Radicalization of Educated Youth in Pakistan: Traits,

Narratives and Trends

Abdul Basit

Abstract

Around 64 percent of Pakistan’s population is below the age of 30 years,

which is expected to rise to 230 million by 2030 and 280 million by 2050.
This makes youth the most important demographic group in Pakistan. In
recent years, growing radicalization among the country’s educated youth
has raised new counter terrorism and extremism challenges. Educated
youth’s quest for significance, self-worth and the desire to serve a higher
purpose in life have pushed a radical fringe towards militancy. Religious-
political parties, missionary organizations and modern Islamist networks
have, intentionally or unintentionally, facilitated movement of vulnerable
youth from non-violent to violent-extremism. Social media has also
lowered entry barrier of youth’s participation into militancy. This paper
has defined and conceptualized radicalization of educated youth in
Pakistan’s context and identified main traits that account for it. The second
section details major narratives, such as Ghazwa-e-Hind, Caliphate and the
Black Flags of Khorasan which militant organizations have exploited to
radicalize the educated youth. The final section offers some policy
recommendations to overcome radicalization among the educated youth.
Key terms: Youth radicalization, Pakistan, Caliphate, Ghazwa-e-Hind,
Khorasan, Education

Introduction

Pakistan has the largest population of young people ever in its history,
making it one of the most youthful countries in the world and second
youngest in South Asia. Of the 207 million population, around 64 percent
is below the age of 30 years, and 29 percent is between the ages of 15-29
Radicalization of Educated Youth in Pakistan [PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF TERRORISM RESEARCH, VOL I, ISSUE 1]

years.1 This youth bulge is projected to continue at least for the next three
decades and can either be an asset or a liability depending on how
effectively this segment is integrated in the society. 2 So, youth is the most
important demographic group in Pakistan and also the most
impressionable.

Radicalization of educated youth is dangerous because militants with

higher education are better positioned to plan sophisticated attacks,
infiltrate elite government and military circles, and facilitate increased
connections between Pakistan-based groups and transnational jihadist
groups.3 Deprived and confused youth, particularly those who cannot find
answers to their problems are most vulnerable to extremist propaganda.
There is a lot of ambiguity on several issues in youth’s mind and there is
no one to answer them.4

The vigilante killing of Mashal Khan, a journalism student of Mardan’s

Abdul Wali Khan University on fake blasphemy charges in 2016,
recruitment of Naureen Laghari by the Islamic State (IS), a student of
Liaqat Medical College Hyderabad, to target Sunday Easter services in
Lahore in 2017, and the targeted killing of a college professor by his
student over alleged “anti-Islam” remarks in Bahawalpur in March 2019
underscore the extent and depth of youth radicalization among Pakistan’s
educated youth. Similarly, the cases of IS-inspired militant cell, Saad Aziz

1
“Pakistan currently has largest youth population of its history: UNDP report,” The News,
May 3, 2018.
2
Raheem ul Haque, “Youth Radicalization in Pakistan,” Peace Brief, United States
Institute of Peace, February 26, 2014.
3
Madiha Afzal, “University education and radicalization in Pakistan,” Livemint, April 16,
2018.
4
Madeeha Anwar, “Pakistan’s Emerging Threat: Highly Educated Youth Gravitate to
Radicalization,” Voice of America, May 6, 2017.

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network, and Al-Qaeda (AQ)-linked Jamaat-ul-Ansar Al-Shariah (JAS) —

involving educated militants from colleges and universities— indicate the
ingress of global jihadist groups in Pakistani universities and higher
education institutions.

Barring a few studies, majority of the research on youth radicalization has

not defined the phenomenon in Pakistan’s context. Particularly,
radicalization of educated youth is a data-scarce subject in Pakistan as
much of it is assumed rather than demonstrated. Moreover, the bulk of the
existing research on the topic is survey-based rather than an in-depth
examination of various emerging trends of educated youth’s radicalization
in the country. Radicalization is not a static but a dynamic phenomenon, so
such survey-based studies have a shelf-life notwithstanding their important
insights into the subject-matter. Therefore, a fresh examination of the
ideological narratives that underpin radicalization of educated youth, their
traits and trends is warranted.

A Survey of Existing Literature on Youth Radicalization in Pakistan

Research on youth radicalization in Pakistan has debunked the madrassa-

militancy, poverty-terrorism and illiteracy-radicalization arguments.5
Winthrop and Graff have demonstrated that (growing) religiosity is a poor
predictor of radicalization in Pakistan. Religiosity is often conflated with
radicalization in Pakistan.6 Similarly, conservatism, opposition to liberal

5
Moeed Yusuf, “Radicalism Among Youth in Pakistan: Human Development Gone
Wrong?”, Pakistan National Human Development Report (NHDR) 2015, United National
Development Pakistan (UNDP), November 2014, 12.
6
Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links
between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” Working Paper 2, Centre for Universal
Education, Brookings Institute, June 2010, 16.

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ideas, support of Shariah, females wearing hijabs and men sporting beards
in large numbers tell us very little about youth radicalism.7

Aamir Rana has found that majority of Pakistani youth (92 percent)
considered religion an important factor in the life. At the same time, 79
percent of them did not consider that the Pakistani Taliban were serving
Islam and 85 percent believed suicide terrorism was prohibited in Islam.8
The simultaneous embrace of Islamic identity and rejection of Islamist
militancy indicates that an individual’s religiosity does not tell us much
about radical attitudes.

