PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

F. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots
Property from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery
to them. The trial court sustained the claim of the
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the defendants and rendered the following judgment:
conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court the property subject of the present litigation;
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be
implementing such decision. without merit and is therefore hereby ordered dismissed;

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of amount of P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees and
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume to pay the costs of the suit."
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority CA Reversed the Decision.
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, ISSUE: WON the disposition of the CPG is valid
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the RULING:
third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn effect of a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal
by either or both offerors. (165a) partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
husband.
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal
partnership property without the consent of the other. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
However, either spouse may, without the consent of partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain
the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
partnership property for charity or on occasions of any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
family rejoicing or family distress. (174a) wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot
bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172,
120 SCRA 628 (1983) Idem.).

FACTS: In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands

belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936.
consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by
The spouses bought several pieces of land
the phrase "except in cases provided by law."
sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the
lands were divided into three lots.
Contract:
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the
spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe. In the instant case Gimena had no capacity to give
The sale was made without the consent of her consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give
husband, Maximo. consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, both spouses.
namely his widow Gimena and their children Sofia
and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable
First Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. contract is supported by the legal provision that
contracts entered by the husband without the consent of
They alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of
the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at
Lots and that they had orally mortgaged the same to
her instance during the marriage and within ten years
the defendants; and an offer to redeem the
from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.).
mortgage had been refused so they filed the
complaint in order to recover the three parcels of
land. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage
||| because he was the victim who had an interest in the
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the TINITIGAN vs TINITIGAN, SR.
defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children 100 SCRA 619 (1980)
could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract
while the marriage subsisted because they merely had Facts:
an inchoate right to the lands sold.
Teofista Payuran Tinitigan first entered into a contract of
lease of a residential house and on the second time,
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of
together with her three children leased a factory building
the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon
together a portion of lan where it is erected to United
did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could
Electronics Corporation.
not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After Sr. the husband of Teofista Tinitigan was not secured.
the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question As a result, he filed a complaint for Annulment of
the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal.
hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The
father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their The case was then set for hearing and the contract of
share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) lease was settled amicably. Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial
pertaining to the widow. approval of sale of the two rented house and lot which
are conjugal property where the court granted.
their shares of the lands as stated in the body of this
decision; and the petitioners as possessors in bad faith Teofista filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
shall make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the Loring property is suitable for condo site and
the share aforementioned from 1959 and solidarily pay commands a higher price. Days after, Teofista filed for
their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon legal separation but agreed to the continuation of the
administration of the conjugal property but subject to
certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall
be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal.

(the lots having been purchased during the existence of Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioner's motion for lack of
the marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that
inferentially, by force of law, could not, be disposed of by the order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Teofista
a wife without her husband's consent." and her children then filed a petition for certiorari at the
CA which it affirmed.
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY WIFE WITHOUT
CONSENT OF HUSBAND, VOIDABLE; CASE AT BAR. Issue:
— The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. Subject to certain exceptions, the husband WON the order authorizing Tinitigan Sr. to sell the Loring
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the property is void
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. And the
Ruling:
wife can not bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. In NO. The order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring
the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging property is not void. The court held according to Article
to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the 171 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the
husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal
"except in cases provided by law." Therefore, the sale partnership even without the consent of the wife if the
made by Gimena is a defective contract falling within the sale is necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability
category of a voidable one, as contracts entered by the which might endanger the family’s economic standing.
wife without the consent of the husband when such This is one instance where the wife’s consent is not
consent is required, are annullable at his instance during required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is
the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction necessary.
questioned.
In this case, the sale of the property was the surest and
the most practical means resorted to by the respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to save them from a serious financial
setback.

 Pasay Court issued an order dated August 29,

1977 dissolving the conjugal partnership and
approving the partition of their properties
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

