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AIL- NHRC NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

01 P

AIL- NHRC NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF POORVA PRADESH

FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDISTAAN

IN THE MATTER OF:

Ms. KAVITA SINGH……………………………….……………………………….……PETITIONER

v.

TARGA- AIR………………………………………….…….........................................RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ...............................................................................................3


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................................4
I.BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED ……………………………………………..4
II.STATUTES REFERRED……………………………………………………………………4
III.TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………………………………………5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................................7
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................8
SUMMARY OF ISSUES ..........................................................................................................9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................. 15
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………………..34

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.No. Abbreviation Meaning


1. & And
2. AIR All India Reporter
3. Hon’ble Honorable
4. HC High Court
5. Ors. Others
6. SCC Supreme Court Cases
7. v Versus
8. vol Volume
9. SC Supreme Court
10. No Number
11. PIL Pubic Interest Litigation
12. ERP Essential Religious Practice
13. S/o Son of
14. U.P Uttar Pradesh
15. M.P Madhya Pradesh
16. A.P Andhra Pradesh
17. H.P Himachal Pradesh
18. S/d Signed
19. Anr. Another

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED

1. P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd Edn. 2005)


2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (6th Edn. 2010)
3. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, (8th Edn. 2012)
4. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law, (4th Edn.)
5. Halsbury's Laws of England, Para. 4th Edn. 1980)
6. Bryan A. Garner, Black Law Dictionary, (8th Edn. 2004)
7. Durga Das Basu, Constitutional Law of India, (8th Edn. 2011)
8. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitution Law, (6th Edn. 2013)
9. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, (13th Edn. 2016)

STATUTES REFERRED

1. Constitution of India, 1950


2. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

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TABLE OF CASES

S.No Case Name Citation Page(s) Referred


.

1 Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. (2016) 2 SCC 725 2, 5


Government of Tamil Nadu

2 Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945 3

3 Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335 4, 6

4 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 6

5 C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 1868 2, 7

6 Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra (2005) 2 SCC 673 5


Community v. State of Maharashtra

7 D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 259 4, 8

8 Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669 9

9 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) AIR 555 6

10 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of AIR 1981 SC 746 4


Delhi

11 Haji Ali Dargah Trust v. Noorjehan Safia (2016) 16 SCC 6


Niaz 788

12 Indian Medical Association v. Union of (2011) 7 SCC 179 5, 7


India

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13 Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State (2019) 11 SCC 1 3, 8


of Kerala

14 Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 1 SCC 1 3, 7

15 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 8

16 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 4, 6

17 Marthanda Varma v. State of Kerala (2021) 1 SCC 225 9

18 M Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das 2019 SCC OnLine 6, 9


SC 1482

19 Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 4, 7

20 Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya (2016) 7 SCC 353 5, 7


Pradesh

21 Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female (2000) 3 SCC 224 6


Workers

22 N. Adhithayan v. Travancore Devaswom (2002) 8 SCC 106 6, 8


Board

23 Neera Mathur v. LIC of India (1992) 1 SCC 286 8

24 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal AIR 1986 SC 180 3, 9


Corporation

25 State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269 7, 9

26 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 2, 7

27 Zee Telefilms v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649 8, 9

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1. The Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court. Petitioner has
approached the Hon’ble High Court of Poorva Pradesh, under Article 2261 of the
Constitution of Indistaan, which grants all the citizens of Aryavarta to move to the High
Court for the enforcement of their rights.
2. The Petitioner has moved to the High Court for the against the arbitrary actions and
policies followed by the Respondent, Targa- Air.
3. The Article 226 of the Constitution of Indistaan provides in relevant part:

“Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and
certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for
any other purpose.”

1
INDISTAAN CONST. Art. 32

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The country of Indistaan, is a developing nation striving for technological advancement and
balancing public and private enterprise. Among its initiatives, the government partnered with a
private company to establish Targa-Air, an airline launched in 2012. The airline industry faced
significant setbacks during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the industry recovered, Targa-Air
introduced cost-cutting measures in 2021 to optimize profitability. These included increased shift
hours, unpaid leave during low travel seasons, stricter attendance requirements, and reduced
maternity leave from 26 to 16 weeks. Female pilots were required to notify the airline 72 hours
before getting married to ensure operational planning. Kavita Singh, joined Targa-Air in 2015
and was promoted to captain. In 2023, she faced personal challenges when her father was
diagnosed with terminal cancer, necessitating frequent leave. Amidst this turmoil, Kavita married
quietly without informing the airline, in violation of its policies. In June 2024, Kavita’s father
passed away. She missed her monthly health checkup and failed to notice her new assignment.
When informed of her new route, she declined due to ill health, leading to a significant flight
delay. Upon returning to work, Kavita attended her health checkup and discovered she was
pregnant. The airline accused her of non-disclosure and terminated her employment. Shocked by
the dismissal, Kavita suffered a miscarriage. Learning of other discriminatory practices at Targa-
Air, including reduced maternity leave and instances of women leaving due to unfavorable
policies, she filed a writ petition in the High Court of Poorva Pradesh under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Kavita argued that the airline’s policies were discriminatory, violated Articles 14
and 21 and contravened the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. Targa-Air defended its stance, asserting
that, as a private entity, it had the freedom to frame policies to maintain operational standards
and that its measures were gender-neutral. The airline denied any violation of constitutional
rights or laws. The High Court issued a notice to Targa-Air, initiating legal proceedings to
determine whether its policies infringed constitutional and statutory provisions, particularly those
protecting maternity benefits and the rights of women employees. This case underscores critical
issues surrounding workplace equality, the enforcement of fundamental rights against private
entities, and the tension between operational efficiency and employee welfare in corporate
settings. It also highlights the ongoing struggle of working women to balance personal
responsibilities with professional obligations amidst discriminatory workplace policies.