Aisha Siddiqa has discovered that educational backgrounds of youth have

no causal link with radicalization in Pakistan. Youth absorb radical ideas
because they become part of the popular culture without necessarily
understanding their underlying message and also due to the fact that
alternative discourses are not available.9 Siddiqa makes an important
distinction of hybrid religious and socio-political attitudes in which people
are moderate in one dimension and conservative in the other.10 Radicalism,
Siddiqa opines, is a by-product of a popular culture in which social,
political and religious conservatism have been normalized cutting across
educational and socio-economic divides.11

7
Abdul Basit, “Countering Violent-Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s Counter-
Radicalization and De-radicalization Initiatives,” IPRI Journal 15, No. 2 (Summer 2015),
47.
8
Muhammad Amir Rana, “Radicalisation in Pakistani Youth,” Southeast Asia Regional
Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, accessed May 30,
2019, http://www.searcct.gov.my/featured-articles/59-radicalisation-in-pakistani-youth
9
Aisha Siddiqa, “Red Hot Chili Pepper Islam—Is the Youth in Elite Universities in
Pakistan Radical?” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, September 15, 2010: 13.
10
Ibid, 25.
11
Ibid, 14.

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Moeed Yusuf has examined youth radicalization as process along a radical

continuum which has different stages instead of treating it as a set of
characteristics and behaviours. These stages are never neatly distinct and
an individual may move back and forth between different stages, may
never move from pre-radicalization to actual radicalization or may never
progress beyond a particular level.12 Yusuf posits that in Pakistan’s context
education alone is a poor predictor of someone’s radicalization. His
findings categorize most of the Pakistani youth in pre-radicalization stage
on the continuum and outlines frustration with poor socio-economic
conditions, lack of governance, weak writ of the state and politico-
ideological environment created by state’s pro-militancy policy for
regional interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan as main causes of youth
radicalism.13

Farhan Zahid has detailed the socio-economic and educational

backgrounds of educated militants in Pakistan. His analyses have focused
on pro-Islamic State militants of Saad Aziz network involved in
assassinations of noted social worker Sabeen Inam, the Vice-principal of
Jinnah Medical and Dental College Debra Lobo and the attack on the
Ismaili Shia community in Karachi.14 Militants involved in this network
were from affluent, urban backgrounds and had degrees from the Institute
of Business Administration (IBA), Sir Syed University of Engineering and

12
Moeed Yusuf, “Radicalism Among Youth”, 5.
13
Yusuf, “Radicalism Among Youth”, 14.
14
Farhan Zahid, “Radicalisation of Campuses in Pakistan,” Counter Terrorists Trends
and Analyses 9. No. 11 (November 2017): 12-15.

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Technology (SSUET) and the University of Karachi. These militants were

tech-savvy, over-ambitious and self-radicalized.15

A similar but more expansive analysis by Huma Yusuf has discussed

trends driving youth radicalization at campuses, such as university-based
student cells of militant organizations. According to Yusuf, urban Islamist
institutions like Al-Huda, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) and Tanzeem-e-Islami (TI)
have contributed to youth’s spill over into violent-extremism.16 According
to her, given the absence of youth-specific strategies in Pakistan’s counter-
terrorism and extremism framework, educated youth’s radicalization is
likely to continue.17

Finally, Raheem ul Haque holds promotion of closed and homogenized

self-identity in Pakistan’s national narrative as the main cause of youth’s
radicalization. Haque sees this permeation of militant ideologies forming a
pyramid, whose top is occupied by terrorists, middle by religious-political
organizations and the bottom by missionary Islamist outfits. In tandem,
they create an enabling social environment for growth of radical
tendencies among the youth.18 The lack of alternative narratives and world
views coupled with a distorted historical curriculum that glorifies militant
jihad and limited employment opportunities also push youth towards
radicalization in Pakistan.19

15
Farhan Zahid, “Tahir Saeen Group—higher degree militants,” Conflict and Peace
Studies 7, No. 2 (July-December 2015): 151-161.
16
Huma Yusuf, “University Radicalization: Pakistan’s Next Counter Terrorism
Challenge,” CTC Sentinel 9, No. 2 (February 2016): 4-8.
17
Ibid.
18
Haque, “Youth Radicalization”.
19
Ibid.

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Against this backdrop, this paper examines the radical ideological

narrative shaping educated youth’s worldview in Pakistan as well as
characteristics and major trends prevalent among them. The conclusion
offers some policy recommendations as well. The paper has utilized
published primary and secondary sources like profiles of prominent
radicalized youth, book chapters, journal papers and newspaper reportage.
Interviews of subject experts and government officials have also been
conducted to enhance the analysis. The terms radicalization and extremism
have been used interchangeably though there exist subtle distinctions
between them.

Defining and Conceptualizing Traits of Educated Radical Youth in

Pakistan

Haque defines youth radicalization in Pakistan as, “an exclusive Islamic

identity—meaning youth identifying through their religious identity over
nationality—combined with a broader movement comprising of militant,
religio-political and missionary organizations.”20

For Siddiqa, youth radicalism in Pakistan is “the tendency to be exclusive

vis-à-vis other communities on the basis of religious beliefs.”21 Siddiqa
upholds that this may not be manifested in behaviour but in extreme forms
could lead to militancy, which she describes as “latent or passive
radicalism.” It exists as a worldview and attitude in which the individual
develops a bias against “the religious other.”22

20
Haque, “Youth Radicalization”.
21
Siddiqa, “Red Hot Chili Pepper Islam”, 23.
22
Ibid.

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Yusuf defines it as, “youth perception on religiosity, their exclusionary

thinking, religious intolerance, a level of sympathy for—at least lack of
active opposition to—Islamist violence among pockets, an us vs them
conception of the world, and frustration with conditions in the country.”23

Haque’s classification of various radical agents on the radicalism

continuum as loosely-coupled, bridge and encapsulating models are quite
instructive in conceptualizing educated youth’s radicalization in
Pakistan.24

The loosely-coupled model facilitates interaction between the

sympathizers, supporters and militant organizations in a shared space.
Generally, worship places, religious congregations, community platforms
and educational institutions are targeted by militant organizations for
potential recruits. The recruiters look for vulnerable youth who come here
in search of spirituality, to atone for past sins and serve a higher purpose in
life. Missionary organizations and modern Islamist institutions such as
Tableeghi Jamaat (TJ), Tableeghi Ijtima (TI), HT and Al-Huda have
allowed for such interactions between political and militant activists with
lower level sympathizers.25

The bridge model comprises of those institutions and organizations which

close the distance between aspiring jihadists and militant organizations.26
In Pakistan’s context, religious-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI) and its students wing Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (IJT) as well as Jamiat
Ulama-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Sami

23
Yusuf, “Radicalism Among Youth”, 14.
24
Haque, “Youth Radicalization”.
25
Haque, “Youth Radicalization”.
26
Ibid.

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ul Haq (JUI-S) have acted as conduits and political guides for aspiring
radical volunteers to different militant organizations like the Afghan
Taliban, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). These organizations are part of the broader
Deobandi mosque-madrassa network, comprising of missionary and
charity organizations. More radicalized individuals and factions from these
organizations have gravitated towards radical-militarism as well.

