determine if an extension is
required. Such review will include an investigation of industry capability to meet the basic operational
specification. At the point it can be determined the industry will have the capability to meet the basic
operational specification, a PCO will be allowed to expire.
Notes, Tables and Symbols
An bold italicized Note within a provision contains information relevant to the specification(s) in the provision
and is an integral part of the provision.
A Conformance Applicability (CA) Table within a provision indicates how factors or aspects relevant to the
specifications in the provision must be addressed or satisfied by an operator to be in conformity with the
provision. The CA table is an integral part of the provision.
An [SMS] symbol in bold text following the last sentence of an IOSA provision indicates the provision
specifies one or more of the elements of a safety management system (SMS). (SMS is addressed in
subsection 8 below.)
A [PCO] symbol in bold text following a sub-specification within or the last sentence of an IOSA provision
identifies a parallel conformity option (PCO).
A (GM) symbol in bold text following the last sentence of an IOSA provision indicates the existence of
associated guidance material. (Guidance Material is addressed in subsection 6 below.)
An [Eff]) symbol in bold text following the last sentence of an IOSA provision indicates that the provision is
equipped with an Assessment Tool for the Effectiveness methodology and must be assessed for
effectiveness.
A ► symbol at the end of an individual standard or recommended practice in Section 1 (ORG) indicates the
specific provision is repeated almost verbatim in one or more of the other seven sections of the ISM.
A ◄ symbol at the end of a provision in Sections 2–8 indicates the specific provision is also contained in
Section 1 (ORG) and has been repeated almost verbatim.
A ▲ symbol is the identifier for a paragraph that immediately follows a provision and designates the provision
as eligible for the application of Active Implementation. (Active Implementation is addressed in subsection 7
below.)
Special Review Suspension
IATA, upon request from an appropriate industry source, may subject the technical specifications within an
IOSA standard to a special review in accordance with the IOSA Standards Special Review Process. Such
process is defined in Section 1 of the IOSA Program Manual (IPM).
When a special review is conducted, the IOSA standard or certain sub-specifications within the IOSA
standard are put under suspension until the special review has been completed.
When a new edition of the ISM is published while a special review is in progress, the suspended IOSA
standard or sub-specification(s) within the IOSA standard will be identified with either of the following, as
appropriate:
• (This standard is currently suspended in accordance with the IOSA Standards Special Review
Process), or
• (This sub-specification is currently suspended in accordance with the IOSA Standards
Special Review Process).
6 Guidance Material
Guidance material is informational in nature and supplements or clarifies the meaning or intent of certain
ISARPs. ISARPs that are self-explanatory do not have associated guidance material.
Guidance material is designed to ensure a common interpretation of specifications in ISARPs and provide
additional detail that assists an operator to understand what is required in order to achieve conformity. Where
applicable, guidance material also presents examples of acceptable alternative means of achieving
conformity.
Guidance material associated with an individual standard or recommended practice is co-located with the
relevant provision and is preceded by the bold sub-heading Guidance.
Additionally, some guidance material relates to an entire ISM section or to a specific grouping of provisions
within a section. Such guidance stands alone in an appropriate location and is preceded by the bold heading
General Guidance.
Audit specifications are contained only in the ISARPs, and never in the guidance material.
7 Operational Audit
During an audit, an operator is assessed against the ISARPs contained in this manual. To determine
conformity with any standard or recommended practice, an auditor will gather evidence to assess the degree
to which specifications are documented and implemented by the operator. In making such an assessment,
the following information is applicable.
Documented
Documented shall mean the specifications in the ISARPs are published and accurately represented by an
operator in a controlled document. A controlled document is subject to processes that provide for positive
control of content, revision, publication, distribution, availability and retention.
Documentation is necessary for an operator to ensure systems, programs, policies, processes, procedures
and plans are implemented in a standardized manner, and to further ensure such standardized
implementation is sustained on an on-going basis. Documentation provides the standards that govern the
way personnel perform tasks within the management system and in operations. Such documented standards
are necessary for an operator to:
• Provide continuity in the flow of information to personnel;
• Ensure personnel are properly trained;
• Conduct evaluations (e.g. audits, inspections, performance assessments).
Implemented
Implemented shall mean the specification(s) in the ISARPs are established, activated, integrated,
incorporated, deployed, installed, maintained and/or made available, as part of the operational system, and is
(are) monitored and evaluated, as necessary, to ensure the desired outcome is being achieved.
The continuity of implementation is directly linked to documentation. To ensure standardization within the
management system and in the conduct of operations, an operator must ensure specified systems,
programs, policies, processes, procedures and plans are implemented as published in its controlled
documents.
The requirement for specifications to be documented and implemented by an operator is inherent in ISARPs
unless indicated otherwise.
Mandatory Observations
Mandatory Observations are conducted during an Audit as a means for collecting evidence that may, or may
not, complement factual evidence that has already been (or will be) collected during the course of the Audit.
These observations are normally conducted using checklists supplied by IATA, which are attached to the ISM
as an Appendix. The applicability and use of the MO checklists is described in the IPM and the IAH.
Auditing Effectiveness
Certain ISARPs are designated for application of the methodology for auditing the effectiveness of
implementation. These ISARPs are designated with the [Eff] symbol and have a published Assessment Tool
that follows the ISARP text.
The Assessment Tool consists of three parts: Desired Outcome, Suitability, and Effectiveness Criteria. The
Assessment Tool does not introduce any mandatory aspects to the ISARP. It is a separate assessment that
has no influence on the determination of conformity with the ISARP. Detailed guidance on the auditing
effectiveness methodology can be found in the IOSA Audit Handbook.
Inactive Approved Operations
It is not unusual for an operator to elect not to conduct certain types of operations for which it has regulatory
approval (e.g. transport of dangerous goods). In such cases, IOSA provisions with specifications that address
such inactive operations would not be applicable to the operator during an Audit if it is stated clearly in a
controlled document (e.g. Operations Manual) that the specified operations are not conducted by the
operator.
10 English Language
English is the official language of the IOSA Program; documents comprising the IOSA Documentation
System are written in International English* in accordance with IATA policy.
The IPM requires auditors to ensure the English language version of this ISM and/or IOSA Checklists is
always used as the basis for a final determination of conformity or nonconformity with ISARPs during the
conduct of an audit. Versions of the ISM or IOSA Checklists that have been translated into another language
are subject to misinterpretation; therefore, any translated IOSA document is considered an unofficial
reference.
* Refer to the IRM for the definition of International English.
* The official reference for International English in accordance with IATA policy is the online Merriam-Webster
Dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com).
11 Manual Revisions
Revisions to the ISM are developed and issued in accordance with the IOSA Standards Change
Management process, which is published in the IOSA Program Manual (IPM).
The ISM is normally revised annually. In accordance with IATA policy, a revision to the ISM (other than a
temporary revision) will always result in a new edition of the ISM.
The time period between the issuance of a new edition of the ISM and the effective date of such new edition
is typically four full months.
Should critical issues arise that affect the content of the ISM, a temporary revision (TR) will be issued.
12 Modification Status
All changes in this document are listed in the revision highlights table. For easier orientation, the following
symbols identify any changes made within each section:
13 Conflicting Information
IOSA Documentation System
Manuals within the IOSA documentation system are not revised concurrently, thus creating the potential for
conflicting information in different IOSA manuals. If there are inconsistencies between the IOSA
documentation, namely the ISM, IPM and IAH, IATA should be contacted for clarification and correction.
16 Authority
The IOSA program operates under the authority of IATA, as directed by the Director General.
Applicability
Section 1 addresses the organization and management system of an operator for the purpose of ensuring
the safety and security of aircraft operations.
Individual ORG provisions or sub-specifications within an ORG provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable to all operators unless determined otherwise
by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
Many ORG provisions are repeated in one or more other sections of the ISM (as indicated by the ►
symbol). Refer to the IOSA Audit Handbook for information relevant to the proper internal auditing of
repeated ORG ISARPs.
ORG 2.1.4 in this section is applicable only to an operator that is currently on the IOSA Registry and is
being audited for the purpose of registration renewal.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 1, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
ORG 1.1.1
The Operator shall have a management system that has continuity throughout the organization and
ensures control of operations and management of safety and security outcomes. (GM) ►
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational management system structure.
Assessed status of conformity with all other ORG management system ISARPs.
Coordinated to verify status of conformity with management system ISARPs in all operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Operations, Operator, Organogram, Safety (Operational),
Security (Aviation) and State.
A management system is documented in controlled company media at both the corporate and
operational levels. Manuals or controlled electronic media are acceptable means of documenting the
management system.
Documentation provides a comprehensive description of the scope, structure and functionality of the
management system and depicts lines of accountability throughout the organization, as well as
authorities, duties, responsibilities and the interrelation of functions and activities within the system
for ensuring safe and secure operations.
Acceptable means of documentation include, but are not limited to, organograms (organization
charts), job descriptions and other descriptive written material that define and clearly delineate the
management system.
Documentation also reflects a functional continuity within the management system that ensures the
entire organization works as a system and not as a group of independent or fragmented units (i.e.,
silo effect).
An effective management system is fully implemented and functional with a clear consistency and
unity of purpose between corporate management and management in the operational areas.
The management system ensures compliance with all applicable standards and regulatory
requirements. In addition to internal standards and regulations of the State, an operator may also be
required to comply with authorities that have jurisdiction over operations that are conducted over the
high seas or within a foreign country.
ORG 1.1.2
The Operator shall identify one senior management official as the accountable executive (AE) who is
accountable for performance of the management system as specified in ORG 1.1.1 and:
(i) Irrespective of other functions, is accountable on behalf of the Operator for the
implementation and maintenance of the safety management system (SMS) throughout the
organization;
(ii) Has the authority to ensure the planning and allocation of resources necessary to manage
safety and security risks to aircraft operations;
(iii) Has overall accountability for ensuring operations are conducted in accordance with
conditions and restrictions of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC), and in compliance with
applicable regulations and standards of the Operator. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified senior management official designated as the AE for the conduct of operations.
Examined management system structure and organizational lines of accountability.
Examined job description of designated AE (focus: accountability/responsibilities are as
specified in the standard).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Accountability, Accountable Executive (AE), Air Operator
Certificate (AOC), Authority, Aircraft Operations, Responsibility, Operations Manual (OM), Safety
Management System (SMS), Safety Risk Management and Senior Management.
The requirement for an AE is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS
framework.
The designation of an AE means the accountability for operational quality, safety and security
performance is placed at a level in the organization having the authority to take action to ensure the
management system is effective. Therefore, the AE is typically the chief executive officer (CEO),
although, depending on the type and structure of the organization, it could be a different senior
official (e.g. chairperson/member of the board of directors, company owner).
The AE has the authority, which includes financial control, to make policy decisions, provide
adequate human and physical resources, resolve operational quality, safety and security issues and,
in general, ensure necessary system components are in place and functioning properly.
In terms of resources, the AE would have the overall responsibility for ensuring, not only adequate
numbers of personnel, but also that positions within the SMS are filled by personnel in accordance
with ORG 1.5.3. Additionally, the AE would be responsible for ensuring the SMS is provided with
adequate facilities, workspace equipment and supporting services as specified in ORG 1.5.2.
In an SMS, the AE would typically have:
• Ultimate responsibility and accountability for the safety of the entire operation together with
the implementation and maintenance of the SMS;
• Responsibility for ensuring the SMS is properly implemented in all areas of the organization
and performing in accordance with specified requirements.
The AE also is responsible for ensuring the organization is in compliance with requirements of
applicable authorities (i.e. regulations), as well as its own policies and procedures, which may
exceed existing regulations or address areas that are not regulated (e.g. ground handling
operations). An operator’s policies and procedures are typically published in its Operations Manual
(OM).
To ensure that the operator continues to meet applicable requirements, the AE might designate a
manager with the responsibility for ensuring activities of the operator are monitored for compliance
with the applicable regulatory requirements, as well as any additional requirements as established by
the operator, and that these activities are being carried out properly under the supervision of the
head of relevant functional areas.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
ORG 1.1.4
The Operator shall designate a manager who is responsible for the implementation, maintenance
and day-to-day administration of the SMS throughout the organization on behalf of the AE and senior
management. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified designated manager for day-to-day administration and oversight of the SMS.
Examined SMS organizational structure.
Examined job description of SMS manager (focus: assigned responsibility for organizational
implementation of SMS).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated representative.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The requirement for a manager that focuses on the administration and oversight of the SMS on
behalf of the AE is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.
The individual assigned responsibility for organizational implementation of an SMS is ideally a
management official that reports to the AE. Also, depending on the size, structure and scope of an
operator’s organization, as well as the complexity of its operations, such individual may be assigned
functions in addition to those associated with the SMS manager position provided those functions do
not result in a conflict of interest.
The title assigned to the designated manager will vary for each organization. Regardless of title, the
manager is the designated organizational focal point for the day-to-day development, administration
and maintenance of the SMS (i.e. functions as the SMS champion). It is important that such manager
has the necessary degree of authority when coordinating and addressing safety matters throughout
the organization.
Whereas the designated manager has responsibility for day-to-day oversight of the SMS, overall
accountability for organizational safety rests with the AE. Likewise, post holders (refer to ORG 1.1.3)
or operational managers always retain the responsibility (and thus are accountable) for ensuring
safety in their respective areas of operations.
Note: Depending on the size of an operator’s organization and the complexity of its operations, the
responsibilities for implementation and maintenance of the SMS (i.e. fulfillment of the SMS manager
role) may be assigned to one or more persons.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
ORG 1.2.1
The Operator shall have a corporate safety policy that reflects the organizational commitment to
safety, including the promotion of a positive safety culture. Such policy shall be communicated
throughout the organization and include the following:
(i) A statement about the provision of the necessary resources for the implementation of the
safety policy;
(ii) A commitment to the continual improvement of the organization and the management
system;
(iii) A commitment to a periodic review of the policy to ensure its continued relevance to the
organization. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed corporate safety policy (focus: organizational commitment to
safety/provision of necessary resources).
Interviewed AE, SMS manager and/or designated management representative.
Examined examples of corporate communication: (focus: safety policy communicated
throughout organization).
Coordinated to verify communication of safety policy in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Quality Management System (QMS).
The requirement for an operator to have a defined safety policy is an element of the Safety Policy
and Objectives component of the SMS framework.
The policy of an operator reflects the commitment of senior management to ensuring continual
measurement and evaluation as well as the implementation of changes that improve the
management system and the culture. Ideas for improvement may come from internal and external
sources. Therefore, the organization would be constantly monitoring all sources and willing to make
changes as necessary to keep the management system refreshed and strongly focused on improving
operational quality, safety and security performance.
The safety policy typically also reflects the commitment of senior management to ensure:
• Compliance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;
• The management of safety and security risks to aircraft operations;
• The promotion of safety and security awareness;
• Continual improvement of operational performance;
• Regular review of safety performance indicators by senior management;
• Regular analysis of malfunctions or undesirable operational results;
• Follow-up of corrective actions and their effectiveness in improving operational performance.
An SMS, as well as a Quality Management System (QMS) and Security Management System
(SeMS), are integrated components of an operator’s overall management system and would typically
be subjected to protocols for continual improvement in accordance with the operator’s policy.
The corporate safety policy may be documented in the OM or other controlled document. To enhance
effectiveness, the policy is communicated and made visible throughout the organization through the
dissemination of communiqués, posters, banners and other types of media in a form and language
that can be easily understood. To ensure continuing relevance, the corporate policy is typically
reviewed for possible update a minimum of every two years.
Consistent with the structure and complexity of the operator’s organization, the corporate safety
policy may be issued as a stand-alone policy or combined with the safety reporting policy specified in
ORG 1.2.2.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Just Culture.
The requirement for an operator to have a safety reporting policy is an element of the Safety Policy
and Objectives component of the SMS framework.
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification in the management of risk.
Such a policy is typically documented in operations manuals or other controlled documents.
Consistent with the structure and complexity of the operator’s organization, the safety reporting policy
may be issued as a stand-alone policy or combined with the safety policy that is specified in ORG
1.2.1.
A safety reporting policy encourages and perhaps even provides incentive for individuals to report
hazards and operational deficiencies to management. It also assures personnel that their candid
input is highly desired and vital to safe and secure operations.
It is important that the operator provides appropriate protections to encourage personnel to report
what they see or experience. For example, enforcement action may be waived for reports of errors
or, under certain circumstances, even rule breaking. It should be clearly stated that reported
information will be used solely to support the enhancement of safety. The intent is to promote an
effective reporting culture and proactive identification of potential safety deficiencies.
An effective reporting culture exists when personnel have confidence that their reports are used to
improve operational safety by learning from mistakes and system flaws, and thus improve the safety
of operations. To that end, an operator’s safety reporting policy would typically incorporate the
principles of Just Culture.
The safety reporting policy is typically reviewed periodically to ensure continuing relevance to the
organization.
Refer to ORG 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, both of which address operational safety reporting.
1.3 Roles and Responsibilities
ORG 1.3.1
The Operator shall ensure the management system defines the safety accountability, authorities and
responsibilities of management and non-management personnel throughout the organization, and
specifies:
(i) The levels of management with the authority to make decisions regarding risk tolerability
with respect to the safety and/or security of aircraft operations;
(ii) Responsibilities for ensuring operations are conducted in accordance with applicable
regulations and standards of the Operator;
(iii) Lines of safety accountability throughout the organization, including direct accountability for
safety and/or security on the part of senior management. [SMS] (GM) ►
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all
repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed defined safety accountability/authorities/responsibilities for
management/non-management personnel (focus: definitions apply to personnel throughout the
organization).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Coordinated to verify defined accountability/authorities/responsibilities in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of IOSA Audit Handbook (IAH) and Risk Tolerability.
The definition of authorities and responsibilities of management and non-management personnel is
an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS framework.
In the context of the management system, the following typically apply:
• Accountability is the obligation to accept ultimate responsibility and be answerable for
decisions and policies, and for the performance of applicable functions, duties, tasks or
actions. Accountability may not be delegated.
• Authority is the delegated power or right to command or direct activities, and to make
decisions.
• Responsibility is the obligation to execute or perform assigned functions, duties, tasks and/or
actions. Responsibility may be accompanied by an appropriate level of delegated authority.
In the context of an SMS, the assignment of responsibility to individual personnel means such
personnel are ultimately accountable for safety performance, whether at the overall SMS level
(accountable executive) or at specific product and/or process levels (other applicable members of
management).
An effective management system ensures that responsibilities, and thus accountability, for safety
and security are allocated to relevant management and non-management personnel that perform
safety- or security-related functions, or that have a defined role in either the SMS or the SeMS.
Responsibilities and accountability are typically defined in the functional job description for such
personnel and are designed to flow from corporate senior management into all operational areas of
the organization.
Responsibilities and accountability are normally described and communicated in a manner that
ensures a clear understanding throughout the organization. Organization charts, or organograms,
are typically used to depict the functional reporting system of an organization, and thus are an
acceptable means for defining the flow (or “lines” as depicted on an organogram) of responsibilities
and accountability within the management system.
Management positions critical to operational safety or security may require enhanced job
descriptions or terms of reference that reflect specialized requirements inherent in certain key
positions. Such specialized requirements would include any delegation of authority exercised by
personnel on behalf of an authority (e.g. designated or authorized flight examiner).
Compliance with regulatory requirements, as well as internal policies and procedures, is an essential
element of a safe and secure operational environment. The responsibility for ensuring compliance
with both regulatory and internal requirements is specified and assigned within the management
system. Job descriptions, terms of reference and operating manuals are examples of appropriate
locations for documenting management system responsibilities.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
ORG 1.3.2
The Operator shall have a process or procedure for the delegation of duties within the management
system that ensures managerial continuity is maintained when operational managers including, if
applicable, post holders are unable to carry out work duties. (GM) ►
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for management system delegation of duties (focus: processes
maintain managerial continuity during periods when corporate/operational managers are unable
to perform work duties).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Coordinated to verify processes for management system delegation of duties in all operational
areas.
Examined example(s) of delegation of duties when managers have been unable to perform work
duties.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a process or procedure that ensures a specific
person (or perhaps more than one person) is identified to assume the duties of any operational
manager that is or is expected to be, unable to accomplish assigned work duties. An operator may
have nominated deputies in place or a process for ensuring the appointment of a temporary
replacement.
For the purpose of this provision, the use of telecommuting technology and/or being on call and
continually contactable are acceptable means for operational managers to remain available and
capable of carrying out assigned work duties.
A notification of such delegation of duties may be communicated throughout the management
system using email or other suitable communication medium.
1.4 Safety Performance
ORG 1.4.1
The Operator shall have a process to define safety objectives. Such safety objectives shall:
(i) Reflect the Operator’s commitment to maintain or continuously improve the overall
effectiveness of the SMS;
(ii) Be communicated throughout the organization;
(iii) Be periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the Operator.
[SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational program for setting safety objectives.
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected safety objectives currently valid.
Examined selected records/documents that identify tracking of safety objectives.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Safety Assurance and Safety Objective.
Defining safety objectives is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS
framework.
Safety objectives provide direction to the operator’s safety management activities and would
therefore be consistent with the safety policy that sets out the organization’s high-level safety
commitment.
A safety objective is a high-level statement that typically expresses a desired safety outcome that is
to be achieved over a defined period of time (e.g. one year).
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
1.5 Resource Management
ORG 1.5.3
The Operator shall ensure management and non-management positions within the organization that
require the performance of functions relevant to the safety or security of aircraft operations are filled
by personnel on the basis of knowledge, skills, training and experience appropriate for the position.
(GM) ►
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed standards/processes for hiring/selection of management/non-management
personnel (focus: safety/security positions relevant to aircraft operations are filled by personnel
with qualifications appropriate for position).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Interviewed selected personnel that perform safety/security functions relevant to aircraft
operations.
Coordinated to verify implementation of personnel selection standards/processes in all
operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Prerequisite criteria for each position, which would typically be developed by the operator, and
against which candidates would be evaluated, ensure personnel are appropriately qualified for
management system positions and operational roles in areas of the organization critical to safe and
secure operations.
ORG 1.5.4
The Operator shall ensure personnel who perform functions relevant to the safety or security of
aircraft operations are required to maintain competence on the basis of continued education and
training and, if applicable for a specified position, continue to satisfy any mandatory technical
competency requirements. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed standards/processes for maintaining competency of personnel in functions
relevant to safety/security of aircraft operations (focus: standards specify continuing
education/training, meeting technical requirements).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Coordinated to verify application of competency standards.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Positions or functions within an airline organization considered ‘operationally critical’ are those that
have the potential to affect operational safety or security. This definition includes management
positions and any positions or functions that may affect the airworthiness of aircraft.
Typically, training programs are implemented to ensure personnel throughout the organization are
qualified and competent to perform individual duties.
Some management positions within airline operations may require an individual to maintain a
technical competency as a requirement for being assigned to the position. For example, it may be
specified that certain management positions within Flight Operations may only be filled by individuals
who are qualified flight crew members. Similar situations could exist within Cabin Operations,
Engineering and Maintenance or other operational disciplines.
In such cases, the job description specifies the requirement for maintaining technical competency,
and adequate opportunity is provided to fulfill the requirement.
1.6 Outsourcing Management
ORG 1.7.1
The Operator shall have a corporate emergency response plan (ERP) for the central management
and coordination of all activities necessary to respond to a major aircraft accident or other type of
adverse event that results in fatalities, serious injuries, considerable damage and/or a significant
disruption of aircraft operations. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed corporate emergency response plan (ERP) (focus: plan suitable for
organizational response to major aircraft accident/other adverse event).
Interviewed designated ERP manager.
Coordinated to verify implementation of ERP in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Emergency Response Plan (ERP) and Public Health
Emergency.
Emergency response planning is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the
SMS framework.
An emergency (or crisis) response plan is based upon an assessment of risk appropriate to the size
and type of operations, and includes consideration of a major aircraft accident and other potential,
aircraft and/or non-aircraft events that would require a full corporate emergency response.
In some states, emergency or crisis response is assumed by a governmental authority rather than by
the operator. In such case, an emergency response plan focuses on and addresses interaction with
and/or participation in the governmental response to an emergency or crisis.
As a best practice, an operator might consider defining in its ERP an appropriately coordinated
response to a public health emergency.
An effective ERP includes industry best practices and ensure community expectations are
addressed. Additionally, an ERP:
• Specifies general conditions for implementation;
• Provides a framework for an orderly implementation;
• Ensures proper coordination with external entities at all potential locations (refer to ORG
1.7.4);
• Addresses all potential aspects of an event, including casualties;
• Ensures regulatory requirements associated with specific events are satisfied;
• Provides a scenario for the transition back to normal operations;
• Ensures regular practice exercises as a means to achieve continual improvement (refer to
ORG 1.7.8 and ORG 1.7.9).
IATA provides a guide for use by operators in addressing a public health emergency. Such
document, titled Emergency Response Plan and Action Checklist, may be found at
http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety/health/Pages/diseases.aspx.
ORG 1.7.5
The Operator shall have published procedures and assigned responsibilities to ensure a coordinated
execution of the corporate ERP. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures/responsibilities for execution of corporate ERP.
Interviewed designated corporate ERP manager.
Coordinated to verify procedures/assigned responsibilities for ERP execution in all operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Personnel are typically assigned with specific responsibilities throughout the organization for the
implementation of procedures associated with the ERP. Such responsibilities and procedures might
include:
• Assemblage of required personnel;
• Travel arrangements, as required;
• Provision of facilities, equipment and other resources;
• Humanitarian and other assistance to individuals involved in the event, as required;
• Management of continuing normal operations;
• Control of areas impacted by the event, as applicable;
• Liaison with relevant authorities and other external entities.
The following areas would normally be considered in developing plans for liaison with external
entities associated with any event:
• Fire;
• Police;
• Ambulance;
• Coast guard and other rescue agencies;
• Hospitals and other medical facilities;
• Medical specialists;
• Civil aviation or defense agencies;
• Poison control centers;
• Chemical or radiation specialists;
• Environmental agencies;
• Insurance companies.
Additionally, contact and arrangements are typically made with certain operational business partners,
including code share and wet lease operators.
ORG 2.1.1
The Operator shall have a quality assurance program that provides for the auditing of the
management system of operations and maintenance functions to ensure the organization is:
(i) Complying with applicable regulations and standards;
(ii) Satisfying stated operational needs;
(iii) Identifying areas requiring improvement;
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Audit, Group Company and Quality Assurance.
The quality assurance program comprises two complementary functions: To monitor an operator’s
compliance with relevant regulations and standards, as well as to evaluate and continually improve
operational safety performance. Such functions are elements of the Safety Assurance component of
the SMS framework.
In some organizations the quality assurance program may have a different name (e.g. internal audit
program, internal evaluation program).
In certain circumstances, an operator may have the quality assurance audit function performed by an
external organization. This typically occurs when the operator is affiliated with one or more other
organizations in a Group Company. However, an operator might also choose to simply outsource the
quality assurance audit function to a qualified external service provider that is not part of or
associated with a Group Company. In both cases, the operator, as the AOC holder, has the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the quality assurance program meets the needs of its organization in
accordance with the specifications of this standard.
A robust quality assurance program ensures a scope of auditing that encompasses all areas of the
organization that impact operational quality in terms of safety and/or security. Operational functions
include flight operations, operational control/flight dispatch, maintenance operations, cabin
operations, ground handling and cargo operations.
This provision is designed to permit flexibility in the implementation of the quality assurance program.
The structure and organization of the program within an operator’s management system, whether
centralized, non-centralized or a combination thereof, is at the discretion of the operator in
accordance with its corporate culture and regulatory environment.
An effective audit program includes:
• Audit initiation, including scope and objectives;
• Planning and preparation, including audit plan and checklist development;
• Observation and gathering of evidence to assess documentation and implementation;
• Analysis, findings, actions;
• Reporting and audit summary;
• Follow-up and close out.
To ensure auditors gather sufficient evidence to produce realistic assessments during an audit, the
program typically includes guidance that defines the various sampling techniques that are expected
to be used by auditors in the evidence collection phase of the audit.
The audit process typically includes a means whereby the auditor and responsible personnel from
the audited area have a comprehensive discussion and reach agreement on the findings and
corresponding corrective actions. Clear procedures are established to resolve any disagreement
between the auditor and audited area. All action items require follow-up to ensure closeout within an
appropriate period of time.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
ORG 2.1.4
If the Operator is on the IOSA Registry, the Operator shall ensure the quality assurance program as
specified in ORG 2.1.1 provides for the auditing of the IOSA Standards and Recommended Practices
(ISARPs) a minimum of once during the IOSA registration period. For internal audits of the ISARPs,
the Operator shall have processes that ensure:
(i) The effective edition of the IOSA Standards Manual (ISM) is used;
(ii) Auditor Actions are accomplished by auditors;
(iii) Recording and retention of information associated with the internal audit of individual
ISARPs as specified in Table 1.2. (GM)
Note: If a new edition of the ISM becomes effective before the last 5 months of the Operator’s IOSA
registration period, the Operator shall take into account all changes that might require additional
auditing (e.g. new or significantly revised ISARPs).
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes that ensure auditing of all ISARPs during the IOSA registration
period.
Identified/Assessed internal audit processes/procedures (focus: use of effective ISM edition;
auditors accomplish Auditor Actions).
Interviewed quality assurance program manager.
Interviewed selected internal auditors.
Examined selected records (database, procedural documents) of audits performed against
ISARPs (focus: effective ISM edition used, all specified information included, Auditor Actions
accomplished).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Auditor Actions, IOSA Operator, IOSA Registration Period and
Registration Renewal Audit.
The currently effective edition of the ISM is used for auditing of the ISARPs during the first 19 months
of the IOSA registration period. Use of an ISM edition that becomes effective in the final five (5)
months of the operator’s registration period is optional.
The accomplishment of Auditor Actions as specified in item (ii) is necessary to ensure internal
auditors gather the necessary evidence to determine whether (or not) a standard or recommended
practice is documented and implemented by the operator.
Table 1.2, as specified in item (iii), includes a note that refers to procedural documents. An example
of a procedural document is an audit checklist in which all specified audit information associated with
the audit of the individual ISARPs is recorded, including accomplishment of the Auditor Action steps.
IATA continues to provide a template in the form of a spreadsheet to record all required information
as specified in ORG 2.1.4 and Table 1.2.
To the extent possible, auditing of the ISARPs should be spread out over the full registration period
rather than waiting to conduct all auditing just prior to the registration renewal audit.
Refer to the IAH for information relevant to auditing of the ISARPs under the quality assurance
program.
ORG 2.1.6
The Operator shall ensure the audit planning process defines the scope of each audit, as appropriate
for the area being audited, and also:
(i) Includes audit objectives that address ongoing compliance with regulatory requirements,
Operator standards and other applicable regulations, rules and standards;
(ii) Considers relevant operational safety or security events that have occurred;
(iii) Considers results from previous audits, including the effectiveness of corrective action that
has been implemented. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed quality assurance audit planning process (focus: audits
planned/scheduled/completed in order to meet applicable internal/external requirements).
Interviewed quality assurance program manager.
Examined selected audit plans (focus: audit scope/objectives defined; operational
events/previous audits considered).
Crosschecked audit plan with selected audit reports (focus: audits conducted in accordance
with audit plan).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The audit scope refers to the breadth of operational disciplines or operational areas covered by an
audit and therefore will vary depending on the focus area for each audit (e.g. flight dispatch function,
dangerous goods handling, ramp handling operations, line maintenance activities).
Audit objectives define tangible achievements expected to result from an audit, normally expressed
as a statement of intent (e.g. to determine compliance with regulatory requirements, to establish
conformity with operator standards, to assess conformity with IOSA standards, to determine
efficiency of operations).
To be effective, auditors prepare for an audit of a particular area of operations by:
• Conducting research into any relevant incidents or irregularities that may have occurred;
• Reviewing reports from previous audits.
Refer to the IAH for information relevant to planning associated with auditing of the ISARPs.
ORG 2.1.7
The Operator shall have a process for addressing findings that result from audits conducted under
the quality assurance program, which ensures:
(i) Identification of root cause(s);
(ii) Development of corrective action as appropriate to address findings;
(iii) Implementation of corrective action in appropriate operational area(s);
(iv) Evaluation of corrective action to determine effectiveness. (GM) ►
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for addressing quality assurance audit findings.
Interviewed quality assurance program manager.
Examined selected audit reports/records (focus: identification of root cause,
development/implementation of corrective action, follow-up to ensure effectiveness).
Coordinated to verify implementation of audit findings process in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Certain audit findings might fall under the category of hazards to operations. In such cases, the
hazard would be subject to the risk assessment and mitigation process in the development of
corrective action.
Refer to the IAH for information relevant to auditing under the quality assurance program.
2.2 External Monitoring
ORG 2.2.1
The Operator shall have processes to monitor external service providers that conduct outsourced
operational functions for the Operator to ensure requirements that affect the safety and/or security of
operations are being fulfilled. (GM) ►
Note: IOSA or ISAGO registration as the only means to monitor is acceptable provided the Operator
obtains the latest of the applicable audit report(s) through official program channels and considers
the content of such report(s).
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for monitoring external service providers that conduct
outsourced operational functions.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records/reports resulting from monitoring of service providers (focus:
monitoring process ensures provider is fulfilling applicable safety/security requirements).
Coordinated to verify implementation of service provider monitoring in applicable operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator has a responsibility to ensure outsourced operational functions are conducted in a
manner that meets its own operational safety and security requirements. A monitoring process is
necessary to satisfy that responsibility, and such process would be applicable to any external service
provider that conducts outsourced operational functions, including the parent organization or a
separate affiliate of the operator.
In some regulatory jurisdictions, there may be a regulatory control process that permits certain
organizations to meet rigorous standards and become approved to conduct outsourced operations or
maintenance for an operator. Such regulatory control process would be an acceptable means for
meeting the specification of this provision if it can be demonstrated by the operator that the regulatory
control process:
• Includes ongoing monitoring of the approved service providers;
• Such monitoring is sufficiently robust to ensure the approved service providers fulfill the
operational requirements of the operator on a continuing basis.
Achieving and maintaining IOSA and/or ISAGO registration is a way for an external service provider
to demonstrate fulfillment of requirements that affect the safety and/or security of operations. Thus,
an operator’s process that requires such service providers to maintain IOSA and/or ISAGO
registration would generally be acceptable as a method of monitoring.
Using the IOSA and/or ISAGO programs to satisfy the specifications in this provision would require
that an operator has access, preferably unrestricted access, to all information and data provided by
the respective registration programs. Such access would be subject to receiving the relevant
authorizations for individual reports. This type of monitoring would include a regular review of the
registry site(s) to identify any potential annotations or restrictions that might have been placed on an
operator’s or provider’s registration.
Using IOSA and ISAGO as described would also require an operator to request relevant audit reports
through proper and official program channels. For IOSA this would require requesting an IAR through
IATA and for ISAGO it would require participation in the ISAGO program. A review of the information
contained in the audit report(s) would ideally complement and/or supplement any additional
monitoring measures an operator is applying to ensure the service provider is fulfilling all relevant
requirements. For example, combining the information from the report(s) with a risk assessment
would be one option to have acceptable assurance that all requirements are fulfilled.
To ensure effective monitoring, consideration is given to a range of internal and external methods for
use in the oversight of external service providers. Methods might include auditing, systematic review
and risk assessment of reported hazards and/or occurrences, monitoring of performance output
(KPIs), reporting and governance processes; monitoring and analysis of targeted risk areas, as well
as the establishment of an effective two-way communication link with the service provider.
Under certain circumstances, operational functions may be involuntarily removed from an operator
and conducted by a governmental or quasi-governmental authority that is not under the control of the
operator (e.g. passenger or baggage security screening at some airports). Under such
circumstances, the operator would have a process to monitor output of the function being conducted
by the authority to ascertain desired results are being achieved.
If an operator is part of a Group Company and has management and/or operational functions
performed by an affiliate organization that is part of the same Group Company, an operator may
demonstrate monitoring of the external organization by processes that ensure functions performed
by the affiliate organization for the operator are:
• Subjected to auditing under the quality assurance program of the affiliate organization;
• Continually satisfying the needs of the operator.
ORG 2.2.3
The Operator shall have a process that provides for the auditing of other operators that transport
passengers of the Operator under a commercial aviation agreement. Such process shall ensure the
following with respect to the audit of other operators:
(i) The audit is conducted against and requires conformity with applicable ICAO standards;
(ii) An initial audit is conducted prior to the commencement of the above-specified passenger
transport operations;
(iii) A subsequent audit is conducted during every 24-month period following commencement of
the above-specified passenger transport operations. (GM)
Note: A commercial aviation agreement as specified in this standard includes the following:
• ACMI Lease (wet lease) Agreement
• Capacity Purchase Agreement (CPA)
• Code Share Agreement
• Damp Lease Agreement
Note: The specifications of this standard shall be applicable to the Operator if it has transported its
passengers on another operator under any of the specified commercial aviation agreements during
the most recent IOSA registration period.
Note: IOSA registration indicates an operator is in conformity with all applicable ICAO standards and
thus is acceptable as the audit of another operator as specified in this provision provided the
Operator obtains the latest applicable audit report(s) through official program channels and considers
the content of such report(s).
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for monitoring safety/security performance of external operators
that transport passengers of the Operator.
Interviewed responsible managers.
Examined plan/methods for monitoring applicable other operators (focus: includes all operators
that transport the operator’s passengers under a commercial aviation agreement).
Examined selected monitoring reports of other operators (focus: monitoring process ensures the
other operator is fulfilling applicable safety/security requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of ACMI Lease Agreement, Capacity Purchase Agreement (CPA),
Code Share Agreement, Damp Lease Agreement, IOSA Registration Period and Wet Lease
Agreement.
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a process that provides for the auditing of any
other operator with which it has entered or will enter into a commercial aviation agreement to
transport its passengers on flights conducted by the other operator. Such audit verifies that the other
operator meets applicable ICAO standards and may be conducted either by the operator or by a third
party that is acceptable to the operator.
Another operator that is on the IOSA Registry has already been audited and found to meet applicable
ICAO safety standards. Therefore, conformity with this standard does not require an operator to
provide for an additional audit of another operator that is on the IOSA Registry as long as such
registration is maintained by the other operator and any registration annotations have been taken into
consideration by the operator.
Applicable ICAO standards as specified in item (i) are those standards contained in Annexes 1, 6, 8,
17, 18 and 19 that would be applicable to the other operator being audited.
A complete cross-reference list of ICAO-IOSA standards may be found at www.iata.org/iosa.
2.3 Product Control
ORG 2.5.4
The Operator shall have SMS documentation, including a manual, that describes:
(i) The safety policy and objectives;
(ii) SMS requirements;
(iii) SMS processes and procedures;
(iv) Accountability, authorities and responsibilities for SMS processes and procedures. [SMS]
(GM)
Note: An SMS manual may be in the form of a stand-alone document or may be integrated with other
organizational documents (or documentation) maintained by the Operator.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed SMS documentation (focus: description of overall organizational
management of safety).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected parts of SMS documentation (focus: content includes safety
policy/objectives; describes/defines accountability/responsibilities for safety
processes/procedures in all areas of operations).
Coordinated to verify SMS documentation in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
SMS documentation is an element of the Safety Policy and Objectives component of the SMS
framework.
SMS documentation is typically scaled to the size and complexity of the organization and describes
both the corporate and operational areas of safety management to show continuity of the SMS
throughout the organization. Typical documentation would include a description of management
positions and associated accountability, authorities, and responsibilities within the SMS.
To ensure personnel throughout the organization are informed, SMS documentation includes a
description of the operator’s approach to safety management. Such descriptive information would be
contained in a manual and presented in a manner that ensures the SMS information is clearly
identifiable. The exact title and structure of such manual may vary with each operator.
Depending on the size, structure and scope of an operator’s organization, as well as the complexity
of its operations, SMS documentation may be in the form of stand-alone documents or may be
integrated into other organizational documents.
Requirements for SMS documentation will vary according to the individual state safety program
(SSP).
SMS documentation typically addresses:
• Scope of the SMS;
• Safety policy and objectives;
• Safety accountability;
• Key safety personnel;
• Documentation control procedures;
• Coordination of emergency response planning;
• Hazard identification and risk management schemes;
• Safety assurance;
• Safety performance monitoring;
• Safety auditing (safety and quality auditing may be combined);
• Management of change;
• Safety promotion;
• Outsourced services.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
2.6 Records System
ORG 2.6.1
The Operator shall have a system for the management and control of operational records to ensure
the content and retention of such records is in accordance with requirements of the Authority, as
applicable, and to ensure operational records are subjected to standardized processes for:
(i) Identification;
(ii) Legibility;
(iii) Maintenance;
(iv) Retrieval;
(v) Protection, integrity and security;
(vi) Disposal, deletion (electronic records) and archiving. (GM) ►
Note: The operational records system specified in this standard shall also include the management
and control of SMS operational records.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system for management/control of operational records (focus: system
includes standardized processes as specified in standard).
Interviewed responsible management representative(s).
Examined selected examples of operational records.
Coordinated to verify implementation of records management/control processes in all
operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The system addresses the management and control of all records associated with operations, which
includes personnel training records, and also includes any other records that document the fulfillment
of operational requirements (e.g. aircraft maintenance, operational control, operational security).
SMS operational records substantiate the ongoing operation of the operator’s SMS and may be
managed and controlled within either a centralized or standalone records system. SMS operational
records typically include or provide a record of the following:
• Hazards register and hazard/safety reports;
• SPIs, SPTs and related charts;
• Completed safety risk assessments;
• SMS internal reviews or audits;
• SMS/safety training;
• SMS/safety committee meeting minutes.
3 Risk Management
ORG 3.1.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program that is implemented and integrated
throughout the organization and includes a combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard
identification. [SMS] (GM) ►
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all
repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational safety hazard identification program (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed cross-discipline process for safety hazard identification (focus: all
operational disciplines participate in process).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate organizational integration (focus:
coordinated involvement of all operational disciplines in hazard identification process).
Examined selected examples of hazards identified through data collection/analysis.
Coordinated to verify implementation of safety hazard identification program in all operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
The methods used to identify hazards will typically depend on the resources and constraints of each
particular organization. Some organizations might deploy comprehensive, technology-intensive
hazard identification processes, while organizations with smaller, less complex operations might
implement more modest hazard identification processes. Regardless of organizational size or
complexity, to ensure all hazards are identified to the extent possible, hazard identification processes
are necessarily formalized, coordinated and consistently applied on an on-going basis in all areas of
the organization where there is a potential for hazards that could affect aircraft operations.
To be effective, reactive and proactive processes are used to acquire information and data, which are
then analyzed to identify existing or predict future (i.e. potential) hazards to aircraft operations.
Examples of processes that typically yield information or data for hazard identification include:
• Confidential or other reporting by personnel;
• Investigation of accidents, incidents, irregularities and other non-normal events;
• Flight data analysis;
• Observation of flight crew performance in line operations and training;
• Quality assurance and/or safety auditing;
• Safety information gathering or exchange (external sources).
Processes would be designed to identify hazards that might be associated with organizational
business changes (e.g. addition of new routes or destinations, acquisition of new aircraft type(s), the
introduction of significant outsourcing of operational functions).
Typically, hazards are assigned a tracking number and recorded in a log or database. Each log or
database entry would normally include a description of the hazard, as well as other information
necessary to track associated risk assessment and mitigation activities.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
ORG 3.1.2
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system that is implemented throughout the
organization in a manner that:
• Encourages and facilitates personnel to submit reports that identify safety hazards, expose
safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
• Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
• Includes analysis and management action as necessary to address safety issues identified
through the reporting system. [SMS] (GM) ►
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all
repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational operational safety reporting system (focus: system
urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined records of selected operational/safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to
identify/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Coordinated to verify implementation of operational safety reporting system in all operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Frontline personnel, such as flight or cabin crew members and maintenance technicians, are
exposed to hazards and face challenging situations as part of their everyday activities. An
operational reporting system provides such personnel with a means to report these hazards or any
other safety concerns so they may be brought to the attention of relevant managers.
To build confidence in the reporting process and encourage more reporting, an acknowledgement of
receipt is typically provided to each person that submits a report.
An effective system provides for a review and analysis of each report to determine whether a real
safety issue exists, and if so, ensure development and implementation of appropriate action by
responsible management to correct the situation.
Refer to ORG 1.2.2, which specifies a corporate safety reporting policy and addresses the
importance of having an effective reporting culture to ensure the proactive identification of potential
safety deficiencies.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
ORG 3.1.5
The Operator shall have a process to identify changes within or external to the organization that have
the potential to affect the level of safety risks associated with aircraft operations, and to manage risks
that may arise from or are affected by such changes in accordance with ORG 3.1.1 and ORG 3.2.1.
[SMS] [Eff] (GM)
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The safety risks associated with aircraft operations that may arise or are affected by external or
internal changes are managed and controlled to ensure they remain at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) Clear criteria are established, that define when a formal change management process must be
applied
(ii) Process is applied prior to any change that has the potential to affect the level of safety risks.
(iii) All areas within the organization are aware of the process and apply it for all relevant changes.
(iv) All relevant personnel are adequately trained in the execution of the process.
(v) All changes are documented and decisions on the application of the process are recorded.
(vi) The hazard identification process involves personnel from all relevant areas within the
organization.
(vii) Information is fed into the RA and mitigation process.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational change management process (focus: process
identifies/assesses internal/external changes to determine operational safety risk).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected records/documents that show processing of internal/external changes
(focus: assessment of changes to determine safety risk; actions taken to implement/revise
new/existing risk controls).
Coordinated to verify implementation of change management process in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Change Management.
Change management is an element of the Safety Assurance component of the SMS framework and
is considered a proactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.
Safety risk management requires an operator to have a formal process to identify hazards that may
affect aircraft operations. Hazards may exist in ongoing aircraft operations or be inadvertently
introduced whenever internal or external changes occur that could affect aircraft operations. In such
cases, hazard identification as specified in ORG 3.1.1 and safety risk assessment and mitigation as
specified in ORG 3.1.2 (both are repeated in other ISM sections) are integral elements of an
operator’s change management process.
A change management process is normally designed to ensure risk management is applied to any
internal or external change that has the potential to affect an operator’s established operational
processes, procedures, products, equipment and services. The change management process
typically takes into account the following three considerations:
• Criticality. Criticality assessments determine the systems, equipment or activities that are
essential to the safe operation of aircraft. While criticality is normally assessed during the
system design process, it is also relevant during a situation of change. Systems, equipment
and activities that have higher safety criticality are reviewed following change to make sure
that corrective actions can be taken to control potentially emerging safety risks.
• Stability of systems and operational environments. Changes might be planned and under the
direct control of the operator. Examples of such changes include organizational growth or
contraction, the expansion of products or services delivered, or the introduction of new
technologies. Changes might also be unplanned and external to the operator, such as
changing economic cycles, labor unrest and changes to the political, regulatory or operating
environments.
• Past performance. Past performance of critical systems and trend analyses in the safety
assurance process is typically employed to anticipate and monitor safety performance under
situations of change. The monitoring of past performance will also assure the effectiveness
of corrective actions taken to address safety deficiencies identified as a result of audits,
evaluations, investigations or reports.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
3.2 Risk Assessment and Mitigation
ORG 3.2.1
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program that includes processes
implemented and integrated throughout the organization to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in operations. [SMS]
[Eff] (GM) ►
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all
repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its operational risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) Risk register(s) across the organization capture risk assessment information, risk mitigation
(control) and monitoring actions.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix defines safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) All relevant hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
(x) The program takes into consideration any area of the organization where there is a potential for
hazards that could affect aircraft operations.
(xi) The program has some form of central coordination to ensure all existing or potential hazards that
have been identified as relevant are subjected to risk assessment and, if applicable, mitigation.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational safety risk assessment/mitigation program (focus: hazards
analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action; action
implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed cross-discipline process for risk assessment/mitigation (focus: all
operational disciplines participate in process).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate organizational integration (focus:
coordinated involvement of all operational disciplines in risk assessment/mitigation program).
Examined selected examples of risk assessment/risk mitigation action(s).
Coordinated to verify implementation of safety risk assessment/mitigation in all operational
areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA),
Safety Risk Management and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
To be completely effective, a risk assessment and mitigation program would typically be
implemented in a manner that:
• Is active in all areas of the organization where there is a potential for hazards that could
affect aircraft operations;
• Has some form of central coordination to ensure all existing or potential hazards that have
been identified are subjected to risk assessment and, if applicable, mitigation.
The safety risks associated with an identified existing or potential hazard are assessed in the context
of the potentially damaging consequences related to the hazard. Safety risks are generally
expressed in two components:
• Likelihood of an occurrence;
• Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
Typically, matrices that quantify safety risk acceptance levels are developed to ensure
standardization and consistency in the risk assessment process. Separate matrices with different risk
acceptance criteria are sometimes used to address long-term versus short-term operations.
A risk register is often employed for the purpose of documenting risk assessment information and
monitoring risk mitigation (control) actions.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
3.3 Flight Data Analysis (FDA)
ORG 3.3.1
If the Operator conducts flights with aircraft that have a maximum certified takeoff mass in excess of
27,000 kg (59,525 lb), the Operator shall have a flight data analysis (FDA) program that requires a
systematic download and analysis of electronically recorded flight data from applicable aircraft in its
fleet. The FDA program shall be non-punitive and be integrated in the Operator’s SMS. [SMS] (GM)
Note: Conformity with this provision is possible only when the Operator is also in conformity with
ORG 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.3.5.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed FDA program (focus: program is non-punitive and is applied to aircraft in
the fleet with a MCTOM greater than 27 000 kg).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Interviewed FDA program manager.
Assessed processes/systems for download of electronically recorded flight data (focus: usable
program data is downloaded from all applicable aircraft types in the operator’s fleet).
Assessed status of conformity with ORG 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.3.5.
Observed FDA program resources and activities.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Data Analysis (FDA) Program.
The FDA program fits into the Safety Assurance (safety performance monitoring/measuring) and
Safety Risk Management (hazard identification) components of the SMS framework.
A systematic download and analysis of electronically recorded aircraft flight data would typically
include:
• Systems on applicable aircraft that:
– Capture flight data and permit rapid download through use of an optical disc/PC or
equivalent, or
– Capture and automatically transmit encrypted aircraft data through a ground link to a
ground station.
• A ground system that transforms raw digital flight data into a usable form of information that
can then be verified, processed and categorized for analysis;
• One or more ground stations (usually a desk top computer loaded with the appropriate
software) to permit the analysis of flight data to identify deviations from expected
performance;
• A secure database that protects and permits retention, retrieval and use of program data
(e.g. data mining, research, event development).
In addition to the above, an FDA program might include optional flight animation software that
provides a visual simulation of actual flight events.
The practice of analyzing recorded data from routine flight operations is a cornerstone in support of
an operator’s accident prevention programs. Rather than reacting to serious incidents, an effective
FDA program enables a proactive identification of safety hazards associated with flight operations.
An FDA program is also used for:
• Routine flight operational measurements;
• Incident investigations;
• As applicable, continuing airworthiness.
A key element in developing an FDA program is gaining the support of flight crew members. Such
support is typically achieved through a policy and/or procedures and a formal agreement that lays out
the conditions for ensuring the program is non-punitive and downloaded flight data is de-identified
and secure. If applicable, such policy and/or procedures would typically be set forth in a formal
agreement with the association that represents flight crew members.
It is important that the FDA program clearly defines the meaning of a non-punitive environment and
that relevant program participants, particularly flight crew members:
• Have a clear understanding of the types of operational behaviors that are unacceptable, and
the conditions under which disciplinary action would or would not apply.
• Are provided with enough information about the process to ensure a perception of fair
treatment in accordance with program policy and procedures.
• Have confidence that non-punitive principles will be applied in the treatment of events
identified under the FDA program.
An effective FDA program typically includes assurance that:
• Flight data and other relevant information are analyzed thoroughly such that, as far as
reasonably practicable, all relevant factors associated with an event are identified, not just
the action or inaction of specific individuals.
• Investigation of FDA events focuses on systemic issues that might influence behaviors,
rather than on individual actions.
• Individuals involved in the investigation of an event will be treated fairly based on the quality
of their behavioral choices.
• Factual details of an event are provided to relevant operational managers for an objective
review of all factors involved.
All or certain specific elements of the FDA program might be outsourced to an external service
provider; however, the operator would retain overall responsibility for the maintenance of the
program.
The most comprehensive approach to flight data analysis would include not only the systematic
download and analysis of recorded aircraft flight data, but also acquisition, correlation and analysis of
other information derived from operational safety reports, regulatory authorities, investigative bodies,
OEMs and other operators.
Further guidance may be found in the following source documents:
• ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual, and ICAO Doc 10000, Manual on Flight Data
Analysis Programmes (FDAP).
• CASA CAAP SMS-4(0), Guidance on the establishment of a Flight Data Analysis Program
(FDAP)–Safety Management Systems (SMS).
Guidance
Responsibilities within FDA program processes may be shared among individuals based on the size
and complexity of an operator’s organization.
FDA program processes may be outsourced to external service providers, but the operator is always
responsible for the performance of the program.
The intent of items (i) and (ii) is that functions in program processes are performed by personnel that
have experience, skills and/or capabilities appropriate for the function(s) performed:
Personnel that provide interpretation and analysis of flight technical data are typically flight crew
members that have an in-depth understanding of the operator’s aircraft types, operating procedures,
routes and airports.
Personnel that provide interpretation and analysis of aircraft technical data typically have
maintenance engineering and/or appropriated maintenance technical experience and are familiar
with the operator’s power plant/structures/systems departments, information sources/requirements
and engineering monitoring programs.
Personnel that perform flight crew liaison (i.e. the “gatekeeper” function) would typically have
integrity, good judgement and the trust of both flight crew members and company management.
The intent of item (v) is a training and qualification program that ensures personnel are competent to
perform assigned duties and functions within the FDA program. Personnel would typically complete
initial training prior to the performance of any program functions and subsequent recurrent training to
ensure continued competency.
Refer to ORG 3.3.4, which addresses the management and protection of program data and
information.
ORG 3.3.4
If the Operator has an FDA program in accordance with ORG 3.3.1, the Operator shall have
standards for the management and protection of program data and information that define:
(i) Methods for ensuring the integrity and validity of downloaded flight data;
(ii) Policies and procedures for data de-identification and confidentiality;
(iii) Methods for maintaining and presenting event and exceedance information for trend
analysis;
(iv) Policies and procedures for data retention, retrieval and archiving;
(v) Processes for assessing and improving data management policies, methods and
procedures. (GM).
Auditor Actions
Assessed FDA program data management/protection (focus: program standards define all
aspects of management and protection of data).
Interviewed FDA program manager.
Examined selected records/examples of data management/protection (focus:
policies/methods/procedures consistent with program standards for ensuring effective data
management/protection).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Effective management and protection of FDA program data and information is needed to ensure the
success, and perhaps even the survival, of an FDA program.
FDA data de-identification is a critical aspect of protection and therefore is normally well defined in
program standards. The operator will typically provide a clear statement that assures the
nondisclosure of flight crew individuals associated with or linked to FDA events, except when it can
be determined there is an unacceptable safety risk if specific action regarding the flight crew is not
taken.
In general, a successful FDA program requires the establishment of an acceptable level of trust
between management and its flight crews. Therefore, the safety intent of the FDA program will be
clearly documented so it is understood by all participants, and the conditions of use and protection of
program data and information will be explicitly defined in a formal agreement involving the operator’s
management, representatives of its flight crews and the participating regulatory authority.
More detailed information regarding FDA program data management and protection may be found in
the source documents referenced in the guidance associated with ORG 3.3.1.
ORG 3.3.5
If the Operator has an FDA program in accordance with ORG 3.3.1, the Operator shall have
processes to ensure program findings (e.g. hazards, adverse events and trends, airworthiness
issues) are coordinated with relevant operational areas of the organization for further validation and
assessment, and for a determination of appropriate follow-up action. Such coordination and follow-up
action shall be accomplished within the SMS as follows:
(i) Hazard identification and safety risk assessment and mitigation in accordance with ORG
3.1.1 and ORG 3.2.1.
(ii) Event investigation in accordance with ORG 3.5.1 and ORG 3.5.2.
(iii) Continuing airworthiness assessment in accordance with Maintenance Management
Manual (MMM) procedures as specified in MNT 1.7.1 and Table 4.3. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational safety risk assessment/mitigation program (focus: process
for analysis of safety data to predict future risks).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected results of data analysis performed to predict future risks.
Examined examples of action(s) taken to address future risks identified from safety data
analysis.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to standards in ICAO Annex 6, which specify an FDA program as part of an operator’s SMS.
The primary aim of an FDA program is the continuous improvement of the operator’s overall safety
performance. Therefore, the FDA program, which functions to monitor and measure flight safety
performance, is integrated in the Safety Assurance component of the operator’s SMS.
The FDA program is also used for safety hazard identification and, as such, is integrated in the Risk
Management component of the operator’s SMS. Within an SMS there are typically multiple systems
used as sources for hazard identification (e.g. accident/incident investigation, operational safety
reporting, change management). Therefore, risk management processes are integrated in the
operator’s SMS to ensure an efficient use of resources and processes, and, where possible, to
eliminate or reduce duplicated processes.
Refer to ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual, and ICAO Doc 10000, Manual on Flight Data
Analysis Programmes (FDAP), for more detailed information regarding integration of the FDA
program into the operator’s SMS.
3.4 Specific Risk Assessments
ORG 3.5.1
The Operator shall have a process for the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents, to include
reporting of events in accordance with requirements of the State. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed accident investigation process (focus: process includes compliance with
regulatory accident/incident reporting requirements; output includes final report with
recommendations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected accident and incident reports (focus: investigation identifies operational
safety hazards, produces recommendations to prevent recurrence/mitigate risk).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Accident and incident investigation is considered a reactive hazard identification activity in an SMS.
A primary purpose of accident and incident investigation is hazard identification, which is an element
of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.
Investigations typically result in a report that describes the factors that contributed to the event, which
is then made available to responsible senior operational managers to permit them to evaluate and
implement appropriate corrective or preventive action.
An effective investigation process typically includes:
• Qualified personnel to conduct investigations (commensurate with operation size);
• Procedures for the conduct of investigations;
• A process for reporting investigative results;
Guidance
Investigation of operational irregularities is considered a reactive hazard identification activity in an
SMS.
A primary purpose of investigating non-routine operational occurrences is hazard identification, which
is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS framework.
The investigation of irregularities or non-routine occurrences is a hazard identification activity. Minor
events, irregularities and occurrences occur often during normal operations, many times without
noticeable consequences. Identifying and investigating certain irregular operational occurrences can
reveal system weaknesses or deficiencies that, if left un-checked, could eventually lead to an
accident or serious incident. These types of events are referred to as accident precursors.
A process to monitor operations on a regular basis permits the identification and capture of
information associated with internal activities and events that could be considered precursors. Such
events are then investigated to identify undesirable trends and determine contributory factors.
The monitoring process is typically not limited to occurrences, but also includes a regular review of
operational threats and errors that have manifested during normal operations. Monitoring of normal
operations can produce data that further serve to identify operational weaknesses and, in turn, assist
the organization in developing system solutions.
As with the investigation of accidents and serious incidents, the investigation of minor internal
occurrences results in a report that is communicated to relevant operational managers for analysis
and the possible development of corrective or preventive action.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
3.6 Cybersecurity Risk Management
ORG 4.1.1
The Operator shall have a process to review the management system at intervals not exceeding one
year to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness in the management and control
of operations and associated risks. A review shall include assessing opportunities for improvement
and the need for changes to the system, including, but not limited to:
(i) Organizational structure;
(ii) Defined safety objectives;
(iii) Reporting lines, authorities, responsibilities;
(iv) Policies, processes and procedures;
(v) Allocation of resources;
(vi) Identification of training needs. [SMS] (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed corporate management review process (focus: process identifies
organizational opportunities for changes/improvement to management system).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected records of management review meetings.
Examined selected examples of output from management review process (focus: changes
implemented to improve organizational performance).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Management review is a necessary element of a well-managed company that provides a medium
through which organizational control and continual improvement can be delivered. To be effective, a
formal management review takes place on a regular basis, typically once or more per year. The
management review would focus on the entire management system, including the assessment of the
effectiveness of the SMS processes.
The management review would typically be conducted by a strategic committee of senior
management officials that are familiar with the workings and objectives of the management system. If
the review of the SMS is conducted separately, such committee is typically referred to as a Safety
Review Board (SRB), which is a very high level, strategic committee chaired by the AE and
composed of senior managers, including senior line managers responsible for functional areas in
operations (e.g. flight operations, engineering and maintenance, cabin operations).
To ensure frontline input as part of the review process, an operator would form multiple units of
specially selected operational personnel (e.g. managers, supervisors, frontline personnel) that
function to oversee safety in areas where operations are conducted. Such units are typically referred
to as Safety Action Groups (SAGs), which are tactical committees that function to address
implementation issues in frontline operations to satisfy the strategic directives of the SRB.
An appropriate method to satisfy this requirement is a periodic formal meeting of senior executives.
The agenda of the meeting would typically include a general assessment of the management system
to ensure all defined elements are functioning effectively and producing the desired operational
safety outcomes consistent with defined safety objectives.
Senior management ensures deficiencies identified during the management review are addressed
through the implementation of organizational changes that will result in improvements to the
management system.
Guidance
Management review supports safety performance monitoring and continuous improvement of the
SMS, which are elements of the Safety Assurance component of the SMS Framework.
Such review permits senior management to consider quality assurance and risk management issues
that have the potential to affect the safety of operations and then ensure appropriate corrective or
preventive actions are implemented and are being monitored for effectiveness in preventing
accidents and incidents.
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
4.2 Safety Communication
ORG 4.2.1
The Operator shall have a system that enables effective communication of safety and operational
information throughout the management system and in all areas where operations are conducted.
Such system shall ensure:
(i) Personnel maintain an awareness of the SMS;
(ii) Safety-critical information is conveyed;
(iii) External service providers are provided with information relevant to operations conducted.
(GM) ►
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed organizational communication system (focus: safety and operational
information is communicated throughout the organization and to relevant external service
providers).
Interviewed AE and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined examples or records of information communication.
Interviewed selected management system personnel.
Coordinated to verify implementation of communication system in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety communication is an element of the Safety Promotion component of the SMS framework.
An effective communication system ensures the exchange of operational and safety-related
information throughout all areas of the organization and includes senior managers, operational
managers and front-line personnel.
To be totally effective, the communication system would also include external organizations that
conduct outsourced operational functions. Communication with external service providers would
typically be limited to information that is pertinent and relevant to the provider’s services delivered to
the operator. It would be at the operator’s discretion to define the extent and content of such
communication and the delivery method(s) to be used.
Methods of internal communication will vary according to the size and scope of the organization.
However, to be effective, methods are as uncomplicated and easy to use as is possible and facilitate
the reporting of operational deficiencies, hazards or concerns by operational personnel.
Specific methods of communication between management and operational personnel could include:
• Email, Internet;
• Safety or operational reporting system;
• Communiqués (e.g. letters, memos, bulletins);
• Publications (e.g. newsletters, magazines).
If email is used as an official medium for communication with operational personnel, the process is
typically formalized by the operator to ensure control and effectiveness.
The general intent of safety communication is to foster a positive safety culture in which all
employees receive ongoing information on safety issues, safety metrics, specific hazards existing in
the workplace and initiatives to address known safety issues. Such communication typically conveys
safety-critical information, explains why particular actions are taken to improve safety and why safety
procedures are introduced or changed.
Information and issues relevant to safety performance are typically derived from various sources
such as, but not limited to, the quality assurance/flight safety analysis programs, operational safety
reporting and accident/incident investigations.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
4.3 Training
ORG 4.3.1
The Operator shall have a program that ensures its personnel are trained to understand SMS
responsibilities and competent to perform associated duties. The scope of such training shall be
appropriate to each individual’s involvement in the SMS. [SMS] (GM) ►
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to personnel of the Operator.
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator is in conformity with all
repeats of this provision in other ISM sections.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed SMS training program (focus: program ensures training for the operator’s
personnel as appropriate to individual SMS involvement).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected SMS training curricula/syllabi (focus: personnel are trained to understand
SMS responsibilities and to perform associated SMS duties).
Examined selected management/non-management personnel training records (focus:
completion of SMS training relevant to individual involvement in the SMS).
Coordinated to verify SMS training is implemented in all operational areas.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
SMS training is an element of the Safety Promotion component of the SMS framework.
Within an operator’s organization there are personnel that perform duties that are directly or indirectly
related to the safety of aircraft operations. All such personnel thus have an involvement in the
operator’s SMS. This applies to management and non-management personnel in frontline
operational positions and could also include others that perform certain administrative functions. The
intent of this provision is for the operator to have a program that ensures personnel are trained and
competent to perform their SMS duties. Such program would include training for support staff,
operational personnel, managers and supervisors, senior managers and the accountable executive.
The content of safety training is appropriate to each individual’s involvement in the SMS and typically
includes or addresses some or all of the following subject areas:
• Organizational safety policies, goals and objectives;
• Organizational safety roles and responsibilities related to safety;
• Organizational SMS processes and procedures;
• Basic safety risk management principles;
• Safety reporting systems;
• Human factors.
Recurrent training would be offered at the option of the operator to ensure personnel maintain
continuing competency in SMS duties. If offered, such training would typically focus on changes to
SMS policies, processes and procedures as well as any specific safety issues relevant to the
organization.
An operator may use various methods to verify if personnel are competent to perform their duties at
the conclusion of the training. The methods used would be solely at the discretion of the operator and
would typically be based on the depth and detail of the training provided. Such methods may include
a combination of the following:
• Including knowledge checks during the training modules;
• Performing Q&A sessions at the conclusion of a module or training session;
• Including practical exercises with feedback;
• Observing the staff member during the performance of SMS duties;
• Administering an oral or written test;
Refer to the IAH for information that identifies repeats of this ORG provision in other ISM sections.
Expanded guidance may be found in the ICAO SMM, Document 9859.
4.4 Effectiveness
ORG 4.4.1
The Operator should demonstrate that systems, processes and procedures specified in the ISARPs
identified with the [Eff] symbol are achieving the designated Desired Outcome.
