On the Foundation of Theology

in Plato's Laws
LEWIS MEEK TRELAWNY-CASSITY
Antioch College

ABSTRACT: While recent scholarship often makes the claim that Plato's theology in the
Laws is based upon inferences from observable features about the world, this interpreta-
tion runs into difficulties when one considers ( 1 ) the continuing importance that the
Socratic turn undertaken in the Phaedo has for speculation in the Laws about the order
of the cosmos and (2) the actual observations that Plato makes about the sublunar and
celestial realms in the Laws. In light of these difficulties, I develop an interpretation of
the theology of the Laws that seeks to show the priority of soul to matter by means of
an articulation of the ftmdamental orientation to the world that is manifest in human
beings seeking shared understanding through Aoyoc;. This fundamental orientation
is characterized by the recognition that vovç, not personal ambition, should guide
human action and thought, and I argue that this recognition supplies at least partial
support for the belief that voOc; is in control of the cosmos. This interpretation helps
makes sense of difficult passages in the Platonic corpus that ground cosmology on
piety {Laws 10.898c6, Philebus 28e2, Timaeus 29a4). The relationship of this philo-
sophical piety to the piety required by the laws of Magnesia is, however, problematic,
and it could appear that Plato bridges this gap by a prudentialist account of why tbe
laws of tbe city should be considered divine. I broach this problem in the final section
of this paper byway of an examination of the relationship between the second sailing
(ôeurepoc; nXoöc;) of the Phaedo and the ôeuxepoc; nXovq of the Statesman and tbe
Laws. I conclude with tbe observation that both the Phaedo and the Laws make use of
an enchantment {èniûÔr\) that goes beyond the botmds of what Xóyoc; can establish.

© 2014. Epoche, Volume 18, Issue 2 (Spring 2014). ISSN 1085-1968. 325-349
DOI: 10.5840/epoche2014194
326 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

deoç f] Tiç àvdpwnwv v^ïv, cb Î,Évoi, eïXrife rr¡v airiav rfjç TWV
vófj.íüv ôiaOéoecoç; (Laws 624al-2)
Ls it a god or some human being, strangers, who is given the credit for laying
down your laws?'

INTRODUCTION

O ver the past couple of decades scholars have turned with a renewed interest
to the theological arguments in Book 10 of Plato's Laws? Both the theological
arguments themselves as well as their political-legislative context offer readers the
enticing prospect of understanding Plato's final thoughts on issues of the highest
significance, such as the existence and providence of the gods that care for the
city. In this paper I challenge a prevalent interpretation of Book 10 that seeks to
ground the theology of the Laws on the empirical observation of the structure
of the heavens and the earth.
While thinkers after Plato may have drawn on the Laws in order to develop
empirically-based cosmological-teleological arguments for the existence of
providential gods, such arguments do not lie at the foundation of Plato's theol-
ogy. Rather, scholars such as Vlastos and Pangle have come closer to an adequate
grasp of the foundations of Platonic theology by noting that Plato's arguments for
the order of the cosmos are "a priori" or "psychological."' Rather than attempt to
adjudicate between Vlastos's sense of a priori and Pangle's sense of psychological,
my analysis emphasizes that the foundation of Plato's theology in the Laws, like the
foundation of all Platonic thought, makes its beginning from the Socratic turn.^
In seeking to formulate a persuasive preamble that supports the laws of
Magnesia as a whole. Book 10 of the Laws seeks to defend three beliefs, namely
that the gods exist, care for human beings, and cannot be moved by bribes or
supplications to overlook unjust deeds (10.885b7-9). The Athenian Stranger
states that these beliefs can be justified by establishing two principles: ( 1 ) that
the soul is prior to the body and (2) that a good soul rather than an evil one is in
charge of the heavens as a whole ( 12.967d4-e2). Recent scholars such as Cleary,
Naddaf, and Mayhew argue that the first claim is established by a logical argument
for the priority of self-moving motion (10.893bl-894bl).' These scholars then
argue that the second claim is established by reference to empirical observation
or perception of the heavens. Discussing the theology of the l a ws, Naddaf writes,
"Plato's greatest achievement is that all of the arguments that he employs in his
proof of the existence of god are empirical; he relies neither on a demiurge, nor
on the world of intelligible forms."* Addressing the question of which soul is in
control of the cosmos, Mayhew similarly notes,"The answer is obvious because the
On the Eoundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 327

universe is orderly, consistent, predictable, and not erratic or disorderly—cosmos,

not chaos. There is implied here a sort of argument from design."^
This claim that the theology in Book 10 of the Laws is based on now familiar
arguments that appeal from the visible structure of the cosmos to the existence
of god has obvious attraction. Not only does this interpretation seem to fit the
arguments of the Laws at first glance, but it also makes sense of the Laws in terms
of teleological and cosmological arguments that have had influence throughout the
history of philosophy. While Plato's Laws may have contributed to the formation
of the tradition of observation-based arguments for the existence of god, caution
is needed before simply assimilating Plato to this tradition itself, especially if
this assimilation occurs at the expense of what is truly Platonic about the Laws.
The recent interpretations that I am challenging share the view that in the Laws
"Astronomy now seems to replace dialectic as the highest science."^ If this view is
right in claiming that Plato seeks to establish cosmological questions primarily
on the basis of empirical observation of visible features of the cosmos, Zuckert's
recent characterization of the Laws as"pre-Socratic"is correct.'Yet before claim-
ing that Plato at the end of his life turned away from the turn that marks him
as Plato—the Socratic turn—to turn to a version of the pre-Socratic TtptoTot;
TtXoOc;, I believe that we need to reexamine the theology of the Laws more closely.
In light of this reexamination, we will find that Kleinias's reply that it would not
be pious (oaiov) to deny that god supervises the whole sheds unexpected light
on the foundation of Platonic theology.

§1. THE SOCRATIC TURN AND EMPIRICAL PROOFS

Cosmological-teleological arguments, as Gerson has noted, function by the process

of abduction.'" That is, given a certain state of affairs or a certain being, these sorts
of arguments search for a hypothetical explanatory entity to explain this state of
affairs or being. If an explanatory entity is shown to be the only possible cause
for a certain state of affairs or being, then cosmological-teleological arguments
lead us to suppose that this entity exists.
In the Laws it often appears that the Athenian Stranger is relying on argu-
ments of this sort. Indeed many scholars believe that Plato seeks to demonstrate
the existence of a providential god by calling our attention to the fact "that the
movements of the heavenly bodies are of the same nature as those of nousl'^^ By
showing that the motions of the heavens are like the motion of voûc;, which is
"god, in the correct sense, for the gods" ( 10.897b2), the Athenian would thereby be
demonstrating the existence of god through empirical observation of the heavens.
In the following sections of this paper I will point to sections of the Laws that
question the view that perception or observation presents us with an orderly entity
that demands explanation by means of the postulation of a cosmic voûc;. Before
328 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