The encapsulating model denotes creation of an entire social network to

constitute a large organization. Such organizations comprise of missionary
outfits that disseminate the ideological narratives, charity arms which
deliver social goods and services to win sympathies of the society, political
wings that participate in politics and the militant arms which engage in
militancy.27 Groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa
(JuD) fit in this categorization.

For instance, JuD comprises of a preaching arms with the same name. It
has a network of academies, madrassas and mosques as well as a
humanitarian relief NGO, the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF). The
group has a political party, the Milli Muslim League (MML), as well.

Similarly, JeM has a chain of mosques and madrassas spread throughout

Pakistan, particularly in south Punjab. The organization has a charity arm
Al-Akhtar Trust and its own flagship publication Zarb-e-Momin to
disseminate its ideological narrative. JeM was closely linked with
influential Deobandi madrassa Jamia Binoria in Karachi as well. The
founder of Jamia Binoria, Mufti Nizam-ud-Din Shamzai, was JeM chief

27
Ibid.

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Masood Azhar’s mentor and helped him found the militant outfit after his
release from Indian custody.28

Traits of Educated Radical Youth

Given weak causal links of madrassa education, poverty and religiosity

with radicalization, the traits outlined by Gambetta and Hertog (2016)
might elucidate radicalization of educated Pakistani youth: i.e. disgust,
cognitive closure, in-group and out-group distinction and simplism.
Arguably, personality traits determine (or are correlated to) political
attitudes and perceptions.

a) Disgust

It refers to exclusivism, conservatism, rejection of innovation and a

puritanical approach to politics, culture and religion. Majority of the issues
related to disgust are linked with notions of religious morality and purity.
In this frame of mind, outsiders are deemed to have a corrupting
influence.29

Purity and orderliness are the main concerns of the Islamists. Notions like
“takfir” (excommunicating Muslims from Islam) are invoked to purify the
Muslim community.30 For instance, Islamic State’s massacre of the Yazdi
community in Iraq after declaring the self-styled Caliphate in Iraq in June
2014. Disdain for modernity as Westernism, secularism as an anti-thesis to
Islamic norms of politics and governance and rejection of innovation as
“bid’ah” are other examples of disgust.

28
Farhan Zahid, “Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar,” Counter
Terrorist Trend and Analyses 11, No. 4 (April 2017): 1-5.
29
Deigo Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2016), 130.
30
Ibid, 131.

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The discourse of Muslims’ decline and poor state of affairs in South Asia
was divided between the modernist and the traditionalists. The modernists
like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan advocated embracing science and technology
and learning English to rise again as a community. He was founder of the
Aligarh movement and created a university with the same name to
promote scientific learning, critical thinking and a culture of research. He
also advocated the need to rethink, revive and restructure the religious
ideas, practices and identity. 31

The opposing view was of the traditionalists like Maulana Shibli Numani,
Maududi and others who termed learning of English, science and
technology as adoption of Western culture. The traditionalists were
disgusted with these notions and advocated reverting back to ways of
Muslim forefathers to regain the lost glory. The traditionalist founded
Deoband madrassa and Nadwatul Ulama to restore Shariah system.32 In
1947, Pakistan inherited this debate between modernists represented by
British trained bureaucracy and traditionalists represented by the
traditional Ulema. This polarization has continued in Pakistan in one form
or the other.

b) Cognitive Closure

Cognitive closure refers to quest for order, structure and certainties. It

encompasses “intolerance of ambiguity,” a notion introduced in
connection with authoritarianism. Moreover, it constitutes a very narrow

31
Fatima Sajjad et al., “De-radicalizing Pakistani Society: the receptivity of youth to a
liberal religious worldview,” Journal of Peace Education 14, No. 2 (2017): 4.
32
Fatima Sajjad et al., “De-radicalizing Pakistani Society”.

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and intolerant view entailing political conservatism, hierarchical and

authoritarian vision of social order.33

The cognitive closure provides traditionalists with a unity of mind and

purpose. It reduces a complex world full of chaos, disorder and disruption
into neat structures allowing them to rationalize their message with
articulation.34 Traditionalists hate a world in flux where room for diverse
and multiple identities and co-existence of competing narratives is
possible. To evade this complexity, they evoke the tradition of earliest
forefathers (Salf Salihin) as the purest form of Islam and emphasize on
puritanical interpretation of Quranic texts and the Prophetic tradition of
Ahadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad).

Militants’ rejection of Sufi Islam as bid’ah and stress on literalism

underscore this trend in the Pakistani context. Likewise, opposition to
women’s inclusion in public sphere and incorporation of minorities in the
mainstream by granting them equal rights are seen as conspiracies against
Islam and Pakistan. The slogan of “Islam in danger” or “war on Islam” are
invoked to block any efforts that can challenge this closed and tunnelled
mindset.

c) In-group and Out-group Distinction

This trait relates to an introvert and strong communal bonding whereby

any outside intrusion whether in the form of ideas or people is strongly
resisted. All kinds of externalities are deemed negative and are perceived
to have a corrupting influence.35

33
Gambetta and Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, 132.
34
Ibid, 133.
35
Ibid, 134.

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Individuals with a high cognitive closure like groups with impermeable

boundaries. In-group prejudices and negative attitudes to out-group can
push people to carryout violence against any perceived or real threat.36
This mindset generates a constant sense of fear and insecurity that “Islam
is in danger.” This type of introvert culture which closes the doors on flow
of fresh ideas and information generates conspiracy theories.37

