Justice and Security Sector Reform

BCPR’S PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH

November 2002
Table of Contents

Page

Executive Summary ............................................................................................... i

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 2

I Human Development and Justice and Security

Sector Reform ............................................................................................. 3

II BCPR and Justice and Security Sector Reform ........................................... 5

III BCPR’s Justice and Security Sector Reform Approach................................ 7

IV Good Governance in BCPR’s Justice and Security Sector Approach ..........13

Introduction

The Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has established a Justice
and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) team to provide technical support and assistance to
Regional Bureaux and Country Offices. This paper outlines BCPR’s JSSR strategy and
programmatic approach.

The paper is organized as follows. Section I establishes the linkage between human
development and justice and security sector reform. Section II places JSSR within the
context of BCPR’s overall approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Section
III lays out BCPR’s approach to justice and security sector reform, stressing the need
for a thematic methodology that is comprehensive and integrated. Section IV reviews
the fundamentals of good governance as it relates to justice and security sector reform
and introduces a strategic technique for ensuring programmatic coherence.

2
 I. Human Development and Justice and Security Sector Reform

Without safety and security, human development cannot be achieved. 1

Unfortunately, war has killed more than 3.6 million since 1989. In 2000, more than
300,00 people lost their lives in violent conflict. 2 Aside from the considerable death
toll, violent conflict impedes future development and reverses decades of socio-
economic gains in terms of the loss of social and physical infrastructure and missed
opportunities for individuals, families, and their communities.3 By threatening lives
and livelihoods, violent conflicts restricts the ability of men and women to exercise
choice in their own lives.

Of the 34 countries that are furthest away from achieving the international
development goals established at United Nations global conferences in the past
decade, 22 are affected by current or recent conflict. In 1998, of the countries at the
bottom of the Human Development Index, more than half suffered the direct and
indirect effects of warfare. Increasingly around the world, violent conflicts are more
likely to occur within the borders of a state than between sovereign countries. Of the
27 major conflicts that occurred in 1999, 25 were intra-state.

At the same time, crime and an inequitable application of justice continue to

plague the security of people in many parts of the developing world. Approximately
half a million individuals lost their lives in 2000 due to various types of criminal
violence other than armed conflict.4 The poor and other vulnerable groups are the
most susceptible to inequitable and inaccessible justice as well as the imprecations
of violence and insecurity. A recent development report states that security has
become “one of poor people’s major concerns” and that during the 1990s they

1
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 85. See also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The
DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. Policy Statement and Executive Summary. (OECD,
2001), p. 19.
2
World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health. (Geneva, 2002).
3
A recent IMP Working Paper states, “conflict significantly reduces financial development, and that
negative effect increases as conflict intensifies.” Sanjeev Gupta, Benedict Clements, et al., Fiscal
Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low- and Middle Income Countries. (International
Monetary Fund, WP/02/142, 2002.
4
World Report on Violence and Health, 2002.
3
 experienced a decline in their sense of security. 5 “To one degree or another, poor
people speak of declining public safety as an element of increasing insecurity in
almost every country, in both rural and urban areas.” All too often the poor perceive
the state institutions that possess the legal monopoly of coercive power – the military
and the police – as “sources of insecurity” rather than as public institutions providing
justice, equity, and the preservation of peace.

Safety and security – or their absence - is not just a question of conflict, crime,
and public disorder, but, as significantly, is an issue of good governance.6 Where
the justice and security sector is not accountable to democratic institutions of
governance, human development is not be sustainable.7 Phrased differently,
“democratic civil control over state security forces, far from opposing personal
security, is essential to it.” 8 Consequently, governance reform of the justice and
security sector is now widely recognized as one of the essential conditions, albeit not
sufficient, for sustainable human development.

5
Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, Meera Kaul Shah, and Patti Petesch, Voices of the Poor: Crying
Out for Change. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), published for the World Bank.
6
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent
Violent Conflict. . (OECD, 2001), p. 38.
7
Human Development Report 2002, p. 86.
8
Ibid., p. 87.
4
II. BCPR and Justice and Security Sector Reform

With the Secretary-General’s efforts to foster “a culture of prevention” to meet the

challenges to peace and security around the world and his conviction that “prevention
action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be
most effective,”9 UNDP has a central role to play in the UN’s crisis prevention and
peace-building efforts. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, in
fact, succinctly stated that “UNDP, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies,
funds and programmes and the World Bank, are best placed to take the lead in
implementing peace-building activities.”10