pursuant to an agreement. The Loring property These powers do not include the powers of disposition
was adjudicated in favor of the wife Payuran. or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse.
GUIANG vs CA
291 SCRA 372 (1998) In this case, the consent of Gilda is absent and it
provides that in the absence of such authority or
Facts: consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were legally married ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL
where they had three children. WIthin their marriage, PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; SETTLEMENT DOES
they bought a lot in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos Bo. NOT MENTION A CONTINUING OFFER TO SELL
1, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Years passed by, the PROPERTY OR ACCEPTANCE THEREOF; CASE AT
Corpuzes sold one-half of their lot to petitioner-spouses BAR. — Neither can the "amicable settlement" be
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. considered a continuing offer that was accepted and
perfected by the parties, following the last
However, when Gilda was in Manila looking for work sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent
abroad Judie sold the remaining one-half portion of the events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a
lot including the house standing thereon to the Guiang complaint for trespassing against private respondent,
spouses. after which the barangay authorities secured an
"amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the
When Gilda returned home, she then filed a complaint MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
before the RTC for the nullification of the deed of sale however, does not mention a continuing offer. Its tenor
executed by her husband. In response to Gilda's filed was to the effect that private respondent would vacate
case in the RTC declaring the deed of transfer of rights the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can
involving the conjugal property of her and her husband the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
null and void for it was executed without her consent. mentioned in Article 124.
Guiang executed an amicable settlement to ratify the
deed of transfer of rights. RTC rendered a decision in
RELUCIO vs LOPEZ
favor of Gilda declaring the deed of rights and the
373 SCRA 578 (2001)
execution of amicable settlement null and void and of no
effect. Petitioners argues that contracts entered into Facts:
where consent of one party is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for Appointment as
voidable and are binding, unless annulled but they are Sole Administratix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties,
susceptible of ratification. Forfeiture, etc. against defendant Alberto Lopez and
petitioner Imelda Relucio.
Issue:
In her petition, the respondent Angelina Lopez alleged
WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly that Alberto Lopez, is legally married to her but
executed abandoned her and their four legitimate children.
Ruling: She contends that Alberto arrogated upon himself the
full and exclusive control and administration of their
NO. Art. 124 of the Family Code provides that the
conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his
administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of her and
property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
their four children while maintaining an illicit relationship
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall and cohabited with petitioner Imelda Relucio.
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by Relucio on
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
the ground that Lopez has no cause of action against
years from the date of the contract implementing such
her.
decision.
Respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s Motion
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
necessary or indispensable party because some of the
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
subject properties are registered in her name and
sole powers of administration.
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals
likewise denied.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Issue: her mind as she did not agree with the term of payments
by the petitioner.
WON respondent's petition for appointment as sole
administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. Thelma, herein filed a complaint for specific performance
against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a against the spouses Camaisa to compel the wife to sign
cause of action against petitioner the contract to sell. Norma Camaisa filed a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court rendered a summary
Ruling: judgment dismissing the complaint. In response, Thelma
Jader- Manalo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
NO. Respondent's petition against her husband did not where it affirmed the dismissal of the case.
establish a cause of action against petitioner. The
causes of the action are for the judicial appointment of Issue:
Angelina as administratrix of the conjugal partnership
arising from her marriage to Alberto, it is for the WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
accounting of the conjugal partnership, for the forfeiture property without the wife's written consent
of Alberto's share in the co-owned property acquired
during his illicit relationship with Imelda and for support Ruling:
and moral damages. With all of these, Imelda is a
complete stranger. The administration of the property of NO. The court ruled that the husband cannot validly
the marriage is entirely between the spouses, to the dispose a conjugal preoperty without the wife's written
exclusion of all other persons and the cause of action consent.
pertains only to Alberto. In this case, Imelda is not a real
party in interest, neither can she be an indispensable The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal
party, nor a necessary party in the petition filed by property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
Angelina. cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,
the disposition is void.
Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to
wit: "If a spouse without just cause abandons the other The authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance
or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, of a conjugal property without the consent of the other
the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for spouse is applicable only in cases where the said
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
partnership property . . ." The administration of the
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that
consent to the contracts.
Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first
cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no
right- duty relation between petitioner and respondent CONJUGAL PROPERTY; DISPOSITION BY THE
that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none HUSBAND REQUIRES WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE
of the three elements of a cause of action exists WIFE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The law
requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the
husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires
the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition
JADER-MANALO vs CAMAISA is void. The properties subject of the contracts in this
374 SCRA 498 (2002) case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
Facts: concur.

Thelma A. Jader-Manalo, the petitioner allegedly came

across an advertisement placed by respondents, the VILLANUEVA vs. CHIONG
Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto 554 SCRA 197 (2008)
Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper
for the sale of a ten-door apartment owned by herein Facts:
respondents.
Florentino and Elisera Chiong, the respondents were
After the purchase price and the term of payments married but got separated. Within their marriage, they
agreed upon by the petitioner and the respondent's acquired a lot. However, years after they got separated,
husband, a contract to sell was prepared. The husband Florentino sold the one-half of the property to the
signed the contract, but unfortunately the wife changed petitioners Walter and Aurora Villanueva where they
were allowed to build a store and house. Upon the last
payment of the agreed amount, the Chiongs demanded
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