Cognitive closure is positively linked with aggressive actions against the

out-group. The high need for closure predisposes people to see inter-group
relations in “us vs them” way that encourages competition.38 For instance,
Islamists reject Western culture and defend their in-group keeping it
doctrinally or at least culturally pure. Salafist’s preference for ‘al wala wal
bara’ (disavowal and loyalty) which command loyalty towards community
of pure Muslims and rigidly dismisses social contact and cooperation with
everyone else.39

d) Simplism

It pertains to a black-and-white conception of the world seeking simple

and unambiguous answers. This outlook exists on binaries of good-and-
evil, right-and-wrong, Muslims vs non-Muslims etc. A cursory view of
militant organizations’ literature and manuals reveal their penchant for
simplism.40 Over-simplification in one’s beliefs can lead to ideological
extremes. This trait is particularly high among suicide bombers who are

36
Gambetta and Hertog, Engineers of Jihad, 134.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid, 147.

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indoctrinated with the belief that they are martyr-heroes who are glorifying
Islam with their sacrifices and will get paradise and 72 virgins in return. 41

Islamists propagate the over-simplistic notion that revival of Shariah and

Caliphate will automatically fix several complex issues ailing the Muslim
world. They do not offer operational details of how the Shariah system
will work and how a consensus will be created within multiple Islamic
schools of thought who qualitatively differ with each other in their
interpretation of Shariah. Likewise, different militant groups fail to
explain how non-state violence will create a unified global Caliphate when
the global jihadist movement is internally divided between AQ and IS and
various militant organizations in different parts of the world have suffered
internecine and infighting.

Narratives Driving Radicalization among the Educated Youth in

Pakistan

Ideological narratives cut across the literate, semi-literate and illiterate

divide among the youth in Pakistan. These narratives appeal to different
youth groups for different reasons. As radicalization literature indicates
that there is no fixed template that predicts process of radicalization.
Likewise, there is no fixed or linear trajectory that outlines possible route
to radicalization. In fact, there are multiple pathways and one person’s
entry into and trajectory towards radicalization may bypass several stages
of pre-radicalization while there could be several others who may never
progress beyond a particular point or stage on the radicalism continuum.
Similarly, an individual may entertain ideological extremism but may not
exhibit tendency towards behavioural violence, while others could be

41
Ibid, 148.

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ideologically less extreme but due to their trigger happy nature may
indulge in physical violence.42

The ideological indoctrination of an individual or a group of individuals

would qualitatively differ across geographical and social contexts. For
some, revenge for the lost relatives in drone strikes or counter-terrorism
operations may become the reason to join militancy, while for others,
narratives could be the medium helping them in overcoming their identity
issues, such as an urge for belonging, self-worth, empowerment and
atonement from the past sins. So, what is more important is to know how
these narratives are conveyed and by whom.

Generally, narratives are framed in a way to be emotionally appealing,

easy to understand as well as short and crisp. Long and difficult
theological discourses throw people off. In the age of social media,
people’s attention is very short, so the message has to be conveyed
eloquently in a short period of time. It should appeal to aspiring radicals’
wishes, aspirations, fears and expectations and more importantly provide
them with answers to questions buzzing in their minds. Also, narratives
should propose a solution to existing problems.

The most prevalent narratives that different militant and radical groups in
Pakistan have used to recruit educated youth are: Ghazwa-e-Hind/Anti-
Indian, Caliphate, the Black Flags/Banners of Khorasan and anti-
Americanism.

42
Yusuf, “Radicalism Among Youth”, 5.

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a) Ghazwa-e-Hind

The narrative of Ghazwa-e-Hind refers to an eschatological end of times

discourse describing the final battle that will occur in Al-Hind (the Indian
Sub-continent) in the jihadist propaganda. Groups like JeM, AQ and its
affiliate Al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) have used this
narrative to exploit local conflicts like Kashmir to attract recruits for anti-
India and pro-Kashmir militancy.43

A famous Pakistani televangelist Zaid Hamid has also popularized the

Ghazwa-e-Hind narrative in his video speeches and television
programmes. He is quite famous among a segment of Pakistani youth who
follow him on social media and consume his YouTube videos. Several
Facebook pages having thousands of followers have been created in the
name of Ghazwa-e-Hind.44

The concept of Ghazwa-e-Hind is based on three Ahadith of the Prophet

Muhammad which point to a final apocalyptic war that will take place in
India. They speak of the conquest of India as follows:

i) It was narrated by Thawbaan that the Messenger of Allah

(blessings and peace of Allah be upon him) said: “There are two
groups of my Ummah whom Allah will protect from the Fire: a
group who will conquer India, and a group who will be with

43
Husain Haqqani, “Prophecy and the Jihad in the Indian Sub-continent,” Current Trends
in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, March 27, 2015.
44
Amber Rahim Shamsi, “Will the real Zahid Hamid please stand up?” Express Tribune,
May 9, 2010.

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‘Eesaa ibn Maryam.” Narrated by an-Nasaa’i (no. 3175) and Imam

Ahmad in al-Musnad (37/81), Mu’sasat ar-Risaalah edn.45
ii) It was narrated that Abu Hurayrah said: The Messenger of Allah
promised us that we would conquer India, so if I am martyred I will
be among the best of the martyrs, and if I return then I am Abu
Hurayrah the freed (protected from hellfire).46
iii) “Some people of my Ummah will invade India and Allah will
enable them to conquer it, until they bring the kings of India in
chains, and Allah will forgive their sins. Then they will return to
ash-Shaam (Syria) and they will find ‘Eesa ibn Maryam in
Syria.” Narrated by Na‘eem ibn Hammaad in al-Fitan (p. 399).47

b) Caliphate

The Caliphate narrative has been around in Pakistan militant landscape

since the 1990s but it was popularized by Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) after 9/11
when the group started spreading its tentacles in the country and furthered
by the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) after its emergence in 2015.48 The
revival of Caliphate has been promoted as a way out of current
predicaments that ail the Muslim world, in general, and Pakistan, in
particular. It refers to the thirty years rule of four rightly guided
companions of the Prophet Muhammad; Abu Bakr (632–634 CE), Umar
ibn al-Khattab (634–644 CE), Usman ibn Affan (644–656 CE) and Ali ibn
Abi Talib (656–661 CE).
45
Hasan refers to a Hadith which is reliable but whose narrators have not attained the
highest degree of accuracy but they are known for their trustworthiness. Such a Hadith is
also devoid of both anomaly and defect.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Declan Walsh, “Allure of ISIS for Pakistanis Is on the Rise,” New York Times,
November 21, 2014.