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ISSUES RAISED

__________ISSUE I__________

WHETHER THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR VIOLATE ARTICLES


14 AND 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION BY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST FEMALE
EMPLOYEES ON THE GROUNDS OF GENDER?

__________ISSUE II__________

WHETHER THE TERMINATION AND POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR INFRINGE ON


KAVITA SINGH'S RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 21 (RIGHT TO LIFE AND
LIVELIHOOD) OF THE CONSTITUTION?

__________ISSUE III__________

WHETHER THE TARGA-AIR’S MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES IN VIOLATION OF


THE MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, WHICH ENSURES A MINIMUM LEAVE PERIOD
AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION DURING PREGNANCY?

__________ISSUE IV__________

WHETHER THE TARGA-AIR’S OPERATIONAL POLICIES OVERRIDE


INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1 WHETHER THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR VIOLATE


ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION BY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST
FEMALE EMPLOYEES ON THE GROUNDS OF GENDER?

Captain Kavita Singh challenges the employment policies of Targa-Air, arguing that they violate
her constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 15 by imposing discriminatory conditions on
female employees. These policies include mandatory disclosure of marital status, reduced
maternity leave, and penalties for pregnancy-related absences. Such measures disproportionately
burden women, creating unequal outcomes and structural barriers in the workplace, thereby
contravening the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Constitution. The
petitioner highlights judicial precedents, such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 2and C.B.
Muthamma v. Union of India3, which establish that workplace policies must uphold gender
equality and professional dignity.

The petitioner also contends that Targa-Air’s policies violate Article 15, which prohibits
discrimination on the grounds of sex, both directly (through explicit requirements like marital
disclosure) and indirectly (by disproportionately affecting women). Article 15(3), which allows
for special provisions for women, underscores the need for affirmative action to ensure
substantive equality. By undermining maternity rights, Targa-Air’s policies not only disregard
domestic law but also breach international commitments under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which mandates
protections for women against workplace discrimination.

Captain Singh seeks judicial intervention to declare Targa-Air’s policies unconstitutional,


reinstate her with full benefits, and mandate the adoption of gender-sensitive policies. This
would ensure alignment with constitutional guarantees of equality and India’s international
obligations to promote workplace inclusivity and gender justice.

2
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011
3
C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1868

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ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE TERMINATION AND POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR


INFRINGE ON KAVITA SINGH’S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

The petitioner’s counsel argues that Targa-Air’s termination of Kavita Singh violated her
fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to life,
dignity, and livelihood. The arbitrary nature of the termination, carried out without adhering to
principles of natural justice or procedural fairness, disregarded her circumstances, including
pregnancy and caregiving obligations for her terminally ill father. Judicial precedents like Olga
Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation4 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 5establish that
the right to livelihood is integral to living with dignity and that actions impacting such rights
must be fair and reasonable—principles that Targa-Air’s actions failed to uphold.

The counsel further contends that Targa-Air’s policies, such as reduced maternity leave and
mandatory health checkups during pregnancy, disproportionately burdened female employees
and failed the test of reasonableness and substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21. Supreme
Court judgments, including Air India v. Nergesh Meerza 6and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
of India7, underscore the need for non-discriminatory policies and reasonable accommodations
for women in the workplace, especially during pregnancy. Targa-Air’s failure to provide
accommodations like flexible schedules or lighter duties highlights its neglect of Kavita’s unique
needs, infringing her right to dignity and equal treatment.

Lastly, the counsel emphasizes the violation of natural justice, arguing that Targa-Air did not
adequately investigate Kavita’s circumstances or provide her a fair hearing. The principles of
fairness, as upheld in cases like D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. 8and State of Orissa v.
Binapani Dei9, mandate thorough inquiry and procedural safeguards before termination. Targa-

4
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 180
5
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
6
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,1981 (4) SCC 335
7
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 198 SC 802
8
D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 (3) SCC 259
9
State of Orissa v. Binapani De, AIR 1967 SC 1269

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Air’s arbitrary actions and failure to account for proportionality render its policies and
termination decision unconstitutional, demanding redress to safeguard fundamental rights and
gender equality.

ISSUE 3 : WHETHER THE TARGA-AIR’S MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES IN


VIOLATION OF THE MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, WHICH ENSURES A MINIMUM
LEAVE PERIOD AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION DURING
PREGNANCY?

The petitioner’s counsel argues that Targa-Air’s maternity leave policies violate the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961, as well as Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The reduction of
maternity leave from the statutory 26 weeks to 12 weeks is a clear breach of Section 5(3) of the
Act and undermines the health, dignity, and well-being of female employees. Additionally,
Targa-Air’s requirement for pregnant employees to work extended shifts and perform arduous
tasks contravenes Section 4 of the Act, which prohibits such practices. These policies not only
endanger the health of pregnant employees like Ms. Kavita Singh but also create discriminatory
conditions that are unconstitutional.

The counsel highlights that the Maternity Benefit Act applies to all private sector organizations,
including airlines, making Targa-Air’s non-compliance both unlawful and punishable.
Precedents such as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers 10 (2000) affirm that
maternity benefits are fundamental rights under Article 21. Furthermore, the denial of reasonable
accommodations and the imposition of unsafe working conditions violate Article 14 by
disproportionately burdening female employees during pregnancy. The airline’s practices reflect
exploitative employment conditions that conflict with statutory and constitutional protections.