the execution of a deed of sale where Elisera refused to Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and
sign. Elisera then filed a complaint for quietitng of title authority of Enrico.
while in response, the Villanuevas filed for a complaint RTC further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from
for specific performance. Florentino executed the Deed recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a
of Abolsolute sale but was annulled by the RTC and personal action against her.
ordered the petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all However, the RTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over
improvements therein. Petitioners Villanueva sought for the personal action which should be filed in the place
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals affirmed the where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in
trial court’s decision. The petitioners contend that the accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
RTC and CA erred in declaring the deed of sale on Civil Procedure.
executed by Florentino Chiong in favor as null and void
and void as well as holding that the lot in question is The Lindo spouses prayed for the dismissal of the case
conjugal property.
on the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping. They
Issue: admitted the loan but stated that it only amounted to Php
340K and further alleged that Enrico was not a party to
WON the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent the loan since it was contracted by Edna without his
valid?
signature. This was dismissed by the RTC. The spouses
Ruling: then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

NO. the sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is The CA set aside the decision of the RTC for having
not valid. Article 160 of the Civil Code, provides that all been issued with grave abuse of discretion. They also
property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, ruled that Flores had only one cause of action against
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the Edna for her failure to pay her obligation which he could
husband or to the wife. According to Art. 166 of Civil not split by separately filing: (1) a foreclosure of
Code , the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is mortgage and (2) a collection of sum of money.
necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid.
In this case, one of the requisites which is the consent of
The creditor has a single cause of action against the
Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold
the lot and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. debtor. Thus, Flores may institute 2 alternative
remedies: collection or foreclosure BUT NOT BOTH.
Flores filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same.
FLORES v LINDO
Issue: Whether the CA committed an error in dismissing
Facts the complaint for the collection of sum of money on the
ground of multiplicity of suits (usually no but in this case
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a YES
loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to
P400,000 payable on 1 December 1995 with 3%
compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in Ruling:
case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (the Deed) While it is true that a mortgagee-creditor has a single
covering a property in the name of Edna and her cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to
husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively,
recover the debt and that he has the option of either
respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note
and the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or
attorney-in-fact. instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security,
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the
loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of the court, in this case, made a pro hac vice decision
funds, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for (applicable only to this case; an exception to the rule)
Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the
respondents. balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person
RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
foreclosure of the mortgage. The RTC found that the The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under
Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Art. 22.Every person who through an act of

performance by another, or any other means, partnership property, subject to such precautionary
acquires or comes into possession of conditions as the court may impose.
something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to
The obligations to the family mentioned in the
him.
preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
There is unjust enrichment "when a person property relations.
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
and good conscience." The principle of unjust intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and failed within the same period to give any information
(2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
another. presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a)

G. DISSOLUTION OF CPG
H. LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, the following procedure shall
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
apply:

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately
all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or exclusive properties of each spouse.

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a) payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership
Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and as an asset thereof.
wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal
partnership, except that: (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his
or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the
refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not ownership of which has been vested by law in the
have the right to be supported; conjugal partnership.

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal
transaction of the other is required by law, judicial partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In
authorization shall be obtained in a summary case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall
proceeding; be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties, in accordance with the provisions
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
property, the separate property of both spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of
spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or them.
encumber any specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from
satisfy the latter’s share. (178a) whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables
used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to
other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a partnership, and other matters which are not
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)
marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as Art. 133. From the common mass of property support
provided in this Code. shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance but from this shall be deducted that amount received
with Article 51. for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining
to them. (188a)
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be SENTERO v CFI OF CAVITE
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of 153 SCRA 728 (1987)
the common children choose to remain. Children
below the age of seven years are deemed to have FACTS
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales,
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court
Federico Santero and Willy Santero are the children
shall decide, taking into consideration the best
begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta
interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a,
Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
185a)
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four
of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of neither of their mothers, was married to their father
the estate of the deceased. Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November
30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda.
surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal de Santero who died in 1976. prcd
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within six months from the death of the deceased Meanwhile before We could act on the
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no instant petition private respondents filed another
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the
involving the conjugal partnership property of the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and
terminated marriage shall be void. Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late
Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an
order be granted directing the administrator
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of
marriage without compliance with the foregoing P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of
separation of property shall govern the property Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted the
relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) motion of the private respondents but oppositors
(petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider
Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal said Order.
partnership properties of two or more marriages
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of ||| an Amended Order was issued by respondent Court
this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or
capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be explanation as to the additional three (3) children of
determined upon such proof as may be considered Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In compliance
according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating
to which partnership the existing properties belong, among others that in her previous motions, only the last
the same shall be divided between the different four minor children as represented by the mother,
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support
of each. (189a) and her first three (3) children who were then of age
should have been included since all her children have
the right to receive allowance as advance payment of
Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of
estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
Art. 188, of the New Civil Code. father Pablo Santero.