At the end of 2000, UNDP updated its development strategy for crisis and post-
conflict (CPC) countries to emphasize four key risk factors “that fuel violent conflict:”
inequity, inequality, justice, and insecurity.11 UNDP is already addressing many of the
identified root causes of conflicts through development projects promoting socio-
economic development, good governance, access to justice and rule of law. What is
required, however, is a programmatic approach that focuses directly on the justice and
security sector as a comprehensive and integrated whole, which as the public service
provider of physical security and due process is fundamental to the establishment of a
sense of personal security, the maintenance of public order, and the enforcement of the
rule of law. In particular, BCPR, with its focus in CPC countries, requires a unique
concentration on justice and security sector reform (JSSR), the objective of which is to
strengthen the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its individual parts to provide
an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting public service.

The need to develop a consistent and focused BCPR approach is crucial, for the
failure to reform the justice and security sector in crisis and post-conflict countries will
perpetuate their cycle of violence, conflict, and criminality. An unreformed sector will

9
United Nations, Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985-S/2001/574,
June 7, 2001, p. 2.
10
United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, op. cit., p. 8, para. 46
(www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations). Emphasis added.
11
United Nations, Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United
Nations Population Fund, “Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations,” DP/2001/4, November
27, 2000, www.undp.org/erd/ref/undp_in_cpc_sit.pdf, para. 45..

5
not only be unable to prevent conflicts from arising, but may often cause or worsen the
conflict. In fact, the justice and security sector rather than providing a public service to
the citizens and residents of the state often protects the narrow, private interests of élite
groups and the government-of-the-day. The use of torture, intimidation, and
harassment against the civilian population by the sector on behalf of ruling regimes is,
unfortunately, widespread. An inequitable application of due process coupled with the
inability of large segments of the population to access the courts of justice only
exacerbates the problem. Lastly, ineffective, underfunded, and underpaid public
security and judicial apparatuses are vulnerable and susceptible to corruptive
influences, which may only hasten a downward spiral into violence and conflict.

Wherever the fundamental base of power of the government rests with the justice
and security sector, an occurrence all too common in crisis and post-conflict situations,
the justice and security sector may be one of the chief causes of insecurity for citizens
and neighboring states. In the 1990s alone, the governments of 17 countries were
overthrown through armed conflict. Since 1989, national armies have intervened in a
significant manner in the political life of 13 Sub-Saharan states alone, which is
equivalent to 1 in 4 countries of the region, a fact that only further highlights the
centrality of JSSR as a recondition for sustainable human development.

Nevertheless, people desperately need the institutions of the justice and security
sector to provide basic levels of physical security and due process for their families and
in their communities. Ironically, those most in need of professional and well-functioning
justice and security sector services, the poor and socially vulnerable, are generally
those not only most suspicious of them, but also most likely to be unable to obtain the
public service that the sector is supposed to provide.

Despite this close link between conflict prevention, peace-building and a well-
governed justice and security sector, JSSR has not been on the agenda of most
development actors until very recently. There is growing agreement that in crisis and
post-conflict situations this field needs to be addressed with a comprehensive and
integrated programmatic perspective of protecting individuals and communities from
violence, ensuring the protection of rights, and guaranteeing equitable and fair access

6
to due process. Underpinning this approach is the dual role of states in today’s world:
states can be the source of violence and oppression, yet they are central to the ability to
control violence, conflict, and criminality.

III. BCPR’s Justice and Security Sector Reform Approach

According to the Development Assistance Committee, OECD (DAC), JSSR

involves transforming the way the sector is managed and monitored to ensure that the
sector’s principle institutions (first and foremost, the judiciary/courts, corrections, police,
and military) are accountable to democratic civil authorities and that sound principles of
public management and governance are instituted. The key actors of the JSSR sector
are:

…the security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes
needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have
a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against
acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and
paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial
and penal institutions) and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities
responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the
Defence Ministry, etc.).” 12

To this, non-statutory security actors such as armed opposition groups,

traditional militias and private security firms need to be added. As far as civilian
oversight is concerned, civil society and the media have important roles and
functions to play and may usefully be added to the list. Taken together these
groups comprise what may be called the justice and security community in a
given country.