The counsel also points to the severe consequences of Targa-Air’s negligence, including Ms.
Kavita Singh’s miscarriage caused by the stress and lack of accommodations. This violation of
her right to dignity and health warrants judicial intervention. Drawing on precedents like Air

10
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers, 2000 (3) SCC 224

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India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981)11, the counsel urges strict penalties and compensation to ensure
accountability and deter similar unlawful practices in the future.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER TARGA-AIR’S OPERATIONAL POLICIES OVERRIDE


INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION?

The petitioner’s counsel argues that Targa-Air’s operational policies, though framed
autonomously, cannot override the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution.
Private entities performing public or quasi-public functions, such as Targa-Air, are bound by
constitutional principles, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Indian Medical Association v.
Union of India12 (2011). Furthermore, in Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh 13
(2023), the
Court extended the applicability of Articles 19 and 21 to private entities when their actions
infringe individual rights. This establishes that Targa-Air, as a provider of essential public
services, must adhere to constitutional values, particularly when its policies affect the dignity,
equality, and livelihood of employees like Kavita Singh.

The counsel asserts that Targa-Air’s policies, including reduced maternity leave and mandatory
health disclosures, violate Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Constitution, being the supreme law,
renders such policies invalid and unenforceable, as noted in Minerva Mills v. Union of India
14 15
(1980). The Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) emphasized the
indivisibility of fundamental rights, requiring fairness, equity, and adherence to natural justice
even from private actors. By prioritizing operational efficiency over employees' constitutional
rights, Targa-Air has acted in a manner inconsistent with these principles.

Lastly, the counsel highlights that Article 21’s protection of life includes the right to dignity and
livelihood, as recognized in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation 16(1986). Targa-Air’s

11
Supra note 5 at 11
12
Indian Medical Association v. Union of Indi, 2011 (7) SCC 179
13
Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 1 SCC 1
14
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
15
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
16
Supra note 3 at 11

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rigid operational policies, which impose undue burdens on pregnant employees without
reasonable accommodations, erode these rights and disregard principles of natural justice. Thus,
the petitioner contends that such policies must be struck down as unconstitutional.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1 WHETHER THE EMPLOYMENT POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR VIOLATE


ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION BY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST
FEMALE EMPLOYEES ON THE GROUNDS OF GENDER?

1. The counsel for petitioner most humbly submits that the Policies of Targa-Air Constitute
Gender Discrimination and Violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Indistaan (Right to
Equality). The issue of gender discrimination in the workplace remains a persistent challenge in
contemporary society, despite significant progress in advancing women’s rights. The present
case centres on whether the employment policies of Targa-Air, a leading airline in Indistaan,
violate the constitutional rights of its female employees under Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution. These provisions guarantee equality before the law, equal protection of the laws,
and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. The petitioner, Captain Kavita Singh, a highly
skilled and experienced pilot, contends that Targa-Air's policies impose discriminatory
conditions on female employees, particularly in matters of marriage, maternity leave, and
pregnancy-related absences, which undermine their professional and personal autonomy.

1.1 Violation of Article 14: Right to Equality

Discriminatory Nature of Targa-Air’s Policies

Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees that “the State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” This provision
ensures formal equality and requires that individuals in similar circumstances be treated alike. It
also prohibits discrimination by private entities performing public functions or providing
essential services.

(a) Targa-Air’s policies impose a disproportionate burden on female employees by:


(b) Requiring female pilots to disclose their marital status 72 hours before marriage.
(c) Reducing maternity leave from the statutory 26 weeks to 16 weeks.

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(d) Penalizing female employees for taking maternity leave or being unable to fulfil duty
schedules due to pregnancy-related health issues.

These policies create an unequal work environment that treats women less favourably than their
male counterparts, thereby violating the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14.

The marriage notification requirement exclusively for female pilots exemplifies direct
discrimination. By mandating that women provide 72-hour advance notice before marriage, the
policy creates an invasive surveillance mechanism that treats women's personal choices as
potential professional impediments. This requirement lacks any rational organizational purpose
and represents a clear violation of personal autonomy and professional dignity.

That the Maternity and reproductive rights policies further demonstrate institutionalized
discrimination. Reducing maternity leave to 16 weeks, implementing punitive mechanisms for
pregnancy disclosure, and creating stringent health monitoring specifically targeting women
transform biological capabilities into professional liabilities. These provisions effectively
penalize women for exercising reproductive rights, compelling them to choose between
professional advancement and personal biological realities.

That the policies create a complex system of indirect discrimination that appears facially neutral
but produces systematically unequal outcomes. Mandatory health checkups, performance
monitoring, and compliance requirements impose additional burdens exclusively experienced by
female employees. This approach creates structural barriers that significantly impede women's
professional progression and organizational participation.

Constitutional jurisprudence, particularly landmark cases like Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan17


and Air India v. Nargesh Mirza 18, provides robust precedential support for challenging such
discriminatory practices. These judgments consistently emphasize that workplace policies must
inherently respect gender equality and avoid creating differential treatment based on gender.

17
Supra note 2 at 10
18
Supra note 3 at 10

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Further, in the case of C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India19, the Supreme Court invalidated a rule
requiring female officers in the Indian Foreign Service to seek permission before marriage. The
Court held that such a requirement was arbitrary and discriminatory, as it imposed restrictions on
female employees that were not applicable to their male counterparts. The Court emphasized that
such policies reinforce gender stereotypes and violate the constitutional guarantee of equality.