Petitioners argue that private respondents are not Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law,
entitled to any allowance since they have already gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right
attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of
one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83
the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.
misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the
for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law
materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school spouses who are the mothers of the children here).
term 1982-83 because these wards have already
attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship.

ISSUE: WON the respondents are entitled of the support

RULING:

GO v GO
YES. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83,
GR No. 157537 (2011)
Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and
188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
Facts
The fact that private respondents are of age,
gainfully employed, or married is of no moment
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola
and should not be regarded as the determining
sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140
factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio
While the Rules of Court limit
B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or
"Art. 290. Support is everything that is on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he
and medical attendance, according to the social affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio
position of the family. Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased
the two parcels of land (the property).
Support also includes the education of the
person entitled to be supported until he On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go
completes his education or training for some died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the the petitioners.
age of majority." On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and
his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito's wife Dina B. Go)
"Art. 188. From the common mass of property
sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560
support shall be given to the surviving spouse
square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for
and to the children during the liquidation of the
P5,686,768.00.
inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
deducted that amount received for support demanded the return of the property, but Servacio
which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to refused to heed their demand. After barangay
them." proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued
Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in
The fact that the private respondents are age, gainfully Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the
employed or married is of no moment and should not be annulment of the sale of the property.
regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowances under Art. 188. The petitioners averred that following
Protacio, Jr.'s renunciation, the property became
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow conjugal property; and that the sale of the property
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta
children without distinction. Hence, the private was null and void.
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, the consent of the other co-owners was not
Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he necessarily void, for the rights of the selling
had purchased it with his own money. co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-
owner of Marta's share.
ISSUE: WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio
was void for being made without prior liquidation
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that
RULING: since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire
Article 130. Upon the termination of the
property by one co-owner without the
marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
consent of the other co-owners is not null
property shall be liquidated in the same
and void. However, only the rights of the co-
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making
the deceased.
the buyer a co-owner of the property.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is
instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either The proper action in cases like this is not for
judicially or extra-judicially within one year the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
from the death of the deceased spouse. If of possession of the thing owned in common
upon the lapse of the six month period no from the third person who substituted the co-
liquidation is made, any disposition or owner or co-owners who alienated their
encumbrance involving the conjugal shares, but the DIVISION of the common
partnership property of the terminated property as if it continued to remain in the
marriage shall be void. possession of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Should the surviving spouse contract a
subsequent marriage without compliance with Thus, it is now settled that
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory the appropriate recourse of co-
regime of complete separation of property owners in cases where their
shall govern the property relations of the consent were not secured in a
subsequent marriage. sale of the entire property as well
as in a sale merely of the
Article 493.Each co-owner shall have the full
undivided shares of some of the
ownership of his part and of the fruits and
co-owners is an action for
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
Revised Rules of Court.
even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
to him in the division upon the termination of property, holding that: ". . . As long as the portion
the co-ownership. (399) sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to
the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or
to state it plainly, as long as the portion sold does
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs,
with his children in respect of Marta's share in it is valid." 10 Quoting Tolentino's commentary on
the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert the matter as authority, 11 the RTC opined:
or claim title to any specific portion of Marta's
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil
share without an actual partition of the
Code regarding the dissolution of the conjugal
property being first done either by agreement
partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
says" [sic]
was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's
share. 18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell "Alienation by the survivor. — After the death of
his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to
the right to freely sell and dispose of his sell any portion of the community property in
undivided interest, but not the interest of his order to pay outstanding obligation of the
co-owners. 19 Consequently, the sale by partnership, such sale must be made in the
Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without manner and with the formalities established by
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of

the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer,
alienation or disposition of said property affected
without said formalities shall be null and void,
except as regards the portion that belongs to the
vendor as determined in the liquidation and
partition. Pending the liquidation, the disposition
must be considered as limited only to the
contingent share or interest of the vendor in the
particular property involved, but not to the
corpus of the property.

This rule applies not only to sale but also to

mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or disposal
of the conjugal property without the required
formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the
law recognizes their validity so long as they do
not exceed the portion which, after liquidation
and partition, should pertain to the surviving
spouse who made the contract."