going on to consider Plato's analysis of the empirical evidence for god's existence
and providence in the Laws, however, I would like to examine a few passages in the
Platonic corpus that shed light on the relationship between science and empirical
observation. V^ile Bobonich has recently made the case for a marked develop-
ment in Plato's psychology from the Phaedo to the Laws, my account emphasizes
the ways in which Laws 10 closely echoes the methodology of the Phaedo.^^
In the Phaedo, Socrates recounts his youthful encounter with "the inquiry into
nature" (nepi cpúaecac; iGTopiav) and his eventual disillusionment with this
manner of inquiry (96a6ff ). While Socrates initially sought the causes (aiTÍai)
of all things through the pre-Socratic analysis of nature (cpúatc;), looking into
"the affairs in the heaven and on earth" (TO nepl TOV oupavóv t e Kai Tfiv yijv
Tiá9ri), he eventually realized that he was naturally unsuited (àcputic;) for this sort
of inquiry, as it eroded the self-evident observations that he had already derived
from human experience (96cl-7). The word-play on (puaiç and àcputic; here
brings out the difference between Socrates's inquiry into the nature of his own
soul and natural science simpliciter. That is, Socrates becomes dissatisfied with
the pre-Socratic analysis of nature because it cannot account for his experience
as human being.''
On the way to developing his own method of investigation, Socrates was briefly
impressed by a book of Anaxagoras that posited VOOÍ; (Reason) as the cause
(aiTta) of everything (97c).'''While Socrates's previous investigation sought the
causes (alriai) of thinking ((ppóvr|0ic;) in terms of blood, air, or fire, Anaxago-
ras's investigation offered the possibility of providing explanations (aÍTÍat) of the
cosmos in terms of what is best. As Socrates examined Anaxagoras's teachings,
however, he quickly realized that Anaxagoras did not employ voûc; in the way
that he had hoped, for Anaxagoras did not, as one might expect, explain the order
of cosmos by means of the hypothesis that voûc; orders all things for the best.
In response to his dissatisfaction, Socrates says that he would gladly follow
any teacher who could explain the cosmos in terms of voùc;,but, as such an ex-
planation is apparently lacking, he must take refuge in Xó-yoi. In describing his
famous turn, Socrates makes an analogy with those who stare at an eclipse of
the sun and thus become blind. Appealing to this image, Socrates states that the
pre-Socratic inquiry into nature ran the risk of blinding him to his soul (\|/uxr|)
(99e2). That is, grasping the causes of the cosmos by means of sense perception
(aYaörjOic;) runs the risk of blinding one's soul to the very causes or questions that
matter most to oneself as an ensouled being." Thus Socrates's famous "second
sailing" (oeÚTcpoc; nXouc;) seems to be a turn away from any empirical evidence
provided by the senses towards an investigation based on intersubjective agree-
ment through dialogue. Far from being a method that deals only with images
of being, Socrates suggests that this method is the only one adequate for beings
such as human beings are.'*
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 329

Although Socrates's failure with Anaxagoras's teleological explanation of the

cosmos leaves him with what Menn calls the "second-best explanation through
forms," some of Plato's later works seem to go beyond this type of explanation
towards "the hypothesis of a better explanation through the causality of nous''"
The Timaeus, as Cleary and Sedley have noted, seems to especially fulfill the lacu-
nae of the Phaedo by presenting an account of the cosmos in which everything is
ordered as much as possible by the causality of voûç."' While Menn too stresses
that Plato's later works, such as the Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus, and Laws, move
beyond formal causality to develop an account of voijc; as the cause of order in
the cosmos, Menn rightly stresses that, like formal causality, noetic causality is
also hypothetical.^^
That is, while the Timeaus puts forward a view of natural science that is
compatible with the injunctions of the Phaedo, it does not provide a deduction
of the existence of a providential creator god. Rather, the Timaeus provides a
plausible explanation of the cosmos based on the hypothesis of such a god. Plato
does not provide an empirical deduction of god's existence and providence for
at least two reasons. First, even if Plato's later works express an interest in noetic
as opposed to eidetic causality, Plato does not, despite the evidence that the
Timaeus provides of his interest in biological and cosmological minutiae, give
up the Socratic Turn for a return to the Presocratic npwxoq nXovq. Second, as
Gregory has persuasively argued, the cosmological models of the Timaeus were
probably understood by Plato as prototypes that could explain some, but not all,
of the celestial phenomena.^" Given the conjectural and modest claims that Plato
makes about the nascent science of astronomy, it seems unlikely that he would
base all of his theological arguments on such fledgling theories.
While some scholars wish to base Plato's theology entirely on an cosmological-
teleological argument supported by empirical evidence, I have suggested that such
a view seems partly at odds with what one might call Plato's "philosophy of sci-
ence," which begins from the position of the ôeUTEpoc; TTXOÍJC; and an awareness
of the conjectural or hypothetical character of natural science. Still, empirical
phenomena do play an important role in Plato's theology, and I will turn to them
in the next section. Before examining celestial phenomena, a traditional focus of
the exegesis on Plato's theology, I will flrst take up Plato's analysis of the empiri-
cal evidence provided by the sublunary world, for we have direct access to these
phenomena, while as Aristotle notes with regard to the celestial phenomena, "we
are far removed from the objects of our attempted inquiry."^'

§2. O N THE SUBLUNARY EVIDENCE FOR DIVINE CARE

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the theology of the Laws is not the demonstra-
tion of the mere existence of the gods but the proof of the gods' providence or
330 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

beneficence: their care (erttiiéXeta) for the citizens of the polis. Indeed, Plato's
treatment of providence in his dialogues exercised the minds of antiquity to
develop a systematic analysis of providence in relation to both the celestial and
sublunary realms. As R. W. Sharpies points out, the discussions of Plato's view of
providence (provzííe«fífl,Ttpóvoia, or èTti|iéA.Eia) by Apuleius,pseudo-Plutarch,
and Nemesius sought to distinguish between the providence of the highest god, the
cosmic gods that supervise the heavens, and the divinities ( daemones, ôai\ioveq)
that watch over human affairs.^^ This trifold distinction, which stems from the
Timaeus 40d-42e, is particularly important for our discussion, as the theology of
the Laws must establish divine care for the earthly, not just the cosmic or celestial,
sphere. Let us look at some passages from the Laws and Stateman that refiect on
the evidence for the providence of god in the sublunary world, before going on
to examine the evidence from the heavenly sphere.
In Book 4 of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger turns to the analysis of the par-
ticular land on which the colony of Magnesia is to be founded. After reflecting
on the fertility of the soil, the the city's closeness to the sea, the forestry of the
land, and the nature of the prospective colonists, the Athenian, almost expressing
a moment of despondency about the possibility of humans establishing legisla-
tion at all, says:
I was about to say that no human being ever legislates anything [(be, oùôeic;
TtOTE àvBp(i)TC<x)v oùôèv vo|j.o0eTe'ï],but that chances and accidents [TÚxat
ôè Kai 0U|i9opai] of every sort, occurring in all kinds of ways, legislate
everything for us. Either it's some war that violently overturns regimes and
transforms laws, or it's the baffiing impasse of harsh poverty that does it. Dis-
eases, too, make many innovations necessary [avayKáCouGi KaivoTO[a.eïv],
when epidemics occur or bad weather comes and frequently lasts many years.
If he looked ahead to all these things, someone might be eager to say what I
just said—that no mortal ever legislates anything, but that almost all human
affairs are matters of chance [TO 0vr|TÔv [lèv ^iqôéva vo|ao9ETeïv fir|ôév,
TÛ^ctc; ô'eîvai axeôôv ärtavTa r à àvBpcuTtiva TtpáynaTa]. (4.709al-b2)
In this passage, marked by a disheartening awareness of the limits of human
agency, the Athenian gives an answer to the opening question of the Laws: no one
legislates anything. Neither god nor some human is in charge of human affairs,
but all things are a matter of chance (TÚ^H)- The harshness of the world ruled
by necessity (aváyKri) and chance makes human beings constantly revise their
actions in such a way that legislating, that is, organizing human affairs according
to rational principles, is impossible.
Pulling himself together, however, the Athenian goes on to note that human
beings do have some skills to deal with the harsh necessities of the world around
them, and he says that it is "equally good" to speak about these same affairs in
the following way:
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Lava's 331