Note: Conformity with this ORG provision is possible only when the Operator demonstrates
effectiveness of implementation for all ISARPs designated with the [Eff] symbol.
Note: Conformity with this provision does not require specifications to be documented by the
Operator.
Auditor Actions
Coordinated to verify status of conformity with ISARPs designated with the [Eff] symbol.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Desired Outcome and Effective.
Applicability
Section 2 addresses safety and security requirements for flight operations, and is applicable to an operator
that uses two-pilot, multi-engine aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg
(12,566 lbs.) to conduct:
• Passenger flights with or without cabin crew;
• Cargo flights with or without the carriage of passengers or supernumeraries.
Additionally, the IOSA standards and recommended practices (ISARPs) in Section 2 are applicable only to
those aircraft that are of the type authorized in the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and used in commercial
passenger and/or cargo operations unless applicability is extended to encompass non-commercial
operations as stated in a note immediately under the body of the provision.
Individual FLT provisions or sub-specifications within a FLT provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable unless determined otherwise by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
Certain flight crew training ISARPs in sub-section 2 contain a Conformance Applicability (CA) table, which
is an integral part of the standard or recommended practice. Refer to the ISM Introduction for a description
of a Conformance Applicability (CA) table.
Where an operator outsources flight operations functions to external service providers, an operator retains
responsibility for ensuring the management of safety in the conduct of such operations and must
demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service providers in accordance with
FLT 1.11.2.
Some cabin safety specifications applicable to functions or equipment within the scope of flight operations
are located in Section 5 (CAB) of this manual.
General Guidance
The definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 2, as well as the list of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
FLT 1.2.1
The Operator shall have a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) or equivalent document issued by the
State of the Operator (hereinafter, the State) that authorizes the Operator to conduct commercial air
transport operations in accordance with specified conditions and limitations. The AOC and/or
associated documents shall include:
(i) Operator identification (name and location);
(ii) Date of issue and period of validity;
(iii) Description of types of operations authorized;
(iv) Type(s) of aircraft authorized for use;
(v) Authorized areas of operation or routes;
(vi) Exemptions, deviations and waivers (listed by name);
Auditor Actions
Identified the documents that authorize the Operator to conduct commercial air transport
operations in accordance with conditions and limitations specified by the State.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined AOC (focus: information is current and relevant to the Operator).
Crosschecked AOC against OM (focus: authorizations/limitations consistent with operations
conducted by Operator).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Low Visibility Operations (LVO) and North Atlantic Track High
Level Airspace (NAT HLA).
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), Enhanced Visual System (EVS),
ETOPS, Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO), Head-up Display (HUD), Minimum Navigation
Performance Specifications (MNPS/NAT HLA), PBN Navigation Specification AR (Authorization
Required), Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM), Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
and State.
The specifications of this provision require the conditions and limitations of any State-approved or
State-accepted air transport operations, conducted by the operator, to be described in the AOC, AOC
equivalents and/or associated documents.
The AOC is produced (by the State) in a manner consistent with local conditions for State approval or
acceptance. This should not preclude the operator from describing authorized operations, including
conditions and limitations for such operations, in associated documents and in a manner consistent
with the specifications of this provision. Such documents typically include the OM or any operational
document that describes the conditions and limitations of authorized operations.
The exemptions, deviations, waivers and special authorizations in specifications vi) and vii) may be
described in State-approved or State-accepted documents other than the AOC.
Operators subject to laws or regulations of the State that prevent the issuance of an AOC consistent
with the specifications of this provision and/or prohibit the description of authorized operations in a
manner consistent with the specifications of this provision may demonstrate an equivalent method of
ensuring the specifications of this provision are satisfied.
The period of validity is designated on the AOC or determined by reference to the dates of issuance
and expiration.
The specification in item vii) e) refers to aircraft operated on routes where the diversion time from any
point on the route to an en route alternate airport exceeds the threshold time but is within the
maximum diversion time as established by the State.
1.3 Accountability, Authorities and Responsibilities
FLT 1.3.2
The Operator shall delegate authority and assign responsibility for the management and supervision
of specific areas of the organization relevant to the flight operations management system, to include,
as a minimum:
(i) Fleet operations;
(ii) Line operations;
(iii) Documentation control;
(iv) Flight crew training;
(v) Operations engineering;
(vi) Flight crew scheduling;
(vii) Accident prevention and flight safety;
(viii) Human resources;
(ix) Quality assurance;
(x) Security. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified positions with authority/responsibility for management/supervision of the specified
areas of flight operations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined job description for selected management positions (focus: authority/responsibility for
management of the specified areas of flight operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Crew and Operations Engineering.
The specification in:
• Item i) refers to the management of policies, rules, procedures and instructions governing
specific aircraft.
• Item ii) refers to the management of policies, rules, procedures and instructions governing
flight crew.
• Item vii) could also be referred to as the flight safety program.
• Item viii) refers to the provision of Human Resources including management staff, support
staff, administrative staff and flight crew.
FLT 1.4.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure issues that affect operational safety and security are
coordinated among personnel with expertise in the appropriate areas within the flight operations
organization and relevant areas outside of flight operations, to include, as appropriate:
(i) Accident prevention and flight safety;
(ii) Cabin operations;
(iii) Engineering and maintenance;
(iv) Operations engineering;
(v) Operational control/flight dispatch;
(vi) Human resources;
(vii) Ground handling, cargo operations and dangerous goods;
(viii) Manufacturers, (AFM/AOM, operational and safety communication);
(ix) Regulatory agencies or authorities. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety and security coordination process(es).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected evidence of internal/external coordination.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) and Approved Flight Manual.
Some examples of issues that could affect operational safety and security include aircraft
modifications, new equipment, new destinations/routes, or regulatory changes.
The specifications of this provision are satisfied if an operator can demonstrate that a process exists
within the flight operations organization that ensures necessary internal and external coordination.
The coordination processes specified in this provision may occur during meetings or other means of
liaison (e.g. email, memos, conference call).
The specification in item iv) refers to coordination with the following or other appropriate categories of
personnel:
• The operations engineering manager or other person responsible for defining, producing,
customizing and distributing aircraft performance data;
• The manager responsible for defining, producing, customizing and/or distributing route and
airport instructions or information, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Flight Management
System (FMS) databases, if applicable;
• The operations engineering manager or other person in charge of aircraft equipment
specification.
The specification in item iv) typically includes coordination on the following operational safety issues:
• Fleet and cross-fleet standardization;
• Flight deck layout;
• Aircraft avionics, instrumentation, equipment and/or components in accordance with the
provisions of FLT 4.3.1.
The specification in item vi) refers to coordination with respect to staffing necessary to meet operator
requirements.
FLT 1.4.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure the dissemination of safety-critical operational
information to appropriate personnel within and external to the flight operations organization, to
include:
(i) Airworthiness Directives (ADs);
(ii) Manufacturer bulletins;
(iii) Flight crew bulletins or directives;
(iv) NOTAMs. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process that ensures the dissemination of safety-critical operational
information.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed frontline personnel.
Examined selected evidence of information dissemination.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Airworthiness Directive, Flight Crew Bulletin and NOTAM.
The intent of this provision is to ensure a process is in place to disseminate safety critical information
to personnel that require it.
1.5 Provision of Resources
FLT 1.5.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure candidates, prior to being employed as flight crew
members, are screened for the purpose of determining if they possess the requisite certifications,
skills, competencies and other attributes required by the Operator and/or State. Such process, as a
minimum, shall include procedures for reviewing and/or assessing:
(i) Technical and non-technical competencies and skills, to include interpersonal skills;
(ii) Aviation experience;
(iii) Credentials and licenses;
(iv) Medical fitness;
(v) Security background;
(vi) Common language(s) fluency. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process/criteria used for pre-employment screening of flight crew
member candidates.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew candidate screening records.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Air Traffic Control (ATC).
The specification in:
• Item i) refers to technical competencies and skills that will vary with the requirements of the
position in which the flight crew member will be employed. For example, an ab initio pilot will
not necessarily have flying skills but will possess other skills and/or attributes necessary to
succeed in training.
• Item iii) typically includes verification of authenticity of licenses.
• Item iv) could be assessed by a flight operations management interview, Human Resource
interview and/or the conduct of a psychological analysis.
• Item vi) is applicable unless such check is performed or prohibited by the State.
• Item vii) refers to aviation English language fluency (where required for Air Traffic Control
(ATC) communications) and sufficient fluency in the designated common language(s)
necessary for ensuring effective communication (see FLT 3.1.1).
FLT 1.5.5
The Operator shall have criteria and processes for the selection of instructors, evaluators and line
check airmen, to include a minimum experience level in line operations that is acceptable to the
Operator and/or the State. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed instructor/evaluator/line check airman selection criteria and processes.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected instructor/evaluator/line check airman candidate screening records.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure instructors and evaluators are selected in a manner
consistent with the overall objectives of an operator's training program. To achieve this aim, selection
criteria and processes would typically include:
• Confirmation that a minimum level of experience has been attained;
• A review of the training records of potential selectees;
• Recommendations from Flight Operations management and/or the training department.
FLT 1.6.3
The Operator shall ensure the system for the management and control of flight operations
documentation as specified in ORG 2.5.1 and Table 1.1 addresses, as a minimum, the following
documents from external sources:
(i) As applicable, regulations of the State and of the other states or authorities relevant to
operations;
(ii) As applicable, relevant ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), manuals,
regional supplementary procedures and/or circulars;
(iii) Airworthiness Directives (ADs);
(iv) As applicable, Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP) and NOTAMS;
(v) State-approved or State-accepted Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM);
(vi) Manufacturer's Aircraft Operating Manuals (AOMs), including performance data, weight and
balance data/manuals, checklists and MEL/CDL;
(vii) As applicable, other manufacturer's operational communications. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system(s) for management and control of documentation and data used in
flight operations (focus: system includes management/control of specified documents from
external sources).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected documents from external sources (focus: application of management/control
elements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), Aircraft Operating
Manual (AOM), Approved Flight Manual (AFM), Airworthiness Directive (AD), Configuration Deviation
List (CDL), Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), Minimum Equipment List (MEL), State
Acceptance and State Approval.
The specification in item i) refers to applicable regulations imposed on an operator by the State,
which issues the Air Operator Certificate (AOC), and other states and/or authorities that actively
regulate foreign operators or have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by the
operator. This may be done through the issuing of an Operational Specification (OPS SPEC) or
specific state legislation.
The specification in item ii) refers to applicable ICAO standards, recommended practices,
supplemental procedures and/or guidance material made applicable to the operations of the operator
by any states or authority with jurisdiction over the operations of the operator. Applicable authorities
typically include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an
operator over the high seas or over the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
The specification in item ii) also refers to applicable ICAO standards and/or recommended practices
that are referenced in the operator's documentation.
The specification for the manufacturer's AFM in item v) may be replaced by an Aircraft Operating
Manual (AOM) customized by the manufacturer for the specific use in flight operations by an
operator.
The specification in item vi) refers to bulletins or directives distributed by the manufacturer for the
purposes of amending aircraft technical specifications and/or operating procedures.
The specification in item vii) refers to operational communications received from the manufacturer of
equipment that is installed on the airplane, typically from the manufacturers of the engines,
components and safety equipment.
1.7 Operations Manual
FLT 1.7.1
The Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM) for the use of personnel in the flight operations
organization, which may be issued in separate parts, and which contains or references the policies,
procedures, checklists and other guidance or information necessary for compliance with applicable
regulations, laws, rules and Operator standards. As a minimum, the OM shall be managed and
controlled in accordance with FLT 1.6.1, define the content of the onboard library and be in
accordance with specifications contained in Table 2.2. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational documents that comprise the OM.
Identified external documents referenced in the OM that contain operational information used by
flight crew.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected parts of OM (focus: contents in accordance with Table 2.2).
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: flight crew use/interpretation of OM
and related checklists).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the flight crew will find all information necessary to perform its
functions within the OM, or within another document that is referenced in the OM. The OM is
identified as a source of operational information approved or accepted for the purpose by the
operator or the State.
Guidance and procedures in the OM enable the flight crew to comply with the conditions and
limitations specified in the AOC.
FLT 1.12.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program in the flight operations organization that
includes a combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in flight operations (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of flight operations in cross-discipline safety hazard identification
program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform flight operations data collection/analysis to identify hazards
to aircraft operations.
Examined selected examples of hazards identified through flight operations data
collection/analysis.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
FLT 1.12.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program in the flight operations
organization that specifies processes to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine the corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in flight
operations. [SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its operational risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant flight operations hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) within the flight operations organization capture risk assessment information, risk
mitigation (control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment and mitigation program in flight operations (focus:
hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action; action
implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of flight operations in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform flight operations risk assessment/mitigation.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment/mitigation action.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA),
Safety Risk Management and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
Hazards relevant to the conduct of aircraft operations are potentially associated with:
• Weather (e.g. adverse, extreme and space);
• Geophysical events (e.g. volcanic ash, earthquakes, tsunamis);
• Operations in airspace affected by armed conflict (i.e. Conflict Zones);
• ATM congestion;
• Mechanical failure;
• Geography (e.g. adverse terrain, large bodies of water, polar);
• Airport constraints (e.g. isolated, runway closure, RFFS capability);
• Alternate airport selection, specification and availability at the estimated time of use;
• Preflight fuel planning and in-flight fuel management;
• Critical fuel scenarios;
• ETOPS/EDTO;
• Performance-based compliance to prescriptive regulations;
• Operational considerations (e.g. area of operations, diversion time);
• The capabilities of an individual aircraft (e.g. cargo smoke detection and fire suppression
systems, open MEL items);
• The properties of items to be transported as cargo;
• The quantity and distribution of dangerous goods items to be transported;
• Criminal, dangerous, and/or unauthorized activities directed at manned aircraft or in the
vicinity of manned aircraft operations (e.g. laser pointing, unauthorized UAS/RPAS
operations);
• Flights using aircraft to transport cargo in the passenger cabin, without passengers;
• Any other condition(s) that would pose a safety risk to aircraft operations.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
FLT 1.12.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system in the flight operations organization
that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates flight crew members and other flight operations personnel to
submit reports that identify safety hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety
concerns;
(ii) Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
(iii) Includes analysis and flight operations management action as necessary to address safety
issues identified through the reporting system. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in flight operations (focus: system
urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in flight
operations.
Interviewed selected flight crew members.
Examined selected data that confirm an effective flight operations safety reporting system
(focus: quantity of reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected flight operations safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to
identify and address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
Safety Performance Monitoring and Management
replaced in accordance with intervals specified in the continuing qualification curriculum that is
defined in an operator's AQP, ATQP or EBT (as applicable).
Most provisions contain specifications related to the recurring frequency of training and evaluation
events for flight crew members. Such provisions, with a few exceptions, define cycles or intervals for
the completion of recurrent training and/or evaluation expressed in months since training was first
completed or qualification was first established. It is important to note, however, that for the purpose
of conformance with these provisions, such intervals are nominal and that the actual interval may
vary slightly. For example, an operator may adjust the frequency of evaluations to minimize overlap,
provide scheduling flexibility, preserve the original qualification date, and/or ensure evaluations are
consistently completed in accordance with the nominal cycle set forth by the State and/or applicable
authorities. Accommodations of this nature are commonplace and vary widely by regulatory
jurisdiction. In all cases, however, the auditor will make the determination of whether or not such
accommodations fit within the nominal cycles established in each provision.
Conformance Applicability (CA) Tables embedded in certain provisions indicate how aspects or
factors relevant to flight crew training and qualification must be addressed or satisfied for an operator
to be in conformity with the provision. Each CA table contains four columns that address the following
relevant aspects/factors:
• Specific to Aircraft Type: Indicates whether the training specified in the provision must
account for or be tailored to aircraft type or crew position.
• Included in Initial/Transition/Conversion Training: Indicates whether the training specified in
the provision must be included as part of initial, transition or conversion training.
• Included in Recurrent Training/Continuing Qualification: Indicates whether the training
specified in the provision must be included as part of recurrent training/continuing
qualification and, as applicable, specifies the maximum recurrent interval.
• Conformance through AQP/ATQP/EBT: Indicates whether the specified training and/or
evaluation, including the associated recurrent training/continuing qualification interval, if any,
may be replaced by equivalent requirements as part of, as applicable, the operator's AQP,
ATQP or EBT program.
2.1 Training and Evaluation Program
General
FLT 2.1.1A
The Operator shall have a training and evaluation program, approved or accepted by the Authority,
that consists of ground and flight training and, when applicable, evaluations to ensure flight crew
members are competent to perform assigned duties. The program shall address traditional and, if
applicable, advanced, alternative or evidence-based training and qualification, and ensure training
and evaluation is conducted for each type of aircraft in the fleet. Such program shall also, as a
minimum, address:
(i) Initial qualification;
(ii) Continuing qualification;
(iii) Re-qualification;
(iv) As applicable, aircraft transition or conversion;
(v) Upgrade to PIC;
(vi) As applicable, other specialized training requirements, including those associated with
operations authorized in the AOC;
(vii) As applicable, each traditional training program requirement that is replaced by a
requirement under an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), Alternative Training and
Qualification Program (ATQP) or Evidence-based Training (EBT) program. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew training/qualification program (focus: program includes each
type of aircraft in the fleet).
Identified/Assessed AQP/ATQP/EBT elements/regulatory approval (as applicable).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined training/qualification course curriculum for selected aircraft types (focus: inclusion of
applicable training/qualification courses for each aircraft type).
Examined training/qualification records of selected flight crew members (focus: completion of
applicable training/qualification courses).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), Alternative Training
and Qualification Program (ATQP) and Evidence-based Training (EBT).
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator's training program contains the elements
necessary to ensure flight crew members are continuously competent to perform assigned duties.
The initial qualification process provided to newly hired crew members typically includes company
indoctrination and initial endorsement on company aircraft types. This presupposes that the newly
hired crew member already holds a commercial flying license.
Initial endorsement training may not be required as part of initial qualification if a newly hired crew
member already holds a type endorsement acceptable to both the State and the Operator. Company
indoctrination training, however, is considered a part of initial qualification.
Continuing qualification includes recurrent or refresher training and also includes any training
necessary to meet recency-of-experience requirements.
Transition (conversion) training refers to an aircraft type qualification training and evaluation program
for each type of aircraft in the fleet and is not required when an operator only uses one type of
aircraft.
Specialized training could also include training on a specific type of new equipment (e.g., ACAS).
AQP/ATQP incorporate the elements and specifications contained in FLT 2.1.1B, Table 2.6 and
Table 2.7.
EBT incorporates the elements and specifications contained in FLT 2.1.1B, Table 2.6 and Table 2.8.
Training could be outsourced, in which case services typically range from simple dry lease of a
training device to delegation of all training to an external organization (e.g., Authorized Flight Training
School).
FLT 2.1.1B
If the Operator conducts training and evaluation in accordance with an AQP, ATQP or EBT program,
such program shall be approved or accepted by the Authority and incorporate all of the elements and
specifications contained in Table 2.6 and, as applicable, Table 2.7 or Table 2.8. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (focus: regulatory approval; requirements for
elements/specifications in accordance with Tables 2.6, Table 2.7 or Table 2.8.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected training/qualification course curricula/syllabi for different aircraft types.
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
AQP/ATQP/EBT elements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
AQP/ATQP incorporate the elements and specifications contained in FLT 2.1.1B, Table 2.6 and
Table 2.7.
EBT incorporates the elements and specifications contained in FLT 2.1.1B, Table 2.6 and Table 2.8.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance
for the development of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program. Such guidance might be derived from one or
more of the following source references, as applicable:
• Office of the Federal Register, (2 October 1990), Special Federal Aviation Regulation 58 -
Advanced Qualification Program, Federal Register, Vol. 55, No. 91, Rules and Regulations
(pp. 40262-40278).
• FAA 14 CFR Part 121, Subpart Y.
• FAA Advisory Circular 120–54A, Change 1, Advanced Qualification Program (31 January
2017).
• Advisory Circular 120–35D (13 March 2015), Flightcrew Member Line-Operational
Simulations: Line-Oriented Flight Training, Special Purpose Operational Training, Line
Operational Evaluation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington D. C.: U. S.
Department of Transportation.
• FAA Advisory Circular 120–51E (22 January 2004), Crew Resource Management Training,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington D. C.: U. S. Department of Transportation.
• Commission Regulation (U) No. 965/2012 of 05 October 2012 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative
Training and Qualification Programme (ATQP) including associated GM and AMC.
• Mangold, S., and Neumeister, D. (1995). CRM in the model AQP: A preview. In R. S. Jensen
and L.A. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology (pp 556-561), Columbus; the Ohio State University.
• ICAO Doc 9995 Manual of Evidence-based Training.
• IATA Evidence-Based Training Implementation Guide July 2013.
• IATA Data Report for Evidence-Based Training August 2014.
• Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the
development of an advanced training and qualification program designed to conform to the
specifications of Table 2.6, Table 2.7 and Table 2.8.
FLT 2.1.2
The Operator shall ensure objectivity is maintained in the training and evaluation program, and that
instructors, evaluators and line check airmen are permitted to perform assigned activities without
inappropriate interference from management and/or external organizations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for objectivity in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected instructors/evaluators (focus: evaluation criteria/methodology).
Examined selected instructor/evaluator job descriptions.
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: objectivity; no undue external interference in
training/evaluation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure an absence of bias in the training and evaluation program that
permits trainees to be objectively assessed against the operating standards set forth by the operator
and/or authority without undue internal or external interference.
Policies and/or procedures used to address objectivity do not apply to ground training courses and
evaluations, but do typically address one or more of the following:
• If applicable, the organizational structure of an operator's training program that ensures flight
crew members are trained and evaluated by separate and distinct departments or individuals
within the training organization;
• The requirements of the State related to the evaluation of pilots to whom an evaluator may
have given flight instruction for a license or rating during Type qualification, Transition
(conversion), Upgrade to PIC and/or Re-qualification;
• The proper conduct of evaluations administered in conjunction with simulator, aircraft and/or
line training, whether conducted or administered by any of the following:
○ Different organizations, or
○ Different individuals than those that conducted the majority of the training, or
○ A common instructor and check airman (e.g. training to proficiency).
• Exceptions that may be appropriate under extenuating circumstances, such as the
introduction of new aircraft types or the management of very small fleets.
FLT 2.1.3
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members receive training that supports the introduction of:
(i) New policies, rules, instructions and procedures;
(ii) New aircraft types, systems and fleet modifications/upgrades. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed methodology for introduction of specified new elements into flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: examples of new
elements as specified).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training/evaluation reflects current
policies/procedures/equipment/aircraft modifications).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
This provision is satisfied if a process exists for the introduction into the training program of each
specification that results from the coordination processes required by FLT 1.4.2. Such coordination
processes typically occur:
• Within the training program;
• Between those responsible for the training program and the relevant areas of the
organization in accordance with FLT 1.4.2.
FLT 2.1.4
If the Operator uses distance learning and/or distance evaluation in the flight crew training and
qualification program, the Operator shall ensure such training and/or evaluation is monitored in
accordance with FLT 2.1.28 and, if required, is approved or accepted by the State. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed regulatory approval, process for monitoring/continual improvement of
distance learning in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected distance learning/qualification course development records (focus:
monitoring/continual improvement).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Distance Learning.
Distance learning refers to flight crew training or evaluation that is not conducted in a classroom or
face-to-face with an instructor or evaluator, but rather is conducted through the use of distributed
printed material or electronic media (e.g., Internet, compact disc, etc.).
Training Manual
FLT 2.1.10
The Operator shall have a Training Manual for the use of flight operations personnel, which may be
issued in separate parts, that contains the details of all relevant training programs, policies,
procedures, requirements and other guidance or information necessary to administer the Operator's
Training Program. The Training Manual shall, as a minimum, be managed and controlled as
specified in FLT 1.6.1, and be in accordance with specifications contained in FLT 1.6.4 and
Table 2.2. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew training manual, regulatory approval, content in accordance with
Table 2.2.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected parts of training manual (focus: content includes policies/procedures/
requirements, other guidance/information necessary to administer the training/evaluation
program.
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: simulator training consistent with Training Manual).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The training manual typically applies to instructors, evaluators, line check airmen, flight crew
members, training schedulers, simulator operations personnel, administrative support personnel and
other applicable flight operations personnel.
The training manual may be split among several publications with the relevant parts made easily
accessible to the appropriate personnel.
FLT 2.1.12
The Operator shall ensure the Training Manual contains standards for flight crew training and
evaluation that have been approved or accepted by the State and include, as a minimum:
(i) Standardized procedures for training and the conduct of evaluations;
(ii) Standards that ensure piloting technique and the ability to execute normal and non-normal
procedures are checked in a way that demonstrates each pilot's competence;
(iii) A requirement that simulated aircraft, weather and environmental conditions are
standardized and appropriate for the training/evaluation being administered;
(iv) If the Operator conducts training flights, a definition of the conditions and/or maneuvers that
can be safely simulated in the aircraft, as well as the minimum weather and environmental
conditions required to ensure the training/evaluation being administered can be safely and
effectively conducted;
(v) Limits for the number of times maneuvers may be repeated and the evaluation still be
considered acceptable;
(vi) Procedures for remedial training and subsequent evaluation of a flight crew unable to
achieve or maintain required standards. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew training manual, regulatory approval of standards.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
FLT 2.1.20
The Operator shall have processes that ensure instructors, evaluators, and line check airmen
(whether employed or contracted) are standardized and:
(i) As applicable, have the required certification(s)/approval(s) from the State;
(ii) As applicable, meet the required qualification and performance standards of the Operator
and/or the State;
(iii) Are periodically evaluated to ensure compliance with required qualification and performance
standards. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew training/evaluation program (focus: includes qualification and
performance standards that ensure standardization and appropriate certification/
acceptance/approval/evaluation of instructors/evaluators/line check airmen).
Identified/Assessed processes for the standardization of instructors/evaluators/line check
airmen in the flight crew training/qualification program.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected qualification records for training/evaluator/line check personnel (focus:
certification/approval in accordance with applicable regulations/standards; periodically evaluated
against qualification/performance standards).
Program Improvement
FLT 2.1.27
The Operator shall ensure formal and regular communication occurs between and among flight
operations management, instructors, evaluators, line check airmen and flight crew members to
achieve continual improvement of ground, simulator and aircraft training and line operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for communication among management/training
personnel/flight crew members for continual improvement in flight crew training/evaluation
program.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected flight training personnel/flight crew members.
Examined selected communication media including, as applicable, meeting minutes, bulletins,
surveys, questionnaires, other communication evidence (focus: regular communication occurs
among all stakeholders for continual improvement of operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for the operator to ensure a mandate exists, as well the means and
opportunity, for the conduct of regular communications between and among the operational
personnel, including flight crew members, for the purpose of achieving continual program
improvement. This typically includes general training bulletins, instructor/check airman meetings,
surveys/questionnaires, and other feedback methods.
FLT 2.1.28
The Operator shall have processes for ensuring continual improvement of the flight crew training and
evaluation program, to include, as a minimum, the monitoring, recording and evaluation of results of
successful and unsuccessful flight crew evaluations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for program monitoring, continual improvement of flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected records of program monitoring (focus: improvements resulting from
monitoring).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Flight crew operational non-compliances, training deficiencies and evaluation trends (simulator,
aircraft and line operations) are typically used by the training organization for trend analysis and
program improvement.
Grading scale criteria (e.g. numerical, letter grade) provides a means to accurately identify areas for
improvement.
Instructors, Evaluators, and Line Check Airmen
FLT 2.1.35
The Operator shall have an initial training program for instructors, evaluators and line check airmen,
to include:
(i) An instructor course that addresses as a minimum:
(a) The fundamentals of teaching and evaluation;
(b) Lesson plan management;
(c) Briefing and debriefing;
(d) Human performance issues;
(e) Company policies and procedures;
(f) Simulator serviceability and training in simulator operation;
(g) If the Operator conducts training flights, dangers associated with simulating system
failures in flight;
(h) As applicable, the simulated or actual weather and environmental conditions
necessary to conduct each simulator or aircraft training/evaluation session to be
administered.
(ii) A formal observation program consisting of:
(a) The observation by the candidate of experienced instructors administering the
course and syllabus lessons;
(b) The observation of the candidate during supervised practical instruction.
(iii) A seat-specific (right or left seat, as applicable) qualification program for instructors,
evaluators, line check airmen and any other pilots, so designated by management, who
perform duties from either seat;
(iv) If non-line qualified instructors are used, a jump seat observation program or equivalent for
non-line qualified instructors to provide familiarity with current and type-related line
operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for initial training program for instructors/evaluators/line check
airmen in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Interviewed the responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial training course curricula/syllabi for instructors/evaluators/line check
airmen (focus: specified elements are addressed in initial training for instructors/evaluators/line
check airmen).
Guidance
The operator could have different recurrent qualification programs for line check airmen authorized to
conduct line flying under supervision and those who conduct simulator and/or aircraft evaluations.
Instructors, evaluators and line check airmen typically attend a standardization meeting at least once
within the preceding 12 months. Minutes of standardization meetings are normally distributed to
instructors, evaluators and line check airmen.
The observations required in conjunction with item ii) are typically conducted at least within the
preceding 12 months for each instructor, evaluator and line check airman, unless a longer interval is
approved or accepted by the Authority.
Simulator observations in conjunction with item ii) typically entail an assessment of the individual
while carrying out the duties for which highest qualified (e.g., instructor or evaluator).
The specification in item v) of this provision may be satisfied by an equivalent program that includes
line-oriented simulator sessions and/or completion of the company recurrent training program
administered to line pilots.
Facilities, Training Aids and Equipment
FLT 2.1.46
The Operator shall have published guidance for instructors and evaluators, approved or accepted by
the State, if applicable, that specifies minimum serviceability levels of training devices and/or training
aircraft to ensure serviceability does not adversely affect training, evaluation and/or safety, as
applicable. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance for instructors/evaluators that specifies minimum required
serviceability levels for training devices in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected instructors/evaluators.
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: documentation that specifies minimum simulator
serviceability levels for type of training/evaluation to be conducted).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Minimum serviceability guidance for training devices typically takes into account, among other things,
simulator motion, visual systems, or instrumentation.
Minimum serviceability guidance for aircraft used for Training Flights would typically take into account
MEL allowances that are permissible under passenger operations, but unsuitable for the conduct of
the training/evaluation to be conducted.
The specification of this provision is satisfied if an operator provides guidance to instructors and
evaluators when critical components of a training device are fully or partially inoperative. For
example, simulator minimum serviceability requirements typically refer instructors or evaluators to
published company guidance to determine if a certain type of training (such as LOFT/LOS) can be
conducted with simulator components inoperative.
FLT 2.1.47
If the Operator has a zero flight time training (ZFTT) program, the Operator shall ensure such training
program is approved or accepted by the State and:
(i) Is conducted using flight simulators representative of the aircraft flown by the Operator and
qualified to Level C, D or an equivalent;
(ii) Specifies minimum pilot experience requirements for entry into each ZFTT
qualification/training course;
(iii) Each ZFTT qualification/training course is customized as necessary to address pilot
experience, flight crew position and simulator level;
(iv) A demonstration of competency is completed in a flight simulator conforming to the
specifications in item i) under the supervision of an evaluator;
(v) A final demonstration of competency is completed in an aircraft during actual line operations
under the supervision of an evaluator, instructor or current and qualified Pilot-in-Command
(PIC) designated for the purpose by the Operator and/or State. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed program elements for ZFTT in flight crew training/evaluation program;
approval by State.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
applicable ZFTT program elements).
FLT 2.2.7
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete Operator familiarization training prior to
being assigned to duties in line operations. Such training shall ensure familiarity with:
(i) Duties and responsibilities;
(ii) Relevant state regulations;
(iii) Authorized operations;
(iv) Relevant sections of the OM. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes No No
* This training may be provided as a complete package included in a company indoctrination course
or, if applicable, tailored to address requirements that are different from the individual’s previous
training.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed initial training/qualification course curriculum/syllabus (focus: operator
familiarization training; definition of subjects addressed).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
operator familiarization training prior to assignment to line duties).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight crew demonstrates familiarity with operational
responsibilities and requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
This provision and many of the ensuing flight crew training provisions contain a Conformance
Applicability (CA) Table. Refer to the General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2,
Training and Qualification, for a detailed description of the CA Table.
Training is applicable to all flight crew members.
Many operators refer to this training course as Basic Company Indoctrination.
FLT 2.2.8
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete practical training exercises:
(i) In the use of emergency and safety equipment required to be on board the aircraft;
(ii) That address emergency evacuation and coordination among flight crew members and, as
applicable, cabin crew members and/or supernumeraries required for the safety of
operations. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Sub-spec Specific to Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Aircraft Initial/Transition/ Training/Continuing through
Type Conversion Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Training
(i) Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
(ii) Yes Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for practical training exercises in flight crew training/evaluation
program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT, (focus continuing qualification recurrent
schedule for practical training exercises).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: inclusion
of initial/recurrent practical training exercises as specified).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
practical training exercises in initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Supernumerary, which defines and includes examples of
supernumeraries, including those that are required for the safety of operations.
The principal intent of the specifications of this provision is to ensure flight crew members have a
working knowledge of the emergency and safety equipment required to be on board an aircraft.
Training exercises typically address the operation of safety and emergency equipment carried on the
flight deck, emergency exits and slides, flotation devices (e.g. life rafts, life vests) and locating
equipment (e.g. ELT).
The extent to which training exercises must include the actual use or manipulation of such equipment
is typically determined by the operator in conjunction with requirements of the Authority. Additionally,
since the routine manipulation or use of certain required items may pose an occupational health
hazard, such training is typically accomplished using mock-ups or non-functioning replicas.
Training is applicable to all flight crew members.
Supernumeraries as specified in item ii) are those that are required for the safety of operations in
accordance with FLT 2.2.44.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.10
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members receive training in all aspects of aircraft performance.
Such training shall include:
(i) Weight/mass and balance;
(ii) Takeoff, climb, cruise, approach and landing performance;
(iii) Obstacle clearance;
(iv) Fuel planning;
(v) Diversion planning;
(vi) Effect of inoperative or missing components (MEL/CDL);
(vii) If applicable, engine-out driftdown. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes No No
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training in aircraft performance in flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: aircraft
performance training; definition of aspects/subjects addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of initial
aircraft performance training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training is applicable to all flight crew members.
The specification in item vi) might not apply to ferry flights or maintenance flights.
The specification in item vii) is applicable when engine-out performance is operationally limiting.
FLT 2.2.11
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in aircraft
systems and limitations, to include a demonstration of competence in the operation of aircraft
systems. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation in aircraft systems/limitations in flight
crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in aircraft systems/limitations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in aircraft systems limitations/operation).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in aircraft systems limitations/operation).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training/evaluation in flight crew operation of aircraft
systems/limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.12
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members
complete training and an evaluation in dangerous goods. (GM).
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 24 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in
dangerous goods.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation in dangerous goods in flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in dangerous goods).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
dangerous goods training/evaluation; definition of specific aspects/subjects addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in dangerous goods in initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR).
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending
on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires
24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is
defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final
3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on
which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current
validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months (or 90 days) of
the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent
training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.13
If the Operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure flight crew
members complete training and an evaluation in dangerous goods. (GM).
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 24 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in
dangerous goods.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation in dangerous goods in flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in dangerous goods).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
dangerous goods training/evaluation; definition of aspects/subjects addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in dangerous goods in initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending
on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires
24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is
defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final
3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on
which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current
validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months (or 90 days) of
the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent
training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.14
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an
evaluation in crew resource management (CRM), including Threat and Error Management, using
facilitators that have been trained in human performance and human factors principles. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 36 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous CRM training.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight requirements for training/evaluation in CRM, use of CRM facilitators
trained in human performance/factors principles in crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in CRM, use of CRM facilitators).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in CRM, threat/error management).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in CRM in initial/recurrent training).
Observed line flight operations (focus: application of CRM/TEM principles/skills to flight
management).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Crew Resource Management (CRM), CRM Facilitator, Human
Performance, Human Factors Principles and Threat and Error Management.
CRM training is applicable to all flight crew members.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirement.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.16A
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in subjects
associated with adverse weather and/or environmental conditions. Such training and evaluation shall
address, as applicable:
(i) Cold weather operations;
(ii) De-/anti-icing policies and procedures as specified in FLT 3.9.6;
(iii) Contaminated runway operations;
(iv) Thunderstorm avoidance. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 36 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in
subjects associated with adverse weather and/or environmental conditions.
Note: Item ii) is applicable if the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are
conducive to ground aircraft icing.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation in adverse weather/environmental
conditions in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in adverse weather/environmental conditions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in adverse weather/environmental conditions; definition of aspects/subjects
addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in adverse weather/environmental conditions in initial/recurrent training).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training/evaluation in operations in adverse
weather/environmental conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Contaminated Runway.
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.
The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of runway excursions and in-flight
loss of control.
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members receive recurrent training and an
evaluation in the subjects associated with the adverse weather or environmental conditions they may
encounter in operations.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.16B
If the Operator conducts operations on routes that traverse active volcanic areas or in the terminal
areas of airports in the vicinity of active volcanoes, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members
complete training and an evaluation in such operations. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* No No
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in
operations on routes that traverse active volcanic areas or in the terminal areas of airports in the
vicinity of active volcanoes.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation in operations associated with potential
volcanic ash in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in operations associated with potential for volcanic
ash).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: training
in operations associated with potential for volcanic ash).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in operations associated with potential for volcanic ash in initial/recurrent
training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members.
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members receive training and an evaluation in the
subjects associated with the adverse environmental conditions they might encounter in operations, to
include the consequences of an inadvertent entry into a volcanic ash cloud or unanticipated volcanic
eruptions along the route of flight. Such training and evaluation is designed to increase flight crew
awareness and vigilance related to volcanic activity and emphasize the possibility that they may be
the first to observe an eruption or be required to pass information related to a new eruption to the
appropriate authorities for dissemination.
Additional information related to the risk management of flight operations with known or forecast
volcanic ash contamination is contained in ICAO Doc 9974, Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.17
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete upset prevention and recovery training
(UPRT). (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 36 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous UPRT.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training in procedures for aircraft upset recovery in flight
crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training in procedures for aircraft upset recovery).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: training
in procedures for aircraft upset recovery).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of upset
recovery training/evaluation in initial/recurrent training).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training in upset recovery).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training is applicable to all pilot crew members and typically addresses pilot flying (PF) and pilot
monitoring (PM) duties.
Aircraft upset recovery training typically includes:
• Upset prevention;
• Factors leading to an upset or loss of control situation;
• Upset situation identification;
• Recovery techniques;
• Emphasis on aerodynamic factors present during the upset and the recovery.
Acceptable means of ground training may include video presentation(s), verbal instruction and/or
group discussion.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.
FLT 2.2.22
The Operator shall have a process to ensure flight crew members who conduct flights into areas
where English is required for Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications, and who have not previously
demonstrated expert English language proficiency, receive a periodic evaluation to demonstrate a
minimum level of English language proficiency that is sufficient, as defined by the Operator and/or
the State, to ensure effective communication during the performance of duties. Such evaluation shall
be completed during initial ground training and subsequently once every three (3) to six (6) years
based on the proficiency level of the applicant. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for English language evaluation for flight crew members that
have not previously demonstrated expert English language proficiency and operate
flights/communicate with ATC in areas where the primary language of ATC is English.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined initial training/continuing qualification course curriculum/syllabus (focus:
demonstration of English language proficiency necessary for effective ATC communications,
periodic demonstration every 3-6 years based on demonstrated proficiency level).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/periodic demonstration of English language proficiency).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure a pilot who is required to communicate with air traffic control
in English, periodically demonstrates a sufficient level of English language proficiency to ensure
effective communication during the performance of duties.
Such evaluation applies to each operating pilot member of the flight crew, as required by the AFM.
English proficiency requirements do not apply to flight engineers or flight navigators unless their
duties include air/ground communication.
Periodic demonstration of language proficiency is not required of individuals who have previously
demonstrated an expert level of English language proficiency. Such individuals are those whose
native language is English and those whose native language is not English, but who understand
English and speak English that is easily understood, even if spoken with a dialect or accent.
A State requirement, as part of flight crew licensing, for an individual to demonstrate expert English
language proficiency can be used to satisfy the specifications of this provision.
In order to conform to these specifications, an operator may periodically evaluate Individuals that
have not previously demonstrated expert English language proficiency in accordance with either:
• ICAO Annex 1.2.9.6, 1.2.9.7 and ICAO Annex 1, Attachment 1.1 (ICAO Language
Proficiency Rating Scale), or
• Any State-approved or State-accepted method of English language proficiency evaluation
that establishes a minimum proficiency level, defines an evaluation interval and requires pilot
flight crew members to demonstrate a level of English language proficiency sufficient to
ensure effective communication during the performance of duties.
Guidance for the development of language proficiency plans and associated interim risk mitigation
measures related to delayed implementation may be found in ICAO Resolution A36-11 dated
26 October 2007.
FLT 2.2.24
If the Operator transports dangerous goods on cargo aircraft and assigns flight crew members duties
and responsibilities related to the preflight inspection of accessible dangerous goods, the Operator
shall ensure applicable flight crew members complete training and an evaluation in the preflight
inspection of accessible dangerous goods during initial ground training. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for flight crew training in preflight inspection of accessible
dangerous goods.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: ground training in
preflight inspection of dangerous goods).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of initial
ground training in preflight inspection of dangerous goods).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Cargo Aircraft.
Training and evaluation is applicable to all flight crew members that would be assigned duties and
responsibilities as specified.
Accessible dangerous goods are those items accessible to the flight crew that could require flight
crew action to ensure:
• Accessible dangerous goods are visually intact;
• If applicable, the securing and preflight of any fire protection equipment;
• Accessible dangerous goods are loaded properly, to include the proper segregation of
dangerous goods.
FLT 2.2.26
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training in normal and non-normal
procedures and maneuvers. Such training shall address, as a minimum:
(i) Pilot Monitoring (PM) Pilot Flying (PF) and other flight crew division of duties (task sharing);
(ii) Positive transfer of aircraft control;
(iii) Consistent checklist philosophy;
(iv) Emphasis on a prioritization of tasks (e.g. “aviate, navigate, communicate”);
(v) Proper use of all levels of flight automation. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training in normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers in
flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed in flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training in normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: training
in normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers; definition of specific elements/subjects
addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent training in the specified normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training in normal/non-normal
procedure/maneuvers).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM).
Training is applicable to all flight crew members.
The intent of this provision is to set a training interval for normal and non-normal procedures, and
additionally to ensure the training manual, curricula, lesson plans, or other guidance associated with
such training addresses the specifications in items i) through v).
Division of flight crew duties, transfer of aircraft control, checklist use and prioritization of tasks are in
accordance with the operator's policies for task sharing and as specified in FLT 3.11.18.
Proper use of automation levels is in accordance with the operator's automation policy and as
specified in FLT 3.11.22.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Elements of training may be accomplished as part of ground, simulator, aircraft or line training.
The term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the
purpose of applying the specifications of this provision.
The specification in item iv) refers to the following prioritization of tasks during any normal or
abnormal situation or maneuver:
• Aviate: fly the aircraft in accordance with restrictions and limitations set forth in the OM;
• Navigate: guide the aircraft along the intended or appropriate route;
• Communicate: verbalize intentions to other crew members and ATC, as applicable.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.27
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an
evaluation, that includes a demonstration of competence in normal and non-normal procedures and
maneuvers, to include, as a minimum, rejected takeoff, emergency evacuation, engine failure and/or
those procedures and maneuvers specified in the Operator's AQP/ATQP/EBT as approved or
accepted by the Authority. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes*
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation including a demonstration of
competence in normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers in flight crew training/evaluation
program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in specified normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent training/evaluation in the specified normal/non-normal procedures/maneuvers).
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in CRM
skills.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for training in CRM skills in flight crew training/evaluation
program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for CRM training).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: inclusion
of CRM training in simulator/aircraft or during line flight training).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent CRM training).
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: training in application of CRM/TEM
principles/skills).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training is applicable to all flight crew members.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
This specification is intended to ensure CRM skills are emphasized during and integrated into
simulator or aircraft training, as applicable, and line training.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.31
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete a Line Operational Simulation (LOS)
profile. Such training and/or evaluation shall be:
(i) Approved or accepted by the State;
(ii) A planned scenario administered in a line environment setting with specific CRM objectives
where such non-technical skills are observed, debriefed upon completion and used for the
performance assessment of the flight crew. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for approved LOS in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for LOS).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined criteria for administration of LOS (focus: conducted as uninterrupted scenario in real-
time line environment with planned CRM objectives, CRM skills observed/briefed at completion).
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: inclusion
of LOS in simulator/aircraft or during line flight training).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of LOS
in initial/recurrent training).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training using LOS profile).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Line Operational Simulation (LOS), Line Oriented Evaluation
(LOE), Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) and Special Purpose Operational Training (SPOT).
Training and/or evaluation is applicable to flight crew members.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
LOS includes SPOT, LOE, and LOFT. Such scenarios incorporated into the training program satisfy
the specifications of this provision.
LOS scenarios are conducted in a simulated “line environment” setting and are as standardized and
scripted as possible. A simple menu of expected weather conditions and/or normal/non-normal
procedures/maneuvers would not be acceptable as this would increase the subjectivity of the
presentation.
In the absence of a representative flight simulator, such alternatives typically employ:
• LOS profiles conducted in a generic simulation device or representative flight training device;
• An uninterrupted planned scenario in the aircraft with specific CRM objectives that include
behavioral observation and assessment of crew performance, where such skills are
observed and debriefed upon completion. This requires an operator to specify how the CRM
objectives are set, evaluated and debriefed in a line environment.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.32
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an
evaluation, that includes a demonstration of competence, in wind shear avoidance and recovery from
predictive and actual wind shear. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation/demonstration of competence in wind
shear avoidance/recovery from predictive/actual wind shear in flight crew training/evaluation
program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for wind shear training/evaluation).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: wind
shear training/evaluation/demonstration of competence).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent wind shear training/evaluation).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training/evaluation in wind shear
avoidance/recovery from predictive/actual wind shear).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Wind Shear.
The intent of this provision is to ensure training and evaluation occurs, as applicable, in the
maneuvers specified within the intervals specified. Such training and evaluation can occur in
conjunction with any State-approved or State-accepted training course.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Training and, when applicable, an evaluation in the specified normal and non-normal procedures and
maneuvers is applicable to all pilot crew members.
Training is accomplished in a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State.
Such evaluation of competence in the normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified
is applicable when such procedures and/or maneuvers are stipulated by the operator and/or State in
conjunction with State-approved or State-accepted training courses that require a method of
evaluation. Such courses typically include:
• Type qualification;
• Transition (conversion);
• Upgrade to PIC;
• Re-qualification;
• Recurrent training.
Training and evaluation of the non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified in this provision
cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft on a training flight (see FLT 2.2.38).
Operators that cannot conform to the specifications of this provision due to the non-existence of a
representative flight simulator may demonstrate an alternative means of conforming to these
specifications in accordance with FLT 2.2.41.
The additional ground and line training and evaluation used to satisfy the specifications of this
provision and of FLT 2.2.41 in the absence of a representative flight simulator typically include a
review of:
• Conditions conducive to wind shear;
• Effects on aircraft performance;
• Indications of wind shear presence;
• Avoidance and recovery techniques;
• Wind shear case studies or scenarios.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.33
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and an evaluation, which includes
a demonstration of competence in terrain awareness procedures and maneuvers. Such training and
evaluation shall include:
(i) Knowledge and conduct of associated procedures;
(ii) Response to GPWS alerts and warnings;
(iii) The avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation/demonstration of competence in terrain
awareness procedures/maneuvers in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in terrain awareness procedures/maneuvers).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in terrain awareness procedures/maneuvers; definition of subjects
addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent training/evaluation in terrain awareness procedures/maneuvers).
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: terrain awareness
procedures/maneuvers).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
The specifications in this provision are directly related to the prevention of controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT).
The intent is to ensure training and evaluation occurs, as applicable, in the maneuvers specified
within the intervals specified. Such training and evaluation can occur in conjunction with any State-
approved or State-accepted training course.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Training and evaluation in the specified normal and non-normal procedures and maneuvers in a
representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State is applicable to pilot crew
members.
Training and evaluation of the non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified in this provision
cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft on a training flight (see FLT 2.2.38).
Operators that cannot conform to the specifications of this provision due to the non-existence of a
representative flight simulator may demonstrate an alternative means of conforming to these
specifications in accordance with FLT 2.2.41.
The additional ground and line training and evaluation used to satisfy the specifications of this
provision and of FLT 2.2.41 in the absence of a representative flight simulator typically includes a
review of:
• CFIT avoidance techniques;
• CFIT recovery techniques and maximizing aircraft performance;
• GPWS alerts and warnings;
• CFIT case studies or scenarios.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.34
If the Operator conducts low visibility operations (LVO), the Operator shall ensure flight crew
members complete training and an evaluation that includes a demonstration of competence in such
operations, as well as operations with inoperative ground based and/or aircraft equipment. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in LVO.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation/demonstration of competence in LVO
and/or operations with inoperative ground based/aircraft equipment in flight crew
training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in LVO and/or operations with inoperative ground
based/aircraft equipment).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in LVO and/or operations with inoperative ground based/aircraft equipment).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent training/evaluation in LVO and/or operations with inoperative ground
based/aircraft equipment).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training in LVO).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Low Visibility Operations (LVO).
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Training and evaluation in low visibility operations is applicable to all pilot crew members.
For the purposes of this provision, low visibility operations are considered in effect when the Runway
Visual Range (RVR) is below 400 m for takeoff and/or below Category I limits for landing.
Operators that conduct training flights and cannot safely train/evaluate the specified procedures in an
aircraft or in a representative flight simulator as specified in FLT 2.2.38 may demonstrate an
alternative means of conformance in accordance with FLT 2.2.41.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.35
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members with duties and responsibilities related to
TCAS/ACAS alerting equipment complete training and an evaluation that includes a demonstration of
competence in maneuvers and procedures for the proper response to TCAS/ACAS alerts. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training/evaluation/demonstration of competence in
procedures for proper response to TCAS/ACAS alerts in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification recurrent
schedule for training/evaluation in response to TCAS/ACAS alerts).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in procedures for proper response to TCAS/ACAS alerts).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent training/evaluation in procedures for proper response to TCAS/ACAS alerts).
Observed flight simulator operations (focus: training/evaluation in response to TCAS/ACAS
alerts).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure training and evaluation occurs, as applicable, in the
maneuvers specified within the intervals specified. Such training and evaluation can occur in
conjunction with any State-approved or State-accepted training course.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Training is accomplished in a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State.
TCAS training may be performed without demonstrating capability in a simulator (since many
simulators do not have TCAS capability).
Training and evaluation of the non-normal procedures and maneuvers specified in this provision
cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft on a training flight (see FLT 2.2.38).
Operators that cannot conform to the specifications of this provision due to the non-existence of a
representative flight simulator may demonstrate an alternative means of conforming to these
specifications in accordance with FLT 2.2.41.
The additional ground and line training and evaluation used to satisfy the specifications of this
provision and of FLT 2.2.41 in the absence of a representative flight simulator typically include a
review of:
• TCAS procedures and alert responses;
• TCAS alerts;
• TCAS case studies or scenarios.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.37
If the Operator uses pilot flight crew members designated to perform duties from either control seat,
the Operator shall have seat-specific qualification for such flight crew members, to include training
and an evaluation. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for seat-specific qualification of pilot flight crew members
designated to perform duties from either control seat.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for seat-specific qualification).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: seat-
specific training/evaluation for flight crew members designated to perform duties from either
control seat).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of seat-
specific evaluation in initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure that any pilot designated to perform duties from either control
seat, including takeoffs and landings, completes seat specific qualification.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
The specifications of this provision typically apply to pilot flight crew members, such as:
• Type Rating Instructors (TRIs)
• Type Rating Examiners (TREs)
• Pilots who are authorized to conduct takeoff and landings from either control seat.
Cruise relief pilots may meet the seat-specific requirements of this provision as part of a State-
approved or State-accepted (cruise relief pilot) qualification program.
Cruise relief pilots are not required to receive recurrent training in both control seats once every
12 months unless required as part of a State-approved or -accepted (cruise relief pilot) qualification
program.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.38
If the Operator conducts training flights, the Operator shall specify those required maneuvers and
procedures that cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft, and ensure such maneuvers and
procedures are either trained and evaluated in a representative flight simulator or, if such a synthetic
device does not exist, ensure a demonstration of pilot competence in those maneuvers and
procedures using an alternative means in accordance with FLT 2.2.41. Maneuvers and procedures
that cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft shall include, as a minimum:
(i) Wind shear avoidance and recovery;
(ii) Response to GPWS alerts and warnings and the avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT);
(iii) Response to TCAS/ACAS alerts. (GM)
Note: If a representative flight simulator exists, conformity with FLT 2.2.32, FLT 2.2.33 and
FLT 2.2.35 is required for the Operator to be in conformity with this provision.
Note: If a representative flight simulator does not exist, conformity with FLT 2.2.41 is required for the
Operator to be in conformity with this provision.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed designation of required maneuvers/procedures that cannot be
accomplished in an aircraft, requirement for flight crew training/evaluation in such
maneuvers/procedures in an approved representative flight training device or using alternative
means in accordance with FLT 2.2.41.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined aircraft training/qualification curriculum/syllabus (focus: exclusion of specified
maneuvers from aircraft training).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
specified maneuvers in an approved representative training device or via alternative means).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Simulator.
The intent of this provision is to ensure both of the following:
• The maneuvers and procedures that cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft are
specified by the operator and include, as a minimum, those maneuvers specified in i), ii)
and iii);
• A demonstration of pilot competence in the specified maneuvers and procedures using either
a representative flight simulator or an alternative means (as specified in FLT 2.2.41) if such
flight simulator does not exist.
Training is accomplished in a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by the State.
Refer to FLT 2.2.41 if no representative flight simulator exists for the aircraft type.
Refer to FLT 2.2.32, FLT 2.2.33, FLT 2.2.35 and associated Guidance for additional specifications
and information related to the training and evaluation on the specified maneuvers.
FLT 2.2.39
If the Operator conducts training flights and accomplishes training or evaluation related to a failed or
inoperative engine during such flights, the Operator shall ensure engine failures are simulated for the
purpose of accomplishing any maneuvers that involve a failed or inoperative engine. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for only simulated engine failure during aircraft training flights.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined instructor guidance for aircraft training flights (focus: instructions for simulation of
engine failure for maneuvers that involve failed/inoperative engine).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure maneuvers that involve a failed or inoperative engine are
safely accomplished when training in such maneuvers is performed in the aircraft (as required by the
Authority or due to the unavailability of a representative flight simulator approved for the purpose by
the State). In order to ensure maneuvers that involve a failed or inoperative engine are accomplished
safely during training flights, engine failures are typically simulated in a manner that would not
prevent the flight crew from recovering immediate and full control of an engine.
FLT 2.2.40
The Operator shall ensure flight crew members complete training and, when applicable, an
evaluation that includes a demonstration of competence in duties and procedures related to flight
crew incapacitation. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in duties
and procedures related to flight crew incapacitation.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for demonstration of competence in duties/procedures related
to flight crew incapacitation in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for demonstration of competence in duties/procedures related to flight crew
incapacitation).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
evaluation in duties/procedures related to flight crew incapacitation).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
demonstration of competence in duties/procedures related to flight crew incapacitation in
initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specification of this provision is applicable to all flight crew members.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
A demonstration of competence in the crew member duties and procedures related to flight crew
incapacitation is applicable when such a demonstration is required by the operator and/or State in
conjunction with State-approved or State-accepted training courses that require a method of
evaluation. Such courses typically include:
• Type qualification;
• Transition (conversion);
• Upgrade to PIC;
• Re-qualification;
• Recurrent.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.2.41
If the Operator conducts training flights and is unable to train and evaluate the required maneuvers
and procedures specified in FLT 2.2.38 due to the non-existence of a representative flight simulator,
the Operator shall use an alternative means for ensuring a demonstration of pilot competence in such
maneuvers and procedures. Any alternative means shall be approved or accepted by the State, and
require a demonstration of competence through a combination of means, to include:
(i) The use of generic flight simulators;
(ii) The use of representative and/or generic flight training devices;
(iii) Additional ground and line training and evaluation;
(iv) As applicable, any other means that ensures a demonstration of pilot competence in the
applicable maneuvers and procedures. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for flight crew demonstration of competence using alternative
means for required maneuvers/procedures that cannot be accomplished in an aircraft or due to
the non-availability of a representative flight training device.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined applicable training/qualification curriculum/syllabus (focus: training/evaluation in
designated maneuvers accomplished; definition of acceptable alternative means of training).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: demonstration of
competence in designated maneuvers completed using alternative means).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Training Device (FTD).
The intent of this provision is for the operator to ensure, in the absence of a representative flight
simulator necessary to conform to FLT 2.2.38, that suitable and effective alternatives are used for the
training and evaluation of maneuvers and procedures that cannot be safely conducted in an aircraft.
It is important to note that conformity with this provision requires a combination of alternative training
and evaluation methods to ensure a demonstration of pilot competence (i.e. generic simulators
and/or flight training devices, ground training/evaluation, line training/evaluation, other). This
requirement is based on the presumption that any one method when used alone would be
inadequate to ensure competence in the specified maneuvers as well as associated procedures.
Wind shear, GPWS, and TCAS training maneuvers and procedures, as specified in FLT 2.2.38,
cannot be safely accomplished in an aircraft during a training flight or line training.
Refer to FLT 2.2.32, FLT 2.2.33, FLT 2.2.35 and associated Guidance for additional specifications
and information related to the required training and evaluation associated with:
• Wind shear avoidance and recovery;
• Response to GPWS alerts and warnings and the avoidance of Controlled Flight Into Terrain
(CFIT);
• Response to TCAS/ACAS alerts.
FLT 2.2.42
If the Operator transports passengers or supernumeraries, the Operator shall ensure flight crew
members complete security training as approved or accepted by the State, and in accordance with
the Operator's security training program as specified in SEC 2.1.1. Flight crew security training shall
address the following subject areas:
(i) Determination of the seriousness of the occurrence;
(ii) Crew communication and coordination;
(iii) Policy and procedures associated with flight deck access;
(iv) Appropriate self-defense responses;
(v) Use of non-lethal protective devices assigned to crew members for use as authorized by the
State;
(vi) Understanding the behavior of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability to cope with hijacker
behavior and passenger responses;
(vii) Situational training exercises regarding various threat conditions;
(viii) Flight deck procedures to protect the aircraft;
(ix) Aircraft search procedures;
(x) As practicable, guidance on least-risk bomb locations. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 36 months) Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous flight crew
security training.
Note: Flight crew members shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to
operational duties.
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to flight crew members used on board an
aircraft during commercial and/or non-commercial operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew security training program (focus: approval/acceptance by the
State; meets applicable requirements of other states).
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for flight crew security training).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: security
training is included; required subjects are addressed).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
security training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Air Operator Security Program (AOSP) and Non-Lethal
Protective Device.
Flight crew members are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and thereby
require an awareness of obligations to the Security Program of the operator.
Crew security training would normally be in accordance with applicable regulations and/or the civil
aviation security program of the State, and where no regulatory guidance exists, in accordance with
the policy of the operator.
Security training for flight crew members typically focuses on the need for the flight crew to maintain
control of the flight deck.
Specific subject areas included in recurrent security training are typically identified and derived from
an analysis of actual or likely situations or trends experienced during line operations.
Fight deck access as specified in item (iii) would typically include persons authorized for flight deck
access as well as procedures for flight deck entry/exit.
Flight crew training in self-defense responses as specified in item (iv) typically focuses on ensuring
the security of the flight deck and takes into consideration relevant operational factors (e.g. type of
operation, phase of flight, aircraft type/configuration, responses by cabin crew members or, if
applicable, supernumeraries).
Training as specified in item (vi) typically addresses topics or tactics as appropriate for the operator
that might be associated with or could be used to facilitate crew-passenger reaction to or interaction
with hijackers (e.g. conflict management, use of passive or non-passive cooperation, understanding
Stockholm Syndrome, identification of and response to hijacker types/motives).
Training exercises as specified in item (vii) are typically interactive in nature, and scenarios or
situations (e.g. bomb threat, hijacking, unruly passenger) may be presented using various accepted
training methods (e.g. live role playing, table top, computer-based training).
Training as specified in item (x) is applicable to aircraft types that have designated least-risk bomb
locations. Least-risk bomb locations are typically not identified on all-cargo aircraft.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
2.3 Line Qualification
FLT 2.3.1
The Operator shall have a line qualification program consisting of line training and, where applicable,
evaluations, approved or accepted by the State, which ensures flight crew members are qualified to
operate in areas, on routes or route segments and into the airports to be used in operations for the
Operator. Such program shall:
(i) Be published in the Training Manual or equivalent documents;
(ii) Ensure each pilot flight crew member has adequate knowledge of the elements specified in
Table 2.5, as applicable to the areas, routes and route segments of intended operation;
(iii) Specify qualification requirements for operations in all areas, on all routes or route
segments, and into all airports of intended use;
(iv) Ensure each pilot flight crewmember, prior to entering the line qualification program, has
satisfied the applicable recency-of-experience requirements specified in FLT 3.3.7 (i) under
the supervision of an instructor or evaluator authorized for the purpose by the Operator
and/or State;
(v) Ensure line training and evaluation for each pilot crew member is completed during initial
qualification and, if applicable, in accordance with the continuing qualification curriculum as
defined in the Operator's AQP/ATQP/EBT that conforms to the specifications of FLT 2.1.1B;
(vi) Ensure line training and evaluation is completed prior to a pilot crew member being used as
a PIC in operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight crew line qualification training/evaluation program,
approved/accepted by the State, specifies qualification requirements for operations associated
with areas/routes/route segments/airports used in operations.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
schedule for line training/evaluation).
Identified/Assessed the requirement for recency-of-experience prior to entry into the line
qualification program.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined flight crew line qualification initial/recurrent curricula/syllabi (focus: line
training/evaluation in areas/airports of operations; program elements consistent with
specifications in Table 2.5).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent line qualification training/evaluation).
Examined selected flight crew member training/qualification records (focus: assessment of
recency-of-experience for pilots entering line qualification).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight crew demonstrates knowledge of relevant
operational requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Zero Flight Time Training (ZFTT).
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members are qualified to conduct routine
operations within each theater of operation as defined by the operator. It does not address the
additional and specialized knowledge required to conform to FLT 2.4.1.
Refer to FLT 2.4.1 and associated Guidance for additional specifications and information that
addresses special areas, routes route segments and special airports.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as
approval/acceptance requirements of the Authority.
The specification in item (iv) ensures that a qualifying pilot has the necessary experience to operate
as a required crewmember in the line training qualification program. Recency-of-experience would
typically be established during simulator training in a ZFTT training program or during base training
associated with initial aircraft qualification and/or type rating. If there are delays between simulator
and/or type qualification training and the commencement of line qualification, recency-of-experience
may be lost and would need to be re-established by the operator.
The specification in item (iv) may be satisfied by a process integral to the line qualification program or
be in accordance with the process defined by FLT 3.3.7.
This specification in item (v) applies to all candidates for the position of PIC, to include SIC upgrade
candidates and pilots hired directly into PIC positions in operations for the operator.
The training and evaluation specified in this provision is accomplished by pilot flight crew members
as part of; ground training, simulator/aircraft training or line training.
FLT 2.3.2
The Operator shall ensure each pilot flight crew member, in order to maintain qualification, receives
training and, when applicable, successfully completes an evaluation at or above the standards
stipulated in the training syllabus and administered by an Evaluator of the Operator or a
representative of the Authority, and demonstrates piloting technique and competence to execute
emergency procedures and comply with instrument flight rules. Such training and, when applicable,
evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the State and applicable
authorities to ensure evaluations for all pilot flight crew members are conducted using one or more of
the following intervals, as applicable:
(i) For the PIC, twice within any period of one year plus or minus one calendar month from the
original qualification anniversary date or base month, and/or
(ii) For pilot crew members other than the PIC, in accordance with i), or once within any period
of one year plus or minus one calendar month from the original qualification anniversary
date or base month, and/or
(iii) For any pilot crew member participating in an AQP, ATQP or EBT program, once within any
period of one year, or other period approved or accepted by the State, provided such
training and qualification program incorporates all elements and specifications contained in
Table 2.6, Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for flight crew continuing qualification that includes a
demonstration of piloting technique and competence to execute emergency procedures and
comply with instrument flight rules; definition of continuing training/evaluation interval(s).
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
schedule for demonstration of piloting technique and competence to execute emergency
procedures and comply with instrument flight rules).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
training/evaluation in emergency procedures/compliance with instrument flight rules).
Examined selected flight crew training/qualification records (focus: completion of continuing
qualification training/evaluation at intervals as specified).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for definitions of Base Month, Calendar Month, LOE and Training to Proficiency.
The modification of qualification intervals in accordance with an AQP, ATQP or EBT program
requires conformity with FLT 2.1.1B.
The intent of this provision is to define the conditions necessary for a pilot crewmember to maintain
qualification and to set a basic qualification interval, which may be slightly modified in accordance
with the specifications of the provision or conditions stipulated in guidance material.
The specifications of this provision are minimum requirements and might be exceeded by
requirements of the State or other applicable authorities. The applicable authorities specified in this
provision typically refer to authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by
an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the State and other applicable authorities, may
adjust the frequency of evaluations specified in item i) of this provision to minimize overlap, preserve
the original qualification date, and ensure evaluations are completed within the annual cycle set forth
by the operator, State and/or applicable authorities.
Providing a minimum of two simulator training sessions within a thirteen-month period typically
satisfies the requirements of item i) if the interval between training sessions is not less restrictive than
what is specified by the operator, State and/or applicable authorities.
The evaluation cycles specified in items i) and ii) of this provision may be completed in 13 months in
accordance with State requirements that allow such cycle to be adjusted a maximum of plus or minus
one calendar month from the original qualification anniversary date or base month. Such flexibility is
normally incorporated in the training and evaluation program to allow for latitude in the trainee
scheduling process.