The precise composition of the JSSR community varies from country to

country, based on each country’s historical experience and legal environment.
Based upon the DAC definition, the box below spells out the range of institutions
the may comprise the JSSR community in any given country:

12
OECD/DAC, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. Orientations for External Partners, Paris, 2001, pp. 22-
24, citation from Box 5, p. 23 (www.oecd.org/dac, click on “Good Governance, Conflict and Peace,” click
on “Conflict and Peace”). Public sector management principles require small adjustments to ensure
appropriate national security-related confidentiality, but the need for confidentiality should never be
allowed to override key principles such as accountability, comprehensiveness, and transparency.
7
 The Justice and Security Sector Community

§ Criminal justice organizations: police, judiciary (including courts, prosecutors, and defense
counsel), traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and correctional services;
§ Management and oversight bodies: executive branch of government (presidential and/or
prime ministerial); legislative branch of government, including national, provincial, and
municipal legislatures/assemblies, their committees and commissions; ministries of internal
affairs, justice, defense; financial management bodies (ministries of finance, budget offices,
auditor’s general’s offices); other oversight bodies such as human rights ombudsman, police
commissions; civilian review bodies;
§ Military and intelligence services: armed forces; paramilitary forces; coast guards; militias;
and intelligence services
§ Non-core institutions: customs and other uniformed bodies
The above four categories of actors comprise the justice and security sector. However, it is
important to also take into account:
§ Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, political
party militias, private security companies
§ Civil society: professional organizations, research institutes and think tanks, advocacy
groups, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the media.
Together these six categories of actors comprise what is the justice and security sector community.

Source: Nicole Ball, J. ‘Kayode Fayemi, ‘Funmi Olonisakin, and Rocklyn Williams with Martin
Rupiya, Security Sector Governance in Africa, CDD Occasional Paper, forthcoming.

Two important points need to be stressed. First, the justice and security sector,
and the larger community within which it is situated, consists of a large number of
institutions that as one integrated whole are responsible for the provision of an
accountable, equitable, effective and rights respecting public service for the state and
the people living within it. Second, the sector’s institutions are closely linked and
mutually dependent, each upon the others. It is for these reasons that the JSSR
methodology must be comprehensive and integrated.

JSSR must also target institutional and structural change as well as the manner
and processes with which the sector’s components are defined and work together.
Rewriting laws and administrative regulations may be a necessary first step, but the
issue at hand in JSSR is a change in the behavior, actions, operations, and strategies
8
of the sector’s personnel and the institutions in which they serve the public weal.
Consequently, JSSR is a long-term developmental programme, one which often
requires the transformation of state structures, operating procedures, legal provisions,
and cultural traditions. Reform cannot be measured in weeks and months, but takes
years, requiring slow and patient attention over time as there is often a need to rebuild
the populace’s trust in the institutions of the sector, their operations and activities.

In crisis and post-conflict environments, the linkages between the institutions of

the sector often need to be restructured, a requirement that only reinforces the need to
adopt a thematic approach to JSSR. Part of the restructuring may involve a careful
delineation of the roles and responsibilities of each of the institutions of the sector,
particularly, the relationship between law enforcement and military mandates to ensure
that the armed forces or other “security” services do not insert or re-insert themselves
into issues of domestic law enforcement. A comparable situation applies to, on the one
hand, the separation of police and corrections functions and, on the other, the methods
of cooperation between the judiciary and the sector’s other institutions. The roles and
functions of the sector’s institutions also need to be clarified so that each institution
provides checks and balances to the operations and actions of the others.

It is in this sense that the justice and security sector is not an autonomous,
independent collection of public institutions. Rather it is an integrated component of a
country’s public administration and, thus, part of the state’s overall governance system
and structure. The role of civilian oversight in JSSR, therefore, cannot be minimized. In
fact, civil oversight may be one of the most effective methods of ensuring that the state
does not become the source of insecurity, but is part of the solution. Civilian oversight
pertains not only to the good governance question of the responsibility of state
institutions to manage public services but to civil society and its myriad of organizations
and associations, whose active participation is crucial to ensure that the public services
provided by the sector meet the needs of the populace.

9
 Because of its transformative methodology and the interdependence of the
sector’s institutions, JSSR requires a thematic approach. BCPR’s approach
concentrates on a selected group of conceptual themes, which are accountability and
civilian oversight, due process, effectiveness and efficiency, access, representation,
and human rights to ensure not only that all the various components and institutions of
the sector are appropriately identified and targeted, but that the JSSR programme is
tightly focused and consistently structured. A concentration of selected themes ensures
that JSSR is not just about individual projects that may build the capacities of each of
the sector’s institutions or redraft the laws to guarantee equity and due process.
Recruiting and training police officers, prosecutors, judges, defense counsels, wardens,
for example, are necessary means of improving the capacity of the respective sector’s
institutions, but are not sufficient to enhance the public service provided by the sector or
ensure that the service is grounded in the principles of good governance. Better trained
police officers, for instance, may strengthen the service’s ability to apprehend alleged
perpetrators, but without comparable efforts in the judiciary or corrections systems the
overall effect on the security of the citizens and residents of the country will be
significantly less than envisioned. Similarly, even the best laws are ineffective if judges
are poorly trained and biased and other components of the sector flout them with
impunity.