To the effect that in all things god [öeoc;] —and together with god, chance and
opportunity [KOI \iexa Seoù TUxq Kai Katpóc;]—pilots all the human things.
One must, indeed, concede that these are accompanied by yet a third thing, a
gentler thing: art [réxvrjv]. For I at least would declare that the pilot's art is
a great advantage when it comes to cooperating with the opportune moment
in the midst of a gale. (4.709b7-c3)
The Athenian mitigates his claim that chance legislates all things for human beings
with the claim that god, together with chance and opportunity, pilots all things for
human beings.^' This revision suggests that chance sometimes provides a moment
of divine opportunity (Kaipóc) which human beings can recognize if they have
the appropriate TÉxvr), here understood as skill or ability. This revision does not
make the claim that the god directly exercises providence, for the circumstances
in which humans live is characterized as a storm-tossed sea. Still, this account
claims that god or the cosmos provides, at times, the conditions under which
human skill can be efficacious in ordering human life.
After providing the above reflection on the limits and possibilities of human
agency in the sublunary world, the Athenian Stranger offers Kleinias and Megil-
lus an explanatory myth that is highly suggestive about the relationship between
law and divine providence. Long before any human memory, the Athenian claims
there was "a very happy rule and arrangement [àp^iî TE Kai o'ÍKrjaic;] under
Kronos. The best of arrangements at the present time [vûv] is in fact an imita-
tion [|ii|ir|[ia] of this" (4.713b2-4). Because Kronos knew that human beings
were incapable of self-rule,
he set up at that time kings and rulers within our cities—not human beings
[àvGpcUTtouc;], but divinities [ôai|iovac;], members of a more divine and
better species. He did just what we do now with sheep and the other tame
herd animals ... The same is done by the god, who was a friend of humanity
[cpiXávOpwKoc;]: he set over us the better species of divinities, who super-
vised [éra|i£\oú[ievov] us in a way that provided much ease for both them
and us. They provided peace and awe and good laws and justice without
stint. Thus they made it so that the races of men were without civil strife, and
happy. (4.713c8-e3)
Here, the role of divine providence in human life is very similar to that described
by some of the Middle Platonists noted above, for divinities established by a su-
preme god watch over the welfare of human beings. Just as a shepherd (vojaeúc;)
provides for his flock, so the way of life then "had everything without stint and
spontaneously [aUTÓ[j.aTa]" (731c4).
The myth of Kronos and the establishment of divinities to watch over every
aspect of human life is not introduced in order to support theological claims
about providence, however, but rather the opposite. This myth implies that the
lack of such divinities necessitates the rule of law in human life. The Athenian says.
332 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

The argument thinks that we should imitate by every device the way of life
that is said to have existed under Kronos; in public life and in private life—in
the arrangement of our households and our cities—we should obey whatever
within us partakes of immortality [ev r^ïv âGavaoiac; ëvEOTi], giving
the name "law" to the distribution ordained by intelligence [xfjv TOO VOÛ

While this passage does appeal to the ideal of imitating the divine, it at the same
time suggests the distance of providential gods from human life. That is, human
beings must accept the rule of vó|ioc; precisely because there are no longer be-
nevolent and providential oaijjovec; to act as our shepherds.
While many scholars look to the empirical observations and argumenta-
tion o{ Laws 10 for evidence of Plato's view of providence," the observations at
Laws 4.709a-c and the myth of 4.713a-714a provide some empirical evidence
concerning sublunary providence. While the initial thrust of these passages is to
deny that human life is directly protected by providence,^"* they also suggest that
human reason can formulate law as a second-best means to provide for justice,
peace, and happiness. That is, as a (ii^rioic; (imitation) of the rule of divinities,
vojaoc; is both somehow connected to and a departure from the exercise of divine
care for human beings.
The myth of the Age of Kronos in the Laws does not explain the transition
between the Age of Kronos and the current age, however a parallel myth in the
Statesman does, and a brief examination of it will expand on the points noted
above regarding the Laws." In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger tells a myth
of the age of Kronos, when all things were provided to human beings "spontane-
ously" (aUTÓ[iaTa) (271dl). The Stranger says.
At that time, the god [Oeóc;] who has it in his care [em^eXoú[ievoc;] first
ruled [f|pxev] the circling itself as a whole, and likewise in region by region
there was this same kind of rule, when all the parts of the cosmos had been
distributed under ruling gods. And in particular, divinities [ôa[|aovec;] had
like divine shepherds [vo|ific; Geiot] distributed the animals by genera and
herds, each one of whom was by himself all-sufficing for each of the groups
that he himself grazed, and as a consequence there was neither anything
savage [aypiov] nor any act of feeding on each other, and there was no war
[TtóAe|ióc;] at all or faction [aráotc;] either. (271d3-e2)^*
In parallel to the passage from Book 4 of the Laws, this passage describes an era
of divine care in which divinities directly watch over the flourishing of humans
in the sublunary world.
Unlike the Laws, however, the Statesman describes how god and the divinities
relinquish control of the universe. At the appropriate moment.
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 333

the helmsman [KußEpvr)Tr|c;] of the all, just as if he had let go of the handle of
the rudder, stood apart and withdrew to his own surveying-post [ nep iconf)v ],
and a fated and inborn desire reversed once more the cosmos. Then all the gods
who were jointly ruling with the greatest divinity [oi TO) laeyicTTCp ôai(aovi
öeoi] in their several regions, on recognition of what was then occurring, let
go in turn of the parts of the cosmos that were in their own care [xfjc; aÚTcbv
émueXeíac;]. (272e3-273al)^''
The initial removal of divine care caused the universe to shake and tremble, but
then "it gained calm seas [-yaXiivrjc;]" and "resumed its own usual course, with
its own care of and authority over [èTti[ié\£iav Kai KpaTOç] those things in
itself as well as itself, remembering to the best of its ability the instruction of its
demiurge and father" (273a6-b2).
In the case of the cosmos as a whole, it recovers from the absence of the divine
helmsman by becoming self-organizing and caring for itself by means of its own
thoughtfulness (cppóvrjaic;) (269dl). While the cosmos is here portrayed as a
living organism that cares for the things "in itself" (èv aúxo)) (273bl), the way
that this care applies to humans is problematic at best. Describing the state of
human beings, the Eleatic Stranger says.
Upon their isolation from the care of the divinity who possess [KeKTr||iévou]
and grazes [VÉ|ÍOVTOC;] US, many of the beasts in turn, afl that were harsh in
their natures, became savage, and since human beings had themselves become
weak and unguarded they were torn apart by the beasts, and they were still
without devices and without arts in thosefirsttimes, because the spontaneous
nurture [aUTO|aáTr|c; Tpocpfjc;] had given out. And they did not know how
to supply it for themselves on account of the fact that no need had previously
compelled [ávayKáíeiv] them. (274b5-c4)
While the Stranger notes that human beings long ago described knowledge of
the arts of using fire and planting seeds and tending plants as gifts from gods
like Prometheus, Hephaestus, and Athena, the emphasis in the age of Zeus is the
absence of divine care and the need for humans to care for themselves:
And everything, afl that has arranged human life, has been from these [arts],
after that which characterized care from the gods, as was stated before, gave
out for human beings, and they through themselves had to manage their way
of life and their own care for themselves. (274d2-5)
While the gods are nominally present in the age of Zeus, insofar as human arts
exist that allow for the possibility of survival, the gods only provide the barest
necessities by which human beings can care for themselves.
While Laws 4.709a-c presents a view of empirical political phenomena that
sheds light on the operation or non-operation of divine providence in sublunary
realm,iaws 4.713a-714a and the Statesman treat the same theme by means of a
334 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

myth. But while Plato chooses to present this issue in mythic form, his findings
about the workings of providence on human life in the sublunary world are not
dependent on their mythical formulation; that is, these findings can be affirmed or
denied by simply paying attention to the world in which humans live. The overall
portrait painted by the passages considered in this section show that human life
is hemmed in, at least to some degree, by àvayKri (necessity), a force against
which not even a god can contend {Laws 5.741a4-5,7.818d8-e2). While Plato's
admission of the role that àvayKri plays in disrupting human life precludes, and
provides evidence against, the sort of providence exercised in the mythic Age of
Kronos, we will leave open for the moment the possibility that àvayKri might, as
is said in the Timaeus,be capable of being persuaded (neíGeiv) to some degree by
Reason (voûc;) ( Timaeus 48a 1 -3). In continuing to examine this issue, let us now
look at the evidence provided by the celestial phenomena for divine providence.

