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Journal entry #4

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Dias Mussagaliyev
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5 views

Journal entry #4

Uploaded by

Dias Mussagaliyev
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Journal entry #4

Religious experiences have long been used as evidence to support religious beliefs, but

whether they constitute a reliable foundation is a matter of intense debate. I argue that

appealing to religious experiences is problematic as a means of supporting religious claims,

largely due to their inherently subjective nature and their resistance to verification. In this

entry, I will draw upon William Alston’s perspective and the critique provided by Evan Fales

to support my stance.

William Alston suggests that religious experiences can play an epistemic role similar to that

of sense perception: just as we perceive the material world through our senses, religious

experiences can be a source of knowledge about God (Alston 2). Alston’s analogy makes the

argument that religious experiences justify belief in God in a manner comparable to how

sense perception justifies beliefs about physical objects. He contends that perceiving God

can, therefore, be regarded as a valid means of forming beliefs about the divine, similar to

how observing a tree can validate its existence (Alston 2). This stance is anchored in the idea

that both types of perception share the same structural foundation. Alston suggests that such

experiences provide *prima facie* justification; they are true until proven false and are valid

because they emerge from socially and theologically accepted practices (Alston 3).

However, Alston's perspective faces significant criticism, particularly from the work of Evan

Fales, who disputes the reliability of religious experiences as sufficient evidence to justify

theistic beliefs (Fales 3). Fales argues that unlike sense perceptions, which can be cross-

checked and verified by others, religious experiences lack the same level of verification.

They are inherently rare and private, which makes them unreliable as universally acceptable

forms of evidence. While sensory experiences are common and their results are publicly

verifiable, religious experiences do not meet these criteria. Consequently, Fales asserts that
the epistemic status of religious experiences cannot be equated with sense perceptions; they

are prone to conflicting interpretations and cannot be objectively corroborated (Fales 4).

Alston’s analogy, while philosophically interesting, does not withstand scrutiny when

subjected to the criteria of empirical verification. The subjectivity and lack of common

experiential grounds render religious experiences inadequate for substantiating religious

claims in a way that is persuasive to a broader audience. Religious experiences are typically

personal, unique, and varied, which limits their applicability as reliable evidence beyond the

individual experiencing them. As Freud suggests, religious experiences might even stem from

our psychological needs rather than objective encounters with the divine (Freud 5). This

further underscores the difficulty in accepting them as credible evidence, as they may reflect

projections of internal desires rather than external truths.

Thus, while Alston argues for religious experiences as analogous to sense perceptions, I find

the argument unconvincing, primarily because of the lack of verifiability and the

susceptibility to psychological influences. Fales’ critique highlights the need for cross-

verification in making epistemic claims, a standard which religious experiences fail to meet.

In conclusion, religious experiences may hold significant personal meaning, but they do not

serve as a strong foundation for universally justifying religious beliefs.

References:

Alston, William. "Religious Experience II." Philosophy of Religion. Phil 202, Dr. Deena Lin,

2024, pp. 1-3.

Fales, Evan. "Religious Experience II." Philosophy of Religion. Phil 202, Dr. Deena Lin,

2024, pp. 3-4.


Freud, Sigmund. "Religious Experience V." Philosophy of Religion. Phil 202, Dr. Deena Lin,

2024, pp. 5-6.

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