FIRST DIVISION

[GR No. L-163. April 27, 1946.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee , vs.

MAXIMO APLEGIDO, RAYMUNDO CARRERA and FELIX
PENASO, defendants. RAYMUNDO CARRERA , appellant .

Mr. Mariano A. Albert representing the appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Kapunan, Jr. and Attorney General Bautista

representing the Government.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; LACK OF IDENTITY OR

COMMUNITY OF PURPOSE AMONG THE ATTACKERS; INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITY; CASE AT TIMES. — There is no proof that the three accused,
including the appellant, in the acts of successive aggression that they carried out
against CP, had previously agreed to attack and kill him, or even that they had agreed
to do so during the course of the fight. What, on the contrary, appears clear in the
case is that each aggressor carried out the attack independently of the other, as it
occurred to him instantly, without doing that joint work ( team work ) that would
denote a conspiracy and a joint tactic of aggression. It is also clear from the record
that the fatal injuries were inflicted by the accused MA and FP. In cases of this
nature, it is firmly established jurisprudence that each aggressor is individually
responsible for his acts, to the degree and extent of his personal participation.
"Simultaneity and conjunction in the attack is not enough; identity or community of
purpose between the aggressors is necessary."
2. ID.; ID.; PROOF OF CONSPIRACY. — Conspiracy, concert or common
criminal purpose must be established by positive and conclusive evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; DEFINITION OF "ACCOMPLICE." — According to article 17
of the Revised Penal Code , the following are considered authors of the crime: (1)
those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force
or induce others to execute it; (3) those who cooperate in the execution of the act by
an act without which it would not have been carried out. Accomplices are those who,
not being included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the act by previous or
simultaneous acts. VIada gives this comprehensive definition: "An accomplice to a
crime is anyone who cooperates in its execution by prior or simultaneous acts,
provided that he has not taken a direct part in said execution, nor has he directly
forced or induced others to execute it, or has cooperated in its execution by an
indispensable act, because if one or the other of these circumstances existed, he
would no longer be an accomplice but a perpetrator ." From what has been said it
can be inferred that complicity implies a certain participation in the will or purpose
generating the crime, since to cooperate means to desire or want something in
common. But this common will or purpose does not necessarily mean prior
intelligence , as the defense attorney asserts, since it can be explained or extracted
from the circumstances of each case.

