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Solutions Manual to Accompany

NONLINEAR
PROGRAMMING
Theory and Algorithms

Third Edition

M O K H TA R S . B A Z A R A A
HANIF D. SHERALI
C. M. SHETTY

Pre p a re d by H A N I F D . S H E R A L I
JOANNA LELENO
 Solutions Manual
to Accompany
Nonlinear Programming:
Theory and Algorithms
 Solutions Manual
to Accompany
Nonlinear Programming:
Theory and Algorithms
Third Edition

Mokhtar S. Bazaraa
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA

Hanif D. Sherali
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, VA

C. M. Shetty
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA

Solutions Manual Prepared by:

Hanif D. Sherali
Joanna M. Leleno

Acknowledgment: This work has been partially supported by the National

Science Foundation under Grant No. CMMI-0969169.
Copyright © 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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ISBN 978-1-118-76237-0

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................... 1

1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.10, 1.13

Chapter 2 Convex Sets ...................................................................................... 4

2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.7, 2.8, 2.12, 2.15, 2.21, 2.24, 2.31, 2.42, 2.45,
2.47, 2.49, 2.50, 2.51, 2.52, 2.53, 2.57

Chapter 3: Convex Functions and Generalizations .......................................... 15

3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.9, 3,10, 3.11, 3.16, 3.18, 3.21, 3.22, 3.26,
3.27, 3.28, 3.31, 3.37, 3.39, 3.40, 3.41, 3.45, 3.48, 3.51, 3.54,
3.56, 3.61, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.65

Chapter 4: The Fritz John and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Optimality Conditions .. 29

4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.15, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30,
4.31, 4.33, 4.37, 4.41, 4.43

Chapter 5: Constraint Qualifications ................................................................ 46

5.1, 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, 5.20

Chapter 6: Lagrangian Duality and Saddle Point Optimality Conditions ........ 51

6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.14, 6.15, 6.21, 6.23, 6.27, 6.29,

Chapter 7: The Concept of an Algorithm ......................................................... 64

7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.6, 7.7, 7.19

Chapter 8: Unconstrained Optimization ........................................................... 69

8.10, 8.11, 8.12, 8.18, 8.19, 8.21, 8.23, 8.27, 8.28, 8.32, 8.35,
8.41, 8.47, 8.51, 8.52

Chapter 9: Penalty and Barrier Functions ........................................................ 88

9.2, 9.7, 9.8, 9.12, 9.13, 9.14, 9.16, 9.19, 9.32

Chapter 10: Methods of Feasible Directions .................................................... 107

10.3, 10.4, 10.9, 1.012, 10.19, 10.20, 10.25, 10.33, 10.36, 10.41,
10.44, 10.47, 10.52

v
Chapter 11: Linear Complementary Problem, and Quadratic, Separable,
Fractional, and Geometric Programing ........................................ 134

11.1, 11.5, 11.12, 11.18, 11.19, 11.22, 11.23, 11.24, 11.36, 11.41,
11.42, 11.47, 11.48, 11.50, 11.51, 11.52

vi
 CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 In the figure below, xmin and xmax denote optimal solutions for Part (a)
and Part (b), respectively.

x2

2
(4, 2)

3 2 3 0 2 3 4 x1
2

xmax 2 xmin Feasible region

1.2 a. The total cost per time unit (day) is to be minimized given the storage
limitations, which yields the following model:
d Q d Q
Minimize f (Q1 , Q2 )  k1 1  h1 1  k2 2  h2 2  c1d1  c2 d 2
Q1 2 Q2 2
subject to s1Q1  s2Q2  S
Q1  0, Q2  0.
Note that the last two terms in the objective function are constant and
thus can be ignored while solving this problem.

b. Let S j denote the lost sales (in each cycle) of product j, j = 1, 2. In

this case, we replace the objective function in Part (a) with
F (Q1 , Q2 , S1 , S2 ), where F (Q1 , Q2 , S1 , S2 ) = F1 (Q1 , S1 ) + F2 (Q2 , S 2 ),
and where
dj Q 2j
F j (Q j , S j )  (k  c j Q j   j S j  PQ j )  h j , j  1, 2.
Qj  S j j 2(Q j  S j )
 Qj  S j
This follows since the cycle time is , and so over some T
dj
Td j
days, the number of cycles is . Moreover, for each cycle, the
Qj  S j
fixed setup cost is k j , the variable production cost is c j Q j , the lost
sales cost is  j S j , the profit (negative cost) is PQ j , and the
hj Qj
inventory carrying cost is Qj ( ) . This yields the above total cost
2 dj
function on a daily basis.