§3. THE ORDER OF THE HEAVENS AND LAWS 10

In Book 10 of the Laws, the Athenian states that all citizens of Magnesia must
believe that the gods exist, care for human beings, and are not easily persuaded
by prayers and sacrifices ( 10.885b4-9). These legally mandated beliefs are sup-
ported by two claims: first, the soul is older than the body, and, second, the soul
that regulates the cosmos is guided by vovç ( 12.966d6-968a4). To what degree
does the empirical evidence provided by astronomy play a role in demonstrating
these two claims that underwrite the theology of the Lawsl
In the educational program oí Republic 7, astronomy is treated as a part of the
subordinate prelude (Ttpooijaiov) to the song (vó(aoc;) of dialectic (531d8),and
Socrates emphasizes that astronomy is not to be undertaken in Kallipohs by means
of only an empirical analysis of the visible heavens. Rather, the astronomers in
Kallipolis will begin their analysis of celestial phenomena by assuming (vo|iieiv)
that the heavens have been composed by a craftsman (ornxioupyoc;) (530a4-7).
That is, the view that the heavens are ordered and perfect is not something derived
from sense experience but rather something that one recognizes ( vo|ai(eiv) prior
to undertaking one's analysis. Let us see if this position taken by Socrates in Book
7 of the Republic is consistent with the Athenian Stranger's position in the Laws.
When Kleinias is first asked by the Athenian Stranger to provide arguments
for the existence of the gods, he appeals to the order of the heavens, providing
something like an empirically-based teleological-cosmological argument:'" "First,
there's the earth, the sun, the stars, and all things, and this beautiful orderliness
[ôiaKEKoaiarméva KaXtoc;] of the seasons, divided into years and months"
( 10.886a2-4). In response to this attempt, the Athenian claims that Kleinias has
somehow misunderstood their difference from the heretics. Instead of accepting
or improving upon Kleinias's appeal to the order of the heavens, the Athenian says.
On the Eoundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 335

Now the arguments of such men work the following effect [roôe oúv ot
Tíüv TOioÚTíüv èÇepyaÇovTai Àoyoi]: when you and I adduce evidence
[TeK|if)pta] that the gods exist, bringing forward these very things—sun
and moon and stars and earth—as being gods and divine things, those who
are convinced by these wise men would say that these things are earth and
stones, and incapable of thinking anything about human affairs, however
well decked-out [Ttepi7te7Te|i[iéva] they may somehow be, with arguments
[XÓYotat] that make them plausible. (886d3-e2)"
The wise men are not susceptible to Kleinias's cosmological-teleological logos
because they are under the sway of a particular logos that treats theological
arguments with suspicion.'^ This suspicion renders them insusceptible to the
"empirical" evidence (TEKi.iripia) offered by Kleinias. This passage shows that
assessing the existence of god cannot proceed merely by the presentation of
particular empirical facts, for particular empirical facts are only intelligible in
light of a more general explanatory logos at work in a human soul. The first step
to revising the corrupting atheistic logos is to remove the wise men's distrust and
suspicion that resides within their souls.''
Instead of trying to convince the heretics to properly interpret the celestial
phenomena, the Athenian attempts to engage in dialogue (ôiaÀEYO|.iEVOL) with
them (10.888a2-7). The Athenian's dialogue with the heretics begins by taking
up the issue of the relationship between nature ((púaic;), art (TEXvr]), and chance
(Tuxn)- subjects that were the focus of the Athenian's reflection on the possibil-
ity of legislation in regard to the sublunary world at Laws 4.709al-c3, §2 above.
The Athenian says, "certain people say that all affairs [xà Ttpáy^aTa] come
into being, have come into being, and will come into being, by nature [cpuoEi], by
art [TEXvp],and through chance [ôià TUXH'^]" (888e4-6). In response,Kleinias
replies,"Isn't that finely expressed?," to which the Athenian replies that they should
"investigate [aKE\(/cü|iE9a] whatever it is those people over there happen to think
[TUYXávouaioiavooúnEvoi]"(888e7-889a2).In addition to reminding Kleinias
to thoroughly investigate arguments before believing them (compare 888c7-d2),
this passage foreshadows an important criticism of the atheists' beliefs. Those
responsible for the atheistic doctrine happen or chance to think the way they do.
Plato links the atheists' thinking with chance (TÚXH) in two ways. First, be-
cause the atheists hold that random matter in motion precedes soul, thinking
itself has to be a product of chance.^'' Second, the atheists' thinking is rooted in
chance because it does not engage in open dialogue with opposing viewpoints.
Open discussion is the only way of securing knowledge, and any form of speech
which refuses this cannot lay claim to being free from arbitrariness. Both ances-
tral piety and Presocratic materialism, therefore, are merely arbitrary viewpoints
determined by chance until they engage in critical dialogue."
336 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

By examining Plato's linkage of the thinking (ôiâvoia) of the atheists with

chance (xuxn)' we reach the heart of his criticism of the atheists. Rather than
call forward empirical evidence, such as the motion of the stars, to counteract the
logos of the atheists, the Athenian tries to bring to their attention that on which
their logos depends: soul. The teaching of the atheists seeks to make a sharp
distinction between the works of nature and the works of art (or design) and to
accord a greater value on the former than the latter:^'
It's likely, they assert, that the greatest of them, and the finest, are
produced [ à7t8pYaÇe09ai] by nature and chance, and the smaller by art, which
taking from nature the genesis of the greatest and first deeds [ëpycDv], molds
and constructs all the smaller things which we all call artificial. (889a4-8)
While the atheists ascribe the outcome of natural processes to blind chance, they
cannot escape using the soul-dependent language of craft and rational agency.''
After presenting the atheistic teaching, the Athenian proposes that he and
Kleinias share in examining it together:
But now you teU me again, Kleinias (for you must share in the arguments [TÔJV
Xóycüv] ): the one saying these things ventures [Kivôuveûei] to hold that fire,
water, earth, and air are the first [npcoTa] of all things, and ventures to name
these very things "nature," and to say that soul is something that comes later,
out of these things. But it's likely that he doesn't "venture," [Ktvôuveùeiv]
but really makes these things manifest to us in his argument [ à W à ÖVTCÜC;
ari^iaíveiv raiJTa r)|itv rCb Xoyœ]. (891b8-c5)
The repetition of the verb Kivôuveueiv in this passage carries a connotation of
riskiness. The atheists' thinking is risky both in that it is determined by chance
(TÚxn) and thus proceeds in a haphazard fashion, but also that it is dangerous in
its effect on social norms. While the atheists hold that the material elements are
first, they nonetheless indicate or signify their thoughts to an audience of living
beings, to us, through a rational discourse. Through engaging this logos as well as
getting the atheists to recognize it to be a logos and therefore dependent on soul
is the central part of the Athenian's argumentation here.
After showing that the atheists' opinion rests on their conception of the
posteriority of the soul to matter, the Athenian exclaims, "Haven't we discovered
something like a source [nriyriv Tiva àvoiixou ôoÇr|c;] of the mindless opinion of
those human beings who have at any time engaged in investigations into nature?"
(891c7-9).The play on "mindless," is derogatory, but it is also explanatory, for
the atheists have no way to account for vovq. Most commentators find the proof
of the priority of the soul in the passage discussing the various kinds of motion
(893bff ), but the Athenian's prefatory remarks to this proof are more important:
The arguments which have shaped the soul of the impious [ot rryv TÄV
aaeßcDv ^l/uxqv à7rep-yaaa|ievot Xó^ot] have asserted that what is in fact
On the Eoundation of Theology in Plato's Lav^^s 337