Targa-Air’s policy of mandatory marital disclosure mirrors the discriminatory rule in


Muthamma, as it subjects female employees to additional scrutiny and obligations that are not
imposed on male employees.

The practical implementation of these policies is demonstrated through Kavita Singh's


experience. Her termination following personal medical challenges and familial responsibilities
illustrates how these provisions transform theoretical discrimination into tangible professional
disadvantage. By penalizing her for missed health checkups during a period of significant
personal stress, Targa-Air exemplifies systemic gender-based discrimination.

The principle of proportionality requires that any workplace restrictions must be reasonable,
proportionate, and the least invasive method of achieving organizational objectives. Targa-Air's
policies manifestly fail this test, employing overly punitive and discriminatory mechanisms that
far exceed any legitimate operational requirements.

In conclusion, the employment policies constitute a comprehensive violation of constitutional


equality principles. They create an environment where women must constantly negotiate
additional professional barriers based on their gender, directly contravening the constitutional
commitment to substantive equality and equal protection under the law.

1.2 Violation of Article 15: Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Sex

Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India (parimateria with the Constitution of Indistaan)
provides that “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.” This provision prohibits both direct and indirect
discrimination, ensuring that individuals are not subjected to unfavourable treatment solely based
on the protected grounds. Although Article 15(1) explicitly addresses discrimination by the State,

19
1979 AIR 1868

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its principles have been extended by judicial interpretation to cover private entities performing
public functions, especially when their actions affect fundamental rights.

Targa-Air’s employment policies impose conditions that directly and disproportionately affect
female employees, particularly in matters of marriage and maternity, thereby violating Article
15(1). These policies are not gender-neutral; rather, they target and impact women based on their
biological and social roles, which constitutes unlawful discrimination on the ground of sex.

1.2.1 Direct Discrimination

Direct discrimination occurs when a policy or practice explicitly differentiates between


individuals based on a protected characteristic, such as sex. In the present case, Targa-Air’s
policies specifically target female employees in the following ways:

1.2.2 Mandatory Disclosure of Marital Status: The requirement for female pilots to inform the
company at least 72 hours before marriage is a direct discriminatory provision that applies solely
to women. No such requirement is imposed on male employees, demonstrating an unjustifiable
distinction based on gender.

1.2.3 Reduction in Maternity Leave: The reduction of maternity leave from the statutorily
mandated 26 weeks to 16 weeks is another example of direct discrimination. This policy
explicitly affects only women, as maternity leave is a benefit granted exclusively to female
employees due to their biological role in childbirth and postnatal care.

These policies create a differential treatment that disadvantages female employees, making it
harder for them to balance personal and professional responsibilities. Such differential treatment
based solely on gender is prohibited by Article 15(1).

1.2.4 Indirect Discrimination

Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral policy or practice disproportionately


impacts a particular group based on a protected characteristic. Even if a policy appears gender-
neutral on its face, it may still violate Article 15 if its implementation disproportionately affects
women.

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Targa-Air’s policies, while framed in terms of operational efficiency and safety,


disproportionately affect female employees due to their unique biological and social roles. For
instance:

1.3 Increased Work Hours and Performance Targets: The imposition of longer work hours
and stringent performance targets, coupled with reduced maternity leave, disproportionately
impacts pregnant women and new mothers. These employees may face greater difficulty in
meeting such targets due to their physical condition and caregiving responsibilities.

1.4 Termination Due to Pregnancy-Related Absences: The termination of Kavita Singh


following her pregnancy and miscarriage demonstrates how these policies disproportionately
penalize female employees, even when their absences are justified by health reasons.

1.5 Violation of Article 15(3): Positive Obligation to Protect Women

While Article 15(1) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, Article
15(3) carves out an exception that allows the State to make special provisions for women and
children. It provides:

"Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and
children."

This provision is based on the principle of substantive equality, which recognizes that formal
equality alone is insufficient to address the structural and historical disadvantages faced by
women. Instead of merely providing equal treatment, substantive equality aims to level the
playing field by providing women with additional protections and benefits to ensure their full
participation in public life, including employment.

Through Article 15(3), the Constitution empowers the State and, by extension, private entities
performing public functions, to implement affirmative action measures and protective legislation
that promote gender equality. One of the most significant legislative enactments under this
provision is the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, which aims to safeguard the health and well-being
of working women during pregnancy and childbirth.

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Article 15(3) acknowledges that women face unique biological and social challenges that require
special protections. Unlike Article 15(1), which prohibits discrimination, Article 15(3) allows
positive discrimination in favour of women. This provision mandates that laws and policies must
be designed not only to prevent discrimination but also to facilitate equality by addressing the
specific needs of women.

1.6 Affirmative Action and Workplace ProtectionsArticle 15(3) empowers the State to
implement affirmative action measures to ensure that women can compete on equal footing with
men. These measures are particularly important in the workplace, where women often face
discrimination, harassment, and other barriers to equal participation.

In Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay20, the Bombay High Court upheld a government
resolution that reserved seats for women in medical colleges. The Court held that such
reservations were constitutionally valid under Article 15(3), as they aimed to promote the
welfare and advancement of women. The judgment emphasized that affirmative action measures
are necessary to address the historical and structural disadvantages faced by women.