1.4 Notation: x j : production in period j, j = 1,…,n

d j : demand in period j, j = 1,…,n
I j : inventory at the end of period j, j = 0, 1,…,n.
The production scheduling problem is to:
n
Minimize  [ f ( x j )  cI j 1 ]
j 1
subject to
x j  d j  I j 1  I j for j = 1,…,n
I j  K for j = 1,…,n–1
In  0
x j  0, I j  0 for j = 1,…,n–1.

1.6 Let X denote the set of feasible portfolios. The task is to find an x  X
such that there does not exist an x  X for which c t x  c t x and
t
x t V x  x V x , with at least one inequality strict. One way to find
efficient portfolios is to solve:
Maximize {1c t x   2 xt V x : x  X }
for different values of ( 1 , 2 )  0 such that 1  2  1.

1.10 Let x and p denote the demand and production levels, respectively, and let
Z denote a standard normal random variable. Then we need p to be such
that P ( p  x  5)  0.01, which by the continuity of the normal random
variable is equivalent to P ( x  p  5)  0.01. Therefore, p must satisfy

2
 p  5  150
P(Z  )  0.01,
7
where Z is a standard normal random variable. From tables of the standard
normal distribution we have P( Z  2.3267)  0.01. Thus, we want
p  145
 2.3267, or that the chance constraint is equivalent to
7
p  161.2869.

1.13 We need to find a positive number K that minimizes the expected total
cost. The expected total cost is  (1  p ) P ( x  K   2 ) 
 pP ( x  K   1 ). Therefore, the mathematical programming problem
can be formulated as follows:
K 
Minimize  (1  p )  f ( x 2 )dx   p  f (x 1 )dx
0 0
subject to K  0.
If the conditional distribution functions F ( x 2 ) and F ( x 1 ) are

known, then the objective function is simply  (1  p) F ( K 2 ) 

 p(1  F ( K 1 )).

3
 CHAPTER 2:

CONVEX SETS

2.1 Let x  conv( S1  S2 ) . Then there exists   [0,1] and x1 , x2  S1  S2

such that x   x1  (1   ) x2 . Since x1 and x2 are both in S1 , x must be
in conv( S1 ) . Similarly, x must be in conv( S2 ) . Therefore, x  conv( S1 ) 
conv( S2 ) . (Alternatively, since S1  conv( S1 ) and S2  conv( S2 ) , we
have S1  S2  conv( S1 )  conv( S2 ) or that conv[ S1  S2 ] 
conv( S1 )  conv( S2 ) .)

An example in which conv( S1  S2 )  conv( S1 )  conv ( S2 ) is given

below:

S1
S2

Here, conv( S1  S2 )   , while conv( S1 )  conv( S2 )  S1 in this case.

2.2 Let S be of the form S  {x : Ax  b} in general, where the constraints

might include bound restrictions. Since S is a polytope, it is bounded by
definition. To show that it is convex, let y and z be any points in S, and let
x   y  (1   ) z , for 0    1 . Then we have Ay  b and Az  b ,
which implies that
Ax   Ay  (1   ) Az   b  (1   )b  b ,

or that x  S . Hence, S is convex.

Finally, to show that S is closed, consider any sequence { xn }  x such

that xn  S , n . Then we have Axn  b , n , or by taking limits as
n   , we get Ax  b , i.e., x  S as well. Thus S is closed.

2.3 Consider the closed set S shown below along with conv( S ) , where
conv( S ) is not closed:

4
 Now, suppose that S   p is closed. Toward this end, consider any
sequence {xn }  x , where xn  conv( S ) , n . We must show that
x  conv ( S ) . Since xn  conv( S ) , by definition (using Theorem 2.1.6),
p 1
we have that we can write xn   nr xnr , where xnr  S for
r 1
p 1
r  1,..., p  1, n , and where  nr  1 , n , with nr  0 , r , n .
r 1
Since the nr -values as well as the xnr -points belong to compact sets,
there exists a subsequence K such that {nr }K  r , r  1,..., p  1 ,
and {xnr }  x r , r  1,..., p  1 . From above, we have taking limits as
n   , n  K , that
p 1 p 1
x   r x r , with  r  1 , r  0 , r  1,..., p  1 ,
r 1 r 1
r
where x  S , r  1,..., p  1 since S is closed. Thus by definition,
x  conv( S ) and so conv( S ) is closed. 