Two concrete examples that occur in virtually all crisis and post-conflict situations
illustrate the efficacy of BCPR’s thematic, integrated, and comprehensive JSSR
approach: (1) security of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and demobilized
combatants; and (2) pre-trial detention violations of human rights.

Crisis and post-conflict situations typically produce large number of IDPs,

refugees, and demobilized combatants. The return of these categories of persons to
their homes of origin is essential to resolve the conflict and/or crisis, but it is a return
fraught with insecurity as they will be returning to areas they had previously perceived
to be hostile and dangerous. To encourage returns, therefore, it is necessary to provide
the IDPs, refugees, and demobilized combatants with a reasonable assurance of
security. One of the lessons learned in Bosnia, Kosovo, and, especially, southern

10
Serbia is that the one sufficient condition for the successful returns of minorities is the
reform of the local police and judicial services, particularly the integration of minorities
into the local justice and security sector.

Reform can come in many different forms, depending upon the scope of the
challenge and the receptiveness of the local communities, politicians, and justice and
security sector institutions, but in each circumstance it can be conceived under the
thematic rubric of “access.” For instance, at the grass roots end, reform could consist of
working with local police and judicial services, returning communities, and those
currently living in the areas of return in developing varying problem-solving and conflict
resolution techniques, traditional or otherwise. Police, judicial, and community leaders
can be brought together to learn how to communicate their respective needs and
challenges to one another and what services can be provided. In one Bosnian returns
area, for example, the local police had no facility that could be used as a local village
office. The returning community, to ensure that the police regularly patrolled their
community, organized a makeshift shelter to be used by the police officers, which then
became the community site at which security problems were discussed and resolved in
cooperation with the police.

These preliminary community-based initiatives can over time be scaled up,

assuming that the conditions are propitious. On the local level community-based
policing programmes can be introduced through schools, religious organizations, and
business groups; community-based human rights initiatives developed; and various
types of hot-line and neighborhood watch systems organized to solidify the relationship
of the police and judiciary to the local communities. The next step can be the
integration of members of the returning communities into the local police and judicial
services, an advance that inevitably requires the concurrence of regional and/or
national leaders, which introduces issues of recruitment and selection and,
subsequently, the training of police officers and judicial personnel, both at the
introductory level and over the course of a career. At this point, the larger question of a
police and judicial service’s human resource management and strategic planning come

11
into focus and a fully fledged JSSR programme can been launched, comprising the
broader issues of good governance.

The second illustration pertains to the oft-witnessed due process problem in

crisis and post-conflict environments pertaining to the burgeoning numbers of
individuals detained and incarcerated prior to their day in court. Conceptually, the pre-
trial detention issue is a straightforward one as it is simple to determine the number of
individuals detained by the police and the number released from custody prior to the
date of their court hearing. To determine, however, the reason(s) why the number of
detainees has become unmanageable requires a finely tuned diagnostic methodology,
one which may implicate any one of three institutions, the police, the judiciary (courts
and prosecutorial services), and/or penal system, and often involves more than one, as
the cause of the problem. For instance, the high number of detained persons may be
related to the types of alleged criminal activity for which the police detain an individual,
the manner cases are transferred from the police to prosecutors or investigating judges,
the work rules under which prosecutors or investigating judges handle the cases for
which they are responsible, the level of bail determined by the judge, and/or the non-
incarceration sentences handed down by judges upon conviction. In this case what is
crucial for the development of a successful JSSR programme is not just a careful
empirical analysis to root out the cause(s) of the problem, but the creation of a reform
package that addresses the multiple source(s) regardless of which justice and security
sector institution(s) are involved, a package whose implementation BCPR can facilitate.

12
IV. Good Governance in BCPR’s Justice and Security Sector Reform Approach

Development actors have tended to assume that general support for governance in
other parts of the public sector would eventually lead to improved governance practices
in the justice and security sector, a sort of “trickle across” phenomenon. While
democratic governance is necessary for significant progress in justice and security
sector reform in crisis and post-conflict countries, it is also true that it is difficult to
produce sustainable improvements in overall governance if a concerted JSSR
programme is not initiated.