Similarly, workplace policies that provide special protections for women, such as maternity
leave, flexible working hours, and anti-discrimination measures, are essential for achieving
substantive equality. Targa-Air’s policies, which penalize female employees for pregnancy-
related absences and reduce maternity leave, violate the affirmative action mandate of Article
15(3).

1.7 International Obligations and Article 15(3)

India's international commitments under various conventions and treaties obligate it to


implement policies that promote gender equality, protect women's rights in the workplace, and
ensure maternity protection. Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which allows special provisions
for women, must be interpreted in light of these international obligations. These commitments
strengthen the argument that Targa-Air’s policies, which reduce maternity leave, penalize
pregnancy-related absences, and impose discriminatory conditions on female employees, violate
both domestic law and India's international responsibilities.

20
Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay, 1953 AIR 244

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1.8 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women


(CEDAW)

India ratified CEDAW on July 9, 1993, thereby committing itself to eliminate discrimination
against women in all spheres of life, including employment. Article 11 of CEDAW specifically
addresses discrimination in the workplace and mandates the protection of maternity rights.

Article 11 (1) - "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women, the same rights, in particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same
criteria for selection in matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security,
and all benefits and conditions of service, and the right to receive vocational training and
retraining."21

Article 11(2) of CEDAW further obligates States to ensures

"To prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to
ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or
of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status."22

Targa-Air’s policies, which reduce maternity leave from 26 weeks to 16 weeks and terminate the
petitioner for pregnancy-related absences, violate Article 11 of CEDAW. These actions
undermine the petitioner’s right to equal treatment, job security, and protection from
discrimination based on her biological role as a mother.

Thus, Targa-Air’s policies, which reduce maternity leave, penalize pregnancy-related absences,
and impose discriminatory conditions on female employees, violate these obligations.The

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petitioner respectfully submits that the Hon’ble Court should consider these international
commitments while interpreting Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. The Court is urged to
declare Targa-Air’s policies unconstitutional, direct the airline to reinstate the petitioner with full
benefits, and mandate the adoption of gender-sensitive policies that align with both domestic and
international standards for protecting women’s rights in the workplace.

In light of the foregoing arguments, it is evident that the employment policies of Targa-Air,
particularly those requiring mandatory disclosure of marital status, reducing maternity leave, and
penalizing female employees for pregnancy-related absences, violate the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Indistaan. These policies discriminate
against female employees on the grounds of gender, both directly and indirectly, thereby
undermining the principles of equality and non-discrimination that form the cornerstone of a
constitutional democracy

The Constitution not only guarantees formal equality through the equal protection of laws under
Article 14 but also recognizes the need for substantive equality by allowing special provisions
for women under Article 15(3). The objective of these constitutional protections is to dismantle
systemic barriers, eliminate gender-based discrimination, and ensure that women have equal
access to opportunities in the workplace.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE TERMINATION AND POLICIES OF TARGA-AIR


INFRINGE ON KAVITA SINGH’S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
The Counsel for the Petitioner most humbly submits that firstly, Targa-Air’s termination of
Kavita Singh and the enforcement of its policies violate her fundamental rights under Article 21
of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life, dignity, and livelihood. Secondly, by
failing to provide a fair and reasonable procedure before terminating her employment, Targa-Air
violated Kavita Singh’s right to livelihood, as enshrined under Article 21, which has been held to
include the right to sustain one’s life with dignity and security, as established in Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation23. The arbitrary termination disregarded her circumstances,

23
Supra note 3 at 11

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including her pregnancy and her father’s terminal illness, thereby infringing upon her ability to
maintain her livelihood. Thirdly, the termination was carried out without adhering to principles
of natural justice or procedural fairness and without providing Kavita Singh the reasonable
accommodations necessitated by her pregnancy and caregiving obligations. This failure to
account for her specific circumstances further infringes her constitutional rights under Article 21,
which protects her right to livelihood, dignity, and fairness.The Counsel thus submits that Targa-
Air’s actions constitute a breach of fundamental constitutional protections, disregarding the
Maternity Benefit Act's statutory obligations and perpetuating gender-based workplace
discrimination.

2.1 TARGA-AIR'S POLICIES VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD ENSHRINED UNDER


ARTICLE 21

That Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to life, which extends beyond
mere survival to include the right to live with dignity. The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation24 unequivocally held that the right to livelihood is an integral part
of the right to life, reasoning that without the ability to earn a livelihood, life itself would be
reduced to mere subsistence, bereft of dignity and security.

That Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 25further broadened the scope of Article 21, holding that
any state action affecting the right to life and personal liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable.
Targa-Air’s actions, far from meeting this standard, were arbitrary, gender-discriminatory, and
disproportionately burdensome, especially for female employees. Kavita’s termination based on
her inability to fulfill these unreasonable expectations violated the principle of reasonableness as
enshrined in Article 21.
26
. That Supreme Court, in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi , held that the
right to life includes the right to live with dignity and that no state action should reduce an
individual to a condition of servitude or indignity. By enforcing policies that discriminated based
on gender and failed to account for Kavita’s circumstances, Targa-Air violated her dignity, thereby
infringing her right to life under Article 21.

24
Id.
25
Supra note 4 at 11
26
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, 1981 AIR 476

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That the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza 27 struck down policies that discriminated
against women on the grounds of pregnancy and marital status, holding such rules as violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court unequivocally declared that policies placing
undue burdens on female employees were unconstitutional and inherently unjust, as they failed the
test of substantive equality and fairness. Similarly, Targa-Air’s policies, which reduce maternity
benefits to 16 weeks and mandate the disclosure of marital status, parallel the discriminatory
regulations invalidated in Nergesh Meerza. By imposing these arbitrary and gender-specific
requirements, Targa-Air deprives female employees of equal opportunities, thereby violating their
constitutional rights to dignity, equality, and livelihood.