The evaluation cycles specified in item i) of this provision may also be adjusted in accordance with
State requirements that flight crew members undergo training and, when applicable, an evaluation at
least every 6 calendar months. If the training and evaluation, however, is conducted within 3 calendar
months prior to the expiry of the 6-calendar month period in the case of item i) or the 12 calendar
months period in the case of item ii), the next training and evaluation must be completed within 6 or
12 calendar months, respectively, of the original expiry date of the previous training and evaluation.
Training and evaluation specified in items i) and ii) may be anticipated and conducted within 3
calendar months prior to the expiry date.
Accommodations made to adjust evaluation cycles or frequency may not affect the original
anniversary date or base month when flight crew member qualification was either:
• First established, or
• Re-established following a period of extended absence, and subject to the satisfactory
completion of a training program designed specifically for the re-qualification of flight crew
members following an extended absence.
One of the evaluations specified in item i), in a 12-calendar month period, may be administered by an
instructor, trained and authorized by the operator and the Authority, during the conduct of a simulator
or aircraft training course, approved or accepted by the Authority, for the purpose of maintaining
piloting technique and competence.
One of the evaluations specified in item ii), in a 24-calendar month period, may be administered by
an instructor, trained and authorized by the operator and the Authority, during the conduct of a
simulator or aircraft training course, approved or accepted by the Authority, for the purpose of
maintaining piloting technique and competence.
Simulator or aircraft training courses approved or accepted by the Authority for the purpose of
maintaining piloting technique and competence typically include one or more of the following
elements:
• Training-to-proficiency at the pilot controls of an aircraft or aircraft simulator;
• Appropriate briefings before and after the training;
• LOE using a complete flight crew;
• Maneuvers and procedures (abnormal and emergency) that may occur in line operations.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding specified intervals associated with recurrent training/continuing
qualification.
FLT 2.3.4
The Operator shall ensure pilot flight crew members complete an evaluation that includes a
demonstration of knowledge of the operations approved as part of the Air Operator Certificate (AOC).
Such evaluation shall include a demonstration of knowledge of:
(i) Approaches authorized by the Authority;
(ii) Ceiling and visibility requirements for takeoff, approach and landing;
(iii) Allowance for inoperative ground components;
(iv) Wind limitations (crosswind, tailwind and, if applicable, headwind). (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes* Yes (every 12 months) Yes
* This evaluation may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address
aircraft type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous
evaluation in the knowledge of AOC-approved operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for flight crew initial/continuing qualification that includes a
demonstration of knowledge of operations approved as part of the AOC.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for demonstration of knowledge of AOC operations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined flight crew line qualification initial/recurrent curricula/syllabi (focus: evaluation of
relevant operational knowledge; definition of operational areas addressed).
Examined selected flight crew training/qualification records (focus: completion of
initial/continuing qualification training/evaluation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
The training and evaluation specified in this provision is accomplished by pilot flight crew members
as part of ground, simulator/aircraft or line training.
The specifications of this provision are normally satisfied during line training but can occur elsewhere
in the training program.
The wind limitations specified in item iv) refer to maximum limits that have been demonstrated for
takeoff and landing, as well as limits that have been established for the type of operation being
conducted (e.g., as applicable, automatic landing, HUD/EVS guided, or contaminated runway).
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
FLT 2.3.6
The Operator shall ensure pilot flight crew members complete a Command Training and Evaluation
program during initial training and qualification and, if applicable, in accordance with the continuing
qualification curriculum as defined in the Operator's AQP/ATQP/EBT that conforms to the
specifications of FLT 2.1.1B. Such training and evaluation shall be completed prior to a pilot flight
crew member being assigned as PIC in operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for PIC command training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for PIC command training/evaluation).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew training/qualification records (focus: completion of command
training/evaluation prior to assignment to PIC duties).
Other Actions (Specify).
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Operational Flight Plan (OFP).
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
The specifications of this provision apply to all candidates for the position of PIC, to include SIC
upgrade candidates and pilots hired directly into PIC positions in operations for the operator.
Command training and evaluation is accomplished by pilot flight crew members as part of ground,
simulator/aircraft or line training.
Command training and evaluation programs may be conducted in addition to, and/or in conjunction
with, one or more of the training programs specified in FLT 2.1.1.
The program specified in this provision addresses the technical and non-technical aspects of
command relevant to the operations of the operator, and typically includes:
• Technical seat-specific aircraft training for the aircraft type;
• Basic operator familiarization training in subjects relevant to the PIC;
• Human performance and CRM skill training relevant to command, the relationship with other
crew members and the operation as a whole (e.g. leadership, team building, conflict
resolution, etc.);
• Training in the sections of the OM relevant to command, to include:
○ Authority and responsibilities of the PIC in operations for the operator;
○ Adherence to the limitations of the AOC;
○ Responsibilities relevant to the OFP and ATL;
○ Responsibilities relevant to the reporting of accidents and incidents.
2.4 Special Qualification
FLT 2.4.1
If the Operator conducts flights in areas or on routes or route segments over difficult terrain and/or
into special airports as designated by the State or by the Operator, the Operator shall ensure each
PIC completes training and, if required, an evaluation in the special skills and/or knowledge required
to qualify or requalify for such operations. The content of training shall ensure the PIC has adequate
knowledge of the elements specified in Table 2.5 as applicable to the areas, routes, route segments
and special airports of intended operation. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training to qualify/requalify a PIC in special
skills/knowledge needed for operations associated with specific areas/routes/route
segments/difficult terrain/airports as designated by State or operator.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined training curriculum/syllabus used to qualify/requalify PIC to operate over/into special
routes/areas/airports (focus: training in special skills/knowledge required for certain operations;
program elements consistent with specifications in Table 2.5).
Examined selected PIC training/qualification records (focus: completion of training for operations
associated with designated special areas/routes/route segments/terrain/airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
This provision applies to candidates for the position of PIC, to include SIC upgrade candidates and
pilots hired directly into PIC positions in operations for the operator.
Training as specified in this provision may include aircraft type-specific elements as applicable to
areas of operations, routes, airports, and equipment operated.
The specifications of this provision address the training required to operate over difficult terrain
and/or into special airports based on a determination, by the operator and/or State, that pilots require
special skills or knowledge for such operations. Such training typically addresses routes and/or
airports that are over or in areas:
• With mountainous terrain, including high terrain, rapidly rising terrain or terrain with steep
gradients;
• With terrain that contributes to the existence of mountain waves, turbulence, high surface
winds, sudden wind changes and/or other atmospheric phenomena that could affect the
performance of the aircraft;
• Containing topographical variations such as ridgelines, valleys, ravines, fjords or other areas
where downdrafts on the leeward or downwind side can make traversing the area or
accomplishing a crosswind landing hazardous;
• Where the airport, runway and/or approach environment is difficult to identify at night due to
surrounding lights;
• Where featureless or expansive terrain could contribute to optical illusions during the day or
at night;
• That are devoid of lighting where airport, runway and/or approach area identification is
difficult at night due to lack of visible landmarks;
• That are devoid of lighting and sole reference to external or visual cues is insufficient for the
maintenance of proper aircraft attitude control;
• That require the application of any other specific skills or knowledge, as determined by the
operator and/or State.
The specified training may be included as part of initial or continuing qualification under FLT 3.3.10 or
conducted independently.
FLT 2.4.2
If the Operator engages in specialized operations, the Operator shall ensure flight crew members,
prior to being used in such operations, complete training and/or an evaluation in the operating
practices and procedures for the following special operations, as applicable to the Operator:
(i) Performance-Based Navigation (PBN), training and evaluation required.
(ii) Performance-Based Communication and Navigation Surveillance System (PBCS).
(iii) Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM).
(iv) Minimum Navigation Performance Specifications (MNPS/NAT HLA).
(v) Areas of Magnetic Unreliability (AMU). (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Sub-spec Specific to Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Aircraft Initial/Transition/ Training/Continuing through
Type Conversion Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Training
(i) Yes* Yes* Yes (every 12 months) Yes
(ii)–(v) Yes* Yes* No Yes
* This training may be provided as a complete package or, if applicable, tailored to address aircraft
type or crew position requirements that are different from the individual's previous training in PBN,
PBCS, RVSM, MNPS/NAT HLA and/or AMU practices and procedures.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for training in PBN/PBCS/RVSM/MNPS/NAT HLA/AMU
procedures in flight crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing
qualification/recurrent schedule for training and evaluation in PBN).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Initial/ Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Transition/Conversion Training/Continuing through
Training Qualification AQP/ATQP/EBT
Yes Yes Yes (every 12 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for flight crew training/evaluation in differences between
aircraft types/variants (as applicable).
Identified/Assessed flight crew AQP/ATQP/EBT (if applicable): (focus continuing qualification
recurrent schedule for training/evaluation in differences between aircraft types/variants).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined flight crew line qualification initial/recurrent curricula/syllabi (focus: training/evaluation
in differences between relevant aircraft types/variants).
Examined selected flight crew training/qualification records (focus: completion of
training/evaluation in differences between aircraft types/variants).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aircraft Type and Aircraft Variant (within Type).
The intent of this specification is to ensure flight crew members are familiarized with the significant
differences in equipment and/or procedures between concurrently operated types or variants.
The determination of variant within type is within the domain of the State as part of flight crew
licensing.
FLT 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP/ATQP/EBT elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
Qualification processes are applicable to all flight crew members used in such operations and as
defined in the IRM.
Aircraft differences that require emphasis typically include level of technology, ergonomics,
operational differences and handling characteristics.
Refer to General Guidance at the beginning of this Subsection 2, Training and Qualification, for
explanatory information regarding traditional training program requirements and, if applicable,
recurrent training/continuing qualification intervals that may be replaced by equivalent requirements
as part of an AQP, ATQP or EBT program in accordance with FLT 2.1.1B.
2.5 SMS Training
3 Line Operations
FLT 3.3.2
The Operator shall have guidance and criteria that address the pairing of inexperienced pilot crew
members and ensure scheduling processes prevent inexperienced pilot flight crew members, as
defined by the Operator or the State, from operating together. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/criteria that prohibit pairing of inexperienced pilot flight crew
members.
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling processes that prevent pairing of inexperienced pilot
flight crew members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew pairing records (focus: inexperienced flight crew members not
paired together).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling uses guidance/criteria that
prevent pairing of inexperience flight crew members).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The definition of inexperienced pilot flight crew member typically varies depending on the operator or
the State and generally refers to a minimum number of hours in aircraft type after the completion of
initial training/qualification.
The specifications of this provision are intended to preclude two newly trained or inexperienced pilots
from operating together in an aircraft type until they each achieve a level of experience defined by the
operator or the State.
FLT 3.3.3
If the Operator conducts low visibility approaches, the Operator shall define a minimum level of
command experience required for a pilot to be authorized to conduct such approaches as PIC to
approved Operator minima. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed defined minimum level(s) of command experience required for PIC to be
authorized to conduct low visibility approaches to approved minima.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Guidance
Requirements of the State and/or an applicable authority that are associated with medical
classifications, aircraft types, flight crew positions and/or licensing could require a more restrictive
assessment interval than specified in this provision. An applicable authority is one that has
jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory
of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
The “class” of medical assessment required to conform to the specifications of this provision, typically
“class 1”, is defined by the State and/or an applicable authority.
FLT 3.3.7
The Operator shall have a process to ensure flight crew member recency-of-experience
requirements are satisfied as follows:
(i) A pilot does not act as PIC or SIC of an aircraft unless either:
(a) On the same type or variant of aircraft within the preceding 90 days (120 days if
under the supervision of an instructor or evaluator), that pilot has operated the flight
controls during at least three takeoffs and landings in the aircraft type or in a flight
simulator approved for the purpose by the appropriate authority, or
(b) On the same type or variant of aircraft within a time period acceptable to the State
and applicable authorities, that pilot has operated the flight controls during the
number of takeoffs and landings in the aircraft type or in a flight simulator approved
for the purpose by the appropriate authority, necessary to conform to a defined
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Cruise Relief Pilot.
The specification in item i) requires the pilots to operate the flight controls: PM duties do not satisfy
recency-of-experience requirements for this specification.
The specifications in item (i) also ensure that newly qualifying pilots have the necessary experience
to operate as a required crewmember in the line training qualification program. The process to
ensure such pilots meet recency-of-experience requirements may be integral to the line qualification
program in accordance with FLT 2.3.1.
The term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the
purpose of applying the specifications of this provision.
The specification in item i) b) may stipulate the number of takeoffs and landings to be performed
according to a defined schedule in order to establish an equivalent level of recency experience. Such
schedule would not have to adhere exactly to the specification in item i) a) of this provision if the level
of recent experience is acceptable to the State and applicable authorities, and the PIC or SIC, as
applicable, is required to operate the flight controls in order to satisfy recency-of-experience
requirements.
Item v) specifies that a flight crew member whose recency has lapsed for any reason becomes
unqualified and must be re-qualified by the operator. The requalification program for such a flight
crewmember need not specify the same number of takeoffs and landings as the recency
requirements.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations
conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of
the Operator.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
FLT 3.3.9
The Operator shall have an airport qualification process that ensures a PIC has made an actual
approach and landing at each airport within the Operator's route system accompanied by a pilot,
either as a crew member or flight deck observer, that is qualified for that airport, unless:
(i) The approach to the airport is not over difficult terrain and the instrument approach
procedures and aids available are similar to those with which the pilot is familiar, and the
normal operating minima are adjusted by the addition of a margin of safety that is approved
or accepted by the State, or there is reasonable certainty that approach and landing can be
made in visual meteorological conditions (VMC), or
(ii) The descent from the initial approach altitude can be made by day in VMC, or
(iii) The Operator has qualified the PIC for operations into the airport by means a pictorial
representation that is approved or accepted the Authority, or
(iv) The airport is adjacent to another airport into which the PIC is currently qualified to operate.
(GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling/pairing processes for ensuring PICs will meet
qualification requirements for airports/areas/routes to be used in operations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined OM guidance/procedures (focus: definition of crew member qualification criteria for
operations into airports/areas/routes used in operations).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling and crew pairing accounts for
PIC qualification for operations into airports of intended landing).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specification in item (i) may be satisfied by a process, approved or accepted by the State, that:
• Identifies instrument approach procedures that require the application of margins to
operating minima;
• Specifies the operating margin to be applied.
The specification in item (iii) may be satisfied by any pictorial representation approved or accepted
for the purpose by the Authority, such as an instrument approach plate or chart.
Refer to FLT 2.4.1 and associated Guidance for additional specifications and information that
addresses training for operations associated with special areas, routes, route segments and special
airports.
FLT 3.3.10
The Operator shall have a process to ensure a pilot is not used as a PIC in operations that require
the application of special skills or knowledge within areas, on routes over difficult terrain and/or into
special airports, as designated by the State or by the Operator, unless, within the preceding 12
months, that pilot has either:
(i) Made at least one trip as a pilot flight crew member, line check airman or observer on the
flight deck on a route in close proximity and over similar terrain within the specified area(s),
on the specified route and/or into the special airport, as applicable, or
(ii) Completed training and an evaluation in the special skills and/or knowledge required to
qualify or requalify for such operations. The content of training shall ensure the PIC has
adequate knowledge of the elements specified in Table 2.5 as applicable to the areas,
routes, route segments and special airports of intended operation. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling processes that prevent PICs from flight duty
assignment into airports/areas and on routes/route segments that require special
skills/knowledge, unless qualification requirements have been satisfied.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined OM guidance/procedures (focus: definition of PIC qualification criteria for operations
into airports/areas/routes that require special knowledge/skills).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling tracks/accounts for PIC
qualification for routes/airports that require special knowledge/skills).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Special airport and/or route/area re-qualification (if applicable) could take the form of pictorial review,
simulator training, line check airmen briefing or operation into the airport accompanied by a line
check airman or other qualified airman and could include exemptions for VFR operations.
The intent of this provision is to ensure the PIC has a level of knowledge of terrain, minimum safe
altitudes, seasonal meteorological conditions, communication and air traffic facilities, services and
procedures, search and rescue services and navigational facilities and procedures, including any
long-range navigation procedures, required for safe operations.
Refer to FLT 2.4.1 and associated Guidance for additional specifications and information that
addresses training for operations associated with special areas, routes route segments and special
airports.
3.4 Flight Crew Scheduling
FLT 3.4.1
The Operator shall have a means to ensure flight crew members are qualified and current prior to
accepting and/or being assigned to duty. Such means shall consist of:
(i) A requirement that prohibits flight crew members from operating an aircraft if not qualified for
duty in accordance with requirements contained in Table 2.3;
(ii) A scheduling process that ensures flight crew members, prior to being assigned to duty, are
qualified and current in accordance with the applicable flight crew qualification requirements
contained in Table 2.3 and, if applicable, additional requirements of the State. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling processes that prevent flight crew members from flight
duty assignment unless currently qualified in accordance with Table 2.3 or other applicable
requirements of the State.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined process for determining additional flight crew qualification requirements of the State.
Examined selected flight crew duty assignment records (focus: satisfaction of applicable
qualification requirements).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling requires flight crew member
qualification in accordance with Table 2.3 and requirements of State).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew member requirements and related scheduling
processes preclude operation of an aircraft by a flight crew member that is not qualified and current in
accordance with the specifications of the provision.
FLT 3.4.3A
The Operator shall have a methodology for the purpose of managing fatigue-related safety risks to
ensure fatigue occurring in one flight, successive flights or accumulated over a period of time does
not impair a flight crew member's alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-
related duties. Such methodology shall consist of:
(i) Flight time, flight duty period, duty period limitations and rest period requirements that are in
accordance with the applicable prescriptive fatigue management regulations of the State,
and/or
(ii) If applicable, the Operator's Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) approved or
accepted by the State and established in accordance with FLT 3.4.3B. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements/methodology for flight crew fatigue management and/or
FRMS in accordance with regulations of the State.
Identified/Assessed FRMS (if applicable) (focus: approved/accepted by State, incorporates
elements as specified in FLT 3.4.3B).
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling processes (focus: processes take into account flight
time/flight duty period/duty period/rest period limitations in the duty assignment of flight crew
members).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected scheduling personnel.
Examined selected flight crew duty assignment records (focus: examples of application of flight
crew fatigue management limitations/mitigations).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling includes management of fatigue-
related safety risk).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Fatigue and Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS).
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator establishes a methodology for the management
of crew member fatigue in a manner that:
• Is based upon scientific principles and knowledge;
• Is consistent with the prescriptive fatigue management and/or FRMS regulations of the State;
• Precludes fatigue from endangering safety of the flight.
Where authorized by the State, the operator may use a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) in
accordance with FLT 3.4.3B alone or in combination with prescriptive flight time, flight duty period,
duty period limitations and rest period requirements as the means for managing fatigue-related risks.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure fatigue occurring either in one flight, successive flights or
accumulated over a period of time does not impair a crew member's alertness and ability to safely
operate an aircraft or perform safety-related duties.
Where authorized by the State, the operator may use an FRMS as a means to determine that
variations from prescriptive fatigue management policies demonstrate an acceptable level of safety.
Guidance for the implementation of an FRMS is contained in the IATA/ICAO/IFALPA Fatigue
Management Guide for Operators and, as applicable, other reference documents approved or
accepted by the State for the purpose of FRMS implementation (e.g. FAA, AC
120-103A–Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Aviation Safety).
The applicability of this provision is limited to those operations wherein fatigue is managed in
accordance with the FRMS as defined in the operator's FRMS documentation. It is important to note,
however, that an FRMS may be used alone or in combination with prescriptive flight time, flight duty
period, duty period limitations and rest period requirements as the means for managing fatigue
related risks.
The components of an effective FRMS as specified in this provision are described in the following
table.
FLT 3.4.3C
If the Operator uses an FRMS to manage flight crew fatigue-related safety risks, the Operator should
ensure the organizational activities specified in FLT 3.4.3B related to the management of flight crew
fatigue-related risks are integrated with the Operator's organizational safety management system
(SMS) as specified in ORG 1.1.10. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed integration of FRMS elements in organizational SMS.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected personnel that perform flight crew fatigue-related safety risk management
functions.
Examined selected examples of flight crew fatigue-related hazards addressed/analyzed under
organization-wide safety risk assessment/mitigation program.
Other Action (Specify).
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the “tactical” organizational activities specified in FLT 3.4.3B
interface with organizational safety risk management activities. This includes interfaces with SMS
and Quality systems to ensure operational systems and processes are subjected to the
organization's overarching safety and quality assurance processes.
Guidance for the integration of FRMS and SMS is described in the IATA/ICAO/IFALPA Fatigue
Management Guide for Airline Operators.
FLT 3.4.4
The Operator shall consider the following as duty time for the purposes of determining required rest
periods and calculating duty time limitations for operating flight crew members:
(i) Entire duration of the flight;
(ii) Pre-operating deadhead time;
(iii) Training periods prior to a flight;
(iv) Administrative or office time prior to a flight (for flight crew members that serve in a
management function);
(v) If required by the State, flight time accrued by flight crew members in operations other than
those of the Operator. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements/criteria used for determination of required rest
periods/calculation of duty time limitations for operating flight crew members.
Identified/Assessed processes used to track flight crew compliance with duty time/rest period
limitations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected flight crew duty assignment records (focus: application of duty time/rest
period limitations).
Observed flight crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling uses defined criteria for
determining required flight crew rest periods/calculating duty time limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Deadheading.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator considers non-flight duty time, or flight time
accrued in operations other than those of the operator, that is likely to induce fatigue into the
calculation of duty time limitations and the determination of required rest periods.
FLT 3.4.6
If the Operator uses flight crew members that are concurrently qualified to operate aircraft of different
types, or operate variants within one type, and the State specifies unique training and/or recency
requirements for such flight crew members to remain concurrently qualified, the Operator shall have
a scheduling process that addresses such unique requirements, to include, as a minimum:
(i) Required differences training (between type or variants);
(ii) Recency of experience necessary to maintain currency on all types or variants. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed scheduling processes that address flight crew members concurrently
qualified to operate aircraft of different types/variants within one type.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed flight crew scheduling personnel.
FLT 3.5.2
If the Operator uses aircraft with electronic navigation data capabilities, the Operator shall have
guidance and procedures for flight crew members to ensure the validity of any electronic navigation
database installed into aircraft navigation equipment. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for flight crew preflight of aircraft navigation
equipment (focus: validation of any installed navigation databases; definition of validation
criteria).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight crew preflight navigation database validation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Where more than one database is available for use in the aircraft navigation system, an operator can
ensure database validity by providing guidance for the flight crew to select the new database for use
prior to the first flight on the effective date for the new database.
The operator may provide relief in the MEL, permitting flight crew use of a non-current database for a
specified period of time due to database errors or faults.
FLT 3.5.3
If the Operator uses electronic flight bag (EFB) devices or systems, the Operator shall, in accordance
with requirements of the Authority, have one or more processes to ensure the appropriate
management, control, maintenance and use of EFBs. Such process shall ensure, as a minimum:
(i) Portable EFBs, if used, do not affect the performance of aircraft systems, equipment or the
ability to operate the aircraft;
(ii) Assessment of the safety risks associated with each EFB function used in operations in
accordance with FLT 1.12.2;
(iii) Establishment of procedures for the use, management and maintenance of the device, each
EFB function and any database the device may use;
(iv) Establishment of training requirements for the use of the device and each EFB function;
(v) In the event of an EFB failure, sufficient information is readily available to the flight crew for
the flight to be conducted safely. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for management/control of EFB systems/devices (focus:
device distribution/serviceability (as applicable)/process for data maintenance/timely update,
data limitations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
FLT 3.6.2
The Operator shall have guidance that enables the flight crew to determine if airports of intended use
meet operational requirements, to include:
(i) Applicable performance requirements;
(ii) Runway characteristics;
(iii) Air Traffic Services and associated communications;
(iv) Navigation aids and lighting;
(v) Weather reporting;
(vi) Emergency services. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance that specifies operational requirements for airports of
intended use (focus: availability to flight crew; instructions for information in operations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: determination of airport operational requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Air Traffic Services.
FLT 3.7.1
The Operator shall have a fuel policy and guidance that enables the flight crew to determine the
minimum dispatch/departure fuel for each phase of flight in accordance with DSP 4.3.1. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy/OM guidance that requires flight crew to determine minimum
dispatch/departure fuel. (focus: availability to flight crew; minimum dispatch/departure fuel
includes fuel for phases of flight specified in DSP 4.3.1).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: determination of minimum
dispatch/departure fuel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
DSP 4.3.1 specifies the fuel categories that are typically used when defining regulatory and/or
operational requirements during the flight planning process and on the OFP.
Individual aircraft fuel consumption, MEL/CDL adjustments, anticipated operational constraints
(weather, de-icing, slots, etc.) are all factors normally to be considered in calculating minimum
dispatch/departure fuel required.
Fuel calculations are typically made by a flight crew member, a Flight Operations Officer/Flight
Dispatcher, or both.
FLT 3.7.2
The Operator shall delegate the authority to the PIC to ensure:
(i) A flight is not commenced unless the usable fuel required in accordance with DSP 4.3.1 is
on board the aircraft and is sufficient to complete the planned flight safely;
(ii) If fuel is consumed during a flight for purposes other than originally intended during pre-flight
planning, such flight is not continued without a re-analysis and, if applicable, adjustment of
the planned operation to ensure sufficient fuel remains to complete the flight safely. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement for PIC to ensure required safe usable fuel on board prior
to flight (focus: delegation of authority to PIC; instructions for determination of safe usable fuel).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: determination of usable safe fuel prior to flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Discretionary Fuel.
The intent of this provision is for the PIC to have the authority to ensure sufficient fuel is on board the
aircraft to commence or continue the planned flight safely, and to be able to authorize the loading of
Discretionary Fuel if such fuel is required for the safe conduct of the flight and will not cause
operating limits to be exceeded.
In a shared system of operational control, the PIC and the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer
share the responsibility to ensure operating limitations are not exceeded and sufficient fuel is on
board to commence or continue the planned flight safely.
The extent of the re-analysis or adjustment specified in item ii) is commensurate with the scope and
complexity of the planned operation.
FLT 3.7.3
The Operator shall have guidance that enables the flight crew to prepare and/or accept a load sheet
with accurate aircraft weight/mass and balance calculations for each flight. Such guidance shall:
(i) Assign responsibility to the PIC for ensuring the load sheet content is satisfactory prior to
each flight;
(ii) Incorporate flight crew procedures for preparing or accepting last minute changes (LMC) to
the load sheet, to include guidance for the maximum allowable difference between planned
and actual weights.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for PIC/flight crew preparation/acceptance of
load sheet (focus: instructions for determination of accurate load sheet, preparing/accepting
LMCs, maximum allowable difference between planned/actual weights).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight crew preparation/acceptance of accurate load
sheet).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.7.9
If the Operator conducts isolated airport operations, the Operator shall have guidance and
instructions for the flight crew to:
(i) Practically calculate or determine a point of safe return (PSR) for each flight into an isolated
airport;
(ii) Ensure the flight does not continue past the actual PSR unless a current assessment of
meteorological conditions, traffic, and other operational conditions indicate that a safe
landing can be made at the estimated time of use. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified aircraft fleets used in isolated aerodrome operations.
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for flight crew calculation/consideration of PSR
for isolated airport operations (focus: instructions for calculation/re-calculation of PSR; definition
of conditions that permit continuation beyond PSR).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: calculation/use of PSR).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Isolated Airport and Point of Safe Return (PSR).
This provision, in combination with the fuel carriage requirements of DSP 4.3.11, is intended to
mitigate some of the risks associated with operations to isolated airports that preclude the selection
and specification of a destination alternate.
A PSR is the point of last possible diversion to an en route alternate. While this point can be
calculated and specified on the OFP during the flight planning stage in accordance with DSP 4.1.7,
such a calculation does not typically take into account discretionary fuel or the real-time changes in
fuel consumption that will occur after departure. These factors typically result in an actual PSR that
will be reached later in the flight than the point originally calculated on the OFP.
In order to conform to item i), an operator would provide practical instructions for the flight crew to re-
calculate the position of the PSR while en route. These instructions usually involve using a fuel
plotting chart or the calculating capabilities of the Flight Management System (FMS). Alternatively,
the position of the actual PSR can be re-calculated by operational control personnel and relayed to
the en route aircraft, which also satisfies the specification in item i).
A PSR may coincide with the Final Decision Point used in Decision Point Planning or the Pre-
determined Point used in Pre-determined Point planning.
Guidance on flight planning methods including planning operations to isolated airports and guidance
related to the determination of a PSR is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management
Manual (Doc 9976).
3.8 Aircraft Preflight and Airworthiness
FLT 3.8.3
The Operator shall assign the PIC the authority to reject an aircraft prior to departure
of a flight if dissatisfied with any aspect of the airworthiness and/or maintenance status of the
aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for acceptance/rejection of aircraft based on
airworthiness assessment (focus: delegation of authority to PIC; instructions for assessment of
airworthiness).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: use of ATL).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure that PIC acceptance of an aircraft is based on a review of the
MEL/CDL, ATL and/or any other operator or State-approved sources of technical information
attesting to the mechanical state of the aircraft.
FLT 3.8.7A
The Operator shall have guidance, published in the OM or other document(s) available to the flight
crew during flight preparation, that requires an exterior aircraft inspection (walk-around) that focuses
on safety-critical areas of the aircraft and ensures, as a minimum:
(i) Pitot and static ports are not damaged or obstructed;
(ii) Flight controls are not locked or disabled (as applicable, depending on aircraft type);
(iii) Frost, snow or ice is not present on critical surfaces;
(iv) Aircraft structure or structural components are not damaged. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for aircraft exterior inspection prior to each flight
(focus: instructions for conduct of inspection; definition of safety-critical areas that must be
included).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: aircraft exterior inspection).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
If the exterior aircraft inspection is delegated in accordance with FLT 3.8.6, conformity with this
provision would require that guidance is contained in documents accessible to licensed maintenance
technicians.
FLT 3.8.7B
The Operator shall have a procedure to ensure the availability, accessibility and serviceability of
aircraft flight deck systems and emergency equipment. Such procedure shall include an interior
preflight inspection of systems and equipment, which, as a minimum, is conducted by the flight crew
prior to the first flight:
(i) Of the flight crew on an aircraft during a duty period;
(ii) On an aircraft after it has been left unattended by the flight crew, unless the Operator has a
process or a procedure that ensures flight deck systems and emergency equipment remain
undisturbed. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for flight crew preflight inspection of flight deck
emergency systems/equipment (focus: instructions for conduct of inspection; definition of
emergency systems/equipment to be included).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight deck preflight inspection).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for the flight crew to ensure the availability, accessibility and
serviceability of aircraft flight deck systems and emergency equipment prior to flight.
Serviceability is typically assessed by checking fire extinguisher pressures, oxygen bottle pressures,
PBE humidity indicators and/or other preflight checks specified by the aircraft or equipment
manufacturers and documented in the operator's procedures.
An operator typically includes associated guidance to ensure action is taken to address a condition
where systems or equipment are discovered as faulty, missing or does not satisfy operational
requirements.
Discrepancies involving systems or equipment are normally documented in a technical log book or
equivalent recording medium.
FLT 3.8.8
If the Operator conducts passenger flights or transports supernumeraries in the passenger cabin with
or without cabin crew, the Operator shall have a procedure to ensure the availability, accessibility and
serviceability of aircraft cabin emergency systems and equipment. Such procedure shall include a
preflight inspection of such systems and equipment, which, as a minimum, shall be conducted by the
flight crew or, if applicable, delegated to the cabin crew prior to the first flight:
(i) After a new cabin crew or, if no cabin crew is used, a new flight crew has assumed control of
the aircraft cabin;
(ii) After an aircraft has been left unattended by a flight crew or cabin crew unless the Operator
has a process or procedure that ensures aircraft cabin emergency systems and equipment
remain undisturbed. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedure for flight/cabin crew preflight inspection of cabin
emergency systems/equipment (focus: instructions for conduct of inspection; requirement for
systems/equipment to be serviceable and available/accessible to passengers/supernumeraries;
if applicable, process or procedure that ensures systems/equipment remain undisturbed when no
flight or cabin crew on board).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Guidance
The briefing related to the specification in item ii) also typically addresses any applicable
requirements and restrictions for personnel seated adjacent to cabin emergency exits.
3.9 Ground Handling
FLT 3.9.2
If the Operator conducts passenger flights without cabin crew, the Operator shall have a process
and/or procedures to ensure a coordinated and expeditious cabin evacuation during aircraft fueling
operations with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking. Such procedures shall require:
(i) Cabin exits are designated for rapid deplaning or emergency evacuation, and routes to such
exits are unobstructed;
(ii) The area outside designated emergency evacuation exits is unobstructed;
(iii) Qualified persons trained in emergency procedures are positioned near aircraft boarding
door(s) or are otherwise in a position to monitor passenger safety and, if required, execute a
cabin evacuation;
(iv) A suitable method of communication is established between qualified persons in a
position to monitor passenger safety and personnel that have responsibility for fueling
operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM process/procedures for coordinated cabin evacuation during aircraft
fueling operations with passengers embarking/on board/disembarking (focus: description of
required flight crew actions; description of required aircraft system configuration/exterior
conditions/personnel positioning/method of communication).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin/ground operations (focus: complementary processes/procedures for
cabin evacuation).
Observed line flight operations (focus: coordination for potential cabin evacuation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to ensure an expeditious and coordinated passenger
evacuation regardless of the aircraft type, crew complement or complexity of the fueling operation.
For example, the specifications of the provision could be implemented procedurally and exclusively
by a flight crew supervising the refueling of a small aircraft. Complex air carrier fueling operations, on
the other hand, may call for a process-based approach involving numerous appropriately positioned
and qualified individuals that can collectively ensure conformity with the specifications of the
provision as well as its principal intent.
The specification in item i) refers to the designation of exits for rapid deplaning or emergency
evacuation, which typically considers:
• Aircraft type (e.g. some aircraft types might require the designation of over-wing exits for an
emergency evacuation);
• The method being used for passenger boarding and/or deplaning (e.g. boarding bridge, air
stairs);
• Exterior or interior obstructions that might render an exit unusable for an emergency
evacuation.
The specifications in items i) and ii) refer to obstructions that would render an exit or area outside an
exit unusable during an emergency evacuation.
The specification in item iii) refers to the positioning of persons trained and qualified to monitor
passenger safety and execute a rapid deplaning or cabin evacuation. Such persons are typically
positioned near the boarding door(s) when a passenger boarding bridge is being used or, when a
boarding bridge is not in use, in the location(s) most suitable for monitoring the safety of passengers
that are embarking, on board or disembarking the aircraft. Certain aircraft might be small enough to
permit a qualified person to monitor the safety of passengers embarking, on board or disembarking
from outside the aircraft.
The specification in item iv) refers to the procedures for establishing a suitable method of
communication, which may be initiated by any applicable person. Acceptable procedural methods of
initiating and maintaining communication may include one or more of the following:
• The use of the aircraft inter-communication system, or
• Direct person-to-person contact, or
• Any other method of communication that ensures the flight crew or other suitably qualified
persons are able to expeditiously direct personnel to discontinue fueling operations for any
reason.
The specification in item iv) may be fulfilled by a flight crew member or other suitably qualified person
when aircraft refueling is conducted or supervised by the flight crew.
FLT 3.9.3
If the Operator conducts passenger flights without cabin crew and transports passengers that require
special handling, the Operator shall have a policy and procedures for the acceptance or non-
acceptance, as well as onboard handling, of such passengers by the flight crew. The policy and
procedures shall be in accordance with applicable regulations and as a minimum address, as
applicable:
(i) Intoxicated and/or unruly passengers;
(ii) Passengers with disabilities or reduced mobility;
(iii) Passengers with injuries or illness;
(iv) Infants and unaccompanied children;
(v) Inadmissible passengers;
(vi) Deportees;
(vii) Passengers in custody. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for passengers that require special handling (focus:
description of flight crew actions; definition of types of passengers that require special handling).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin/ground operations (focus: complementary policy/procedures for
treatment of special handling passengers).
Observed line flight operations (focus: treatment of special handling passengers).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principle intent of this provision is to ensure the appropriate acceptance or non-acceptance,
as well as onboard, handling of passengers regardless of aircraft type, crew complement or
complexity of the operation. An operator typically provides guidance to the flight crew, commensurate
with any assigned responsibilities relative to passenger handling, to address the acceptance or
non-acceptance of passengers requiring special handling as defined by this provision. Such
guidance also typically defines the conditions necessary to accept or deny boarding to a passenger.
For intoxicated and/or unruly passengers as specified in item (1), the PIC typically has the authority
to refuse carriage, order in-flight restraint or, depending on the severity of circumstances, divert a
flight to an alternate airport for disembarkation and handover to authorities.
The specifications in items i), v), vi) and vii) might require guidance in the OM that addresses the
proper use of restraint devices, unless such devices are prohibited by the Authority or their use is
impractical due to lack of appropriate crew members.
FLT 3.9.6
If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft
icing, the Operator shall have de-/anti-Icing policies and procedures published in the OM or in other
documents that are available to the flight crew during flight preparation and accessible to the flight
crew during flight. Such policies and procedures shall address any flight crew duties and
responsibilities related to de-/anti-Icing and include:
(i) Holdover Time tables;
(ii) A requirement for a member of the flight crew or qualified ground personnel to perform a
visual check of the wings before takeoff, if any contamination is suspected;
(iii) A requirement that takeoff will not commence unless the critical surfaces are clear of any
deposits that might adversely affect the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft;
(iv) A statement that delegates authority to the PIC to order De-/Anti-icing whenever deemed
necessary. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for aircraft de-/anti-icing of aircraft (focus:
availability/accessibility to flight crew prior to/during flight; description of flight crew
authority/duties/responsibilities; statement that requires critical surfaces to be clear of ice prior to
takeoff).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: operations in ground icing conditions; de-/anti-icing
operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of De-/Anti-icing Program and Holdover Time.
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members comply with the clean aircraft concept
prior to takeoff anytime there is a potential for the accretion of ice on aircraft critical surfaces during
ground operations.
Refer to GRH 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 6 for specifications and associated guidance related to the
establishment and maintenance of a De-/Anti-icing Program.
Qualified ground personnel specified in item ii) are typically used to perform a visual wing check in
instances when the wings are not visible to the flight crew from the interior of the aircraft (e.g., cargo
aircraft operations).
The surfaces specified in item iii) include wings, flight controls, engine inlets, fuselage surfaces in
front of engines or other areas defined in the AOM.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground De-
icing/Anti-icing Operations.
FLT 3.9.8
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure information and
guidance that enable the flight crew to carry out duties and responsibilities related to the transport of
dangerous goods is published or referenced in the OM and included in the onboard library. Such
guidance shall include, as a minimum:
(i) General policies and procedures;
(ii) Duties and responsibilities;
(iii) As applicable, preflight acceptance requirements;
(iv) Flight crew written notification requirements;
(v) Dangerous goods incident and/or emergency response procedures. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures associated with transport of dangerous goods
(focus: included in onboard library; description of flight crew duties/responsibilities;
acceptance/notification requirements).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: provision/receipt/acknowledgement of onboard
dangerous goods).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) and NOTOC
(Notification to Captain).
An operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, typically develops flight crew guidance
related to the transport of dangerous goods based on technical information from one or more source
reference documents, to include:
• IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR);
• ICAO Doc. 9481 AN/928, Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft Incidents Involving
Dangerous Goods;
• An equivalent dangerous goods manual, dangerous goods emergency response guide or
other reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the development of
flight crew guidance related to the transportation of dangerous goods by air.
The specification in item iii) refers to procedures and information formulated to assist each applicable
flight crew member in performing or directly supervising the acceptance of dangerous goods for
transport on an aircraft. Such information might include, but not limited to:
• Details and locations of cargo compartments;
• The maximum quantity of dry ice permitted in each compartment;
• If radioactive materials are to be carried, instructions on loading;
• Dangerous goods reporting requirements.
Item iii) is only applicable to flight crew members assigned such responsibilities by the State or the
operator.
The specification in item iv) refers to PIC and/or flight crew duties and responsibilities related to the
acquisition and review of the NOTOC (Notification to Captain).
3.10 Airspace Rules
FLT 3.10.4
The Operator shall have guidance that addresses the use of standard radio phraseology when
communicating with ATC, the acceptance and readback of ATC clearances and, when necessary,
the clarification of such clearances to ensure understanding. Such guidance shall include, as a
minimum:
(i) A requirement for the use of the call sign;
(ii) A requirement for at least two flight crew members to monitor and confirm clearances to
ensure a mutual (flight crew) understanding of accepted clearances under circumstances,
as determined by the operator or flight crew, when a missed or misunderstood clearance
could pose a safety risk to the flight;
(iii) A requirement to clarify clearances with ATC whenever any flight crew member is in doubt
regarding the clearance or instruction received. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement/guidance for standard radio phraseology in
communication with ATC (focus: instructions/procedures for flight crew communications with
ATC; definition/use of standard phraseology).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: ATC communications; use of standard phraseology).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have policies and procedures that ensure:
• The use of standard radio phraseology;
• ATC clearances are clearly understood during times of increased operational risk.
The specification in item ii) refers to situations when a missed or misunderstood clearance could
pose a safety risk to the flight (e.g. inadequate terrain clearance, runway incursion, loss of
separation). ATC clearances that have the potential to pose such safety risks, if misunderstood by
the flight crew, typically include the following:
• Heading, altitude/flight level, assigned route/waypoint changes;
• Frequency changes during critical phases of flight;
• Instructions for any operation on or near a runway.
FLT 3.10.7
The Operator shall have guidance that enables the flight crew to determine differences in rules and
procedures for any airspace of intended use, to include, as a minimum, an explanation
of the differences between prevailing or local airspace rules and ICAO airspace rules, where
applicable. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement/guidance for determining differences in rules/procedures
in airspace of intended use (focus: instructions for flight crew determination of airspace
rules/procedures, differences between prevailing/local and ICAO rules).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specification of this provision ensures flight crews that operate in airspace(s) with different rules
have those differences explained in the OM.
Airspace(s) of intended use typically includes ICAO, FAA, State or any other local airspace subject to
the operations of the operator.
3.11 In-Flight Operations
Navigation
FLT 3.11.2
If the Operator uses navigation systems that are subject to degradation over time, the Operator shall
have procedures to ensure navigation accuracy is checked after prolonged in-flight operation when
ground-based or space-based navigation facilities become available for such checks. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement/guidance for verification of navigation accuracy after
prolonged in-flight operation (focus: procedure/instructions for flight crew checking of navigation
accuracy using ground-based or space-based facilities).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: verification of navigation accuracy).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Prolonged operation may be defined by the operator or manufacturer and refers to navigation
systems with accuracy that could degrade over time or are affected by the presence of external
navigation aids.
Navigation accuracy may be established with DME/DME, VOR/DME, or VOR/VOR within the service
volume of the applicable navaids.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by guidance that describes flight crew actions
related to Flight Management Computer (FMC) automated navigational accuracy messages (e.g.,
UNABLE REQD NAV PERF or equivalent) or that instructs flight crews to compare Actual Navigation
Performance (ANP) with Required Navigation Performance (RNP).
FLT 3.11.4
The Operator shall ensure minimum flight altitude information applicable to all phases of a flight,
including guidance that specifies when descent below any applicable prescribed minimum altitude is
permissible, is made available to the flight crew along with instructions for the use of such
information. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance that specifies when descent below applicable prescribed
minimum altitude is permissible (focus: availability of minimum altitude information to flight crew
during flight; instructions/procedures for adherence to/descent below minimum altitudes all
phases of flight).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: adherence to minimum altitudes).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Minimum prescribed safety altitudes typically include:
• Minimum Safety Altitude (MSA);
• Minimum Descent Altitude/Height (MDA/H);
• Minimum En route Altitude (MEA);
• Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude (MOCA);
• Minimum Off-Route Altitude (MORA);
• Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA);
• Any other minimum altitudes prescribed by the Authority.
FLT 3.11.5
The Operator shall have a policy and/or procedures that require flight crews to monitor
meteorological conditions during the en route phase of flight, to include current weather and
forecasts for:
(i) Destination airport;
(ii) Destination alternate airport(s), if applicable;
(iii) En route alternate airports(s), if applicable. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement/guidance for monitoring meteorological conditions during
the en route phase of flight (focus: instructions for flight crew monitoring of en route
meteorological conditions, current/forecast weather for destination/alternate airports).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: monitoring en route/airport weather conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crews monitor meteorological conditions at the
destination airport and at each required alternate airport, and that current meteorological reports or a
combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will be, at the
estimated time of use (ETU), at or above the operator's established airport operating minima for that
operation. To fulfill monitoring requirements, flight crews may acquire meteorological information
from approved ground sources or such information may be provided to the aircraft by the operator as
specified in DSP 3.2.9A or DSP 3.2.9B.
FLT 3.11.7
The Operator shall have a policy and/or procedures that require the flight crew to monitor fuel during
flight to ensure a fuel quantity upon landing that is not less than final reserve fuel. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirement/guidance for monitoring en route fuel to ensure landing
with not less than final reserve fuel (focus: instructions/procedure for flight crew fuel monitoring to
ensure landing with final reserve fuel as specified in DSP 4.3.12).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: en route fuel monitoring/tracking).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to FLT 3.14.16 and FLT 3.14.17 for actions to be taken by the PIC in the event the final reserve
minimum fuel quantity specified in DSP 4.3.12 cannot be protected in flight and preserved upon
landing.
FLT 3.11.9
If the Operator is authorized to conduct LVO, the Operator shall have guidance to ensure the proper
conduct of such operations. Such guidance shall address, as a minimum:
(i) Required ground and airborne equipment;
(ii) Operating limitations and procedures;
(iii) Crew qualifications;
(iv) Operating minima (RVR). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified authorization to conduct low visibility operations.
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for the conduct of low visibility operations (focus:
procedures/limitations for conduct of operations; requirements for ground/airborne equipment,
crew qualifications, operating minima).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: conduct of low visibility operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The operating limitations specified in item (ii) typically address crosswinds, runway condition and
aircraft equipment capability.
FLT 3.11.10
If the Operator conducts flight operations beyond 60 minutes from a point on a route to an en route
alternate airport, including ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance that includes:
(i) Procedures to ensure proper conduct of such operations;
(ii) For all aircraft, a requirement for flight crews to monitor meteorological information for any
en route alternates during the en route phase of a flight;
(iii) Procedures to ensure, for aircraft with two-engines engaged in ETOPS/EDTO, the most up-
to-date information provided to the flight crew indicates that conditions at identified en route
alternate airports will be at or above the operator's established airport operating minima for
the operation at the estimated time of use. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified authorization to conduct ETOPS/EDTO/operations beyond 60 minutes from an
alternate airport.
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures for the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO/operations
beyond 60 minutes from alternate airport (focus: procedures/limitations for conduct of operations;
requirements for monitoring en route alternate airport meteorological information; for two-engine
aircraft, requirements for en route alternate airports).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: conduct of ETOPS/EDTO/operations
beyond 60 minutes from alternate airport).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of item ii) of this provision is to ensure flight crew are knowledgeable about diversion
airport options and prevailing weather conditions appropriate for the type of operation conducted.
The intent of item iii) of this provision is to ensure a larger strategy exists to protect a diversion
regardless of whether the diversion is for technical (airplane system- or engine-related) or non-
technical reasons.
An operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance for
the conduct of operations beyond 60 minutes, from a point on a route to an en route alternate airport,
including ETOPS/EDTO. Such guidance might be derived from one or more of the following source
references, as applicable:
• ICAO Annex 6, Amendment 36, Attachment D: Guidance for Operations by Turbine Engine
Aeroplanes Beyond 60 minutes to an En-route Alternate Aerodrome Including Extended
Diversion Time Operations (EDTO);
• ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976);
• FAA Advisory Circular - AC No: 120-42B: Extended Operations (ETOPS and Polar
Operations), Effective 6/13/08;
• EASA Air OPS (regulation 965/2012) ANNEX V (Part-SPA) Subpart F: Extended Range
Operations with Two-Engine Aeroplanes (ETOPS);
• EASA AMC 20-6, Rev 2 to Air OPS (regulation 965/2012): Extended Range Operation with
Two-Engine Aeroplanes ETOPS Certification and Operation;
• Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the purpose of
providing guidance for the conduct of flight operations by turbine engine aircraft beyond
60 minutes to an en route alternate airport including ETOPS/EDTO.
Flight Management and General Procedures
FLT 3.11.17
The Operator shall have a policy and procedures that define a sterile flight deck during critical phases
of flight, to include:
(i) A protocol for intra-flight deck communication;
(ii) If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, a protocol for communication
between the flight crew and cabin crew;
(iii) The mandatory use of headsets and boom or throat microphones for communication with
ATC below the transition level/altitude;
(iv) A restriction of flight crew activities to essential operational matters. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/requirement/procedures for sterile flight deck (focus: procedures
associated with sterile flight deck; definition of protocols/requirements/restrictions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew actions, when considered critical to the safety of
flight, are crosschecked and confirmed.
The specification in item (i) addresses the risk of a misconfiguration by requiring the flight crew to
crosscheck and confirm certain critical manual and/or automatic configuration changes. It is
important to note that the criticality of certain actions may be dependent on phase of flight (e.g.
landing gear down before landing, correct flap selection before takeoff and landing, speedbrakes
extended for a rejected takeoff (RTO) and after landing, speedbrakes retracted for takeoff, go-around
and rejected landing).
The specification in item ii) applies to reference bugs that are set externally on the instrument face,
manually using a control panel, or automatically/manually through the FMS.
The specification in item iii) refers to the barometric pressure setting to which altitude is referenced.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
FLT 3.11.22
The Operator shall have an automation policy with associated guidance and procedures that address
the use of aircraft automated flight and navigation systems, to include:
(i) Flight crew monitoring of the automated flight and navigation systems (AFS) to ensure
appropriate aircraft response to inputs by:
(a) Cross-checking mode control panel status;
(b) Observing the results of any mode changes;
(c) Supervising the resulting guidance and aircraft response.
(ii) The use of a level of automation appropriate for the task, to include manual flight when
aircraft response is not appropriate or adequate.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/guidance/procedures for use of aircraft automated
flight/navigation systems (focus: instruction/procedures for flight crew use/monitoring of
automation, selection of appropriate mode of flight/navigation automation).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: management of flight automation; use
of level appropriate for conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.11.28
The Operator shall have policies, procedures and guidance that address altitude awareness, to
include:
(i) Instructions for the use of automated or verbal flight crew altitude callouts and any other
actions to be taken by the flight crew to maintain altitude awareness;
(ii) Policies and/or procedures for the avoidance of altitude deviations;
(iii) Policies and/or procedures that address call sign confusion during altitude clearance
acceptance and readback;
(iv) Instructions for the flight crew to report the cleared flight level on first contact with ATC,
unless specifically requested not to do so by ATC. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/guidance/procedures that address altitude awareness (focus:
instruction/procedures for flight crew focus on altitude awareness; definition of strategies for
avoidance of altitude deviations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: application of altitude awareness
procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Altitude Deviation.
The intent of this provision is for the operator to provide policies, procedures and guidance in the OM
designed to manage or mitigate potential risks related to the acceptance and maintenance of
assigned altitudes.
As an example, OM guidance to address altitude awareness can include instructions for:
• A crosscheck that the assigned altitude is above the minimum safe altitude;
• “1000 to go” standard callout;
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure that potential errors in altimetry are identified and corrected
when necessary.
The specification in item i) refers to temperature compensation corrections applied to ensure
obstacle clearance in conditions of extreme cold (typically starting at -10 C). Such corrections may be
applied manually by the flight crew (e.g. temperature correction charts) or automatically by onboard
systems (e.g. Air Data Computer).
The operator may provide tables, charts or other means to address potential errors in altimetry.
Meteorological Conditions and Environment
FLT 3.11.38
The Operator shall have policies and procedures for operations in the proximity of adverse weather
and/or environmental conditions to include:
(i) Thunderstorms;
(ii) Turbulence;
(iii) Contaminated runways, including the effect of type and depth of contaminants on
performance;
(iv) Cold weather;
(v) Volcanic ash, if the Operator conducts operations on routes that traverse large active
volcanic areas or in the terminal areas of airports in the vicinity of active volcanoes. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures for operations in proximity of adverse
weather/environmental conditions (focus: flight crew adverse weather/environmental conditions
operating procedures; definition of adverse weather/environmental conditions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: operations in proximity of adverse weather/environmental
conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flight crew members have access to policies and procedures
associated with the adverse weather or environmental conditions they might encounter in operations.
Active volcanic areas specified in item v) normally include the following: Pacific Ring of Fire, the Rift
Valley in Africa, North and South America, Indonesia, Japan and Iceland.
FLT 3.11.39
The Operator shall have guidance that includes policies and procedures for:
(i) Wind shear avoidance;
(ii) Wind shear encounter recovery;
(iii) As applicable, response to predictive and/or reactive alerts. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/guidance for wind shear avoidance/encounter
recovery/response to predictive/reactive alerts (focus: flight crew wind shear avoidance/recovery
procedures).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: wind shear
awareness/avoidance/recovery).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Airborne Wind shear Warning System, which includes definitions
for Predictive Alert and Reactive Alert.
Limitations and Performance
FLT 3.11.46
The Operator shall provide, and require compliance with, operating limitations, as defined by the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and established by the State of Registry for each aircraft
type used in operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM provision of/requirement for compliance with operating limitations as
defined by OEM (focus: guidance/procedures for flight crew compliance with operating
limitations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: compliance with operating limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.11.47
The Operator shall have wind component limitations for takeoff, approach and landing that do not
exceed the values demonstrated or recommended by the OEM and also address operations when
the:
(i) Runway is contaminated;
(ii) Visibility is degraded;
(iii) Aircraft stopping capability is degraded. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedures for compliance with takeoff/approach/landing wind
component limitations that do not exceed OEM limitations (focus: requirement/procedures for
flight crew compliance with wind component limitations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: compliance with wind component
limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Runway Excursion.
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of runway excursions.
The intent is to ensure the operator provides wind component limitations for the phases of flight
specified in the body of the provision (e.g. maximum crosswind component for landing). Additionally,
the provision ensures the operator provides wind component limitations under the conditions
specified in the sub-specifications (e.g. maximum crosswind component for landing on a
contaminated runway). In either case such values cannot exceed those demonstrated or
recommended by the OEM.
Contaminated runways are typically defined by a specific contaminant type/depth or equivalent
braking action report.
FLT 3.11.48
The Operator shall have guidance that specifies a minimum aircraft height above ground level (AGL)
or above airport level (AAL) for commencing a turn after takeoff. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance that specifies a minimum aircraft height above ground level
(AGL)/above airport level (AAL) for commencing a turn after takeoff (focus: requirement/
procedures for flight crew compliance with minimum altitude limitations for turn after takeoff).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: compliance with turn-after-takeoff
altitude limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Values typically vary depending on the operator or could include exceptions covering special airport
operations.
Approach and Landing
FLT 3.11.58
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures that enable the flight crew to determine the
conditions required to commence or continue an approach to a landing, to include, as a minimum:
(i) Crew qualification requirements;
(ii) Onboard equipment requirements;
(iii) Ground based equipment requirements;
(iv) Operating minima.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM requirements/information/guidance/procedures that enables flight crew
to determine conditions required to commence/continue an approach to landing (focus: flight
crew procedures/requirements for commencing/continuing approach to landing).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: determination of conditions for
approach/landing).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.11.59A
The Operator shall have a stabilized approach policy that is approved or accepted by the Authority
and has associated guidance, criteria, and procedures to ensure the ongoing conduct of stabilized
approaches. Such policy shall include:
(i) Criteria defining the stabilized condition, to include:
(a) Aircraft configuration requirements specific to each aircraft type;
(b) Checklist completion requirements;
(c) Speed and thrust limitations;
(d) Vertical speed limitations;
(e) Acceptable vertical and lateral displacement from the normal approach path.
(ii) Required minimum height(s) AAL to achieve stabilization criteria:
(a) Not lower than 1000 ft. for approaches in IMC or not lower than 500 ft. for
approaches in IMC as designated by the operator and/or State where a lower
stabilization height is operationally required, and a minimum stabilization height not
lower than 500 ft. for approaches in VMC; or
(b) Not lower than specific stabilization heights defined by the Operator and supported
by a safety risk assessment in accordance with FLT 1.12.2 demonstrating
acceptable risk for each defined height that is lower than any applicable height(s)
specified in (ii) (a).
(iii) A requirement to abandon an approach or go around in accordance with its go-around policy
as defined in FLT 3.11.60 unless stabilization criteria are met at the relevant heights
specified in (ii) and can be maintained until touchdown;
(iv) A requirement that deviations from stabilized approach criteria must be pre-planned and
require special briefings for designated unique approaches and/or abnormal conditions;
(v) A description of the duties and responsibilities of the PF and PM including countermeasures
to human error. (GM)
Note: The stabilized approach policy and associated implementation shall be subjected to the
Operator’s safety risk management (SRM) processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure
an acceptable level of safety risk is achieved and maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/guidance/procedures for the conduct of a stabilized approach
(focus: flight crew procedures/definition of criteria for stabilized approach).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined safety risk assessments and data associated with Operator-specified AAL, as
applicable.
Examined selected output from FDA/FDM/FOQA program (if applicable) (focus: data that
indicates status of fleet stabilized approach performance).
Examined relevant safety objectives including SPIs/SPTs (focus: proactive measures in place
for identifying and preventing unstabilized approaches).
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: stabilized approach).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Data Analysis (FDA) Program.
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT), Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I), and runway-related incidents/accidents.
The intent of this provision is for the operator to implement a stabilized approach policy, as well as
have guidance, criteria and procedures that ensure the maintenance of the intended lateral and
vertical flight path during approaches, including visual approaches and/or as depicted in published
approach procedures, without excessive maneuvering. Such policy also typically provides guidance
for bracketing and correcting deviations during the approach to ensure the aircraft will always be at
the proper speed over the runway threshold and in a position to land in the touchdown zone.
Monitoring of stabilized approach performance through SMS in accordance with the Note is required
for all operators and may be accomplished using FDA or through other reporting systems.
One or more stabilization heights AAL as specified in (ii) may be established for the criteria defined in
(i) (e.g., landing configuration may be required at 1,000 feet AAL while approach speed or vertical
speed limitations may be required at 500 feet AAL). Selection of heights may also vary depending on
aircraft type and operational characteristics (e.g., turbojet vs. turboprop). Finally, some Operators
may choose not to distinguish between VMC and IMC approaches using one set of stabilization
heights and associated criteria for both.
The criteria defining the stabilized condition are listed in item i) of the provision and are considered at
the 1000 ft. AAL and 500 ft. gates as specified in item ii) a). Alternatively, the operator may specify
stabilization heights appropriate to its operation as specified in item ii) b).
Operator stabilized approach policy and associated implementation is subject to SRM processes and
safety performance monitoring. Operator-defined minimum stabilization heights which are lower than
those specified in (ii) (a) require the conduct of a specific safety risk assessment in accordance with
FLT 1.12.2 demonstrating an acceptable risk level for each defined height.
Refer to FLT 3.11.59B for factors related to the consistent conduct of stabilized approaches that
should be taken into account by the operator’s SRM processes (including required SRAs).
The specifications in item iv) permit an operator conforming to item ii) a), in accordance with
operational requirements approved or accepted by the Authority, to establish stabilization criteria for
heights lower than 1000 ft. AAL, but no lower than 500 ft. AAL (IMC or VMC), for approaches
designated by the operator and/or State where:
• Lower minimum approach stabilization heights are authorized for turbo-propeller aircraft
operations (e.g., 500 feet AAL on VMC/IMC approaches), and/or
• Maneuvering at a lower height AAL is required to meet instrument or other charted approach
constraints (e.g., RNAV/RNP approaches, circling approaches and charted visual
approaches), and/or
• Aircraft are required to comply with ATC speed constraints on final approach, and/or
• Deviations from selected approach stabilization criteria at a height lower than 1000 feet AAL,
are operationally required, and the operator can demonstrate pilot adherence to its stabilized
approach policy via a continually monitored, managed and active flight data analysis (FDA)
program. These criteria used also typically address the maneuvering that may be required in
accordance with a charted visual or instrument approach procedure.
The specifications in item (v) address:
• Timely and effective PF briefings;
• PM stabilized approach criteria deviation callouts and compliance checks;
• PF/PM actions in the event of destabilization below stabilization height, to include monitoring
by the PM for possible excessive deviations from flight path, airspeed, vertical speed, pitch or
bank during the approach, during the transition from approach to landing and during flare and
touchdown;
• As applicable, the role of additional flight crew members on the flight deck (e.g., augmented
crew members).
• The Threat and Error Management (TEM) countermeasures to keep threats, errors, and
undesired aircraft states from reducing margins of safety in flight operations. Examples of
countermeasures include CRM training, SOPs, checklists, briefings, callouts, and other
means that assist the flight crew in managing human error.
OEM aircraft-specific descent and approach profiles can provide helpful guidance for flight crews to
achieve a stabilized approach.
An operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority and consistent with OEM guidance,
typically develops a stabilized approach policy, guidance, criteria and procedures based on one or
more of the following source references:
• Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions Coordinated
by EUROCONTROL and the Flight Safety Foundation – January 2021;
• Flight Safety Foundation Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions – Report of the Runway
Safety Initiative – May 2009;
• Flight Safety Foundation Runway Excursion Risk Awareness Tool;
• Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular – AC No. 91-79A;
• Federal Aviation Administration - Runway Excursions Support Tool;
• European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) Edition 1.0;
• ICAO Runway Safety Programme – Global Runway Safety Action Plan First Edition,
November 2017;
• IATA/IFALPA/IFATCA/CANSO Unstable Approaches: Risk Mitigation Policies, Procedures
and Best Practices, 3rd Edition.
• IATA Runway Safety Accident Analysis Report 2010-2014;
• Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for
the development of flight crew guidance related to the prevention of unstable approaches
and runway excursions.
FLT 3.11.59B
If the Operator has a stabilized approach policy that defines required minimum heights (AAL) to
achieve stabilization criteria in accordance with FLT 3.11.59A (ii) (b), that are lower than any
applicable height(s) specified in (ii)(a), the Operator shall ensure the safety risk management
processes required to achieve overall conformity with FLT 3.11.59A take into account the following
factors:
(i) Precursors of unstable approaches and operational trends that are identified through the
collection and analysis of available de-identified data (e.g., from FDA/FDM/FOQA and other
non-punitive reporting programs);
(ii) Precursors of unstable approaches identified through observational procedures which
cannot be captured by the traditional reporting or FDA;
(iii) Identification and analysis of hazards associated with human factors and piloting
techniques;
(iv) Analysis of aircraft type-specific flight characteristics including energy management in the
approach, landing, and go-around regimes;
(v) Operator’s ability to work with ATSUs to implement procedural changes at specific airports
with runways identified as higher risk by data analysis;
(vi) Flight crew training program content related to the implementation of stabilized approach
policy;
(vii) The most current and relevant manufacturer’s guidance, limitations, and recommendations
related to the development and maintenance of stabilized approach policy. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/guidance/procedures for the conduct of a stabilized approach
(focus: flight crew procedures/definition of criteria for stabilized approach).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined safety risk assessments and data associated with Operator-specified AAL, as
applicable.
Examined selected output from FDA/FDM/FOQA program (if applicable) (focus: data that
indicates status of fleet stabilized approach performance).
Examined relevant safety objectives including SPIs/SPTs (focus: proactive measures in place
for identifying and preventing unstabilized approaches).
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: stabilized approach).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Data Analysis (FDA) Program.
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT), Loss of Control in-Flight (LOC-I), and runway related incidents/accidents.
Refer to FLT 1.12.2 and associated guidance material for additional information regarding safety risk
assessments.
The intent of this specification is to ensure the operator’s SRM processes take into account the
factors related to the consistent conduct of stabilized approaches in accordance with operator policy.
Additional hazard criteria and risk factors may be identified by the operator and incorporated into
required risk assessments.
Examples of observational procedures specified in (ii) include LOSA or data from regulatory line
checks.
To further support SRM activities, an operator would also:
• Include and monitor aircraft parameters related to CFIT, LOC-I, and runway related
incidents/accidents in their flight data analysis (FDA) program in accordance with provisions
in ORG sub-section 3.3;
• Include unstable approaches followed by a landing as a reporting event by the flight crew;
• Minimize the need for the flight crew to report a go-around due to an unstable approach
unless there is another significant event associated with the go-around (e.g., flap
overspeed).
FLT 3.11.60
The Operator shall have a go-around policy with associated procedures and guidance to ensure flight
crews discontinue or go around from an approach or landing in accordance with criteria established
by the Operator. Such policy, procedures and guidance shall, as a minimum, address or define:
(i) Management support for flight crew decision making to discontinue an approach or execute
a go-around;
(ii) Criteria that require a flight crew to discontinue or go around from an approach or landing
(prior to the selection of reverse thrust) including when the aircraft is not stabilized in
accordance with FLT 3.11.59;
(iii) The go-around maneuver;
(iv) Duties and responsibilities of the PF and PM. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/requirements for execution of a missed approach/go-around
when approach not stabilized in accordance with established criteria (focus: flight crew
guidance/procedures for execution of a missed approach/go-around).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined selected output from FDA/FDM/FOQA program (if applicable) (focus: data that
indicates fleet status of missed approach/go-around from unstabilized approach).
Examined (as applicable) relevant safety objectives including SPIs/SPTs (focus: proactive
measures in place for identifying, assessing and addressing potential/actual go-arounds and
discontinued approaches.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: flight crew awareness of/preparation
for factors that could lead to a go-around or discontinued approach).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of approach and landing
accidents (ALAs) such as CFIT and runway excursions.