Similar sets of issues arise when designing and implementing good governance
initiatives in other sectors as do in the justice and security sector, assuming, of course,
that a functioning government exists, which may not be the case in every crisis and
post-conflict situation. When a government does exist, the comparability between JSSR
and other good governance initiatives is particularly pertinent when considering the
political implications of establishing sustainable and affordable police, judicial, military,
and penal institutions capable of providing a reliable public service for the state and its
citizens. Existing constitutional frameworks, for example, have often been used to
justify the status quo rather than promote change, a problem that is compounded by a
weak rule of law foundation and inadequate accountability. The political and sectoral
leadership have frequently seen few, if any, benefits to change and, therefore, are often
not committed to JSSR and its transformation process. The human and institutional
capacity among both public and non-state actors that are necessary for a successful
transformation process is also notoriously weak, not to mention the fact that non-state
actors tend to be systematically excluded from participating in issues pertaining to the
sector. Insufficient attention has been given to private enterprise as an important agent
of change.

External actors, particularly the development aid donors, have sometimes

pressed reforms on governments without due attention either to the appropriateness of
the proposed intervention or to ownership on the part of national stakeholders. Even
where local political will to effect change existed, JSSR has often been severely
13
hampered by the failure to assess the needs and requirements of the country or to
promote local ownership of the programme. Particularly in crisis and post-conflict, a
shared domestic strategic vision, however difficult it may be to attain, remains essential
for a JSSR programme to succeed.

In order to overcome these constraints, it is important to have a sense of the

ideal desired outcome – in this case, the characteristics that a democratically governed
justice and security sector should possess. In crisis and post-conflict countries the best
that may be possible is initiating the process of moving toward the desired outcome, but
it is important nevertheless to know what the ultimate objective is. A document
published in 2000 by the UK Department for International Development has attempted
to define principles of good governance in the security sector:

The key principles of good governance in the justice and security sector
can be summarized as follows:
• The sector’s institutions, particularly those entrusted with the use of
force and coercion, are accountable to and their operations are
overseen by elected civil authorities and various civil society
organizations and associations;
• The sector’s institutions operate in accordance with the international
law and domestic constitutional law;
• The judiciary exists as an independent body capable of rendering
judicial decisions and judgments without outside influence or
interference.
• Individuals are guaranteed due process, legal representation, and
equal treatment in a predictable, fair, and transparent legal proceeding
in which the legal code and procedure is publicly available.
• Information about the planning, budgeting, and operations of the
sector’s institutions is widely available, within government and to the
public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the
management of all resources is adopted;
• Civil-military and civilian-police relations are based on a well-
articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the
respective institutions authorized to exercise coercive power, and on a
relationship with civil society that is based on the respect for human
rights;
• Within the legislative and executive branches of governance civil
authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the
policies, budgets, and operations of the sector’s institutions and civil

14
 society has the capacity to oversee, monitor, and constructive
participate in the political debate concerning those policies, budgets,
and operations;
• An environment exists in which civil society organizations and
associations can actively oversee and monitor the sector’s institutions
and are consulted on a regular basis on its policies, resource
allocations, and other relevant issues;
• The personnel working in the sector’s institutions are adequately
trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent
with due process and human rights requirements.13

It is clear that there are different paths to achieving these objectives given that
the principles, policies, laws, and structures developed during a JSSR good governance
programme must be rooted in the reforming country’s history, culture, legal framework
and institutions. Countries can borrow from each other’s JSSR programmes and have
successfully done so, but the solutions they adopt, over the short and long-term, must
be developed locally and be appropriate to the context in which they are implemented.
JSSR programmes must be locally designed, locally implemented, and locally
evaluated, for what may appear to be productive from the perspective of the
international community may have significantly different connotations and effects when
judged by domestic actors.

JSSR programmes can be successful only if domestic stakeholders believe that

the programme is theirs. Furthermore, success depends upon there being a consensus
among domestic actors on the principles of their JSSR programme, on the strategic
vision embedded in the programme, and on the specific objectives the programme
seeks to realize. One method to garner the required consensus and participation of all
the requisite domestic stakeholders - political, institutional, civil society – that has
proved beneficial is the initiation of a series of roundtables or dialogues. These
roundtables are a vehicle through which the principles of JSSR and the national
strategic vision of the justice and security sector or of any one of its component
institutions can be formulated and agreed upon. For example, the delineation of the
roles and responsibilities of each of the institutions of the sector, particularly, the

13
UK Department for International Development, Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military
Expenditure, op. cit., p. 46.
15
relationship between law enforcement and military mandates, can be submitted to a
national dialogue process.

