Assignment

Subject : Strategic Studies

Topic : Carl Von Clausewitz and his military strategies

Submitted to : Mam Nida Shabir

Submitted by : Hussain Kaleem Khan

Roll no. : 517309

Dated: 22 March, 2024

Government College University Faislabad Campus (GCUF)

 Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general and military thinker. He focused on the
psychological and political parts of war. His main book, “On War,” is a famous guide to military
strategy, even though he didn’t finish it before he died. Clausewitz was a realist in many
different senses, including realpolitik, and while in some respects a romantic, he also drew
heavily on the rationalist ideas of the European Enlightenment.

Clausewitz stressed the dialectical interaction of diverse factors, noting how unexpected
developments unfolding under the “fog of war” (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and
often erroneous information and great fear, doubt, and excitement) call for rapid decisions by
alert commanders. He saw history as a vital check on erudite abstractions that did not accord
with experience. In contrast to the early work of Antoine-Henri Jomini, he argued that war
could not be quantified or reduced to map work, geometry, and graphs. Clausewitz had many
aphorisms, of which the most famous is “War is the continuation of policy with other means.”
(often misquoted as “… by other means.

Carl’s Life and Military Career

Carl von Clausewitz was born on July 1, 1780, in Burg bei Magdeburg, Prussia. He came
from a family with claims to nobility. His father had served in Frederick the Great’s army, and
Clausewitz himself joined the Prussian military at age twelve, eventually rising to the rank of
major general.

Clausewitz participated in various campaigns, including the Rhine campaigns of 1793-

1794 and the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He studied at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin,
where he likely encountered the works of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Johann
Gottlieb Fichte. He became associated with General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a key figure in
the Prussian Army’s reform efforts.
 During the Jena Campaign in 1806, Clausewitz served as an aide-de-camp to Prince
August and was captured at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt by Napoleon’s forces. He was held
prisoner in France until 1808, after which he returned to Prussia and contributed to the army
and state reforms.

Clausewitz also engaged in intellectual pursuits, exchanging letters with Fichte about his
work on Machiavelli. These experiences and studies would later influence his military theories
and writings. In 1810, Carl von Clausewitz married Countess Marie von Brühl and became part
of Berlin’s elite circles. Opposing Prussia’s alliance with Napoleon, he joined the Russian Army
during the Russian campaign of 1812-1813. He helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen,
leading to a coalition against Napoleon. Afterward, he re-entered Prussian service and played
significant roles in battles like Ligny and Wavre during the Waterloo campaign. He later served
as the director of the Kriegsakademie and returned to active duty during crises like the
European revolutions and a cholera epidemic. He died in November 1831, and his wife
posthumously published his famous work, “On War,” in 1832, along with his other collected
works.

Theories of war by Clausewitz

Clausewitz, primarily known as a military theorist, meticulously analyzed war in his

principal work, “On War,” drawing from his experiences in military campaigns. The book,
unfinished at his death, reflects his evolving ideas and includes philosophical examinations of
war. While Clausewitz sought to expand its scope to include forms of warfare beyond state
conflicts, much of this material remained unpublished. His work stands out for its depth and
scale, alongside Leo Tolstoy, as a philosophical examination of war inspired by the Napoleonic
Era.

Clausewitz’s work remains relevant today, with numerous English-language books

focusing on his ideas published between 2005 and 2014, unlike his rival Jomini, whose influence
has waned. While Jomini offered a system of war, Clausewitz provided a philosophy, which still
influences modern strategy. His definition of war as the continuation of policy by other means
and his trinity concept, emphasizing violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation, highlight
his dialectical approach. Despite some misinterpretations, his synthesis underscores the
enduring connection between war and politics.

Clausewitz revolutionized Western military thinking by introducing systematic

philosophical contemplation into the study of war, emphasizing its socio-political nature
alongside its operational aspects. He viewed war as a political, social, and military phenomenon
and stressed the primacy of state policy. Clausewitz emphasized the importance of defense and
advocated for the involvement of entire populations in wartime efforts. While recognizing the
value of intelligence, he remained skeptical of its accuracy due to the fog of war, highlighting
the challenges commanders face in executing plans. Clausewitz also developed the concept of
military genius, emphasizing a combination of intellect, experience, personality, and
temperament in waging war.

Carl von Clausewitz’s work, particularly in his seminal book “On War,” is rich with
strategic concepts that have influenced military thinking and practice. Here are some of the key
concepts from his work:

The Remarkable Trinity:

Clausewitz’s trinity is a framework for understanding the complex nature of war. It

consists of:

Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force. The
play of chance and probability, which make up the creative spirit, within which the military
commander must work. The element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes
it subject to reason alone. This trinity suggests that war is not just a rational act of states but
also involves unpredictable and emotional aspects.