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In the 1990s, anti-Shia militant groups such as Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan

(SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) used the Caliphate narrative not as a
system of governance but as an ideological tool to attract young Pakistani
Sunnis and justify militant violence against Shias.49 So, framing of the
Caliphate narrative was very narrow and explicitly anti-Shia.

After 9/11 and with the advent of HT in Pakistan’s religio-political

landscape, Caliphate was promoted as system of governance whose
adoption would revive Muslim world’s lost glory. HT always presented
itself as a political party and its framing of the Caliphate was pan-Islamist,
not sectarian in nature. HT’s utopian concept was to bring about a
revolution in Pakistan through a bloodless coup and then export this
revolution to other parts of the Muslim world. HT explicitly targeted
educated young men and women in colleges, universities and higher
educational institutions. HT attracted a large number of educated youth in
its fold and penetrated Pakistan’s security institution and bureaucracy as
well.50

The arrival of IS took the Caliphate narrative to a whole new level. It was
presented as a global concept and the narrative expanded from anti-Shia to
anti-Sufi militancy as well.51 Moreover, while Deobandi militancy
underpinned the Caliphate narrative in the 1990s, the post-2014 narrative
was spearheaded by Takfiri-Salafism. From 2014 to 2018, IS urged the
young men and women to pledge oath of allegiance to the self-styled

49
Abbas Rashid, “The Politics and Dynamics of Violent Sectarianism,” The
Transnational Institute (TNI), December 1, 1996.
50
Muhammad Amir Rana, “Hizbut Tahrir in Pakistan: Discourse and Impact,” Pak
Institute for Peace Studies, October 2018.
51
Umair Jamal (Lecturer of International Relations at the Forman Christian College),
interviewed by author, Pakistan, May 20, 2019.

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caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.52 However, after territorial losses in Syria

in 2019, IS declared a new Wilayah (province) in Pakistan and appointed a
former Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Dawood Mehsud as
its new emir.53 In this new phase, the Caliphate narrative has urged its
supporters and sympathizers to take revenge for the lost Caliphate in Iraq
and Syria.54

c) The Black Flags of Khorasan

As a concept, Khorasan is an apocalyptic vision that drives many Sunni

radical groups around the world with a belief that at the onset of the End of
Times, an army of the Mujahideen (Islamist fighters) carrying black flags
will rise from Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.55 This narrative has
been supported by a saying of the Prophet Muhammad narrated by the
classical Hadith scholar Ibne Majah (570-632), which talks about the
carriers of black banners or flags from the land of Khorasan representing
true Islamic believers towards the End of Times. He reported that the
Prophet said, “If you see the Black Banners coming from Khorasan go to
them immediately, even if you must crawl over ice, because indeed
amongst them is the Caliph, Al Mehdi [the Messiah] ...and no one can stop

52
Abdul Basit, “IS Penetration in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Assessment, Impact and
Implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, No. 3 (2017), 19-39.
53
Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State announces Pakistan province,” Voice of America, May 15,
2019.
54
Jeff Seldin, “IS Claim Video Shows Reclusive Leader, Calls for Revenge,” Voice of
America, April 29, 2019.
55
Asif Ullah Khan, “Why Khorasan is Such a Potent Call to Islamist Arms,” The Wire,
February 24, 2017.

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that army until it reaches Jerusalem.” It is worth mentioning, though, that

some Islamic scholars contest the authority of the Hadith. 56

Because of this Hadith, jihadists believe that Afghanistan-Pakistan region

is the place from where they will inflict a major defeat against their
enemies in the Islamic version of the Armageddon. This army of the
Mujahideen will help revive the global Islamic Caliphate and Muslims will
once again become the global leaders. Ultimately, according to this
utopian vision, this movement will lead to the End of Time (Day of
Judgement) as a result of a battle between ‘good and evil forces’ where the
latter will be defeated, and God’s judgment will prevail. 57

d) Anti-Americanism

Pakistan features among the countries with highest levels of anti-

Americanism in the world at all levels of state and society. The
transnational allure of anti-Americanism is particularly appealing to
college and university students in Pakistan. A Pew Survey of August 2014
showed that 59 percent of Pakistanis had negative view of the US.58
Pakistani youth across all segments of society believe that US has betrayed
Pakistan and the former has abandoned the latter after its objectives were
achieved.59 The US intervention in Afghanistan and war in Iraq are also
highly unpopular among Pakistan’s youth.

56
Mohamed Bin Ali, “Jihad’ in Syria: Fallacies of ISIS’ End-Time Prophecies,” S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, July 30, 2014.
57
Colleen Curry, “See the Terrifying ISIS Map Showing Its 5-Year Expansion Plan,”
ABC News, July 3, 2014.
58
“A Less Gloomy Mood in Pakistan,” Pew Research Centre, August 27, 2014.
59
Madiha Afzal, “Of Pakistani Anti-Americanism,” Brookings Institute, November 19,
2013.