During such roundtables, local technical capacity can be developed and

nourished, not just within the sector itself, but in civil society through the strengthening
of expertise residing in research institutes, universities, and various types of advocacy
groups. The benefit of such roundtables, therefore, is two-fold. First, the all important
strategic vision for the justice and security sector or one of its component institutions
can been enunciated and consensus reached by the relevant stakeholders. Second,
through the dialogue process, civil society organizations may be able to acquire the
capability of engaging the sector in policy and operational debates or budgetary
questions, thereby enhancing the accountability of the sector to the publics it serves.

In crisis and post-conflict situations, however, such overarching dialogues may

not be practical or immediately viable. Nevertheless, it may be possible to initiate more
narrowly focused discussions on the policies or operations of one of the sector’s
institutions. Such roundtables can be organized, for instance, to address inequities in
the representation of and access to the justice and security sector of vulnerable
demographic groups. Dialogues may also be more narrowly focused on regional,
provincial, or municipal issues that relate to JSSR. Municipal or neighborhood
roundtables are often used with great success to improve local security issues
pertaining to policing and local access to the criminal justice system.

While recognizing that JSSR is a developmental programme that partakes of

many of the principles and elements of other good governance initiatives, it is also
important to acknowledge that JSSR in crisis and post-conflict situations has its own
particular “points of entry.” JSSR is a highly political endeavour as it involves
transforming the institutions legitimately entitled to use coercive force and adjudicate
conflict. JSSR may alter the power balances between justice and security sector
personnel and civilians, between the executive and legislative branches of government,
within the executive branch, and between government and civil society. It may also
fundamentally affect the balance of power between competing domestic political actors.

16
 In crisis and post-conflict countries when the “rules of the political game” are
themselves under contestation and the institutions of state unsettled, special care must
be exercised when seeking to strengthen justice and security sector governance as
JSSR programmes affect the very foundations upon which political power resides.
Because of the role the militaries and police often play in bolstering the power of élites
or groups of élites, JSSR programmes need to assess the political environment with
particular care and delicacy. What is more, altering the power relations between
civilians and the institutions of the sector has strong psychological and cultural
components. It is critical, therefore, to understand, take into account, and address
these elements. It is for this reason that roundtables are of import and particular “entry
points” must be identified and placed in their appropriate contexts.

With regard to crisis and post-conflict situations, these “windows of opportunity”

can be broken down into the phases or stages in the crisis and post-conflict cycle.
There is the pre-crisis period during which, for instance, due process may be abrogated,
the justice and security sector may experience erosion in its ability to carry out its
institutional responsibilities, and/or the civilian mechanisms managing the sector have
been significantly weakened so that they are no longer capable of exercising
appropriate oversight. In each circumstance, remedial reform activities can be devised
to address the identified weakness. In the aftermath of violent conflict, the opportunity
frequently exists to initiate long-term reform programmes to reconstruct the sector’s
institutions, to rebuild the systems of due process, and to redesign the procedures of
civilian oversight. Finally, there is the reconciliation and “peace-building” period during
which time continued reform is crucial for sustainable development of the sector’s
institutions, due process, and the mechanisms of oversight to prosper.

Just as importantly, however, is the need to select “entry points” that possess
particular strategic resonance and have catalytic value. For BCPR the primary question
is not one of initiating individual JSSR projects, but to use its thematic approach to
identify issues that are linked one with another in order to evolve a comprehensive,
systematic JSSR programme. Therefore, care must be paid so that the niches and
partners that BCPR initially chooses to begin its activities in a country are of sufficient
strategic import that, over time, the initial niche is progressively deepened and

17
developed into an integrated JSSR programme. It is in this sense that the sequencing
of JSSR activities is crucial so that initial successes are built into enduring JSSR
programmes.

Whenever possible, the BCPR’s “entry point” should be the facilitation of a

domestic JSSR strategic framework for the sector or one of the institutions of the sector,
preferably by using the roundtable or dialogue approach. As already indicated,
however, this may not always be possible given the particular political circumstances in
which a JSSR programme is to take place and the immediate needs of the justice and
security sector in a crisis or post-conflict environment. Consequently, it is essential for
BCPR to have a conceptual map within which to place its “entry point,” evaluate its
strategic resonance, and forecast the subsequent progression of its JSSR activities.