The intent of this provision is to reduce the risk of ALAs by ensuring the flight crew will always
discontinue or go around from an approach or landing (prior to the selection of reverse thrust) when a
safe landing cannot be assured (e.g. aircraft not stabilized in accordance with criteria established by
the operator) or a go-around is otherwise required (e.g. when instructed by ATC)
The specification in item (i) is intended to foster a culture that supports flight crew go-around decision
making. It is typically expressed by senior management in a manner that:
• Promotes the go-around as a normal procedure;
• Encourages go-around preparedness and considers the risk of the go-around maneuver
itself;
• Empowers the PM (or the SIC) to call for a go-around at any time during approach and
landing until the selection of reverse thrust;
• Ensures that go-around decision making does not affect the PIC’s emergency authority in the
event of (impending) abnormal or emergency situations;
• Does not inhibit flight crew reporting of go-around related events.
The criteria referred to in item (ii), which would require a go-around or discontinuation of an
approach, typically Include:
• The specifications for a stable approach defined in accordance with FLT 3.11.59 are not met
at the relevant approach gate(s) or can no longer be maintained until touchdown.
• The visibility or ceiling is below the minimum required for the type of approach at the
specified gates (e.g. outer marker, 1,000’ AAL or at minimums).
• The appropriate visual references are not obtained or are lost at or below MDA (or minimum
descent height) or DA (or decision height) and through flare and touchdown by either pilot.
• Prior to touchdown the wind is above the operational or pre-determined wind limit, or the
runway status is below the limit determined by the flight crew’s landing performance
assessment.
• Technical defects or failures occur during approach that might inhibit a safe continuation of
approach, landing or go-around.
• Doubts by either pilot about the aircraft’s geographic or spatial position.
• Confusion by either pilot about the use or behavior of the automation.
• It is foreseeable that the go-around routing and path will not be sufficiently clear of adverse
weather or restricting traffic.
• If instructed by ATC.
• If required for type-specific reasons as outlined in the respective AOM.
• If required by special considerations associated with a CAT II/III operation.
Note: in establishing criteria for discontinuing or going around from an approach, consideration
would be given to installed equipment (e.g. GPWS, automated callouts) and flight crew procedures to
ensure a timely go-around decision can be made.
The specification in item (iii) refers to the aircraft type-specific maneuver(s) for go around from a
visual approach, an instrument approach or a landing prior to the selection of reverse thrust (i.e.
rejected landing).
The specification in item (iv) typically addresses:
• Timely and effective PF briefings.
• PF/PNF consideration of all relevant aircraft performance guidance and data in accordance
with FLT 4.1.1 and FLT 4.1.2.
• PM stabilized approach criteria deviation callouts and compliance checks.
• PF and/or PM go-around callouts and subsequent execution of the go-around maneuver.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of runway excursions.
The definition of the touchdown zone could vary, depending on the operator.
FLT 3.11.65
The Operator shall have guidance, criteria, and procedures for the acceptance of a clearance for a
non-ILS (including non-precision) approach and the conduct of such approach, to include:
(i) Minimum weather conditions and visibility required to continue an approach;
(ii) Operating conditions that require a missed approach to be initiated;
(iii) Circling approach minima;
(iv) Approach-related duties of the PF and PM. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures/criteria for acceptance of clearance and conduct
of a non-ILS approach (focus: flight crew procedures/definition of criteria for
accepting/conducting a non-ILS approach).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: non-ILS approach operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The term Pilot Monitoring (PM) has the same meaning as the term Pilot Not Flying (PNF) for the
purpose of applying the specifications of this provision.
FLT 3.11.66
The Operator shall have a policy and procedures that require and ensure the proper use of a
stabilized constant descent profile during the final segment of a non-ILS (including non-precision)
approach. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for conduct of stabilized constant descent profile for
final segment of non-ILS approach (focus: flight crew procedures/use of descent profile for
conduct of final segment of non-ILS approach).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: non-ILS approach operations; final
segment profile).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure, to the extent reasonably practicable, the use of a stabilized
constant descent profile inside the Final Approach Fix (FAF). It does not, however, preclude the
definition of altitude gates such as Visual Descent Point (VDP) or level segments between the FAF
and the runway where such constraints are deemed necessary and reflected in approach design.
Constant descent profiles during the final segment of an approach might be accomplished by various
means to include:
• Vertical Navigation (VNAV);
• Flight Path Angle (FPA);
• Constant Path Angle (CPA);
• Constant Angle Non-Precision Approaches (CANPA);
• Other methods that provide a stabilized constant path angle for the final segment of a
non-ILS approach.
FLT 3.11.69
If the Operator is authorized to conduct circling approaches, the Operator shall have guidance and
procedures to ensure the proper conduct of such approaches. Such guidance and procedures shall
be in accordance with FLT 3.11.59 and address, as a minimum:
(i) Operating limitations and minima;
(ii) Stabilization criteria and go-around requirements;
(iii) Obstacle clearance requirements. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified authorization to conduct circling approaches.
Identified/Assessed OM requirements/guidance/procedures for conduct of circling approaches
(focus: flight crew procedures/definition of criteria for conducting a circling approach).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: circling approach operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Circling Approach, PANS-OPS and TERPS.
The specifications of this provision are directly related to the prevention of CFIT and runway
excursions.
The intent of this provision is for the operator to provide guidance and procedures in the OM or other
controlled document in order to manage or mitigate potential risks related to the conduct of circling
approaches. Circling approaches may require maneuvering at low airspeeds in marginal weather at
or near the minimum descent altitude/height (MDA/H) as established by the state in which an airport
is located.
Guidance and procedures related to circling approaches typically address the following:
• The meteorological conditions (e.g. visibility, and if applicable, ceiling) required for
commencement/continuation of circling;
• Approach category to be used or the maximum speed to be attained throughout the circling
maneuver;
• Aircraft configuration at various stages of a circling approach;
• The use of flight control systems and automation to assist in the positioning of the aircraft
during the approach procedure;
• Required visual references with the runway or runway environment required to descend
below the MDA/H;
• The prohibition of descent below MDA/H until obstacle clearance can be maintained, the
landing runway threshold has been identified and the aircraft is in a position to continue with
a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone;
• Go-around requirements and the missed approach procedure;
• The design criteria used to define containment areas and provide obstacle clearance (e.g.
PANS-OPS, TERPs).
A side-step maneuver that culminates in a straight-in instrument procedure is not considered a
circling approach, and thus is not addressed by this provision.
FLT 3.12.7
The Operator shall have guidance published or referenced in the OM that addresses runway
incursions, to include a description of the policies, processes, procedures and flight actions
necessary to prevent or reduce the risk of a runway incursion occurring during taxi, takeoff, and
landing. Such guidance shall include:
(i) Instructions for the maintenance of situational awareness by the flight crew while operating
in the airport environment, on the ground and in the air, to ensure an awareness of the
aircraft position relative to the airport surface;
(ii) Operating policies and procedures for use during periods when there is a high risk of an
incursion;
(iii) Specific instructions for the use of onboard equipment and aircraft lighting as a means to
mitigate the risk of an incursion;
(iv) The identification, in documentation available to the flight crew, of areas on the airport
surface that could pose a higher risk of an incursion;
(v) Specific reduced visibility and relevant LVO policies and procedures that minimize the risk of
an incursion. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance for runway incursion prevention/risk reduction during
taxi/takeoff/landing phases of flight (focus: definition of flight crew duties/responsibilities/
procedures/actions for runway incursion prevention/risk reduction).
Examined selected output from FDA program (if applicable): (focus: data that indicates efficacy
of fleet runway incursion mitigation).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: runway incursion prevention/risk
reduction).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Runway Incursion.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator provides flight crews with guidance to identify
risks associated with runway incursions and strategies to mitigate those risks. Mitigation strategies
would address the factors or combination of factors that could pose a higher risk of a runway
incursion occurring during taxi, takeoff and landing.
Other ISARPs in this section with applicable runway incursion mitigations contain a sentence in
related GM (e.g. “The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of runway
incursions”).
Additional risks and mitigations may result from the application of a safety risk assessment and
mitigation program in accordance with FLT 1.12.2. To support SRM activities, an operator would
typically include and monitor aircraft parameters related to potential runway incursions in their flight
data analysis (FDA) program. Operators would also consider using observational procedures (e.g.,
Line Operations Safety Audits) to identify runway incursion safety risks precursors and best practices
that cannot be captured by safety reporting or flight data analysis/monitoring.
It is also the intent of this provision for an operator to ensure the OM incorporates an error mitigation
strategy for reducing the risk of a runway incursion occurring during taxi, takeoff, and landing. Such
error mitigation strategy would address each of the elements specified in this provision.
An operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, typically develops flight crew guidance
related to the prevention of runway incursions based on one or more of the following source
references:
• ICAO Document 9870, Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions;
• European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI), Edition 1.0;
• FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 120–74B;
• Runway Safety; A Pilot's Guide to Safe Surface Operations, published by FAA Air Traffic
Organization (ATO), Office of Safety Services;
• Communications; A key Component of Safe Surface Operations, published by FAA Air
Traffic Organization (ATO), Office of Safety Services;
• Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the
development of flight crew guidance related to the prevention of runway incursions.
3.13 Flight Deck, Passenger Cabin, Supernumerary Compartment Coordination
FLT 3.13.3
If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the Operator shall have procedures for
communication and coordination between the flight crew and the cabin crew to ensure a combined
and coordinated process in addressing:
(i) Passenger safety information;
(ii) Cabin readiness prior to first aircraft movement, takeoff and landing;
(iii) If applicable, arming or disarming of cabin door slides;
(iv) Preparation for an encounter with turbulence;
(v) Flight or cabin crew member incapacitation;
(vi) Emergency evacuation;
(vii) Abnormal situations;
(viii) Emergency situations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedures for flight/cabin crew communication/coordination in
addressing situations that require combined/coordinated action (focus: procedures for
flight/cabin crew communication/coordination; definition of situations that require
combined/coordinated action).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin operations (focus: complementary procedures for
communication/coordination).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight/cabin crew communication/coordination).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the Guidance associated with CAB 3.3.3 located in ISM Section 5.
Communication and coordination may be verbal or accomplished by an alternative means (e.g.
chimes, lights).
Cabin crew coordination briefings could include security issues, aircraft technical issues affecting
cabin service, en route weather, use of seat-belt sign, meal service.
Procedures defining communication/coordination could be part of specific non-normal/emergency
procedures.
First aircraft movement as specified in item ii) is defined as pushback, powerback and/or taxi.
The operator may specify a non-communication period during critical phases of flight (e.g. during
takeoff roll or during landing).
Refer to FLT 3.13.4 for operations that do not use cabin crew members.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
FLT 3.13.8
If the Operator transports passengers and/or supernumeraries, the Operator shall have procedures
that ensure the preparation of the cabin or supernumerary compartment prior to takeoff and landing,
and provide for notification to, as applicable, passengers and/or supernumeraries by either the flight
crew or cabin crew:
(i) To prepare for takeoff;
(ii) When in the descent phase of flight;
(iii) To prepare for landing. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedures for preparation of cabin/supernumerary compartment and
notification to passengers/supernumeraries prior to takeoff/landing (focus: flight/cabin crew
procedures for cabin/supernumerary compartment preparation; definition of situations that
require flight/cabin crew notification).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin operations (focus: complementary procedures for compartment
preparation/notifications).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight/cabin crew notification prior to takeoff/landing).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure cabin or supernumerary compartment readiness under the
conditions specified. Additionally, the provision requires that all applicable personnel are notified
when in the specified phases of flight.
If cabin crew members are not used, preparation of the cabin prior to takeoff and landing would
normally require the flight crew to verify certain conditions are in effect. Items checked by the flight
crew will vary according to aircraft type and equipment carried, but might typically include:
• Passenger seat belts fastened;
• Tray tables and seat backs in a stowed and upright position;
• Cabin baggage and other carry-on items secure in designated areas;
• As applicable, in-flight entertainment system viewing screens off and stowed;
• Galleys and associated equipment stowed or restrained.
FLT 3.13.9
If the Operator carries cargo on the same deck as the flight deck and/or supernumerary
compartment, the Operator shall have procedures to ensure the cargo restraint system and, if
applicable, smoke barrier are closed/secured for:
(i) Taxi operations;
(ii) Takeoff;
(iii) Landing. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are also applicable to procedures for ensuring cargo
restraint is secured on an aircraft that is being used to transport cargo in the passenger cabin, without
passengers.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedures for ensuring the 9G restraint system and smoke barrier are
secured for the specified phases of flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: procedures implemented to ensure cargo restraint system
and, if applicable, smoke barrier are secured).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Cargo Restraint System and Smoke Barrier.
FLT 3.13.16
If the Operator uses aircraft equipped with a flight deck door, the Operator shall have policies and/or
procedures that are in accordance with the requirements of the Authority and, as a minimum, define:
(i) When the flight deck door must remain locked;
(ii) If the Operator conducts passenger flights with cabin crew, the means used and actions
necessary for cabin crew members to:
(a) Notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the
cabin;
(b) Gain entry to the flight deck. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures that address flight deck security (focus:
requirements for door being locked/unlocked; methods for cabin crew to provide security
notifications; process for cabin crew entry to flight deck).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin operations (focus: complementary procedures for security
communication/flight deck entry).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight deck door operation; cabin crew entry).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to ensure the security of the flight deck by providing the flight
crew and cabin crew with complementary policies and/or procedures for use when a lockable flight
deck door is installed. Such policies and/or procedures define the means used and actions
necessary to address the specifications of this provision.
Policies and/or procedures related to flight deck security may be considered sensitive information
and provided to relevant personnel in a manner that protects the content from unnecessary
disclosure.
FLT 3.13.17
If the Operator uses aircraft equipped with an approved flight deck door as specified in (MNT) Table
4.11 (xxvi) (c) (d) and or Table 4.14 (iv), the Operator shall provide guidance, procedures
and instructions for the use of such door by the flight crew to ensure the security of the flight deck.
Such guidance shall include, as a minimum, the procedural means by which the crew:
(i) Prevents access to the flight deck by unauthorized personnel;
(ii) Identifies authorized personnel requesting entry into the flight deck. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures that address flight deck security (focus:
requirements/procedures for flight crew use of door; procedures for identification of persons
requesting flight deck entry).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Coordinated with cabin operations (focus: complementary procedures for gaining flight deck
entry).
Observed line flight operations (focus: flight deck door operation; identification of persons
requesting entry).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to ensure the security of the flight deck by providing the flight
crew with appropriate guidance, procedures and instructions for use when a reinforced flight deck
door is installed, regardless of the aircraft configuration (passenger, cargo, combi).
Guidance, procedures and instructions related to flight deck security are considered sensitive
information and are normally provided to relevant personnel in a manner that protects the content
from unnecessary disclosure.
Tables 4.11 and 4.14 in ISM Section 4 (MNT) contain specifications related to requirements and
recommendations for the installation of reinforced flight deck doors. This provision, however,
contains specifications only related to the use of such doors when installed.
FLT 3.13.18
If the Operator conducts international passenger flights using aircraft equipped with an approved
flight deck door as specified in (MNT) Table 4.11 (xxvi) (c) (d) and Table 4.14 (iv), the Operator shall
have procedures:
(i) To ensure the flight deck door is:
(a) Closed from the time all external aircraft doors are closed following embarkation;
(b) Closed and locked from the time of engine start or commencement of pushback,
and until any external aircraft door is subsequently opened for disembarkation,
except when necessary to permit access or egress by authorized persons.
(ii) To monitor, using visual or procedural means, the entire area outside the flight deck door to
identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behavior or potential threat. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures that address flight deck security (focus:
requirements for door being locked/unlocked; procedures for monitoring area outside door).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: door locked/unlocked; monitoring area outside door).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to ensure the security of the flight deck by providing the flight
crew with appropriate procedures for use when a reinforced flight deck door is installed.
Procedures related to flight deck security may be considered sensitive information and provided to
relevant personnel in a manner that protects the content from unnecessary disclosure.
The specification in item i) refers to the period when the aircraft is being operated beginning when all
exterior doors are closed for engine start or pushback and ending when the aircraft is parked and any
exterior door is opened for disembarkation.
For monitoring the area outside the flight deck door, a closed-circuit television (CCTV) system is an
acceptable method of conformance. However, a CCTV system is not required in order to conform to
this provision. Implementation of other procedural methods in accordance with applicable regulations
is also considered acceptable.
Any means used by an operator for such monitoring ensures that the cabin area outside the flight
deck door, and any persons that might be in that area, would be identifiable to the extent necessary
to meet the requirements of this standard.
FLT 3.13.19
If the Operator conducts passenger operations and does not use a flight deck door, the Operator
shall have measures in place to ensure unauthorized persons are prevented from entering the flight
deck. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures that address flight deck security (focus:
measures/procedures for flight deck entry control/prevention).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: prevention of unauthorized flight deck entry).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to ensure the security of the flight deck, and refers specifically
to aircraft that:
• Do not have a flight deck door, or
• Are equipped with flight deck door that cannot be locked, or
• Are equipped with a smoke barrier.
Measures referred to in this provision are in place to address the potential for unauthorized personnel
to gain entry to the flight deck or gain access to the control seats and/or flight controls. Such
measures may include, but are not limited to:
• Defining authorized personnel (e.g. jump-seat occupants, supernumeraries);
• Authorizing personnel for flight deck access;
• Airline Security programs (as defined by the authority);
• Briefings, announcements, placards;
• Any other measure designed to ensure unauthorized personnel are not permitted access to
the flight deck, control seats, or flight controls.
3.14 Non-Normal/Abnormal and Emergency Operations
FLT 3.14.2
The Operator shall have a policy that prohibits the in-flight simulation of emergencies while
passengers and/or cargo are being transported on board the aircraft.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy that prohibits in-flight simulated emergencies with
passengers/cargo on board the aircraft.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Examined training/qualification program for instructors/evaluators/line check airmen (focus:
prohibition of in-flight simulated emergencies with passengers/cargo on board the aircraft).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.14.3
The Operator shall have a policy and guidance that defines the execution of abnormal/non-normal
and emergency procedures and that ensures a crosscheck and verbal confirmation by two flight crew
members (dual response) occurs before the actuation of any critical aircraft system controls. Such
guidance shall identify critical systems, as defined by the OEM, and address, as a minimum:
(i) Engine thrust levers;
(ii) Fuel master or control switches;
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the operator's policy and guidance defines how
abnormal/non-normal and emergency procedures are executed, and additionally ensures that the
critical actions taken during the execution of such procedures are crosschecked and verbally
confirmed by at least two flight crew members. Such critical actions are defined by the OEM and
typically addressed in operating policy and guidance associated with the use of abnormal/non-normal
and emergency checklists. This does not preclude, however, an OEM or operator from procedurally
addressing critical actions in the checklists themselves.
The specification in item iv) need only be addressed if required by the OEM when the arming of a fire
extinguisher discharge switch (or button) is not linked to the actuation of the associated fire handle or
switch.
The term “abnormal” is used to describe a condition or situation (e.g. abnormal airframe vibration,
abnormal landing configuration).
The terms “normal” and “non-normal/emergency” typically refer to AOM checklists, procedures
and/or maneuvers. The term “non-normal” includes AOM emergency checklists and/or procedures
(i.e. an emergency procedure is a subset of non-normal).
The terms can also be used to describe an event, situation or operation that would be addressed by
normal or non-normal/emergency procedures or checklists. When used in this manner, the terms
may be separated by forward slash marks (e.g. normal/non-normal/emergency).
The term “emergency” used alone refers to declarations and non-AOM procedures.
FLT 3.14.8
The Operator shall have policies and procedures in accordance with FLT 3.11.18, applicable to each
aircraft type, that are to be applied when a TCAS/ACAS resolution advisory (RA) is displayed by
onboard equipment. Such guidance shall, as a minimum:
(i) Specify a TCAS escape maneuver;
(ii) Require flight crews to follow a TCAS RA guidance even if it conflicts with ATC instructions.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures that address reaction to display of TCAS/ACAS
resolution advisory (RA) (focus: procedures for each aircraft type; requirement for flight crew to
follow TCAS/ACAS guidance; definition of/procedure for TCAS/ACAS escape maneuver;
procedures include flight crew sharing/prioritization of tasks).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: TCAS/ACAS RA procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.14.9
The Operator shall have policies and procedures in accordance with FLT 3.11.18, applicable to each
aircraft type, that are applied during a GPWS or other terrain avoidance alert provided by onboard
equipment. Such guidance shall, as a minimum, define a CFIT escape maneuver as an aggressive
pitch up maneuver that maximizes the performance of the aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policies/procedures that address reaction to GPWS/terrain avoidance
alert/warning (focus: procedures for each aircraft type; definition of/procedure for aggressive
pitch-up escape maneuver; procedures include flight crew sharing/prioritization of tasks).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: GPWS/terrain alert/warning
procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications in this provision are directly related to the prevention of CFIT.
FLT 3.14.14
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures that ensure the proper reset of circuit breakers
after a system malfunction or trip. Such guidance shall, as a minimum, specify when and how often
tripped circuit breakers may be reset.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures that address reset of circuit breakers after
system malfunction/trip (focus: procedures define when/how often tripped circuit breakers may
be reset).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight operations (focus: circuit breaker re-set procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
FLT 3.14.15
The Operator shall have an in-flight fuel management policy that requires the PIC to request air traffic
delay information from ATC when unanticipated circumstances may result in landing at the
destination airport with less than either:
(i) The final reserve fuel plus any fuel required to proceed to an alternate airport, or
(ii) The fuel required to operate to an isolated airport. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for in-flight fuel management (focus: flight crew
procedures for monitoring en route fuel usage/identifying trends; requirement for flight crew to
request airport delay information when trend indicates landing with less than final reserve plus
alternate fuel, or isolated airport fuel).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: in-flight fuel management
procedures).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Fuel (Flight Planning), which includes the definition of Final
Reserve Fuel.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator defines the conditions that require the PIC to
request air traffic delay information from ATC. Such operator policy is typically part of the overall in-
flight fuel management strategy to ensure planned reserves are used as intended or required. It also
typifies the beginning of a process that could ultimately preclude a landing with less than final reserve
fuel on board.
It should be noted that the request for air traffic delay information is a procedural means for the flight
crew to determine an appropriate course of action when confronted with unanticipated delays. There
is no specific phraseology recommended for use in this type of communication with ATC as each
situation may be very different.
Guidance on in-flight fuel management and requesting delay information from ATC is contained in
the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
FLT 3.14.16
The Operator shall have an in-flight fuel management policy that requires the PIC to advise ATC of a
minimum fuel state:
(i) When, having committed to land at a specific airport, the PIC calculates that any change to
the existing clearance to that airport may result in landing with less than planned final
reserve fuel;
(ii) By declaring “MINIMUM FUEL.” (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for in-flight fuel management (focus: flight crew
procedures for monitoring en route fuel usage/identifying trends; requirement for flight crew to
declare minimum fuel when minimum fuel for landing at destination airport might be less than
planned final reserve fuel).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: in-flight fuel management
procedures).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of a “MINIMUM FUEL” declaration is to inform ATC that the flight has committed to land at
a specific airport and any change to the existing clearance may result in landing with less than
planned final reserve fuel. This is not an emergency situation, but rather an indication that an
emergency situation is possible should any additional delay occur.
Guidance on in-flight fuel management, including minimum fuel declarations, is contained in the
ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
FLT 3.14.17
The Operator shall have an in-flight fuel management policy that requires the PIC to declare a
situation of fuel emergency:
(i) When the calculated usable fuel predicted to be available upon landing at the nearest airport
where a safe landing can be made is less than the planned final reserve fuel;
(ii) By declaring “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL.” (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM policy/procedures for in-flight fuel management (focus: flight crew
procedures for monitoring en route fuel usage/identifying trends; requirement for flight crew to
declare an emergency when minimum fuel for landing at nearest airport is calculated to be less
than planned final reserve fuel).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Observed line flight and flight simulator operations (focus: in-flight fuel management
procedures).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to specify the last procedural step in a series of steps to ensure the safe
completion of a flight. The “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, FUEL” declaration provides the clearest
and most urgent expression of an emergency situation brought about by insufficient usable fuel
remaining to protect the planned final reserve. It communicates that immediate action must be taken
by the PIC and the air traffic control authority to ensure that the aircraft can land as soon as possible.
It is used when all opportunities to protect final reserve fuel have been exploited and in the judgment
of the PIC, the flight will now land with less than final reserve fuel remaining in the tanks. The word
fuel is used as part of the declaration simply to convey the exact nature of the emergency to ATC.
Guidance on in-flight fuel management including emergency fuel declarations is contained in the
ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
3.15 Flight Crew Reporting Requirements
FLT 3.15.2
The Operator shall have a policy that requires the PIC to report any hazardous flight condition to the
appropriate ATC facility without delay. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy for flight crew ATC hazard reporting (focus: flight crew procedures
for reporting occurrences that could potentially have adverse effect on safety of flight operations).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected flight crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure hazards with the potential to pose safety risks to the reporting
aircraft or flight operations are appropriately identified and reported to the applicable ATS unit as
soon as possible. Such required reports are typically defined by the State or applicable authorities
and may include types of hazards as described in the following table.
FLT 3.15.3
The Operator shall have a policy that assigns responsibility to the PIC for notifying the nearest
authority, by the quickest available means, of any accident or serious incident resulting in injury,
death, or substantial aircraft damage. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy for flight crew accident/incident reporting (focus: flight crew
responsibility/procedures for reporting accidents/serious incidents to the nearest authority by the
quickest available means).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected flight crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the appropriate authority in the state where an event occurred
and any other organization required by such state are expeditiously informed of any accident or
serious incident resulting in injury, death, or substantial aircraft damage. Such authority and
organization(s) are typically defined in the applicable Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and
may refer to one or more entities including but not limited to local law enforcement agencies,
emergency service providers, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and related air accident branches,
safety bureaus or boards (e.g., NTSB).
The PIC, if able, typically reports an applicable event to the operator who then forwards it to the
appropriate authority and other relevant organization(s).
FLT 4.1.1
The Operator shall have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain
guidance, procedures and performance data in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, for
applicable departure, destination and alternate airports. Such guidance and data shall enable the
flight crew to determine or compute:
(i) Maximum structural weights (taxi, takeoff, landing);
(ii) Takeoff performance (accelerate - stop, close-in obstacles) that also ensures charting
accuracy is accounted for, when necessary, in assessing takeoff performance in the event
of a critical power unit failing at any point in the takeoff;
(iii) Maximum brake energy and minimum cooling time;
(iv) Climb performance (distant obstacles);
(v) Landing performance (minimum landing distance, go-around). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures/data for flight crew calculation of aircraft
performance for taxi/takeoff/climb/landing at departure/destination/alternate airports (focus:
performance data provided for all aircraft types; OM contains performance data as specified in
standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected operations engineering personnel (focus: process for development of OM
performance information/data).
Observed line flight operations (focus: use of taxi/takeoff/climb/landing performance
information/data).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of CFIT and runway excursions.
The intent is to ensure the operator has a process or processes to obtain or determine the specified
performance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the maintenance and
publication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.
Data may be tailored for airports of intended use (e.g. runway analysis).
The specifications in items ii) and v) may necessitate the inclusion of guidance and/or patterns to be
followed in case of engine failure during takeoff, approach and go-around.
Tailored data is not always available for emergency alternate airports.
FLT 4.1.2
The Operator shall have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain
guidance, data and procedures in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, that enable the flight crew
to determine and/or compute aircraft performance for all phases of flight. Such guidance and data
shall ensure the flight crew considers all relevant factors affecting aircraft performance, to include:
(i) Aircraft weight (mass);
(ii) Operating procedures;
(iii) Pressure altitude appropriate to the airport elevation;
(iv) Temperature;
(v) Wind;
(vi) Runway gradient (slope);
(vii) Runway surface condition at the expected time of use;
(viii) Obstacle data;
(ix) NOTAMs (including airport NOTAMs);
(x) As applicable, MEL/CDL information;
(xi) Aircraft configuration (wing flap setting);
(xii) Anti-ice usage and, when applicable, ice accretion;
(xiii) As applicable, runway length used for aircraft alignment prior to takeoff;
(xiv) As applicable, fuel freeze considerations during extended operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures/data for flight crew calculation of aircraft
performance for all phases of flight (focus: performance data provided for all aircraft types; OM
guidance/data incorporates relevant factors/limitations as specified in standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected operations engineering personnel (focus: process for development of OM
performance information/data).
Observed line flight operations (focus: determination of relevant factors affecting aircraft
performance).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications in this provision are related to the prevention of CFIT, runway excursions and in-
flight loss of control.
The intent is to ensure the operator has a process or processes to obtain or determine the specified
performance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the maintenance and
publication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.
The specification in item vii) could be defined by a specific contaminant type/depth (e.g. snow, slush,
water, ice) or an equivalent braking action report.
The specifications in xiii) refers to a determination of the length of the runway available, taking into
account the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aircraft prior to takeoff.
The specifications in xiv) apply to considerations regarding the use of standard fuel freeze
temperatures, fuel temperature analysis and en route fuel temperature monitoring for the specific
fuels used in operations. Such considerations allow the flight crew to determine the actual fuel freeze
temperature during extended operations (e.g. polar operations) in order to prevent in-flight freezing of
fuel.
FLT 4.1.3
The Operator shall have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to determine and maintain
guidance, data and procedures in the OM, applicable to each aircraft type, that enable the flight crew
to determine and/or compute en route aircraft engine-out performance. Such guidance, data and
procedures shall include, as a minimum, aircraft engine-out:
(i) Service ceiling;
(ii) Drift down altitudes, as well as specific guidance and procedures that assure terrain
clearance along the route to the destination airport or to an en route alternate airport. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified OM guidance/procedures/data for flight crew calculation of en route aircraft engine-out
performance (focus: performance data provided for all aircraft types; OM contains engine-out
performance data as specified in standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected operations engineering personnel (focus: process for development of OM
performance information/data).
Observed line flight operations (focus: use of en route engine-out performance
information/data).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process or processes to obtain or
determine the specified performance data for use by flight crew. Such process(s) also address the
maintenance and publication of guidance, procedures, and performance data in the OM.
The specification in item ii) refers to those areas were adequate terrain clearance cannot be assured
at the engine-out service ceiling of the aircraft without following specific guidance and procedures for
drift down.
4.2 Navigation and Facilities
FLT 4.2.2
The Operator shall have a process, performed by Operations Engineering, to ensure completion of
an analysis that addresses relevant operational factors prior to operating over any new route or into
any new airport. Such analysis shall take into account:
(i) Obstacle clearance for all phases of flight (minimum safe altitudes);
(ii) Runway (width, length and pavement loading);
(iii) Navigation aids and lighting;
(iv) Weather considerations;
(v) Emergency services;
(vi) Fuel burn calculations;
(vii) As applicable, fuel freeze considerations;
(viii) As applicable, ETOPS/EDTO requirements;
(ix) Air Traffic Services;
(x) Critical engine inoperative operations;
(xi) Depressurization over critical areas;
(xii) (Special) airport classification. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for analysis to identify/address relevant operational factors prior to
conducting operations over new routes/into new airports (focus: analysis includes/addresses
factors as specified in standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in flight operations.
Interviewed selected operations engineering personnel (focus: process for analysis of new
routes/airports).
Examined selected examples of new route/airport analyses.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications are related to the prevention of CFIT and runway excursions.
The specifications in:
• Item vii) refers to a determination if the occurrence of fuel freeze during extended operations
is operationally relevant when planning a new route. If operationally relevant, the
specification vii) of this provision requires the operator to determine and designate the
methods used by the flight crew to determine fuel freeze points in accordance with the
specifications of FLT 4.1.2.
• Item xi) refers to carriage of fuel to respect oxygen requirement after depressurization.
• Item xi) may be satisfied by depressurization routes, charts and/or tables that consider
oxygen requirements over high terrain and fuel burn over remote areas.
• Item xii) may be satisfied by standardized criteria for the determination and classification of
special airports (e.g., EU-OPS).
4.3 Aircraft Systems and Equipment Specifications
Applicability
Section 3 addresses the requirements for operational control of flights conducted by multi-engine aircraft
and is applicable to an operator that conducts such flights, whether operational control functions are
conducted by the operator or conducted for the operator by an external organization (outsourced). Specific
provisions of this section are applicable to an operator based on the operational system in use, the manner
in which authority is delegated by the operator, and the responsibilities, functions, duties or tasks assigned
to the personnel involved.
The IOSA standards and recommended practices (ISARPs) in Section 3 are applicable only to those
aircraft that are of the type authorized in the Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and used in commercial
passenger and/or cargo operations, unless applicability is extended to encompass non-commercial
operations as stated in a note immediately under the body of the provision.
Subsections 3.5, 4.1, 4.3, and 4.6 contain provisions that allow for the use of variations, including
Operational Variations approved by the Authority, to achieve conformity with eligible aircraft tracking,
alternate airport, fuel planning and EDTO specifications. General guidance related to the safety risk
management (SRM) processes necessary to develop and use all such variations prefaces subsection 4.
Table 3.1 categorizes the personnel that are delegated the authority to exercise operational control,
assigned the overall responsibility for the overall operational control of a flight, assigned the individual
responsibility to carry out one or more functions, duties or tasks related to the operational control of a flight,
or assigned the duty to provide administrative support to others with responsibilities related to operational
control.
Table 3.5 defines the competencies of operational control personnel appropriate to the assignment of
overall responsibility for operational control and/or to carry out one or more operational control functions,
duties or tasks according to their specific competencies.
All personnel used to perform operational control functions as defined in Table 3.1, or that act in a manner
consistent with the functional categories specified in Table 3.1 and the competencies specified in Table
3.5, irrespective of management or post holder title, are subject to specified training and qualification
provisions in this section relevant to the operational control function performed.
Individual DSP provisions, and/or individual sub-specifications within a DSP provision, that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable to all operators unless determined otherwise
by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase. The conditional phrase serves to define or limit the applicability
of the provision (e.g. “If the operator uses…” or “If an FOO or FOA is used…”).
• Begin with a conditional phrase that specifies the use of a Flight Operations Officer (FOO) by an
operator are applicable when the operator assigns the FOO, as defined in the IRM and delegated
authority in accordance with Table 3.1, responsibility to carry out operational control functions,
duties or tasks related to all of the competencies of operational control as specified in Table 3.5.
• Begin with a conditional phrase that specifies the use of a Flight Operations Assistant (FOA) by an
operator are applicable when the operator assigns the FOA, as defined in the IRM, responsibility
to carry out operational control functions, duties or tasks related to one or more, but not all,
competencies of operational control as specified in Table 3.5.
• Are applicable to all systems of operational control, but with differences in application to each
system, will have those differences explained in the associated Guidance Material (GM).
• Contain the phrase “personnel responsible for operational control” or “personnel with responsibility
for operational control” refer to any suitably qualified personnel with responsibility for operational
control as designated by the operator, to include the pilot-in-command (PIC) unless otherwise
annotated.
•Contain training and qualification requirements are applicable to personnel, other than the PIC,
that are assigned responsibilities related to the operational control of flights. PIC training and
qualification requirements for all systems of operational control are specified in ISM Section 2
(FLT).
• Are eligible for conformance using variations, including Operational Variations approved by the
Authority, that contain a note referring to the additional SRM and safety monitoring requirements
necessary to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Where operational functions, duties or tasks associated with operational control are outsourced to external
service providers, an operator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the management of safety in the
operational control of flights and must demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service
providers in accordance with DSP 1.11.2.
General Guidance
Authority and Responsibility
For the purposes of this section authority is defined as the delegated power or right to command or direct, to
make specific decisions, to grant permission and/or provide approval, or to control or modify a process.
For the purposes of this section responsibility is defined as an obligation to perform an assigned function,
duty, task or action. An assignment of responsibility typically also requires the delegation of an appropriate
level of authority.
Operational Control
Operational control is defined as the exercise of authority to initiate, continue, divert or terminate a flight in the
interest of the safety and security of the aircraft and its occupants. An operator may delegate the authority for
operational control of a specific flight to qualified individuals, but typically retains overall authority to operate
and control the entire operation. An operator may also assign the responsibility to carry out specific
operational control functions, duties, or tasks related to the conduct of each flight to identifiable, qualified and
knowledgeable individual(s), but would remain responsible (and accountable) for the conduct of the entire
operation.
Any individuals delegated the authority to make specific decisions regarding operational control would also
be responsible (and accountable) for those decisions. Additionally, individuals assigned the responsibility to
carry out specific operational control functions, duties, or tasks related to the conduct of each flight are also
responsible (and accountable) for the proper execution of those functions, duties, or tasks. In all cases, the
authority and responsibility attributes of operational control personnel are clearly defined and documented by
the operator and communicated throughout the organization.
It is important to note that when an operator assigns the responsibility for functions, duties or tasks related to
the initiation, continuation, diversion and termination of a flight to employees or external service providers,
such operator retains full responsibility (and accountability) for the proper execution of those functions, duties
or tasks by ensuring:
• The training and qualification of such personnel meets any regulatory and operator requirements;
• Personnel are performing their duties diligently;
• The provisions of the Operations Manual are being complied with;
• An effective means of oversight is maintained to monitor the actions of such personnel for the
purposes of ensuring operator guidance and policy, as well regulatory requirements, are complied
with.
Authority for the Operational Control of Each Flight
In order to practically exercise operational control of flight operations, an operator typically delegates the
authority for the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of each flight to qualified individuals. Such
delegation occurs in conjunction with an operator's overall system of operational control as follows:
• Shared systems, wherein operational control authority is shared between the pilot-in-command (PIC)
and a flight operations officer/flight dispatcher (FOO) or designated member of management, such
as the Director of Flight Operations (or other designated post holder);
For example: The FOO (or designated member of management, as applicable) has the authority to
divert, delay or terminate a flight if in the judgment of the FOO, a designated member of management
or the PIC, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.
• Non-shared systems, wherein operational control authority is delegated only to the PIC.
For example: Only the PIC has the authority to terminate, delay, or divert a flight if in the judgment of
the PIC the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned.
Responsibility for Operational Control of Each Flight
While an operator retains full responsibility (and accountability) for the entire operation, the responsibility for
the practical operational control of each flight is typically assigned to qualified individuals. As with the
delegation of authority, the assignment of responsibility related to the operational control of each flight occurs
in conjunction with a system of operational control as follows:
• Shared systems, wherein operational control responsibility for each flight is shared between the PIC
and an FOO, or between the PIC and a designated member of management such as the Director of
Flight Operations (or other designated post holder). In either shared system, the PIC, FOO or
designated member of management, as applicable, may be assisted by other qualified personnel
assigned the individual responsibility (by the operator) to carry out specific operational control
functions, duties or tasks. Such personnel, however, typically do not share operational control
responsibility with the PIC, FOO or designated member of management, as applicable.
For example: The FOO (or designated member of management) and the PIC are jointly responsible
(and accountable) for the functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight,
such as pre-flight planning, load planning, weight and balance, delay, dispatch release, diversion,
termination, etc. In such systems, the FOO (or designated member of management) may carry out
such responsibilities unassisted or be assisted by qualified personnel assigned the individual
responsibility (by the operator) to carry out specific operational control functions, duties or tasks.
• Non-shared systems, wherein the PIC is solely responsible for all duties, functions, or tasks
regarding operational control of each flight, and may carry out such responsibilities unassisted or be
assisted by qualified personnel assigned the individual responsibility (by the operator) to carry out
specific operational control functions, duties or tasks.
For example: The PIC is solely responsible (and accountable) for the duties, functions, duties or
tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, and the PIC either acts unassisted or is
assisted by qualified personnel in carrying out functions, duties or tasks such as preflight planning,
load planning, weight and balance, delay, dispatch release, diversion, termination, etc.
Responsibility for Individual Operational Control Functions, Duties, or Tasks
It is important to note that, except for purely non-shared (PIC-only) systems, and as illustrated by the
examples in the previous paragraph, the assignment of responsibilities related to the operational control of
each flight can be further subdivided among a number of qualified and specialized personnel. In such cases,
the responsibility for individual or specific operational control functions, duties or tasks is typically assigned to
FOA personnel who support, brief and/or assist the PIC, FOO personnel and/or designated member(s) of
management, as applicable, in the safe conduct of each flight. Examples of such qualified personnel include
Weather Analysts, Navigation Analysts/Flight Planning Specialists, Load Agents/Planners, Operations
Coordinators/Planners/Controllers, Maintenance controllers and Air Traffic Specialists.
Note: Some operators might choose to assign the responsibility for specialized operational control functions,
such as those described in the example, to fully qualified FOO personnel. In such cases, an FOO, although
qualified in all competencies of operational control, would be functionally acting as an FOA. Therefore, for the
purpose of an audit, FOO personnel acting in this limited capacity are assessed as FOA personnel.
Note: Load Agents/Planners/Controllers who perform load control functions within the scope of ground
handling operations may not be considered FOAs if trained and qualified in accordance with ISM Section 6
(GRH), Subsection 2.1, Training Program.
Administrative Support Personnel
FOA personnel are not to be confused with administrative personnel that lack any operational control
authority, have very limited operational control responsibilities, and who simply provide, collect or assemble
operational documents or data on behalf of the PIC, the FOO, designated member of management or the
operator.
Administrative personnel may be present in any system of operational control, are excluded from the initial
and continuing qualification provisions of this section and may be qualified as competent through on-the-job
training (OJT), meeting criteria as specified in a job description, or through the mandatory use of written
instruments such as task cards, guidelines, or checklists.
Additional Note
For the purposes of this section, continuing qualification includes recurrent or refresher training as well as any
training necessary to meet recency-of-experience requirements.
Definitions, Abbreviations, Acronyms
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 3, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
DSP 1.3.2B
The Operator shall have a process or procedures for the delegation of duties within the management
system for operational control that ensures managerial and operational control continuity is
maintained and responsibility for operational control functions is assumed by qualified personnel
when:
(i) Managers directly responsible for the operational control of flights are unable to carry out
work duties;
(ii) If used in the system of operational control, FOO and/or FOA personnel are unable to carry
out work duties. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for management system delegation of duties for operational
control personnel (focus: operational control managerial continuity is maintained, operational;
control responsibilities are assumed by qualified personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined example(s) of delegation of duties (focus: responsibilities for operational control are
assumed by qualified personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process or procedures for succession in
cases when operational control personnel directly responsible for the operational control of flights are
unable, for any reason, to carry out work duties. Such process or procedures typically also address a
handover of responsibilities that ensures no loss of continuity in the operational control of flights.
The operational control personnel subject to the specifications of this provision include, as a
minimum:
• Managerial personnel, as defined by the operator, with direct responsibility for ensuring the
operational control of flights;
• If applicable, FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or responsibility in
accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 respectively.
DSP 1.3.7
The Operator shall have a process to be used in the event of an emergency situation that endangers
the safety of the aircraft or persons, including those situations that become known first to the
Operator. Such process shall ensure the FOO, FOA or other delegated person:
(i) Initiates emergency procedures, as outlined in the OM, while avoiding taking any action that
would conflict with ATC procedures;
(ii) Notifies the appropriate authorities, without delay, of the nature of the situation;
(iii) Requests assistance, if required;
(iv) Conveys, by any available means, safety-related information to the PIC that may be
necessary for the safe conduct of the flight, including information related to any necessary
amendments to the flight plan. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedure for implementation of emergency procedures/actions
(focus: definition of operational control positions/persons with assigned responsibility for initiating
emergency procedures/notifying authorities/requesting assistance).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: preparedness to implement
emergency actions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specification in item ii) refers to notification to the appropriate authorities without delay and/or
within a period(s) specified by each applicable authority.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations
conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of
the Operator.
Processes used for operational control of flights in the event of an emergency would typically be
compatible with any operating procedures that have been established by the agencies providing
system services for air traffic control. Such compatibility is necessary to avoid conflict and ensure an
effective exchange of information between the operator and any of the service agencies.
During an operational emergency, the procedures specified in item i) would normally be designed to
not conflict with ATC procedures, such as separation standards, controller instructions, minimum
flight altitude assignments or any other restrictions imposed by ATC. During an emergency, however,
the PIC may exercise emergency authority and take any action necessary in the interest of the safety
of the passengers and aircraft.
It would also be important in this context for the PIC to convey relevant information to the FOO, FOA
or other delegated person during the course of the flight with respect to the emergency situation.
1.4 Communication and Coordination
DSP 1.4.2
The Operator shall have a communication system that ensures operational control personnel are
provided with or have access to information relevant to the safe conduct of each flight, to include
information associated with:
(i) The aircraft (MEL, maintenance);
(ii) Meteorology;
(iii) Safety, including current accident and incident notification procedures;
(iv) Routes, including over water and critical terrain (NOTAMs, facilities, outages);
(v) Air Traffic Services (ATS). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system for dissemination of operational safety information in operational
center/office (focus: capability for communicating safety information relevant to operational
control personnel; definition of types of safety information required to be disseminated).
Identified/Assessed accident/incident notification procedures for use by operational control
personnel.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined names/numbers of applicable personnel on mass messaging list.
Examined examples of operational safety information disseminated in operational center/office.
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: operational control personnel
have access to information relevant to safe conduct of flights, accident/incident notification
procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to the PIC, an FOO, a designated member of management
and/or an FOA whose job functions require access to information in one or more of the areas
specified.
An effective system ensures operational control personnel are in receipt of relevant and current
information, as necessary, to complete operational control functions, duties or tasks.
Accident and incident notification procedures are typically contained in an operator's Emergency
Response Plan or Manual, or in a dedicated checklist accessible in the Dispatch or Operations
Control location.
1.5 Provision of Resources
DSP 1.6.3
The Operator shall ensure the system for the management and control of operational control
documentation as specified in ORG 2.5.1 and Table 1.1 addresses, as a minimum, the following
documents from external sources:
(i) As applicable, regulations of the State of the Operator and of other states or authorities
relevant to operations;
(ii) As applicable, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices; (SARPS), manuals, regional
supplementary procedures and/or circulars;
(iii) Airworthiness Directives (ADs);
(iv) As applicable, Aeronautical Information Publications, (AIP) and NOTAMS;
(v) State-approved or State-Accepted Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM);
(vi) Manufacturer's Aircraft Operating Manuals (AOMs), including performance data, weight and
balance data/manuals, checklists and MEL/CDL;
(vii) As applicable, other manufacturer's operational communications. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system(s) for management/control of documentation/data used in
operational control system (focus: system addresses documents from external sources;
definition of applicable external documents).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected documents from external sources (focus: application of management/control
elements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), Aircraft Operating
Manual (AOM), Approved Flight Manual, Airworthiness Directive (AD), Configuration Deviation List
(CDL), Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), Minimum Equipment List (MEL), State Acceptance
and State Approval.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the flight operations organization
documentation management and control system, if used in conjunction with the operator's system of
operational control.
The specifications in item i) refer to:
• Applicable regulations imposed on an operator by the State that issues the Air Operator
Certificate (AOC);
• Regulations issued by other states and/or authorities that actively regulate foreign operators,
which may be done through issuance of an Operational Specification (OPS SPEC) or
specific state legislation;
• Regulations, standards, recommended practices, supplemental procedures and/or guidance
material that are applicable to the operations of the operator by any states or authorities with
jurisdiction over the operations of the operator. Applicable authorities would include those
that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an operator over the high
seas or over the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
The specification in item ii) refers to applicable ICAO standards and/or recommended practices that
are referenced in the operator's documentation.
The specification for the manufacturer's AFM in item v) may be replaced by an Aircraft Operating
Manual (AOM) customized by the manufacturer for the specific use in flight operations by an
operator.
The specification in item vi) refers to bulletins or directives distributed by the manufacturer for the
purposes of amending aircraft technical specifications and/or operating procedures.
The specification in item vii) refers to operational communications received from the manufacturer of
equipment that is installed on the aircraft, typically from the manufacturers of the engines,
components and safety equipment.
1.7 Operations Manual
DSP 1.7.1
The Operator shall have an Operations Manual (OM) for the use of operational control personnel,
which may be issued in separate parts, and which contains or references the policies, procedures
and other guidance or information necessary for compliance with applicable regulations, laws, rules
and Operator standards. As a minimum, the OM shall:
(i) Be managed and controlled in accordance with DSP 1.6.1;
(ii) Have all parts relevant to operational control personnel clearly identified and defined;
(iii) Be in accordance with the specifications in Table 3.2. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational documents that comprise the OM (focus: external documents
referenced in OM/used by operational control personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected parts of OM (focus: contents in accordance with in Table 3.2).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel are able to find all information
necessary to perform their functions either within the OM or within another document that is
referenced in the OM. The OM is normally identified as a source of operational information approved
or accepted for the purpose by the operator or the State.
Refer to the FLT 1.7.4 and associated guidance for human factors principles observed in the design
of the OM.
DSP 1.7.2
The Operator shall have a description of the Operational Flight Plan (OFP) or equivalent document
that is published in the OM and includes:
(i) Guidance for use by operational control personnel;
(ii) An outline of the content in accordance with specifications in Table 3.3. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed description of OFP in OM.
Examined selected OFP(s).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Items readily available in other documentation, obtained from another acceptable source or irrelevant
to the type of operation may be omitted from the OFP.
1.8 Records System
DSP 1.11.4
If the Operator uses electronic navigation data products for application in operational control, the
Operator shall have processes, approved or accepted by the State, if required, which ensure such
electronic navigation data products acquired from suppliers, prior to being used in operations:
(i) Are assessed for a level of data integrity commensurate with the intended application;
(ii) Are compatible with the intended function of equipment in which it is installed. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for acceptance of electronic navigation data products acquired
for application in operational control (focus: assessment for data integrity/functionality are
compatible with intended use; processes have regulatory acceptance).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected product acceptance records (focus: products assessed for data
integrity/functionality).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Navigation Data Integrity.
The responsibility of ensuring electronic navigation data is assessed for integrity and is compatible
with the intended application rests with the operator.
Navigation database integrity can be assured by obtaining data from a supplier accredited in
accordance with approved or accepted standards of data integrity and quality. Such standards
include but are not limited to:
• RTCA/DO-200A, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data, issued 09/28/98;
• RTCA/DO-201A, Standards for Aeronautical Information, issued 04/19/00;
• Advisory Circular (AC) 20-153, Acceptance of Data Processes and Associated Navigation
Databases, issued 09/20/10.
The specifications in items i) and ii) may be satisfied by an operator, in accordance with
State-approved or-accepted methods for assuring data integrity and compatibility, such as:
• Obtaining a letter of acceptance from an applicable authority stating the data supplier
conforms to a recognized standard for data integrity and compatibility that provides an
assurance level of navigation data integrity and quality sufficient to support the intended
application, or
• The existence of operator validation processes to determine navigation data compatibility
and accuracy that provide an assurance level of navigation data integrity and quality
sufficient to support the intended application.
Monitoring and control of electronic navigation data products acquired from suppliers are also in
accordance with DSP 1.11.3.
1.12 Safety Management
Risk Management
DSP 1.12.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program in the organization responsible for the
operational control of flights that includes a combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard
identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in operational control system (focus:
program identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of operational control in cross-discipline safety hazard identification
program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational control data collection/analysis to identify
hazards to aircraft operations.
Examined selected examples of hazards identified through operational control data
collection/analysis.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the hazard identification program in the flight
operations organization if such program includes the operational control system.
Hazard identification specific to an operational activity (e.g. aircraft tracking, alternate airport
selection, fuel planning and/or ETOPS/EDTO) is an SRM process that is central to the development
and use of variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, in accordance with
applicable provisions in subsections 3 and 4.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.12.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program in the organization
responsible for the operational control of flights that specifies processes to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine the corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in operational
control. [SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its operational control risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant operational control hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) across the operational control capture risk assessment information, risk mitigation
(control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment/mitigation program in operational control system
(focus: hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action;
action implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of operational control in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational control risk assessment/mitigation.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment/mitigation actions.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Estimated Time of Use (ETU), EDTO (Extended Diversion Time
Operations), Risk Registry, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA), Safety Risk Management
and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
Hazards relevant to the conduct of aircraft operations are potentially associated with:
• Weather (e.g. adverse, extreme and space);
• Geophysical events (e.g. volcanic ash, earthquakes, tsunamis);
• Operations in airspace affected by armed conflict (i.e. Conflict Zones);
• ATM congestion;
• Mechanical failure;
• Geography (e.g. adverse terrain, large bodies of water, polar);
• Airport constraints (e.g. isolated, runway closure, rescue and RFFS capability);
• Alternate airport selection, specification and availability at the estimated time of use (ETU);
• Preflight fuel planning and in-flight fuel management;
• Critical fuel scenarios;
• ETOPS/EDTO;
• Variations to prescriptive regulations or international standards including Operational
Variations approved by the Authority;
• Operational considerations (e.g. area of operations, diversion time);
• The capabilities of an individual aircraft (e.g. cargo smoke detection, fire suppression
systems, open MEL items);
• The properties of items to be transported as cargo;
• The quantity and distribution of dangerous goods items to be transported;
• Criminal and/or unauthorized activities directed at manned aircraft or in the vicinity of
manned aircraft operations (e.g. laser pointing, unauthorized UAS/RPAS operations);
• Flights using aircraft to transport cargo in the passenger cabin, without passengers;
• Any other condition(s) that could pose a safety risk to aircraft operations.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the safety risk assessment and mitigation
program in the flight operations organization if such program includes the operational control system.
Risk assessment and mitigation specific to an operational activity (e.g. aircraft tracking, alternate
airport selection, fuel planning and/or ETOPS/EDTO) is an SRM process central to the development
and use of variations in accordance with applicable provisions in subsections 3 and 4.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
DSP 1.12.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system in the organization responsible for
the operational control of flights that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates operational control personnel to submit reports that identify
safety hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
(ii) Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
(iii) Includes analysis and operational control management action as necessary to address
safety issues identified through the reporting system. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in operational control (focus: system
urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in
operational control.
Examined data that indicates robustness of operational control safety reporting system (focus:
quantity of reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected operational control safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to
identify/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Safety reporting specific to an operational activity (e.g. aircraft tracking, alternate airport selection,
fuel planning and/or ETOPS/EDTO) is an SRM process central to the development and use of
variations in accordance with applicable provisions in subsections 3 and 4.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the operational reporting system in the flight
operations organization if such system includes the operational control system.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
Safety Performance Monitoring and Management
DSP 2.1.1
The Operator shall have a training program, approved or accepted by the Authority, to ensure the
operational control personnel as specified in Table 3.1, as applicable to the Operator, are competent
to perform any assigned duties relevant to operational control in accordance with the applicable
specifications of Table 3.5 prior to being assigned to operational control duties. Such program shall,
as a minimum, address:
(i) Initial qualification;
(ii) Continuing qualification. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training program for operational control personnel (focus: program
addresses initial/continuing qualification for functions specified in Table 3.1).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification course curricula for operational control personnel (focus: course
content as specified in Table 3.5).
Examined training/qualification records of selected operational control personnel (focus:
completion of initial/recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Continuing Qualification, State Acceptance and State Approval.
Not all states require the approval or acceptance of a training program for operational control
personnel. In such cases, state acceptance is considered implicit.
Guidance
Such process typically provides:
• Continual improvement and effectiveness;
• Incorporation of the latest regulatory and operational changes in a timely manner.
Instructors and Evaluators
DSP 2.1.7
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure those individuals designated to evaluate the competency of such personnel, as applicable,
are current and qualified to conduct such evaluations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed qualification program for FOO/FOA evaluators (focus: curriculum based on
defined competency standards/criteria).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA evaluators (focus: completion of
evaluator qualification program).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority
and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• Personnel delegated to evaluate FOO personnel are themselves current and qualified as an
FOO in accordance with requirements of the State and/or operator;
• Personnel delegated to evaluate FOA personnel are themselves current and qualified in the
applicable competencies of operational control in accordance with requirements of the State
and/or operator.
The specifications of this provision refer to personnel delegated to evaluate the competency of
operational control personnel only. The qualifications for individuals delegated to train operational
control personnel are in accordance with requirements of the State and/or operator.
2.2 Training Elements
DSP 2.2.2
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such
personnel receive recurrent training in the applicable competencies of operational control, as
specified in Table 3.5. Recurrent training shall be completed on a frequency in accordance with
requirements of the Authority, if applicable, but not less than once during every
36-month period plus or minus one month from the original qualification anniversary date or base
month. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed recurrent training/evaluation program for FOO/FOA personnel (focus:
curriculum addresses knowledge/proficiency in competencies as specified in Table 3.5; training
interval not greater than 36 months).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA personnel (focus: completion of
recurrent training/evaluation every 36 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority
and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
Human factors training is accomplished in accordance with DSP 2.2.3.
Dangerous goods training is accomplished in accordance with DSP 2.2.4.
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• The recurrent training program for FOO personnel addresses all of the competencies that
are relevant to the operations of the operator as specified in Table 3.5;
• The recurrent training program for FOA personnel addresses each of the competencies
relevant to their specific job function and to the operations of the operator as specified in
Table 3.5.
Different methods of conducting recurrent training are acceptable, including formal classroom study,
home study, computer-based training, seminars and meetings. All recurrent training, regardless of
method, is documented and retained in accordance with DSP 1.8.1.
DSP 2.2.3
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such personnel
receive training in human factors on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the Authority, if
applicable, but not less than once during every 36-month period plus or minus one month from the
original qualification anniversary date or base month. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO function as
defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed human factors training program for FOO personnel (focus: training interval
not greater than 36 months).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: completion of human
factors training every 36 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Human Factors.
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of
operational control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of
operational control and:
• Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
• Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control
functions, duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies defined in Table 3.5.
DSP 2.2.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, and an FOO or FOA is used in the system of
operational control with duties or responsibilities related to the carriage of dangerous goods, the
Operator shall ensure such personnel receive training and evaluation in dangerous goods during
initial ground training and subsequently during recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with
requirements of the Authority, if applicable, but not less than once during every 24-month
period. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified FOO/FOA duties/responsibilities related to transport of dangerous goods.
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program for FOO/FOA personnel (focus:
curriculum addresses knowledge/proficiency in dangerous goods; training interval not greater
than 24 months).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA personnel (focus: completion of
dangerous goods training every 24 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority
and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with GRH 3.4.2, GRH 3.4.3, DSP 1.3.4 and/or
DSP 1.3.5 respectively, and perform or directly supervise job functions related to the carriage of
dangerous goods as defined by the Authority.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training for operational control personnel is determined by the
operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires
24 months from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is
defined by a competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final
3 months of the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on
which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current
validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months (or 90 days) of
the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent
training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
Refer to the General Guidance at the beginning of this section for additional information regarding the
application of the recurrent training interval.
2.3 Line Qualification
DSP 2.3.1
If an FOO, FOA or designated member of management is used in the system of operational control,
the Operator shall have a line qualification program to ensure such personnel, prior to being assigned
to operational control duties, have demonstrated proficiency in the competencies of operational
control as specified in Table 3.5, as applicable to the Operator, and have demonstrated the ability to:
(i) Assist the PIC in flight preparation and provide the relevant information required;
(ii) File a flight plan with the appropriate ATS unit;
(iii) Furnish the PIC in flight, by appropriate means, with information that may be necessary for
the safe conduct of the flight;
(iv) Initiate, in the event of an emergency, applicable procedures as outlined in the OM. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA/designated management personnel in operational control system
(focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed line qualification program for FOO/FOA/designated management
personnel (focus: curriculum includes evaluation of competencies as defined in Table 3.5).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA/designated management
personnel (focus: completion of line qualification prior to operational control duty assignment).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to designated members of management, as well as FOO or
FOA personnel, who are delegated authority and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with
DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
Competencies of operational control are defined in Table 3.5.
Demonstrations of proficiency are recorded in accordance with DSP 1.8.1.
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• FOO personnel demonstrate the ability to perform all duty functions;
• FOA personnel demonstrate the ability to perform specific duty functions associated with
their assigned area(s) of responsibility;
• A designated member of management that is directly involved with or directly performs the
functions specified in this provision demonstrates the same functional abilities as specified
for an FOO or FOA. Where the performance of one or more functions specified in this
provision is delegated to others (e.g. to FOOs or FOAs), a designated member of
management would typically demonstrate the knowledge necessary to accept the specified
responsibilities and have an understanding of how such functions are associated with the
operational control of flights.
Item ii) refers to planning activities that involve ATS (e.g. flight plan filing, re-routes during flight,
traffic flow management and/or slot controls).
DSP 2.3.3
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such personnel who
have not performed duties as an FOO for a period of 12 consecutive months are not assigned to
perform FOO duties until re-qualified, by demonstrating knowledge and/or proficiency in accordance
with DSP 2.1.1. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed re-qualification program for FOO personnel (focus: applicable when FOO
duties have not been performed for 12 months; curriculum addresses knowledge/proficiency in
competencies as specified in Table 3.5).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: completion of re-
qualification prior to re-assignment to operational control duty).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of
operational control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of
operational control and:
• Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
• Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control
functions, duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies defined in Table 3.5.
2.4 Special Qualification
3 Line Operations
3.1 General
DSP 3.1.2
The Operator shall have a process or procedures to ensure the PIC is provided with all documents,
information and data necessary for the safe conduct of the flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational control process/procedure for provision of documentation to
flight crew (focus: definition of required documents/information/data provided to flight crew).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: PIC provided with
documents/information/data necessary for safe conduct of flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The OM typically specifies the documents required by the PIC for the safe conduct of each flight. This
list of required documents may also be replicated on the folder/envelope containing such documents
or displayed in the operational control/flight dispatch center/office for reference purposes.
Additionally, the process or procedures associated with the provision of flight documents typically
includes safeguards to ensure all of the required documents are provided to the PIC prior to each
flight.
3.2 Flight Preparation and Planning
DSP 3.2.2
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a process or
procedures to ensure such personnel, as applicable, and the PIC use a common set of flight
documents for each planned flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for development/issuance of documents for each flight
(focus: documents issued to PIC are common with those used by FOO/FOA personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: common flight planning
documents used by PIC and FOO/FOA personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority
and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.
Refer to Table 2.2 found in ISM Section 2 (FLT) for OM documentation requirements.
DSP 3.2.7
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a process or
procedures to ensure Operator changes in an ATS flight plan are, when practicable, coordinated with
the appropriate ATS unit before transmission to the aircraft by the FOO, FOA or other delegated
person. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for coordination of ATC flight plan changes (focus:
FOO/FOA coordinates changes with ATC prior to flight plan transmission to flight crew).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: coordination of changes to ATS
flight plan by FOO/FOA).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority
and/or assigned responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.
The intent of this provision is to ensure ATS flight plan changes that occur prior to departure and/or
en route are, when practicable, coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit prior to transmission to the
aircraft. When such coordination is not possible, the flight crew remains responsible for obtaining an
appropriate clearance from an ATS unit, if applicable, before making a change in flight plan.
DSP 3.2.8A
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight will not be commenced unless it
has been ascertained, by every reasonable means available, that conditions and ground facilities
required for the flight are adequate for the type of operation. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for assessment of required conditions/ground
facilities prior to flight departure (focus: flight planning accounts for adequacy of
conditions/facilities for type of flight operation).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: assessment of relevant
conditions/ground facilities prior to flight departure).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew preflight assessment of conditions/facilities).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The term “reasonable means” used in this standard is intended to denote the use, at the point of
departure, of information available to the operator either through official information published by the
aeronautical information services or readily obtainable from other sources.
A review of factors to determine if the conditions at the airport(s) of operation are acceptable for
operations typically includes, as applicable:
• Navigation aids;
• Runways, taxiways, ramp areas;
• Curfews;
• PPR (prior permission required);
• Field conditions;
• Lighting;
• ARFF/RFFS (airport rescue and firefighting/rescue and firefighting services);
• Applicable operating minima.
Guidance for assessing the level of RFFS deemed acceptable by aircraft operators using airports for
differing purposes is described in ICAO Annex 6. Part 1, Attachment I.
DSP 3.2.8B
The Operator shall ensure a flight will not commence or continue as planned unless it has been
ascertained by every reasonable means available that the airspace containing the intended route
from the airport of departure to the airport of arrival, including the intended take-off, destination and
en route alternate airports, can be safely used for the planned operation. (GM)
Note: If the Operator conducts operations over or near areas of armed conflict, a risk assessment
shall be conducted and appropriate risk mitigation measures taken to ensure a safe flight.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight planning process and procedures (focus: flights are not commenced
or continued unless intended airspace/airports of use have been assessed and determined to be
safe for the planned operations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: airspace/airports of intended use
are assessed for safe operations prior to and during the conduct of a flight).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew preflight and en route assessment of
airspace/airports of intended use).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The term “reasonable means” in this standard is intended to denote the use, at the point of departure
or while the aircraft is in flight, of information available to the operator either through official
information published by the aeronautical information services or readily obtainable from other
sources.
Guidance on safety risk assessments is contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM)
(Doc 9859).
The Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084)
contains further guidance on risk assessment for air operators when flying over or near conflict
zones.
DSP 3.2.9A
If the Operator is authorized to conduct certain portions of a commercial flight under visual flight rules
(VFR), the Operator shall have guidance and procedures that:
(i) Specify the type of flight plan to be filed with the appropriate ATS unit;
(ii) Require current meteorological reports, or a combination of current reports and forecasts, to
indicate that meteorological conditions along the portion of the flight to be flown under VFR
will, at the appropriate time, be such as to make compliance with VFR possible. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified authorization for portions of flights to be conducted under VFR.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures applicable to conducting portions of flights under
VFR (focus: flight planning accounts for type of flight plan to be filed/required meteorological
conditions; determination of expected times when meteorological conditions will permit
compliance with VFR).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures for control
of flights to be conducted under partial VFR, availability of meteorological reports, determination
of expected times/conditions that will permit compliance with VFR).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• Operations that require compliance with VFR are practicable under the anticipated
meteorological conditions;
• The operator has guidance and procedures for determining expected times when
meteorological conditions will permit compliance with VFR.
The specification in item i) refers to the type of flight plan to be filed in instances where certain
portions of a flight will be conducted under VFR. In some cases, it may be possible to identify VFR
portions in a predominantly instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan (e.g. Y and Z designation on an
ICAO flight plan). In other cases, an IFR Flight Plan is normally filed for all flights and an instrument
clearance obtained or cancelled en route in accordance with FLT 3.10.2.
Guidance related to the filing of a composite ICAO flight plan, and the use of the Y designation for
flights initially operated under IFR and Z designation for flights initially operated under VFR, is
contained in Amendment 1 to the Procedures for Air Navigation Services–Air Traffic Management
(PANS-ATM, Doc 4444).
