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Routledge Critical Assessments o f Classical A uthors
Forthcoming:
Virgil
Edited by P.R. Hardie
Greek Tragedy
Edited by Katerina Zacharia
HOMER
Critical Assessments
VOLUME IV
Homer’s Art
ROUTLEDGE
Acknowledgements vii
C. Characters 185
83. Preface to his Translation of the Iliad A. Pope 187
84. The Untypical Hero W.B. Stanford 190
85. Agamemnon in the Iliad A.M. van Erp Taalman Kip 206
vi Contents
The editor gratefully acknowledges the following who have kindly given
permission to reprint articles in this volume:
While every effort has been made to contact copyright holders of material
used in this volume, the editor and publisher would be grateful to hear from
any they were unable to contact.
A. The Singer and his Muse
71_____________________________________________________
Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung*
F. Schiller
Die Dichter sind überall, schon ihrem Begriffe nach, die Bewahrer der
Natur. Wo sie dieses nicht ganz mehr sein können und schon in sich selbst
den zerstörenden Einfluß willkürlicher und künstlicher Formen erfahren
oder doch m it demselben zu kämpfen gehabt haben, da werden sie als die
Zeugen und als die Rächer der Natur auftreten. Sie werden entweder Natur
sein y oder sie werden die verlorene suchen. Daraus entspringen zwei ganz
verschiedene Dichtungsweisen, durch welche das ganze Gebiet der Poesie
erschöpft und ausgemessen wird. Alle Dichter, die es wirklich sind, werden,
je nachdem die Zeit beschaffen ist, in der sie blühen, oder zufällige-
Umstände auf ihre allgemeine Bildung und auf ihre vorübergehende
Gemütsstimmung Einfluß haben, entweder zu den naiven oder zu den
sentimentalischen gehören.
Der Dichter einer naiven und geistreichen Jugendwelt, sowie derjenige,
der in den Zeitaltern künstlicher Kultur ihm am nächsten kommt, ist
streng und spröde, wie die jungfräuliche Diana in ihren Wäldern, ohne
alle Vertraulichkeit entflieht er dem Herzen, das ihn sucht, dem Verlangen,
das ihn umfassen will. Die trockne Wahrheit, womit er den Gegenstand
behandelt, erscheint nicht selten als Unempfindlichkeit. Das Objekt besitzt
ihn gänzlich, sein Herz liegt nicht wie ein schlechtes Metall gleich unter
der Oberfläche, sondern will wie das Gold in der Tiefe gesucht sein. Wie die
Gottheit hinter dem Weltgebäude, so steht er hinter seinem Werk; er ist
das Werk, und das Werk ist er; man muß des erstem schon nicht wert oder
nicht mächtig oder schon satt sein, um nach ihm nur zu fragen.
So zeigt sich z. B. Homer unter den Alten und Shakespeare unter den
Neuern; zwei höchst verschiedene, durch den unermeßlichen Abstand der
Zeitalter getrennte Naturen, aber gerade in diesem Charakterzuge völlig
eins. Als ich in einem sehr frühen Alter den letztem Dichter zuerst ken
nenlernte, empörte mich seine Kälte, seine Unempfindlichkeit, die ihm
erlaubte, im höchsten Pathos zu scherzen, die herzzerschneidenden Auftritte
4 Homer's A r t
Und nun der alte Homer! Kaum erfährt Diomed aus Glaukus, seines
Gegners, Erzählung, daß dieser von Väterzeiten her ein Gastfreund seines
Geschlechts ist, so steckt er die Lanze in die Erde, redet freundlich mit ihm
und macht mit ihm aus, daß sie einander im Gefechte künftig ausweichen
wollen. Doch man höre den Homer selbst:
Anmerkung
^Source: Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars.
Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1963, pp. 21-34.
The Odyssey represents a rather different world.1 The differences between the
Iliad and Odyssey cannot be accounted for by the différence in subject matter
alone, because the very choice of subject, that is, the fact that the poet of the
Odyssey combined the theme of the homecoming hero with sailors’ tales and
adventure stories, implies an interest in such stories not found in the Iliad. If
we may interpret the new spirit of the Odyssey as a manifestation of a new era,
it was bound to influence the poet’s idea of his rôle and his concept of poetry.
It is only in rather general terms that one can assume a 'unity of the world of
epic';2 looking more closely, we can see the differences so clearly that we can
neither apply the Iliads notion of the poet’s rôle to the Odyssey, nor assume
that ideas found in the younger poem are already applicable to the Iliad?
Seeing that already in the description of Achilles’ Shield (Σ 604) the
singer is called ‘divine’ (θειος), we may believe that his craft had for a long
time been highly respected and honoured in accordance with his rôle in
society. His social standing cannot have changed much, for in the Odyssey,
too, singers are highly respected. When Agamemnon left for Troy, he
entrusted Klytaimestra to the care of a bard (γ 267), and the singer who
performs at the wedding of Menelaos’ children is called ‘divine’ (δ 17), as
are Phemios (π 252, ψ 133, 143), and Demodokos (Θ 43, V 27). Demodokos
in particular is honoured among the Phaiacians (Θ 472); at table he is given
a large piece of meat at Odysseus’ request, who explains:
For with all peoples upon the earth singers are entitled
to be cherished and to their share of respect, since the Muse has taught them
her own way, and since she loves all· the company of singers.
πασι γάρ άνθρώ ποισ ιν επ ιχ θ ο ν ίο ισ ιν αοιδοί
τιμής εμμοροί είσ ι καί αίδοϋς, οΰνεκ άρα σ φ εας
οϊμας Μ ουσ έδίδα ξε, φ ίλ η σ ε δε φυλον άοιδών.
(θ 479-81)
The Singer a n d his Muse 1
Yec as the Phaiacians are a blessed fairy-tale tribe, their bard is also an
idealized figure; several hints in the Odyssey suggest that in reality the bards
often had to struggle with bitter hardship.4 Phemios - the only other bard
whose name we are told: a telling name, like that of his father, Terpios
(X 330) - is much worse off than Demodokos; he sings for the suitors only
under compulsion (χ 35Iff., a 154), and he escapes Odysseus5 wrath only
through Telemachos5 intervention. That is, of course, an exceptional situa
tion. More characteristic of the bards5 social prestige is Eumaios5 statement
(p 38Iff.) that they are δ η μ ιο ερ γο ί (‘professionals’) like seers, doctors,
builders, in other words ail those not normally represented in the self-
sufficient Homeric household and therefore κ λ η το ί (Tor hire5), that is,
whose services could be hired publicly and for payment when required.5
More important than the bards’ social conditions is the question why the
Odyssey, unlike the Iliad, speaks so much about them. One factor may be
that in the more ‘bourgeois’ world of the Odysseyy it is not only the aristo
crats but also the common people such as shepherds and servants who come
into focus. But that would not fully account for the difference. Rather, the
author presents what matters to him personally.6 To him, his own social
position and his craft matter much more than they did to the author of the
Iliad. He sees himself even less than the latter as a mere instrument of the
Muses; in the Odyssey, poetic composition is beginning to be seen as an
autonomous intellectual activity. This is suggested, for one thing, by the
absence of invocations to the Muses, apart from the conventional proem.