the first cause of the coming into being and passing away of all things is not
first, but has come into being later, and that what in fact comes later comes
earlier. That is why they have fallen into error concerning the real existence
ofthegods. (891e4-9)
The impious's logos states that soul is something which is fashioned out of the ele-
ments, but the impious are unaware that their soul-denying logos shapes, fashions,
and resides in their own souls.''While this argument does not affirm the priority
of soul simply,'^ it does suggest that we should start with the things that are first
for us, not the things that are first simply."*" The appropriate starting point for a
philosophical understanding of the universe, Plato suggests, is recognition of the
fact that those doing the analyzing, human beings, are ensouled beings who come
to know the world through logos.
In Book 10 the Athenian criticizes atheists who hold a position strikingly
similar to the one he offered in a moment of despondency in Book 4: chance
(TUX»!) rules all things, and human action is derivative from chance and nature
(cpúaic;). The Athenian's critique of this position marshals evidence for the pres-
ence and efficacy of Té^vr) (skill, art, design) in human life, and he shows how
human conversation aimed at shared understanding presupposes a world in
which souls can engage one another through a shared order present in nature. On
my interpretation, this section of the dialogue is attempting to bring out the fact
that viewing the world as a KÓa(iO<; is a presupposition of conversation guided
by reason rather than something that empirical observation first discloses about
the world."*'
Yet even if one is convinced by the Athenian's argument that soul is prior to
body, how does the Athenian support his claim that a rational soul is in control
of and looks after the cosmos? After providing arguments which ostensibly prove
the priority of soul to the elements, the Athenian then asks how many souls exist
(896e). Answering his own question, the Athenian notes that there are at least
two souls. The soul does good, "every time it takes as a helper Intelligence [voi3v
[lev TtpoaXaßoOaa]—god, in the correct sense, for the gods—it guides all
things towards what is happy, while when it associates with lack of intelligence
it produces [ànepyài,erai] in all things just the opposite to these" (897bl-5).
Here, Plato identifies his true god as voûc;. While the discussion so far has af-
firmed the existence of souls and voûc;, there is still the question of which soul
drives the cosmos.
Now we are at the point where Plato might be tempted to take empirical data
into consideration, for the Athenian Stranger states that if the motion of the
heavens and the motion of voûç are similar, then the best soul is in charge of the
cosmos. The Athenian asks.
So what nature does the motion of Intelligence [voûc;] possess, then? Now
this, friends, is a question that's difficult to answer while speaking in a
338 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

prudent way. That's why it's just [ôiKaiov], at this point, for you to take me
[npoaXa(a.ßaveiv] as a helper in answering. (897d3-6)
While this passage notes the Athenian's inequality with his interlocutors, the lan-
guage describing the actions of the interlocutors foUowing the Athenian mirrors
the soul's following the commands of voûç.WTiile much of Laws 10 is dedicated
to providing a logos about the existence of voûç, here the interlocutors' practical
actions show in ergon (deed) that human beings are capable of following voi3<;
by means of rational discussion and agreement. That is, Kleinias and Megillus are
able to take advantage of the Kaipóc; provided to them by the Athenian Strangers'
legislative prudence.
The paraflel between the soul following voûc; and the interlocutors following
the Athenian is followed by a reminder that empirical data is not capable of solving
the problems that need to be worked out at the level of self-critical discussion:
Let's not make our reply by looking straight on, and thereby as if we were
looking at the sun, create night at midday—because we supposed Intelligence
[ voûc;] were ever visible and adequately knowable by mortal eyes. One can see
in more safety by looking at an image of what is being asked about. (897d8-e2)
In language evoking the Phaedo (96c, 99d-100b), the Athenian notes that exclusive
concentration on perceptual phenomenon leads to the self-forgetting of the soul.
Instead of focusing on empirical phenomenon, the Athenian "recollects" their
earlier distinction between things that move in one place and things that move
in many (893bff ). The Athenian notes.
Now of these two motions, the one that moves always in one place must nec-
essarily move around some center, being an imitation [|ai|ir]|iá] of circular
things turned on a lathe, and it must in every way have the greatest possible
kinship and resemblance to the revolution of Intelligence [voûc;]. (898a3-6)
This passage, which is to prove crucial in linking the revolution of the stars to
the revolution of voûc;, is surprising because the class of things revolving in one
place is an imitation of the rather ordinary activity of a human being working
some piece of wood on a lathe. V\niereas one might think that Plato would sug-
gest that human activity be understood in terms of celestial motion or abstract
definitions of self-moving motion, this passage interestingly inverts the priority.
The abstract concept of circular motion around a fixed point is only intelligible
as an imitation of purposive human activity. That this is precisely Plato's point
is illustrated by repetition:
Surely, if we said that moving according to what is the same, in the same way,
in the same place, around the same things, towards the same things, and
according to one proportion [Xóyov] and order characterized both Intelli-
gence and the motion that moves in one place—speaking of them as images
of the motions of a sphere turned on a lathe—we'd never
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 339

appear to be poor craftsmen of beautiful images in speech

Kokœv EIKÓVCDV]. (898a8-b3)
In noting how spherical rotation and the operation of nous are simuar and can
be understood as images of an intelligent craftsman shaping a sphere on a lathe,
the Athenian and his interlocutors become dëmiourgoi themselves. That the
démiourgoi of the Laws are ordinary human beings and not some cosmic creator
is significant, especially in light of the opening question of the Laws. By pointing
to how the interlocutors fashion their own rational discourse by analyzing the
world around them through the application of reason, Plato suggests the presence
of the divine in human rationality.
Only now are we prepared for the "empirical" question of whether or not the
heavens are driven around by a rational or irrational soul. Kleinias answers:
But stranger, from what has now been said at any rate, it isn't pious [oaiov]
to say anything other than that the soul—whether it be one or several—that
has every virtue drives things around. (898c6-8)
At first glance it is quite surprising, as Cleary notes, that Kleinias "thinks that an
appeal to piety is sufficient to settle the question in favor of a good soul.""^ Isn't
there a firmer foundation for the orderliness of the cosmos than this?'"
Within the pages of the laws at least there is not, and it is ultimately Kleinias's
piety, not an empirical judgment, that decides the issue at hand. While it is true
that the Athenian in Book 7 mentions a proof (TeK[iTÍ piov) (821e3) that celestial
bodies do not wander irregularly (822a4ff), this demonstration is mentioned
but never actually provided (822c7-9). Even if one hypothesized that Plato is
relying on academic astronomy which he decided not to include in the Laws for
literary purposes,*" these theories would not be simply empirical, for as Kleinias
notes, our direct observation of the heavens suggests that the celestial bodies do
occasionally wander:
For in my lifetime I myself have often seen the Morning Star and the Evening
Star, and certain others, never going along the same course, but wandering
all over the place; and I suppose we all know that the sun and the moon do
these things all the time. (821cl-5)
That is, a rational account of the moments of the heavens is not derivable from the
celestial phenomena simpliciter. Rather the idea of the heavens as cosmos stems
from the attempt of human beings to find a rational account of the sometimes
irregular movements in the celestial realm. This desire is, as Republic 7 suggests,
something that stems from believing (vofitelv) that the universe has been ordered
by a divine cause.
340 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

CONCLUDING REMARKS: ON vovq AND vó^o(;

In the preceding sections of this paper I hope to have established two points
beyond a reasonable doubt: first, a careful reading of the Laws shows that Plato
does not provide or attempt to provide a demonstration of the existence of a
providential god by means of an inference from observable features of either the
sublunary or the celestial sphere; second, the second sailing undertaken in the
Phaedo to understand the world through Xóyoq rather than sense-perception
is the approach that continues unabated throughout the Laws and is especially
evident in Laws 10.
In focusing on these two points throughout this paper, I have been guided by
the goal of providing a more accurate account of the foundation of the theology
of the Laws than has so far been presented in the scholarship. A necessary but
difficult question, however, remains: is this newly-articulated foundation for the
theology of the Laws adequate, both in terms of its philosophical cogency and
in terms of its suitability as a foundation for the religious law of the polis? While
providing a satisfactory answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this
paper, I will attempt to broach the beginning of an answer in these concluding
remarks.
The question, as I have here put it, asks about the relationship between the
dialogical pursuit of truth guided by divine vovq that is manifest in the life of
Plato's Socrates and the instantiation of voûc; in the human community by means
of rule by written divine laws (vó|aoi) that is recommended in the Laws. This
question is itself raised by the Laws, which establishes voûc; as the standard by
which vó^ioc; is to be judged. As the Athenian Stranger says, the laws should make
citizens better, "or else our divine and marvelous law [vó|j.oc;] would in vain
possess a name akin to intelligence [voûc;]"( 12.957c6-7). Yet what does the kin-
ship between vójioc; and voûc; consist of? In developing an initial answer to this
question, I will follow the indication that Plato provides by his characterization
of both the Socratic turn and the rule of law by the phrase "ôeUTepoc; 7TXOÜC;," a
"second sailing" or "second best." The second sailing is for Plato an approach that
proceeds in the awareness of human ignorance and fallibility while nonetheless
attempting to orient itself towards what is best for human beings.
In § 1 of this paper, I articulated the Socratic turn to the Xóyo i as the method-
ological approach that Plato employs across all of his dialogues from the Phaedo
to later dialogues such as the Laws. The Socratic turn or second sailing is, on my
interpretation, Socrates's second best attempt to understand the whole in light of
the recognition that the understanding the whole cannot take place without an
understanding of the soul (\|/uj(r)) of the one who is inquiring. This second best
attempt to understand the whole thus eschews the paths of both pre-Socratic
materialism and Anaxagorean cosmic teleology in favor of shared inquiry with
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 341