DSP 3.2.9B
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be conducted in accordance
with IFR does not:
(i) Take off from the departure airport unless the meteorological conditions are at or above the
operator's established airport takeoff operating minima for that operation; and
(ii) Take off, or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning, unless at the airport of
intended landing or at each required alternate airport, current meteorological reports or a
combination of current reports and forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will
be, at the estimated time of use (ETU), at or above the operator's established airport
operating minima for that operation. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for the assessment of airport meteorological
conditions prior to departure of IFR flights (focus: flight planning determines that conditions at
departure/destination/alternate airports meet all applicable requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations office (focus: procedures for
monitoring/assessing meteorological conditions for operational airports).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew assessment of meteorological conditions for
operational airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Alternate Airport, In-flight Re-planning Point and Estimated
Time of Use (ETU).
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• Flights do not take off or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning unless the
meteorological conditions at each airport specified in i) or ii), are or will be at or above the
operator's established airport operating minima for the operation at the ETU;
• The operator has guidance and procedures for determining the ETU.
The ETU specified in (ii) is typically the estimated time of arrival derived from the OFP. However,
some operators may apply a time margin as required by the State.
The specification in item ii) would require the definition and application of alternate airport planning
minima in accordance with DSP 3.2.9C.
DSP 3.2.9C
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures, approved or accepted by the State, for
determining whether an approach and landing can be safely conducted at each required alternate
airport at the ETU. Such guidance and procedures shall specify the appropriate incremental values
for visibility (and ceiling, if required), to be added to the Operator's established airport operating
minima. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for the application of safety margins in the
assessment/selection of planned alternate airports (focus: flight planning takes into account
defined additives/margins to alternate airport operating minima/times of arrival to account for
forecast uncertainties, determination of ETU).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for
monitoring/assessing approach/landing suitability for planned alternate airport, determination of
ETU).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew assessment of suitability of planned alternate
airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for the operator to have a means to ensure, with a reasonable degree of
certainty, that at the ETU of an alternate airport, the meteorological conditions will be at or above the
operator's established operating minima for an instrument approach. This is practically accomplished
through guidance and procedures for the definition and application of alternate planning minima and
the determination of an ETU.
The specified visibility (and, if required, ceiling) additives are typically dependent on the approach
facility configuration and State requirements for a ceiling to be taken into account.
The ETU for alternate airports is normally determined in accordance with the type of operational
control system and requirements of the State:
• In a non-shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically expressed as a time
margin (e.g. one hour before to one hour after the ETA at the alternate airport);
• In a shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically considered to be a specific
point in time coupled with a requirement to ensure the alternate airport remains at or above
appropriate minima for the duration of the flight.
Specific requirements for en route alternate airports are addressed in DSP 3.6.5.
When determining an ETU, the operator might use a variable time margin based on specific flight
parameters that can be monitored after departure by an FOO or FOA and communicated to the PIC.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance
for the development or application of alternate airport planning minima. Such guidance might be
derived from one or more of the following source references, as applicable:
• ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 3.3.1
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a planned flight does not exceed:
(i) The maximum performance takeoff, en route and landing weight limits, based upon
environmental conditions expected at the times of departure, along the route of flight and at
arrival;
(ii) The aircraft structural ramp, takeoff and landing weight limits. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for application of aircraft performance data for
planned flights (focus: flight planning accounts for aircraft takeoff/en route/landing performance
weight limitations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures/restrictions
that ensure flights do not exceed aircraft performance weight limitations).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: preflight consideration of aircraft performance limitations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the presence of guidance and procedures for the calculation
of maximum takeoff and landing weights, based on takeoff, en route, landing performance, structural
limitations as well as any applicable MEL restrictions. Additionally, such guidance and procedures
address the means used to prevent an aircraft from being loaded in a manner that precludes a flight
from being operated overweight (e.g. notification of weight restrictions to a Load Control Center/office
or equivalent).
DSP 3.3.3
The Operator shall ensure qualified personnel perform weight and balance calculations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified specific personnel that perform weight/balance calculations.
Identified/Assessed weight/balance training/qualification program for operational control
personnel (if applicable) (focus: applicable to personnel that perform weight/balance calculations;
program includes demonstration of competence in weight/balance calculation).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected operational control personnel (if applicable)
(focus: completion of weight/balance training program by operational control personnel that
perform weight/balance calculations).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (if applicable) (focus: flight crew members are qualified to perform
weight/balance calculations).
Coordinated with ground handling operations (if applicable) (focus: load control personnel are
qualified to perform weight/balance calculations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Weight and balance calculations may be delegated to a FOO or an appropriately qualified FOA.
The PIC may complete weight and balance calculations, if qualified in accordance with ISM Section 2
(FLT), Subsection 2.1, Training and Evaluation Program.
Load control personnel that perform functions within the scope of ground handling operations may
complete weight and balance calculations if qualified in accordance with ISM Section 6 (GRH),
Subsection 2.1, Training Program.
3.4 Icing Conditions
DSP 3.4.1
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be operated in known or
expected icing conditions shall not be commenced unless the aircraft is certificated and equipped to
be operated in such conditions. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for consideration of aircraft type for flights planned
into expected in-flight icing conditions (focus: flight planning accounts for aircraft
certified/equipped for icing conditions).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight planning records (focus: aircraft certified/equipped for flight into icing
conditions).
Coordinated with MNT auditor (focus: verification of fleet(s) certified/equipped for in-flight icing
conditions; identification of any exceptions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flights planned to operate in known icing conductions are only
conducted using appropriately certificated and equipped aircraft, which includes consideration of
inoperative items on the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). Additionally, if the operator uses a mixed
fleet including aircraft that are and are not suitably equipped for operations in icing conditions, the
operator would have a means to preclude unequipped aircraft from being used on flights in known
icing conditions.
DSP 3.4.3
If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft
icing, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight planned to operate in
known or suspected ground icing conditions is subjected to the following:
(i) The aircraft has been inspected for ice accretion;
(ii) If necessary, the aircraft has been given appropriate de/anti-icing treatment. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified the operation of commercial/non-commercial flights at airports/stations during times
when there is potential for ground icing conditions.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for flights planned into airports with known/suspected
ground icing conditions (focus: flight planning accounts for possibility of required aircraft de-/anti-
icing operations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight planning records (focus: consideration of requirement for aircraft
de-/anti-icing operations).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for flights planned to
operate in known/suspected ground icing conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to GRH 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 6 for specifications and associated Guidance related to
the establishment and maintenance of a De-/Anti-icing Program.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground De-
icing/Anti-icing Operations.
3.5 Aircraft Tracking
DSP 3.6.1
If an FOO or FOA is used in a shared system of operational control, the Operator shall have
procedures and equipment that ensure effective communication between the:
(i) FOO and the PIC;
(ii) If applicable, FOA and the PIC;
(iii) FOO, PIC and maintenance. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in shared operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA
functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed procedures/equipment for communications within the operational control
system (focus: capability for effective communication with flight crew/maintenance operations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: FOO/FOA communication with
flight crew/maintenance operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Operational Control–Shared Responsibility.
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who participate in an approved or
accepted shared system of operational control and who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, as applicable.
FOO or FOA personnel that participate in a partial shared system might lack the dedicated
equipment necessary to maintain shared responsibility in flight.
The communications system can be direct voice or electronic, but an effective system would be
reliable, clear and understandable over the entire route of the flight. An effective system would also
perform adequately, and appropriate personnel would be knowledgeable in its use.
DSP 3.6.2
If required by the State, the Operator shall have a system of operational control that includes flight
monitoring for the duration of a flight and ensures timely notification to the Operator by the PIC of en
route flight movement and/or significant deviation from the operational flight plan. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified regulatory requirement for an operational control system that includes flight
monitoring.
Identified/Assessed implementation of flight monitoring for duration of all flights (focus:
operational control procedures/capability for timely PIC communication/notification of en route
flight movement/OFP deviations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: flight monitoring process;
communication with flight crew).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: verification of flight crew notifications to operational
control).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Monitoring.
DSP 3.6.5A
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight is not continued toward the
airport of intended landing unless the latest available information indicates, at the ETU, a landing can
be made either at that airport or at least one destination alternate airport. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for monitoring/assessing conditions at flight
destination/alternate airports (focus: flight continuation permitted only if information indicates
landing can be made at destination/alternate airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: monitoring of
destination/alternate airport conditions/information during flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure personnel with operational control responsibilities have
access to the most current and accurate information available in order to support informed decision-
making related to safe flight completion. This is especially important when the conditions under which
a flight was originally planned have changed after takeoff (e.g. unplanned re-release) or because the
flight was planned with a re-release point (a pre-planned re-release). In either case, the overriding
intent is to ensure operational control personnel, including flight crews, have access to the most
current and accurate information available. Access to such information is typically necessary to
ensure flights do not proceed beyond the last possible point of diversion to an en route alternate
airport (appropriate for the aircraft type) and continue to the destination when, in the opinion of either
the PIC or, in a shared system of operational control, the PIC and FOO it is unsafe to do so.
The ETU for an airport of intended landing is normally determined in accordance with the type of
operational control system and requirements of the State:
• In a non-shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically expressed as a time
margin (e.g. one hour before to one hour after the ETA at the alternate airport);
• In a shared system of operational control, the ETU is typically considered to be a specific
point in time coupled with a requirement to ensure the alternate airport remains at or above
appropriate minima for the duration of the flight.
Information that would be useful in determining whether a landing can be made at the destination or
any required alternate is typically related to:
• Meteorological conditions, both en route and at the airport of intended landing, to include
hazardous phenomena such as thunderstorms, turbulence, icing and restrictions to visibility.
• Field conditions, such as runway condition and availability and status of navigation aids.
• En route navigation systems and facilities status, where possible failures could affect the
safe continuation or completion of the flight.
• En route fuel supply, including actual en route consumption compared to planned
consumption, as well as the impact of any changes of alternate airport or additional en route
delays.
• Aircraft equipment that becomes inoperative, which results in an increased fuel consumption
or a performance or operational decrement that could affect the flight crew's ability to make a
safe landing at an approved airport.
• Air traffic management concerns, such as re-routes, altitude or speed restrictions and
facilities or system failures or delays.
• Security concerns that could affect the routing of the flight or its airport of intended landing.
Refer to Table 2.2 found in ISM Section 2 (FLT) for OM documentation requirements.
DSP 3.6.5B
If the Operator selects and specifies en route alternate airports on the OFP, the Operator shall have
guidance and procedures to ensure en route alternate airports selected and specified on the OFP are
available for approach and landing, and the forecast at those airports is for conditions to be at or
above the operating minima approved for the operation at the ETU. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified requirement for selection of en route alternate airports.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for selection/designation of en route alternate
airports (focus: flight planning includes assessment/selection/designation on OFP of en route
alternate airports with conditions that will permit approach/landing at ETU).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: specification of en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: monitoring of en route airports
conditions/information during flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for the operator to have a methodology to protect a diversion should a
situation occur that may require an aircraft to divert while en route. For example, such a methodology
typically includes ensuring that operational control personnel and pilots are knowledgeable about
diversion airport alternates, applicable meteorological conditions, and have the means to obtain
information related to the availability of en route alternates.
One way to ensure a reasonable certainty that the weather conditions at a required en route alternate
will be at or above operating minima approved for the operation is through the application and use of
planning minima (at the planning stage) as specified in DSP 3.2.9C. This is done to increase the
probability that a flight will land safely after a diversion to an en route alternate airport.
The ETU for an en route alternate airport is typically understood to be the earliest to the latest
possible landing time at that airport.
Refer to Subsection 4.5 for provisions that specify the additional steps necessary to protect an en
route alternate airport when aircraft are engaged in operations beyond 60 minutes (from a point on a
route to an en route alternate airport) or ETOPS/EDTO.
DSP 3.6.5C
The Operator shall have procedures to ensure that the inadequacy of any facilities observed during
the course of flight operations is reported to the responsible authority without undue delay, and to
further ensure that information relevant to any such inadequacy is immediately disseminated to
applicable operating areas within the Operator's organization. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for identifying/reporting inadequacy of relevant/required
facilities during course of flight operations (focus: inadequate facilities reported to responsible
authority/communicated to applicable operating areas within organization).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight records (focus: identification/notification of inadequate facilities).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for reporting of
inadequate facilities observed during flights to applicable authorities/operational areas of
organization).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The specifications of this provision address situations when operational control personnel learn of the
inadequacy of facilities (e.g. navigation aid outages, runway closures) from flight crew reports, ATS,
airport authorities or other credible sources. Operational control personnel would be expected to
convey any safety-critical outages to applicable authorities and relevant operational areas within the
organization.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations
conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of
the Operator.
3.7 Emergency Response
DSP 3.7.1
If the Operator conducts international flights with aircraft that have emergency and survival
equipment on board, the Operator shall ensure the availability of information for immediate
communication to rescue coordination centers that describes such equipment, to include, as
applicable:
(i) The number, color and type of lifesaving rafts and pyrotechnics;
(ii) Details of emergency medical and water supplies;
(iii) Type and frequencies of the emergency portable radio equipment. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified aircraft used for international flights that have emergency/survival equipment on
board.
Identified/Assessed availability of information that describes onboard emergency/survival
equipment for the purpose of communication to rescue coordination centers in the event missing
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
The intent of this provision is to ensure applicable operational control personnel provide timely
aircraft accident notification or position information of a flight in distress to the appropriate authority
by designated personnel using the system specified in DSP 1.4.2 and if applicable, the specifications
of ORG 1.7.11.
Position information of an aircraft in distress aims at establishing, to a reasonable extent, the location
of a potential accident site within a 6 NM radius.
Descriptive information relevant to an aircraft in distress may be found in Table 4.12 (xxx) located in
ISM Section 4 (MNT).
DSP 3.7.3
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure FOO, FOA and/or
other designated operational control personnel:
(i) Have access to the same information pertaining to dangerous goods carried as cargo on
board the aircraft that is provided to the PIC;
(ii) Are assigned the responsibility to provide detailed information without delay about
dangerous goods carried as cargo to emergency services responding to an accident or
serious incident involving the Operator's aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified authority for transport of dangerous goods as cargo.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for notification to emergency services responding to
an aircraft accident (focus: procedures/responsibility for providing timely dangerous goods
information).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: access to same dangerous
goods information as provided to PIC; preparedness to provide dangerous goods information in
event of accident).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) and NOTOC
(Notification to Captain).
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
• Applicable operational control personnel have access to the same dangerous goods
information that has been provided to the PIC;
• The operator assigns an operational control person the responsibility to provide specific
information regarding onboard dangerous goods to emergency services personnel that are
responding to an accident or serious incident involving the operator's aircraft.
An operator, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, typically develops guidance related to
the transport of dangerous goods based on technical information from one or more source reference
documents, to include:
• IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR);
• An equivalent dangerous goods manual, dangerous goods emergency response guide or
other reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the development of
flight crew guidance related to the transportation of dangerous goods by air.
The dangerous goods information provided to the PIC is specified in GRH 3.3.4 located in ISM
Section 6.
DSP 4.1.1
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection to
ensure an appropriate takeoff alternate airport is selected and specified on the OFP whenever:
(i) The meteorological conditions at the airport of departure are below the applicable airport
operating landing minima, and/or
(ii) Other operational conditions exist, as defined by the State or the Operator, that would
preclude a return to the departure airport. (GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to takeoff alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is
subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an
acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for takeoff alternate airport selection (focus:
flight planning includes assessment/selection/designation on OFP of takeoff alternate airport
when meteorological/other conditions preclude flight return to departure airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: designation of takeoff alternate airport).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for selection of takeoff
alternate airports).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary process for selection/designation of
takeoff alternate airport).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for takeoff alternate airport selection (focus: differences
from any basic requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Operational Variations.
The intent of this provision is to ensure a methodology exists for the selection and specification of
takeoff alternate airports when required. The selection of such airports is typically intended to
address an operational condition (e.g. an emergency during or immediately after takeoff) that would
require the flight crew to land the aircraft as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the applicable
operating landing minima specified in the provision would typically refer to the minimum ceiling
and/or visibility/runway visual range for landing with an engine inoperative as established by the
operator.
Takeoff alternates are typically selected during the planning stage but may be selected after flight
commencement when necessary via radio, ACARS, or any other communication means acceptable
to the operator and the State.
The appropriateness of an airport for selection as a takeoff alternate is dependent on many factors
including, but not limited to, the operational conditions specified in DSP 3.2.8.
An operator may use a system, a process or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill
operational requirements related to the selection of takeoff alternate airports. In all cases, however,
the robustness of any methodologies used for takeoff alternate airport selection is commensurate
with the breadth and complexity of the operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
• Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
• Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
• Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.2
The Operator shall have a system, process, and/or procedures for alternate airport selection to
ensure a takeoff alternate airport selected in accordance with DSP 4.1.1 is located within a specified
flying time from the airport of departure as follows (as applicable to the Operator):
(i) For aircraft with two engines, not more than one hour flying time from the airport of
departure calculated at the single-engine cruise speed, determined from the aircraft
operating manual in ISA and still air conditions using the actual takeoff mass.
(ii) For aircraft with three or more engines, not more than two hours flying time from the airport
of departure calculated at the all-engine operating cruise speed, determined from the aircraft
operating manual in ISA and still air conditions using the actual takeoff mass.
(iii) For aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO, where an alternate airport meeting the flight time
criteria of i) or ii) is not available, the first available alternate airport located within the
maximum diversion flying time approved for the Operator considering the actual takeoff
mass. (GM)
Note: Pre-existing approved ETOPS/EDTO calculations for the determination of threshold distances
substantially similar to those specified in items i), ii) or iii) may be used to conform with maximum
diversion flight time calculations. For example, operators may be authorized by the State to define
diversion distances for each aircraft type, rounded up to easily recalled figures, that are based on
maximum certificated takeoff mass or on takeoff masses largely representative of those used in
operations.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to takeoff alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is
subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an
acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified operator procedures for designating takeoff alternate airports on the OFP.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for selection/designation of a takeoff alternate
airport located a specified distance in flying time from the departure airport (focus: flight planning
takes into account regulatory/operational conditions/requirements/factors applicable to the
operator/flight; such conditions/requirements/factors that are considered/assessed in the takeoff
alternate process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: designation of takeoff alternate airport in accordance with
relevant factors).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for takeoff alternate airport selection (focus: differences
from any basic requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to address the safety risks associated with continuing a flight to
an alternate airport when a landing as soon as practicable is warranted, but a return to the airport of
departure immediately after takeoff is not possible. As a practical matter, and to limit the exposure to
such risks, this requires the operator to calculate the maximum diversion flight time for each aircraft
type to ensure a takeoff alternate, when required, will be located within a prescribed flight time from
the airport of departure.
An operator may use a system, process, and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to
fulfill operational requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the
robustness of any methodologies used for takeoff alternate airport selection is commensurate with
the breadth and complexity of the operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
• Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
• Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
• Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.4
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection that
takes into account meteorological conditions and relevant operational information to ensure a
minimum of one destination alternate airport is specified on the OFP and the ATS flight plan, except
under one or more of the following conditions (as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the
operations of the Operator):
(i) When, based on the duration of the flight (from the departure airport, or from the point of in-
flight re-planning to the destination), there is reasonable certainty that, at the ETU of the
destination airport:
(a) The approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions
(VMC), as defined by the State; and
(b) Separate runways are usable with at least one runway having an operational
instrument approach procedure.
(ii) When, based on the duration of the flight (from the departure airport, or from the point of in-
flight re-planning to the destination airport), there is reasonable certainty that, at the ETU of
the destination airport, the visibility will be at least 3 miles (5 km) and the ceiling will be at or
above one or more of the following prescribed heights, (as approved or accepted by the
Authority based on the operations of the Operator):
(a) The ceiling height for VMC, as defined by the State, or
(b) 1,500 feet above the lowest (TERPS) circling MDA, if a circling approach is required
and authorized for that airport, or
(c) 2,000 feet or 500 feet above the (PANS-OPS) circling height, whichever is greater,
or
(d) 2,000 feet or 1,500 feet above the lowest applicable HAT/HAA, whichever is
greater. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated
airport operations as specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note: Conformity with item ii) requires the definition of the ceiling and visibility expected at the ETU of
the destination airport. Other determinants such as flight time (e.g. 6 hours) or the availability of
separate runways may also be used to further limit the instances when a flight may depart without
nominating a destination alternate but are not required to achieve conformity with item ii).
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to destination alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation
is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an
acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified regulatory requirements (including AMC) and exceptions for designation of a minimum
of one destination alternate airport.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for selection of a minimum of one destination
alternate airport (focus: flight planning takes into account regulatory/operational conditions/
requirements/factors applicable to the operator/flight; such conditions/requirements/factors that
are considered/assessed in the destination alternate airport selection process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs/ATS flight plans (focus: designation of destination alternate airport in
accordance with relevant factors).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for destination alternate airport selection (focus:
differences from any basic requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Domestic Flight, Isolated Airport, PANS-OPS and TERPS, and
for the abbreviations HAT and HAA.
The principal intent of this provision is to address the safety risks associated with unavailability of the
destination airport. As a practical matter this is typically accomplished by the selection and
specification of alternate airports in accordance with the technical specifications of the provision
and/or to otherwise ensure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that an airport of intended landing
will be available to a flight at the ETU.
Item i) identifies the basic operational specifications for alternate airport selection, although an
operator may conform to a minimum of one of the numbered specifications of the provision and be in
overall conformance with the intent of the entire provision. Individual conformity with items i) and ii) is
“as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator” and dependent
on many factors including the regulatory environment and the type of operations conducted.
The ETU is typically defined as one hour before to one hour after the estimated time of arrival at the
destination airport.
Isolated airport operations, by definition, preclude the designation of a destination alternate airport
and are conducted in accordance with the planning specifications of DSP 4.1.7 and the fuel
specifications of DSP 4.3.11.
For the purposes of item ii), separate runways are two or more runways at the same airport
configured such that if one runway is closed, operations to the other runway(s) can be conducted.
Applicable authorities typically include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international
operations conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than
the State of the Operator.
The operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to
fulfill operational requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the
robustness of any methodologies used for destination alternate airport selection is commensurate
with the breadth and complexity of the operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following.
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
• Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
• Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
• Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.5
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection that
takes into account meteorological conditions and relevant operational information to ensure a second
destination alternate airport is specified on the OFP and the ATS flight plan under one or more of the
following conditions (as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the
Operator):
(i) When, for the destination airport, meteorological conditions at the ETU will be below the
Operator's established airport operating minima.
(ii) When, for the destination airport, meteorological information is not available (unless the
Authority will not permit the initiation of a flight in the absence of such information).
(iii) If the Operator conducts operations to airports with “marginal” meteorological conditions as
defined in the OM, when, for such operations, the meteorological conditions at the ETU of
the destination and first alternate airports will be marginal.
(iv) If the Operator conducts extended over-water operations as defined in the OM, when, for
such operations, the meteorological conditions at the ETU of the destination airport will be
below the Operator's established operating minima for that operation, unless there is a
reasonable certainty that the first alternate airport will be at or above the Operator's
established operating minima at the ETU. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated
airport operations as specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to destination alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation
is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an
acceptable level of safety is maintained
Auditor Actions
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for destination alternate airport selection (focus
differences from any basic requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
• Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.7
If the Operator conducts isolated airport operations that preclude the selection of any destination
alternate airport in accordance with DSP 4.1.4 or 4.1.5, the Operator shall have a process to ensure,
for each flight into an isolated destination airport:
(i) The designation of a point of safe return (PSR);
(ii) The flight does not continue past the PSR unless a current assessment of meteorological
conditions, traffic, and other operational conditions indicate that a safe landing can be made
at the ETU. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified operations to isolated airport that preclude selection/designation of destination
alternate airports.
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for designation/use of PSR in the conduct of isolated
airport flights (focus: flight planning includes computing/designating PSR for each isolated airport
flight; procedures for monitoring/assessing conditions during flight to allow/disallow flight
continuation past PSR to destination airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight records (focus: designation/use of PSR for isolated airport flights).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for designation of PSR
for isolated airport flights; ensuring safe destination conditions for flight continuation past PSR).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary PSR procedures for isolated airport
flights).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Isolated Airport and Point of Safe Return (PSR).
The intent of this provision, in combination with the fuel carriage requirements specified in
DSP 4.3.11, is the mitigation of some risks associated with operations to those airports that preclude
the selection of a destination alternate and, in addition, the creation of awareness among operational
control personnel and the PIC as to the actual position of the PSR and the conditions necessary to
continue beyond the PSR to the isolated airport.
For the purposes of this provision, an airport is considered isolated when there is no destination
alternate appropriate for a given aircraft type within a prescribed flight time from the destination.
A destination airport is typically considered isolated by the Authority when the fuel required to go-
around from Decision Altitude/Height (DA/H) or the Missed Approach Point (MAP) at the destination
airport and then divert to the nearest alternate exceeds, for a turbine engine aircraft, the fuel required
to hold at the destination airport for two hours including final reserve fuel.
In the context of isolated airport operations, a PSR is the point of last possible diversion to an en
route alternate. The specification in item i) requires that a PSR is to be determined for each flight to
an isolated airport. While this point can be calculated and specified on the OFP at the planning stage,
such a calculation does not typically take into account any discretionary fuel, or the real-time changes
in fuel consumption that will occur after departure.
Therefore, since the PSR will typically be reached later in the flight than the point originally calculated
in the OFP, an operator would normally provide practical instructions so that operational control
personnel and the flight crew can calculate or determine the actual position of the PSR.
The Final Decision Point used in Decision Point Planning or the Pre-determined Point used in Pre-
determined Point planning may be used to meet the intent of this specification in lieu of a specific
PSR.
Guidance for planning operations to isolated airports, including the determination of a PSR, may be
found in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
4.2 Minimum Flight Altitudes and En Route Performance
DSP 4.2.2
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure provision of an OFP such that, if the
most critical engine on an aircraft with two engines become inoperative at any point along the
planned route of flight, the aircraft can continue to an airport and land safely without flying below the
minimum flight altitude(s) at any points along the route. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for consideration of en route critical engine failure for
flights conducted by two-engine aircraft (focus: flight planning takes into account critical engine
failure/flight diversion at any point on planned route without flying below minimum altitudes;
designated en route alternates shown on OFP).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: planned route of flight/en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process that ensures OFP route
for two-engine aircraft permits, in case of critical engine failure at any point, flight to proceed to an
airport above minimum altitudes).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary criteria for consideration of en route critical
engine failure/selection of en route alternate airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Operational flight planning normally includes a review of the route of the flight in conjunction with
published aeronautical and terrain data to ensure compliance with the minimum flight altitudes
defined by the operator and/or applicable authorities. The specifications of this provision typically
require a minimum amount of terrain clearance, specified by the operator and/or applicable
authorities along the route of flight to assure continued safe flight and landing.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations
conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of
the Operator.
4.3 Fuel Planning
DSP 4.3.1
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure an aircraft carries a
sufficient amount of usable fuel to complete each planned flight safely and allow for deviations from
the planned operation. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for fuel planning for all flights (focus: flight
planning takes into account possible deviations from planned operation in calculating usable fuel
for safe completion of flight).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: fuel load meets/exceeds minimum required departure/dispatch
fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures that
ensure sufficient usable fuel for safe flight completion taking into account unplanned deviations).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary procedures for assessing minimum
required fuel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to define the foundation necessary to support the practical
implementation of an operator's fuel policy. It also addresses the baseline criteria to be considered in
any methodology used in the determination of total usable fuel required to complete each planned
flight safely. Simply put, it requires an operator to use system, process and/or procedures alone or in
any combination in order to fulfill operational requirements related to the implementation of its fuel
policy. In all cases the robustness of any such methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and
complexity of the operation and takes into account:
• The aircraft-specific data and operating conditions for the planned operation
(see DSP 4.3.2);
• The following components of usable fuel required in accordance with the respective
provisions of this sub-section:
○ Taxi fuel (see DSP 4.3.5);
○ Trip fuel in (see DSP 4.3.6);
○ Contingency fuel (see DSP 4.3.7);
• If required (as applicable to each flight):
○ Destination alternate fuel (see DSP 4.3.8 or DSP 4.3.9), or
○ No-alternate fuel (see DSP 4.3.10), or
○ Isolated airport fuel (see DSP 4.3.11).
• Final reserve fuel (see DSP 4.3.12);
• If required, additional fuel (see DSP 4.3.13);
• If requested by the PIC, or the PIC and FOO in a shared system of operational control,
discretionary fuel (see DSP 4.3.14).
Some regulatory authorities or operators may classify destination alternate fuel, no alternate fuel and
Isolated airport fuel under the common heading of “Alternate Fuel” in regulations and/or flight
planning systems.
It is important for operational control personnel and the flight crew to have a clear and common
understanding of the terms used in the operator's fuel policy, as such understanding is the key to
successful flight planning and completion. Equally important is the notion that differences in
terminology may exist from operator to operator. Regardless of the terms used, however, an operator
can conform to the provisions of this sub-section if the pre-flight computation of usable fuel is
substantially equivalent, allocates fuel in a similar fashion, and has the components that, when
combined, result in an equivalent or greater amount of fuel.
Fuel calculations are typically made by a flight crew member, a Flight Operations Officer/Flight
Dispatcher (FOO), or both.
Guidance on the organizational and operational systems and processes related to the
implementation of fuel policy is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual
(Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.2
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure the amount of usable fuel to
be carried on an aircraft in accordance with DSP 4.3.1 is, as a minimum, based on the following data
and operating conditions for each planned flight:
(i) Current aircraft-specific data derived from a fuel consumption monitoring program, if
available, or if current aircraft-specific data is not available, data provided by the aircraft
manufacturer;
(ii) The anticipated aircraft mass;
(iii) Notices to Airmen (NOTAM);
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of NOTAM (Notice to Airmen).
The intent of this provision is to define the aircraft-specific data, manufacturer data, operating
conditions and other factors that would be considered by an Operator during the pre-flight
computation of the total usable fuel required for a planned flight. When considered in combination
with DSP 4.3.1, this provision helps to form the basic foundation for the means to complete the pre-
flight calculation of usable fuel.
The specification in item i) refers to the process for ensuring actual aircraft fuel use approximates
planned fuel use within an acceptable margin of error. This is practically accomplished by comparing
the achieved in-flight performance of an aircraft to its predicted performance. Variations between the
achieved performance and the predicted performance will result in a variation of the rate of fuel
consumption which is typically accounted for by the operator during flight planning and in flight.
An operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to
fulfill operational requirements related to the implementation of fuel policy. In all cases, however, the
robustness of any such methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the
operation.
Guidance on fuel planning including guidance related to the creation and maintenance of fuel
consumption monitoring programs is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management
Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.5
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the taxi fuel required in accordance
with its fuel policy is the amount of fuel estimated to be consumed before takeoff, taking into account
local conditions at the departure airport and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel consumption. (GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of taxi fuel for all flights (focus: flight
planning takes into account operating data/conditions that might cause/lead to increased taxi fuel
consumption; such operating data/conditions that are considered/assessed in taxi fuel
calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating data/conditions used as basis for taxi fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic
requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of taxi fuel in order, to the extent
reasonably practicable, protect the remaining elements in the useable fuel equation. To achieve this
aim, the computation of taxi fuel would take into account foreseeable taxi conditions and delays in
order to result in an amount of fuel generally equal to or greater than the actual taxi fuel consumed
before takeoff.
It is important to note that every usable fuel calculation typically takes into account unforeseen as
well as foreseen deviations from the planned operation. Unforeseen taxi delays, for example, may be
addressed by the use of Statistical Taxi Fuel, the uplift of discretionary fuel when deemed necessary
by the PIC, or the partial consumption of contingency fuel. Consuming contingency fuel during taxi,
however, would be carefully considered as its use on the ground may leave the flight crew with fewer
options, once airborne, to compensate for other unforeseen factor(s).
Operators using a variation to determine taxi fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability,
using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust taxi times to ensure continuous
improvement in preflight taxi fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
(i) Flight fuel calculations;
(ii) Capabilities of the operator;
(iii) Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
(iv) Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
(v) Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Guidance on fuel planning, including pre-flight fuel calculation examples, is contained in the ICAO
Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.6
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the trip fuel required in accordance
with its fuel policy is the amount of fuel required to enable the aircraft to fly from takeoff, or from the
point of in-flight re-planning, until landing at the destination airport taking into account the operating
conditions specified in DSP 4.3.2. (GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of trip fuel for all flights (focus: flight
planning takes into account operating data/conditions that might cause/lead to increased trip fuel
consumption; such operating data/conditions that are considered/assessed in trip fuel calculation
process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating data/conditions used as basis for trip fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of trip fuel in order, to the extent
reasonably practicable, ensure that the total planned trip fuel burn is greater than or equal to the
actual trip fuel burn.
The specifications of this provision define trip fuel for preflight planning and in-flight re-planning
purposes, as well as to form the basis for the computation of other fuel amounts (e.g., contingency
fuel, additional fuel). In this context, trip fuel is typically computed from either the departure airport or
the point of in-flight re-planning until landing at the destination airport taking into account the
operating conditions of DSP 4.3.2. In the case of in-flight re-planning (planned or unplanned), the
intent of this provision is for the operator to reconsider (re-compute) the trip fuel required from the re-
planning point to the commercial (actual) destination.
Operators using a variation to determine trip fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability,
using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust taxi times to ensure continuous
improvement in trip fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
(i) Flight fuel calculations;
(ii) Capabilities of the operator;
(iii) Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
(iv) Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
(v) Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Guidance on fuel planning, including pre-flight fuel calculation examples, is contained in the ICAO
Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.7
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the contingency fuel required in
accordance with its fuel policy is the amount of fuel required to compensate for unforeseen factors
that could have an influence on the fuel consumption to the destination airport. Contingency fuel shall
not be lower than any one or more of the following (as approved or accepted by the Authority based
on the operations of the Operator):
(i) Five (5) percent of the planned trip fuel or of the fuel required from the point of in-flight re-
planning based on the consumption rate used to plan the trip fuel, but never lower than the
amount required to fly for five (5) minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the
destination airport in standard conditions.
(ii) If approved or accepted by the Authority for domestic operations; an amount of fuel to fly for
45 minutes at normal cruising fuel consumption, including 30 minutes final reserve.
(iii) If approved or accepted by the Authority for international operations, an amount of fuel to fly
for 10 percent of the total time required to fly from the airport of departure or the point of in-
flight re-planning to, and then land at, the airport to which it was released or re-released.
(iv) If approved or accepted by the Authority for the purpose of reducing contingency fuel, not
less than three (3) percent of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight re-planning,
three (3) percent of the trip fuel for the remainder of the flight, provided that an en route
alternate airport is available in accordance with the requirements of the Authority.
(v) If approved or accepted by the Authority based on actual fuel consumption data, an amount
of fuel sufficient for 20 minutes flying time based upon the planned trip fuel consumption
provided that the operator has established a fuel consumption monitoring program for
individual aircraft and uses valid data determined by means of such a program for fuel
calculation.
(vi) If approved or accepted by the Authority, an amount of fuel based on a statistical method
that ensures an appropriate statistical coverage of the deviation from the planned to the
actual trip fuel. This method is used to monitor the fuel consumption on each city pair/aircraft
combination and the Operator uses this data for a statistical analysis to calculate
contingency fuel for the applicable city pair/aircraft combination. (GM)
Note: Contingency fuel in accordance with item (iv), (v) and (vi) can never be lower than the amount
of fuel required to fly for five (5) minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the destination
airport in standard conditions.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of contingency fuel for all flights (focus:
flight planning takes into account unforeseen operating factors that might cause/lead to
increased fuel consumption to the destination airport; such operating factors that are
considered/assessed in contingency fuel calculation process are defined; minimum contingency
fuel amount in accordance with regulatory requirements is defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating factors used as basis for contingency fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic requirements
specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure fuel is allocated to compensate for unforeseen factors that
could influence fuel burn to the destination airport. Such factors include, for example, deviations of an
individual aircraft from expected fuel consumption data, forecast meteorological conditions expected
taxi times before takeoff or planned routings and cruising altitudes/levels.
From a safety risk management perspective, contingency fuel is used to mitigate the risks associated
with operational factors or hazards that cannot be planned, anticipated, or controlled. The risk
associated with the improper calculation or complete consumption of contingency fuel is that of
creating a low fuel state or a diversion that could subsequently affect Air Traffic Management (ATM)
and other aircraft.
It is important to note that differences in fuel computation terminology may exist from operator to
operator. For example, required contingency fuel may be a component of other fuel reserves
mandated by the Authority. Regardless of the terms used, however, an operator can conform to the
provision if the pre-flight computation of usable fuel allocates an equivalent or greater amount of fuel
as specified in items i) through vi) and as applicable to the operator in order to compensate for
unforeseen factors that could influence fuel burn to the destination airport.
An operator may conform to a minimum of one of the numbered specifications of the provision and be
in overall conformity with the intent of the entire provision. Individual conformity with items i) through
vi), however, is “as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator”
and dependent on many factors including the regulatory environment and the type of operations
conducted.
The specification in item ii) protects 15 minutes of contingency fuel plus 30 minutes of final reserve
fuel for a combined domestic reserve of 45 minutes.
Operators using variations to determine isolated airport fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of isolated airport fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples related to the computation of contingency fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning
and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.8
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure, for flights that require a single
destination alternate airport, the destination alternate fuel required in accordance with its fuel policy is
not lower than amount of fuel that will enable the aircraft to complete all of the following:
(i) Perform a missed approach at the destination airport;
(ii) Climb to the expected cruising altitude;
(iii) Fly the expected routing to the destination alternate airport;
(iv) Descend to the point where the expected approach is initiated;
(v) Conduct the approach and landing at the destination alternate airport. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated
airport operations as specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of destination alternate fuel for flights
that require a single destination alternate airport (focus: flight planning takes into account fuel
consumption required to divert from destination airport and proceed to/hold/land at alternate
airport; diversion flight phases that are considered/assessed in single destination alternate fuel
calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for single destination alternate fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic
requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of destination alternate fuel when
one destination alternate airport is required. Such computation ensures, to the extent reasonably
practicable, that the planned fuel burn will be greater than or equal to the actual fuel burn.
From a safety risk management perspective, “destination alternate fuel” is used to mitigate the risks
associated with the unavailability of the destination airport. The risk associated with the improper
calculation or complete consumption of such fuel is that of creating a low fuel state or a diversion that
could subsequently affect Air Traffic Management (ATM) and other aircraft.
Operators using variations to determine additional fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of additional fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of destination alternate fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning
and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.9
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure, for flights that require a second
destination alternate, the destination alternate fuel required in accordance with its fuel policy is not
lower than the amount of fuel, as calculated in accordance with DSP 4.3.8, that enables the aircraft to
proceed to the destination alternate airport requiring the greater amount of fuel (GM).
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated
airport operations as specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of destination alternate fuel for flights
that require a second destination alternate airport (focus: planned isolated airport fuel is the
calculated amount that enables flight to proceed from destination and hold/approach/land at the
alternate airport requiring the most fuel; diversion flight phases that are considered/assessed in
second destination alternate fuel calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for second destination alternate fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic
requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of destination alternate fuel when a
second destination alternate airport is required. Such computation ensures, to the extent reasonably
practicable, that the planned fuel burn will be greater than or equal to the actual fuel burn.
From a safety risk management perspective, “destination alternate fuel” as described in this provision
is used to mitigate the risks associated with the unavailability of the destination or first alternate
airport. The risk associated with the improper calculation or complete consumption of such fuel is that
of creating a diversion or low fuel state that subsequently impacts Air Traffic Management (ATM) and
other aircraft.
Operators using variations to determine alternate fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of alternate fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of alternate fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel
Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.10
If the Operator conducts flights that do not require a destination alternate airport, the Operator shall
have a process and/or procedures to ensure a supplemental amount of fuel is carried on such flights
to provide for increased fuel consumption during the flight to the destination airport due to unforeseen
operational occurrences. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable if the contingency fuel calculated in
accordance with DSP 4.3.7 is sufficient to enable the aircraft to hold at an altitude of 450 m (1,500 ft)
above the destination airport for 15 minutes at the holding speed based on standard conditions.
Note: The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated
airport operations as specified in DSP 4.1.7 and DSP 4.3.11.
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for addition of supplemental fuel to provide for
potential increased fuel consumption for flights that do not require a destination alternate airport
(focus: planned supplemental fuel required when contingency fuel is not sufficient to fly at holding
speed for 15 minutes at 450 m/1500 ft above destination airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: basis for addition of supplemental fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
From a safety risk management perspective “no-alternate” fuel is intended to mitigate the safety risks
associated with the occurrence of unforeseen operational contingencies associated with no-alternate
operations. The risk associated with the improper calculation or complete consumption of such fuel is
that of creating a low fuel state.
Operators using variations to determine isolated airport fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of isolated airport fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of alternate and contingency fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.11
If the Operator conducts isolated airport operations, the Operator shall have a process and/or
procedures to ensure the isolated airport fuel calculated in accordance with its fuel policy is not less
than the amount of fuel required to fly for two (2) hours at normal cruise consumption above the
isolated destination airport, including the final reserve fuel calculated in accordance with DSP 4.3.12.
(GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified conduct of isolated airport operations that preclude selection/designation of
destination alternate airports.
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of isolated airport fuel for flights to
isolated airports (focus: planned isolated airport fuel is the amount of fuel sufficient to fly for two
hours at normal cruise consumption above destination isolated airport, but not less than the
greater of final reserve fuel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for isolated airport fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure sufficient fuel is uplifted to mitigate the safety risks associated
with isolated airport operations conducted in accordance with DSP 4.1.7, and to protect final reserve
fuel. As such, final reserve fuel must be computed and protected in accordance with DSP 4.3.12
regardless of the method used to compute “isolated airport fuel”
As a practical matter destination airports are typically considered isolated by an authority when the
fuel required to go-around from Decision Altitude/Height (DA/H) or the Missed Approach Point (MAP)
at the destination airport and then divert to the nearest alternate exceeds, for a turbine engine
aircraft, the fuel required to hold at the destination airport for two hours including final reserve fuel
(e.g. 90 minutes hold + 30 minutes Final Reserve).
Operators using variations to determine additional fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of additional fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of isolated airport fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and
Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.12
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the final reserve fuel calculated in
accordance with its fuel policy is not less than the amount of fuel required to fly for 30 minutes under
speed and altitude conditions specified by the Operator and as approved or accepted by the
Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of final reserve fuel for all flights (focus:
planned final reserve fuel is an amount that is not less than fuel to fly for 30 minutes at holding
speed at 450 m/1500 ft or fuel to fly 30 minutes under speed/altitude conditions
approved/accepted by authority).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for final reserve fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for
calculating planned final reserve fuel).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary procedures for assessing final reserve fuel
in accordance with fuel policy).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the allocation of an amount of fuel to be protected in flight and
preserved upon landing at any airport. As such, it represents the last line of defense in a multi-
layered strategy to ensure safe flight completion. It also serves as the demarcation line between
normal and emergency fuel states for the purposes of the fuel state declarations in accordance with
FLT 3.14.17.
An operator may define the 30-minute final fuel reserve requirements using speed, altitude and/or
other conditions that are in accordance with requirements of the Authority (e.g. 30 minutes at holding
speed at 450m/1,500 ft above airport elevation in standard conditions).
DSP 4.3.13
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the additional fuel calculated in
accordance with its fuel policy is a supplementary amount of fuel required to be carried when the sum
of the trip fuel, contingency fuel, alternate fuel and final reserve fuel is insufficient to meet any one of
the following conditions (as applicable to the Operator):
(i) Allow the aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO to comply with critical fuel scenario as
established by the State.
(ii) Allow the aircraft flying greater than 90 minutes from an alternate airport to:
(a) Descend as necessary and proceed to an alternate airport in the event of engine
failure or loss of pressurization, whichever requires the greater amount of fuel
based on the assumption that such a failure occurs at the most critical point along
the route;
(b) Fly for 15 minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the alternate airport
elevation in standard conditions;
(c) Make an approach and landing at the alternate airport.
(iii) Allow for any additional operational requirements, as defined by the State or the Operator,
not covered by items i) and ii). (GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the
Authority or other variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of
safety is maintained.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of additional fuel for all flights (focus:
planned additional fuel is required when the calculated sum of trip fuel/contingency fuel/alternate
fuel/final reserve fuel is insufficient to meet defined operational conditions or, if applicable, when
calculated using a variation; operational conditions that are considered/assessed to determine
requirement for additional fuel are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for additional fuel).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Basic fuel planning, represented by the sum of the trip fuel, contingency fuel, alternate fuel and final
reserve is predicated on the termination of a flight at the destination or destination alternate. As such,
it only takes into account foreseen and unforeseen factors (excluding system failures) that could
influence fuel consumption to the planned destination or destination alternate. The intent of this
provision is to define the “additional fuel” required to protect against the very unlikely event of an
engine failure or de-pressurization at the most critical point in the flight and presumes that the
majority of the fuel used in basic fuel planning will still be available for use in proceeding to an en
route alternate in the event of such an occurrence.
The specification in item i) applies to aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO. It addresses the fuel
necessary to comply with the ETOPS/EDTO critical fuel scenario as established by the State of the
Operator. Such scenarios typically include additional controls to ensure sufficient fuel is uplifted for
conditions that would contribute to increased fuel burn (e.g. to account for icing, errors in wind
forecasting, deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance, and APU use).
Operators using variations to determine no-alternate fuel would typically have the demonstrable
capability, using historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure
continuous improvement in the accuracy and adequacy of no-alternate fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Flight fuel calculations;
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
• Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific
fuel burn and/or the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of additional fuel calculations and critical fuel scenarios are contained in the ICAO Flight
Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.14
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to provide for the uplift of discretionary fuel in
accordance with its fuel policy, which is the extra amount of fuel to be carried at the discretion of the
PIC, or the PIC and FOO in a shared system of operational control. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in shared operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight
Dispatcher function as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for addition of discretionary fuel for all flights (focus:
planned discretionary fuel is designated when requested by PIC or requested by PIC/FOO in
shared system of operational control).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: basis for addition of discretionary fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for uplift of
discretionary fuel when requested by PIC or PIC/FOO).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: procedures for calculating/requesting discretionary fuel in
accordance with fuel policy).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
In a shared system of operational control, the PIC and the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer
(FOO) share the responsibility to ensure operating limitations are not exceeded and sufficient fuel is
on board the aircraft to complete the planned flight safely.
4.4 Oxygen
4.5 Operations Beyond 60 Minutes from an En Route Alternate Airport and ETOPS/EDTO
DSP 4.5.1
If the Operator conducts flight operations beyond 60 minutes from a point on a route to an en route
alternate airport, including ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have a system, process and/or
procedures to ensure such operations are planned and conducted in accordance with operational
requirements and applicable regulations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified conduct of flight operations, including ETOPS/EDTO, over routes beyond 60 minutes
from alternate airport.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for planning flights conducted over routes
beyond 60 minutes to an alternate airport (focus: flight planning for ETOPS/EDTO takes into
account all applicable regulations/requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures to ensure
flights operated beyond 60 minutes from an alternate airport are conducted in accordance with
applicable requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator may use a system, process or procedures alone or in combination in order to fulfill
operational requirements related to the conduct of operations beyond 60 minutes. In all cases,
however, the robustness of any methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of
the operation.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance
for the conduct of operations beyond 60 minutes, from a point on a route to an en route alternate
airport. Such guidance might be derived from one or more of the following source references, as
applicable:
• ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Attachment C: Guidance for Operations by Turbine Engine
Aeroplanes Beyond 60 minutes to an En route Alternate Aerodrome Including Extended
Diversion Time Operations (EDTO).
• ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
• ICAO Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO) Manual (Doc 10085).
• FAA Advisory Circular - AC No: 120-42B: Extended Operations (ETOPS and Polar
Operations).
• EASA Air OPS (regulation 965/2012) ANNEX V (Part-SPA) Subpart F: Extended Range
Operations with Two-Engine Aeroplanes (ETOPS)
• EASA AMC 20-6, Rev 2 to Air OPS (regulation 965/2012) : Extended Range Operation with
Two-Engine Aeroplanes ETOPS Certification and Operation
Guidance
The intent of item i) of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel and the flight crew are
knowledgeable about diversion airport options and prevailing weather conditions appropriate for the
type of operation conducted.
The intent of item ii) is to ensure a larger strategy exists for two-engine aircraft engaged in
ETOPS/EDTO to protect a diversion regardless of the reason for the diversion (i.e. technical or non-
technical reasons).
Guidance related to the identification and/or protection of en route alternate airports is contained in
ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Attachment C and the ICAO Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO)
Manual (Doc 10085).
DSP 4.5.3
If the Operator uses aircraft with two engines in ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance
and procedures to select en route alternate airports for such operations, and ensure en route
alternate airports are specified on:
(i) The OFP or other equivalent operational document available to the PIC in flight;
(ii) The ATS flight plan where required by the State or the ATS system in use. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO using aircraft with two engines.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for en route alternate selection/designation for
ETOPS/EDTO conducted with two-engine aircraft (focus: flight planning includes
selection/designation of en route alternate airports; en route alternate airports shown on OFP;
shown on ATS flight plan in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO OFPs (focus: designation of en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures for
selecting en route alternate airports and specifying on OFP and ATS flight plan for two-engine
aircraft ETOPS/EDTO).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of the specification in item i) is to ensure en route alternates, when required, are selected
and subsequently specified on the OFP or other equivalent operational document available to the
PIC in flight.
The intent of the specification in item ii) is to ensure en route alternates, when required for
ETOPS/EDTO, are specified on the ATS flight when required by the State or other applicable
authority.
DSP 4.5.4
If the Operator conducts ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure,
for aircraft engaged in such operations:
(i) A flight will not proceed beyond the threshold time unless the identified en route alternate
airports are re-evaluated for availability and the most up-to-date information indicates that,
during the ETU, conditions at those airports will be at or above the Operator's established
airport operating minima for the operation;
(ii) If any conditions are identified that would preclude a safe approach and landing at an
identified en route alternate airport during the ETU, an alternative course of action has been
determined;
(iii) The most limiting EDTO-significant system time limitation (except for the most limiting fire
suppression system), if any, indicated in the aircraft flight manual (directly or by reference)
and relevant to a particular operation is not exceeded. (GM)
Note: The Operator may conform with item (iii) of this provision through Operational Variations
approved by the Authority or other variations to EDTO significant system time limitation criteria
provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance
monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Note: Refer to ORG 3.4.1 and DSP 4.5.5 for cargo compartment fire suppression limitation
exceedances.
Auditor Actions
Identified that ETOPS/EDTO is in use.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for the monitoring/assessment of en route alternate
airport conditions during the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO (focus: designated en route alternate
airports monitored/assessed during ETOPS/EDTO to verify continuation of planned flight; when
conditions make designated en route alternate unusable, planned flight evaluated for change).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO OFPs (focus: designation of en route alternate airports).
If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for EDTO flight planning (focus: deviation from basic
ISARP requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with
applicable regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus:
monitoring of risk associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Threshold Time.
The intent of this provision is to ensure a larger strategy exists to preclude a diversion and to protect
a diversion should one occur regardless of whether the diversion is for technical (aircraft system or
engine) or non-technical reasons.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of
variations, including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General
Guidance at the beginning of this subsection.
Variations to EDTO significant system time limitation exceedance criteria are typically approved or
accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to
ensure the desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at
least the following:
• Capabilities of the operator;
• Overall reliability of the aircraft;
• Reliability of each time limited system;
• Relevant information from the aircraft manufacturer;
• Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the
ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Applicability
Section 4 is applicable to all operators, and addresses aircraft engineering and maintenance functions
relevant to the airworthiness of the aircraft, engines and components.
Individual MNT provisions or sub-specifications within a MNT provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable unless determined otherwise by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase “If the Operator...” are applicable if the Operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
An operator may choose to have certain functions within the scope of ground handling operations (e.g.
aircraft loading, aircraft ground handling) performed by maintenance operations personnel. If this situation
exists, the operator must be in conformity with the ISARPs contained in Section 6, Ground Handling
Operations (GRH), that are applicable to the ground handling functions performed by maintenance
operations personnel.
Where an operator outsources the performance of aircraft engineering and maintenance operational
functions to external organizations, the operator retains overall responsibility for ensuring aircraft
airworthiness, and must demonstrate processes for monitoring the applicable external organization(s) in
accordance with MNT 1.11.7.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 4, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
Many provisions in this section contain the phrase “organization that performs maintenance (or performs
maintenance functions) for the Operator.” This phrase is inclusive and refers to any organizations that might
perform maintenance on the operator’s aircraft, either an external maintenance organization or the operator’s
own maintenance organization.
The term “maintenance” as used in above-referenced phrase means restoring or maintaining an aircraft,
aircraft engine or aircraft component to or in an airworthy and serviceable condition through the performance
of functions such as repair, modification, overhaul, inspection, replacement, defect rectification and/or
determination of condition.
If a standard or recommended practice requires an operator to ensure that certain provisions (specifically in
MNT subsection 4) are satisfied by an organization that performs maintenance or maintenance operational
functions for the operator under a maintenance agreement, then the operator monitors such maintenance
organization to ensure specifications in the relevant ISARPs are being fulfilled.
If the organization that has a maintenance agreement with the operator subcontracts certain maintenance
functions to other maintenance organizations (as agreed between parties), then the operator’s monitoring of
the contracted maintenance organization would also ensure such organization is performing oversight of all
relevant subcontractors. For example, when an operator contracts with an airframe maintenance provider to
conduct base maintenance and such maintenance provider then subcontracts certain maintenance activities
or functions to one or more of its subcontractors, the operator’s monitoring would also ensure the contracted
airframe maintenance provider is providing proper oversight of the relevant subcontractors.
MNT 1.3.1
The Operator shall provide, for the use and guidance of relevant maintenance and operational
personnel, a Maintenance Program that is approved by the relevant Authority and contains
information and data for each aircraft type/model and configuration in the Operator's fleet in
accordance with specifications in Table 4.1. The Maintenance Program shall satisfy:
(i) Requirements of the State of Registry;
(ii) Requirements of the State of Design;
(iii) Requirements of the Operator;
(iv) Maintenance specifications provided by the aircraft, engine and component OEMs. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified an approved maintenance program for each aircraft type.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected maintenance program(s) (content in accordance with specifications in
Table 4.1).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO), State of Design
and State of Registry.
An aircraft maintenance program is usually approved by the Authority. However, when an operator
uses an aircraft registered in a different state, it is possible that the maintenance program could be
approved by the authority of the State of Registry.
An operator's Authority typically holds the operator responsible for the definition, the control and the
provision of Maintenance Data, and an Approved Maintenance Program for use by the operator and
its maintenance organization.
The aircraft is maintained under one approved operator's aircraft maintenance program. When an
operator wishes to change from one approved aircraft maintenance program to another approved
program, a transfer/bridging check/Inspection may need to be performed, as agreed with the
Authority, in order to implement the change.
The operator's aircraft maintenance program typically contains a preface that defines the
maintenance program contents, the inspection standards to be applied, permitted variations to task
frequencies and, where applicable, any procedure to escalate established check/inspection intervals.
A reliability program provides an appropriate means of monitoring the effectiveness of the
maintenance program. Maintenance program optimization relies on implementation of the reliability
program.
Some operator's approved aircraft maintenance programs, not developed from the MRB Process,
use reliability programs as the basis of the approval. The purpose of a reliability program is to ensure
the aircraft maintenance program tasks are effective and carried out at appropriate time intervals.
Actions resulting from the reliability program may result in the escalation or de-escalation, or addition
or deletion, of maintenance tasks, as deemed necessary.
1.5 Communication
MNT 1.9.1
The Operator shall ensure all aircraft in its fleet are equipped with, in accordance with conditions of
applicability, the aircraft systems and equipment specified in Table 4.11. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed fleet aircraft systems/equipment (focus: systems/equipment in accordance
with Table 4.11 for aircraft types in operator’s fleet).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined records of installation, inspection and/or maintenance of selected
systems/equipment.
Observed line flight operations (FLT/CAB auditors) or inspected static aircraft (focus: sampled
aircraft have applicable systems/equipment installed).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is that in accordance with conditions of applicability, which includes
requirements of the relevant authority, the systems and equipment specified in Table 4.11 are
installed on each aircraft type in the operator’s fleet.
The condition of applicability of some system or equipment requirements is predicated on the use of
an aircraft type in a certain type of operation (e.g. long-range over-water flights). Where an operator
has a fleet of an aircraft type of which some are not used in the conditional operation, then the
operator would typically have to demonstrate a segregation system that prevents such aircraft from
being used in the conditional operation.
The operator or the Authority may prescribe additional requirements for aircraft systems or
equipment installation.
1.10 Quality Assurance Program
MNT 1.11.7
The Operator shall have monitoring processes to ensure external approved maintenance
organizations that perform maintenance for the Operator:
(i) Comply with applicable regulations and safety and quality requirements;
(ii) Have procedures that are acceptable to the Authority granting the approval;
(iii) Perform all maintenance in accordance with requirements of the Operator. (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed (focus: monitoring process ensures provider fulfils applicable
safety/security requirements).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in MNT operations.
Guidance
An external maintenance organization that performs contracted maintenance functions for the
operator may perform the tasks specified in i) through v).
An aircraft part fabricated or manufactured for an operator by a non-approved maintenance
organization is produced under the quality system of either the operator or the external maintenance
organization. Such an arrangement must be approved by the Authority.
An operator is not required to keep records of traceability that would track the use of batch-controlled
consumables.
1.12 Safety Management
Risk Management
MNT 1.12.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program for maintenance operations that includes a
combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in MNT operations (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of MNT operations in the organization-wide, cross-discipline safety
hazard identification program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in MNT operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform analysis of MNT operational data for the purpose of
identifying hazards to aircraft operations.
Examined examples of hazards to aircraft operations that have been identified through data
collection and analysis in MNT operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations), Base Maintenance, Line
Maintenance, Risk Management and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
The operator typically applies its safety hazard identification program to the full scope of
maintenance operations associated with maintaining its aircraft, which includes line and base
maintenance.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
MNT 1.12.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program in maintenance operations
that specifies processes to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine corresponding safety risk(s) to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in maintenance
operations. [SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its maintenance risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant maintenance hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) across the maintenance organization capture risk assessment information, risk
mitigation (control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 1.6.5.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment and mitigation program in MNT operations (focus:
hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action; action
implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of maintenance operations in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in MNT operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform safety risk assessments in MNT operations.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment and resulting risk
mitigation action(s) in MNT operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA),
Safety Risk Management and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
The operator typically applies its safety risk assessment and mitigation program to the full scope of
maintenance operations associated with maintaining its aircraft, which includes line and base
maintenance.
Hazards relevant to the conduct of maintenance operations are potentially associated with:
• Weather (e.g. temperature, precipitation);
• Work environment (e.g. lighting, temperature, noise/vibration, ventilation, hazardous/toxic
substances, cleanliness, floor condition, body position, physical facility layout changes);
• Infrastructure (e.g. inadequate, uncontrolled or lack of equipment/tools);
• Automation limitations (e.g. poor assumptions based on misunderstanding of automation
functionality);
• Foreign Object Debris (FOD);
• Personnel (e.g. not enough, lack or ineffective training, lack of skills, shift work, inadequate
shift patterns);
• Aircraft and parts (e.g. different configurations, lack or difficulty of access);
• Technical data (e.g. uncontrolled, not up to date, inadequate layout of Task Cards, lack of
understanding or difficulty in using electronic documentation or IT system);
• Inadequate communication (e.g. language differences, comprehension);
• Changes in processes, procedures, IT platforms, organizational, tooling and equipment.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
MNT 1.12.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system in maintenance operations that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates feedback from personnel to report safety hazards, expose safety
deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
(ii) Includes analysis and management action as necessary to address safety issues identified
through the reporting system. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in MNT operations (focus: system
urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in MNT operations.
SMS Training
2 Maintenance Control
MNT 2.1.1
The Operator shall have a maintenance control system that is in accordance with procedures
acceptable to the Authority and ensures:
(i) Each aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition;
(ii) Operational and emergency equipment necessary for flight is serviceable;
(iii) The Certificate of Airworthiness of each aircraft remains valid.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the system for control of aircraft maintenance.
Identified the procedures for renewal of certificate of airworthiness (CoA).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected individual aircraft records for CoA.
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 2.1.2
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ascertain if trends for oil consumption are such
that an aircraft has sufficient oil to complete each flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for monitoring aircraft engine oil consumption (focus:
oil consumption monitored; trends identified for individual aircraft; consumption trends accounted
for prior to each flight to ensure completion).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected aircraft oil consumption records (focus: consumption monitored, trends
identified and accounted for prior to flights).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The designation of a minimum oil quantity is typically provided by the manufacturer, while the
determination, monitoring and replenishment of oil supply are the responsibilities of engineering and
maintenance and/or the flight crew in accordance with ISM Section 2 (FLT), Table 2.2, item v).
MNT 2.2.2
The Operator shall have a system for tracking hours, cycles and calendar time for aircraft, engines
and life-limited components.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the system for tracking hours, cycles and calendar time for aircraft, engines
and life-limited components.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined one aircraft, engine and life-limited component.
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 2.3.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no new part is installed on an aeronautical product
unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the installation of new parts and,
in addition, meets a minimum of one of the following:
(i) The new part has marking identifying it as a part specified in the type design conforming to a
recognized national or international standard, or
(ii) The new part has been approved for use on an aeronautical product, in accordance with the
type certificate/STC, if the part was originally designed and manufactured for non-
aeronautical use, or
(iii) The new part was manufactured under a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), or
(iv) The new part was produced by the Operator using approved procedures for the purpose of
maintaining or altering its own aeronautical product. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process for managing and controlling new parts and parts installation.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed inspection of incoming parts.
Examined selected parts installed on aircraft as new parts.
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (if applicable) (focus: new
part/component being installed meets applicable standards of airworthiness).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: control process for ensuring
new parts meet applicable standards of airworthiness).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that
contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft. Such documentation enables
the external AMO to validate the airworthy condition of the part and its certification for installation on
the aeronautical product being maintained. The “approved documentation” category typically
includes as necessary, without being limited to, any of the following: MMM, IPC (including
Supplements), AD, SB, Work Order, Repair Order, Form 8130-3/EASA Form 1/or equivalent.
The production of parts by an operator for its own use, as specified in item iv), is acceptable provided
there are approved procedures identified in the MMM.
MNT 2.3.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no used part is installed on an aeronautical product
unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the installation of used parts and
is any of the following:
(i) An airworthy part that has been removed from an aircraft for immediate installation on
another aircraft, or
(ii) An airworthy part that has undergone maintenance for which a maintenance release has
been signed by an appropriately rated Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO), or
(iii) An airworthy part that has undergone an approved repair or alteration that restored the
certificated level of airworthiness to a used part. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process for managing and controlling used parts and parts installation.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected parts installed on aircraft for certificates.
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (if applicable) (focus: used
part/component being installed meets applicable standards of airworthiness).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: control process for ensuring
used parts meet applicable standards of airworthiness).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that
contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft. Such documentation enables
the external AMO to validate the airworthy condition of the part and its certification for installation on
the aeronautical product being maintained. The “approved documentation” category typically
includes as necessary, without being limited to, any of the following: MMM, IPC (including
Supplements), AD, SB, Work Order, Repair Order, Form 8130-3/EASA Form 1/or equivalent.
MNT 2.3.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure that no used life-limited part is installed on an
aeronautical product unless such part meets the standards of airworthiness applicable to the
installation of life-limited parts and:
(i) The technical history of the part is available to demonstrate the time in service, as
authorized for that part in the type certificate governing the installation, has not been
exceeded;
(ii) The technical history referred to in sub-paragraph i) is incorporated into the technical record
for the aeronautical product on which the part is installed. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process for managing and controlling used life-limited parts and parts
installation.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Interviewed personnel that execute procedures for tracking life-limited parts.
Traced the technical history of selected life-limited parts.
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (if applicable) (focus: used life-limited
part/component being installed meets applicable standards of airworthiness).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: control process for ensuring
used life-limited parts meet applicable standards of airworthiness).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The operator is responsible for providing an external AMO with approved documentation that
contains information about parts allowed to be installed on its aircraft.
In general, it is best for an operator to have a fully traceable history for all life-limited parts. Not all
parts have a fixed life. The life of some parts might be variable depending on the way the part has
been used in the past. For example, load-bearing parts (e.g. landing gear components) that can be
installed on different aircraft types (e.g. A319, A320, A321) will have a shorter life if installed on the
heavier aircraft (as opposed to the same part installed on a lighter aircraft). Therefore, a complete
history of these types of components is critical in knowing exactly when the life of the part will expire.
For parts that have a fixed life (e.g. batteries, slides), traceability to birth is not a requirement.
However, in such cases, it is very important that the operator has documentation that shows clearly
that the used part has not exceeded its airworthiness life limit.
2.4 Deferred Maintenance
MNT 2.4.1
The Operator shall have a maintenance control function that is responsible for approving, controlling,
monitoring and scheduling non-routine and deferred maintenance activities, including MEL/CDL
requirements.
Auditor Actions
Identified the description of the maintenance control center (MCC) (or equivalent).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Interviewed personnel responsible for selected maintenance control functions.
Examined maintenance control processes/procedures.
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 2.4.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure deferred maintenance items (defects) are tracked and
corrected within the required intervals prescribed by the MEL, CDL or the appropriate maintenance
data. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for managing deferred maintenance items.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Interviewed MCC personnel.
Examined selected records of deferred maintenance items.
Traced the tracking and correction of selected deferred maintenance item(s).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: Open/closed MEL/CDL and other deferred
maintenance items are being deferred in accordance with approved MEL/CDL requirements or
the appropriate maintenance data).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Maintenance Data.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process to rectify all aircraft defects within
the limits prescribed by the approved MEL, CDL or the appropriate maintenance data. Postponement
of any defect rectification cannot typically be permitted without the operator's awareness and
agreement, and in accordance with a procedure approved by the State of Registry/Authority.