The Ilias parva goes even further: Ί sing Ilion and Dardanos5 land of fine
horses5 ("Ιλιον αείδω κ α ι Δ αρδανίην έύπωλον). Although the poet’s
talent is granted by god (Θ 44, 498), by the Muses or Apollon who have
‘taught’ him (Θ 481, 488), and the Muse ‘urges’ him (άνήκεν, Θ 73) to
sing, yet his song itself no longer needs their help, he sings ‘as the thought
drives him5 (οππη οί νόος ορνυται, α 347), as the spirit moves him to
singing5(οππη θυμός έπο τρ ύ νη σ ιν ά είδ ειν, θ 45). In the Odyssey we also
find people who speak with real pride of their own achievements and show
awareness of their own abilities. Thus Phemios is equally proud of having
been ‘self-taught’ (αυτοδίδακτος) and of having had various ‘ways’ of song
(Οίμας, x 347) implanted in his mind by a god. For him, there is no
contradiction between the divine gift and his own ability,7 since the latter
presupposes the former, the talented minstrel sings ‘from the gods5 (θεών
εξ, p 518). On the other hand, he is evidently proud of his own creative
power.8
This idea, which was to find such magnificent expression later in choral
lyric poetry, appears first in the Odyssey. It is very telling because in other
respects, too, there is much more emphasis on personal achievement as well
as on personal failure. Odysseus5 companions perish ‘by their own wild
recklessness’'(αύτών . . . σ φ ετέρ η σ ιν ά τα σ θα λίη σ ιν, α 7) - not through
the ‘will of Zeus5 (Δίός βουλή), as the proem to the Iliad had said.
8 Homer's A r t
Accordingly, Zeus says in the gods’ first meeting: O h for shame, how the
mortals put the blame upon us gods! For they say evils come from us, but it
is they, rather, who by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what was
given’ (oi δέ και αυτοί σφήσιν άτασθαλχησιν υπέρ μόρον αλγε3
εχουσ ιν, α 32ffi). The suitors, too, perish because of their own transgres
sions and misdeeds - as Penelope says: ‘So they suffered for their own
recklessness’ (τφ δι ατασθαλίας επαθον κακόν, ψ 67). However, it is
not only their mistakes that mortals are accountable for; while in general it
is true in the Odyssey as well as in the Iliad that decisive motivations and
ideas are inspired by gods, yet on occasion there can be a notion that an idea
may come from one’s own ‘m ind’ (θυμός). Thus, when Penelope asks why
Telemachos went to Pylos, Medon replies: Ί do not know whether some god
moved him, or whether his own mind had the impulse to go’ (Ô 712f.).9
In addition to a greater awareness of the individual’s intellectual activity
and achievement, there is also a new appreciation of intellectual abilities
which seem responsible for the Odyssey %stronger interest in bards and their
craft. While in the Iliady too, good advice and a fitting comment are
acclaimed (for instance, Nestor is highly respected on account of both
and Odysseus’ standing epithet is ‘equal of Zeus in counsel’, Διί μήτιν
ατάλαντος, B 169, 407, 636, K 137 - cp. v 89 - , Γ 2Û0ff. and 2l6ff.),
these phrases refer nearly always10 to battles: a clever idea is significant only
insofar as it proves useful for the fight. By contrast, in the Odyssey cleverness
is seen as an independent value in its own right. Odysseus himself, the
versatile’,11 is the most telling example of this. Even Kalypso admires his
cleverness:
You are so naughty, and you will have your own way in all things.
See how you have spoken to me and reason with me.
ή δή άλιτρός γ3έσσι και ούκ άποφώλια ειδώς*
οΐον δή τον μύθον επεφράσθης αγορεύσαχ.
(ε 182-3)
His pride and his fame rest on his devious cleverness. When he is ship
wrecked and tossed about in the waves, Athena gives him not μένος
(strength and energy) but επί φροσόνη (forethought, 8 437).
It is the wise, bright-eyed goddess herself who tells Odysseus most clearly
what they both have in common: he possesses ‘intimately’, πεδόθεν,
dissimulation and trickery, and as he is the best among men ‘in counsel
and words’ (βουλή και μύθοχσιν), so is she among the gods (v 291ff). It is
because Odysseus is so clever that she helps him:
relevant. N ot to all men had god given the gifts of charm5, χαρίεντα, such
as ‘stature, brains or eloquence5 (φυή, φρένες, άγορητύς). For one man
may be inconspicuous to look at,
but the god puts comeliness on his words, and they who look toward him
are filled with joy at the sight, and he speaks to them without faltering
in winning modesty, and shines among those who are gathered,
and people look on him as on a god when he walks in the city.
άλλα θεός μορφήν επεσι στέφει, οί δέ τ ές αυτόν
τερπόμενοι λευσσουσιν* ο δ'άσφαλέως αγορεύει
αιδοί μειλιχίη, μετά δέ πρέπει άγρομένοισιν,
ερχόμενον δ* άνά άστυ θεόν ώς εισορόωσιν.
(θ 170-73)
However, when Menelaos erects an empty tomb for his murdered brother
‘so that his fame might be ever-lasting’ (ιν’άσβεστον κλέος εϊη, δ 584),
or when the shadow of the quite insignificant Elpenor asks for the same
favour ‘so that those to come will know of me’ (καί έσσομένοισι πυθέσ-
θαΐ, λ 76), this could be seen as an indication that the concept of ‘fame’ is
beginning to fade.16
Also, what is praised is no longer the old war-like valour. Odysseus
himself takes pride in his ‘tricks’ (δόλοΐ), and his fame reaches the sky (l
20, cp. i 281, τ 203, Autolykos τ 396). He is so proud of them that he asks
the bard to sing to the Phaiacians his trick with the Wooden Horse (Θ
492ff.). Another ‘trick’ is Hephaistos’ net in the tale of Ares and Aphrodite,
which Demodokos had recited before. Such are now the contents of songs
and the objects of praise (κλείειν), this is what the audience enjoy (Θ
367ffi). Glory that reaches the sky is earned not only by the bravery or
intelligence of heroes, but even by the song itself, which is another indica
tion of the poet’s self-esteem: in Demodokos’ first appearance (Θ 73ff), the
Muse drives him
The same words are addressed to Alkinoos by Odysseus who adds that he
cannot think of anything more pleasant than to listen to a bard during a
banquet (l 3—11)-1
In the Iliad, too, the song to entertain the guests was a regular part of a
banquet. W hat is new in the Odyssey is the exuberant joy expressed again and
again by the listeners, on hearing nor only festive songs but stories generally,
and this may well be a characteristic feature of the younger poem. Thus,
Telemachos says to Menelaos who had told him about his journeys, that he
could easily stay and go on listening for a whole year without feeling homesick.
When Odysseus enquires after Eumaios’ fate, he replies: ‘Stranger, since you
are asking me, listen carefully, in silence, enjoy yourself and drink’:
These nights are endless, and a man can sleep through them,
or he can enjoy listening to stones, and you have no need
to go to bed before it is time. Too much sleep is only a bore.
αϊδε δέ νύκτες άθέσφατον εστι μέν ευδειν,
εστι δέ τερπομένοισιν άκοόειν ουδέ τί σε χρή,
πριν ώρη, καταλέχθαν άνίη γάρ πολύς ύπνος.
(ο 392-4)
How deeply Eumaios had been impressed by Odysseus’ tales becomes clear
when he later reports to Penelope about these nights: the stories that man is
telling, her heart would be bewitched by them! He has hosted him for three
days and three nights, and he still has not come to the end of his account:
Here, too, as in λ 368, Odysseus is compared to a bard; this time the point
of comparison is the effect of the ‘words’ (έπεα): it is ‘enchantment’
(θέλγειν). The listeners, spellbound, look at the bard, eager to continue
listening, they are completely fascinated.