others through rational discourse (Xóyoc;). In the Phaedo Socrates disavows

knowledge of the truth of the Anaxagorean claim that voûc; (reason or intellect)
is the efficient cause of the order of the cosmos, but he argues that—with regard
to his own actions—he is guided not by his bones or sinews but by his reason-
ing (voûc;) as to which course of action seems to him to be the best (98c4 and
99a8, compare also Crito 46b4-6). In this section of the Phaedo, then, Socrates's
second sailing is characterized by the commitment to living human life by means
of shared inquiry through discourse guided by voûc;. In the Phaedo Socrates ap-
pears to be able to live his life in this manner while leaving open the question as
to whether voûc; is in control of the cosmos as a whole.
In §2 of the paper, I turned to an examination of whether or not Plato's de-
scription of the sublunar world in the Laws provided evidence for the exercise
of a providential god (Beóc;) or intellect (voûç). The simplest way of posing this
question would be to examine observable features of the sublunar world and to
thus determine whether Reason (voûç) or fortune (TÚxn) held complete sway
over human life. While my exegesis in this section showed that Plato provided
arguments and myths against the exercise of direct daimonic providence over
human affairs, Plato also indicated that the simplest way of posing the question
was incomplete. VS^ile the exercise of direct providence over human life belongs
to the mythical age of Kronos, Plato suggests that human beings have the ability
to provide for themselves through the exercise of their reason by means of the
establishment of an imitation ((ii^riaic;) of the direct divine providence operative
in the age of Kronos, an imitation which is named law (vó^xoc;).
In the transition from §1 to §2, then, we see that in the Laws Plato effects a
distancing in the relationship of human beings to the non-observable divine voûc;
that is to guide human life. Whue Socrates follows this divine rationality directly,
the city must follow divine voûc; by means of its distribution (ôiavofxr)) in the
law (vó^ioc;) (4.713e6-714a2). This distancing is supported by the claim that
during the age of Zeus the maintenance of the human community is only possible
by recourse to that remnant of god within ourselves that is manifest through the
establishment of well-apportioned law. While the Athenian Stranger thus suggests
that an element of immortality and divinity (àOavaaia) inheres in the human
being even in the Age of Zeus, he states that this element is only accessible if we
obey (or are persuaded by) (7T£Í9£a9ai) law in both public and private hfe. Here,
it is vó|.ioc; not Socratic Xóyoc; that provides the human connection with voûc;
(compare 4.713e6-714a2 with 1.645b4-8).
In this transition from Xóyoc; to vojaoc; it appears that the Athenian Stranger
turns away from the Socratic turn to discourse to instead embrace the rule of law.
There is some truth to this appearance, perhaps borne out by the view of many
scholars that the Laws is the least Socratic of Plato's works. While there is an
important distancing here from the human relation to voûc;, there is a kinship
342 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

between both the Socratic turn and the turn to law in the Statesman and the Laws.
In the Apology, Socrates claims that he is different from other humans insofar as
he possesses a"human wisdom" (avSpcüTtívrj aocpia) that consists of an aware-
ness of the limits of his own knowledge and a skepticism about those humans
who profess a more than human knowledge (20d8-e2). It is this knowledge that
is at the root of both of the second sailings.
The arguments for the turn from the rule of some human being to the rule
of law are initiated by a reflection on the problems that occur when some mortal
(9vr|TÓc;) (4.713e5) seeks to rule the pohs as though he were a divine being from
the age of Kronos. In the Statesman this very recognition that humans are unfit
to rule over other humans as though they were divine shepherds leads the Fleatic
Stranger of that dialogue to suggest the establishment of law as a "second sail-
ing" or "second best" (OEÚrepoc; nXoûç) that is necessary in light of the flaws of
mortal nature (300cl-3). This awareness of the limitations of human action in
the political sphere pervades the Laws, and the Athenian puts the polis founded
in the Laws forward as a second-best city because it is to be founded and inhab-
ited by human beings, not gods (5.739b8-e7;9.853c3-7). This awareness, which
focuses not on the best course simply but on the best course given the limitations
of human knowledge and action, is derived from a knowledge about human be-
ings (av0pü)Ttívr| aocpia) and underlies both the Socratic second sailing and the
second-best regime of the Laws, which is second-best at least partially because
it follows the OEÚTEpoc; nXoûc; of the Statesman and embraces the rule of law
rather than the rule of a wise philosopher-king.
In linking the ÔsÛTEpoc; nXoûç of the Phaedo with that of the Statesman and
the Laws, I have attempted to show some similarities between them: both second
sailings are rooted in an awareness of human limitation (a certain àvGpcoTrivr)
aocpia) and in the desire to follow reason (voûç) as the guide to human hfe. Yet
even if we accept this questionable kinship between these two second-saihngs,
can the Socratic devotion to voûc;—regardless of whether or not voûc; rules the
cosmos—ever directly ground the claim that rational, incorruptible gods care
for each particular polis that is inhabited by human beings?
Plato's answer in the Laws appears to be that such a claim cannot be grounded
by Xóyoc; and that the existence and providence of the gods described by the laws
of Magnesia are established through persuasive speech that falls short of rational
demonstration (see 10.907bl0-dl). This tension between what philosophy can
demonstrate about the scope of divine providence and what citizens desire is
brought up in the Laws by a deep disagreement between the Athenian and his in-
terlocutors about the ultimate importance of human beings. In Book 1 of the Laws,
the Athenian discusses whether the "divine puppet" of the human being is put
together as "the plaything of the gods or for some serious purpose" ( 1.644d7-9).
WTiile the Athenian is ambivalent about whether lawgiving is a serious pursuit
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 343