MNT 2.5.1
The Operator shall have processes to:
(i) Obtain and assess continuing airworthiness information, including Airworthiness Directives
(ADs), Alert Service Bulletins and recommendations from the organizations responsible for
aircraft type design, and
(ii) Implement the resulting actions that are mandatory or considered necessary in accordance
with procedures acceptable to the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for obtaining, assessing and implementing ADs and ASBs.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of AD and SB compliance, including Task Cards.
Traced selected AD(s) and/or SB(s) from receipt to implementation.
Observed AD/SB management (focus: AD/SB process includes identification, planning,
accomplishment, certification, recording, follow-up monitoring).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: ADs for which compliance can be physically
checked, if applicable).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Authority, Service Bulletin (which includes the definition of Alert
Service Bulletin) and Design Approval Holder (DAH).
Continuing airworthiness information and recommendations typically include:
• Airworthiness Directives that are developed by the Authority;
• Alert Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Limitations, maintenance planning and
accomplishment instructions that are developed by the Type Design Organization(s) in
accordance with their obligations as Design Approval Holder (DAH) for the respective
product.
If improvements identified in the assessment process are considered by the operator as necessary to
meet its safety and reliability needs, the current planning, accomplishment instructions, and/or
airworthiness limitations may need to be adjusted through the implementation process.
MNT 2.5.3
The Operator shall have a program for the management of the minimum equipment lists (MELs) used
in its fleet operations. Such program shall ensure MELs:
(i) Are approved by the State of the Operator and/or State of Registry if applicable;
(ii) Include the latest applicable MMEL provisions released by the Type Certificate Holder(s);
(iii) Are relevant to and customized for the type/model of aircraft in the Operator’s fleet;
(iv) Identify applicable maintenance procedures called upon by the MEL items and such
procedures are readily available for implementation by the appropriate maintenance
personnel;
(v) Include, as applicable, aircraft systems and equipment required for operations in conformity
with special authorizations as specified in FLT 1.2.1. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the procedure(s) for revising the MEL per the MMEL applicable revision.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of MEL usage requiring an (M) procedure.
Examined MEL (focus: MEL revision is in conformity with the latest applicable MMEL provisions
and is customized for the type/model of aircraft in operator’s fleet, including required equipment
for operations in accordance with applicable special authorizations).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: MEL is customized for the applicable aircraft
type/model).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Minimum Equipment List (MEL) and Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL).
The relevance and customization of the MEL is performed by the operator to reflect the configuration
particular to each aircraft type in its fleet (e.g. the long-range or extended-range version, the engine
type/model, the optional equipment installed etc.). The MEL typically does not include MMEL
provisions that are not relevant to the actual configuration of the operated aircraft.
The timeframe in which the applicable MMEL revisions released by the type certificate holder (TCH)
are incorporated into the MEL is acceptable to the Authority.
The maintenance procedures as specified in (iv) are identified by an (M) symbol in the MEL.
The intent is that all maintenance procedures are developed to a sufficient level.
2.6 Repairs and Modifications
MNT 2.6.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure all modifications and repairs:
(i) Are carried out using approved data;
(ii) Comply with airworthiness requirements of the Authority and State of Registry.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for managing modifications and repairs.
Identified/Assessed the procedures for maintaining technical records of modifications and
repairs.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of aircraft modification(s) and/or repair(s).
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (focus: installation/replacement
accomplished using approved data/in accordance with regulations).
Observed AD/SB management (focus: AD/SB process ensures modifications/repairs
accomplished using approved data/in accordance with regulations).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: Compare the repair status and the physical
status of the aircraft/engine(s)/propeller(s) and their repaired components as applicable).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 2.7.1
The Operator shall have processes for defect recording and control, including the management of
recurring defects, to address:
(i) Documenting troubleshooting history;
(ii) Tracking chronic or repetitive unserviceable items;
(iii) Implementing instructions for corrective action;
(iv) Ensuring rectification takes into account the methodology used in previous repair attempts.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for recording and controlling defects.
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for tracking and correcting chronic or repetitive
unserviceable items.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Interviewed personnel that execute procedures that address chronic or repetitive unserviceable
items.
Examined corrective action records for selected chronic unserviceable items.
Traced the process for developing corrective action for chronic unserviceable item(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 2.8.2
If the Operator uses twin engine aircraft that are approved for ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall
ensure compliance with maintenance requirements as specified in Table 4.5. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified twin engine aircraft types approved for the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO.
Identified/Assessed maintenance program for twin engine aircraft approved for the conduct of
ETOPS/EDTO (focus: satisfaction of requirements specified in Table 4.5).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO aircraft maintenance records (focus: compliance with
maintenance program requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
In complying with the requirements specified in Table 4.5, an operator would normally be expected to
develop, whenever applicable, the following:
• The list of ETOPS/EDTO Significant Systems/Sub-systems (i.e. the list including, for a given
aircraft, any system/sub-system whose failure or degradation could adversely affect the
safety of an EDTO flight or whose continued functioning is important to the safe flight and
landing of an aircraft during an ETOPS/EDTO diversion).
• The list of maintenance tasks with ETOPS/EDTO significance (i.e. the list of maintenance
tasks affecting any EDTO Significant System/Sub-system).
• The reliability program supplemented, as applicable, to take into account the ETOPS/EDTO
requirements and specific analysis.
• The Engine Condition Monitoring Program (ECMP) including the Oil Consumption Monitoring
Program.
• The APU in-flight Start Program.
• The ETOPS/EDTO aircraft Pre-Departure Service Check (PDSC).
• The list of ETOPS/EDTO Qualified Maintenance Personnel as well as the training program
and qualification procedures of such personnel.
• The procedure to integrate in the MMM all applicable Configuration, Maintenance and
Procedures (CMP) provisions issued by the manufacturer of the aircraft.
MNT 2.10.1
If the Operator uses aircraft with electronic navigation capabilities, the Operator shall have a
procedure to ensure the timely insertion of current and unaltered electronic navigation data to all
applicable aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the procedure(s) for inserting/loading electronic data into aircraft navigation
systems.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of electronic navigation data insertion/loading.
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: verify currency of aircraft navigation databases).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure a procedure for the insertion of databases for use in aircraft
navigation systems prior to the first flight on the effective date for the new database.
2.11 Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM)
3 Technical Records
4 Maintenance Organizations
4.1 Approval
MNT 4.1.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure an aircraft is not operated unless it is maintained and
released to service by an Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) that:
(i) Is acceptable to the Authority:
(ii) Has established procedures acceptable to the Authority to ensure maintenance practices
are in compliance with all relevant requirements;
(iii) Maintains the validity of its approval through compliance with the requirements for an
approved maintenance organization acceptable to the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) for the selection of AMOs.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
MNT 4.2.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has the necessary personnel to plan, perform, supervise, inspect and
release the maintenance work to be performed. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for human resources in the AMO selection
process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying adequacy of AMO
maintenance human resources).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The “necessary personnel” requirement addresses both the number and the (certificated)
qualification/competence of the personnel. Personnel are typically employed or contracted by an
AMO as acceptable to the Authority and in a proportion that ensures organizational stability. The
qualification/competence of the personnel and the number of personnel are normally commensurate
with the scope of approval of the AMO by the Authority. In some cases, the process put in place by
an operator could require the AMO to support its “necessary personnel” status with an appropriately
detailed and updated maintenance man-hour plan.
4.3 Quality Assurance
MNT 4.3.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has an independent quality assurance program that:
(i) Meets the specifications contained in Table 4.7;
(ii) Monitors compliance with applicable regulations, requirements and the Maintenance
Procedures Manual (MPM) of the AMO;
(iii) Addresses the specific requirements of the Operator as specified in the maintenance
agreement;
(iv) Is under the sole control of the Quality Manager or the person assigned managerial
responsibility for the program. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for a QA program in the AMO selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying AMO quality assurance
programs meet all applicable requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM).
The primary objectives of the quality system are to enable the AMO to ensure it can deliver a safe
product and remain in compliance with all requirements.
An essential element of the quality system is the independent audit. The independent audit is an
objective process of routine sample checks of all aspects of the approved maintenance
organization's ability to carry out all maintenance to the required standards. This process typically
includes:
• Product sampling, as this is the end result of the maintenance process, which represents an
objective overview of the complete maintenance-related activities; product sampling is
intended to complement the requirement for certifying personnel to be satisfied that all
required maintenance has been properly carried out before the issue of the certificate of
release to service;
• A percentage of random audits carried out on a sample basis when maintenance is being
carried out; random audits include audits done during the night for those organizations that
work at night.
Another essential element of the quality system is the quality feedback system. The principal function
of the quality feedback system is to ensure all findings resulting from the independent quality audits
of the organization are properly investigated and corrected in a timely manner:
• Independent quality audit reports are sent to the relevant department(s) for rectification
action proposing target rectification dates;
• Rectification dates are discussed with such department(s) before the quality department or
nominated quality auditor confirms dates in the report;
• The relevant department(s) rectifies findings within agreed rectification dates and informs the
quality department or nominated quality auditor of the completion of such rectifications.
The accountable executive is kept informed of any safety issues and the extent of compliance with
authority requirements. The accountable executive also holds regular meetings with personnel to
check progress on rectification. In large organizations such meetings may be delegated on a day-to-
day basis to the quality manager, subject to the accountable executive meeting at least twice per
year with the senior personnel involved to review the overall performance and receiving at least a half
yearly summary report on findings of non-compliance.
All records pertaining to the independent quality audit and the quality feedback system are retained
for at least two evaluation cycles after the date of closure of the finding to which they refer, or for such
period as to support changes to the audit time periods, whichever is the longer.
Note: The quality feedback system may not be contracted to outside persons.
It is not intended that this QA Program be based on a system of end product inspection, but rather
upon periodic verifications of all aspects of the systems and practices used for the control of
maintenance to ensure compliance with regulations and with the operator's approved procedures.
The aim of the program is to provide an unbiased picture of the AMO's performance to verify that
activities comply with the MPM and confirm that the systems and procedures described in the MPM
remain effective and are achieving the AMO's requirements.
4.4 Personnel
MNT 4.4.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator uses maintenance personnel:
(i) That are appropriately licensed and/or authorized to sign the maintenance release;
(ii) Whose competence has been established in accordance with a procedure and to a level
acceptable to the authority granting approval for the maintenance organization. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for qualifications of personnel in the AMO selection
process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: process for verifying AMO
personnel are licensed/authorized to sign maintenance release).
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (focus: personnel signing
maintenance release are appropriately licensed/authorized).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: personnel signing maintenance release are
appropriately licensed/authorized).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Licensing typically ensures maintenance personnel have met the basic requirements of an applicable
authority in terms of age, knowledge, experience and, if required, medical fitness and skill, and have
demonstrated the required knowledge and skill in a manner specified by the authority.
Planners, mechanics, specialized services personnel, supervisors and certifying personnel are
typically assessed for competence by an on-the-job evaluation and/or examination relevant to their
particular job or role within the organization before unsupervised work is permitted.
To assist in the assessment of competence, job descriptions are recommended for each job role in
the organization. Basically, the assessment establishes that:
• Planners are able to interpret maintenance requirements into maintenance tasks and have
an appreciation that they have no authority to deviate from the maintenance data;
• Mechanics are able to carry out maintenance tasks to any standard specified in the
maintenance data and notify supervisors of mistakes requiring rectification to meet required
maintenance standards;
• Specialized services personnel are able to carry out specialized maintenance tasks to the
standard specified in the maintenance data and will both inform and await instructions from
their supervisor in any case where it is impossible to complete the specialized maintenance
in accordance with the maintenance data;
• Supervisors are able to ensure that all required maintenance tasks are carried out and where
not completed or where it is evident that a particular maintenance task cannot be carried out
in accordance with the maintenance data, it is to be reported to the responsible person for
appropriate action. In addition, for those supervisors who also carry out maintenance tasks,
that they understand such tasks are not to be undertaken when incompatible with their
management responsibilities;
• Certifying personnel are able to determine when the aircraft is or is not ready to be released
to service.
Knowledge of organizational procedures relevant to each individual's particular role in the
organization is important, particularly in the case of planners, specialized services personnel,
supervisors and certifying personnel.
MNT 4.5.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has a training program that requires all maintenance personnel to
receive initial and recurrent training that is appropriate to individually assigned tasks and
responsibilities, and provides maintenance personnel with the:
(i) Knowledge of regulations, standards and procedures in accordance with requirements in the
MMM;
(ii) Knowledge and skills related to human performance, including coordination with, as
applicable, other maintenance personnel and/or flight crew. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for an overall training program in the AMO
selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying AMOs have
initial/recurrent training programs for maintenance personnel).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: personnel signing maintenance release receive
initial and recurrent training that are appropriate to individually assigned tasks and
responsibilities).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Human Factors Principles and Human Performance.
The intent of this provision is for the operator to ensure appropriate initial and recurrent training for
maintenance personnel and to ensure such training takes into account the knowledge and skills
specified.
Maintenance personnel receive training in human performance to promote an understanding of the
human factors (e.g. human capabilities, limitations, and the interface(s) between human and system
components) involved in performing maintenance duties and coordinating with other maintenance
personnel and/or flight crew. These human factors are taken into account during training to reduce
human error in maintenance activities, including activities performed by an external AMO.
MNT 4.5.7
If the Operator uses a maintenance organization that has maintenance personnel taxi the Operator's
aircraft on the movement area of an airport, the Operator shall have a process to ensure such
maintenance personnel are authorized, competent and qualified to conduct aircraft taxi operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for the qualifications of personnel that taxi aircraft
in the AMO selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying training/qualification of
AMO personnel authorized to taxi aircraft, if applicable).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 4.6.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has the necessary technical data, equipment, tools and material to
perform the work for which the maintenance organization has been approved, to include:
(i) Equipment and tools necessary to comply with the work specified in the agreement between
the Operator and the maintenance organization;
(ii) Sufficient supplies and spare parts to ensure timely rectification of defects with regard to the
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) provisions as specified in the agreement between the
Operator and the maintenance organization. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for technical data, equipment, tools and material in
the AMO selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying adequacy of AMO
data/equipment/supplies/parts to perform maintenance).
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (focus: availability/use of necessary
technical data/equipment/tools/material for maintenance activity being performed).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: availability/use of necessary technical
data/equipment/tools/material for maintenance activity being performed).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: availability/use of necessary
technical data/equipment/tools/material for management/handling of aircraft parts/components).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Tools and equipment, as specified in the Approved Data, can be made available when needed. Tools
and equipment, which require to be controlled in terms of servicing or calibration to measure
specified dimensions and torque figures, are to be clearly identified and listed in a control register,
including any personal tools and equipment that the organization agrees can be used. Where the
manufacturer specifies a particular tool or equipment, then that tool or equipment is used, unless the
AMO has an approved procedure to determine the equivalency of alternative tooling/equipment and
the procedure documented in the MPM.
The availability of equipment and tools indicates permanent availability except in the case of any tool
or equipment that is so rarely needed that its permanent availability is not necessary.
A maintenance organization approved for base maintenance has sufficient aircraft access equipment
and inspection platforms/docking such that the aircraft may be properly inspected.
The supplies necessary to perform maintenance work refer to readily available raw material and
aircraft components, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, unless the
organization has an established spares provisioning procedure.
MNT 4.6.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has facilities suitable for the storage of parts, equipment, tools and
material under conditions that provide security and prevent deterioration of and damage to stored
items. Such processes shall ensure:
(i) Clean work areas, including management offices;
(ii) Parts and material properly identified and stored;
(iii) Oxygen and other high-pressure bottles properly identified and stored;
Guidance
Storage facilities for serviceable aircraft components are clean, well-ventilated and maintained at an
even dry temperature to minimize the effects of condensation. Storage recommendations from the
manufacturers for aircraft components are to be followed.
Storage racks are strong enough to hold aircraft components and provide sufficient support for large
aircraft components such that the component is not distorted during storage.
All aircraft components, wherever practicable, remain packaged in protective material to minimize
damage and corrosion during storage.
MNT 4.6.4
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has a shelf-life program for applicable items, which includes a
requirement for the shelf-life limit to be controlled and displayed.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for a shelf life program in the AMO selection
process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying acceptable AMO shelf-
life program for applicable stored items).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: shelf-life program for
applicable stored aircraft parts/components).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 4.6.5
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has a receiving inspection program that:
(i) Assures incoming material has the required certification documentation and traceability;
(ii) Includes a process for verification of incoming part tags to ensure information on the tag
(e.g. part name, part number, serial number, modification and/or any other applicable
reference information) matches the corresponding information on the part.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the receiving inspection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of incoming material (focus: certification documentation and
traceability).
Examined selected records of verification of incoming part tags.
MNT 4.7.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has a secure quarantine area for rejected parts and materials awaiting
disposition.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for a secure parts/materials quarantine area in the
AMO selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying adequate AMO
parts/materials quarantine area).
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: secure quarantine area(s)
adequate for rejected aircraft parts/components).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 4.7.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator has a process for segregating aircraft serviceable parts, aircraft non-
serviceable parts, and non-aircraft parts.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for a parts segregation process in the AMO
selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying acceptable AMO process
for segregating parts).
Observed segregated parts.
Observed aircraft parts/components management/handling (focus: process for segregating
serviceable/non-serviceable/non-aircraft parts/components).
Other Actions (Specify)
MNT 4.7.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that handles, or
performs maintenance on, electrostatic sensitive devices (ESD) for the Operator has an ESD
Program. Such ESD program shall comply with applicable manufacturer instructions and the
specifications contained in Table 4.8. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified the requirement criteria for an ESD program in the AMO selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying acceptable AMO ESD
program).
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure maintenance organizations comply with storage
recommendations from the manufacturers, with particular emphasis on recommendations with
respect to temperature and humidity.
Consideration is to be given to the scope of work of the AMO in determining applicability of specific
handling and/or storage requirements.
4.8 (Intentionally open)
4.9 Procedures Manual
MNT 4.10.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization that performs
maintenance for the Operator produces a completed and signed maintenance release that certifies
all maintenance work performed has been completed satisfactorily and in accordance with the
approved data and procedures described in the MPM of the maintenance organization. Such
maintenance release shall include:
(i) Basic details of the maintenance performed;
(ii) A reference of the approved data used and, if required, the revision status;
(iii) Maintenance tasks that were not accomplished;
(iv) The date maintenance was completed;
(v) When applicable, identity of the approved maintenance organization;
(vi) Identity of the person(s) that sign the release. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified the requirement criteria for the production of the maintenance release in the AMO
selection process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: verifying AMO production of
completed/signed maintenance release that certifies maintenance performed in accordance with
MPM).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: production of complete maintenance release for
specific maintenance activity being performed).
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (focus: production of complete
maintenance release for specific maintenance activity being performed).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Maintenance Organization Exposition.
An operator has the option of defining when the revision status of approved data (that was used
during the performance of maintenance) must be included in the maintenance release. The process
that defines such requirement is typically documented in the operator's MMM.
A requirement for the documented revision status to be part of the maintenance release might
depend on the particular approved data that is referenced. For example, if the Aircraft Maintenance
Manual that was used for maintenance is distributed online, there would be an online record of the
revision that was available at the time of maintenance, which might obviate the need for that
information to be documented in the maintenance release. Conversely, the revision status of certain
engineering documents and/or drawings might not be found online or be otherwise available, in
which case the operator could opt to require the revision status to be included in the maintenance
release for the purpose of ensuring traceability.
Aircraft CRS
A Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) is required before flight:
• At the completion of any maintenance package specified by the aircraft operator;
• At the completion of any defect rectification, while the aircraft operates flight services
between scheduled maintenance.
The maintenance package may include any one or a combination of the following elements: a check
or inspection from the operator's aircraft maintenance program, Airworthiness Directives, overhauls,
repairs, modifications, aircraft component replacements and defect rectification.
New defects or incomplete maintenance work orders identified during maintenance are brought to
the attention of the operator for the specific purpose of obtaining agreement to rectify such defects or
complete the missing elements of the maintenance work order. In the case where the aircraft
operator declines to have such maintenance carried out and provided this missing element/defect
does not affect the airworthiness of the aircraft, this fact is entered in the aircraft CRS before issue of
such certificate.
Component CRS
A CRS is necessary at the completion of any maintenance on an aircraft component while off the
aircraft.
The authorized release certificate/airworthiness approval tag constitutes the aircraft component
certificate of release to service when one AMO maintains an aircraft component for another AMO.
When an AMO maintains an aircraft component for use by the organization, an authorized release
certificate/airworthiness approval tag may or may not be necessary, depending upon the
organization's internal release procedures defined in the maintenance organization exposition and
approved by the Authority.
MNT 4.11.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure each maintenance organization
that performs maintenance for the Operator has procedures to control and document the
calibration and records of all tools, including personnel-owned tools, and preventing out-of-service
and due-for-calibration tools and equipment from being used, in accordance with specifications in
Table 4.10. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the requirement criteria for the tool calibration in the AMO selection
process.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected AMO selection records.
Examined selected AMO oversight/monitoring reports (focus: process for verifying acceptable
AMO tool calibration program).
Observed line maintenance operations (focus: proper calibration of tools used in maintenance
activity being performed).
Observed aircraft part/component installation/replacement (focus: proper calibration of tools
used in maintenance activity being performed).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The control of these tools and equipment requires that the organization has a procedure to
inspect/service and, where appropriate, calibrate such items on a regular basis and indicate to users
that the item is within any inspection or service or calibration time limit. A clear system of labeling of
all tooling, equipment and test equipment is therefore necessary, providing information on:
• When the next inspection or service or calibration is due;
• Whether the item is serviceable or unserviceable and the reason for its unserviceability.
A register is maintained for all precision tooling and equipment together with a record of calibrations
and standards used.
Inspection, service or calibration of tools and equipment on a regular basis is in accordance with the
equipment manufacturer's instructions except where the maintenance organization can justify by
means of results that a different time period is appropriate in a particular case.
The procedural approach complies with the applicable standards authority (e.g. US Bureau of
Standards or a country's approved standards certificate from the testing facility).
** The signature and identity shall: (1) be traceable to the individual making the entry; and (2) satisfy the
requirements specified in the aircraft release to service procedure of the MMM (i.e. be either a
handwritten or electronic signature system or company-controlled stamp identity system, as approved by
the Authority).
Applicability
Section 5 addresses the safety and security requirements associated with the aircraft passenger cabin. All
standards and recommended practices (ISARPs) in this section are applicable to an operator that
conducts passenger flights with cabin crew.
Individual CAB provisions or sub-specifications within a CAB provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable unless determined otherwise by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase “If the Operator...” are applicable if the Operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
• Begin with a conditional phrase “If the Operator conducts passenger flights with or without cabin
crew…” are applicable if the Operator conducts passenger flights without cabin crew.
Additional ISARPs applicable to an operator that conducts passenger flights without cabin crew are
located in Section 2 (FLT) of this manual.
Specifications applicable to the carriage of supernumeraries are located in Section 2 (FLT) of this manual.
Where an operator outsources the performance of cabin operations functions to external service providers,
the operator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the management of safety in such operations and
must demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service providers in accordance with
CAB 1.10.2.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 5, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
Refer to the IATA Cabin Operations Best Practices Guide for practical information and guidance related to
cabin safety policies and procedures, (http://www.iata.org/publications/Pages/cabin-safety-guide.aspx).
CAB 1.2.4
The Operator shall ensure the duties and responsibilities of cabin crew members are defined and
described in the Operations Manual (OM). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed defined cabin crew member duties and responsibilities in the OM.
Interviewed cabin operations manager/designated management representative(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Cabin Crew Member and Operations Manual (OM).
The intent of this provision is that OM documentation describes:
• Duties and responsibilities for cabin crew members, including, if applicable, cabin crew
leader;
• Chain and succession of command on board the aircraft.
CAB 1.2.5
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members maintain familiarity with laws, regulations and
procedures pertinent to the performance of their duties. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed method for ensuring cabin crew members maintain familiarity with
applicable laws, regulation and procedures.
Interviewed cabin operations manager/designated management representative(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator might use other methods that complement training to ensure cabin crew members
remain knowledgeable of the laws, regulations, rules, guidelines and other information that is
relevant in the performance of duties. For example, cabin crew members might have destination-
specific information or briefing books that explain the customs and immigration processes associated
with flying into foreign destinations. Additionally, laws, regulations and procedures might be reviewed
to the extent necessary during cabin crew briefings prior to duty assignments.
1.3 Communication
CAB 1.3.2
The Operator shall have processes to ensure information relevant to cabin crew policies, procedures
and responsibilities is communicated to all cabin crew members, and to ensure essential operational
information or guidance is communicated to the cabin crew prior to each flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for communication of information relevant
policies/procedures/responsibilities to cabin crew members prior to each flight.
Interviewed cabin operations manager/designated management representative(s).
Examined examples of information provided to cabin crew members prior to flight.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew has received essential operational
information/guidance prior to flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Processes are in place to ensure information regarding policies, procedures and responsibilities is
made available to cabin crew members on a regular and timely basis. Vehicles for communication
typically include the OM, operations bulletins, bulletin board notices, safety bulletins, electronic
platforms, electronic computer messages, telephone calls or any other effective means.
Also, a process is in place to ensure essential information necessary for the safe conduct of a flight is
communicated to the cabin crew prior to the departure of each flight or series of flights. Such process
would include a means for cabin crew members to acknowledge receipt of essential information.
Written or verbal confirmation to a responsible manager that is recorded is considered an acceptable
means of acknowledgement.
1.4 Provision of Resources
CAB 1.6.2
If required by the Authority, the Operator shall have a process to ensure the OM, including updates
and revisions, is submitted for acceptance or approval. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for submission of OM, including updates/revisions, to Authority
for acceptance/approval.
Interviewed responsible management representative(s).
Examined examples of acceptance/approvals of recent revisions to the cabin (OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The OM contains a list of effective pages and, if applicable, displays evidence of approval or
acceptance by the Authority.
The manual (or revisions) is (are) typically accepted or approved, as applicable, prior to issuance to
cabin crew members and before any operational procedures contained in the manual are
implemented.
In some states, the regulatory authority might have a passive process for providing acceptance of the
manual. In such case, the process defines the procedural steps and provides a record of the
completed steps and date of acceptance.
CAB 1.6.5
The Operator shall ensure a minimum of one complete version of the OM as specified in CAB 1.6.1 is
accessible on board the aircraft for passenger flights and located in a manner that provides for:
(i) If used directly for the conduct of cabin operations, immediate access by each cabin crew
member;
(ii) If used as a reference document only, unobstructed access by the cabin crew. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed onboard availability/access of OM to cabin crew members.
Interviewed cabin operations manager/designated management representative(s).
Observed line cabin operations (focus: onboard accessibility of complete version of OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) Practical Manual.
The number of complete OMs on board the aircraft would be determined by how the manual is used
by the cabin crew.
It is not envisaged that the cabin crew would refer to the OM during an emergency situation or when
an immediate response is required (e.g. during critical stages of flight). Therefore, there is no
requirement for the OM to be immediately available to cabin crew members while they are seated in
crew seats.
The onboard OM may be in the form of hard printed copies or as electronic media installed on fixed
or portable electronic devices.
Provision of the OM electronically, either within an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) or installed on cabin
crew personal electronic devices, can offer more immediate availability of the OM to cabin crew
members within their working environment or on their person. In any case, one or more access
terminals or devices would be located so the cabin crew has immediate and/or unobstructed access
to the OM as applicable to the way the manual is used, the size of the aircraft, and the number of
cabin crew members.
A safety risk assessment would typically be conducted to determine appropriate mitigations, policies
and procedures to ensure sufficient charging of the device(s) for the duration of the flight and to
address the possibility of a device malfunction preventing access to the OM.
Item (i) specifies the use of the onboard OM directly for the conduct of cabin operational functions
(e.g. using checklists, making cabin announcements). When the OM is used in this manner, because
each cabin crew member will require access at any time to perform their duties, it might be necessary
to have more than one copy available depending on the size of the aircraft and the number of cabin
crew members.
Item (ii) specifies the use of the onboard OM only as a reference manual, which would occur when a
practical manual is used directly for the conduct of cabin operational functions (see CAB 1.6.7). For
example, the OM might be used as a reference to perform a more detailed check of a policy or
process. Where the OM is used only as a reference, a minimum of one copy, either electronic or
printed, would be required and located so cabin crew members always has access. The flight deck
may be an acceptable location for the OM if there are no other suitable locations within the cabin.
CAB 1.6.7
If the Operator publishes a practical manual for use by the cabin crew in the performance of cabin
operations duties, the Operator shall ensure one or more copies of the up-to-date practical manual
are on board the aircraft for passenger flights and located in a manner that provides for immediate
access by each cabin crew member. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed onboard availability/access of practical manual to cabin crew members.
Interviewed cabin operations manager/designated management representative(s).
Examined practical manual used by cabin crew members.
Observed line cabin operations (if applicable) (focus: one or more copies of up-to-date practical
manual on board; cabin crew has immediate access to practical manual).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Practical Manual.
A practical manual (or QRH, QRM) is a condensed version of the OM designed for use by personnel
in conducting frontline operations. It contains selected reference information, policies, procedures,
illustrations, memory aids, checklists and/or other material necessary from the OM to ensure
standardization in performing normal duties and addressing non-normal, abnormal and/or
emergency situations.
A practical manual is typically required to be in the possession of each individual cabin crew member
in electronic or printed format, or available at each cabin crew station or other location that ensures
immediate access by each cabin crew member.
1.7 Records System
CAB 1.11.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program in the cabin operations organization that
includes a combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in cabin operations (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of cabin operations in the organization-wide, cross-discipline safety
hazard identification program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform analysis of cabin operational data for the purpose of
identifying hazards.
Examined examples of hazards to aircraft operations that have been identified through data
collection and analysis in cabin operations.
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations), Risk Management and Safety
Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
CAB 1.11.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program in the cabin operations
organization that specifies processes to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in cabin operations.
[SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its cabin operations risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant cabin operations hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) across the cabin operations organization capture risk assessment information,
risk mitigation (control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment and mitigation program in cabin operations (focus:
hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action; action
implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of cabin operations in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform safety risk assessments in cabin operations.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment and resulting risk
mitigation action(s) in cabin operations.
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA),
Safety Risk Management and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
Potential hazards typically associated within cabin operations include, but are not limited to:
• Inadvertent slide deployment;
• Smoke/fire/fumes;
• Turbulence;
• Unruly passengers;
• Cabin crew injury/incapacitation;
• Carriage of lithium batteries in the cabin;
• Inflight product and services;
• Service of hot food and beverages.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
CAB 1.11.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system in the cabin operations organization
that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates cabin operations personnel to submit reports that identify safety
hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
(ii) Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
(iii) Includes analysis and cabin operations management action to address safety issues
identified through the reporting system. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in cabin operations (focus: system
urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in cabin
operations.
Examined data that confirm an effective cabin operations safety reporting system (focus:
quantity of reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected cabin operations safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to
identify and address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
Safety Performance Monitoring and Management
CAB 2.1.1A
The Operator shall have a training and evaluation program that is approved or accepted by the
Authority, and that ensures cabin crew members understand their responsibilities and are competent
to perform the duties and functions associated with cabin operations. The cabin crew training
program shall also, as a minimum, address:
(i) Initial qualification;
(ii) Continuing qualification;
(iii) Re-qualification;
(iv) If applicable, aircraft transition or conversion;
(v) If applicable, other specialized training requirements;
(vi) If applicable, each traditional training program requirement that is replaced by a
requirement under an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) as approved or
accepted by the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for specified training/qualification courses applicable to each
aircraft type in cabin crew training/evaluation program.
Identified/Assessed program elements under AQP (as applicable); program has regulatory
approval.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined training/qualification course curriculum (focus: inclusion of applicable
training/qualification courses).
Examined training/qualification records of selected cabin crew members (focus: completion of
applicable training/qualification courses).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and Continuing
Qualification.
AQP incorporates the elements and specifications contained in CAB 2.1.1B, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
CAB 2.1.1B
If the Operator conducts cabin crew training and evaluation in accordance with an AQP, such AQP
shall be approved or accepted by the Authority and incorporate the applicable elements and
specifications contained in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed cabin crew AQP (focus: regulatory approval, incorporation of
elements/specifications in accordance with Tables 5.2 and 5.3).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined initial/recurrent/requalification/aircraft type course curricula/syllabi for training of cabin
crew members.
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance
for the development of an AQP. Such guidance might be derived from one or more of the following
source references, as applicable:
• Office of the Federal Register, (2 October 1990), Special Federal Aviation
Regulation 58–Advanced Qualification Program, Federal Register, Vol. 55, No. 91, Rules
and Regulations (pp. 40262–40278).
• FAA 14 CFR Part 121, Subpart Y.
• FAA Advisory Circular 120–54A, Advanced Qualification Program (23 June 2006).
• FAA Advisory Circular 120–51 (3 January 1995), Crew Resource Management Training,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.
• Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the
development of an advanced training and qualification program designed to conform to the
specifications of Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
CAB 2.1.2
The Operator shall ensure all cabin crew members complete an initial training course:
(i) As part of the cabin crew qualification process for individuals who have not previously been
qualified as a cabin crew member for the Operator;
(ii) Prior to being assigned duties as a cabin crew member. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for completion of initial training by cabin crew members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined records of initial training of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An AQP may allow for deviations and/or an abbreviated curriculum for initial/new hire cabin crew
training in a merger or acquisition situation.
CAB 2.1.3
The Operator shall ensure all cabin crew members complete a recurrent training course once every
12 months or, if applicable, in accordance with the Operator's AQP as specified in CAB 2.1.1B in
order to remain qualified to perform duties as a cabin crew member. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for completion of recurrent training by cabin crew members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined records of recurrent training of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator typically has a process that tracks qualification requirements to ensure cabin crew
members complete recurrent training in a timely manner to remain qualified.
The nominal cycle for the completion of the recurrent training course by each cabin crew member is
12 months and, during that period, each cabin crew member receives training in the subject areas
applicable to the course for that 12-month period.
As a means of ensuring flexibility in the scheduling process, in some regulatory jurisdictions an
operator may be permitted to increase the maximum cycle for the completion of recurrent training by
cabin crew members up to 15 months with no change to the original training anniversary date of each
cabin crew member. Such flexibility, however, would not alter the requirement for a basic 12-month
recurrent training cycle for cabin crew members.
In the event a cabin crew member becomes unqualified for any reason (e.g., extended leave of
absence), completion of re-qualification training would establish a new anniversary date
(superseding the original anniversary date) upon which recurrent training would be based.
An AQP may have an approved extension to the duration of Continuing Qualification cycle if
evidence substantiates the extension maintains or increases the level of safety for the operator. A
Continuing Qualification cycle may be extended up to a maximum of 39 months. Additionally, an
individual crewmember may be assigned an augmented or additional training and/or evaluation
schedule based on performance during training, qualification or in line operations.
CAB 2.1.4
The Operator shall have a cabin crew requalification training course, which shall be completed:
(i) By individuals who have failed to remain qualified as a cabin crew member;
(ii) As part of the process to regain qualification to perform duties as a cabin crew member;
(iii) If applicable, in accordance with the Operator's AQP as specified in CAB 2.1.1B. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for completion of requalification training by cabin crew
members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined records of requalification training of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator typically has a process that tracks qualification requirements to ensure, when cabin crew
members become unqualified for any reason, such crew members complete applicable
requalification training prior to being assigned to perform duties as a cabin crew member.
An AQP typically includes remediation methodology in its approved documentation describing
strategies that will be used to remediate unsuccessful testing, validation, or evaluation. Remediation
may not require completion of a requalification course. An AQP may allow for flexibility of
requalification requirements based on the Qualification Standards and additional parameters set by
the operator. Any deviations from traditional training requirements will be included in its approved
documentation.
CAB 2.1.1B addresses overall AQP elements and specifications, as well as Authority
approval/acceptance requirements.
CAB 2.1.5
The Operator shall have aircraft type training, which shall be completed by cabin crew members as
part of the process to qualify and remain qualified to perform cabin crew duties on each type of
aircraft to which they may be assigned. As a minimum, subjects covered under aircraft type training
shall include:
(i) Aircraft systems;
(ii) Exit locations and operation;
(iii) Emergency equipment locations and operation;
(iv) Emergency assignments;
(v) Unique features of the aircraft cabin (as applicable for variants of a common aircraft
type). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for completion of aircraft type training by cabin crew
members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined course syllabus for aircraft type training of cabin crew members.
Examined records of aircraft type training of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An aircraft type training course for cabin crew members would include the description, locations and
operation of an aircraft and its equipment.
Instruction in aircraft systems typically includes:
• Aircraft interior, passenger seats and restraints;
• Crew member seats and restraints;
• Aircraft-specific duties and responsibilities;
• Galley systems;
• Communication systems;
• Lighting systems;
• Oxygen systems.
Instruction on exit locations and operation addresses the types of exits on an aircraft.
Instruction on emergency equipment locations and operation addresses slides, rafts, slide/rafts, ramp
slide/rafts, life jackets and other flotation devices.
Sub-specification iv): The term “emergency assignments” refers to specific duties assigned to cabin
crew members during emergency situations.
A process, in accordance with requirements of the Authority, would be used to qualify cabin crew
members that concurrently operate aircraft of different types or operate variants within one aircraft
type. The qualification process would typically address the differences between variants or types.
CAB 2.1.6
The Operator shall require instructors and evaluators that train and/or evaluate cabin crew members
to successfully complete an instructor and/or evaluator training course that ensures such instructors
and evaluators have an adequate level of knowledge and standardization to provide, as applicable,
instruction or evaluation in the cabin crew training program. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements for completion of instructor/evaluator training by
instructors/evaluator that deliver training courses to or evaluate cabin crew members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined course curriculum/syllabus for training of cabin crew training instructors.
Examined records of instructor training of selected cabin crew training instructors/evaluators.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The syllabus for the cabin crew instructor training program typically focuses on instruction techniques
and provides the level of technical knowledge relevant to the areas in which the individual instructor
will deliver instruction.
An AQP typically distinguishes between instructor and evaluator duty positions. However, the
instructor/evaluator role may be assumed by the same person. Distinct training is typically provided
focusing on instruction and evaluation techniques.
• Included in Recurrent Training: Indicates whether the training specified in the provision must
be included as part of recurrent training/continuing qualification and, as applicable, specifies
the maximum recurrent interval.
• Conformance through AQP: Indicates whether the specified training and/or evaluation,
including the associated recurrent training/continuing qualification interval, if any, may be
replaced by equivalent requirements as part of, as applicable, the operator’s AQP.
CAB 2.2.2
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training that provides knowledge of safety
policies and procedures associated with the preflight, in-flight and post-flight phases of cabin
operations. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP/
Training ATQP/EBT
Yes* Yes Yes (every 24 months) Yes
* Where multiple aircraft types are operated, this training shall cover all relevant aircraft-specific
differences in safety equipment and/or safety and security procedures.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of preflight/inflight/post-flight safety training for
cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training courses for cabin crew
members, including regulatory requirement for frequency of recurrent training courses.
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training in safety policies and procedures typically addresses:
• Crew coordination and communication;
• Sterile flight deck;
• Mandatory briefings;
• Safety checks;
• Passenger acceptance and handling;
• Cabin baggage;
• Personal electronic devices;
• Fueling with passengers on board;
• Turbulence;
• Flight and cabin crew member incapacitation;
• Flight deck access.
CAB 2.2.3
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training that provides the knowledge
required to execute emergency procedures. Such training shall, as a minimum, address emergency
procedures associated with:
(i) Cabin fires;
(ii) Smoke and fumes;
(iii) Emergency landing (land and water);
(iv) Planned cabin evacuation (land and water);
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
Yes* Yes Yes (every 24 months) Yes
* Where multiple aircraft types are operated, this training shall cover all relevant aircraft-specific
differences in safety equipment and/or safety and security procedures.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of cabin emergency procedures training in
cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent emergency procedures training
courses for cabin crew members, including regulatory requirement for frequency of recurrent
training courses.
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
CAB 2.2.4
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training that provides the knowledge
required to understand the function and operation of cabin emergency equipment and to execute
associated preflight checks. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
Yes Yes Yes (every 24 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of cabin emergency equipment training in cabin
crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses (focus: function/operation of equipment).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent emergency equipment training
courses for cabin crew members, including regulatory requirement for frequency of recurrent
training courses.
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Aircraft type-training courses may include training in the use of specific emergency equipment such
as slides, rafts, slide/rafts and ramp slide/rafts.
CAB 2.2.5
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members complete practical training exercises consisting of
cabin drills and hands-on operation of cabin equipment. As a minimum, focus areas within the scope
of practical training exercises shall include:
(i) Cabin exit operations (normal and emergency) for each aircraft and exit type;
(ii) Cabin emergency evacuation;
(iii) If the operator uses aircraft equipped with cabin doors that have emergency egress slides:
(a) Initial training: Use of emergency egress slide(s);
(b) Requalification and recurrent training: Use of emergency egress slide(s) in
accordance with requirements of the Authority.
(iv) Firefighting;
(v) Oxygen administration;
(vi) If required, ditching. (GM)
Note: If applicable, cabin crew members may complete practical training exercises through
participation in event management scenarios in accordance with the Operator's AQP as specified in
CAB 2.1.1B.
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
Yes Yes Yes* Yes
* All focus areas within the scope of practical training exercises shall be addressed not less than
once every 36 months.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of practical training exercises (cabin drills and
hands-on operation of cabin equipment) in cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training
courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training exercises in courses for
cabin crew members (focus: frequency of exercises/courses and regulatory requirement for
frequency of recurrent training exercises/courses).
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Wet Drill.
Practical training exercises to satisfy this provision typically include procedures associated with the
use of cabin systems and equipment, to include the public address and intercom systems, life-rafts,
life preservers, PBE/smoke hoods, as well as operation of the door(s), deployment and use of
emergency egress slide(s), fighting an actual or simulated fire, operation of hand fire extinguishers,
passenger briefings and in-flight decompression (group drill).
Personal electronic devices powered by rechargeable lithium-ion (LI) batteries are common in the
passenger cabin. The batteries in such devices have the potential for overheating (thermal runaway),
explosion and fire. An operator might consider a practical training exercise that simulates a LI battery
fire in the cabin, thus requiring the cabin crew members to implement firefighting procedures
appropriate for this type of fire.
Hands-on practical training exercises might involve the use of actual aircraft emergency and
lifesaving equipment or might be conducted using realistic and functional simulators or mock-ups.
A requirement for a practical training exercise for ditching is determined by the State. An operator
that conducts over-water and/or long-range over-water flights would typically ensure cabin crew
members complete practical training exercises in ditching.
An operator might elect to include a wet drill as part of initial training as a means of providing hands-
on familiarization with ditching equipment and procedures. A wet drill would require cabin crew
members to go into the water and then climb into a raft, or to board a raft in the water directly from an
aircraft exit (with cabin crew members not going into the water).
When using the actual aircraft to conduct training in emergency exit operations, emergency operation
can be simulated by disarming the exits and having the trainee accomplish all steps as though the
door were armed.
Due to challenges and problems associated with using actual aircraft systems, cabin simulators or
training mock-ups are typically used to the extent possible. If cabin exit simulators or training mock-
ups are not available, practical hands-on drills are performed on board actual aircraft, which, to
preclude disruption of training, would necessitate a documented program and aircraft schedule.
CAB 2.2.6
If the Operator uses pressurized aircraft, the Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive
training in high altitude depressurization. Such training shall provide:
(i) An understanding of the effects on crew and passengers;
(ii) The knowledge necessary to execute associated emergency procedures. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
Yes* Yes Yes (every 24 months) Yes
* Where multiple aircraft types are operated, this training shall cover all relevant aircraft-specific
differences in safety equipment and/or safety and security procedures.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of high-altitude depressurization training in
cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training courses for cabin crew
members (focus: effects on crew and passengers, execution of associated emergency
procedures and frequency of recurrent training courses).
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training in depressurization may be conducted in the classroom, via distance and/or e-learning, as a
practical exercise, or by using a combination of methods.
A video presentation on the effects of hypoxia and a re-enactment of an explosive depressurization
to emphasize the visual effects on the crew and passengers is an example of one means of
presenting depressurization training. A presentation that includes photos, accompanied by a group
discussion, is another example of a means of presenting such material.
CAB 2.2.7
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training in dangerous goods awareness,
recognition and emergency action. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
No Yes Yes* Yes
* All subjects within the scope of dangerous goods training shall be addressed not less than once
within the 24-month period from the previous training in dangerous goods.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of dangerous goods training
(awareness/recognition/emergency action) in cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training
courses.
Examined regulatory requirement for frequency of training in dangerous goods in cabin crew
recurrent training.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training courses for cabin crew
members.
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
This provision specifies the minimum dangerous goods awareness training required for cabin crew
members and is applicable to an operator regardless of whether such operator transports or does not
transport dangerous goods.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending
on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is completed within a validity period that expires 24 months
from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a
competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of
the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the
recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period.
If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months of the validity period, the new
validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
CAB 2.2.8
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training in human performance to gain an
understanding of the human factors involved in conducting cabin safety duties and coordinating with
the flight crew during the execution of onboard emergency procedures. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
No Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of cabin operations human performance
training in cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training courses in human
performance for cabin crew members (focus: cabin safety duties, coordination with flight crew
during execution of onboard emergency procedures, regulatory requirements for frequency of
recurrent training courses).
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Crew Resource management (CRM), Human Factors
Principles and Human Performance.
Training in human performance usually includes basic human factors concepts and crew resource
management (CRM).
CAB 2.2.9
If the Operator uses aircraft that require more than one cabin crew member, the Operator shall
ensure cabin crew members receive training that provides the necessary awareness of other cabin
crew assignments and procedures to assure fulfillment of all cabin crew duties in the event of an
emergency situation.
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
No Yes Yes (every 24 months) Yes
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of cabin crew assignments/procedures
awareness training in cabin crew initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined curriculum/syllabus of initial/requalification/recurrent training courses for cabin crew
members (focus: awareness of other cabin crew assignments, fulfillment of cabin crew duties
during emergency situations, regulatory requirements for frequency of recurrent training
courses).
Examined training records of selected cabin crew members.
Other Actions (Specify)
CAB 2.2.11
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members receive training that provides knowledge in first aid
and inflight medical events. As a minimum, subjects within the scope of first aid training include:
(i) Life-threatening medical emergencies;
(ii) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR);
(iii) Management of injuries;
(iv) Management of illnesses;
(v) First-aid equipment and supplies;
(vi) If applicable, medical equipment and supplies. (GM)
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
No Yes Yes* Yes
* All subjects within the scope of first aid training shall be addressed every 36 months.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for completion of first aid training in cabin crew
initial/requalification/recurrent training courses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
• Medical problems:
○ The unconscious (underlying causes);
○ Suspected communicable diseases;
○ Respiratory disorders (asthma, hyperventilation, chronic lung diseases,
persistent coughing);
○ Cardiovascular disorders (angina, heart attack, shock, DVT);
○ Abdominal problems (vomiting, diarrhea, pain, heartburn, bleeding);
○ Nervous system disorders (headache, seizure, stroke);
○ Ear, nose and throat problems such as barotrauma (body damage caused
by pressurization difference) and/or epistaxis (nose bleed);
○ Behavioral/psychological disorders (panic attack, alcohol intoxication,
irrational behavior);
○ Other problems (diabetes, allergic reaction, pregnancy related).
• Trauma:
○ Wounds and bleeding (practical training);
○ Burns;
○ Head and neck injury;
○ Eye injury;
○ Musculoskeletal injury;
○ Chest and abdominal injury.
Initial training would typically address all the subject areas listed above.
Unless there were changes to the altitude physiology, travel health and regulations components, it
would not be necessary to review these areas each year. However, in the event of changes, cabin
crew members would typically be promptly advised, and such changes may then be addressed
during the next recurrent training.
The procedures, resources and first aid subject areas may be addressed in recurrent training, to
include testing and evaluation. Selected elements included in these subject areas would be
addressed each year in recurrent training such that all elements are addressed during every
36-month period or, if applicable, in accordance with the Operator's AQP.
CPR is a lifesaving procedure that requires practice in order to maintain competence. Therefore, it is
recommended that cabin crew members complete recurrent training in the most current CPR
procedures on an annual basis.
It is recommended that elements chosen to be reviewed each year be built into practical scenarios.
Scenario-based training is advantageous because:
• It requires the crew to function as a team;
• Scenarios might be designed to cover multiple aspects of first aid, as well as subjects from
other areas, such as altitude physiology and regulations;
• It stimulates participation and improves retention.
Other training methods would also be acceptable as long as it can be reasonably established that
cabin crew members have the knowledge and skills to apply first aid and lifesaving procedures at any
given time.
CAB 2.2.12
The Operator shall ensure cabin crew members complete initial and recurrent security training as
approved or accepted by the State, and in accordance with the Operator's security training program
as specified in SEC 2.1.1. Cabin crew security training shall address the following subject areas:
(i) Determination of the seriousness of any occurrence;
(ii) Causes of disruptive behavior on board and management of such types of incidents;
(iii) Crew communication and coordination;
Conformance Applicability
Specific to Aircraft Included in Included in Recurrent Conformance
Type Initial/Requalification Training through AQP
Training
No Yes Yes (every 36 months) Yes
Note: Cabin crew members shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to
operational duties.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed cabin crew security training program (focus: approval/acceptance by the
State; meets applicable requirements of other states).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training/qualification course curricula/syllabi (focus: security
training is included; required subjects are addressed).
Examined selected cabin crew member training/qualification records (focus: completion of
security training training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Security Program.
Cabin crew members are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and thereby
require an awareness of obligations to the Security Program of the operator.
Crew security training would normally be in accordance with applicable regulations and/or the civil
aviation security program of the State, and where no regulatory guidance exists, in accordance with
the policy of the operator.
Specific subject areas included in recurrent security training are typically identified and derived from
an analysis of actual or likely situations or trends experienced during line operations.
Fight deck access as specified in item (iv) would typically include persons authorized for flight deck
access as well as flight deck entry/exit procedures.
Non-lethal devices as specified in item (vi) typically include handcuffs or restraints.
Training as specified in item (vii) typically addresses topics or tactics as appropriate for the operator
that might be associated with or could be used to facilitate crew-passenger reaction to or interaction
with hijackers (e.g. conflict management, use of passive or non-passive cooperation, understanding
Stockholm Syndrome, identification of and response to hijacker types/motives).
Training exercises as specified in item (viii) are typically interactive in nature, and scenarios or
situations (e.g. bomb threat, hijacking, unruly passenger) may be presented using various accepted
training methods (e.g. live role playing, table top, computer-based training).
Training as specified in item (xi) is applicable to aircraft types that have designated least-risk bomb
locations.
3 Line Operations
CAB 3.1.1
The Operator shall specify and require a minimum number of cabin crew members for each aircraft
type to ensure a safe and expeditious aircraft evacuation and to perform the necessary functions in
an emergency. Such minimum cabin crew specification(s) shall:
(i) Be based on aircraft seating capacity or number of passengers carried;
(ii) Be in accordance with minimum cabin crew requirements of the Authority;
(iii) If the Operator has procedures for a temporary reduction of minimum cabin crew
complement during a case of incapacitation or unforeseen circumstances at a stopover
(layover) point where a replacement cannot be obtained, require such procedures to be
approved or accepted by the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed minimum cabin crew specification(s) (focus: specifications cover each
aircraft type; are based on aircraft seating capacity or number of passengers carried; are in
accordance with requirements of the Authority).
Identified regulatory requirement for minimum cabin crew complement for each aircraft type.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined onboard documentation specifying minimum cabin crew requirements.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew complement in accordance with minimum
cabin crew requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of State Acceptance and State Approval.
CAB 3.1.2
If the Operator uses aircraft that require more than one cabin crew member, the Operator shall
ensure, for flights on such aircraft:
(i) Designation of a suitably qualified cabin crew leader who has overall responsibility for the
conduct and coordination of normal and emergency cabin procedures.
(ii) A defined delegation of leadership duties during inflight rest periods and/or in the event of
unexpected incapacitation of the cabin crew leader. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed means of designating cabin crew leaders for flights with more than one
cabin crew member.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined responsibilities cabin crew leaders.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: designation of a cabin crew leader).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The position of cabin crew leader might have a different title or name according to the operator (e.g.
purser, lead flight attendant, senior cabin crew member or onboard leader).
Suitably qualified cabin crew leaders are normally those with a prerequisite amount of experience as
an operating cabin crew member, as defined by the operator (e.g. one year of full-time experience)
and who have completed cabin crew leadership training as specified in CAB 2.2.13.
New operators could be required to establish alternative minimum experience requirements.
Leadership duties would normally be delegated during incapacitation or inflight rest periods to a
cabin crew member who has undergone the operator’s cabin crew leadership training course or, if
none have had leadership training, the most experienced cabin crew member.
CAB 3.1.4A
The Operator shall have a methodology for the purpose of managing fatigue-related safety risks to
ensure fatigue occurring in one flight, successive flights or accumulated over a period of time does
not impair a cabin crew member's alertness and ability to perform safety-related cabin duties. Such
methodology shall consist of:
(i) Flight time, flight duty period, duty period limitations and rest period requirements that are in
accordance with the applicable prescriptive fatigue management regulations of the State,
and/or,
(ii) If applicable, the Operator's Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) approved or
accepted by the State and established in accordance with CAB 3.1.4B. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements/methodology for cabin crew fatigue management and/or
FRMS in accordance with regulations of the State.
Identified/Assessed FRMS (if applicable) (focus: approved/accepted by State, incorporates
elements as specified in CAB 3.1.4B).
Identified/Assessed tracking/scheduling processes (focus: processes take into account cabin
crew time/flight duty period/duty period/rest period limitations in the duty assignment of cabin
crew members).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed selected scheduling personnel.
Examined selected cabin crew duty assignment records/rosters (focus: examples of application
of cabin crew fatigue management limitations/mitigations).
Observed cabin crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling includes management of fatigue-
related safety risk).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS).
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator establishes a methodology for the management
of cabin crew member fatigue in a manner that:
• Is based upon scientific principles and knowledge;
• Is consistent with the prescriptive fatigue management and/or FRMS regulations of the State;
• Precludes fatigue from endangering safety of the flight.
Where authorized by the State, the operator may use a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) in
accordance with CAB 3.1.4B alone or in combination with prescriptive flight time, flight duty period,
duty period limitations and rest period requirements as the means for managing fatigue-related risks.
Guidance for the implementation of an FRMS is contained in the IATA Fatigue Management Guide
for Airline Operators and, as applicable, other reference documents approved or accepted by the
State for the purpose of FRMS implementation (e.g. FAA, AC 120–103A–Fatigue Risk Management
Systems for Aviation Safety).
CAB 3.1.4B
If the Operator uses an FRMS to manage cabin crew fatigue-related safety risks, the Operator shall
incorporate scientific principles and knowledge within the FRMS, comply with any applicable
requirements for managing cabin crew fatigue as established by the State or Authority and, as a
minimum:
(i) Define and document the FRMS policy;
(ii) Incorporate risk management processes for fatigue hazard identification, risk assessment
and risk mitigation;
(iii) Develop and maintain effective FRMS safety assurance processes;
(iv) Establish and implement effective FRMS promotion processes. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed FRMS policy/components/elements, compliance with fatigue risk
management requirements of State/Authority.
Identified/Assessed FRMS processes for cabin crew fatigue-related risk management data
collection/analysis/hazard identification, safety risk assessment, safety risk mitigation/control.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed selected personnel that perform cabin crew fatigue safety risk management
functions.
Examined selected examples of fatigue risk management (focus: hazard identified, risk
assessed, mitigation action developed and implemented).
Observed cabin crew scheduling operations (focus: scheduling includes management of fatigue-
related safety risk in accordance with an approved FRMS).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure fatigue occurring either in one flight, successive flights or
accumulated over a period of time does not impair a cabin crew member's alertness and ability to
safely perform safety-related cabin duties.
Where authorized by the State, the operator may use an FRMS as a means to determine that
variations from prescriptive fatigue management policies demonstrate an acceptable level of safety.
Guidance for the implementation of an FRMS is contained in the IATA Fatigue Management Guide
for Airline Operators and, as applicable, other reference documents approved or accepted by the
State for the purpose of FRMS implementation (e.g. FAA, AC 120–103A–Fatigue Risk Management
Systems for Aviation Safety).
The applicability of this provision is limited to those operations wherein fatigue is managed in
accordance with the FRMS as defined in the operator's FRMS documentation. It is important to note,
however, that an FRMS may be used alone or in combination with prescriptive flight time, flight duty
period limitations and rest period requirements as the means for managing fatigue related risks.
The components of an effective FRMS as specified in this provision are described in the following
table.
CAB 3.1.5
The Operator shall have a process to ensure flight time, flight duty periods and rest periods for cabin
crew members are recorded and retained for a minimum period of time in accordance with applicable
regulations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified process for retention of duty and rest periods.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined time limits for retention of duty and rest periods.
Examined selected records of duty and rest periods.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
For each cabin crew member, flight/duty time records would typically consist of:
• The start, duration and end of each flight duty period;
• The start, duration and end of each duty period;
• Rest periods;
• Flight time.
If computer software is used for cabin crew planning and scheduling, the operator would ensure the
software provides appropriate warnings when individual flight segments or series of flight segments
are projected to exceed applicable maximum or minimum limits.
CAB 3.1.6
The Operator shall consider the following as duty time for the purpose of determining required rest
periods and calculating duty time limitations for operating cabin crew members:
(i) Entire duration of the flight;
(ii) Pre-operating deadhead time;
(iii) Training period(s) immediately prior to a flight;
(iv) Administrative or office time immediately prior to a flight (for cabin crew members that serve
in a management function). (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified the means of calculation of duty time limitations for operating cabin crew members.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined criteria for calculating duty time and rest period limits.
Examined selected records of duty times and rest periods.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM of the definition of Deadheading.
Training periods and administrative or office time before a flight, without an intermediate rest period
before flying duty, is considered continuous duty time.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator considers non-flight duty time that is likely to
induce fatigue into the calculation of duty time limitations and the determination of required rest
periods.
3.2 Cabin Crew Policies and Procedures
CAB 3.2.1
The Operator shall have procedures that specify cabin crew functions, applicable to each aircraft
type, and actions to be executed during an emergency or situation requiring an emergency
evacuation.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for emergencies and emergency evacuations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures that specify cabin crew functions/actions for
an emergency/emergency evacuation situation).
Other Actions (Specify)
CAB 3.2.2
The Operator shall have procedures to ensure a coordinated and expeditious cabin evacuation
during aircraft fueling operations with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking. As a
minimum, procedures shall require:
(i) Cabin exits are designated for rapid deplaning or emergency evacuation, and routes to such
exits are unobstructed;
(ii) The area outside designated emergency evacuation exits is unobstructed;
(iii) One cabin crew member or other qualified person is positioned by the boarding door(s);
(iv) Means of communication are established among cabin crew members and with passengers;
(v) A suitable method of communication is established between qualified persons that monitor
passenger safety and personnel that have responsibility for fueling operations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified the specified procedures for cabin evacuation during aircraft fueling operations with
passengers embarking, on board or disembarking.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedures to ensure coordinate/expeditious
cabin evacuation during fueling operations with passengers on board).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
During fueling operations with passengers on board the aircraft, the designation of exits for rapid
deplaning or evacuation takes into account various factors, which would typically include:
• Aircraft type (e.g. some aircraft types might require the designation of over-wing exits for
evacuation);
• Number of cabin crew members on board;
• The method being used for passenger boarding and/or deplaning (e.g. boarding bridge, air
stairs);
• Exterior obstructions (e.g. catering vehicle) that might render an exit unusable for an
emergency evacuation;
• Interior obstructions (e.g. catering trolley) that might block the route to one or more
emergency evacuation exits.
Cabin crew procedures ensure a method of communication is established.
• Among cabin crew members positioned throughout the cabin for the purpose of coordination
should a passenger evacuation be required (when more than one cabin crew member is
required to be on board);
• Between the cabin crew and passengers (one way) for the purpose of providing instructions
should a passenger evacuation be required;
• Between the cabin crew and the flight crew (when the flight crew is on board) for the purpose
of ensuring notification when fueling operations are in progress and when a passenger
evacuation is required;
• Between the cabin crew and the flight crew and/or ground handling personnel for the
purpose of ensuring notification when fueling operations must be discontinued for any
reason.
CAB 3.2.3
The Operator shall have a procedure to ensure the cabin crew verifies that:
(i) Passenger and crew baggage in the passenger cabin is securely stowed;
(ii) If applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in passenger seats
are properly secured. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedure for cabin crew to verify cabin security (focus: baggage and cargo
packages/passenger items are stowed or properly secured).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedure to verify baggage and cargo
packages/passenger items are stowed or properly secured).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a procedure for verification by the cabin crew
that all baggage and, if applicable, cargo packages and/or passenger items being transported in
passenger seats are stowed or properly secured.
Some operators might transport smaller cargo packages (e.g. mail, COMAT items) secured in cabin
passenger seats.
Some operators might transport certain passenger items secured in cabin passenger seats. These
types of items are typically large, valuable or fragile articles belonging to passengers that are not
conducive to transport as checked baggage or appropriate for stowage in overhead bins/lockers (e.g.
large musical instruments, certain electronic equipment, prominent trophies, works of art). Such
items might thus be secured and carried in a dedicated cabin passenger seat (which might be
purchased by the passenger-owner for the purpose of transporting the item).
Loading procedures and limitations for securing such items are defined in GRH 3.4.12, which is
located in Section 6 (GRH) of this manual.
CAB 3.2.4A
The Operator should have procedures for the opening and closing of aircraft cabin access doors
during normal operations. Such procedures should define:
(i) Who is responsible for opening and closing aircraft cabin access doors;
(ii) When doors should be opened and closed;
(iii) Appropriate methods of communication and/or coordination between the cabin or flight crew
and ground personnel to ensure safety is maintained during normal door operations. (GM)
Note: Effective 1 September 2023, this provision will be upgraded to a standard; IOSA registration
will require conformance by the Operator.
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures for opening and closing cabin access doors.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedures for opening/closing cabin access
doors).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Conformity with this provision is assessed in conjunction with GRH 3.2.5 and, if applicable, FLT
3.13.11.
Depending on aircraft size and type of operation, procedures may require that the flight crew, cabin
crew or ground handling personnel are assigned responsibility for the opening and/or closing of
aircraft cabin access doors.
Procedures and associated responsibilities for opening and closing of cabin access doors can vary
according to the situation (e.g. an operator may have different requirements for a flight with the
cabin/flight crew on board versus an aircraft towing operation without crew on board)
Procedures would address and mitigate safety hazards such as fall from height, entrapment and
personnel injury during door operation.
CAB 3.2.4B
If the Operator uses aircraft equipped with cabin doors that have an automatic slide or slide/raft
deployment system, the Operator shall have cabin crew procedures for arming and disarming such
door systems. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures for arming and disarming door systems.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedures for arming/disarming applicable
cabin door slides/slide rafts).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
This standard addresses door systems that are designed to automatically deploy a slide or slide/raft
for emergency evacuation if the door is opened with the system in the armed mode. Such door
systems are typically armed once the door has been closed for flight and disarmed at the end of a
flight and prior to the door being opened for passenger and/or crew deplaning.
Depending on the type of aircraft and door system, the pack that contains the slide or slide/raft might
be mounted in the door itself, or might be mounted in the fuselage, tail cone or other location.
CAB 3.2.5
The Operator shall require cabin crew members to be seated with their safety harness fastened:
(i) During the takeoff and landing phases of flight;
(ii) Whenever the pilot-in-command (PIC) so directs. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirements and conditions for cabin crew members to be seated with
their safety harness fastened.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew seated/safety harness fastened for
takeoff/landing, when directed by PIC).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The safety harness consists of the seat belt and shoulder straps.
CAB 3.2.7
The Operator shall have procedures for preparation of the cabin prior to takeoff and landing. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for cabin preparation prior to takeoff and landing.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedures for cabin preparation prior to
takeoff/landing).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Preparation of the cabin prior to takeoff and landing would require the cabin crew to visually verify
certain conditions are in effect. Items checked by the cabin crew will vary according to aircraft type
and equipment carried, but typically include:
• Passenger seat belts fastened;
• Tray tables and seat backs in a stowed and upright position;
• Cabin baggage and other carry-on items secure in designated areas;
CAB 3.2.12
If the Operator uses aircraft with electrical system circuit breakers that are accessible to cabin crew
members, the Operator shall have procedures that specify limitations for resetting tripped circuit
breakers by cabin crew members during flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures specifying limitations for resetting tripped circuit breakers by
cabin crew members during flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Interviewed cabin crew members to confirm awareness of limitations for resetting tripped circuit
breakers.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Procedures and limitations with respect to resetting circuit breakers typically include:
• Authority to reset (normally from the PIC);
• Applicable type of equipment;
• Applicable conditions;
• Number of resets permitted.
3.3 Flight Deck Coordination
CAB 3.3.1
The Operator shall have a policy and associated procedures that define a sterile flight deck during
critical phases of flight, to include:
(i) A procedure for communication between the cabin crew and flight crew;
(ii) A procedure for notification of the flight crew in the event of an emergency. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy and procedures that define a sterile flight deck during critical phases
of flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: policy/procedures that define sterile flight deck, address
cabin-flight crew communication).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Critical Phase of Flight and Sterile Flight Deck.
The phases of flight when the operational state of the flight deck must be sterile would be defined by
the operator or the State.
The operator also typically includes the policy and procedures associated with a sterile flight deck as
part of cabin crew training as specified in CAB 2.2.2.
CAB 3.3.2
If the Operator uses aircraft equipped with a flight deck door, the Operator shall have policies and/or
procedures that are in accordance with requirements of the Authority and, as a minimum, define:
(i) When the flight deck door must remain locked;
(ii) The means used and actions necessary for cabin crew members to:
(a) Notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the
cabin;
(b) Gain entry to the flight deck. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policies and/or procedures for flight deck access that are in accordance
with requirements of the Authority.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: policies/procedures for cabin-flight crew that address
locking/use of flight deck door, cabin crew entry to flight deck).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the security of the flight deck by providing the flight crew and
cabin crew with complementary policies and/or procedures:
• That ensure the flight crew is notified in the event of suspicious activity or a security breach in
the cabin;
• For use by cabin crew members to gain entry to the flight deck when a lockable door is
installed.