To ensure thematic coherence and maintain tightly focused and consistently

structured JSSR programmes, BCPR has developed an overarching conceptual map of
the justice and security sector. Each of the institutions of the sector – and therefore the
sector as an integrated whole – can be situated according to BCPR’s matrix. One axis
of the map divides the justice and security sector into three elements: (1) the individual
working in one of the sector’s institutions (judge, prosecutor, warden, police officer,
etc.); (2) the structure and systems of the institutions themselves (judiciary, corrections,
law enforcement, military), and/or (3) the linkages between and among the institutions,
civilian authorities, and civil society. The other axis of the map specifies BCPR’s
selected themes.

Table 1 and 2 are two maps that break down law enforcement and the judiciary
into their component parts and are intended to illustrate only the range of projects that
can be successfully implemented using JSSR’s strategic technique and thematic
methodology while keeping in mind that the ultimate objective remains one of good
governance, the strengthening of the ability of the sector as a whole and each of its
individual parts to provide an accountable, equitable, effective, and rights respecting
public service. The maps are not intended to be comprehensive, but used as
exemplars of concrete practical programming that UNDP can undertake in each area
once BCPR has initiated a JSSR programme. Comparable matrixes can be developed

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to analyze UNDP’s option regarding the penal system and the military. It should be
noted that the military map would concentrate primarily on the accountability and civilian
oversight themes, stressing the definition of the role of the military under democratic
governance along with related budgetary issues.

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 TABLE I: LAW ENFORCEMENT MAP

Thematic
Accountability & Access Due Process Effectiveness & Efficiency Representation
Institutional Oversight
- Internal Affairs - Professional standards - selection & recruitment
Individual processes and - Developing police - Professional training – process criteria
Police Officer procedures programs to train police Police Academy and In- - remedial training
- Codes of Conduct/Ethics officers on citizen rights; Service
- Disciplinary procedures; - Assisting the production
- Background Checks, of cards for police listing
Disclosure and human rights and other
Certification of Personal legal procedures
Histories – education,
outside employment, etc .

- Internal Affairs structure - Community-based - Mid-Level - Human Resource - Balanced demographic

Police Institution and organization; policing; Supervision/Management management (incl. selection representation of
- Response Time to Calls; & recruitment process, minorities and vulnerable
- Ministry of Interior or - Police Equipment: - Public Complaint promotion systems and groups
equivalent; provincial and Transport & Mechanisms exams, job training,
local police command Communications - Registry of Evidence performance evaluations,
structures, organization Systems; Collection; Custodial career development
- Outreach Public Relation Registry; opportunities, retirement
- Development of Programs to Vulnerable - Detention Procedures plans)
Personnel Databases Groups, Schools, - Internal Affairs - Level of salary and
- Early Warning Systems; Religious Organizations, Department benefits
Use of Force and Business Groups - Managerial Culture,
Firearms - Public Complaint Processes, Procedures
Mechanisms
- Inspector -Strategic planning and
General/Auditor General Budgeting
- Police Public Information
Departments - Management and
Administrative Support
Services (procurement,
facilities management, etc.)

-Information Technology;
Records Management

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Linkages to - Executive oversight: - Civil Society Advocacy - Joint Training with - Surveys of Police - Public Information
JSSR Ministry of Finance; Prime Groups Prosecutors or Activities and Performance campaigns
Community Minister and/or - Neighborhood Watch Prosecuting Judges -- Registration of Private
President’s Office Programs (evidence handling, Security Companies
- Surveys of Service interrogation of suspects, - Strengthening Roundtable
-Judiciary and legal Provided by Police questioning of witnesses, Dialogues on Policies and
oversight: judges and - returning IDPs and search and seizure Operations
refugees procedures, etc.) -Methods of Coordination
prosecutors
- Police Unions and Cooperation with
- Legislative oversight:
- Licensing to Possess Prosecutors or Prosecuting
(policy, operations, and
and Carry Weapons Judges
budgetary oversight)
- Public Information
- Ombudsman function
- Civilian Review Boards Campaigns on Citizen
and Commissions Rights
- Strengthening - Due Process Legislation
Independent media and - Assisting NGOs to
its investigative create educational
informational programmes
capabilities
and materials on citizen
- Building local capacity in
rights
Civil Society on policy,
operations, and budgetary
issues (Neighborhood
Associations; Research
Institutes, Advocacy
Groups, Human Rights
Commissions; Business
Associations)