DECISION

BRIONES , M. . p

This is the appeal filed by Raymundo Carrera against the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo in which he is sentenced for homicide, as co-author,
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years, and one (1) day of
imprisonment greater than fourteen (14) years, seven (7) months and one (1) day of
temporary confinement, jointly in the sum of P2,000, with the accessories of law,
and to pay the costs of the trial. His co-defendants Maximino Aplegido and Felix
Penaso were justly sentenced, but these last two have not appealed the sentence,
choosing to accept it.
The following facts have been established beyond all doubt, according to the
appellant's own court-appointed attorney:
At about 5 p.m. on July 30, 1944, Maximino Aplegido, who was selling
mangoes and sweets outside a cockfighting ring, had a fight with Silverio Esgana,
because the latter, annoyed at not getting his way in the bargaining over the price of
the mangoes, kicked the basket that contained them, scattering them on the floor.
Outraged by this behavior, Maximino gave Silverio a knife blow to the left side of
the chest. Being unarmed, Silverio ran away, but having come across a man who
was carrying a sickle, he seized it and returned to where Maximino was, wounding
him in the face with the sickle and immediately escaping. Maximino, more furious,
pursued Silverio, whom he managed to catch and stabbed him in the back.
At this juncture Canuto Prudente, Silverio's father-in-law, arrived on the
scene and took part in the fight to help his son-in-law. Then, without further ado,
Felix Penaso, Maximino's nephew and like him a mango seller and peddler, took
Canuto Prudente into his own hands, hitting him on the back of the head with a club
commonly called a "caborrata ." It was at this precise moment that the appellant,
Raymundo Carrera, also a peddler, entered the scene, presumably to help his fellow
peddlers, attacking Canuto with a cockfighting knife, causing a wound of about an
inch in length near the right elbow. Afterwards, Felix Penaso hit Canuto Prudente
again with the club on the right cheek and forehead, as a result of which Canuto fell
to the ground. At this point Maximino finished off the attack by stabbing Canuto in
the stomach, who died moments later that same afternoon.
The district nurse who examined the body found a large wound on the right
forehead, about an inch in diameter; another large wound on the right cheek, about
half an inch in diameter; and another large wound on the right side of the head, also
about an inch in diameter. These three wounds were inflicted by the accused Felix
Penaso with a blunt instrument. The nurse also found two other wounds caused by
a sharp weapon: a large one below the left nipple, about three inches in length,
inflicted by the accused Maximino Aplegido, and another on the outside of the right
arm, near the elbow, about an inch in length, inflicted by the appellant.
The appellant's defense in the first instance was that of an alibi, but his court-
appointed attorney on appeal has abandoned that defense and admits the appellant's
presence and participation in the fight that culminated in the homicide in question.
But to what degree was that participation and what is the liability resulting from it?
Is the lower court's sentence condemning the appellant as a co-author correct? Both
the prosecution and the defense agree that SS the sentencing judge erred in assessing
the facts and the law applicable to them. It is evident from the evidence that the fight
that led to the death of the deceased occurred unexpectedly, without any prior or
formed agreement at the time between the actors to commit the homicide
complained of. It is also evident from the evidence that the appellant's only
intervention was reduced to a stab (with a fighting cock's knife) that caused a wound
to the right arm of the deceased, near the elbow, that could not have had serious
consequences. There is no evidence that the three accused, including the appellant,
in the acts of successive aggression that they carried out against Canuto Prudente,
had previously agreed to attack and kill him, or even that they agreed to do so during
the course of the fight. What, on the contrary, appears clear in the records is that
each aggressor carried out the attack independently of the other, as it occurred to
him instantly, without doing that joint work ( team work ) that would denote a
conspiracy and a joint tactic of aggression. It also appears clear in the records that
the fatal wounds were inflicted by the accused Maximino Aplegido and Felix
Penaso. In cases of this nature, it is firmly established jurisprudence that each
aggressor is individually responsible for his acts, to the degree and extent of his
personal participation. "Simultaneity or community of purpose among the
aggressors is not sufficient" ( People v. Caballero , 53 Jr. Phil., 623, 634, citing
several decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain; People v. Tamayo , 44 Jr. Phil.,
40; United States v. Solis , 4 Jur. Phil., 180). And conspiracy, concert, or common
criminal purpose must be established by positive and conclusive evidence ( People
v. Ancheta , 66 Phil., 638; Lawyers Journal , March 15, 1939).
Having established that the appellant is not a co-author of the homicide, the
defence and the prosecution disagree, however, in their assessment of his criminal
responsibility, the former considering him guilty merely of injuries, slight or less
serious, while the prosecution considers him an accomplice. In these cases, the
boundary dividing the criminal responsibility of the participants in the aggression is
so tenuous, so subtle that it is sometimes very difficult to highlight it. It is not
possible to establish a priori , fixed and inflexible norms. The safest thing is to
carefully examine the circumstances of each case and outline with them the contours
of each responsibility.
According to article 17 of our Revised Penal Code , the authors of the crime
are considered to be (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2)
those who directly force or induce others to execute it; (3) those who cooperate in
the execution of the act by an act without which it would not have been carried out.
Accomplices are those who, not being included in article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the act by previous or simultaneous acts. Viada gives this
comprehensive definition: "An accomplice of a crime is the one who cooperates in
its execution by previous or simultaneous acts, provided that he has not taken a direct
part in said execution, nor has he directly forced or induced others to execute it, nor
has he cooperated in its execution by an indispensable act, because if one or the
other of these circumstances existed, he will no longer be an accomplice but an
author ."
From the above it can be inferred that complicity implies a certain
participation in the will or purpose that generated the crime, since to cooperate
means to desire or want something in common. But this will or common purpose
does not necessarily mean prior understanding , as the defense attorney asserts,
since it can be explained or extracted from the circumstances of each case. Let us
apply, for example, the complicity to the case at hand. It is unquestionable that the
appellant did not have a prior agreement with his co-defendants to attack and kill
Canuto Prudente. It is evident that the bloody fight was the result of a sudden and
momentary altercation, resulting from haggling over the price of the sleeves and
provoked by the kick that Silverio Esgana gave to the basket in which they were
placed, scattering them on the floor. But it is also unquestionable that the appellant