That the personal and health challenges faced by Kavita Singh, compounded by her employer’s
refusal to accommodate or acknowledge them, aggravated her loss of livelihood. The Supreme
Court, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India28 , held that state and private actions leading
to unjust deprivation of dignity, security, and livelihood violate the principles of Article 21. Targa-
Air’s neglect of these considerations amounts to a violation of this principle.

The principle of effet utile (practical interpretation) demands that Article 21 be interpreted
dynamically to ensure its meaningful application. Similar to treaty interpretation under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), constitutional provisions must be applied in
good faith, giving full effect to their purpose of protecting fundamental rights. Arbitrary actions
like those of Targa-Air, which disproportionately undermine livelihood, defeat the object and
purpose of Article 21.

2.2 TARGA-AIR’S POLICIES ARE ARBITRARY, FAILING THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS


That furthermore, Targa-Air terminated Kavita Singh without duly considering her inability to
comply with certain policies due to pregnancy and familial stress. As per the Supreme Court’s
ruling in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei29 (1967), decisions impacting rights or
obligations must be informed by proper inquiry and consultation. Targa-Air’s refusal to account

27
Supra note 5 at 11
28
Supra note 6 at 11
29
Supra note 8 at 11

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for Kavita’s health needs or caregiving obligations demonstrates a lack of inquiry into the
extenuating factors affecting her compliance.

That in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India30 (1978), the apex court laid down that any action or
policy affecting an individual's fundamental rights must satisfy the test of reasonableness, which
includes being just, fair, and non-arbitrary. Targa-Air’s policies, such as mandatory disclosure of
marital status, health checkups during pregnancy, and reduced maternity leave, lack the fairness
and rationality required under this principle.

That the principle of reasonableness requires that policies be non-arbitrary and that they consider
the contextual realities of those affected. The Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
31
Nadu (1974) held that arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality. By enforcing policies that
disproportionately burden female employees and fail to account for their specific needs, Targa-Air
has acted arbitrarily, violating constitutional protections under Articles 14 and 21.

That Targa-Air terminated Kavita Singh without adequately investigating her inability to comply
with certain policies due to her pregnancy and her father’s illness. Despite issuing a show-cause
notice, the company failed to provide her with a reasonable opportunity to explain her
circumstances or to seek accommodations. This action violates the procedural safeguards outlined
in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993), where the Court held that procedural fairness is
indispensable in cases of termination. The failure to account for Kavita’s pregnancy-related
medical needs further demonstrates a lack of procedural fairness, rendering the termination
arbitrary.

The requirement for mandatory health checkups and attendance during pregnancy
disproportionately burdens female employees without providing reasonable accommodations for
their unique needs. This disparity violates the principle of substantive equality upheld in Air India
v. Nergesh Meerza (1981), where the Court struck down gender-based employment rules that
were inherently unfair.

30
Supra note 4 at 11
31
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 AIR 555

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. That the principle of proportionality, as established in Modern Dental College v. State of


Madhya Pradesh (2016), requires that the means employed to achieve a goal must be
proportional to the objective. The disproportionate impact of these policies on female employees
far outweighs the purported operational benefits, rendering them unreasonably harsh and
unconstitutional. Furthermore, in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1997), the Court emphasized
the importance of balancing competing interests while safeguarding fundamental rights. Targa-
Air’s policies fail to strike this balance, thereby violating the standard of reasonableness.

2.3 TARGA-AIR VIOLATED NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAILED TO PROVIDE REASONABLE


ACCOMMODATIONS

That the principles of natural justice, which include the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram
partem) and the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua), are indispensable to any action
affecting an individual’s fundamental rights. These principles are firmly rooted in Article 21, as
recognized in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where the Court held that any procedure
depriving an individual of their rights must be just, fair, and reasonable.

That Targa-Air’s decision to terminate Kavita Singh was taken without providing her an adequate
opportunity to explain her inability to comply with certain policies due to her pregnancy and
caregiving responsibilities. The issuance of a show-cause notice without a thorough inquiry into
her circumstances demonstrates a blatant disregard for procedural fairness, as established in State
of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (1967). In this case, the Court emphasized that
administrative decisions must be informed by proper inquiry and adherence to procedural
safeguards.

That Employers must provide reasonable accommodations for employees facing health or
caregiving challenges, particularly in cases of pregnancy. The failure to do so infringes on the
employee's right to dignity and livelihood, as protected under Article 21.

That despite Kavita Singh’s inability to comply with mandatory health checkups and flight
schedules due to her pregnancy, Targa-Air did not provide her with reasonable accommodations

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such as lighter duties, flexible schedules, or extended leave. This failure disregards her medical
needs and violates the principles of fairness and dignity enshrined in Air India v. Nergesh
Meerza (1981), where the Court invalidated policies that imposed unfair burdens on pregnant
employees.

ISSUE 3 : WHETHER THE TARGA-AIR’S MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES IN


VIOLATION OF THE MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, WHICH ENSURES A MINIMUM
LEAVE PERIOD AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION DURING
PREGNANCY?