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Both local and global militant groups have exploited the anti-US
sentiments in Pakistan in their recruitment campaigns.60 The US is framed
as the ultimate evil which is leading the war against Islam. The US drone
strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan, Navy
SEALs operation in Abbottabad to kill Osama Bin Laden, NATO
helicopters’ attack on paramilitary Frontier Corps’ (FC) check post in
Salala and killing of the two Pakistanis by a Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) contractor, Raymond Davis, in Lahore have created a deep seated
mistrust of the US in Pakistan.61

In Pakistan, there are several conspiracy theories about American troops’

presence in Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistanis allege that under the garb
of war on terror, the US is after Pakistan’s nuclear programme. 62 The
continuous concerns raised from different American quarters about the
safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and their potential theft
by the militant groups have only strengthened the anti-US conspiracy
theories.63

Emerging Trends from Radicalization of Educated Youth

a) Students Cells of Militant Organizations

Three factors explain increasing levels of radicalization and recruitment at

college and university campuses in Pakistan. First, as madrassas faced
increased scrutiny from the government under the National Action Plan

60
Hassan Abbas, “How Drones Create More Terrorists?” The Atlantic, August 23, 2013.
61
Hussain Nadim, “Neither Friend Nor Foe: Pakistan, the United States, and the War in
Afghanistan,” Working Paper, Lowy Institute, September 2017.
62
Michael Kugelman, “Four Pakistani Conspiracy Theories That Are Less Fictitious
Than You Think,” War on the Rocks, March 25, 2014.
63
Sabrian Tavernise, “US Is a Top Villain in Pakistan’s Conspiracy Talk?” New York
Times, May 5, 2010.

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(NAP), militant organizations shifted their attentions towards college and

university campuses. Second, IS has focused more on cities thus further
enabling recruitment and radicalization of educated youth.64 In the age of
social media, militant organizations look for college and university
educated youth who could run their propaganda operations on the Internet,
recruit people and raise funds online. Third, inclusive recruitment
strategies by IS have lowered the entry barrier into militancy for several
educated youth in Pakistan. 65

According to Farhan Zahid, jihadist cells linked with different militant

organizations have been discovered in different reputed institutions and
universities such as University of Karachi, Punjab University (PU),
International Islamic University (IIU), NED University of Engineering and
Technology, Institute of Business Administration (IBA) and Bahauddin
Zakariya University (BZU), among others.

After 9/11, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) faced internal dissections for not taking a
clear stance on US intervention in Afghanistan.66 JI’s student wing, the
Islami Jamiat-e-Talba (IJT), in University of Karachi led by Atta ur
Rehman formed a pro-AQ militant faction Jandullah. This faction was
involved in a series of attacks on security forces and government
installations in Karachi.67 Rehman was a student of statistics at University
of Karachi. Likewise, the mastermind of the Mehran Naval base attack in

64
Yusuf, “University Radicalization”, 1. Cities offer more lucrative targets to militant
outfits and increase the security maintenance costs for the security agencies. Moreover,
terrorist attack in the cities attract immediate media attention.
65
Madeeha Anwar, “Pakistan’s Emerging Threat: Highly Educated Youth Gravitate to
Radicalization,” Voice of America, May 6, 2017.
66
Ali K. Chishti, “How Jandullah became Al-Qaeda,” The Friday Times, November 14,
2014.
67
Saad Rasool, “IJT and Educational Militancy,” Pakistan Today, September 21, 2013.

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May 2011, Shahid Khan, was also a former member of IJT and a
prominent leader of the organization. He was a working journalist and held
a masters in Political Science degree from the University of Karachi.68

Similarly, two brothers, Dr. Akmal Waheed and Dr. Arshad Waheed,
hailing from JI’s Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA) were
arrested in 2004 on accusations of treating AQ and Jandullah militants.69
The Waheed brothers recruited a large number of the IJT activists from
different educational institutions of Karachi and moved them to South
Waziristan. They were arrested and released by Pakistani authorities in
2006 after which they moved to South Waziristan. In 2006, Arshad was
killed in a US drone attack, while Akmal moved to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) with his family where he was sentenced to three years in
prison for communicating with senior AQ members.70

In 2013, another AQ linked cell of International Islamic University (IIU)

students was busted in Islamabad. The cell was active since 2007 and
carried out a number of terrorist attacks in collusion with Al-Qaeda,
including the assassination of former minister for minorities and the
Pakistan People Party (PPP) lawmaker Shahbaz Bhatti.71 It was led by
Abdullah Omar, a student of Sharia Law at IIU and son of a former
military officer Colonel Abbasi. He was assisted by two brothers Hammad

68
Ziaur Rehman, “Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi,” CTC Sentinel 5, No. 7
(July 2012), 9.
69
Ibid.
70
“Drone deaths underline IJT’s Jihadi Links,” The News, November 22, 2014.
71
Asad Haroon, “Al-Qaeda presence in Islamabad and has Sleeping Cells, says a report
of government of Pakistan,” Dispatch News Desk, February 19, 2014.

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Adil and Adnan Adil who were also students of IIU’s Shariah Law
department.72

Likewise, another AQ linked nine-member cell was neutralized in

Lahore’s Punjab University in 2013. Once again, the nexus between IJT
and AQ surfaced.73 The post-arrest investigation revealed that AQ
members were hiding in Punjab University’s hostel with IJT’s help.74 Six
of the nine arrested militants were suicide bombers, two collaborators with
expertise in information technology and IED production, as well as the
coordinator of the cell. The cell members held their meetings on campus.75

In 2015, a self-initiated pro-IS cell of university student was dismantled in

Karachi following the attack on a bus of Ismaili Shia community in
Safoora Chorangi in which 46 people were killed. The ringleader of the
cell, Saad Aziz, was a graduate of Pakistan’s famous business school, the
Institute of Business Administration (IBA), and hailed from an upper-
middle class family. Other members of this cell such as Azhar Ishrat and
Allure Rehman, were engineering graduates from SSUET and the
University of Science and Technology (NUST). Another cell member,
Hafiz Nasir held a master’s degree in Islamic studies from University of
Karachi.76 This cell was also involved in targeted killing of noted social

72
Farhan Zahid, “Al-Qaeda’s Islamabad Cell,” Centre for Research and Security Studies,
January 28, 2015.
73
“Al-Qaeda suspect arrested from PU hostel,” Pakistan Today, September 17, 2013.
74
Ali Usman and Asad Kharal, " Punjab University: Consensus against IJT grew from al
Qaeda man’s arrest,” Express Tribune, December 4, 2013.
75
Asad Kharal, “Startling Revelations: Nine Al-Qaeda suspects arrested,” Express
Tribune, September 11, 2013.
76
Sadaf Ayub, “Why does a university-educated student turn to terrorism?” Dawn, April
8, 2017.