- Legislation making public

Criminal Statistics;
strengthening NGOs
working with criminal
statistics

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 TABLE 2: JUDICIAL MAP

Thematic
Accountability & Access Due Process Effectiveness & Representation
Institutional Oversight Efficiency
- Professional Code of - Security for judges, - Create judge and - Professional standards - Selection & recruitment
Conduct and ethics prosecutors, defense prosecutor training center - Professional training process
Individual - Disciplinary procedures counsels for training of rule and - Training center (current - Ensuring that minority or
Judge, - Certification and procedures in civil and professionals and law vulnerable ethnicities are
Prosecutor, background checks, criminal cases; human school grads), not excluded from the
(‘vetting’) rights administration on case profession
and Defense - Professional management and support - Ensure that minority
Counsel requirements system judges are conversant in
current law

- Ministry of Justice; - Individual physical - Legal reform of criminal - Human Resource - Balanced demographic
national, regional, and access to courthouse procedure code and management (including institution (setting up
Judicial local court, prosecutorial (providing transportation criminal code selection & recruitment recruitment procedures for
Institution, and defense services and/or protection of - Legislative possession process, professional minority or vulnerable
Prosecutorial (structure and individuals) and use of weapons and standards, job training, groups)
organizations) - Minority or vulnerable regulation of security performance evaluations,
and Defense -Federal and local judicial ethnicity's access to file a companies career development
Services and prosecutorial/defense complaint and obtain - Assistance in legal rights opportunities, retirement
structures public records of squatters and plans)
- Development of records - Setting up local homeowners - Level of salary and
management and taskforce which can - Providing education to benefits
archives review and set up IDPs regarding housing, - Management structures
provisional judicial citizenship rights, - Administrative procedures
institution during crisis registration, obtaining - Library for judicial or client
(including in IDP area); records research
Judicial infrastructure - Establish national - Analysis of pre-trial
(court buildings, commission round table detention periods and
information management for effective penal chain review of system to
systems); recruitment and determine resolution of
education of temporary problems caused in police,
judges courts/prosecution, or
- Security and protection detention facility.
for victims and witnesses - Financial administration of
in trials running judicial and

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 in trials running judicial and
- Expeditious distribution prosecutorial institution
of laws (translated if - Establishing case tracking
country has more than mechanism for judicial and
one official language) prosecutorial registrars
- Civil registry for all
residents

- Assisting NGOs to - Outreach projects to - Analyze and develop - Supporting creation of

create a booklet or other minority or vulnerable systemic remedies for internal monitoring of
Linkages to materials to educate groups to assure access cases of illegal detention; performance of judges to
JSSR citizens about their rights to courts and Interaction with ensure competence and
Community if arrested representation through government executive knowledge of law.
- Assisting NGOs to education, coordination, authority to create - Training of mechanisms by
create educational and capacity-building mechanisms to stop illegal which investigating judges
materials for children - Pro bono assistance to detention of individuals or prosecutors coordinate
- Educating civil society clients in civil and criminal and put them in a judicial with police
about legislation and cases (partnerships process - Training so that
rights (round table and between legal institutions - Strengthening local civil prosecution and judiciary
civil society groups that and defense clinics) society organizations to are knowledgeable of laws
discuss advancement of - Establishment for center monitor the adherence to relating to criminal trials.
judicial reform) for citizen education of due process rights in - Trainings to coordinate the
- Assisting NGO legal rights, customary, criminal cases work between Prosecutors
Organizations to establish and alternative dispute - Establish ombudsman (or Investigating Judges)
and maintain defense and resolution mechanisms function and ensuring due and Police to interview
legal aide services for the within the legal system process witnesses, develop
poor - Outreach to civil society evidence, take notes at
- Strengthening Bar to determine measures for scene of a crime, interrogate
Association and other criminal procedure reform a suspect, question
professional groups and round table and witnesses and conduct
- Strengthening legal outreach about revisions search and seizure
libraries (applicable law, of criminal procedure after
case law, legal adoption of reforms
commentary)
- Strengthening research
institutes and media
(through incentives and
other means within civil
society)
- Mechanisms of non-
criminal sanctions for
alleged past abuses

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 Finally, it should be stressed that BCPR’s JSSR programme does not imply an
intention to promote a new area of work entirely separate from the normal activities of
UNDP’s development assistance. Rather, to the extent possible, the justice and
security sector should be incorporated into ongoing efforts to strengthen governance in
a range of areas: effective legislatures and other oversight bodies, financial
management, human rights protection and the like.

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