This, too, is an entirely new concept, and peculiar to the Odyssey. Accord-
ing to the Iliad, song creates ‘enjoyment’, τέρπειν — there is no hint of
‘enchantment’. In the Iliade θέλγειν is always done by gods, and VÓOV
θέλγειν means ‘to make unconscious’ (O 594, M 255).20
In Iliad Ξ 215, Aphrodite’s girdle is a ‘charm’ (θελκτήριον). In the
Odyssey, by contrast, mortals, too, can ‘bewitch’; for example Aigisthos
bewitched Klytaimestra (γ 264), Penelope the suitors (σ 212, 282);
Eumaios does not wish to be beguiled by Odysseus’ lies (ξ 387) and
Penelope calls Phemi os’ songs θελκτήρια - understandably, for she is so
shaken by what Phemios has just sung that she can hardly control herself.21
The way in which several passages in the Odyssey (cp., in particular, T
204ff.) highlight the lively interest shown by the audience for a song is
significant.22 Odysseus, like Penelope, is unable to conceal his emotion, he
is in tears and hides his face (Θ 83—92), indeed he has been sobbing
continuously during Demodokos’ performance (Θ 5 39—41), while the Phaia-
cians enjoy the song and urge the singer on (Θ 90—1). True, the reason why
Penelope and Odysseus are so deeply upset by the songs about the Achaians’
homecoming is, naturally, because this subject is so closely linked to their
own fate; yet it affects not only them: the Phaiacians, too, are captivated by
Odysseus’ narrative, they listen in silence, spellbound, ‘bewitched’, as we
are told twice:
This implies that the song casts a spell over all those who are eagerly
listening, and not just over those who are personally affected; as Archilochos
later puts it: ‘Anyone who . . . is enchanted by songs’, κ η λ ε ιτ α ι (κηλω ται
pap.: Kemke) δ’ οτις [ . . . ] ων α οιδα ΐς (fr. 253 W.).
The close link between the enchanting effect of poetry and the passionate
desire to listen to stories which characters in the Odyssey display on many
occasions is impressively illustrated by the story of the Sirens. They bewitch
all mortals with their ‘clear song’, they lure Odysseus by saying that nobody
has been able to sail past them without listening to their ‘honey-sweet
voices’,
The Singer a n d his Muse 15
Surprisingly, the power of their song is not based on magic; they do not
promise Odysseus anything miraculous, nor any magic formula, but joy and
greater knowledge. As the Muses in the Iliad (B 485), being present
everywhere, know everything and pass it on to the poet, so here the Sirens
know everything that happened at Troy and is happening on the vast earth
- and this is what Odysseus wants to hear; he is so keen on it that his
companions have to tighten his bonds even more strongly (μ 196). So it is
knowledge that mortals so keenly desire,./though it is knowledge of a
particular kind. For from the narrator’s viewpoint, it is knowledge of very
recent events or even, as with the Sirens, of contemporary events. Whereas
in the Iliad heroes sometimes relate episodes in their lives which had mostly
happened quite some time before, the characters of the Odyssey want to hear
of the most recent events. This is precisely why the suitors, to Penelope’s
grief, demand the song of the homecoming (νόστος) of the Achaians:
The audience wants the ‘newest song’; this evidently refers to the content
alone: the epic poet is not concerned about the form.
Just as keen on news as his audience is Odysseus himself, ‘who saw the
cities of many peoples and learnt their way of thinking’ (a 3), who again and
again wants to find out ‘what people may be like’ (οίτινες άνέρες εΐεν, ι
89, 174, K 101; cp. K 110, 147). So eager to know is he that he enters the
Cyclops’ cave rashly, risking his companions’ lives and his own, deaf to their
entreaties to turn back — just to see that brute himself, ‘and whether he
16 Homer's A r i
m ight give me presents’ (l 229), in other words, out of curiosity and greed.
For the same reasons, his companions open Aiolos’ bag (K 44—5). W hen
Odysseus meets Aias’ shadow in Hades, who keeps apart, silent in his proud
resentment, he m ight yet have spoken to him ,
for all too right following the tale you sing the Achaians’
venture, all they did and had done to them, all the sufferings
of these Achaians, as if you had been there yourself or heard it
from one who was.
The Singer a n d his Muse 17
Demodokos has reported ‘in order’, κατά κόσμον, as if he had himself been
present or heard from another (sc. who had been there, that is, from an eye
witness).26 At one point, Odysseus explicitly names his source for some
thing which he could not otherwise have known:
So, above all else the narrative has to be truthful, and its truth is of a quite
pragmatic kind: ‘this is how it happened’. Whoever reports reliably, accu
rately and objectively earns the highest praise, as Demodokos does, and we
need not hesitate to attribute this view to the poet himself and his audience.
To ask how this claim to truthfulness is to be reconciled with the fairy-tale
narratives, or whether the poet expected his audience to accept the Kirke story
or the visit to Hades at face-value, would; be anachronistically modern. Thé
transitions from the sphere of ‘realistic’ travelogues to that of miracles and
fairy-tales (and vice versa) are fluid and almost imperceptible. How closely
these two spheres are interwoven can best be seen in the Sirens’ episode. These
fantastic creatures, as fascinating as they are terrifying, promise very tangible
knowledge; this means that the miraculous is still, up to a point, accepted as
real, and reality appears, conversely, dressed up as fantasy. The critical spirit of
enlightenment, its scepticism and rationalism have not yet stirred; as soon as
it does, criticism of Homer’s lies’ is voiced, too. But the audience of the
Odyssey still listens with equal fascination to fairy-tales and adventures as well
as to historical, geographical and ethnographical accounts.
Summing up the results of the individual interpretations and looking at
the Homeric epics as a whole from the perspective of our investigation, we
see a rather diverse picture. The Iliad ? on the one hand, mentions profes
sional bards and their competitions, if only in passing, as performers at
religious festivals and similar occasions; the Odyssey, on the other hand, pays
much greater attention to the singer. The poet of the Iliad is absorbed with
battles and the warlike qualities of his protagonists to such an extent that he
himself remains almost completely invisible behind the events he narrates.
He almost never speaks in his own person except when invoking the Muses,
and there he is interested primarily in the accuracy of the report, and above
18 Homer’s A r t
ail in the accurate and complete account of the names; we have seen .how
closely the name is linked to the concept of ‘fame'. This is still alive in the
Odyssey, as κλέος, ‘reputation', remains the crucial criterion of values and
actions in aristocratic society, but here fame is based not so much on purely
martial qualities as on intellectual abilities. A new, intellectual type of man
emerges, represented by Odysseus himself and also by the singer; they both
have essential features in common. The high esteem of intellectual ability
also accounts for the new-found assurance and authority of the bard who no
longer invokes the Muse - except in the proem - but proudly asserts his
own creative and intellectual abilities. The poet of the Odyssey describes not
only his own ‘colleagues' (Demodokos, Phemios) but also projects some of
his own characteristics on his protagonist, the great narrator of tales; in a
way he forms him, as far as the traditional myth allows, after his own image.
There is only one scene in the Iliad where a hero is portrayed singing and
playing the lyre - Achilles singing of the ‘exploits of men' (κλέα άνδρών,
I 189). The content of song is the heroic deed and the great personality.