The Counsel for the Petitioner most humbly submits that Targa-Air’s maternity leave policies
are in clear violation of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, as well as Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. Firstly, the reduction of maternity leave to 12 weeks, contrary to the
statutory requirement of 26 weeks under Section 5(3) of the Act, constitutes an unlawful
denial of rights guaranteed to pregnant employees. Secondly, the policies requiring employees
to work overtime and perform arduous tasks during pregnancy contravene the express
provisions of the Act and endanger the health and well-being of women employees. Thirdly,
Targa-Air’s failure to provide a safe and supportive work environment violates the dignity of
female employees and creates discriminatory conditions that undermine their fundamental
rights.

3.1 TARGA-AIR’S MATERNITY LEAVE POLICIES VIOLATE THE MANDATES OF THE


MATERNITY BENEFIT ACT, 1961

That the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, provides for 26 weeks of paid maternity leave under
Section 5(3). This entitlement is mandatory and designed to ensure the health and welfare of
pregnant employees. Targa-Air’s unilateral reduction of maternity leave to 12 weeks
constitutes a blatant violation of this statutory requirement. The employer’s actions not only
undermine the Act’s protective framework but also unlawfully restrict the rights of female
employees.

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That in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (2000) 3 SCC 224, the
Supreme Court held that maternity benefits are a statutory and fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution, ensuring the well-being and dignity of working mothers.
Targa-Air’s policy of reducing maternity leave contradicts this precedent, denying women
their rightful protections.

That the statutory mandate of 26 weeks is based on medical and societal considerations,
as shorter leave periods are insufficient for a woman’s postnatal recovery and the initial
care of the newborn. By restricting maternity leave to 12 weeks, Targa-Air disregards
these essential considerations, jeopardizing both the health of the mother and the child.

That the Section 1 of the Maternity Benefit Act explicitly states that the Act applies to all
establishments, including factories, corporations, and similar organizations in the private
sector. Targa-Air, as a private airline, is unequivocally bound by the provisions of this
Act. Any deviation from the statutory obligations constitutes an illegal act subject to
penalties.

That under Section 21 of the Act, employers found in violation of its provisions are liable
for fines of up to Rs. 5,000 or imprisonment for up to one year. Targa-Air’s policies,
which violate Section 5(3), render the airline liable for these penalties. Non-compliance
further underscores the arbitrary and exploitative nature of its employment practices.

That in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335, the Supreme Court affirmed that
private entities, including airlines, must adhere to statutory mandates protecting the rights
of female employees. The Court held that employers cannot override statutory provisions
through internal policies, as such actions violate both statutory and constitutional
obligations.

3.2 REQUIRING ARDUOUS WORK DURING PREGNANCY CONTRAVENES STATUTORY AND


CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS

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That Section 4 of the Maternity Benefit Act expressly prohibits employers from requiring
pregnant employees to perform arduous tasks, involve long hours of standing, or pose risks
to the health of the mother or fetus. By requiring overtime and extended shifts, Targa-Air
blatantly disregards these protections, subjecting female employees to exploitative
conditions.

That Targa-Air required pregnant employees, including Ms. Kavita Singh, to work
extended shifts and undertake strenuous tasks. These requirements are a direct violation of
Section 4, as they disregarded the specific medical needs of pregnant employees and
exposed them to conditions detrimental to their health.

That requiring pregnant employees to work extended shifts and perform physically
strenuous tasks disregards medical evidence regarding the health risks associated with such
activities. This violates the constitutional obligation to ensure safe and supportive working
conditions, as emphasized in Neera Mathur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
(1992), where the Court ruled that policies jeopardizing the health and safety of pregnant
employees are unconstitutional.Targa-Air’s policies expose pregnant employees to undue
physical and emotional stress, infringing upon their fundamental rights.

That Targa-Air’s policies disproportionately burden female employees, particularly during


pregnancy, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations or exemptions. Such policies
create unsafe and discriminatory conditions, violating the principle of equality enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution.

3.3 FAILURE TO PROVIDE A SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND LIABILITY FOR


RESULTANT INJURY

That Targa-Air’s policies and practices create an unsafe and discriminatory work
environment for female employees, particularly those who are pregnant. By compelling
employees to work overtime, undertake extended shifts, and adhere to rigid schedules, the
airline subjects women to conditions that are hazardous and detrimental to their health during
pregnancy. Section 4 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 expressly prohibits pregnant

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employees from undertaking work that is arduous or likely to interfere with their pregnancy
or adversely affect their health. Targa-Air’s policies directly contravene these provisions,
exposing pregnant employees to exploitative and unsafe conditions.

That Targa-Air’s negligence in ensuring the well-being of Ms. Kavita Singh during her
pregnancy caused immense emotional and physical harm, culminating in a miscarriage. The
airline’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations and its abrupt termination of her
employment during a vulnerable period demonstrate a blatant disregard for her health and
dignity.

That in Dulieu v. White & Sons (1901), the Court held that damages could be claimed for
physical harm caused by emotional shock resulting from negligence. Similarly, in the present
case, Ms. Kavita suffered a miscarriage due to the stress and shock caused by Targa-Air’s
unlawful actions. This principle of compensating employees for harm caused by negligence
must apply to the airline’s exploitative practices.

That the Supreme Court in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981) emphasized the need to
prevent exploitative policies that undermine the dignity and health of female employees.
Similarly, Targa-Air’s failure to comply with statutory safeguards and its blatant disregard
for Ms. Kavita’s well-being warrant judicial censure. Strict penalties and compensation are
necessary to deter such unlawful practices and ensure compliance with legal and
constitutional obligations.

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ISSUE 4: WHETHER TARGA-AIR’S OPERATIONAL POLICIES OVERRIDE


INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION?