Fog of War:

The “fog” metaphorically describes the uncertainty in situational awareness experienced

by participants in military operations. It deals with the ambiguity in observing one’s own forces
and the enemy’s, the unknowns in regards to the environment and conditions, and the
unpredictability of adversary’s actions.

War as a Continuation of Policy by Other Means:

This concept posits that war is not an end in itself but a means to achieve the political
objectives set by the state. It emphasizes that military strategy and tactics must align with the
political goals to be effective.

Absolute War versus Real War:

Clausewitz distinguishes between an idealized form of war, which he calls “absolute

war,” characterized by unlimited aims and methods, and “real war,” which is constrained by
practicalities such as geography, the nature of the forces, and the international political
situation.

The Culminating Point of Victory:

This is the stage in a military campaign where further offensive action may lead to a
decline in strength relative to the enemy. Recognizing this point is crucial to avoid overreaching
and potentially turning a victory into a defeat.

The Principle of Mass:

The principle of mass involves concentrating combat power at the decisive place and
time to achieve results that are out of proportion to the effort expended.

The Economy of Force:

This principle is about allocating minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.
It is the judicious employment and distribution of forces.
Genius in Warfare:

Clausewitz talks about the qualities that constitute military genius, which include a quick
and correct grasp of situations, the ability to make swift decisions, and the mental agility to
adapt to changing circumstances.

These concepts are interrelated and contribute to a holistic understanding of warfare as

a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Clausewitz’s insights remain relevant to modern
strategic thinking, providing a lens through which to analyze and understand conflicts in the
contemporary world.

Key ideas discussed in On War

Dialectical approach to military analysis: Clausewitz employs a dialectical method,

examining war as a complex interplay of opposing forces, ideas, and actions, leading to a
deeper understanding of its nature.

Methods of “critical analysis”: Clausewitz emphasizes the importance of critically

analyzing military situations, strategies, and actions to make informed decisions and adapt to
changing circumstances effectively.

Application of economic profit-seeking logic to war and peace negotiations: He

suggests that the logic of seeking economic profit, commonly associated with commercial
enterprises, can also be applied to military endeavors and negotiations for peace, highlighting
the rational calculations made by political actors in pursuing their objectives.

Nature of the balance-of-power mechanism: Clausewitz discusses how the balance of

power between states influences their behavior and decision-making in war and peace, often
shaping alliances and strategies to maintain or shift this balance.
 Relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war: He examines
how military actions serve political objectives, emphasizing the interdependence between
military and political goals in the conduct of warfare.

Asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense: Clausewitz explores the

asymmetrical nature of offensive and defensive strategies, considering factors such as terrain,
technology, and morale in determining their effectiveness.

Concept of “military genius” beyond intellect: He defines military genius as a

combination of intellect, experience, personality, and temperament, emphasizing the
importance of leadership qualities and strategic vision in military commanders.

“Fascinating trinity” of war: This concept encompasses the primal elements of violence,
chance, and the subordination of military actions to political objectives, providing a holistic
understanding of the complexities of warfare.

Distinctions between “absolute war,” “ideal war,” and “real war”: Clausewitz
distinguishes between theoretical concepts of war and its practical realities, highlighting the
differences between idealized notions and the messy, unpredictable nature of actual conflicts.

Concept of limited objectives versus rendering the enemy helpless: He discusses the
spectrum of war objectives, ranging from limited aims to total victory, and the strategic
considerations involved in choosing between them.

War’s belonging to the social realm rather than art or science: Clausewitz views war as
a social phenomenon deeply embedded in human societies, rather than a purely artistic or
scientific endeavor, emphasizing its complex political and cultural dimensions.

Strategy primarily in the realm of art, constrained by political and military analyses: He
suggests that strategy involves creative decision-making and planning, informed by political and
military considerations, to achieve desired objectives.
 Tactics primarily in the realm of science, seen in siege warfare: Clausewitz distinguishes
between the artistic elements of strategy and the scientific aspects of tactics, particularly
evident in the systematic planning and execution of siege warfare.

Importance of “moral forces” over quantifiable physical elements: He emphasizes the

significance of morale, motivation, and belief systems in shaping military outcomes, often
outweighing purely physical factors in determining success or failure.