Themes of this kind are not unknown to the Odyssey, but here the interest in
challenges met with cleverness and resourcefulness appears appreciably
stronger. The characters in the Iliad are predominantly warlike, and even
where their intelligence is emphasized, it refers to fighting. In the Odyssey,
by contrast, they are, above all, intelligent, resourceful, even deceitful, and
they are curious and inquisitive (qualities that the Iliad conspicuously
lacks), they like telling of remote and strange peoples and countries, often
blurring the distinction between reality and fairy-tale.
Poetry aims to entertain, its effect is pleasure, according to the lliad\
there is no suggestion anywhere that it intends or produces anything else. In
the Odyssey it does, too, but beyond that it can also enchant, its effect
assumes a magical quality. 28 However, what is felt to be fascinating is
something very rational, that is, pragmatic and empirical knowledge. This
is connected with the listeners’ extraordinarily keen interest, their insatiable
appetite for stories and new information.
Both epics have in common that they may have been composed for
aristocratic societies whose requirements they meet and whose views and
preferences their respective poets share. The poet lives within his own
society and with his public; he does not see himself isolated, speaking as
an individual and in his own name and on his own behalf, as Hesiod does
and, later, the lyric poets do even more explicitly.
Notes
1. See, above all, F. Jacoby, Antike 9 (1933) 159ff- ( =Kleine philologische Schriften
Bd.l, Berlin (1961) 107f£); W. Nestle, Hermes 11 (1942) 46-77 and 113-39; H.
Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, Oxford (1975) lOff.
The Singer a n d his Muse 19
2. Nestle's reservations against this term, op. cit. 136, appear justified.
3. For a different view, see W. Schadewaidt, Ve?« Homers Welt und Werk, 2nd ed.,
Stuttgart (1951) 61.
4. See H. Frankel, op. dt. Uff.
5. See W. Kraus, Wiener Studien 68 (1955) 66ff.
6. Jacoby, Antike 9 (1933) 175ff. offers several examples illustrating how the
poet of the Odyssey has his own personal interests and does not hesitate to include
interesting facts simply because they are interesting to him and because he expects
the same of his listeners.
7. As E.R. Dodds has pointed out, The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley-Los
Angeles (1951) 10.
8. For this is the meaning of αύτοδίδακτος, ‘a tentative term for free and
autonomous creativity5, as Schadewaidt put it, op. cit. 79- So Phemios can offer not
only old songs which had been handed down from bard to bard; he can create out of
his own mind a new song about a contemporary theme, such as the return of the
Greeks (a 350-2). See H. Frankel, op. cit. 19f., n. 26.
9. Cp, γ 26f., η 263.
10. Γ 2l6ff. is an exception, as H. Erbse has pointed out to me.
11. πολύτροπος is the one who has many τρόποι (‘ways and means5) at his
disposal, like Hermes (cp. h.Merc. 13 and 439) - not ‘much turned, much travelled5
(LSJ).
12. See H. Frankel, op. cit. 10-11, who has shown how much Odysseus himself
has in common with the bard, including certain features that can only have been
transferred from the poet's own experience.
13. Cp. p 518f£, on which see below.
14. Cp. τ 332ff., ω 94, ε 311.
15. Occasionally poets talk as if deeds were accomplished for the sake of song,
not songs for the sake of deeds; so from the bard's perspective the original sequence
seems reversed, and he instinctively applies this perspective to the characters of his
poem; cp. Z 357fi, Θ 579f, and Eur. Troades 1240ff
16. See G. Steinkopf, ‘Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ruhmes bei den
Griechen5, PhD thesis, Halle (1937) 15.
17. On this passage, see P. Von der Mühll in West-östliche Abhandlungen (Fes
tschrift R. Tschudi), Wiesbaden (1954) 1-5. A different interpretation is suggested
by W. Marg in Navicula Chilionensis (Festschrift F. Jacoby), Leiden (1956) 16—29;
he states that even the Alexandrians had no other evidence for the quarrel between
Odysseus and Achilles which he regards as an impromptu invention; he infers from a
comparison between Θ 75-82, the proem to the Iliad, and A 255ff. that the ΟΪμη
referred to in Θ 74 must be the Iliad itself, which would make this line a homage to
the Iliad and the oldest testimony of its existence, op. cit. 27. This is not convin
cing; the first point is an argumentum e silentio', we know too little about pre-
Homeric songs of heroes to be sure that a song of a quarrel between Odysseus
and Achilles never existed - such quarrels were a familiar subject of epic. The
opposite conclusion seems more likely: as Marg himself rightly says, the story is
told so briefly that it remains obscure - does it not follow that it is a summary of a
song with which the poet's audience would have been familiar? As for the proem to
the Iliad, its comparison with Θ 74, far from supporting Marg's conclusion, shows
rather that the motifs are quite different; Achilles5 wrath and his quarrel with
Agamemnon are disastrous for the Achaians (A 2) and a cause for Priam and the
Trojans to rejoice (A 255), whereas here Odysseus' quarrel with Achilles gives joy
to Agamemnon on account of an oracle. (Θ 490 proves nothing because it refers to
the whole of the Trojan War, not just to the Iliadi) Marg's assumption implies that
20 Homer's A r t
the poet has coded his alleged 'allusion' to the Iliad by (1) substituting Odysseus for
Agamemnon, (2) putting the quarrel »theme into a completely different context,
and (3) invented an oracle for this purpose - this seems very far-fetched.
18. These lines became famous, cp. Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 79—88.
19 For the meaning of θεσκελος, cp. Γ 130, λ 610.
20* Cp. Ω 343, N 435, O 322, Φ 276, 604.
21. This difference seems not to have been noticed so far. W. Kraus, Wiener
Studien 68 (1955) 69 rightly points out that 'diese Beispiele zeigen, zu welcher Art
von Dingen die Dichtung gehört, daß sie aufgefaßt wird als etwas irrational
Wirkendes, das die Seele einer fremden Macht unterwirft’ - but this applies
only to the Odyssey\ Cp. also έπαοιδή = ‘spell, incantation’, x 457.
22. This is expressed by the verb itself: φρεσι σύνθετο (α 328); cp. B. Snell,
Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der vorplatonischen Philosophie (Philolo
gische Untersuchungen 29), Berlin (1924) 43.
23- H. Frankel, op. cit. 89. Odysseus is ‘struck’ by the new and unknown, it is a
challenge to him; here we can see the roots of the Ionian ίστορίη of the fifth
century.
24. F. Jacoby, Antike 9 (1933) 178.
25. Cp. Hes. Th. l44f., 195if., 281ff., Op. 81f., fr. 235 M.-W. For a more
detailed discussion, see E. Risch, ‘Namensdeutungen und Worterklärungen bei den
ältesten griechischen Dichtern7, in Eumusia, Festgabe fur Ernst Howald, Zürich
(1947) 72ff.; cp. also L.Ph. Rank, ‘Etymologiseering en verwante verschijnselen bij
Homerus’, PhD thesis, Utrecht (1951).
26. The same distinction is made by Thucydides I 22,2.
27. See on this passage K. Reinhardt, Von Werken und Formen 113.
28. It would be interesting to investigate how this may be linked to the
preference for sphinxes and other fantastic demons on contemporary vases and to
the beginnings of the ‘orientalizing’ style in vase-painting.