participated to a certain extent in the common homicidal will, as can be deduced
from the following circumstances: (1) the appellant was also a peddler and dealer in
sleeves like his co-defendants, so he would have felt drawn into the fight by
something like esprit de corps or class; (2) the appellant was present from the
beginning of the fight; he saw or had occasion to see that his co-defendants were
equipped with effective weapons to kill, one with a truncheon ( caborrata ), and the
other with a dagger; He saw or had occasion to see when the accused Penaso struck
Prudente with the club on the back of the head, leaving him stunned and staggering;
so when at this point in the fight the appellant intervened with the blow with the
knife mentioned above, he knew very well that the outcome of the fight was to the
death, that his co-accused were shooting to kill (perhaps he himself was also
shooting to kill), and that, given all the circumstances, the violent death of the
adversary could be the eventual result of the fight; (3) It is true that the wound
produced by the appellant was not mortal—and therefore, his responsibility is only
that of an accomplice—nevertheless, said wound could have weakened the defenses
of the murderer and thus contributed to the fatal result, that is, his death. Here, then,
is a case in which there was no prior agreement or intelligence to commit murder,
but the participation in the common murderous purpose was interwoven by the very
circumstances of the case.
The appellant's attorney cites, in support of his thesis, some cases from our
criminal jurisprudence, among which the most typical and the most similar to the
one he occupies is undoubtedly the case of the United States against Magcomot (13
Jur. Fil., 392), under the report of the distinguished Judge Mr. Mapa. However, from
a simple reading of the report it is clear that the facts in that case are substantially
different from those that make up the one we are dealing with. In that case the
accused were a certain Epifanio Magcomot and his sons Clemente and Isidro.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, these last two quarreled in a game of
"monte" with a man named Bonifacio Gabales, and while they were holding him,
Epifanio suddenly and unexpectedly arrived, coming from quite far away, and with
a Flemish knife attacked and wounded Bonifacio, as a result of which he died.
Clemente and Isidro did not inflict any wounds on the deceased. The sentencing
judge found the three accused guilty of murder as perpetrators, but this Court
overturned the sentence, absolving the children and imputing responsibility
exclusively to the father. The illustrious rapporteur, reasoning the ruling, makes the
following considerations:
"The arrival of this person there was completely accidental and
unexpected and he attacked so suddenly, so quickly according to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, that they probably could not have
prevented it even if their co-defendants had wanted to, and it is also possible
that they would not have even noticed the attack until after it had been
carried out, given the unexpectedness and suddenness of it and the darkness
of the night, busy as they were in restraining the deceased at that moment.
Taking into account all the circumstances of the case, we are convinced that
said attack was executed without the will, which is the primary basis of all
criminal responsibility, there are no suitable terms to make those responsible
for said attack and its consequences, without hindering that the acts of
violence executed by them and the death of the deceased were simultaneous,
because simultaneity does not necessarily prove by itself the concert of
wills, or the unity of action and purpose. generators of collective
responsibility, and without which it is strictly fair, based on good principles
of law, that each person should be individually responsible only for that
which he himself has executed. ( United States v. Magcomot , 13 Jur. Fil.,
pp. 392, 395).
As seen above, the evidence in the present case shows that when the appellant
and the defendant were well into it, Maximino Aplegido had already hit the deceased
with the baton on the back of the head, causing him to stagger. It was at this precise
moment that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the right arm, near the elbow, and
then Aplegido stabbed him below the left nipple. From these facts it is evident not
only that there was a certain correlation in the acts of aggression of the accused, but
above all that the appellant was or should have been aware of the attitude of his co-
accused, a circumstance that was lacking in the aforementioned Magcomot case.
We have examined the precedents cited by the Attorney General in his
argument and we consider the most pertinent and applicable to be the case of Pueblo
v. Cortes (55 Jur. Fil., 152). We adhere to what was declared and decided in that
case, and in addition to the judgments of the Supreme Court of Spain cited therein,
we believe that the following may also be cited in support of the doctrine reaffirmed
here.
"As a result of a dispute between the deceased and the defendants,
the latter began to beat him with blows and one of them took out a knife
from the stab in his stomach, which caused his death a few hours later.
 Should the defendants who only beat and mistreated the deceased, but
without injuring him, be considered accomplices to this murder? The
Supreme Court has resolved in the affirmative, based on the fact that the
facts set forth, practiced by the said defendants, cannot but consider them as
accomplices to the murder, because they were simultaneous to it and
contributed to depriving the victim of strength and means of defense,
making it possible and even easy for the main aggressor to do what he might
not otherwise have been able to do. (Judgment of May 24, 1879, Gazettes
of August 9 and 10.)
"Whoever, having taken part in a dispute or dispute between a
companion of his and the deceased, upon meeting him knocks him to the
ground, in which situation his companion kicks him in the head, causing his
death, shall be liable as an accomplice to the murder committed? - The
Supreme Court has resolved in the affirmative: 'Considering that no error
has been committed with respect to the participation of accomplice
attributed by the court to the accused Manuel Callejo, since appearing and
taking part in the disputes that they had with the deceased and his
companions that night, and finally knocking him to the ground, in which
situation Victoriano Vela kicked him in the head, as a result of which he
died, there is no doubt that he cooperated in the murder taking place by
previous and simultaneous acts, and, consequently, not being included in the
cases of article 13 of the Penal Code to consider him the author, the
provisions of 15, etc., are applicable,' (Judgment of July 6 of 1881, Gazette
of September 15.)" (2 Viada, 5th edition , pages 430, 431.)
We conclude, therefore, that the appellant is liable as an accomplice, and
applying Article 52 in conjunction with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code , as
well as the provisions of the law on indeterminate sentencing, we sentence him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, nor more than eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
The appellant is also sentenced to compensate the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500. With this modification, the appealed judgment is confirmed in all other
respects. So ordered.
Moran, Pres. Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, and Pablo, MM., are in agreement.
(El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Aplegido, G.R. No. L-163, (27 April 1946), 76 Phil 571-580)