Military virtues of professional armies versus other fighting forces: Clausewitz

discusses the distinctive characteristics and advantages of professional armies, contrasting
them with irregular or militia forces in terms of discipline, training, and organizational cohesion.

Effects of numerical superiority and “mass”: He examines the impact of numerical

strength and concentration of forces, highlighting the advantages and limitations of massed
formations in battle.

Unpredictability of war: Clausewitz acknowledges the inherent uncertainty and

unpredictability of war, emphasizing the need for flexibility, adaptation, and contingency
planning in military operations.

“Fog of war” and friction in real-world scenarios: He discusses the challenges and
disruptions caused by incomplete information, communication breakdowns, and other factors
contributing to the “fog of war” and friction in military operations.

Strategic and operational “centers of gravity”: Clausewitz identifies key strategic and
operational factors that are critical to the success of military campaigns, often serving as focal
points for decision-making and resource allocation.

Culminating point of the offensive and culminating point of victory: He examines the
strategic concepts of reaching the peak of offensive momentum and achieving decisive
victories, exploring the implications for military strategy and planning.

Influence of Carl Von Clausewitz theories:

 Clausewitz died without completing Vom Kriege, but despite this his ideas have been
widely influential in military theory and have had a strong influence on German military thought
specifically. Later Prussian and German generals, such as Helmuth Graf von Moltke, were clearly
influenced by Clausewitz: Moltke’s widely quoted statement that “No operational plan extends
with high certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force” is a classic reflection
of Clausewitz’s insistence on the roles of chance, friction, “fog,” uncertainty, and interactivity in
war.

Clausewitz’s influence spread to British thinking as well, though at first more as a

historian and analyst than as a theorist. Clausewitz had little direct influence on American
military thought before 1945, but his ideas were transmitted indirectly through British writers.
However, he greatly influenced figures like Karl Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao Zedong, shaping
the Communist Soviet and Chinese military traditions. Lenin considered Clausewitz one of the
great military writers, emphasizing war as a continuation of politics. This perspective influenced
Soviet military thinking since 1917.

Kissinger suggested that Lenin reversed Clausewitz’s argument, viewing politics as a

continuation of war by other means. Rapoport proposed that Lenin’s approval of Clausewitz
stemmed from his focus on the struggle for power, a central theme in Marxist ideology. Lenin
likely appreciated Clausewitz’s realism in recognizing power struggles as essential to
international politics.

Clausewitz directly influenced Mao Zedong, who organized a seminar on Clausewitz for
the Party leadership in Yan’an after reading “On War” in 1938. This influence is evident in Mao’s
writings and reflects his personal study. Clausewitz’s concepts of “friction” and the “fog of war”
have become widely recognized in fields like business strategy and sport. Additionally, the term
“center of gravity” in military doctrine originates from Clausewitz’s usage, although its meaning
in U.S. military doctrine differs from his original concept.

Eisenhower’s deterrence strategy in the 1950s was influenced by his reading of

Clausewitz, particularly Clausewitz’s concept of “absolute war.” Eisenhower believed that
demonstrating the horrors of nuclear warfare would deter potential adversaries, leading to
policies prioritizing nuclear weapons and public statements asserting the willingness to use
them. This approach aimed to deter the Soviet Union and China from risking conflict with the
United States.

Some theorists argue that nuclear proliferation rendered Clausewitzian concepts

obsolete after dominating the 20 th century. Sheppard suggests that nuclear weapons made
conventional armies obsolete, as no two powers have used nuclear weapons against each
other. Anatol Rapoport warned that a Clausewitzian view of war promoted a dangerous zero-
sum paradigm and undermined rational decision-making in the nuclear age.

The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century have witnessed state armies
dealing with insurgencies, terrorism, and asymmetrical warfare. Clausewitz’s analysis wasn’t
limited to wars between conventional armies but also covered conflicts involving revolutions,
rebellions, and non-state actors, as seen during the French Revolution and Napoleon’s era. He
extensively studied guerrilla warfare, as evident in his lectures and writings on small wars,
including the French Vendée and the Tyrolean uprising. His work includes a notable chapter on
“The People in Arms,” reflecting the broader scope of warfare beyond conventional conflicts.

Criticism:

Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, criticized Clausewitz’s concept of the
“Trinity” as obsolete in his 1991 book, arguing for a new model of modern warfare. His critique
has had significant influence, but it has also been challenged by scholars like Daniel Moran, who
accused Creveld of misrepresenting Clausewitz’s metaphor. Christopher Bassford further
argued against Creveld’s interpretation, highlighting the central role of the people in
Clausewitz’s concept of the Trinity.