73 ______________________________________
Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece*
P. Murray
It is generally agreed that the concept of inspiration is one of the most basic
and persistent of Greek notions about poetry. Yet there appears to be a
certain confusion on the significance of this observation. For instance, while
most scholars consider that the idea is of very great antiquity in Greece,
there is a recent tendency to regard the concept as a formulation of the fifth
century B.c. E. A. Havelock, for example, describes the notion of poetic
inspiration as an invention of fifth century philosophers,1 and G. S. Kirk
states, without discussion, that poetic inspiration was ‘probably quite a new
conception’ at the time Euripides was writing.2 This type of disagreement
clearly relates to the more fundamental question of the meaning of the
concept of inspiration itself. For although there is an apparent consensus
that ancient notions of poetic inspiration correspond in some way to certain
modern ideas about the nature of poetic creativity, little attention has been
paid to these modern notions of inspiration. And unless such modern
notions are investigated, the mere observation that there is a similarity is
of little value.3
In this paper I consider the idea of poetic inspiration in early Greek
literature from Homer to Pindar. Despite variations in the views of indivi
dual poets (related, no doubt, to changes in the function and social status of
the poet during this period)4 the early Greek poets share certain basic
assumptions about the nature of poetic creativity, and can therefore be
treated together as a group. My aim in what follows is to clarify these basic
assumptions, and therefore the early Greek concept of poetic inspiration.
The Muses
Homer does not tell us precisely what the gift of poetry entails, nor does he
speculate as to the reasons for its bestowal. But evidently it is a permanent
gift of poetic ability, rather than a temporary inspiration. Failure to recog
nise this can be exemplified by Harriott’s discussion of the gift idiom: ‘the
Greeks expressed the belief that poetry is in some mysterious way “given”,
and that it comes from a source external to the poet and is other than he is.
This view of inspiration is still current, although partly replaced by
psychological theories in which poetry is held to emanate from the uncon
scious m in d /17 There is a difference between lines of poetry being given’ to
a poet and the ‘gift’ of poetic ability, which are here confused. I shall discuss
elsewhere the full implications of the uses of the gift idiom to denote the
bestowal of permanent poetic ability, and the relationship of the idea to the
concept of poetic genius. For the purposes of this paper I wish merely to
point out this difference between the temporary inspiration and the perma
nent gift of poetry which the Muses grant, and the fact that we can discern
here the beginnings of a distinction between the concepts of poetic inspira
tion and poetic genius.
W e gather that the Muse is believed to inspire the bard in a temporary
sense from, for example, the description of Demodocus at Od. viii 73, where
the Muse provides the immediate impulse to song: Μουσ’ αρ* άοΐδόν
άνήκεν άειδέμεναι κλέα άνδρών. The invocations to the Muses— a
traditional feature of early Greek poetry— also imply the notion of temporary
inspiration. Sometimes the poet simply asks the Muse to help him begin, or
to join in his song. But often the poet asks the Muse for something specific,
such as knowledge of events, or sweetness in song.19 We can look at these
invocations in two ways: (a) in pragmatic terms, that is, in terms of their
significance for an audience, (b) in terms of the poet’s need for divine
assistance. Undoubtedly ancient poets use invocations to establish their
authority, to guarantee the truth of their words, and to focus the attention
of the audience at strategic points. But the invocations also express the
poet’s belief in divine inspiration. The point at which the appeal ceases to be
genuine is, of course, problematic. But a comparison between the invoca
tions of the early Greek poets and those of their literary successors strongly
suggests that the former spring from a real, religious belief in the Muses.20
Knowledge
It has often been pointed out that the invocations in Homer are essentially
requests for information, which the Muses, as daughters of Memory, pro
vide. This is clear from the detailed invocation before the catalogue of ships:
The Singer a n d his Muse 25
made Hesiod a poet they told him that they could reveal the truth when
they wished:
These ambiguous lines have been variously interpreted,26 but what cannot
be disputed is the fact that the Muses are here represented as having the
power to tell the truth. The chief difficulty is to determine the precise
nature of the distinction drawn between truth (άληθέα) and plausible
fiction (ψεύδεα - . . ετύμοισιν όμοια). The conventional, and I think
the correct, interpretation is that Hesiod is here contrasting the true content
of his own poetry with the plausible fiction of Homeric epic. West rejects
this interpretation on the grounds that 'no Greek ever regarded the Homeric
epics as substantially fiction’. But Homer was criticised for misrepresenting
the truth.27 Harriott’s suggestion that in these lines Hesiod is faithfully
reporting the Muses’ warning that if he were to offend he would be
punished by being misled into recording a lying vision’28 seems to me
to be singularly unlikely: Hesiod would hardly preface his work with a
warning that what followed might be untrue; on the contrary, the proem to
the Tbeogony is surely to be regarded as a plea for the infallibility of the
poem as a whole. There is, of course, an important difference between the
kinds of knowledge bestowed by the Muses in Homer and in Hesiod. The
knowledge which Homer’s Muses grant is primarily knowledge of the
past— that is, knowledge as opposed to ignorance. Hesiod’s Muses, on the
other hand, are responsible for both truth and falsehood: what they give
Hesiod is true knowledge as opposed to false. And the poet speaks with the
authority of one who believes that his knowledge comes from divine
revelation.29
Pindar too, often claims to have special knowledge from the Muses, as for
example at Pa. vi 51-8:
Like Hesiod, but more obsessively, Pindar insists on the truth of what he
has to say31— an insistence which is all the stronger because he is acutely
The Singer a n d his Muse 27
Memory
The ancient tradition which made the Muses the daughters of Μνημοσύνη
is further evidence of such a connexion. The goddess Μνημοσύνη first
appears as mother of the Muses in Hesiod,35 but the connexion between
memory and the Muses is already apparent in Homer's use of the verb,
μιμνήσκομαι of the Muses' function at 1L ii 492.36 For Plato it was a
commonplace that one of the tasks of the Muses was to remind the poet, as
we can see from Socrates' words at Euthydemus 275c: he, like the poets, must
invoke Memory and the Muses in order to remember a previous conversa
tion. Several scholars have stressed the importance of this aspect of the
Muses, pointing out that at times the Muses seem to be little more than a
personification of memory.37 Havelock goes so far as to say that the Muses in
Homer have nothing to do with inspiration because they ‘are connected
with special feats of memory'.38 This dissociation of inspiration and memory
is misguided: there is no inherent incompatibility between inspiration and
information, as I have pointed out, and the fact that we might identify the
source of the poet’s inspiration as an internal one does not mean that the
poet or his audience feels it to be so. Furthermore Havelock’s contention
that the Muses embody the bard’s powers of memorisation is highly dubious,
as is his theory that Μνημοσύνη chiefly implies the notions of recall,
record and memorisation.39
The precise nature of poetic memory in early Greece has been much
discussed. J.-P. Vernant, in an article entitled ‘Aspects mythiques de la
mémoire et du temps’40 argued that the psychological function of memory
in early Greek poetry is not to reconstruct the past accurately, but to
28 Homer’s A r t
transport the poet into the past, to give him a direct vision of Tanden
temps5. Memory of this type, to be distinguished from historical memory, is
the privilege of poets and seers, who have in common un même don de
‘ voyance55\ As evidence for this latter statement Vernant cites the phrase τά
τ' έόντα τά τ3εσσόμενα προ τ’ εόντα which is used in connexion with
Calchas5 prophetic skill at 11. i 70 and of the Muses’ song at Hes. Tb. 38
(note that it is used of the Muses, not of Μνημοσύνη as Vernant states). In