Such policies and/or procedures define the actions necessary to address the specifications of this
provision.
The operator also typically includes the policy and procedures associated with a sterile flight deck as
part of cabin crew training as specified in CAB 2.2.2.
Policies and/or procedures related to flight deck security are considered sensitive information and are
normally provided to relevant personnel in a manner that protects the content from unnecessary
disclosure.
CAB 3.3.3
The Operator shall have procedures for communication and coordination between the cabin crew
and flight crew to ensure a combined and coordinated process in addressing:
(i) Passenger safety information;
(ii) Cabin readiness prior to first aircraft movement, takeoff and landing;
(iii) Arming or disarming of cabin door slides or slide rafts, if applicable;
(iv) Preparation for and an encounter with turbulence;
(v) Medical situations;
(vi) Flight or cabin crew member incapacitation;
(vii) Emergency evacuation;
(viii) Abnormal situations;
(ix) Emergency situations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures as specified in the standard for communication and
coordination between the cabin crew and flight crew.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for cabin-flight crew
communication/coordination to address cabin operational situations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Sterile Flight Deck.
Communication and coordination between the flight crew and cabin crew might be verbal or non-
verbal and could be included as an integral part of specific normal, abnormal and emergency
procedures.
Procedures normally include a flight and cabin crew coordination briefing prior to each flight
addresses relevant safety subjects (e.g. sterile flight deck, security, aircraft technical issues, flight
crew incapacitation, cabin depressurization, onboard fire, emergency evacuation, forced landing or
ditching.)
Appropriate communication and coordination between the flight and cabin crews ensures cabin door
slides or slide rafts are armed prior to first movement of the aircraft.
CAB 3.3.4
The Operator shall have procedures to ensure the cabin crew provides notification to the flight crew
when a safety-related situation has been identified. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures to ensure cabin crew notification to the flight crew when a safety-related
situation has been identified.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew procedures for safety notifications to flight
crew).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Examples of safety-related situations that typically require notification to the flight deck include:
• Unruly behavior by passenger(s);
• Injury to passenger or crew member;
• Medical emergencies, use of first aid or medical equipment;
• Fire, smoke or toxic fumes in the cabin;
• Failure of any emergency system or equipment.
In general, any occurrences that could pose danger to the aircraft or its occupants would be
considered reportable to the flight deck.
Procedures typically specify certain critical phases of flight during which the cabin crew is prohibited
from initiating any communication to the flight crew (e.g. takeoff and landing).
CAB 3.3.7
The Operator shall have procedures that ensure the cabin crew is notified:
(i) When to be seated and secure themselves for takeoff;
(ii) When the flight is in the descent phase;
(iii) When to be seated and secure themselves for landing.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for cabin crew notifications (focus: cabin crew is notified when
to be seated and secure themselves for takeoff/descent/landing).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: cabin crew notified prior to takeoff/descent/landing).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the cabin crew has adequate time to prepare the cabin and
secure themselves at their assigned crew station before takeoff and landing.
Notification may be provided through cabin announcements, interphone or other signals (e.g. cycling
of fasten seatbelt signs/chimes) and may originate from the flight crew or be delivered by the cabin
crew leader.
Notification of descent may be given at top of descent and/or later in the descent phase according to
the operation.
On very short flights, notification of time of descent may be included in a briefing between the flight
and cabin crew.
3.4 Cabin Operations Policies and Procedures
CAB 3.4.2
The Operator shall have a policy and associated procedures for addressing passengers that exhibit
unruly behavior and/or interfere with a crew member prior to or during flight. Such policy and
procedures shall be in accordance with local laws and regulations, and also specify reasonable
measures for ensuring passengers obey lawful commands from the PIC and/or cabin crew for the
purpose of securing the safety of the aircraft, persons on board and their property. As a minimum, the
policy and procedures shall address:
(i) Identification of passenger unruly behavior and interference;
(ii) Conditions under which passengers may be denied boarding, disembarked or restrained in
accordance with the authority of the PIC;
(iii) Reporting of instances of unruly behavior. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the policy and associated procedures for addressing passengers that
exhibit unruly behavior and/or interfere with a crew member prior to or during flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for handling of unruly passengers, crew
member interference).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Policy and associated procedures would typically be published to ensure awareness by all applicable
ground and flight personnel.
To ensure procedures are effective, guidelines are typically created to address all aspects of
managing unruly behavior including prevention. For example, because of the increased effect of
alcohol at altitude, guidelines would normally ensure the service of such beverages is carried out in a
reasonable and responsible manner. Additionally, passengers would typically not be permitted to
drink alcohol unless served by the cabin crew; the cabin crew would be attentive to identifying
passengers that might be consuming their own alcohol.
The intent of item (iii) is that instances of passenger unruly behavior or interference are reported
internally in accordance with SEC 1.12.1 and SEC 4.3.1. Such reporting is usually done for the
purpose of performing trend analysis and developing appropriate mitigation measures. In addition,
depending on the severity, some instances may be required to be reported to the applicable aviation
security authority in accordance with SEC 4.3.2.
Additional information may be found in the IATA Cabin Operations Safety Best Practices Guide.
CAB 3.4.4
The Operator shall have cabin crew procedures that require all passengers to be seated with their
seat belts (or harness or other restraint provided) fastened:
(i) For the taxi, takeoff and landing phases of a flight;
(ii) Prior to and/or during turbulence;
(iii) When the PIC considers it necessary for the safety of the flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures that ensure all passengers are seated with seat belts/harnesses fastened
during the flight phases specified in the standard.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for ensuring passengers seated/seat belt
fastened for defined phases of flight/conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Procedures for turbulence normally require at least one briefing to passengers.
Briefings may be delivered using a variety of methods including passenger announcement,
discussion, demonstration, audio/visual media or automated seat messages where such systems
exist. Briefings may be directed to individual passengers, small groups or all passengers
simultaneously.
On longer flights where multiple periods of turbulence might occur, operators typically determine a
required number and frequency of briefings and/or visual checks by the cabin crew.
CAB 3.4.5
If the Operator conducts passenger flights with or without cabin crew, the Operator shall have
procedures that require the secure restraint of infants during the phases of flight and conditions
specified in CAB 3.4.4. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures to ensure infants are securely restrained during the flight phases or
conditions specified in CAB 3.4.4.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for ensuring secure infant restraint for
defined phases of flight/conditions)
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The term “infant” refers to small children as defined by the Authority. If the Authority does not have a
definition, the operator would publish its own definition in the OM. An “infant” is typically defined as a
child that is less than two years of age.
Some regulatory authorities require the use of child restraint devices, for which there is no universally
accepted definition. The term “restraint devices” refers to any device that is accepted by the Authority
and is used specifically to keep small children restrained in the aircraft cabin. Automobile seats
approved for use on an aircraft, “loop belts” and “infant seat belts” are examples of child restraint
devices.
Procedures would be in place to ensure infants are securely restrained. Such procedures typically
include the use of infant restraint devices or could specify other means of restraint. If the Authority
requires specific procedures (e.g. infants held by an adult who is occupying an approved seat or
berth) or identifies an approved type of restraint device, the operator is required to be in compliance
with those requirements.
CAB 3.4.10
The Operator shall have cabin crew procedures that ensure passengers are briefed on matters
related to safety, including turbulence, normal, abnormal and emergency situations. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified procedures for briefings to passengers for situations as specified in the standard.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for passenger safety briefings as applicable
to the situation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Briefings may be delivered using a variety of methods including passenger announcement,
discussion, demonstration, audio/visual media or automated seat messages where such systems
exist. Briefings may be directed to individual passengers, small groups or all passengers
simultaneously.
CAB 3.4.11
The Operator shall have guidance and associated cabin crew procedures to ensure passengers:
(i) Are informed and receive instruction on all restrictions pertaining to onboard smoking;
(ii) Comply with the Fasten Seat Belt sign and, if applicable, the No Smoking sign.
Auditor Actions
Identified guidance and procedures to ensure passengers are informed of all restrictions and
instructions pertaining to on onboard smoking and Fasten Seat Belt/No Smoking signs.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined documentation of guidelines, PAs, safety video & associated procedure(s).
Observed line cabin operations (focus: guidance/procedures to communicate smoking
restrictions to passengers, address compliance with fasten seat belt/no smoking signs).
Other Actions (Specify)
CAB 3.4.12
The Operator shall have cabin crew procedures and guidance to ensure passengers are familiar with
location and use of:
(i) Seat belts;
(ii) Emergency exits;
(iii) Life jackets (individual flotation devices), if required;
(iv) Oxygen masks, where applicable;
(v) Other emergency equipment provided for individual use, including safety information
cards. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/cabin crew procedures to ensure passengers are familiar with
the location and use of the safety and emergency equipment as specified in the standard.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Examined documentation of guidelines, PAs, safety video & associated procedure(s).
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for ensuring passengers are familiar with
cabin emergency equipment/systems).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
A demonstration video or an announcement on the cabin public address system are methods that
ensure passengers are familiar with locations and the use of the specified items.
A safety information card, which is made available to each passenger, is typically used to supplement
a demonstration or announcement.
Seat cushions that are designed to float are considered individual flotation devices.
CAB 3.4.13
The Operator shall have a cabin crew policy and procedures that ensure, as applicable to aircraft
type and configuration, the delivery of oxygen to passengers:
(i) Immediately following a depressurization;
(ii) For treatment during a medical event where oxygen is required. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy/cabin crew procedures for the administration of oxygen.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for administration of oxygen from portable
bottles/cabin system as applicable to aircraft type).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Emergency oxygen for use following depressurization events may be available through automatically
deployed oxygen masks. Cabin crew procedures during a depressurization on such aircraft usually
require fitting their own mask first and instructing passengers to self-administer oxygen using the
deployed masks.
For aircraft that are not fitted with automatically deployed oxygen masks, cabin crew procedures
usually ensure that passengers who still require oxygen following the event are provided with oxygen
from a portable supply or a mask fitted to a fixed aircraft system.
During a medical event where oxygen is appropriate for treatment, cabin crew procedures include
using portable oxygen bottles or other oxygen supplying equipment, as applicable for the type of
aircraft.
CAB 3.4.15
The Operator shall ensure the immediate availability of procedures and associated checklist(s),
applicable to each aircraft type, to be used for an in-flight search or inspection to discover concealed
weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices when sabotage or other type of unlawful
interference is suspected. Such procedures shall contain:
(i) Guidance for the course of action to be taken if a bomb or suspicious object is found;
(ii) Least risk location(s) for a bomb or explosives specific to each aircraft type, if so designated
by the manufacturer. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures the operator uses for onboard bomb search or security
inspection when an act of unlawful interference or sabotage is suspected.
Examined selected records of completion of security searches, as appropriate.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
In order to address the need to conduct a timely search or inspection of an aircraft, a checklist or
other form of guidance (e.g. Bomb Threat Search Checklist, Aircraft Search Instructions) applicable
to each aircraft type is immediately available, either located on board the aircraft or readily accessible
through other means, for use by the cabin crew or other qualified personnel. Such checklist or
instructions assist qualified personnel in carrying out a systematic search of the flight deck and/or
cabin during flight to identify suspected or potentially dangerous devices or explosives. Instructions,
which are specific to the aircraft type, specify predetermined structurally safe locations to move, if
deemed appropriate, dangerous or potentially explosive articles. (Note: some aircraft types may not
have designated least risk locations.)
The capability to undertake a systematic search for such items on board a cargo aircraft may be
difficult due to limited access to many parts of the aircraft in flight. Opening containers and accessing
pallets of cargo in flight also may not be possible and the availability of flight crew or other trained
personnel to undertake such a search may be limited.
CAB 4.1.1
The Operator shall have procedures to ensure the availability, accessibility and serviceability of
aircraft cabin emergency systems and equipment for passenger flights. Such procedures shall
include a preflight inspection of systems and equipment, which, as a minimum, shall be conducted by
the cabin crew or, if applicable, by the flight crew prior to the first flight:
(i) After a new cabin crew has assumed control of the aircraft cabin unless there is a procedure
for an onboard handover briefing (e.g. during transit stops) between a departing/inbound
crew and a replacement/outbound crew that includes verification of the status of emergency
systems and equipment;
(ii) After an aircraft has been left unattended by a flight crew or cabin crew for any period of time
unless the Operator has a process or procedure that ensures cabin emergency systems and
equipment remain undisturbed while crew members are temporarily absent from the
cabin. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures to ensure the availability/accessibility/serviceability of aircraft
cabin emergency systems and equipment for passenger flights.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: procedures for preflight inspection of cabin emergency
systems/equipment).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has procedures for a preflight inspection of cabin
emergency systems and equipment that is accomplished by either the cabin crew or, as applicable,
the flight crew under the circumstances specified.
Cabin preflight inspection procedures normally define the specific conditions of the preflight checks,
including:
• The systems and equipment to be checked by the cabin and/or flight crew;
• The extent of such checks required to ensure availability, accessibility and serviceability.
The check of some cabin emergency systems and equipment may be accomplished by other
operational disciplines (e.g. engineering and maintenance) as defined by the operator.
In some cases, emergency systems are continually monitored by built-in test equipment that is
designed to alert the crew to a fault condition.
An operator typically includes associated guidance to ensure action is taken to address a condition
where equipment is discovered as faulty, missing or does not satisfy operational requirements.
Discrepancies involving cabin systems and equipment are typically documented in a cabin log book
or equivalent recording medium.
The cabin unattended period as specified in item (ii) is intended to apply to short periods of time
during the same continuous crew duty period (e.g. crew temporarily leaving the aircraft while
maintenance procedures are performed or for aircraft immigration checks during a turnaround).
CAB 4.1.2
The Operator shall have a process that permits the cabin crew to report the existence of non-
serviceable aircraft equipment prior to and after the completion of a flight.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for cabin crew to report the existence of non-serviceable aircraft
equipment prior to/after the completion of a flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cabin operations.
Check for process alignment with flight operations and Operations/cabin crew manuals.
Observed line cabin operations (focus: process for cabin crew to report non-serviceable aircraft
equipment prior to/after flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Applicability
Section 6 addresses functions within the scope of ground handling operations and is applicable to an
operator that conducts passenger, cargo and/or combi (combined cargo and passenger) aircraft
operations.
Individual GRH provisions or sub-specifications within a GRH provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable unless determined otherwise by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the Operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
Functions within the scope of ground handling operations include:
• Passenger handling;
• Baggage handling;
• Aircraft ground handling and loading;
• Load control;
• Aircraft fueling;
• Aircraft de-/anti-icing.
In this section, non-revenue cargo is addressed in the same way as revenue cargo for the purposes of
handling loading, securing and transporting. COMAT is non-revenue cargo.
For the purpose of addressing cargo in this section, mail is considered to be an item of cargo. Therefore,
any reference to cargo also includes mail.
Where an operator outsources the performance of ground handling operational functions to external
service providers, the operator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the management of safety in the
conduct of such operations and must demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service
providers in accordance with GRH 1.10.2.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 6, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
Processes and procedures for use in ground handling operations are defined in the IATA Ground Operations
Manual (IGOM), the IATA Airport Handling Manual (AHM), the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR)
and in other relevant IATA publications.
Due to revision cycle differences, the IATA documents cited above are typically revised at various times
during the effective period of an ISM edition. Accordingly, when an IATA document is revised, it could render
an existing reference to specific information in an IATA document to be in error. In such case, the revised
IATA document would have to be searched to find the specific information referenced.
1.3 Communication
GRH 1.6.3
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure a current edition of
the IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR), the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe
Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Technical Instructions) or equivalent documentation is
accessible at each location where ground handling operations involving the loading of dangerous
goods as cargo are conducted. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for ensuring distribution of DGR or equivalent DG documents to all
locations where DG is handled.
Interviewed responsible management representative(s).
Traced distribution of DGR or equivalent DG documents.
Observed accessibility of DGR or equivalent DG documents in areas of operations where
dangerous goods are handled.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) and Technical
Instructions.
Most dangerous goods are typically transported as cargo. However, certain types of dangerous
goods are permitted for transport in passenger or crew baggage. The specifications in this provision
are applicable to an operator that transports dangerous goods as cargo.
Acceptable equivalent documentation would typically contain information derived from the DGR or
Technical Instructions, as well as the dangerous goods policies and procedures specific to the
type(s) of operations being conducted at the location.
GRH 1.6.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure the OM or an
equivalent operational manual contains information that will permit ground handling personnel to
carry out duties and responsibilities with respect to dangerous goods. Such information shall include,
as a minimum:
(i) Action to be taken in the event of emergencies involving dangerous goods;
(ii) Details of the location and identification of cargo holds;
(iii) The maximum quantity of dry ice permitted in each compartment;
(iv) If radioactive material is transported, instructions for the loading of such dangerous goods in
accordance with applicable requirements. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed information in the OM or equivalent document that permits personnel to
carry out duties and responsibilities relevant to dangerous goods handling.
Interviewed responsible management representative(s).
Interviewed personnel that perform operational functions in ground handling operations.
Observed accessibility of DG information on key cargo (dry ice and radioactive material) in
selected areas of operations where personnel carry out dangerous goods handling.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Guidance may be found in DGR 1.4.2.
GRH 1.6.5
If the Operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure the OM
contains the policies and associated guidance necessary to prevent dangerous goods from being
inadvertently carried or loaded onto the aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policies and guidance in the ground handling OM or equivalent manual
necessary to ensure personnel do not inadvertently permit loading or transport of dangerous
goods on aircraft not approved or used for such transport.
Interviewed responsible management representative(s).
Interviewed personnel that perform operational functions in ground handling operations.
Observed availability of policies and guidance that ensures personnel do not inadvertently
permit dangerous goods to be carried or loaded onto aircraft not approved or used for the
transport of dangerous goods.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator requires specific approval to transport dangerous goods as cargo. In some cases, an
operator might have approval to transport dangerous goods as cargo but actually transports
dangerous goods only on certain aircraft. For example, an operator that conducts flights with
passenger and cargo aircraft might transport dangerous goods only in its cargo aircraft and not in its
passenger aircraft.
The intent of this provision is for an operator that does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, or
does not transport dangerous goods as cargo on certain aircraft in its fleet, to have policies and
associated guidance in the OM to ensure personnel are able to identify and reject undeclared
dangerous goods (including COMAT classified as dangerous goods) from being loaded or
transported on aircraft in its fleet that are not approved or used for such transport.
Guidance in an operator's OM typically addresses vigilance with respect to hidden or inconspicuous
dangerous goods and includes an indicative list of items that could contain or be classified as
dangerous goods.
1.7 Records System
GRH 1.11.1
The Operator shall have a hazard identification program for ground handling operations that includes
a combination of reactive and proactive methods of hazard identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in GRH operations (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of GRH operations in cross-discipline safety hazard identification
program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform GRH operations data collection/analysis to identify hazards
to aircraft operations.
Examined selected examples of hazards identified through GRH operations data
collection/analysis.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
GRH 1.11.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program for ground handling
operations that specifies processes to ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine the existing and potential safety risks to aircraft
operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk control action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in ground handling
operations. [SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of its ground handling operations risks and through
implementation of mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant ground handling operations are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) across the ground handling operations organization capture risk assessment
information, risk mitigation (control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment and mitigation program in ground handling
operations (focus: hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine
appropriate action; action implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of ground handling operations in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform ground handling operations risk assessment/mitigation.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment/mitigation action.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Ground Support Equipment (GSE), NOTOC (Notification to
Captain), Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA), Safety Risk Management,
Safety Risk Mitigation and Unit Load Device (ULD).
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
Hazards relevant to the conduct of ground operations are potentially associated with:
• Aircraft loading/unloading operations (e.g. unsafe airside driving, unsupervised ground
operations activities at the airside, lack of PPE, ineffective baggage reconciliation process).
• Aircraft special loads (e.g. for dangerous goods, live animals, perishables, valuables,
time/temperature-sensitive products: lack of or incomplete NOTOC, lack of or inadequate
security controls).
• Aircraft servicing (e.g. for water/toilet service, catering: lack of guide man, lack of proper
periodic water testing, lack of proper inspection before/after service).
• Passenger embarkation/disembarkation (e.g. Passengers walking on the ramp).
• Fueling operations (e.g. fueling with passengers on board the aircraft).
• De-/anti-Icing operations (e.g. lack of effective pre-departure checks, glycol/water mixture
not effectively checked or tested, incorrect de-/anti-icing procedures).
• Aircraft towing and pushback (e.g. lack of wing walkers, improper connection/disconnection
of tow-bars, improper ground-to-cockpit communication).
• Adverse weather conditions (e.g. low visibility, high wind, extreme temperatures, volcanic
ash).
• ULD Management (e.g. unsafe ULD loading/buildup/storage).
• Management of Ground Support Equipment (GSE) (e.g. lack of daily equipment checks, lack
of proper identification of out-of-service GSE).
• Loading/securing of cargo on aircraft that transport cargo without passengers in the
passenger cabin.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
GRH 1.11.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system for ground handling operations that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates ground handling operations personnel to submit reports that
identify safety hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
(ii) Requires reporting of events that result in aircraft ground damage;
(iii) Includes analysis and ground handling operations management action to address
operational deficiencies, hazards, incidents and concerns identified through the reporting
system. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in ground handling operations (focus:
system urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in ground
handling operations.
Examined data that confirm an effective ground handling operations safety reporting system
(focus: quantity of reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected ground handling operations safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-
up to identify and address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify).
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
To enhance industry data usability, it is recommended that ground damage events are reported in
accordance with a formal reporting structure.
Refer to ORG 2.4.3, which addresses the submission of safety and security occurrences to IATA for
inclusion in the Incident Data Exchange (IDX).
Refer to IGOM 6.4 for guidance that addresses aircraft damage reporting.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
Safety Performance Monitoring and Management
GRH 2.1.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure personnel that perform operational duties in functions
within the scope of ground handling operations for the Operator, to include personnel of external
service providers, complete:
(i) Initial training prior to being assigned to perform such operational duties;
(ii) Recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the regulatory
authority but not less than once during every 36-month period, except for recurrent training
in dangerous goods as specified in GRH 2.2.1 or GRH 2.2.2;
(iii) Re-qualification training applicable to personnel that become unqualified for any reason,
prior to being reassigned to perform operational duties. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training program for ground handling personnel (focus: ensures completion
of initial/recurrent/requalification training for personnel in all ground handling functions; includes
processes that ensure personnel of external service providers complete initial/recurrent training).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent/requalification course curricula/syllabi (focus:
curricula/syllabi include initial/recurrent/requalification training courses for all personnel that
perform ground handling duties/functions).
Examined initial/recurrent/requalification training records of selected personnel (focus:
completion of initial/recurrent/requalification training).
Other Actions (Specify).
Guidance
Refer to the Applicability box at the beginning of this section for the functions within the scope of
ground handling operations.
Requirements for initial, recurrent and re-qualification training apply to all personnel that perform
duties within the scope of ground handling operations for the operator, both at the main base and at
all other locations.
GRH 2.1.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure the training programs completed by ground handling
operations personnel in accordance with GRH 2.1.1 provide the knowledge necessary to perform
duties, execute procedures and operate the equipment associated with specific ground handling
functions and responsibilities. Such programs shall include:
(i) Familiarization training on applicable regulations;
(ii) In-depth training on requirements, including policies, procedures and operating practices;
(iii) Training in human factors principles;
(iv) Safety training on associated operational hazards. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training programs for ground handling operations personnel (focus:
includes programs for personnel in all ground handling operations functions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected training program records/documents (focus: programs include all specified
training areas as applicable to ground handling operations functions).
Other Actions (Specify).
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of FOD (Foreign Object Debris/Damage) and Human Factors
Principles.
Safety and human factors training typically includes the following subject areas as appropriate to the
individual’s assigned operational function(s):
• Safety philosophy;
• Safety regulations;
• Hazards;
• Human factors;
• Airside markings and signage;
• Emergency situations;
• FOD prevention;
• Personal protection;
• Accidents, incidents, near misses;
• Airside safety supervision.
AHM 1110 Item 11 contains detailed guidance for safety and human factors training.
GRH 2.1.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure training for personnel that perform operational duties in
functions within the scope of ground handling operations for the Operator:
(i) Includes testing or evaluation by written, oral or practical means, as applicable;
(ii) Requires a demonstration of adequate knowledge, competency and proficiency to perform
duties, execute procedures and/or operate equipment. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training programs for ground handling operations personnel (focus:
programs include a process for testing/evaluations/demonstrations as specified).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent/requalification course curricula/syllabi (focus: training
courses include testing/evaluations/demonstrations).
Examined initial/recurrent/requalification training records of selected personnel (focus:
testing/evaluations/demonstrations as specified completed during initial/recurrent/requalification
training).
Other Actions (Specify).
Guidance
Training is usually divided into theoretical and practical parts, both of which normally include a record
of an evaluation and successful completion of training.
An assessment of knowledge gained from the theoretical part of training is normally accomplished
through use of written or computer-based testing.
Practical training typically includes an on-the-job training phase followed by a demonstration of
competence in the skills that are relevant to the specific ground handling function.
An oral means of assessment may be included as an element of the evaluation included in the
theoretical and/or practical parts of training but would typically not be used as the sole method of
evaluation.
Records of evaluations for both theoretical and practical training are normally retained to verify
currency in accordance with training program requirements.
GRH 2.1.4
The Operator shall have a process to ensure completion of required training by personnel that
perform operational duties in functions within the scope of ground handling operations for the
Operator is recorded and such records are retained in accordance with GRH 1.7.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed ground handling operations records system (focus: system includes
training records of personnel that perform ground handling operations duties).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined initial/recurrent/requalification training records of selected personnel (focus:
completion of initial/recurrent/requalification training).
Other Actions (Specify).
GRH 2.1.5
The Operator shall have a process to ensure the training programs completed by ground handling
operations personnel in accordance with GRH 2.1.1 are reviewed and updated to remain relevant
and current.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for review and update of training programs completed by ground
handling operations personnel.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected training program records/documents (focus: programs have been
periodically reviewed and updated).
Other Actions (Specify).
GRH 2.2.1
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
ground handling operations personnel complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training
and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. Such training shall
be completed by personnel that perform operational duties in the following functions within the scope
of ground handling operations:
(i) Passenger handling;
(ii) Baggage handling;
(iii) Aircraft loading;
(iv) Load control. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program (focus: defines DG training
requirements for ground handling personnel as appropriate for specific assigned
responsibilities/duty functions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined applicable initial/recurrent dangerous goods training curricula and syllabi (focus:
subject areas appropriate for personnel based on specific responsibilities/duty functions).
Examined training records of selected personnel (focus: completion of required training as
appropriate for assigned responsibilities/duty functions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending
on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is completed within a validity period that expires 24 months
from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current unless a shorter period is defined by a
competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of
the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the
recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period.
If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months of the validity period, the new
validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
GRH 2.2.2
If the Operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure ground handling operations personnel complete dangerous goods training, to include initial
training and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. Such
training shall be completed by personnel that perform operational duties in the following functions
within the scope of ground handling operations:
(i) Passenger handling;
(ii) Baggage handling;
(iii) Aircraft loading;
(iv) Load control. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program: (focus: defines DG training
requirements for all ground handling personnel based on specific assigned responsibilities/duty
functions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent training curricula/syllabi (focus: subject areas appropriate for
personnel based on specific responsibilities/duty functions).
Examined training records of selected personnel (focus: completion of required training as
appropriate for assigned responsibilities/duty functions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
When an operator does not transport dangerous goods as cargo (i.e. a “no-carry” operator),
dangerous goods training is still required for ground handling personnel to ensure prohibited
dangerous goods are recognized and are not loaded onto an aircraft.
Dangerous goods training would be structured to provide the requisite knowledge to permit ground
handling personnel to recognize prohibited dangerous goods (whether labeled or not labeled),
ensure such dangerous goods are not inadvertently loaded on an aircraft and apply emergency
action in the event of contamination or a spill.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training is determined by the operator and may vary depending
on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
GRH 2.2.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure initial and recurrent training completed by applicable
ground handling personnel in accordance with GRH 2.1.1 addresses the following areas of
operations, as applicable to ground handling duties or function(s) performed:
(i) Passenger services;
(ii) Ramp services;
(iii) Load control;
(iv) Aircraft fueling;
(v) Aircraft ground de-/anti-icing.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training program for ground handling personnel (focus: training program
addresses all specified operational areas).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent/requalification training curricula/syllabi (focus: training
addresses all specified operational areas).
Examined initial/recurrent/requalification training records of selected personnel (focus:
completion of training appropriate for individual duties/functions performed).
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.1.3
If the Operator conducts passenger flights and accepts battery-operated mobility aids for transport on
the aircraft, the Operator shall have procedures for acceptance and handling of such mobility aids to
ensure they meet following requirements:
(i) The battery is a type that is permitted;
(ii) Battery terminals are protected and electrical circuits are isolated;
(iii) Loading is in a manner that prevents movement and damage from other cargo;
(iv) If applicable, batteries are removed, protected and transported as per specifications
applicable to the type of batteries;
(v) The pilot in command is informed of the location of the mobility aids and/or the
batteries. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for acceptance/handling of battery-operated mobility aids.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed acceptance/handling of battery-operated mobility (focus: acceptance/handling
procedures are implemented).
Examined selected retained documents (e.g. NOTOC) of accepted battery-operated mobility
aids (focus: mobility aids accepted/handled in accordance with procedures; notification to PIC
includes location).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Passenger Mobility Aid.
Refer to DGR 2.3.2 and ICAO Technical Instructions Part 7;2.13 for additional guidance.
GRH 3.1.5
If the Operator transports passengers that require special handling, the Operator shall have a policy
and associated procedures for the preflight acceptance or non-acceptance, as well as handling, of
such passengers by ground passenger handling personnel. Such policy and procedures shall be in
accordance with applicable regulations and, as a minimum, address:
(i) Intoxicated passengers;
(ii) Passengers with disabilities or reduced mobility;
(iii) Passengers with injuries or illness;
(iv) Infants and unaccompanied children;
(v) Inadmissible passengers;
(vi) Deportees;
(vii) Passengers in custody. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy and procedures for passengers requiring the listed categories of
special handling.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Sampled records of specific cases of handling special needs passengers.
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: policy/procedures for preflight
acceptance of passengers that require special handling).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
A policy and associated procedures typically address the acceptance and pre-boarding handling of
passengers that require special handling, or perhaps the refusal to accept certain categories of
passengers. For example, such policy and procedures might include or address the following:
• For intoxicated passengers: Refusal to accept at check-in and, upon discovery after check-
in, refusal to board the aircraft.
• For passengers with disabilities: Acceptance and/or limitations for such acceptance in
accordance with applicable regulations, ground handling and, as applicable, specialized
equipment considerations.
• If unaccompanied children are accepted: Maximum number, minimum age, any special
arrangements once on board, specific seat allocation, ground handling considerations.
• If stretchers are accepted: Maximum number, escort requirement, associated equipment that
would need to be available, ground handling considerations.
• If passengers in custody are accepted: Maximum number, number of escort officers, specific
seat allocation, ground handling considerations.
Refer to IGOM 1.4.
GRH 3.1.6
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a policy and associated
procedures for addressing passengers that exhibit unruly behavior and/or interfere prior to flight
departure. Such policy and procedures shall be in accordance with local laws and regulations and
specify measures that will ensure the safety of the aircraft, persons on board and their property. As a
minimum, the policy and procedures shall address:
(i) Identification of passenger unruly behavior and interference;
(ii) Conditions under which passengers may be denied boarding in accordance with the
applicable authority;
(iii) Reporting of instances of passenger unruly behavior or interference. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy and procedures for addressing passenger unruly
behavior/interference.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Sampled records of specific cases of passenger unruly behavior/interference.
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: policy/procedures for preflight
handling of passenger unruly behavior/interference).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
A policy and associated procedures would typically be published to ensure awareness by all
applicable ground personnel.
To ensure procedures are effective, guidelines are typically created to address all aspects of
managing unruly behavior including prevention.
The intent of item (iii) is that instances of passenger unruly behavior or interference are reported
internally in accordance with SEC 1.12.1 and SEC 4.3.1. Such reporting is usually done for the
purpose of performing trend analysis and developing appropriate mitigation measures. In addition,
depending on the severity, some instances may be required to be reported to the applicable aviation
security authority in accordance with SEC 4.3.2.
Refer to IGOM 1.4.10 for guidance that addresses unruly passengers.
3.2 Airside Operations
GRH 3.2.2
The Operator shall ensure aircraft arrival procedures are in place that are completed prior to aircraft
arrival at the assigned parking gate or stand. Such procedures shall ensure:
(i) The ramp area surface is inspected and is free of:
(a) Debris that could cause foreign object damage (FOD);
(b) Contamination that could be hazardous to aircraft movement.
(ii) The aircraft movement path is clear of objects and obstacles;
(iii) Personnel not involved in the aircraft arrival are positioned outside the equipment restraint
area (ERA);
(iv) Required GSE is available and positioned clear of the ERA;
(v) The aircraft docking guidance system is operational or, if applicable, marshalling personnel
are in place;
(vi) If applicable, wing walkers and/or other applicable personnel are present. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft arrival procedures in the OM (focus: published procedures for
aircraft arrival are in accordance with specifications in this standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed aircraft arrival operations (focus: procedures for aircraft arrival are implemented as
published in the OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Equipment Restraint Area (ERA) and Foreign Object
Debris/Damage (FOD).
As specified in item (i) (b), snow and ice are ramp surface contaminants that can be hazardous to
aircraft ground movement.
Documented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.1.1, 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.3.1 will typically
demonstrate documental conformity with the specifications in this provision.
GRH 3.2.3
The Operator shall ensure aircraft arrival procedures are in place that are completed once an aircraft
has stopped at the parking gate or stand. Such procedures shall ensure:
(i) Vehicles and personnel remain clear of parking stand until engines are shut down and anti-
collision lights are turned off;
(ii) As applicable, wheel chocks are positioned at the landing gear wheels and verbally/visually
confirmed to the flight crew;
(iii) Safety cones are placed around the aircraft;
(iv) An aircraft exterior inspection is accomplished prior to GSE being positioned to the aircraft
to identify and record visible aircraft damage. (GM)
Note: Procedures shall ensure visible damage found during the aircraft exterior inspection is
reported to a supervisor and the flight crew, and GSE is not positioned to the aircraft in an area where
such damage exists.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft arrival procedures in the OM (focus: published procedures for
aircraft arrival inspection is in accordance with specifications in this standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed aircraft arrival operations (focus: procedures for aircraft arrival are implemented as
published in the OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to IGOM 3.1.2 for guidance that addresses general ramp safety.
During the aircraft exterior inspection, involved ground handling personnel confirm there is no
damage to the aircraft where GSE will be positioned before such GSE is moved toward the aircraft. In
addition, an assigned person completes a walkaround inspection to identify any damage to other
areas of the aircraft.
Communication with the flight crew is normally established through use of the aircraft intercom
system. However, when necessary, such communication may be conducted using standardized
hand signals.
Documented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.1 (Aircraft Arrival), IGOM 4.2 (Aircraft
Chocking) and IGOM 4.3 (Aircraft Coning) will typically demonstrate documental conformity with the
specifications in this provision.
Refer also to ICAO Manual on Ground Handling 6.3.3.3 and 6.3.5.3.
GRH 3.2.7
The Operator shall ensure aircraft departure procedures are in place and are completed prior to an
aircraft departing the parking gate or stand. Such procedures shall ensure:
(i) The ramp area surface is inspected and is free of:
(a) Debris that could cause foreign object damage (FOD);
(b) Contamination that could be hazardous to aircraft movement;
(c) Objects that could be impacted by the aircraft or subjected to jet blast effect.
(ii) Personnel not involved in the aircraft departure are positioned outside the ERA;
(iii) If applicable, wing walkers and/or other applicable personnel are present;
(iv) If applicable, communication with the flight crew on air starter unit (ASU) positioning, engine
start sequence and identification of minimum specifications for volume and pressure of air
supply;
(v) Use of anti-collision light(s);
(vi) Communication is established with the flight crew;
(vii) Vehicles and personnel remain clear of aircraft engine intake and/or blast areas during
engine start. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft departure procedures in the OM (focus: published procedures for
aircraft departure are in accordance with specifications in this standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed aircraft departure operations (focus: procedures for aircraft departure are
implemented as published in the OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Communication with the flight crew is normally established through use of the aircraft intercom
system. However, when necessary, such communication may be conducted using standardized
hand signals.
Documented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.6 (Aircraft Departure) will typically demonstrate
documental conformity with the specifications in this provision. Refer to:
• IGOM 4.6.7.1 for guidance that addresses safety precautions related to proper use of aircraft
anti-collision lights;
• IGOM 4.6.8 for departure ground staff to flight deck communication and use of common
phraseology;
• IGOM 4.6.5 for pre-departure communication table.
Refer to IGOM 3.1.2 for guidance that addresses general ramp safety.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 10121, Manual on Ground Handling, Chapter 6, 6.3.9
and 6.3.10.3.
GRH 3.2.8
The Operator shall ensure an aircraft departure procedure is in place for an aircraft walkaround
inspection that is completed immediately prior to the aircraft departing the parking gate or stand.
Such check shall ensure:
(i) The ramp area surface is free of debris that could cause foreign object damage (FOD);
(ii) GSE and passenger boarding equipment are detached from the aircraft;
(iii) GSE and vehicles are positioned clear of the aircraft movement path;
(iv) The aircraft movement path is clear of objects and obstacles;
(v) Aircraft servicing panels and/or hatches are closed and secured (except external power and
headset panels);
(vi) Aircraft cabin and cargo doors are closed and handles are flush with the fuselage;
(vii) Any visible aircraft damage or abnormalities are reported to the flight crew and
maintenance;
(viii) Landing gear safety pins are removed. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft departure procedures in the OM (focus: published procedure for
aircraft pre-departure check is in accordance with specifications in this standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed aircraft departure operations (focus: procedure for aircraft departure walkaround
check is implemented as published in the OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Examples of aircraft abnormalities as specified in item (vii) are fuel and hydraulic fluid leakage.
The intent of item (viii) is that, during the aircraft walkaround inspection, a check is made to ensure
none of the landing gear safety pins are installed. If it is found that one or more safety pins is/are
installed, removal will normally be accomplished only by appropriately qualified personnel.
Documented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.6.3.1 (Pre-Departure Walk Around Check) will
typically demonstrate documental conformity with the specifications in this provision.
GRH 3.2.9
If the Operator conducts aircraft pushback or towing operations, the Operator shall ensure
procedures are in place for such operations. Such procedures shall ensure:
(i) Equipment used is suitable for the aircraft type;
(ii) Maximum aircraft nose gear turn limits are not exceeded;
(iii) Standardized communication is used between the ground crew and the flight crew;
(iv) A safe connection, operation and disconnection of the pushback or towing equipment. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft departure procedures in the OM (focus: published procedure for
aircraft pre-departure check is in accordance with specifications in this standard).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Observed aircraft departure operations (focus: procedure for aircraft departure walkaround
check is implemented as published in the OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Communication between the ground crew and flight crew as specified in item (iii) may be
accomplished verbally using the aircraft interphone system or visually using hand signals.
Documented procedures in accordance with IGOM 4.6 (Aircraft Departure), IGOM 4.7 (Power Push
Unit) and IGOM 4.9 (Aircraft Towing) will typically demonstrate documental conformity with the
specifications in this provision.
3.3 Load Control
GRH 3.3.1
The Operator shall ensure a Load Control system is in place that provides for:
(i) Aircraft weight and balance conditions that are correct and within limits;
(ii) Aircraft loaded in accordance with applicable regulations and specific loading instructions for
the flight;
(iii) Dissemination of dangerous goods and other special load information applicable to each
flight;
(iv) Information, to include last minute changes, that is in agreement with the actual load on the
aircraft and presented on a final load sheet. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed Load Control system.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in load control operations.
Examined checklists/procedures used in the load control process.
Observed load control operations (focus: load control system includes functions necessary to
address aircraft load, weight/balance calculation, production of final load sheet).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Load, Load Control, Special Load and Weight and Balance
Manual (W&BM).
A load planning system typically entails, as a minimum:
• Assemblage of all data relating to the aircraft load (originating and en route stations);
• Planning of the load for ready accessibility;
• Planning of special loads according to restrictions, maximum quantities, separation and
segregation requirements;
• Consideration of center of gravity parameters, including those affecting aircraft fuel
consumption.
Guidance may be found in AHM 551 and 590.
GRH 3.3.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure aircraft weight and balance data:
(i) Take into account limitations of the manufacturer and Operator;
(ii) Are current and accurate. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed load control process(es) for weight/balance calculations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in load control operations.
Examined examples of data used in the weight/balance calculation process.
Observed load control operations (focus: weight/balance calculations based on current data,
account for relevant limitations and specifics of aircraft type and actual configuration).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Cargo Restraint System, Combi (Combined Passenger and
Cargo) Aircraft Operations and Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Holder as well as the
abbreviations DCS (Departure Control System), DOI (Dry Operating Index) and DOW (Dry Operating
Weight).
Also refer to the IRM for the definition of Fuel (Flight Planning), which includes a definition of the term
Unusable Fuel.
The generation of the balance chart (operational limits) is normally accomplished in accordance with
methods defined by the manufacturer’s Weight and Balance Manual or equivalent document, which,
as applicable, is approved by the applicable authority. Such activity is usually performed by Flight
Operations or Ground Operations, or a combination thereof.
The process for producing weight and balance data and related documentation typically ensures that
weight and balance limits are respected both in normal and in special conditions.
The following are some examples of special conditions:
• Operations with fuel pumps inoperative (MEL);
• Fuel carried as ballast (unusable fuel transported for weight and balance purposes);
• Flight conducted with nonstandard aircraft configuration, nonstandard passenger weights or
other nonstandard conditions (e.g. rows of seats removed to fit a stretcher);
• Flight operations with one or more cabin doors inoperative that results in passenger
distribution curtailment (MEL).
To ensure aircraft weight and balance data are current and accurate, an operator typically performs
periodic aircraft weighing as recommended by the aircraft manufacturer and approved by the
applicable authority.
Additionally, an operator would continuously monitor any aircraft weight and balance variations that
result from individual aircraft maintenance activities or modifications (usually accomplished in
accordance with operational bulletins or other similar directives) that change the basic weight and
balance reference data as per tolerances and procedures established and accepted by local
authorities (normally identified as DOW/DOI).
This above monitoring activity is usually performed by flight operations or maintenance operations, or
a combination thereof.
Weight and balance data is typically maintained and updated via the DCS, to include remote central
load control (CLC) or any other available means, and then communicated in a timely manner.
For combi aircraft operations, guidance in the OM would typically address limitations of the actual
combi aircraft main deck/cabin configuration and ensure load control processes maintain current
aircraft weight and balance data and account for passengers being seated on the same deck and
forward of the cargo. Such passengers would be protected through provision of an adequate buffer
and/or cargo restraint system in accordance with requirements of the aircraft manufacturer,
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) holder and/or data approved by the Authority.
Guidance may be found in AHM 565 (EDP system semi-permanent data exchange) and AHM 562.
GRH 3.3.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure a process is in place
to provide the pilot-in-command (PIC), as soon as practicable prior to departure of the aircraft, with
accurate and legible written information pertaining to dangerous goods on board the aircraft to be
transported as cargo. Such notification shall include the following:
(i) If applicable, Air Waybill number;
(ii) Proper shipping name and/or UN/ID number;
(iii) Class or division, and subsidiary risk(s) corresponding to the label(s) applied, and for
Class 1, the compatibility group;
(iv) If applicable, packing group;
(v) For non-radioactive material, number of packages, exact loading location and, as required,
net quantity or, if applicable, gross weight of each package, except:
(a) For UN 1845: carbon dioxide, solid (dry ice), UN number, proper shipping name,
classification, total quantity in each aircraft hold and offload airport;
(b) For UN 3480 (Lithium ion batteries) and UN 3090 (lithium metal batteries), only the
UN number, proper shipping name, class, total quantity at each loading location,
and whether the package must be carried on a cargo only aircraft need be provided.
UN 3480 (Lithium ion batteries) and UN 3090 (lithium metal batteries) carried under
a State exemption must meet all of the requirements of iv) and v).
(vi) For radioactive material, number and category of packages, overpacks or freight containers,
exact loading location and, as applicable, transport index for each package;
(vii) Any restriction for transport on cargo aircraft only;
(viii) Offload airport;
(ix) If applicable, dangerous goods transported under a state exemption;
(x) An indication that aircraft loading personnel observed no evidence of damage to or leakage
from packages, or leakage from ULDs, loaded onto the aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed load control process to provide PIC with information pertaining to onboard
dangerous goods as cargo.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in load control operations.
Examined documents (e.g. NOTOC) that confirm dangerous goods information was provided to
PIC (focus: use of checklist/form that conforms to the specifications stated in the provision).
Observed load control operations (focus: load control system includes process/method for
providing applicable dangerous goods information to PIC).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of NOTOC (Notification to Captain) and State.
Information pertaining to dangerous goods on board the aircraft is typically presented to the PIC in a
notification called the NOTOC (notification to the captain). The NOTOC contains the detailed
information (as specified in this provision) relative to all dangerous goods loaded on the aircraft as
cargo.
Information contained in the NOTOC may also be used:
• For emergency response to an accident or incident involving dangerous goods on board;
• To provide to air traffic services in the event of an in-flight emergency.
In the event the NOTOC is of such a size as to make in-flight radiotelephony transmission
impracticable in an emergency situation, a summary of the information is typically provided to the PIC
(NOTOC Summary), which contains at least the quantities and classes or division of dangerous
goods in each cargo compartment.
Guidance may be found in DGR 9.5 and Table 9.5.A.
GRH 3.3.7
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
the legible copy of the dangerous goods information provided to the PIC in accordance with GRH
3.3.4:
(i) Is retained on the ground for a minimum period of three months after the flight on which the
dangerous goods were transported;
(ii) Includes an indication that the PIC has received the information. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed load control process that ensures dangerous goods information provided to
PIC is retained and includes indication PIC has received the information.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in load control operations.
Examined selected retained documents containing dangerous goods information that was
provided to the PIC (e.g. NOTOC).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of item (i) is that either the NOTOC or a document containing all information that must be
included in the NOTOC is retained for reference for a minimum period of three months or longer as
required by the State of Flight Departure.
An indication of receipt by the PIC is typically the PIC's signature.
Refer to IGOM 5.4.1.4 for guidance that addresses the notification to the PIC of onboard dangerous
goods. Additional guidance may be found in DGR 9.5.
3.4 Aircraft Loading
GRH 3.4.1
The Operator shall have aircraft loading procedures in the OM that ensure:
(i) The cargo hold is inspected before loading to:
(a) Check for damage;
(b) Ensure it is empty of other than documented transit load items.
(ii) The aircraft is loaded:
(a) In accordance with written loading instructions;
(b) In a manner that satisfies weight and balance requirements.
(iii) The load is secure and will not move during the flight;
(iv) If applicable, ULD locks are extended and locked. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed aircraft loading procedures.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined examples of documented aircraft loading instructions.
Observed aircraft loading operations (focus: aircraft loaded in accordance with loading
instructions/weight/balance requirements).
Interviewed personnel that perform aircraft loading.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to IGOM 4.5.5–4.5.9 and IGOM 5 (all), as well as AHM 514 and 590 for additional guidance.
GRH 3.4.2
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure a qualified individual
is designated to be responsible for the correct loading and securing of dangerous goods on board the
aircraft.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for designating qualified individual to be responsible for
loading/securing dangerous goods.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Guidance
Refer to DGR 9.3 for guidance that addresses the transportation, loading and securing of dangerous
goods, and to DGR 10.9 for guidance that addresses securing and separation of radioactive material.
Refer to IGOM 4.5.7.7 for guidance that addresses securing of dangerous goods.
GRH 3.4.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in
place that assure, when a dangerous goods package or shipment appears to be damaged or leaking:
(i) The package or shipment is prevented from being loaded into an aircraft;
(ii) If already loaded, the package or shipment is removed from an aircraft;
(iii) In the case of leakage, an evaluation is conducted to identify and prevent from transport any
baggage, cargo, transport devices or other items that may have become
contaminated. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for handling/addressing leaking/damaged dangerous goods
shipments.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined records/documents that illustrate handling of leaking/damaged dangerous goods
shipments.
Observed aircraft loading operations (focus: procedures for addressing dangerous goods
packages/shipments that appear to be leaking or damaged).
Interviewed personnel that perform aircraft loading.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to DGR 9.3, 9.4 and 10.9, which contain guidance that addresses apparent damage to
dangerous goods shipments.
GRH 3.4.5
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in
place that require, when an aircraft has been contaminated by dangerous goods leakage:
(i) Hazardous contamination is removed from the aircraft without delay;
(ii) In the case of radioactive contamination, arrangements are made to take the aircraft out of
service for evaluation by appropriately qualified personnel.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for addressing aircraft contaminated by leakage of dangerous
goods.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined guidance/checklists used for dealing with an aircraft contaminated by leakage of
dangerous goods.
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.4.6
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall ensure a process is in
place that requires, when undeclared or mis-declared dangerous goods are discovered in cargo
during aircraft loading, a report is made to the appropriate authority of the State of the Operator
(hereinafter “the State”) and state of occurrence. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to operators that transport, and also to
operators that do not transport, dangerous goods as cargo.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for reporting undeclared/mis-declared dangerous goods
discovered in cargo during aircraft loading to the appropriate authority.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined document(s) used for reporting undeclared/mis-declared dangerous goods
discovered in cargo during aircraft loading.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to DGR 9.6 for additional guidance.
GRH 3.4.8
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in place that
prevent shipments labeled “Cargo Aircraft Only” from being loaded onto an aircraft for a passenger
flight.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for preventing shipments with “Cargo Aircraft Only” labels
from being loaded onto aircraft for passenger flight.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined guidance/checklists used to ensure personnel do not load shipments with “Cargo
Aircraft Only” labels onto aircraft for passenger flight.
Interviewed personnel that perform aircraft loading.
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.4.10
If the Operator conducts passenger flights and transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator
shall ensure procedures are in place that prevent dangerous goods from being carried in an aircraft
cabin occupied by passengers, except as permitted by the Authority or the IATA DGR. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for preventing the transport of dangerous goods in an aircraft
cabin occupied by passengers, except as permitted.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined guidance/checklists used to ensure dangerous goods are not transported in an
aircraft passenger cabin, except as permitted.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
In general, dangerous goods are prohibited from being transported in an aircraft cabin occupied by
passengers. Limitations and exceptions are specified in DGR Sections 2 and 9.
GRH 3.4.11
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in
place that prevent dangerous goods from being carried on the aircraft flight deck, except as permitted
by the Authority or the IATA DGR. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for preventing the carriage of dangerous goods on the aircraft
flight deck, except as permitted.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined guidance/checklists used to ensure dangerous goods are not carried on the aircraft
flight deck, except as permitted.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
In general, dangerous goods are prohibited from being transported on the flight deck of an aircraft.
Limitations and exceptions are specified in DGR Sections 2 and 9.
GRH 3.4.12
If the Operator conducts passenger flights and permits cargo or passenger items to be transported in
the passenger seats of the aircraft cabin, the Operator shall ensure aircraft loading procedures are in
place that require such cargo packages or passenger items to:
(i) Be secured by a safety belt or restraint device having enough strength to eliminate the
possibility of shifting under all normal anticipated flight and ground conditions;
(ii) Be packaged or covered in a manner to avoid possible injury to passengers and cabin crew
members;
(iii) Not impose any load on the seats that exceeds the load limitation for the seats;
(iv) Not restrict access to or use of any required emergency or regular exit, or aisle(s) in the
cabin;
(v) Not obscure any passenger's view of the seat belt sign, no smoking sign or required exit
sign. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for loading and securing cargo/passenger items in cabin
passenger seats.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) and Unit Load Device
(ULD).
Guidance may be found in the applicable section(s) of the IATA ULD Regulations (ULDR).
The intent of this provision is that an operator, upon receiving or accepting ULDs from another party,
performs an inspection to ensure continued ULD airworthiness. Damaged or unserviceable ULDs
have the potential to affect flight safety.
Inspection procedures are typically applied to ULDs whether loaded or unloaded.
Differences in damage limitations can occur between ULDs of the same manufacturer, as well as
ULDs of different manufacturers. The maximum allowable damage for each specific ULD is typically
stated in the applicable Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) issued by the manufacturer.
The ULD Operational Damage Limits Notice (ODLN) is normally attached to the ULD to ensure easy
access to the appropriate damage limit information, and to facilitate inspection in the field (see ULDR
Section 7 Standard Specification 40/3 and 40/4).
Refer to IGOM 4.5.9 for guidance that addresses ULD airworthiness and serviceability.
3.5 Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
GRH 3.5.3
The Operator shall ensure a program is in place for the maintenance of ground support equipment,
which assures:
(i) A preventive maintenance program plan for each type of equipment;
(ii) Maintenance completed on such equipment is recorded;
(iii) Such equipment remains serviceable and in good mechanical condition.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed maintenance program for GSE.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected GSE inspection/maintenance schedules/records.
Observed aircraft ground handling operations (focus: GSE is serviceable/in good mechanical
condition; completed maintenance recorded).
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.6.5
The Operator shall ensure a process is in place that requires dangerous goods accidents or incidents
to be reported to the appropriate authority of the State and the state in which the accident or incident
occurred, and such reports are in accordance with the reporting requirements of the appropriate
authorities. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to operators that transport, and also to
operators that do not transport, dangerous goods as cargo.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for reporting dangerous goods accidents/incidents.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined guidance used for reporting dangerous goods accidents/incidents.
Examined selected dangerous goods accident/incident reporting records (focus: reporting in
accordance with reporting requirements of the appropriate authorities).
Examined selected dangerous goods accident/incident reports.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of State.
Guidance may be found in DGR 9.6.
3.7 Security
GRH 3.7.7
If the Operator conducts international passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
hold baggage is protected from unauthorized interference from the point it is screened or accepted
into the care of the Operator until departure of the international flight transporting the baggage.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure screened checked baggage is protected from
unauthorized interference.
Observed the protection of hold baggage from unauthorized interference until departure of the
aircraft transporting the baggage.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: process for protecting hold baggage
from unauthorized interference after screening or acceptance by the operator, until loaded onto
an aircraft prior to the departure of an international passenger flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.7.8
If the Operator conducts international passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
procedures are in place to record information associated with international hold baggage that has
met criteria in accordance with SEC 3.6.1 and 3.6.6.
Auditor Actions
Identified hold baggage criteria specified in SEC 3.6.1 and 3.6.6.
Identified/Assessed process(es) for recording information associated with hold baggage that
has met criteria in accordance with SEC 3.6.1 and 3.6.6.
Interviewed personnel that authorize the transport of unaccompanied hold baggage.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected unaccompanied hold baggage screening records.
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 3.7.10
If the Operator conducts International passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
transfer hold baggage for such flights either:
(i) Is subjected to screening prior being loaded onto the aircraft, or
(ii) Has been screened at the point of origin and subsequently protected from unauthorized
interference from the point of screening at the originating airport to the departing flight at the
transfer airport.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the process(es) to ensure transfer hold baggage for international flights is
subjected to screening prior to being loaded, where applicable.
Identified the process(es) to determine that hold baggage does not need to be rescreened at a
point of transfer, where applicable.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: processes for ensuring international
transfer hold baggage has been screened and protected from unauthorized interference prior to
being loaded onto an aircraft).
Other Actions (Specify)
GRH 4.1.5
The Operator shall ensure safety procedures associated with aircraft fueling operations are in place
that assure, during fueling operations with passengers on board the aircraft:
(i) The ground area beneath aircraft exit doors that have been designated for rapid deplaning
or emergency evacuation is kept clear of obstructions;
(ii) Where a boarding bridge is in use, an interior access path is maintained from the aircraft to
the terminal;
(iii) Where a passenger boarding bridge is not in use, aircraft passenger steps or an alternate
means of emergency evacuation is in place. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety procedures for aircraft fueling operations (focus: specifications of
this standard are included/addressed in fueling procedures).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Interviewed selected aircraft fueling supervisory personnel.
Observed aircraft ground handling operations (focus: implementation of safety procedures
during aircraft fueling operations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Integral Airstairs.
When deployed, integral airstairs are acceptable as an alternate means of emergency evacuation.
Refer to IGOM 3.2.3 for GSE positioning for aircraft refueling operations. Additional guidance may be
found in AHM 462, as well as the ICAO ASM, Part 1.
4.2 Aircraft De-/Anti-icing
GRH 4.2.1
If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft
icing, the Operator shall have a De-/Anti-icing Program, which, if applicable, is approved by the
Authority and, as a minimum:
(i) Ensures adherence to the Clean Aircraft Concept;
(ii) Defines responsibilities within the Program;
(iii) Addresses applicable locations within the route network;
(iv) Defines areas of responsibility;
(v) Specifies technical and operational requirements;
(vi) Specifies training and qualification requirements;
(vii) Is applicable to external service providers that perform de-/anti-icing functions for the
Operator. (GM)
Note: The specifications of this provision are applicable to both commercial and non-commercial
operations.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed approved aircraft de-/anti-icing program (focus: all applicable locations
within the route network are addressed; non-commercial operations are accounted for).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Guidance
To ensure desired results, an operator's de-/anti-icing program would typically include policies and
procedures that:
• Define equipment for and methods of applying de-icing and anti-icing fluid to produce an
aircraft free of contamination (clean aircraft);
• Specify a sequence for fluid application to the applicable aircraft surfaces and define specific
methods and techniques for applying fluid to each individual surface;
• Provide limitations that are to be observed to successfully complete the process, including
correct fluid mixtures, fluid temperatures and nozzle pressure.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground
De-icing/Anti-icing Operations, Chapter 11, and in SAE AS6285, Aircraft Ground Deicing/Anti-Icing
Processes.
GRH 4.2.4
If the Operator has a de-/anti-icing program, the Operator shall ensure fluids used in de-icing and
anti-icing operations are:
(i) Stored, handled and applied in accordance with criteria established by the Operator, fluid
manufacturer and aircraft manufacturer;
(ii) Manufactured in accordance with SAE specifications. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for management/monitoring of de-/anti-icing fluid quality at
applicable locations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined records/documents that detail quality management of de-/anti-icing fluids at selected
locations.
Examined selected records/reports resulting from monitoring and supervision of aircraft de-/anti-
icing operations (focus: aircraft de-/anti-icing fluid usage in accordance with established criteria;
fluid conformity to SAE specifications is under supervision and quality control/monitoring
program).
Interviewed supervisory personnel for aircraft de-/anti icing operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
To be effective, an operator's de-/anti-icing program would typically include policies and procedures
that ensure the following:
• Fluids used in the de-/anti-icing process are manufactured in accordance with the relevant
SAE specifications and meet use criteria established by the operator, fluid manufacturer and
aircraft manufacturer;
• The appropriate types of fluids (Types I, II, III or IV) are used in the proper manner for
conditions under which de-icing and anti-icing operations are being conducted, each diluted
as required to achieve desired results;
• Fluids are handled in accordance with recommendations of the fluid manufacturer and
effectiveness is not degraded due to contamination.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground
De-icing/Anti-icing Operations, Chapter 11.
GRH 4.2.5
If the Operator has a De-/Anti-icing Program, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in place for
ground handling personnel to communicate with the flight crew to assure:
(i) The aircraft is properly configured prior to beginning the de-/anti-icing process;
(ii) The flight crew receives all necessary information relevant to fluid(s) applied to the aircraft
surfaces;
(iii) The flight crew receives confirmation of a clean aircraft;
(iv) The flight crew receives an “all clear” signal at the completion of the de-/anti-icing process
and prior to aircraft movement. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for communication between ground personnel and flight crew
during aircraft de-/anti-icing operations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in ground handling operations.
Examined selected records/reports resulting from supervision of aircraft de-/anti-icing operations
(focus: ground-aircraft communication procedures).
Examined selected records/reports of quality control inspection (focus: ground aircraft
communication procedures).
Applicability
Section 7 addresses functions within the scope of cargo operations and is applicable to an operator that
transports revenue and/or non-revenue cargo. COMAT (Company Material) is non-revenue cargo.
In this section, non-revenue cargo is addressed in the same way as revenue cargo for the purposes of
handling, loading, securing and transporting.
For the purpose of addressing cargo in this section, mail is considered to be an item of cargo. Therefore,
any reference to cargo also includes mail.
Individual CGO provisions or sub-specifications within a CGO provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable unless determined otherwise by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the Operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
Functions within the scope of cargo operations include:
• Cargo acceptance;
• Cargo handling;
• ULD loading/build-up;
• Application of required security measures.
Certain operators, particularly all-cargo operators, might have ground handling operations functions
performed by cargo operations personnel (e.g. aircraft loading, airside operations, load control). Where
this situation exists, the operator must be in conformity with the ISARPs contained in Section 6, Ground
Handling Operations (GRH), that are applicable to the ground handling operations functions performed by
cargo operations personnel.
Where an operator outsources the performance of cargo operations functions to external service
providers, the operator retains overall responsibility for ensuring the management of safety in the conduct
of such operations and must demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service providers in
accordance with CGO 1.10.2.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 7, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
1.3 Communication
CGO 1.11.1
If the Operator transports revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a hazard identification program
implemented in the cargo operations organization that includes a combination of reactive and
proactive methods of hazard identification. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety hazard identification program in cargo operations (focus: program
identifies hazards to aircraft operations; describes/defines method(s) of safety data
collection/analysis).
Identified/Assessed role of cargo operations in cross-discipline safety hazard identification
program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform cargo operations data collection/analysis to identify hazards
to aircraft operations.
Examined selected examples of hazards identified through cargo operations data
collection/analysis.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Hazard (Aircraft Operations) and Safety Risk.
Hazard identification is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the SMS
framework.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.1 located in ISM Section 1.
CGO 1.11.2
If the Operator transports revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and
mitigation program implemented in the cargo operations organization that specifies processes to
ensure:
(i) Hazards are analyzed to determine the corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
(ii) Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
(iii) When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in cargo operations.
[SMS] [Eff] (GM) ◄
Assessment Tool
Desired Outcome
• The Operator maintains an overview of cargo operations risks and through implementation of
mitigation actions, as applicable, ensures risks are at an acceptable level.
Effectiveness Criteria
(i) All relevant cargo operations hazards are analyzed for corresponding safety risks.
(ii) Safety risks are expressed in at least the following components:
- Likelihood of an occurrence.
- Severity of the consequence of an occurrence.
- Likelihood and severity have clear criteria assigned.
(iii) A matrix quantifies safety risk tolerability to ensure standardization and consistency in the risk
assessment process, which is based on clear criteria.
(iv) Risk register(s) across the cargo operations organization capture risk assessment information,
risk mitigation (control) and monitoring actions.
(v) Risk mitigation (control) actions include timelines, allocation of responsibilities and risk control
strategies (e.g. hazard elimination, risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation).
(vi) Mitigation (control) actions are implemented to reduce the risk to a level of “as low as reasonably
practical”.
(vii) Identified risks and mitigation actions are regularly reviewed for accuracy and relevance.
(viii) Effectiveness of risk mitigation (control) actions are monitored at least yearly.
(ix) Personnel performing risk assessments are appropriately trained in accordance with ORG 4.3.1.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed safety risk assessment and mitigation program in cargo operations (focus:
hazards analyzed to identify/define risk; risk assessed to determine appropriate action; action
implemented/monitored to mitigate risk).
Identified/Assessed role of cargo operations in cross-discipline safety risk
assessment/mitigation program (focus: participation with other operational disciplines).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform cargo operations risk assessment/mitigation.
Examined selected records/documents that illustrate risk assessment/mitigation action.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Risk Register, Safety Risk, Safety Risk Assessment (SRA),
Safety Risk Management and Safety Risk Mitigation.
Risk assessment and mitigation is an element of the Safety Risk Management component of the
SMS framework.
The potential for hazards is typically associated with the following aspects of cargo handling
operations:
• Acceptance and handling of dangerous goods and other special cargo shipments (e.g.
lithium batteries);
• Application of security controls;
• Protection from acts of unlawful interference;
• Build-up, handling and serviceability of ULDs;
• Operation and serviceability of cargo handling equipment;
• Adequacy of facilities.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
Operational Reporting
CGO 1.11.3
If the Operator transports revenue cargo, the Operator shall have an operational safety reporting
system in the cargo operations organization that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates cargo operations personnel to submit reports that identify safety
hazards, expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
(ii) Includes analysis and cargo operations management action to address operational
deficiencies, hazards, incidents and concerns identified through the reporting system.
[SMS] (GM) ◄
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed documented operational safety reporting system in cargo operations
(focus: system urges/facilitates reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to
validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in cargo
operations.
Interviewed personnel that perform operational functions in cargo operations.
Examined data that confirm an effective cargo operations safety reporting system (focus:
quantity of reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected cargo operations safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to
identify and address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
Safety Performance Monitoring and Management
CGO 2.1.1
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure personnel that perform operational duties in functions within the scope of cargo (revenue or
non-revenue) operations for the Operator, to include personnel of external service providers,
complete:
(i) Initial training prior to being assigned to perform such operational duties;
(ii) Recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the regulatory
authority but not less than once during every 36-month period, except for recurrent training
in dangerous goods as specified in CGO 2.2.1, CGO 2.2.2 or CGO 2.2.3. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for ensuring completion of training by cargo operations
personnel (focus: includes personnel in all cargo operations functions; includes external service
providers).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent course curricula/syllabi (focus: initial and recurrent training
programs address all cargo operations functions).
Examined initial/recurrent training records of selected personnel (focus: completion of initial and
recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the Applicability box at the beginning of this section for the functions within the scope of
cargo operations.
Requirements for initial and recurrent training apply to all personnel that perform duties within the
scope of cargo operations for the operator, both at the main base and at all other locations.