The Counsel for the Petitioner most humbly submits that while Targa-Air may claim autonomy
in formulating its operational policies, these policies cannot override the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Firstly, private entities, especially those performing
public or quasi-public functions, are obligated to adhere to constitutional values, as recognized in
the Indian Medical Association v. Union of India (2011). Secondly, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has expanded the applicability of fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 to private
entities in cases where their actions affect individual rights, as held in Kaushal Kishor v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2023). Thirdly, the Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, governs
all actions and policies, rendering any conflicting policies by private entities, such as those of
Targa-Air, unenforceable. The Counsel submits that Targa-Air’s operational policies, which
infringe upon fundamental rights, cannot be justified on the grounds of operational efficiency.

4.1 PRIVATE ENTITIES PERFORMING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS ARE BOUND BY


CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

That the Constitution of India, while primarily enforceable against the State, extends its ambit to
private entities performing public or quasi-public functions. In Indian Medical Association v.
Union of India (2011), the Supreme Court held that private entities engaged in activities such as
education and healthcare must align their actions with constitutional principles to ensure the
protection of individual rights. Targa-Air, as a private airline, performs a public function by
providing an essential service in the aviation industry. Its policies, therefore, cannot disregard
constitutional protections, especially when they affect fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19,
and 21.

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That in Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023), the Apex Court expanded the scope
of Articles 19 and 21, making them directly enforceable against private entities, including
corporations and individuals, when their actions infringe upon these fundamental rights. Targa-
Air’s discriminatory policies and the arbitrary termination of employees like Kavita Singh
clearly violate these constitutional protections, holding the airline accountable for its actions
despite its private nature.

That the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms v. Union of India (2005) emphasized that private
entities could not escape accountability for violating fundamental rights merely because they are
not classified as "State" under Article 12. The Court observed that fundamental rights represent
higher human values that extend beyond public entities to regulate the conduct of private actors
performing critical functions. By implementing policies that infringe on the dignity, equality, and
livelihood of its employees, Targa-Air has acted in a manner that conflicts with these
fundamental human values, underscoring its constitutional obligations.

4.2 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER OPERATIONAL POLICIES

That the Constitution of India is the supreme law of the land, and any policy—whether framed
by the State or private entities—must align with its provisions. In Minerva Mills v. Union of
India (1980), the Hon’ble Supreme Court underscored that no entity or law can override
constitutional principles.Targa-Air’s operational policies, which mandate arbitrary and
discriminatory practices such as reduced maternity leave and mandatory health disclosures,
directly infringe upon Articles 14, 19, and 21. These policies, being inconsistent with
constitutional protections, are invalid and unenforceable.

That in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court highlighted the
indivisibility of fundamental rights, stating that all policies must respect the principles of
fairness, equity, and natural justice. The Court further observed that even private actors must
adhere to constitutional values when their policies or actions affect fundamental rights.Targa-
Air’s policies, which prioritize operational efficiency over the constitutional rights of employees,
disregard these higher standards of fairness and equity. Such policies are, therefore,
unenforceable under constitutional law.

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. That Article 21 guarantees the right to life, which includes the right to dignity, livelihood, and
fairness in treatment. The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
(1986) held that the right to livelihood is an integral aspect of the right to life. Targa-Air’s
policies undermine this right by subjecting employees like Kavita Singh to conditions that erode
their dignity and livelihood. By imposing rigid operational demands on pregnant employees and
failing to provide reasonable accommodations, Targa-Air has violated its employees’
constitutional rights under Article 21.

That policies that infringe on the right to life, dignity, and livelihood are subordinate to the
principles of natural justice. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi (1981), the
Supreme Court emphasized that the right to life includes living with dignity. Targa-Air’s
operational efficiency cannot come at the cost of violating its employees’ constitutional rights,
particularly when these rights are grounded in principles of natural justice and fairness.

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PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble court may be pleased to:

1. Declare that the employment policies of Targa-Air, specifically those requiring


mandatory disclosure of marital status and reducing maternity leave, are unconstitutional
for being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Indistaan, as they
discriminate against female employees on the grounds of gender.
2. Declare that the termination of the Petitioner is illegal, arbitrary, and violative of her
fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby directing Targa-Air to
reinstate the Petitioner to her original position with full seniority, benefits, and back
wages.
3. Hold that the maternity leave policies of Targa-Air are in violation of the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961, and direct the Respondent to:
a) Reinstate the statutorily mandated minimum maternity leave period of 26 weeks.
b) Compensate the Petitioner for the physical, emotional, and financial distress caused
due to non-compliance with the Act and the subsequent termination.
4. Issue a writ of mandamus directing Targa-Air to formulate and implement gender-
sensitive policies in compliance with constitutional mandates and statutory obligations,
ensuring non-discrimination, equal opportunities, and reasonable accommodations for
female employees.
5. Declare that Targa-Air’s operational policies cannot override individual rights protected
by the Constitution, particularly the rights to equality, non-discrimination, dignity, and
livelihood, and direct the Respondent to review and amend any such policies that infringe
upon these rights.
6. Award appropriate compensation to the Petitioner for the mental agony, emotional
distress, and loss of livelihood suffered due to the unlawful actions of Targa-Air.

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7. Grant any other relief or order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
interests of justice, equity, and good conscience.
8. And for this act of kindness and justice, the Petitioner, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.

AND/OR

Permit any other relief that this Hon’ble court may be peased to grant in the interest of
justice, equity and good conscience.

Place: S/d_______________

Date: (Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners)

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