fact this phrase suggests that what poets and seers have in common is
knowledge rather than vision. Of course the connexion between knowledge
and sight is very close in early Greek literature— at IL ii 485, for example,
the Muses know everything because they have seen everything41— but the
‘don de “voyance” 5, of which Vernant speaks appears to be something rather
different from sight in the sense of knowledge. The poet’s knowledge, he
says, is the result o f ‘une vision personelle directe. La mémoire transporte le
poète au coeur des événements anciens, dans leur temps’, a contention which
is supported by reference to Plato’s Ion 535b-c, where Socrates asks Ion
about his mental state during his rhapsodic performances:
But the possibility that the bard might have heard of the sufferings of the
Achaeans from someone else is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the
The Singer a n d his Muse 29
notion that he was given a personal vision of them. He sings κατά κόσμον,
a phrase which refers as much to the form as to the content of his song: it is
both true and well structured.43 W hat amazes Odysseus is the reality and
vividness of Demodocus’ account, but this does not imply that he has
visionary powers. The first of the two alternative ways in which the bard
might have acquired his knowledge would be compatible with vision
(although it does not imply it), but the second renders this possibility
highly unlikely since information from someone else can create the same
vividness as the bard’s personal presence at the events. In fact it seems to me
that Homer is here offering a formulation of the idea of poetic imagination
as a form of visualisation, an idea which is found fully developed in
A ristotlespoetics (l455a22) and in Longinus (15.1).44
One of the basic confusions in V ernanti argument is his failure to
distinguish between ecstatic and non-ecstatic inspiration either in prophecy
or in poetry. For example, the ‘don de voyance' of which Vernant speaks is
highly appropriate to Cassandra as she is depicted in the Agamemnon. In her
frenzy she does have a direct and personal vision of various episodes relating
to the past, present and future of the house of Atreus. That she actually sees
what she describes is clear from her words at, for example, 1125: ιδού
ιδού.45 It has long been recognised, however, that, with the exception of
Theoclymenus at Od. xx 351—7, prophecy of this visionary nature is absent
from Homer. The μάντίς in Homer is largely concerned with the technique
of interpreting omens, not with having visionary experiences of events
inaccessible to ordinary human beings.40. Vernant’s remarks about poetry
are similarly misleading. For example: Ta poésie constitue une des formes
typiques de la possession et du délire divins, l’état d ’ “enthousiasme” au sens
étymologique.’ This statement is certainly true of Plato, but one cannot use
Plato as evidence for pre-Platonic views of poetry. The notion that memory is
a power of poetic or prophetic vision is, I think, easier to reconcile with an
ecstatic theory of inspiration in which the poet or prophet is literally taken
out of himself than with the more intellectual concept of inspiration which
we find in Homer and the early Greek poets. That is not to say that poetic
memory during this period is simply a process of factual recall.
The substantial implications of the ancient connexion between Memory
and the Muses in oral poetry were first recognised by J. A. Notopoulos.47 He
pointed out that there are at least three different ways in which memory is
important in such poetry. First, memory serves to perpetuate and hence
immortalise κλέα άνδρών. The immortalising power of poetry is recog
nised from Homer onwards and is a central theme in Pindar’s poetry. The
latter repeatedly emphasises the Muses’ function as bestowers of immortal
ity.48 Second, memory conserves information— a point too obvious to need
substantiation. Third, and most important, memory is the means by which
oral poetry is created. Homeric epic is based on a vast and complex system of
formulas and word groups, which the bard must retain in his mind to use as
30 Homer’s A r t
Performance
The widely held view that there are certain fundamental differences between
oral and literary poetry has recently been challenged by R. Finnegan.49 She
demonstrates that no one model will cover all types of oral literature and
argues that there is no clear-cut differentiation between oral literature on
the one hand and written literature on the other. Nevertheless it would
clearly be false to say that oral poetry is exactly the same as written poetry in
all respects. The one aspect in which oral poetry obviously does differ from
literary poetry is in its performance— a point which Finnegan herself
stresses. Indeed she describes performance as the ‘heart of the whole concept
of oral literature’.50 In general classical scholarship has not seen that this
important difference between oral and literary poetry has a direct bearing on
the concept of poetic inspiration.
One of the essential features of the Parry-Lord theory of oral formulaic
composition is that oral poetry is composed and performed simultaneously.
This is not to say that the bard is merely an illiterate improviser or to imply
that hard work and thought may not go into the composition beforehand.
But it is at the moment of performance that the poem is fully composed for
the first tim e.51 Composition, therefore, does not depend on flashes of
inspiration which mysteriously provide ideas or phrases to the poet, but
on a steady flow of words. The oral poet is both a composer and a performer:
he needs not only memory and a command of technique, but also fluency
and confidence or presence’ as a performer. W hat must therefore be
emphasised is that inspiration in oral epic poetry is inextricably connected
with performance.
The Muses in early Greek poetry do more than simply provide informa
tion. Od. xvii 518—21, for example, shows that they also inspire the bard
with the power to mesmerise his audience. W hen the Muses made Hesiod a
poet, they inspired him with a wonderful voice: ένέπνευσαν δέ μοί
αύδήν / θέσπίν (Tb. 31-2).52 The significance of these words is not
generally stressed. Fluency of composition is a common characteristic of
inspiration in all periods. To take one example from ancient literature,
Cratinus describes the inspiring effects of wine in fr. 186: ‘Lord Apollo,
what a flood of words! Streams splash, his mouth has twelve springs, Ilissus
The Singer a n d bis Muse 31
is in his throat. W hat more can I say? If someone doesn't srop him up, he'll
swamp the whole place with his poems!’53 Harriott,54 amongst others,
points out that the comparison of flowing speech to a river goes back to
Homer. In the Iliad (i 249) Nestor's eloquence is described in the well
known line: του καί από γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ρέεν αύδή. Hesiod
emphasises the effortless flow of the Muses' voices in similar language (Th.
39-40), and those whom the Muses love have this gift of fluency (Th. 96-7,
cf. 84). Harriott and others draw our attention to these passages, but fail to
pin-point their significance. Surely the significance of the comparison of the
poet’s utterance to a stream is that in oral poetry fluency is vital. Since
composition and performance are simultaneous, without fluency composi
tion breaks down.
Even when Greek poetry ceased to be orally composed, there was still the
association of inspiration with performance: throughout the classical period,
poetry was always composed for some kind of audience; it was never simply
a private expression. Hence performance was important and the Muses
continued to provide inspiration in performance as well as in composition.
The frequent invocations to the Muses to give sweetness in song should be
interpreted with this in mind. For example, Aleman fr. 27: Μώσ" αγε
Καλλιόπα θύγατερ Διός / αρχ* έρατών έπέων, επί δ’ ίμερον / υμνώ
καί χαρίεντα τίθη χορόν.55 Pindar begins Nem. iii with an invocation
which is clearly a request for help in performance:
The Choruses in Aristophanes also frequently invoke the Muse for help in
performance, as, for example, at Peace 775-80: 'Muse, having driven away
the war, join in the chorus with me, your friend, celebrating weddings of
the gods, banquets of men and festivities of the blessed.’57 In the context of
both victory celebration and dramatic competition, composition and per
formance are united, and the Muse relates to both.
W hat is the precise nature of the relationship between the Muse and the
poet in early Greek poetry? Whatever it is, the poet is certainly not the
unconscious instrument öf the divine, as some scholars have suggested. G.