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workers Sabeen Mahmood and Debra Lobo, a US citizen, then working as

vice principal of Jinnah Medical and Dental College.77

Aziz was member of IBA’s religious society Iqra where Rehman

introduced him to TI and subsequently to an AQ operative Abu Zar who
recruited him in 2010.78 In 2011, Aziz went to North Waziristan where he
was trained by Ustad Ahmed Faruq, the deputy chief of AQIS and a
graduate of Punjab University himself.79 On his return to Karachi, Aziz
started his own cell and planned attacks with operational autonomy and
liberty.80

b) Nexus of Religious-political Parties with Militancy

Religious-political parties which in the 1980s and 1990s had links with
Afghan jihadist groups and sectarian outfits, intentionally or
unintentionally, have served as conduits for conversion of radical youth
from non-violent to violent extremism. Right after 9/11, their inaction or
confused stance on Pakistan’s decision to side with the US in the war on
terror and a soft corner for TTP and other such groups encouraged youth
from within these parties to switch sides from so-called ‘good Taliban’ to
‘bad-Taliban’.

JI’s links with different militant organizations dates back to the Afghan
Jihad when it supported Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami. The
Kashmir-focused militant group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is considered
JI’s militant wing, a charge that party denies. As many as twenty-three

77
Nazila Syed Ali and Fahim Zaman, “Anatomy of a murder,” Herald, September 25,
2016.
78
Hussain Nadim, “Pakistan’s New Breed of Militants,” Foreign Policy, June 9, 2015.
79
Ustad Farooq was eliminated in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in 2015 .
80
Sidra Roghay, “The many shades of Saad Aziz,” The Friday Times, June 5-7, 2011.

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most wanted AQ members, including the mastermind of 9/11 attacks

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, were arrested from homes of JI leaders in
different parts of Pakistan.81 As mentioned above, JI’s student wing IJT
played the role of a bridge in facilitating graduation of several educated
radicals into militancy.

Likewise, JUI (F) and JUI (S) have remained political guide and conduits
for radical youth towards militancy. For instance, the former deputy chief
of TTP, late Waliur Rehman was member of JUI (F) before turning
towards militancy.82 In 2013, he was killed in a drone attack in Miranshah,
capital of North Waziristan Agency.83 Similarly, militant commander and
head of his own faction Hafiz Gul Bahadur was previously affiliated with
JUI (F).84

Likewise, late Maulana Sami-ul-Haq’s JUI (S) is well known for its links
and support for the Afghan Taliban.85 Sami was considered the spiritual
father and ideological mentor of the Taliban movement.86 Several
members of Taliban’s Rahbari Shura (executive council) studied in Sami’s
Jamia Haqqania in Nowshera district.87

81
Imtiaz Gul, “Transnational Islamist Network,” International Review of Red Cross 92,
No. 880 (December 2010), 3.
82
Mansur Khan Mehsud, “The new, new face of the Pakistani Taliban,” Foreign Policy,
April 30, 2010.
83
“Pakistan Taliban: Senior leader 'killed in US drone strike,” BBC, May 29, 2013.
84
Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan
Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor 7, No. 9 (Jamestown Foundation, April 2009).
85
“Father of the Taliban calls on China to aid Afghan peace talks, “South China Morning
Post, October 28, 2018.
86
Ali Mustafa, “Who was father of the Taliban?” TRT World, November 6, 2018.
87
“Mulla Omar didn’t study at Haqqania, but many other Taliban leaders did,” The News,
November 3, 2018.

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c) Modern Islamist Networks

Some missionary organizations and Islamist networks operating in

Pakistan’s urban spaces have played a bridging role in movement of
aspiring radicals from non-violent to violent extremism.88 These
organizations have provided spaces and platforms for interaction between
militant recruiters, facilitators and would-be radicals. Given stark
similarities in the worldviews and ideological outlooks of these
organizations and militant groups, the more overambitious youth from
within these organizations have gravitated towards militancy.89 The tussle
between the old and new generation within these organizations could also
be a reason that the more rebellious and critical youth have defected to
militant organizations. The new generation considers the old one as status
quo oriented, outdated and complacent.

A case in point is of TI, an urban missionary organization, whose members

have joined different militant organization. TI has been in the crosshair of
fierce competition between AQ and IS for educated recruits in the main
Pakistani cities to spread their networks. TI has long called for
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Pakistan. For instance, members
of Saad Aziz cell had links with TI.90 The main financier of this cell Adil
Masood Butt, who ran the College of Accountancy and Management
Sciences (CAMS) in Karachi, was a former member of TI.91 Similarly, two

88
Author interview with Saba Noor, Lecturer at the Department of Peace and Conflict
Studies, National Defence University (NDU), Pakistan, on May 5, 2019.
89
Mehwish Rani (independent researcher working on extremism and terrorism in
Pakistan), interviewed by author, May 4, 2019.
90
Farhan Zahid, “Pakistan’s Tanzeem-e-Islami and Its Troubled Extremist Links,”
Terrorism Monitor 15, No. 21 (Jamestown Foundation, November 2017), 5-7.
91
“Al-Qaeda financer arrested in Karachi’s Defence raid,” Pakistan Today, September
17, 2015.