CGO 2.1.2
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure the training programs completed by cargo operations personnel in accordance with
CGO 2.1.1 provide the knowledge necessary to perform duties, execute procedures and operate the
equipment associated with specific cargo functions and responsibilities. Such programs shall include:
(i) Familiarization training on applicable regulations;
(ii) In-depth training on requirements, including policies, procedures and operating practices;
(iii) Training in human factors principles;
(iv) Safety training on associated operational hazards. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training programs for cargo operations personnel (focus: includes
programs for personnel in all cargo operations functions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected training program records/documents (focus: programs include all specified
training areas as applicable to cargo operations functions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Human Factors Principles.
Refer to DGR 1.5.2 and Table 1.5.A for guidance that addresses dangerous goods training for
personnel that perform cargo operations functions.
CGO 2.1.5
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure training for personnel that perform operational duties within the scope of cargo operations for
the Operator:
(i) Includes testing or evaluation by written, oral or practical means, as applicable;
(ii) Requires a demonstration of adequate knowledge, competency and proficiency to perform
duties, execute procedures and/or operate equipment.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed training programs for cargo operations personnel (focus: programs include
a process for testing/evaluations/demonstrations as specified).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent course curricula/syllabi (focus: initial and recurrent training
programs include testing/evaluations/demonstrations).
Examined initial/recurrent training records of selected personnel (focus: testing/evaluations/
demonstrations as specified completed during initial and recurrent training).
Other Actions (Specify)
CGO 2.2.1
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have a process to ensure cargo operations personnel assigned the responsibility for accepting
dangerous goods complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent training
within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program: (focus: defines DG training
requirements for all cargo handling personnel based on specific assigned responsibilities/duty
functions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined applicable initial/recurrent dangerous goods training curricula and syllabi (focus:
subject areas appropriate for personnel based on specific responsibilities/duty functions).
Examined initial/recurrent dangerous goods training records of selected personnel (focus:
completion of required training as appropriate for assigned responsibilities/duty functions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The curriculum for dangerous goods training for cargo operations personnel is determined by the
operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is completed within a validity period that expires 24 months
from the previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a
competent authority. However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of
the 24-month validity period, the new validity period may extend from the month on which the
recurrent training was completed until 24 months from the expiry month of the current validity period.
If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months of the validity period, the new
validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
CGO 2.2.2
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, but does not transport dangerous goods,
the Operator shall have a process to ensure cargo operations personnel assigned the responsibility
for accepting cargo complete dangerous goods training, to include initial training and recurrent
training within 24 months of previous training in dangerous goods. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program: (focus: defines DG training
requirements for personnel with cargo acceptance/handling responsibilities).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent dangerous goods training curricula/syllabi (focus: subject
areas appropriate for personnel with cargo acceptance/handling responsibilities).
Examined initial/recurrent training records of selected cargo operations personnel (focus:
completion of required training as appropriate for assigned responsibilities/duty functions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
When an operator does not transport dangerous goods (i.e. a “no-carry” operator), dangerous goods
training is still required for cargo operations personnel to ensure declared and undeclared dangerous
goods are recognized and prohibited from being carried or loaded onto an aircraft.
Dangerous goods training is structured to provide the requisite knowledge to permit cargo operations
personnel to recognize dangerous goods, whether labeled or not labeled, and to prevent such
dangerous goods from being inadvertently accepted and/or planned for loading into an aircraft.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training for cargo handling personnel is determined by the
operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
CGO 2.2.3
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have a process to ensure cargo operations personnel assigned the responsibility for handling or
storing such cargo, as well as, where applicable, the loading of ULDs, receive dangerous goods
training, to include initial training and recurrent training within 24 months of previous training in
dangerous goods. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for dangerous goods training for cargo operations personnel that
handle/store cargo; where applicable, load cargo on/into ULDs.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected initial/recurrent dangerous goods training curricula/syllabi applicable to
cargo operations personnel that handle/store cargo; where applicable, load cargo on/into ULDs.
Examined initial/recurrent training records of selected cargo operations personnel that
handle/store cargo; where applicable, load cargo on/into ULDs.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Unit Load Device (ULD), which addresses certified and non-
certified units.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training for cargo personnel with responsibilities for handling or
storing dangerous goods cargo as well as, where applicable, the loading of such cargo onto/into
ULDs, is developed by the operator and may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty
function(s).
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job
functions.
2.3 SMS Training
CGO 3.1.1
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure such shipments accepted for transport:
(i) If revenue cargo, are in compliance with standards in the OM as specified in CGO 1.6.1;
(ii) If interline cargo, are in compliance with IATA interline cargo requirements;
(iii) If non-revenue cargo, are in compliance with the OM or equivalent document as specified in
CGO 1.6.1. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process that ensures cargo shipments accepted for transport are in
compliance with applicable requirements.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Guidance
Such scales might be referred to as weigh bridges.
Accuracy in cargo weights is a critical safety factor and is monitored by many states. Records of
scale checking and calibration are typically made available to the applicable authority for review, if
requested.
Guidance may be found in AHM 534.
3.2 Dangerous Goods
CGO 3.2.1
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have a Dangerous Goods Acceptance Checklist that:
(i) Reflects applicable requirements contained in the current DGR;
(ii) Once completed, contains information that identifies the person(s) that performed the
acceptance check. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods acceptance checklist (focus: contains DGR
requirements, information that identifies person that performed acceptance check).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined process(es) for development/maintenance of dangerous goods acceptance checklist.
Guidance
Refer to DGR 9.1.3 for guidance that addresses use of the Dangerous Goods Acceptance Checklist.
CGO 3.2.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have procedures to ensure any package, overpack, freight container, or ULD containing dangerous
goods is inspected and is not accepted, unless:
(i) Properly marked and labeled;
(ii) There is no leakage;
(iii) Its integrity has not been compromised. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for inspection dangerous goods shipments prior to acceptance
for transport.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo acceptance operations (focus: procedures for inspection of dangerous goods
shipments prior to acceptance).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Detailed instructions for acceptance and handling of dangerous goods are contained in DGR
Section 9. This information is not to be interpreted as requiring an operator to accept or transport a
particular article or substance, or as preventing an operator from imposing special requirements on
the transport of a particular article or substance.
CGO 3.2.5
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo on or in ULDs, the
Operator shall have procedures to ensure ULDs containing dangerous goods, which require a hazard
label, have a dangerous goods tag that:
(i) Contains information that is visible and legible and, if placed in a protective tag holder, such
information remains visible and legible;
(ii) Is marked with the class or division number(s) of such dangerous goods;
(iii) If a ULD contains packages bearing a “Cargo Aircraft Only” label, indicates the ULD can
only be loaded onto a cargo aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for ensuring ULD containing dangerous goods have a tag in
accordance with applicable requirements.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo acceptance and cargo handling operations (focus: procedures for ensuring
ULDs containing dangerous goods are tagged in accordance with applicable requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The need for procedures would normally apply to any operator that accepts dangerous goods for
transport on or in ULDs to ensure:
• The types of dangerous goods contained in ULDs, as well as any associated restrictions, are
accurately displayed on a ULD tag, which may be placed inside a protective tag holder on the
exterior of the ULD;
• ULDs are only loaded onto aircraft that are compatible with the load and associated
restrictions.
Refer to DGR 9.3.8 for guidance that addresses ULD dangerous goods tags.
CGO 3.2.8
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have a process to ensure, when dangerous goods hazard labels are found to be missing, illegible or
detached from shipments subsequent to the time of acceptance, such labels are replaced in
accordance with the information provided on the Shippers Declaration for Dangerous Goods. Such
requirement for the replacement of labels shall not apply where labels are found to be missing or
illegible at the time of acceptance. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for ensuring dangerous goods hazard labels are replaced in
accordance with the shipper's declaration when such labels are found to be missing, illegible or
detached.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo acceptance and cargo handling operations (focus: process for replacement of
lost/illegible/detached dangerous goods labels).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to DGR Section 9 for guidance that addresses dangerous goods hazard labels.
CGO 3.2.10
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have procedures that ensure dangerous goods are separated from other cargo or incompatible
materials in accordance with published category restrictions. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods handling procedures (focus: dangerous goods are
separated from other cargo or incompatible materials in accordance with published category
restrictions).
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that ensure dangerous goods
separation from other cargo in accordance with published restrictions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Loading requirements contained in DGR 9.3.2 and Table 9.3.A, primarily address dangerous goods
compatibility restrictions on an aircraft. Similar separation requirements are applicable for stowage of
these materials in a cargo facility.
Specifications for the segregation of dangerous goods during transportation and aircraft
loading/unloading are found in GRH 3.4.3.
CGO 3.2.12
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall
have procedures to ensure any dangerous goods shipment that appears to be damaged or leaking:
(i) Is not to be loaded on or into a ULD or delivered to an aircraft;
(ii) Is safely removed from the ULD (or other transport device) by the Provider or other relevant
authority, and safe disposal arranged;
(iii) In the case of leakage, an evaluation is conducted to ensure the remainder of the shipment
is in proper condition for transport by air and that no other package, cargo, ULD, other
transport device has been contaminated or damaged.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for handling/addressing ULDs and leaking/damaged
dangerous goods shipments.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Examined selected records/documents (focus: handling of leaking/damaged ULDs containing
dangerous goods).
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that address damaged/leaking ULDs
that contain dangerous goods).
Other Actions (Specify)
CGO 3.2.13
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo on flights using cargo aircraft, the Operator
shall have procedures to ensure packages or overpacks containing dangerous goods, and bearing a
“Cargo Aircraft Only” label, except those specifically excluded, are transported on cargo aircraft in
accordance with any of the following:
(i) In a Class C compartment, or
(ii) In a ULD container equipped with a fire detection/suppression system equivalent to that
required by the certification requirements of a Class C compartment as determined by the
relevant authority, or
(iii) In a manner that, in the event of an emergency involving packages or overpacks containing
dangerous goods, a crew member or other authorized person can access and handle such
packages or overpacks and, when size and weight permit, separate them from other
cargo. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for handling shipments with “Cargo Aircraft Only” labels.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that ensure shipments with “Cargo
Aircraft Only” labels are transported on cargo aircraft in accordance with applicable
requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Cargo Compartment, which includes definitions of compartment
types by classification.
3.3 Live Animals and Perishables
CGO 3.3.1
If the Operator transports live animals and/or perishables as cargo, the Operator shall have
procedures that ensure such cargo is accepted and handled in accordance with standards specified
in the OM. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for acceptance/handling of live animal and/or perishable
cargo shipments.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo acceptance and cargo handling operations (focus: live animal/perishable cargo
acceptance/handling in accordance with OM).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of CITES (The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora).
Live animal handling procedures and specific responsibilities of an operator with regard to required
documentation, acceptance, containers, animal welfare, compliance with all regulations, storage and
loading and liability are addressed in the LAR and PCR. Additional requirements may be mandated
by the State of Flight Departure, the State of Flight Arrival and/or the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
3.4 Other Special Cargo
CGO 3.4.1
If the Operator transports outsized cargo and/or heavy cargo, the Operator shall have procedures
that ensure such cargo is accepted and handled in accordance with standards specified in the
OM. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for acceptance/handling of special cargo shipments.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo acceptance and cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that ensure
other special cargo acceptance/handling in accordance with OM).
Interviewed cargo operations personnel that accept/handle special cargo.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of the Air Cargo Tariff and Rules (TACT).
Guidance for the handling of human remains can be found in the TACT Rules and the Airport
Handling Manual (AHM).
Outsized and heavy cargo refers to items that are larger or heavier than can be accommodated on or
in a ULD. Standards for handling these items are found in the OM as well as in the Weight and
Balance Manual for each aircraft type.
Prior arrangements and specific handling requirements generally apply to all types of special cargo
and are incorporated into the OM, including those items identified in this provision, but also
emergency medical supplies, live human organs and diplomatic shipments.
3.5 Unit Load Device (ULD)
CGO 3.5.1
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo using ULDs, the Operator shall have
procedures to ensure ULD-related operations, including, but not limited to, ULD build-up/breakdown,
transportation, storage and handling, whether performed on or off the airport, are conducted in
accordance with the Weight and Balance Manual, and with requirements of the ULD Regulations
(ULDR) or other means acceptable to the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for ensuring ULD-related operations are conducted in
accordance with the ULDR or other means acceptable to the Authority.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that ensure ULD-related operations
conducted in accordance with W/B manual/ULDR/other applicable requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
All ULDs are required to meet airworthiness requirements when loaded onto an aircraft, either by
certification or by compliance with the Weight and Balance Manual. Adhering to the ULDR is one
means (but not the only means) that ULD operations may be carried out in compliance with the
requirements of the Weight and Balance Manual.
Essential components of ULD operations typically include:
• Minimum training requirements stipulated in the ULDR;
• Continued airworthiness of ULD during operations;
• Limitations applicable to ULDs;
• Adequate supervision and management of all ULD operations.
Guidance may be found in the applicable chapter of the ULDR.
CGO 3.5.2
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo using ULDs, the Operator shall have
procedures that ensure ULDs, when accepted and/or loaded for transport, meet safety requirements
pertaining to the loading and securing of cargo. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for ensuring loaded ULDs meet safety requirements.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures for ensuring ULD cargo
loading/securing in accordance with applicable safety requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Detailed instructions for the safe loading and securing of cargo are contained in the ULDR and
address the use of pallets, nets, straps and containers. The ULDR also provides information
regarding ULD limitations.
Each state may have additional or varying regulations and specifications.
3.6 Combi Aircraft Operations
CGO 3.6.1
If the Operator conducts combi aircraft operations, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in place
for loading such aircraft, and such procedures shall be in accordance with, as applicable,
requirements of the aircraft manufacturer, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) holder and/or data
approved by the Authority. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure(s) for loading cargo onto combi aircraft in accordance with all
requirements.
Interviewed responsible manager(s) in cargo operations.
Interviewed cargo operations personnel that load cargo onto combi aircraft.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Cargo Restraint System, Combi (Combined Passenger and
Cargo) Aircraft Operations and Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Holder.
Procedures would typically ensure passengers seated on the same deck and forward of the cargo
are protected through provision of an adequate buffer and/or cargo restraint system.
3.7 Security
CGO 3.7.1
If the Operator transports revenue cargo, the Operator shall ensure security measures are
implemented in cargo facilities in accordance with requirements of the applicable civil aviation
security program. (GM)
Note: This provision is applicable to all facilities where cargo acceptance and/or cargo handling
operations are conducted either by the Operator or by external service providers for the Operator.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes that ensure implementation of security measures at cargo
facilities (focus: ensures procedures in accordance with the local civil aviation security program).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: implementation of access control measures at
cargo facilities in accordance with applicable security requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Cargo Facility.
The intent of this provision is for the operator to ensure the security of all facilities where cargo
operations are conducted either by the operator or by an external service provider for the operator.
Security measures that address landside and airside facility access for vehicles and personnel, as
well as the protection of cargo so as to prevent acts of unlawful interference, would normally be found
in the applicable civil aviation security program. Such measures address requirements of applicable
regulatory and airport authorities, as appropriate.
At locations where cargo security measures are under the control of an entity for which the operator
has no oversight capabilities (e.g. airport authority, law enforcement agency), the operator would
have to be aware of this arrangement as well as the details of the access control measures.
CGO 3.7.2
If the Operator transports revenue cargo, the Operator shall ensure procedures are in place for the
screening of persons and the security control of vehicles in accordance with requirements of the
applicable civil aviation security program. Such procedures shall apply to persons and vehicles:
(i) Under its control that have unescorted access to security restricted areas (in which there is
cargo);
(ii) Not under its control but have unescorted access to such areas as authorized by the
Operator. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes that ensure access control procedures are applied to
unescorted persons/vehicles with access to secured cargo.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: procedures that ensure unescorted
persons/vehicles with access to known cargo are subjected to screening/security controls).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Known Cargo.
The intent of this provision is for an operator to ensure security procedures are applied to persons
and vehicles that have access to security restricted areas where there is cargo (i.e. cargo that has
already been screened or had security controls applied, and/or is under protection to prevent
unlawful interference).
At locations where cargo security measures are under the control of an entity for which the operator
has no oversight capabilities (e.g. government agency, airport authority, law enforcement agency),
the operator would have to be aware of this arrangement as well as the details of the access control
measures. However, the operator would not have to be directly involved in the implementation of
such measures.
CGO 3.7.4
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have processes for the
acceptance of cargo as follows:
(i) For cargo that can be identified as having the application of screening or other security
controls confirmed or accounted for by a regulated agent or an entity approved by the
relevant authority (known cargo), a process to ensure such cargo is:
(a) Delivered by a regulated agent, a nominated representative of an entity approved
by the relevant authority, or a known representative of the operator;
(b) Free from any signs of tampering;
(c) Accompanied by all required information (paper or electronic) corresponding to the
cargo being delivered, including documentation that details the security status
(e.g. consignment security declaration);
(d) Protected from unauthorized interference throughout the chain of custody since the
point that cargo gained its secured status;
(e) Subjected to additional security controls as required by risk assessment.
(ii) For cargo that cannot be identified as having the application of screening or other security
controls confirmed or accounted for by a regulated agent or an entity approved by the
relevant authority (unknown cargo), a process to ensure such cargo is subjected to
screening or other security controls as accepted by the applicable state. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for acceptance of cargo (focus: processes address both
known and unknown cargo).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected cargo shipment acceptance documents.
Observed cargo acceptance operations (focus: acceptance processes for verifying the security
status of known cargo, ensuring application of screening/security control for unknown cargo).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Known Cargo, Regulated Agent and Unknown Cargo.
The IATA Security Manual outlines specific provisions covering the basic acceptance of all known
cargo to be carried on commercial passenger flights.
The term “entity that is approved by the relevant authority” as used in this provision is non-specific,
but could include, for example, a cargo service provider for the operator or, in certain cases, the
operator itself. As stated, any such entity must be approved by the relevant authority.
Known cargo, when presented to an operator for transport on an aircraft, has by definition been
subjected to screening or appropriate security controls by a regulated agent, an approved entity or
the operator. An operator, as a minimum, implements the steps specified in this provision to maintain
or protect the “known” status of the shipment from the time the shipment is accepted until it is finally
loaded into an aircraft.
All cargo shipments on which the application of screening or security controls has been confirmed
and accounted for by a regulated agent or approved entity are required to be accompanied by
documentation that states the security status (e.g. consignment security declaration), either in
electronic or paper form.
When cargo has been screened or subjected to other security controls as required by a regulated
agent or an approved entity prior to acceptance by the operator, the operator, among other protective
actions, would typically examine the documentation (e.g. consignment security declaration) and
check the shipment for evidence of tampering prior to loading onto the aircraft.
For cargo destined to an EU country, the application of screening or other security controls by a
Regulated Agent that holds a current RA3 validation issued by an EU Independent Validator is
evidence the agent has approval by the relevant authority.
If for some reason a shipment is not properly maintained or protected in its known status, the
shipment then reverts to unknown cargo. In such case, the operator, in order to return the shipment
to known cargo status, would have to ensure the shipment is again subjected to the application of
screening or other security controls.
Additional guidance may be found in the IATA Security Manual.
CGO 3.7.7
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure transfer cargo has been subjected to appropriate security controls in accordance with
requirements of the relevant authority before being transported on an international flight. (GM)
Note: Appropriate security controls may have been applied at the point of original uplift.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure security controls are applied to transfer cargo.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of transfer cargo (focus: verification that security controls have been
applied).
Observed cargo handling operations (focus: process to verify appropriate screening/security
controls have been applied to transfer cargo).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Transfer Cargo and Mail.
Applicability
Section 8 addresses the management of operational security in accordance with requirements of an Air
Operator Security Program (AOSP). This section is applicable to all operators.
Individual SEC provisions or sub-specifications within a SEC provision that:
• Do not begin with a conditional phrase are applicable to all operators unless determined otherwise
by the Auditor.
• Begin with a conditional phrase (“If the Operator...”) are applicable if the operator meets the
condition(s) stated in the phrase.
Where operational security functions are outsourced to contracted external service providers, an operator
retains responsibility for the conduct of such functions and will have processes to monitor applicable
external service providers in accordance with SEC 1.11.2 to ensure requirements that affect the security of
operations are being fulfilled.
General Guidance
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 8, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and
acronyms, are found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
SEC 1.1.3
The Operator shall have a corporate security policy that states the commitment of the organization to
a culture that has security as a fundamental operational priority. Such policy shall be communicated
throughout the organization and commit the organization to:
(i) The provision of resources necessary for the successful implementation of the policy;
(ii) Compliance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;
(iii) The promotion of security awareness and the establishment of a security culture;
(iv) The establishment of security objectives and security performance standards;
(v) Continual improvement of the SeMS;
(vi) Periodic review of the policy to ensure continuing relevance to the organization. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed corporate security policy (focus: policy identifies security as fundamental
operational priority).
Examined examples of security policy communication (focus: communication methods,
organizational awareness campaign).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Just Culture.
The security policy of an organization typically expresses the clear and genuine commitment by
senior management to the establishment of a security culture. Such policy also defines the
organization's fundamental approach toward security and how security is expected to be viewed by
employees and external service providers.
When an operator has an integrated management system (e.g. SMS, QMS) that includes SeMS, the
security policy may be incorporated in the corporate safety and/or compliance monitoring policy. The
security policy might include the following elements to ensure the comprehensive integration of
security:
• The adoption of industry best practices for security management where warranted;
• Continual management review and improvement of the SeMS and security culture;
• The development of objectives for the measurement of security performance;
• Imperatives for including operational security in the description of duties and responsibilities
of senior and frontline management;
• The promotion of a reporting system that encourages the reporting of inadvertent human
error and/or intentional acts of non-compliance;
• Communication processes that ensure a free flow of information throughout the organization.
In addition to a formal security policy document, an operator would typically have documented
dissemination channels that can contribute to awareness of the policy and its content among all
employees and establish security as a priority for everyone.
States and the Industry have developed different promotional tools for security incident awareness
and reporting. The use of IATA’s “See it Report it” training and certification tool is one method for an
operator to demonstrate conformity with this provision.
(https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Pages/security-management-system-sems.aspx)
The organizational security policy typically expresses the operator’s focus on achieving an effective
security culture that protects the safety and security interests of its employees, customers,
shareholders, assets and brand. Such policy also ensures that obligations contained in domestic and
international aviation security laws and regulations are met.
The security policy usually specifies minimum security requirements and identifies applicable
reference documents (e.g. the AOSP). It also defines the roles and responsibilities of management
and non-management employees, and those with specific security accountabilities.
The security policy typically addresses the yearly establishment of KPIs for the head of security and
but for the entire organization. Review of the KPIs provides the basis for the following year’s program
objectives including the allocation of resources to achieve such objectives. This review typically
includes the impact of the security culture, identification of non-compliances including associated
corrective actions, reported incidents along and root cause analysis. Trends identified are then used
to define new security objectives.
Finally, the security policy will normally state the operator’s commitment to proactively managing risk,
complying with legislation and regulations, aligning security activity with assessed risk and
implementing a ‘just culture’ to encourage security-related reporting.
1.2 Air Operator Security Program (AOSP)
SEC 1.2.1
The Operator shall have a formal Air Operator Security Program (AOSP) that includes:
(i) The requirements of the civil aviation security program of the State of the Operator
(hereinafter, the State);
(ii) Applicable requirements of other states where operations are conducted;
(iii) The security standards of the Operator. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed the AOSP.
Examined operator-specific security requirements and standards.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Acts of Unlawful Interference, State, State Acceptance and
State Approval.
An operator is required to have a AOSP in order to:
• Protect customers, personnel, assets and customer goods from any act of unlawful
interference;
• Comply with regulatory requirements.
The name of an operator’s security program may vary based on the regulatory jurisdiction. Examples
of typical alternative names to AOSP include ACSP (Air Carrier Security Program) and ASP (Airline
Security Program).
The Security Program may be structured in accordance with the template provided by the State or
other relevant states (where operations are conducted).
The State may issue a standard security program with which all operators must comply (operators
may apply for exemptions or amendments, as applicable). In such cases, the standard security
program of the State is typically recognized as the AOSP of the operator. The AOSP typically also
includes or refers to other company manuals and procedures that provide operator-specific details.
A standard security program may be acceptable in meeting security requirements of other states, or
the operator may be required to submit individual security programs tailored to meet requirements of
other states. An operator must satisfy the security requirements of all applicable states for the
purpose of meeting the intent of this provision.
The AOSP may be approved or accepted (i.e. no notice of deficiency or equivalent is issued) by the
relevant state.
The AOSP may include security sensitive information as required by the State. In such case, the
AOSP would normally include a description of dissemination of security sensitive information in a
way that ensures the required level of data protection.
Refer to Guidance associated with SEC 1.4.1 for additional information.
1.3 Authorities and Responsibilities
SEC 1.3.1
The Operator shall ensure the SeMS defines the authorities and responsibilities of management
personnel within the SeMS and provides a general description of security responsibilities for
categories of non-management personnel within the SeMS as documented in the AOSP. The SeMS
shall specify:
(i) The levels of management with the authority to make decisions that affect operational
security;
(ii) Responsibilities for ensuring security functions are performed and procedures are
implemented in accordance with applicable regulations and standards of the Operator;
(iii) Lines of accountability throughout the SeMS, including direct accountability for security on
the part of senior management;
(iv) Responsibilities of members of management, irrespective of other functions, as well as of
non-management personnel, with respect to security performance of the SeMS. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed defined management/non-management authorities and responsibilities
throughout the SeMS.
Interviewed designated management representative(s).
Examined job descriptions of selected management/non-management personnel in security
management.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 1.3.1 located in ISM Section 1.
1.4 Communication
SEC 1.4.1
The Operator shall have a system that enables effective communication of security information
throughout the management system and all areas where operations are conducted. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system(s) for communicating information relevant to security operations
(focus: capability for communicating information relevant to operations within the security
organization).
Interviewed designated management representative(s).
Examined examples of information communication in security operations.
Interviewed selected non-management operational personnel in security operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The intent of security communication is to foster a positive security culture in which all employees
receive ongoing information on security issues, security metrics, specific security risks existing in the
workplace, and initiatives to address known security issues. Such communication typically conveys
security-critical information, explains why particular actions are taken to improve security, and why
security procedures are introduced or changed.
Security information that is sensitive is typically drafted and circulated in a manner that is in
accordance with applicable security information protocols. Communication of such information is
normally limited only to those with an operational need to know.
Any system would have to be able to address the varying degree of urgency with which security
information needs to be circulated.
Security Intranet Site
A corporate security department website is one method of disseminating security information to
operational personnel. Different levels of access might be required in order to control the access to
restricted information to those with a “need to know.” Corporate security awareness information and
security incident reporting forms or templates are typically made available on this website. However,
where various management systems (e.g. QMS, SMS, SeMS) are aligned or integrated, there may
be one common form or template accessed from a central location that is used for reporting
incidents.
Corporate Manual System
An operator's manuals and regulations are the formal system of coordinating and communicating the
policies, procedures and significant guidance necessary to ensure the operator's mission is carried
out in a consistent and integrated manner.
Security Bulletins
Security bulletins, which are typically issued by the corporate security department or by operational
departments within the operator, might specify action and/or contain general information. Issuance of
bulletins electronically (e.g. email) is an efficient means of ensuring all personnel with a “need to
know” are made aware of new or amended security information in a timely manner.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
SEC 1.5.2
The Operator shall ensure management and non-management positions that require the
performance of functions within the scope of the AOSP, to include positions within the organization of
the Operator and, if applicable, service providers selected by the Operator to conduct operational
security functions, are filled by personnel on the basis of knowledge, skills, training and experience
appropriate for the position. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed standards and methods for selection of personnel in functions relevant to
safety and security of aircraft operations.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Interviewed selected personnel that perform security functions relevant to the safety or security
of aircraft operations.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Prerequisite criteria for each position, which would typically be developed by the Operator, and
against which candidates would be evaluated, ensure personnel are appropriately qualified for
management system positions and operational roles in areas of the organization critical to safety and
security operations.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 1.5.3 located in ISM Section 1.
SEC 1.5.3
If permitted by the State, the Operator shall ensure a process has been established that requires
operational security personnel in the organization of the Operator and, if applicable, service providers
selected by the Operator to conduct operational security functions, to be subjected to pre-
employment and recurring background checks in accordance with requirements of applicable
aviation security authorities. The requirement for a background check shall be applicable to
personnel who:
(i) Engage in the implementation of security controls;
(ii) Have unescorted access to the security restricted area of an airport;
(iii) Have unescorted access to other security areas and searched aircraft;
(iv) Have access to sensitive aviation security information. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for the pre-employment and recurring background checks.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of personnel background checks.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Security Control and Security Restricted Area.
A background check might include:
• Criminal record check;
• Previous employment history;
• Personal references;
• Education and training.
National legislation on civil liberties and protection of personal information will greatly influence the
limits placed on an employer when performing pre-employment background checks. An employer is
not permitted to deviate from the laws of the country where the hiring process is taking place.
Escorted access may be provided to an individual that has yet to complete all aspects of the
background checking process.
An individual currently permitted unescorted access to a security restricted area, but who
subsequently fails to satisfy the criteria to continue to hold an airport identification card or for
unescorted access to a security restricted area, will typically have access to security restricted areas,
as well as access to sensitive aviation security information, revoked immediately.
The operator’s role in the background check process will be determined by the State. In some cases,
the entire process will be managed and/or conducted by the State.
1.6 Documentation System
SEC 1.6.4
If the Operator has external service providers conduct outsourced operational security functions, the
Operator shall have a process to ensure such external service providers receive information
regarding security directives and instructions in a timely and secure manner that meets requirements
of the AOSP. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to circulate relevant security information to external service
providers.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected examples of information provided to external service providers.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Outsourcing.
The operator would have a central source of information for security procedures that is automatically
updated in case of approved changes. Obsolete versions would only be accessible for
archiving/historical purposes. The main source of information would be electronic and found in a
specific/dedicated library. Printouts of the procedures would be considered as backup solutions.
Personnel of a service provider with a need to know would have to know how to obtain or access
copies from the single information source and that a new copy must be produced to ensure use of a
current document version.
1.7 (Intentionally open)
1.8 Records System
SEC 1.10.2
The Operator shall have a process for addressing findings resulting from audits of operational
security functions that ensures:
(i) Identification of root cause(s);
(ii) Development of corrective action, as appropriate, to address findings;
(iii) Implementation of corrective action in appropriate operational security area(s);
(iv) Evaluation of corrective action to determine effectiveness. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for addressing audit findings within operational security.
Interviewed responsible quality assurance program manager.
Examined selected audit reports/records (focus: identification of root cause,
development/implementation of corrective action, follow-up to evaluate effectiveness).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Executive managers of organizational business units are responsible for making sure quality
assurance activity is undertaken to ensure:
• Conformity with the security standards;
• Existence of required security systems;
• Compliance with relevant aviation security legislation;
• Conformity with IOSA and the SeMS standards.
Auditors conducting quality assurance activities apply the internal audit procedure. This manual,
IOSA ISARPS, and the internal assessment tool form the basis for quality assurance activity.
Information and data taken from audit reports or an equivalent business tool are used to record all
quality assurance activity. Individual business units are responsible for identifying and assigning
corrective actions to the appropriate personnel for implementation, completion and follow-up
monitoring for effectiveness.
Corrective actions are managed in accordance with internal quality assurance processes and
procedures.
For each audit finding a root cause is identified and corrective action developed as appropriate to
address the root cause. Corrective action is then implemented in the appropriate operational security
areas and evaluated to determine effectiveness in addressing the root cause.
To ensure findings are corrected in a timely manner, it is important for the operator to have a process
that clearly identifies the owner of the deficient process and delegates responsibility to that owner to
develop and implement the appropriate corrective action(s).
It is also important to establish a clear timeline to implement the appropriate corrective action(s) as
well as have a process to escalate to senior management when deadlines are missed.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 2.1.7 located in ISM Section 1.
Quality Control
SEC 1.11.4
If the Operator has operational security functions conducted by external organizations not under the
control of the Operator, the Operator shall have methods, as permitted by the applicable civil aviation
security authority, for the monitoring of such functions to ensure, as permitted, implementation of
outsourced security measures is in compliance with its AOSP. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified operational security functions conducted by external organizations not under the
control of the operator.
Identified/Assessed methods used by the operator for monitoring functions to ensure that
security controls are implemented.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of monitoring the external organizations that conduct security
functions.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Security procedures may be performed by law enforcement agencies, civil aviation authorities,
airport authorities or other organizations not under the control of or under contract to the operator.
When the operator has no direct authority over the organization performing the security measures,
oversight and verification functions could be performed via inspections and reporting in case of
incidents or deviation from the standard operating procedures.
If permitted by law or the applicable civil aviation security authority, the operator might assess the
quality of such security procedures through the use of tests, surveys and/or exercises.
This standard is applicable to all security procedures required under the security program of the
State, state of operation or the operator.
1.12 Operational Reporting
SEC 1.12.1
The Operator shall have an operational security reporting system that is implemented throughout the
organization in a manner that:
(i) Encourages and facilitates personnel to report security incidents and security occurrences
pertaining to the Operator;
(ii) Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
(iii) Includes analysis and management action as necessary to address security issues
identified through the reporting system. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system for operational personnel to report security incidents and security
occurrences (focus: system urges/facilitates reporting of security/safety concerns; includes
analysis/action to validate/address reported security/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected reports submitted by operational personnel.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Just Culture, Security Incident, Security Occurrence, Security
Vulnerability and Security Threat.
Frontline personnel, such as flight or cabin crew members, maintenance technicians and ground
handling personnel, are in the best position to note abnormalities that could indicate real or potential
security threats, or any other security concerns, so they may be brought to the attention of the head
of security and other relevant managers.
Applicable aviation security authorities would be notified in accordance with SEC 4.3.2 when a
legitimate security incident or security occurrence has been identified through the operational
security reporting system.
The effectiveness of a reporting system is determined by a basic requirement for safeguarding
information. Typically, individuals will continue to provide information only when there is confidence
that such information will be used only for the purpose of improving operational security and will
never be compromised or used against them.
A system that encourages and promotes reporting from personnel might include:
• A process that protects the confidentiality of the report;
• A process that provides for review by corporate security personnel;
• An articulated Just Culture policy that encourages reporting of security incidents or events,
even if resulting from human error;
• A shared responsibility between personnel (or, if applicable, respective professional
associations) and management to promote the confidentiality of the reporting system;
• A process for secure de-identification of reports;
Guidance
An effective process provides for a review and analysis of each report to determine the risk
associated with the reported issue and, where applicable, ensures development and implementation
of appropriate action by responsible management to correct the situation.
In addition, an effective process provides for a review and analysis of information derived from each
report and from external sources to determine the need for risk assessment and, when applicable,
the development and implementation of appropriate risk control action by responsible management
to mitigate the security risk. Effective security risk management ensures security information, security
incidents and acts of unlawful interference are acted upon under a security methodology that
evaluates and address security threats, vulnerabilities and associated consequences.
SEC 2.1.1
The Operator shall have a security training program that is approved or accepted by the State and
meets applicable requirements of other states. Such program shall consist of initial, recurrent and,
where applicable, requalification training that comprises, as appropriate, theoretical and practical
training to ensure:
(i) Personnel, employed by or under the control of the Operator who implement security
controls understand security awareness and reporting, and have the competence to perform
their duties;
(ii) Flight and cabin crew members, as well as frontline aircraft ground handling and cargo
handling personnel, are able to act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the
consequences of acts of unlawful interference and disruptive passenger behavior. (GM)
Note: If permitted by the State, the program shall ensure applicable personnel have completed
appropriate security background checks in accordance with SEC 1.5.3 prior to attending any training
that contains sensitive or restricted security information.
Note: Applicable personnel shall complete initial security training prior to being assigned to
operational duties.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed security training program (focus: approval/acceptance by State; meets
applicable requirements of other states; background checks required prior to personnel attending
training).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected security training program curricula (focus: contain theoretical and practical
training elements).
Examined selected ground/cargo handling personnel training records (focus: completion of
initial/recurrent security training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Training may be sub-divided for line managers/supervisors, aircrew, ramp workers, cargo personnel
and other personnel who are directly involved in the implementation of security measures and
thereby require an awareness of obligations to the AOSP.
The security training program is typically integrated into the normal training curriculum for operational
personnel and need not be stand-alone training.
The proportion of theoretical and practical training is typically based on requirements of the State. For
certain functions or duties there may not be a practical component.
The scope of recurrent security training, as well as the specific subject matter included, may vary in
accordance with requirements of the applicable authorities and the security policy of the operator.
An existing background check from a previous employer may be acceptable if still time valid.
Different training tools for security awareness and security incident reporting have been developed
by states and the Industry. The use of IATA’s “See it Report it” training and certification tool is one
method for the operator to demonstrate conformity with the relevant specification in this provision.
(https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Pages/security-management-system-sems.aspx)
SEC 2.1.4
The Operator shall ensure personnel who perform security functions, crew members and appropriate
operational personnel, as specified in SEC 2.1.1, complete recurrent security training on a frequency
in accordance with requirements of the security program of the State and, if applicable, other states
where operations are conducted or, if there is no regulatory mandate, not less than once every 36
months. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified requirements mandating frequency of recurrent training (focus: compliance with
requirements of the State and other relevant states; if there is no regulatory mandate, not less
than once every 36 months).
Examined selected recurrent training records, material and schedules.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The scope of recurrent security training, as well as the specific subject matter included, may vary in
accordance with requirements of the applicable authorities and the security policy of the operator.
SEC 2.1.5
If the Operator manages a security screening system, the Operator shall ensure personnel who
manage or operate the screening system:
(i) Are approved and/or certified in accordance with requirements of the applicable aviation
security authority;
(ii) Complete initial and recurrent training that includes training in the identification of
explosives, weapons or other dangerous items or devices. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified security screening system(s) managed or operated by operator.
Identified/Assessed screener approval/certification program (focus: in compliance with
requirements of all applicable aviation securities authorities).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected initial/recurrent screener training curricula (focus: training includes
identification of explosives/, weapons/other dangerous items/devices).
Examined selected initial/recurrent screener training records (focus: completion of training in
identification of explosives/, weapons/other dangerous items/devices).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
When a screener certification program exists, an operator is normally required to ensure all
screeners are certified by the applicable aviation security authority. In locations where there is no
screener certification program, the operator typically provides a level of training to all screeners that
ensures such personnel are able to properly detect and identify all explosives, components of
improvised explosive devices, weapons and other dangerous items or devices.
Continuing competency is normally maintained through recurrent training on a frequency that is in
accordance with requirements of the applicable aviation security authority.
The approval/certification of personnel who manage or operate the screening system would typically
include:
• A check of the person’s reliability (initial and recurrent background check).
• Completion of initial and recurrent training specific for the job function, to include:
○ Theoretical, practical and on-the-job training.
○ Training on the use of screening equipment to enhance capabilities for detecting
explosive materials and/or explosive devices, whether carried by persons or within
any item screened.
• Evidence of formal approval/certification accomplished either by or on behalf of the relevant
aviation security authority.
Screeners undertaking cargo screening duties are typically not looking for weapons. Such personnel
are normally trained to detect and identify improvised explosive devices, including individual
components, and unauthorized dangerous goods.
SEC 2.1.8
The Operator shall ensure operational personnel complete security awareness training that focuses
on preventative measures and techniques in relation to passengers, baggage, cargo, mail,
equipment, stores and supplies, as applicable, and permits such personnel to contribute to the
prevention and reporting of acts of sabotage, other forms of unlawful interference and security
occurrences. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement to complete security awareness training for operational
personnel.
Examined security awareness training program contents and selected training records.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Security awareness training revolves around ensuring all personnel have a positive attitude about
security. The focus of training to achieve such awareness will vary by region or company and may be
influenced by cultural, religious and other factors. Such training is typically tailored to promote an
organizational security culture and to be effective in the environment in which it is to apply. Some
operators, depending on the individual organizational structure, may find it more appropriate to have
multiple security awareness training courses developed specifically for each operating area. Security
awareness training may be integrated into other job-related training courses (as opposed to a
standalone course).
Typically, operational personnel that complete security awareness training are crew members,
frontline ground handling personnel and all personnel that implement security controls irrespective of
whether such personnel are directly employed by the operator or employed by external service
providers.
Different training tools for security awareness and security incident reporting have been developed
by states and the Industry. The use of IATA’s “See it Report it” training and certification tool is one
method for the operator to demonstrate conformity with the reporting specification in this provision.
(https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Pages/security-management-system-sems.aspx).
3 Security Operations
SEC 3.1.1
If the Operator has exclusive control over airport airside areas and/or security restricted areas, the
Operator shall ensure an identification verification system is in place that prevents personnel and
vehicles from unauthorized access. Such identification system shall include:
(i) Designated checkpoints where identification is verified before access is permitted;
(ii) A requirement for authorized personnel to prominently display an identification badge. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed identification verification system in place to prevent unauthorized access to
airport security restricted area(s).
Identified designated checkpoints where identification is verified.
Identified system used to ensure all authorized personnel prominently display their identification
badge.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Access to airside and security restricted areas is often the responsibility of the airport operator or a
designated government agency. At those airports where an operator has exclusive control over a
specific area within the airside or the security restricted area, it is the responsibility of the operator to
control access through its managed checkpoints.
In most cases the identification badge is issued by the airport authority or a designated government
agency. It is not expected that an operator will need to develop its own identification system, provided
the airport operator or government agency system is sufficient.
SEC 3.1.2
The Operator shall ensure measures are in place to control and supervise personnel and vehicles
moving to and from the aircraft in security restricted areas to prevent unauthorized access to the
aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed measure(s) to control and supervise the movement of personnel and
vehicle to and from the aircraft in the security restricted area(s)
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Procedures are in place to ensure airline personnel intercept any person identified as having no need
to be on board or near the aircraft.
In some environments, it would be prudent not to leave an in-service aircraft unattended. Precautions
may be taken to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft that are not in service and are parked and
unattended. For example, all external doors may be locked, all stairs and loading bridges are
removed (or locked) and any steps left near the aircraft are immobilized.
Passengers boarding or disembarking from flights using the apron are to be supervised when
passing from the terminal building to the aircraft. Such measures are applied whether the passengers
are walking or are being transported in vehicles.
Particular care is taken to ensure only crew members, authorized representatives and officials, and
bona fide passengers are permitted access to the aircraft.
SEC 3.1.3
The Operator shall ensure access control measures and security screening measures as mandated
by the State are in place to prevent the introduction of unauthorized weapons, explosives or other
dangerous devices or items on board an aircraft by persons other than passengers. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to prevent the introduction of unauthorized weapons,
explosives or other dangerous devices on board an aircraft.
Examined records of the capture and prevention of unauthorized weapons, explosives or other
dangerous devices on board an aircraft.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Supernumerary.
Typically, access control and security screening measures will apply to personnel of the operator and
service providers, including supernumeraries that are authorized to travel on an aircraft to perform
specific duties. Measures that apply to access control and screening of personnel are documented in
the AOSP and/or other operational manual(s). The baseline for such measures typically would be
that a person:
• Holds a valid authorization to enter a security-restricted area (based on, as a minimum, a
background check, operational needs and completion of security awareness training);
• Is subjected to screening (combination of equipment and procedures aimed at identifying
and/or detecting all potentially dangerous items, substances, and devices that could be used
to commit an attack).
As a reference, ICAO Annex 17 requires states to establish measures to ensure applicable personnel
are screened prior to entry airport security restricted area, including use of appropriate screening
methods capable of detecting explosives either continuously or in an unpredictable manner.
An effective method to deter or detect illegal access to aircraft is the implementation of frequent but
irregularly timed patrols by security personnel. This is particularly important when operations are at
their lowest levels and aprons and hangar areas are least frequented. Such patrols are normally
conducted by airport personnel.
Additional measures to prevent unauthorized access to passenger aircraft may include:
• Parking aircraft in a well-lit area; adding security lighting, if necessary;
• When possible, parking aircraft in an area visually observable and/or covered by CCTV;
• Parking aircraft away from fences or buildings that might provide easier access;
• For aircraft parked overnight, depending on the assessed risk at the location, applying a
tamper-evident seal to all exterior doors accessible without aids or verifying the identity of all
persons who access the aircraft to ensure a legitimate reason for accessing the aircraft;
• For aircraft parked remotely from a loading bridge:
○ Closing all exterior doors and exterior hatches of the aircraft;
○ Removing all stairs;
○ Ensuring no portable stairs, lift devices or passenger transfer vehicles are in the
immediate vicinity of the aircraft.
• For aircraft parked with access to a loading bridge:
○ Closing all exterior hatches of the aircraft;
○ Closing all exterior doors of the aircraft not served by a bridge;
○ Locking the door between the terminal and the bridge;
○ Ensuring no portable stairs, lift devices or passenger transfer vehicles are in the
immediate vicinity of the aircraft;
○ Locking or keeping under constant surveillance doors that provide access to the
bridge from the apron or retracting the bridgehead from the aircraft and deactivating
the bridgehead positioning controls.
3.2 (Intentionally open)
3.3 Carriage of Weapons
SEC 3.3.1
If the carriage of weapons on board an aircraft by law enforcement officers and/or other authorized
persons acting in the performance of their duties is approved by the Operator, the State and/or other
applicable authorities, the Operator shall have a policy and procedures, in accordance with the laws
of the state(s) involved, for such carriage of weapons. (GM)
Note: Notification to the PIC of authorized armed persons on board occurs in accordance with FLT
3.9.4 and GRH 3.7.5. The content of such notification may vary in accordance with the laws of the
state(s) involved in the approval for weapons carriage.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy and procedures for the carriage of weapons in the cabin of the
aircraft.
Examined selected documents that reflect validity of carrying weapons on board an aircraft.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The term ‘weapon’ in the context of this provision is normally a firearm legally in the possession of a
law enforcement officer or other authorized individual (e.g. an inflight security officer acting in the
performance of his or her duties as an armed officer).
An agreed procedure with the relevant law enforcement agency is typically in place that permits the
operator to notify the PIC (and other crew members as required by local requirements) of the
presence of armed persons on board.
Operators will have differing methods to accomplish the booking, seating and notification to the flight
crew of armed individuals on board. A clear communication protocol by the operator ensures a
consistent booking-to-boarding process for such individuals. The content of the flight crew notification
will differ among operators but will always include the number and seat assignment of armed persons
on board.
In accordance with ICAO standards, states that could be relevant to an individual flight (i.e. states of
departure, transit, arrival, potential diversion) will have laws that require special authorization for the
carriage of weapons on board an aircraft.
Each Contracting State ensures that the carriage of weapons on board aircraft by law enforcement
officers and other authorized persons acting in the performance of their duties requires special
authorization in accordance with the laws of the States involved.
(Intentionally open)
SEC 3.3.3
If the carriage of weapons in hold baggage on board an aircraft for a passenger flight is approved by
the Operator, the Operator shall have procedures for the carriage of such weapons to ensure:
(i) If the weapon is a firearm or capable of discharging a projectile, the passenger or an
authorized and duly qualified person has declared the weapon to be not loaded;
(ii) The weapon is stowed in a place that is inaccessible to any unauthorized person during
flight;
(iii) The carriage of a weapon is legally permitted by all state(s) involved, including the State and
state(s) of flight departure, transit and arrival. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Examined/Assessed procedures used for the authorization, control and stowage of weapons
carried on board.
Identified persons who are authorized and qualified to determine weapons are not loaded.
Examined locations where weapons are stowed in the aircraft to confirm they remain
inaccessible to unauthorized persons during flight.
Identified/Assessed procedures to determine that the transport of a weapon is legally permitted
in all states involved.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
With the approval of the operator, the following procedures are typically implemented for any weapon
carried as hold baggage:
• Prior to acceptance, the passenger or other authorized and duly qualified person determines
that the weapon is not loaded. A declaration may be used to confirm the status of the
weapon;
• The weapon is transported in a sturdy container to prevent any possible damage during the
flight;
• Ammunition is securely boxed and carried separately from the weapon, and is handled in
accordance with applicable dangerous goods regulations;
• Weapons and ammunition are stowed in an area that inhibits access by any unauthorized
person while the aircraft is in flight; such weapons are not to be carried on the flight deck or
retained by any crew member;
• If available, a lockable tamper-proof container located in the aircraft hold is used for this
purpose;
• Transit and transfer stations are advised and ensure the integrity of such items;
• At the final destination, when required by the State of Flight Arrival, security procedures are
implemented to return the weapons and/or ammunition to the passenger;
• Where the weapon is stowed in a baggage compartment (or hold) that is accessible to
persons during flight:
○ The compartment door(s) remain closed and are monitored during the flight;
○ The weapon is packed separately from any ammunition;
○ The weapon is stowed in the compartment in a manner that access is obstructed (or
impeded) by other baggage.
SEC 3.4.1
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure originating
passengers and their cabin baggage are subjected to screening prior to boarding a passenger
aircraft for;
(i) An international flight;
(ii) As required by the applicable aviation security authority, a domestic flight. (GM)
Note: Supernumeraries that require a flight reservation or passenger name record for transport on
the aircraft shall be subjected to the requirements of this provision unless exempted by the State.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure all passengers (including supernumeraries, if
applicable) and their cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding a passenger aircraft for
international flights.
Identified/Assessed process(es) for the screening of originating passengers (including
supernumeraries, if applicable) and their cabin baggage for domestic flights (if required by the
applicable aviation security authority).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: originating passengers/cabin
baggage are subjected to screening prior to aircraft boarding).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Domestic Flight.
The effective screening of all passengers and their cabin baggage is recognized as an essential
element in achieving a safe and secure operation, and forms part of the passenger handling
procedures contained in the AOSP.
Technical equipment used for the screening of persons and baggage has certain limitations. Archway
metal detectors and hand-held metal detectors, for example, cannot detect non-metallic weapons
and explosives. Even conventional X-ray equipment does not always image or define explosive
material effectively. To compensate for such limitations, or to introduce a random element into the
selection process, it may be advisable to conduct an additional search of passengers and cabin
baggage after they have been screened. The additional screening can be performed by hand or by
technical means, such as explosive trace detection (ETD), full-body X-ray, explosive particle or vapor
detection portals and/or other approved advanced technological methods.
It is recommended that screening equipment used to assist screening personnel is capable of
detecting explosive materials and/or explosive devices that might be carried by passengers either on
their person or in cabin baggage.
If the use of explosive detection screening equipment is not continuous, then it is recommended that
such equipment be used on a random basis to ensure non-predictability by passengers and others.
Specific guidelines and procedures are developed and training is given to personnel for addressing
persons with special needs.
SEC 3.4.3
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure transfer and
transit passengers and their cabin baggage either:
(i) Are subjected to screening prior to boarding a passenger aircraft, or
(ii) Have been screened to an appropriate level at the point of origin and subsequently
protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening at the originating
airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer or transit airport. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified process(es), when required, to ensure all passengers and their cabin baggage are
screened prior to boarding a passenger aircraft.
Identified/Assessed criteria used to determine whether passengers and cabin baggage are re-
screened at the transit/transfer airport or if one-stop-security is applied.
Observed screening measures being implemented for transfer and transit passenger and their
cabin baggage, as applicable.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Unauthorized Interference.
Transit and transfer passengers and their cabin baggage may not require screening prior to
admission to an airport sterile area if, in the judgment of the appropriate authority for security, the
standard of screening en route and at the airport of embarkation is equal or comparable to that of the
admitting state. However, measures ought to be established to ensure transit or transfer passengers
do not take unauthorized articles on board an aircraft.
SEC 3.4.5
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure passengers
and their cabin baggage, which have already been subjected to screening, are:
(i) Protected from unauthorized interference from the point of screening until they board a
passenger aircraft;
(ii) Subjected to re-screening if the potential for unauthorized interference has been determined
to exist. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to determine if passenger re-screening is required.
Identified/Assessed methods used to ensure passengers are protected from unauthorized
interference until they board the aircraft.
Identified/Assessed process(es) used to determine if unauthorized interference may have been
possible.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: process for protecting
passengers/cabin baggage from unauthorized interference after screening until aircraft
boarding).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
For domestic flights and for flights between countries that have an equivalent application of security
standards and such equivalency is recognized by the relevant state authority, the separation of
screened and unscreened passengers and their carry-on baggage is sufficient.
For international flights, if the design of the airport permits, to ensure separation from departing
passengers who have been subjected to screening, arriving passengers disembark from an aircraft in
accordance with any of the following:
• On a level different from the departure boarding area, or
• Through an area isolated from the departure boarding area; or
• Into an area of the airport dedicated to arriving passengers only.
If physical means to avoid contact between departing and arriving passengers is not possible,
passenger mix may be prevented by restricting access to the departure lounge until all arriving
passengers have cleared the area. This solution may not be possible in large airport terminals with
many gates close to each other.
The major concern regarding the sterility of arriving passengers will most likely be associated with
flights that have originated in states where screening requirements are considered to be inadequate
by the State of Flight Arrival. In order to limit the disruption of passenger flow within a terminal,
consideration might be given to assigning the disembarkation of all such flights to a common sector
or area of the airport or terminal that can be cordoned off and/or monitored by security personnel.
Where passengers are arriving from a state where screening is considered by the State of Flight
Arrival to be equal or better, arriving and departing passengers can mix.
In order to limit the disruption of passenger flow within a terminal, consideration might be given to
assigning the disembarkation of all such flights to a common sector or area of the airport or terminal
that can be cordoned off and/or monitored by security personnel.
3.5 Special Category Passengers
SEC 3.5.1
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a policy and a process that
incorporates risk assessment measures to ensure procedures are in place for the transport of
potentially disruptive passengers who are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of
judicial or administrative proceedings. Such procedures shall be designed to take into consideration
the assurance of the safety of the aircraft during the flight. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed policy and process(es) in place for the transport of potentially disruptive
passengers.
Identified/Assessed process(es) used to assess the risk posed by any potentially disruptive
passenger.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Deportee and Inadmissible Passenger.
Airlines that have transported people who have been refused entry to a state can be called upon to
return such person(s) to the port of embarkation. Such removal is accompanied by a judicial order of
removal.
Those responsible within the organization of an operator for compliance with judicial orders (e.g.,
station managers) inform the PIC and cabin crew at the point of embarkation. Transit and destination
airports also need to be advised that such a person is being carried. The original operator advises all
other operators involved in the transport of the inadmissible passenger to their final destination.
The following information is provided to the originating operator, as well as subsequent operators:
• Name and sex of the person identified as the deportee; reason for deportation (nature of
crime);
• Willingness or unwillingness to travel by air;
• Whether the person has attempted to escape custody;
• Whether the person has any history of violence;
• Whether the person has a history of self-harm;
• Whether members of the person's family are booked on the same flight;
• Whether the person is likely to be the target of harm during the transportation;
• Identity of escorts (if required);
• The mental and/or physical state of the person;
• Wanted status of the person (by any other authority);
• Other information that would allow an operator to assess the risk of endangering the security
of the flight;
• Special conditions and precautions for transport of the person, if any.
To ensure the safety of the aircraft during a flight, an operator typically has a process to assess the
information (see above) associated with the transport of passengers that require special attention.
For example, a decision might be needed as to whether a passenger will be denied boarding, or
whether a passenger might require an escort.
Accordingly, there is usually a well-defined escort policy that is provided to the appropriate
immigration authorities. Females travelling under the provisions of a judicial order may require a
female escorting officer as a member of the escort team.
Special provisions may exist for flights where transportation of multiple inadmissible passengers is
required.
Although a person is involved in travel in response to a judicial or custodial order, while in flight, such
passenger is always under the control of the PIC and crew of the aircraft.
3.6 Hold Baggage
SEC 3.6.1
If the Operator conducts international passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
originating hold baggage, including courier baggage, is:
(i) Subjected to screening prior to being loaded into an aircraft for an international passenger
flight;
(ii) Protected from unauthorized interference from the moment of acceptance until loaded on
board the aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for ensuring all originating checked baggage is subjected to
screening prior to being loaded onto an aircraft.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: originating hold baggage is subjected
to screening prior to being loaded onto an aircraft for an international flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
All checked baggage loaded on international flights is examined by authorized screeners using
approved screening methods. Each state will have varying regulations and requirements, but
typically approved screening methods include:
• Explosive detection systems (EDS);
• Explosive trace detection (ETD);
• X-ray;
• Physical search;
• Canine.
Where the State delegates screening to the operator, or where the foreign host government does not
perform screening to the standard required, the operator is responsible for ensuring all checked
baggage is screened to the appropriate level and meets the requirements of the Operator.
In the event of an increased threat, the operator, based on risk assessment, may direct
supplementary screening procedures as appropriate to counter the threat.
Courier service is an operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are
transported as the baggage of a courier passenger on board a scheduled airline flight under normal
passenger hold baggage documentation.
This provision also refers to a person who is employed by a courier service operator and travels as a
passenger or crew member, and who checks a courier shipment in as hold baggage. Such baggage
is then screened under the same requirements that apply to all hold baggage.
SEC 3.6.6
If the Operator conducts international passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure
procedures are in place to prevent items of hold baggage from being transported on such flights
unless such items have been:
(i) Individually identified as either accompanied or unaccompanied baggage;
(ii) Subjected to appropriate security controls based on risk assessment. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to identify if hold baggage is accompanied or unaccompanied.
Identified appropriate security controls performed on unaccompanied checked baggage before
being transported on international flights.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Observed passenger/baggage handling operations (focus: process for ensuring passenger-
baggage reconciliation for international flights).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
An operator typically has a system in place to identify a passenger who fails to board a flight after
check-in or fails to re-board a flight at a transit stop. In an effort to reduce the risk, the aviation
industry initially introduced a system where passengers identified their bags before loading. That
system can still be invoked at remote locations if no other procedure exists.
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have a process to verify and confirm, before a flight
departs, that only baggage that has been properly identified, screened to the appropriate standard
and accepted for carriage has been uplifted.
Applicable primarily to flights operated solely for the purpose of transporting passengers on a charter
basis (e.g. executive charters, VIP charters), if permitted by the State, the requirement for passenger
baggage reconciliation procedures may be rescinded. Additionally, as permitted by the State,
baggage reconciliation procedures could be rescinded:
• For specific passengers designated as VIPs (e.g. heads of state) who are being transported
on scheduled passenger flights;
• When baggage and passengers are separated for reasons beyond the control of the
passengers (e.g. mishandled bag, involuntary offloading due to an oversold flight, weather
diversions, operational aircraft change, passenger re-routing, weight restrictions).
3.7 Cargo Shipments
SEC 3.7.1
If the Operator transports revenue or non-revenue cargo, the Operator shall have a process to
ensure cargo shipments for transport on all flights have been subjected to the appropriate security
controls, including screening where required, as established by the applicable state(s) prior to being
loaded onto an aircraft.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure cargo has been subjected to the appropriate security
controls.
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure security controls performed on cargo meet the
requirement of the applicable state(s).
Examined selected records that reflect implementation of cargo security controls.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
SEC 3.8.1
If the Operator conducts passenger flights, the Operator shall have a process to ensure in-flight,
catering and/or other supplies intended for transport on a passenger flight are subjected to
appropriate security controls as established by the appropriate state and are thereafter protected
from unauthorized interference until loaded onto the aircraft. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to secure in-flight, catering and other supplies.
Identified/Assessed process(es) to ensure all in-flight, catering and other supplies are protected
from unauthorized access once security controls have been implemented.
Observed in-flight, catering and other security controls.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Catering supplies are frequently prepared by an external service provider at an off-airport location.
Additional guidance may be found in the IATA Security Manual.
3.9 General Protection
SEC 4.1.1
The Operator shall have processes for maintaining a constant review of the level and nature of
security and cybersecurity threats to civil aviation, and for identifying direct or potential threats
against the Operator and/or its aircraft operations. For threats that have been identified, such
processes shall include:
(i) An assessment of associated risks and vulnerabilities;
(ii) Development of appropriate response measures. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) for monitoring level and nature of security threats to civil
aviation (focus: identification of threats to operator, assessment of associated risks, development
of response measures).
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined methods used to monitor security threats to civil aviation.
Examined selected records of threats identified, risk assessments and appropriate response
measures.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Cybersecurity.
To ensure threat assessment remains up to date and relevant to the changing environment, an
operator will have mechanisms in place that allow it to collect real-time (or close to real-time) security
threat information from both open and, if possible, restricted sources. Included would be relevant
information shared or provided by applicable states for the purpose of assisting the operator in
(1) identifying direct or potential threats to its operations and (2) conducting effective security risk
assessments.
Processes would include, based on threat information received, periodic security risk assessment(s),
with the focus on airports it operates to, usual flight routes and any locations where it may have
assets.
Furthermore, significant security or geo-political events would also be monitored to indicate the
possible need for unscheduled security risk assessments and, if applicable, development of
appropriate response measures.
Procedures might also include instructions for communicating security threats to persons responsible
for making decisions and taking action, as well as providing advice to the flight crew. Means of
communication and details of telephone numbers, emergency radio channels and contact persons
would be readily available to ensure a response to threats without delay.
An operator’s security threat review process will typically include an Aircraft Cyber Risk Assessment
Framework (ACRAF) that is implemented and integrated in its risk management framework to
ensure:
• Critical systems, information, assets and data (CSIAD) relative to the aircraft are identified;
• Cyber threats relevant to the identified CSIAD are analyzed to determine corresponding risks
to aircraft operations;
• Cyber risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s).
Risk mitigation actions are an output of the risk assessment process and are implemented in
operations. In addition, any risks and vulnerabilities discovered during the process would be reported
to the applicable OEMs and other relevant external providers.
An operator typically identifies one senior management official that is accountable for the risk
management of cybersecurity operations and has the authority to plan and allocate the resources
necessary to manage cybersecurity risks.
Risk management framework preparation step
The aircraft cyber risk assessment is typically established at the aircraft life-cycle operations level. A
first preparation step would be consistent with the latest revision of the NIST SP800-37, which ties
back to ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and based on (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) ITIL or
ISO/IEC 31000 principles. The following would be defined within the operator’s risk management
framework:
• How to identify the risks that could cause the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and/or
availability of your information.
• How to identify the risk owners for each risk.
• Criteria for assessing consequences and assessing the likelihood of the risk.
• How the risk will be calculated.
• Criteria for accepting risks.
• Risk owners accept residual risks and approve the risk treatment plan.
Note: Risk Assessment is normally conducted on a regular basis.
Identification and categorization of CSIAD step
The identification and categorization of the aircraft CSIAD and interconnected CSIAD, and the
information processed, stored, and transmitted, would normally be based on an impact analysis. The
categorization via an impact analysis would follow the latest guidance version of FIPS 199 and NIST
Special Publications SP 800-30, 800-59, 800-60.
Evaluation of threats against CSID element step
Once the above step is completed, each identified CSIAD element would go through the evaluation
of threats against it, the development of the security requirements and the selection of security
controls that will protect the element. The security requirements would normally follow the latest
guidance version of the NIST Special Publications SP-800-171.
Protection of CSIAD via Security Controls step
The selection of security controls, which support technical, operational and management security
performance requirements and are within the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) context,
would follow the latest guidance version of FIPS 199 and 200 for minimum security requirements and
NIST Special Publications SP 800-30, 800-53 for security control selection guidance for non-national
security system. CNSS instruction 1253 can also help support this step for national security systems.
Implementation would follow the latest guidance version of the NIST SP 800-53, 800-53A, 800-53B.
Assessment of effectiveness of the selected Security Controls step
After implementation of the selected security controls, the operator would continue to assess cyber
threats relative to the CSIAD, determine any residual risks to aircraft operations and determine the
need for additional mitigating actions to supplement or replace existing security controls. The
assessment activity would typically follow the latest guidance version of NIST SP 800-53A, 800-53B
and SP 800-70.
SEC 4.1.2
The Operator shall have a process to ensure the implementation of appropriate security measures in
response to:
(i) Security threats directed against the Operator;
(ii) Threat levels issued by applicable aviation security authorities. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process(es) to implement appropriate security measures in response to
any security threats directed against the operator, or threat levels issued by the applicable
aviation security authorities.
Observed implementation of appropriate security measures in response to security threats and
threat levels issued by aviation security authorities.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The contingency plan for response to an increased threat to operations is included in the AOSP.
An assessment of increased threat could come from the authorities or from an operator's own threat
assessment process.
Procedures typically set out the increase in security measures appropriate to counter a situation of
increased threat, as well as methods used to communicate any changes in threat level to the flight
crew, operational personnel, management and overseas stations. There is also normally a
verification process to ensure required measures have been implemented without delay.
SEC 4.1.3
The Operator shall have procedures for sharing, as appropriate, with the State, relevant operators,
airport authority, air traffic service and external service providers, in a practical and timely manner,
relevant information to assist in the implementation of an effective security risk assessment process.
(GM)
Note: This provision is applicable to the Operator only if procedures for sharing the specified relevant
information are approved by the State.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for sharing relevant security information with the specified
entities.
Observed implementation of appropriate security measures in response to security threats and
threat levels issued by aviation security.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected records of security information sharing.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The information shared typically would include, but not be limited to, geopolitical information at the
national and airport level as well as potential flight paths, identified security deficiencies, security
inspection and audit results, and security measures implemented.
It is important that the procedures for sharing information are approved by the State and developed
according to guidelines established by the State.
4.2 Contingency Planning
SEC 4.2.1
The Operator shall have a contingency plan that provides for a comprehensive and managed
response to aviation security incidents. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed contingency plan.
Reviewed contents of the contingency plan applicability to aviation security incident responses.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
The primary objective of a contingency plan is the protection of life and property and the resumption
of normal operations. The secondary objective is investigation to determine if the crisis was an
accident or a crime; the latter typically requires those found responsible to be taken into custody.
4.3 Investigation and Notification
SEC 4.3.1
The Operator shall have a process to ensure an investigation is conducted for any of the following:
(i) Threats or acts of unlawful interference;
(ii) Failure of implementation of security controls under the responsibility of the Operator;
(iii) Security incidents, security occurrences or security threats. (GM)
Auditor Actions
Identified process(es) to investigate security incidents.
Interviewed responsible manager(s).
Examined selected incident investigation documents and reports.
Other Actions (Specify)
Guidance
Investigation outcomes may be integrated with root causes identified through the quality assurance
program as part of the continuous improvement cycle of the Operator’s SeMS.
Refer to the IATA SeMS manual for guidance that addresses the SeMS continuous cycle.
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