M. A. Grube, for example, says of the invocations in Homer: 'When Homer
invokes the Muses on his own account, everything is inspiration and he
32 Homer's A r t
speaks as if the poet were but a passive instrum ent/58 The first three words
of the Iliad (Μήνιν άείδε, θεά) might indeed be taken to suggest that the
poet is nothing but the instrument of the goddess. But the request for
specific information at 8 (Who then of the gods brought them together to
contend in strife?) suggests that the poet is an active recipient of informa
tion from the Muse rather than a passive mouthpiece. The same is true of all
the other invocations in the Iliad?9 The proem of the Odyssey makes the
poet’s active role even clearer:
The relationship here envisaged between the poet and the Muse is an
intellectual one— the Muse is asked to communicate with the bard, not
to send him into a state of ecstasy— and it would be a mistake to interpret
these invocations as evidence for the view that the bard takes no part in
composition.
The early Greek poets in general express their belief in their dependence
on the Muse, but they also stress their part in composition. For example, at
Od. viii 44-5, Alcinous says of Demodocus:
These words make it clear that poetry is both god-given and the product of
the bard’s own θυμός.60 There is a similar combination of human and
divine elements in Phemius’ claim at Od. xxii 347—8:
It might be argued that the two halves of this statement are contradictory:
because the gods have implanted the paths of song in him the bard cannot
claim responsibility for his composition. But these lines, like the previous
example quoted, must surely be understood in the context of Homer’s
language. Dual motivation is, of course, a characteristic of Homeric epic
and a god’s prompting does not exclude a personal motivation.61 The two
halves of Phemius’ statement are therefore complementary rather than
contradictory: he is both self taught and the recipient of divine aid. It
has been suggested that αύτοδίδακτος refers to the technical aspects of
composition (form, style etc.), whereas οιμας refers to the subject matter of
his song,62 but this seems to me to be too precise a distinction. W hilst the
word αύτοδίδακτος clearly implies a notion of skill or technique, the
metaphor of the path or way of song should not be restricted to subject
The Singer a n d his Muse 33
matter.63 The general point of Phemius’ claim is that he does not simply
repeat songs he has learnt from other bards, but composes his songs
himself.64 The particular point which is relevant to the present discussion
is that although Phemius stresses the divine origin of his poetry he is very
much aware of his own part in composition. This attitude is typical of the
early period of Greek literature as a whole in the way that poetry is
described in both human and divine terms.
One of the .conventional ways of describing a poet is to call him a
Μουσών θεράπων, and θεράπων is a revealing word. It does not imply
that the poet is passive or servile but rather suggests a close relationship
between the Muse and the poet who attends here.65 Theognis specifies the
nature of this relationship more precisely when he describes the poet as a
messenger (άγγελος) of the Muses.66 The relationship between the poet
and the Muse is described in a number of different ways by Pindar, as for
example in fr. 150: μαντεύεο, Μοΐσα, προφατεύσω δ’ εγώ. This meta
phor conveys Pindar s sense of dependence on the Muse, but also stresses his
part as the προφητής (one who interprets and proclaims) of her message.67
As Dodds explains: ‘The words he uses are the technical terms of Delphi;
implicit in them is the old analogy between poetry and divination. But
observe that it is the Muse, and not the poet, who plays the part of the
Pythia; the poet does not ask to be himself “possessed”, but only to act as
the interpreter for the entranced Muse. And that seems to be the original
relationship. Epic tradition represented the poet as deriving supernormal
knowledge from the Muses, but not as falling into ecstasy or being possessed
by them.’68 Dodds is clearly right in saying that ‘the Muse, and not the poet
. . . plays the part of the Pythia’, but to infer from this that the Muse is
actually possessed seems to me dubious. It is difficult to see who or what
might be possessing the Muse, and Pindar nowhere makes any reference to
possession. The emphasis in the fragment is on Pindar’s position as the
intermediary between gods and men, not on the psychological state of the
Muse. Pindar also emphasises his active role in poetic creation by his use of
the term ευρίσκω, as at 0. iii 4-6:
Craft
Like Pindar the early Greek poets as a whole seem to have had a very
balanced view of poetic creativity, more balanced than some scholars would
allow. Havelock,71 as I have already said, maintains that in the early period
poetry was thought of as a craft and that the ‘contrary conception’ of poetic
inspiration was invented in the fifth century. Other scholars take the
directly opposite view. Barmeyer,72 for example, suggests that the early
Greek άοΐδός is to be regarded as inspired rather than as a craftsman. And
Svenbro in his recent book argues that pour Homère et Hésiode l’aède tient
sa parole “de la Muse", il n’apparaît nullement comme le “producteur" de
son discours’73 and even that d’idée même de l’aède comme auteur du chant
est en effet “systématiquement" rejetée par Homère’.74 The situation of the
choral poet, on the other hand, is completely different: ‘toujours en quête de
commissions . . . il doit insister sur le fait qu’il est le “producteur" de son
poème afin d ’être rémunéré, et il le fait au moyen de nombreuses métaphores
fondées sur l’analogie entre poète et artisan’.75 In his zeal to stress the
importance of the different social situations of the Homeric άοΐδός and the
choral poet Svenbro ignores the continuity in attitudes to poetry which
exists between them. The notion that the poet receives his words from the
Muse is not confined to Homer and Hesiod any more than the notion of the
poet as craftsman is confined to Pindar and the choral poets.
In the Odyssey the bard is included in a list of δημιοεργοί:
Svenbro argues that this passage cannot be taken as evidence for the idea of
the poet as craftsman, referring to Vernant’s observation that the word
δημιοεργός ‘ne qualifie pas à l’origine l’artisan en tant que tel . . . il
définit toutes les activités qui s’exercent en dehors de Γοΐκος, en faveur
d ’un public’.76 Now it may be true that the word δημιοεργός in itself does ^
not imply the notion of craftsmanship, but the context in which the word
occurs must surely be considered. The fact that the bard is included in a list
of people who have specialised skills which can be of use to the community
suggests that he too possesses a certain skill. When Phemius has to justify
his existence to Odysseus he does so on the grounds that he is
αύτοδίδακτος, a word which clearly implies that there is at least an
element of skill in the poet’s activity. At Od. xi 368 Alcinous praises
Odysseus for telling his story έπισταμένως (that is, skilfully) like a
bard. And, as I have pointed out, the phrase κατά κόσμον used of
The Singer a n d his Muse 35
Demodocus’ song at Od. viii 489 refers as much to the construction as to the
contents of the song.77
The importance of skill in poetry during the early period is also apparent
from the frequency of references to the teaching and learning of poetry, and
from the repeated use of skill words vis-à-vis poetry: οίδα, έπίσταμαί,
σοφός, σοφία, τέχνη.78 Bruno Snell has shown that the word έπίσταμαί
in the early period means primarily know (how).79 Similarly, οΐδα, τέχνη,
σοφός and σοφία denote practical ability and knowledge rather than
‘wisdom’. Homer uses the word σοφία only once, and in connection
with a carpenter (7/. xv 412). And Hesiod uses the word of skill in seaman
ship (Op. 649) as well as pf Linus' musical skill (fr. 306). Craftsmen of many
different varieties are described as σοφός— including poets.80 Snell points
out that σοφός originally meant 'one who understands his craft’: the
emergence of σοφ- words to mean ‘wisdom’ in a more intellectual sense
was a gradual process.
The use of the. word ποιητής to mean poet81 is evidently based on the
notion of the poet as craftsman, but the evidence I have cited shows that this
concept did not suddenly emerge from nowhere in the fifth century. In a
fragment attributed to Hesiod (fr. dub. 357) poetic composition is likened
to stitching:
about his inspiration and genius as well as about his craftsmanship. Svenbro
is not the only scholar guilty of one-sidedness in discussing Pindar’s
attitude to poetry. Grube, for example, claims that Pindar ‘despises tech
nique and training; everything in poetry is natural talent’.87 This statement
is misleading. W hilst Pindar does contrast the true poet who is a poet by
nature (φοά) with the poet who has merely been taught his craft,88 he never
denies the importance of technique in poetry. His frequent use of craft
metaphors and his own evident concern with technique show that he
regarded technique as a vital ingredient in poetry. But for the true poet
mere technique is not enough.