or a playful one (6.769al-3), his interlocutors Kleinias and Megillus insist that
human affairs are worthy of great seriousness (7.803b3-804cl).
The presupposition that allows for the translation of the voûc; operative in
the Socratic turn into the divine voûc; that is equivalent to the providential gods
of the polis can perhaps be found in this belief held by citizens and legislators
such as Megillus and Kleinias. That is, the insistence on the utmost importance
of human affairs by Megillus and Kleinias leads to the assumption that these
affairs must be of interest to the gods in control of the cosmos as weU, for if they
were not, these affairs would merely have the status of playthings subject to whim,
chance, or fortune.
The belief of Megillus and Kleinias that the affairs of the human community
are a serious matter is not grounded in the Laws, but rather, on my interpretation,
it provides the grounds for the civic religion put forward in the Laws. While this
points to the fact that the theology of the Laws that supports this civic religion
rests not on Xóyoc; but on opinion (oó^a), it would be too quick a jump to simply
assume that this belief is merely a noble lie enacted for the sake of the polis, thus
finding in Plato an argument akin to the thinking presented in the Sisyphus Frag-
ment. Rather, it is worth considering the parallel in the Phaedo where Socrates's
belief that the conduct of his own life and inquiries are a serious matter leads
him to follow the direction given by vovq. This belief about the proper conduct
of the individual life also does not rest on a demonstration of the efficacy and
existence of voûc; but rather proceeds from it as an originating point (àpxn).
Ultimately, the Laws presents the alignment of voûc; and vó|aoc; as a goal to
be sought, not a goal attained. While the injunctions of vófioc; can in the best
case point us in the direction of voûc;, there is a irremediable gap between the
Athenian's noetic theology and the supervisory gods promulgated by persuasive
arguments in the Magnesian legal code.
In the Laws, then, Plato sings us a song (vópoc;, èncpôri) as to what we should
believe (vo^iCeiv) about the gods of the city, not what we can know. It is a song of
what the city should believe, a song that surpasses the possibility of what can be
shown through speech or through observation. Yet, as I have suggested, this gap
exists not only in discussions about vó[aoc; and its gods but also about human life
and its ends. In the Phaedo, after all, Socrates engages not just in conversations
dictated by his famous turn, but also in the effort to console his friends with per-
suasive accounts of why his death is not to be mourned and why the philosopher
should not fear death. These accounts are not put forward by Plato as demonstrable
claims that can be supported by observation, but rather as incantations to assuage
the fears of Socrates's friends. As Socrates says in the Phaedo,
No man having intelligence [voûc;] would ¿nsîsf that these things are as I have
described them, but I think that it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for
344 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true... and a man
should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation [éTTCpor) ]. ( 114dl-7)^'
To mistake a song or a belief or a law for voû<; itself is to err, for to vo|iiÇeiv
is not the same as to know. Still, for Plato, to know oneself as human means to
know oneself, to recognize oneself, as in need of law, and this recognition, which
requires at least an inkling of an insight provided by divine VOTJC;, as well as an
awareness of the harshness of àvayKr), is the beginning of the piety that is the
foundation of Platonic legislation and theology.''*

NOTES

1. I use the text of John Burnet,PZflto«is Opera (Oxford: Oxford University, 1900-1907)
throughout. For translations I use Thomas Pangle, The Laws of Plato (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1980) with some occasional alterations.
2. Recent works focusing almost exclusively on Book 10 of the Laws include in chrono-
logical order: Thomas Pangle, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Lawsl'
The American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 1059-77; Platon,AromoiX, translated
with a commentary by Peter Steiner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992); John Cleary,
"The Role of Theology in Plato's Laws',' in Plato's Laws and Its historical Significance,
ed. Franco Lisi (Sankt Augustin: Akademie Verlag, 2001); Gerard Naddaf, "Plato:
The Creator of Natural Theology," International Studies in Philosophy 36:1 (2004):
103-27; Robert Mayhew, Plato: Laws 10 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Robert Mayhew, "The Theology of the Laws',' in Plato's Laws: A Critical Guide, ed.
Christopher Bobonich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Sara
BriU, "Psychology and Legislation in Plato's Laws," Proceedings of the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2010): 211-42.
3. Gregory Vlastos, Wflio's Universe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975): 53;
Thomas Pangle, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws''
4. As John Sallis notes, "But among all the polyphonic discourses of the Platonic dia-
logues, there are none in which this turn to the Xoyoi has not already been taken. It is
always the second sailing that bears Platonic thought along." The Verge of Philosophy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008): 13.
5. In "The Role of Theology in Plato's Laws" Cleary claims that the argument for the
priority of soul relies on the impossibility of an infinite regress of movers that in
turn are moved by something else: 130. For similar interpretations of the argument
for the priority of soul, see Naddaf, "Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology": 117;
Mayhew, Plato: Laws 10:119-22.
6. Naddaf, "Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology": 119.
7. Mayhew, PZflfo; Laws i 0:146.
8. Naddaf, "Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology": 118.
9. See Catherine Zuckert's Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press: 2009). Zuckert's insightful account does not claim that
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Lav^s 345

Plato turned to a pre-Socratic approach at the end of his life, but, rather, that the Laws
was written to explore the possibilities and limitations that pre-Socratic philosophy
had for improving political life. See also Zuckert's "Socrates and Timaeus: Two Platonic
Paradigms of Philosophy;'£poc/2e 15 (2011): 331-60.
10. L. R Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy (London: Roudedge, 1990), 3-4.
11. Naddaf, "Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology": 117.
12. Christopher Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
13. As Sallis points out, however, Socrates's venture into natural science made him ques-
tion beliefs that he thought he knew (96c5-6) and so contributed to his awareness
of ignorance; ßemg flMi/lo^os (Bloomington: Indianapolis, 1996), 39.
14. Compare Aristotle's Metaphysics, Alpha, Chapter 3,984bff.
15. Compare Sallis, Being and Logos, 41.
16. Ibid., 43.
17. Stephen Menn,P/ato on God as Nous (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1995), 3.
18. John Cleary suggests that the Timaeus is intended to fulfill the teleological obligations
for natural science established in the Phaedo, in Aristotle and Mathematics (Leiden:
Brill, 1995),23-4,27; David Sedley, Creationism audits Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2007), 91-2, also finds a connection between Phaedo
99c7-8, where Socrates remains open to being the student of anyone who can teach
how voüc; arranges the whole, and how Socrates sits as Timaeus's silent auditor in
the Timaeus.
19. Menn, Plato on God as Nous: 4-5,43.
20. Andrew Gregory, "Eudoxus, Callipus and the Astronomy of the Timaeus" Ancient
Approaches to Plato's Timaeus, ed. Robert Sharpies (London: Institute of Classical
Studies, 2003).
21. On the Heavens, II.3.286a3-8; compare Parts ofAnimals I.5.644b25-28 and Richard
Bodéüs, Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2000), 43-57.
22. Sharples,"Threefold Providence: The History and Background of a Doctrine" (2003).
23. The emphasis here on the pilot's art (KußEpvr|TiKr|) is a surprising contrast with
the disparagement, only a few pages earlier, of role of the pilot's art (KußepvqTiKr))
in winning Athens's freedom from Persia (4.707a6-bl, compare 7.803a6-dl).
24. My italics. Referring to Plato's previous play with the word ôai|iova at Cratylus 398b,
Benardete, Plato's Laws, 134, notes a possible pun on xr\v xov vov ôiavo|if)v and

25. When the question of sublunary providence is taken up in Laws 10, the Athenian
Stranger attempts to refute empirical experience rather than appeal to it. People
who believe that the gods do not care for human beings hear or see {r\ ôi" aKofjc;
ala0ó|ievoc; r\ Kai Ttavxánaaiv aUTÓc; aUTÓ7tTr|c;) the good fortunes (rùx^O of
the wicked (10.899e8-900a5).
26. A point emphasized by Strauss, The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws: 58.
346 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