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other financiers, Sheeba Ahmed and Khalid Yousaf Bari, were also TI
members.92

Likewise, members of a neutralized AQ cell in Karachi (JAS) were former

members of TI. The leader of JAS, Abdul Kareem Saroosh Siddiqui, is a
drop out from University of Karachi’s Applied Physics department. This
cell was involved in a string of terrorist attacks in Karachi, including the
abortive assassination attempt on the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
leader Khawaja Izhar-ul-Hasan and killing of a retired military officer
Colonel Tahir Zia Nagi.93

HT has also faced defections of its overambitious members to AQ. In

2016, a splinter of HT, Saut-ul-Ummah, was in connection with AQ and its
affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to create a similar franchise in Pakistan.
However, these efforts did not succeed and this splinter cell was
neutralized.94 HT primarily focuses on Pakistan’s educated youth in
colleges, universities and higher education institutions. It romanticizes the
idea of the Caliphate as the ideal rule which offers the youth a panacea out
of current predicaments. The group operates with great secrecy in Pakistan
to avoid arrests and crackdowns.95

HT particularly gained notoriety for making inroads in Pakistan’s security

institutions and bureaucracy. In 2011, a serving officer of a Law
Enforcement Agency (LEA), Muhammad Ali, who opposed Pakistan’s

92
Naimat Khan, “Terrorist moms,” Friday Times, December 25, 2015.
93
Roohan Ahmed, “What we know about Ansar-ul-Shariah Pakistan,” Sama Digital,
September 9, 2017.
94
Jawad R Awan, “Saut-ul-Ummat rings alarm bells in Pakistan,” The Nation, February
27, 2016.
95
Tariq Pervez (former head of Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority /
NACTA), interviewed by author, May 15, 2019.

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counter-terrorism alliance with the US was arrested with four other

officers for having links with HT. In 2003, HT established link with a
specialized force unit and in 2009 recruited several officers, including their
senior.96

In April 2015, Punjab’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) arrested an

assistant professor of the Lahore University of Management Sciences
(LUMS) for his inks with HT.97 Similarly, in October 2015 Karachi police
arrested Owais Raheel for distributing HT’s pamphlets in the mosques of
city’s elite residential areas like Clifton and Defence.98 Likewise, in
December 2015, Punjab’s CTD arrested threes professors and a student
from Punjab University on suspected ties with HT.99

Conclusion

The radicalization of educated youth in Pakistan is directly correlated to

state’s pro-militancy policies in the past which fostered a conducive
environment for growth of radicalism. A revision of strategic paradigm
which has afforded physical and ideological spaces to different militant
groups is needed. Mere doctrinal shift in counter-terrorism and extremism
policies at the tactical level can deliver temporary respite but for a long-
term solution structural reforms are necessary.

The current youth bulge in Pakistan is likely to continue for the next three
decades. By 2030, Pakistan’s population is expected to rise to 230 million
and to 280 million by 2050. Youth is the most important population
96
Yusuf, “University Radicalization”, 6.
97
Sher Ali Khan, “Global connections: The crackdown on Hizbut Tahrir intensifies,”
Herald, February 12, 2016.
98
Yusuf, “University Radicalization”.
99
“Two more PU teachers, student held for links with Hizbut Tahrir,” Pakistan Today,
December 15, 2015.

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segment in Pakistan and it will either become an asset or a liability

depending on how we develop this human capital. Following
recommendations offer some policy areas where focus is needed to curb
youth radicalization.

i) Violent vs Non-violent Extremism

The policy discourse on radicalization in Pakistan needs to be expanded

from violent-extremism to non-violent extremism. In the light of foregoing
analysis, it is quite clear that due to identical ideological outlooks, non-
violent extremist organizations such as TI and HT have faced defections of
their members to militant groups. Violent and non-violent extremism are
two sides of the same coin: one is action-based extremism, the other is
value-based extremism. Goals of violent and non-violent extremists are
more or less the same. Likewise, both have similar political and
ideological narratives. As such, non-violent extremists do not rule out
violence, but de-emphasize it as a matter of strategy, not principle.
Targeted policy-interventions are needed to plug existing gaps in the
operations of these organizations along with initiating a dialogue for
internal reforms.

ii) Counter Narratives

Threat of cyber radicalization in Pakistan is real and requires monitoring

of cyber communities where extremist narratives are discussed,
disseminated and promoted. Militant recruiters easily reach out to students
through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Telegram and Instagram.
There are around 40 million Internet and as many as 32 million Facebook
users in Pakistan. Social media has lowered the entry barriers of youth’s
participation in militancy. Pakistan’s counter-extremist responses have to

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factor in strategies dealing with dissemination of radical narratives in

social media and cyber space.

Pakistan’s education system does not equip students with critical thinking
to question the sources of information and look for alternative discourses
to find their answers. There is a need to build a national counter-narrative
and cultivate an environment of open conversations on issues considered
taboos in Pakistan.100 Alternative narratives promoting pluralism,
inclusivity and diversity presenting a moderate outlook of Islam should be
promoted.101

iii) Evidence-based Research on Radicalization

There is very little data available in Pakistan to carryout evidence-based

research on radicalization and de-radicalization and to empirically map the
success or failure of de-radicalization initiatives. State should allow
rigorous profiling of terrorists that could lead to generalizable conclusions
about the process of radicalization in Pakistan.

iv) Liberal-religious Education

Given Pakistan’s conservative religious framework any alternative

discourse offered in secular framing will be rejected by a large majority.102
However, if the same message pertaining to pluralism, inclusivity,
tolerance, respect for diversity and religious freedom are packaged in a
religious framework with quotes from Quran and the Prophetic traditions,
such as there is no compulsion in the religion, people are more likely to

100
Madiha Afzal ,”Education and Attitudes in Pakistan: Understanding Perception of
Terrorism,” Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, April 2015.
101
Siddiqa, “Red Hot Chili Pepper Islam”, 8.
102
Fatima Sajjad et al., p. 17.

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accept, absorb and adopt such messaging. Secularly oriented counter

narratives are bound to fail as seen in the past with former President
General (retired) Pervez Musharraf’s initiative of enlightened moderation.
In 2018, the launch of counter-extremist narrative Paigham-e-Pakistan
endorsed by more than 1,800 religious scholars is an encouraging step.103
There is a need to work on its operational strategy which should ensure its
judicious implementation throughout the country.

Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow (ARF) at the International

Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a
constituent of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

103
“Paigham-i-Pakistan,” Dawn, January 18, 2018.

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