Conclusions
It was Plato who, so far as we know, first opposed the concepts of poetic
inspiration and technique when he described inspiration as ενθουσιασμός.
Even Democritus, who is often considered a precursor to Plato, evidently
did not consider inspiration and technique as incompatible: 'Όμηρος
φύσεως λαχών θεαζούσης έπέων κόσμον ετεκτήνατο παντοίων
(DK fr. 21). In fact throughout early Greek poetry there seems to be an
equal emphasis on craft and inspiration. If we are unable to accept this fact,
it must be because we have certain preconceived notions about the concept
of poetic inspiration and its relation to the idea of poetry as a craft. Doubt
less the notion of inspiration originated from the poet’s feeling of depen
dence on the divine. And this feeling corresponds to the belief of many
poets throughout history that, as Dodds put it, ‘creative thinking is not the
work of the ego’.89 But the idea of poetic inspiration in early Greece differs
in a number of important ways from subsequent conceptions. It was parti
cularly associated with knowledge, with memory and with performance; it
did not involve ecstasy or possession, and it was balanced by a belief in the
importance of craft. But although it therefore laid far more emphasis on the
technical aspects of poetic creativity, it was nevertheless an idea essentially
connected with the phenomenon of inspiration as we know it.
Notes
1. Preface to P la to (Oxford 1963) 156. This and the following works are cited by
author’s name alone: E.R. Dodds, T he G reeks a n d the Ir ra tio n a l (Berkeley 1951); R.
Harriott, Poetry a n d C riticism before P la to (London 1969); G. Lanata, Poetica p re -
P laton ica (Florence 1963); H. Maehler, D ie A u ffassu n g des D ichterberufs im frü hen
G riechentum (Göttingen 1963).
2. The Bacchae (New Jersey 1970) 10.
3. Those scholars who have discussed the subject of poetic inspiration in general
have confused rather than clarified the ancient position. C. M. Bowra, for example,
The Singer a n d his Muse 37
32. See e.g. 0. i 28-32, N . vii 20-3. In general on this persuasive power of
poetry see e.g. Harriott 117—20; J. de Romilly, ‘Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie',
J U S xciii (1973) 155-62.
33. Frr. 3, 4, 23.11, 131. The view expressed by Falter (η. 18) 40 that
Empedocles’ invocation to the Muse in fr. 3 is nothing but ‘poetische Einkleidung,
Motiv, keineswegs aber aus wahrem Glauben erwachsen’ is rightly refuted by W. J.
Verdenius, ‘The meaning of Πίστίς in Empedocles M n em .4 i (1948) 10—11. Cf. P.
Boyancé, h e culte des M uses chez les philosophes grecs (Paris 1936) 241. Clearly the
goddess in Parmenides’ proem fr. 1.22-32 also guarantees the truth of his message,
but she is not identified as a Muse. See e.g. Harriott 65-7.
34. ‘Solon’s Prayer to the Muses’, T A P A lxxx (1949) 65.
35. T h . 53-61 with West ad loc. To the references there given add T h . 915-17;
P M G fr. 941; Pi. P a . vi 54-6, viib 15-16; PI. T h eaet . 191d; Plut. M or. 9d, frr.
215h, 217j. See further e.g, B. Snell 'Mnemosyne in der frühgriechischen Dich
tung’, A rc h iv f u r Begriffsgeschichte ix (1964) 19—21; A. Setti, ‘La Memoria e il canto’,
Stud, l i a i . XXX (1958) 129— 71.
36. Cf. e.g. Certam en 98; Pi. N. i 12.
37. See e.g. J. Duchemin, P in d a re poète et prophète (Paris 1955) 26.
38. 163-4.
39. 100.
40. J o u r n a l de Psychologie (1959) 1-29 repr. in M y th e et pensée chez les Grecs (Paris
1974) 80-107. See also M. Detienne, Les m aîtres de v érité dan s la grèce arch aïqu e'
(Paris 1973) 15, 24-7, 110.
41. See further Snell (η. 21).
42. 83 η. 9.
43. See Lanatas excellent discussion of this passage, 12-13.
44. I hope to discuss the history of this concept in a later article.
45. Cf. 1114, 1217.
46. See e.g. E. Rohde, Psyche, trans. W, B. Hillis (London 1925) 289; Dodds 70.
47. 'Mnemosyne in Oral Literature', Τ Α Ρ Α lxix (1938) 465—93.
48. See e.g. Horn. II. vi 358; Od. viii 73, 580; xxiv 196-7; h .A p . 298—9; Theog.
237-52; Sapph. fr. 55, cf. fr. 193; Bacch. iii 71, 90-8, ix 81-7, x 9-18; Pi. 0 . viii
70-80, x 86-96, P. i 93-100, iii 112-15, iv 293-9, v 45-9, vi 5-17, xi 55-64, N.
vi 26—35, vii 11-16, ix 4 8 -5 5 , 1. v 53-7, vii 16-26, viii 56-63, fr. 121; PI. Sm p.
209d—e.
49. O ra l Poetry (Cambridge 1977).
50. Ibid. 28, cf. 133.
51. See M. Parry, ‘Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-Making’, H S C P
xli (I 9 3 O) 77-8 = The M a k in g o f H omeric Verse , ed. A. Parry (Oxford 1971) 269-70;
A. B. Lord, T he Singer o f T ales (Cambridge Mass. I960) 13—29; M. N. Nagler,
S pon taneity a n d O ra l T r a d itio n (Berkeley 1974) xxi, xxiii, 20-1. On the whole topic
of prior composition, memorisation and performance see Finnegan (n. 49) 73—87.
52. Cf. T h . 97; Horn. Od. i 371.
terms σοφός and σοφία with a new significance: in particular σοφός denotes for
him a rare individual, set apart from his fellows both by his inborn nature and by
his communion with the gods); Xenoph. fr. 2.12; Ar. N u . 547, P a x 797, L ys. 368.
For a detailed study of the subject see B. Gladigow, Soph ia u n d Kosmos (Hildesheim
1965).
81. Hdt. ii 53; Ar. A ch . 654. See further e.g. Harriott 93-4. Similar terminology
for the poet's craft occurs in Sanskrit and other LE. languages. See M. West, ‘Greek
Poetry 2000-700 b . c . ’ C Q xxiii (1973) 179 and bibliography there.
82. For a sensible discussion see Harriott 94.
83· See e.g. Bacch. v 9-10, xiii 223, xix 8—10; Pi. 0. vi 1-4, 86-7, P . iii 113, vi
9, N. ii 1-2, iii 4-5, I. i 14, fr. 194.
84. Op. cit. (n. 4) 178-9, 187, 168-70.
85. See Wilamowitz P in d a ro s (Berlin 1922) 124; M. R. Lefkowitz, ‘τώ καί έγώ:
The First Person in Pindar’, H S C P lxvii (1963) 229-32.
86. See the further criticisms of St. Fogelmark in his review of Svenbro, Gnomon
1 (1978) 13-24.
87. Op. cit. (n. 17) 9.
88. 0. ii 83-88. Cf. 0. ix 100-2, N. iii 40-2.
89. 81.
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