27. The myth of the Statesman is of course a dialectical moment in the work as a whole
and cannot simply be projected onto the Laws. Still, the context of the Statesman shows
that its theme is especially relevant for understanding the Laws. In the course of their
conversation in the Statesman the Young Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger have come
up with the highly contestable definition of the statesman as the shepherd (vo[i£Úc;)
of the human things (267e9), compare Gorgias 452alff. The myth corrects this view
by showing that there is no human who stands to other humans as a shepherd stands
to his sheep, hence the necessity of rule by law. See also the discussion in Aristotle's
Po//í¿cs 3, Chapters 15-17.
28. Translations of the Statesman are from Benardete with very minimal changes.
29. Strong nautical imagery colors this section. Throughout the myth of the Statesman
Plato seems to alternate freely between "divinity" and "god." The term neptcünri
does not seem to refer to a ship's lookout, and the god seems to drop his concern for
steering the ship of the cosmos in favor of gazing around. Ostenfeld has pointed out
that Pindar employs similar language that shows Pythagorean influence in Olympian
2.70 where he writes of the tower of Kronos (Kpóvou TÚpatv).
30. SeeMayhewP/afo;Law5lO,61ff.
31. I have emended the first sentence of Pangle's translation here.
32. Compare LSJ on 7T8ptTtÉa0Cü: "bake a crust round": only metaph., disguise,
"ovójiaTt n. Tfiv (iOxOripiav" Ar.P1.159; n. aùràc; 7TpO0OéTOic; deck themselves
out with false hair, Id.Fr.321; nenXaa\i£vwc, TO Ttpayiia 7t. Bato 7.6; n. aßXaßtöc;
cover Marius without hurting him, Plu.Mar.37 (-neaelv codd.):—Pass.,"[ävop8c;]
XXavíat 7t8ptTts7Tefi|iévoi" Com.Adesp.338; Xóyotatv EV nwq 8Íc; xô ntOavóv
7t8ptn8n8|.i[i8va dressed up, Pl.Lg.886e; "Xûnat rjôovaîc; Tt8ptn8Tt8[i|j.évat"
X.Oec.1.20; also pr||iaTÍotc; •n:8pm8908Íc; cajoled by words, Ar.V.668."
33. At this section of the dialogue, the atheists consider their insight to be the "greatest
prudence" (|i8YÍaTr| 9póvr|atc;) (886b7-8). This characterization is important, for
the atheists believe that by not being taken in by the arguments of the religious they
are not only showing intellectual wisdom but also looking out for their own well-being.
34. Compare Descartes's Mediation One: "According to their supposition [those who
deny the existence of god], then, I have arrived at my present state by fate or chance
or a continuous chain of events, or by some other means; yet since deception and
error seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make my original cause, the
more likely it is that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time" (trans. John
Cottingham).
35. The city of Magnesia is intended to be heavily shaped by persuasive legal preludes
and incantations (èrtcuôri), but Plato makes clear that habitual virtue is not enough:
see Book 12,951b for the necessity of knowledge of other ways of life and Book 7,
816d9-e2 on the necessity of comedy.
36. England, The Laws of Plato, on 888e4 suggests that Téxvr| be translated "design."
37. Benardete, Plato's Laws: The Discovery of Being, 297, notes well the link between
T8xvr| and knowledge of causality. To the Platonic-Aristotelian way of looking at
things, to deny that T8xvr| is part of nature is to deny that the world can be known.
On the Eoundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 347

38. England correctly notes that "There is a lurking irony in his choice of the
àn£pyaaa|-i£voi to govern AJÍUXIÍV; he thereby calls attention to the absurdity of
regarding \(/uxr| as a "production" of dead cpúoic;" (England on 891e7).
39. As Aristotle notes in Metaphysics Delta chapter 11, priority admits of a variety of
meanings. The Laws often seems to connate temporal priority and phenomeno-
logical priority by seeking to draw a link between what is TtpÓTepoc; and what is
npeaßUTepoc;. Carone, Plato's Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions: 165 has sug-
gested that TtpeaßUTepoc; carries connotations of dignity; whüe this may be true
generally, the theme of old age is so prevalent in the Laws that I believe Plato uses
this term to signify older in time.
40. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b2-4, Physics 184aff.
41. This approach raises a general interpretative problem: is Plato's cosmology simply
an exposition of his psychology, or is his psychology to be seen as derivative from his
cosmology? Brill and Pangle both stress that the cosmology of the Laws is deployed for
psychological purposes. This point can be pressed too hard if it implies that Platonic
cosmology is at its core rhetoric, and it faces, at the opposite end of the spectrum
a danger of lapsing into a neo-Kantian position, which holds that the nature of the
(human) mind legislates to qsúaic;, a position that my interpretation ñirts with. It
seems correct to me, however, to assert that various psychological attitudes carry
within themselves a corresponding cosmological viewpoint and that addressing this
viewpoint is an important element of legislation, as Brill clearly points out.
42. "The role of theology in Plato's Laws," 132.
43. See also Philebus 28el-2 where Protarchus appeals to piety in supporting the view
that the cosmos is orderly.
44. In Plato's Cretan City (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), 482-3,
Morrow notes that the Athenian may be referring here to the theories of Eudoxus
of Cnidos and that the Athenian leaves out the specifics so as not to puzzle Kleinias
and Megülus. England on 822a4, following Ritter, notes that some commentators
believe that this passage indicates that by the time of the writing of the Laws Plato
discovered that the earth rotated on its axis every twenty-four hours.
45. Translation adapted from Cooper, Plato: Complete Works.
46. I would like to offer my thanks to Anthony Preus, Randy Scholtz, and Robert Guay
for working through the Greek text of Laws 10 with me a few summers ago. I am
also grateful to Sara Brul for several helpful conversations about Plato's approach to
legislation in the Laws and to Tamsin Trelawny-Cassity for comments on this essay.
Comments from an anonymous reviewer for Epoche were very helpful in improving
the clarity of my conclusion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benardete, Seth. 1986. Plato's Statesman (Chicago: University ofChicago Press).

2000. Plato's Laws: The Discovery ofBeing {Chicago: University ofChicago Press).
348 Lewis Meek Trelawny-Cassity

Bobonich, Christopher. 2002. Plato's Utopia Recast (Oxford: Claredon Press).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251436.001.0001
, ed. 2010. P/afo'sIflws.-ilCnízcfl/GMíííe (New York: Cambridge University Press).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781483
Bodéüs, Richard. 2000. Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals (Albany: State
University of New York Press).
Brill, Sara. 2010. "Psychology and Legislation in Plato's Laws','Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 26:211 -42.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-90000126 !
Burnet, John. 1900-1907. Pteon/s Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Carone, Gabriela. 2005. Plato's Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press). http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511734915
Chantraine, Pierre. 1977. Dictionnaire étymologique de langue grecques (Paris: Les Édi-
tions Klincksieck).
Cleary, John. 1995. Aristotle and Mathematics: Aporetic Method in Cosmology and Meta-
physics (Leiden: Brill).
2001. "The Role of Theology in Plato's Laws," in Lisi 2001:125-40.
Cooper, John, ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett).
England, E. B. 1921. The Laws of Plato (Manchester: University of Manchester Press).
Gerson, Lloyd. 1990. God and Greek Philosophy (New York: Routledge).
Gregory, Andrew. 2003."Eudoxus,Callippus and the Astronomy of the Timaeus','in Sharpies
and Sheppard 2003: 5-28.
Helmig, Christoph. 2003. "'Die Bedeutung und Funktion von ÉTtcpôii in Platons Nomoi^
in Scolnicov and Brisson 2003.
Kaiser, Otto. 2003."Gott und Mensch als Gesetzgeber in Platons Nomoi" in Zwischen Athen
UKii/er«5öZe/« (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110907049
Lisi, Francisco, ed. 2001. Plato's Laws and Its Historical Significance: Selected Papers of
the International Congress on Ancient Thought (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag).
Mayhew, Robert. 2008. Plato: Laws 10 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2010. "The Theology of the Laws" in Bobonich 2010: 197-216.
Menn,Stephen. 1995.Plato on GodasNous (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press).
Morrow, Glenn. 1960. Plato's Cretan City (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).
Naddaf, Gregory. 2004. "Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology," International Studies in
Philosophy 36:1:103-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphu20043616
Ostenfeld, Erik. 1993."The Physicality of God in the Politicus Myth and in the Later Dia-
logues," Classica Et Mediaevalia 44: 77-95.
Pangle, Thomas L. 1976. "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws," The
American Political Science Review 70: 1059-77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1959374
1980. The Laws of Plato (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Sallis,John. 1999. Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press).
2008. The Verge of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
On the Foundation of Theology in Plato's Laws 349

Scolnicov, Samuel, and L. Brisson, eds. 2003. Plato's Laws: From Theory to Practice (Sankt
Augustin: Academia Verlag).
Sedley, David. 2007. Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity (Berkeley: University of
California Press).
Sharpies, R.W. 2003."Threefold Providence: The History and Background of a Doctrine,"
in Sharpies and Sheppard 2003:107-27.
Sharpies, R.W., and A. Sheppard, eds. 2003. AnaewíApproflc/íesfoPZflíosrzwzfleiis (London:
Institute of Classical Studies).
Strauss, Leo. 1975. The Argument and Action of Plato's Laws (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press).
Zuckert, Catherine. 2009.Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press).http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226993386.001.0001
2011. "Socrates and Timaeus: Two Platonic Paradigms of Philosophy," £poc/ze
15: 331 -60. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5840/epoche201015232
Copyright of Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy is the property of Philosophy
Documentation Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users
may print, download, or email articles for individual use.