2.7 a. Let y1 and y 2 belong to AS. Thus, y1  Ax1 for some x1  S and
y 2 = Ax 2 for some x 2  S . Consider y   y1  (1   ) y 2 , for any
0    1. Then y  A[ x1  (1   ) x 2 ] . Thus, letting
1 2
x   x  (1   ) x , we have that x  S since S is convex and that
y  Ax . Thus y  AS , and so, AS is convex.

b. If   0 , then  S  {0} , which is a convex set. Hence, suppose that

  0 . Let  x1 and  x 2   S , where x1  S and x 2  S . Consider
 x   x1  (1   ) x 2 for any 0    1. Then,  x   [ x1 
(1   ) x 2 ] . Since   0 , we have that x   x1  (1   ) x 2 , or that
x  S since S is convex. Hence  x   S for any 0    1 , and
thus  S is a convex set.

2.8 S1  S 2  {( x1 , x2 ) : 0  x1  1, 2  x2  3}.
5
 S1  S2  {( x1 , x2 ) : 1  x1  0,  2  x2  1}.

2.12 Let S  S1  S2 . Consider any y, z  S , and any   (0,1) such that

y  y1  y2 and z  z1  z2 , with { y1 , z1}  S1 and { y2 , z2 }  S2 .
Then  y  (1   ) z   y1   y2  (1   ) z1  (1   ) z2 . Since both sets
S1 and S2 are convex, we have  yi  (1   ) zi  Si , i = 1, 2. Therefore,
 y  (1   ) z is still a sum of a vector from S1 and a vector from S 2 ,
and so it is in S. Thus S is a convex set.

Consider the following example, where S1 and S 2 are closed, and convex.

S1 S2

sequence {yn} sequence {zn}

Let xn  yn  zn , for the sequences { yn } and {zn } shown in the figure,

where { yn }  S1 , and { zn }  S2 . Then {xn }  0 where xn  S , n ,
but 0  S . Thus S is not closed.

Next, we show that if S1 is compact and S 2 is closed, then S is closed.

Consider a convergent sequence {xn } of points from S, and let x denote its
limit. By definition, xn  yn  zn , where for each n, yn  S1 and
zn  S 2 . Since { yn } is a sequence of points from a compact set, it must be
bounded, and hence it has a convergent subsequence. For notational
simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that the sequence { yn }
itself is convergent, and let y denote its limit. Hence, y  S1 . This result
taken together with the convergence of the sequence { xn } implies that
{zn } is convergent to z, say. The limit, z, of {zn } must be in S 2 , since S 2
is a closed set. Thus, x  y  z , where y  S1 and z  S 2 , and therefore,
x  S . This completes the proof. 

6
2.15 a. First, we show that conv( S )  Sˆ . For this purpose, let us begin by
showing that S1 and S 2 both belong to Ŝ . Consider the case of S1
(the case of S 2 is similar). If x  S1 , then A1 x  b1 , and so, x  Sˆ
with y = x, z = 0, 1  1, and 2  0 . Thus S1  S2  Sˆ , and since
Ŝ is convex, we have that conv[ S1  S2 ]  Sˆ .
Next, we show that Sˆ  conv( S ) . Let x  Sˆ . Then, there exist
vectors y and z such that x  y  z , and A1 y  b11 , A2 z  b2 2 for
some (1 , 2 )  0 such that 1  2  1 . If 1  0 or 2  0 , then
we readily obtain y = 0 or z = 0, respectively (by the boundedness of
S1 and S2 ), with x  z  S2 or x  y  S1 , respectively, which
yields x  S , and so x  conv( S ) . If 1  0 and 2  0 , then
1 1
x  1 y1  2 z2 , where y1  y and z2  z . It can be easily
1 2
verified in this case that y1  S1 and z2  S 2 , which implies that both
vectors y1 and z2 are in S. Therefore, x is a convex combination of
points in S, and so x  conv( S ) . This completes the proof 

b. Now, suppose that S1 and S2 are not necessarily bounded. As above,

it follows that conv( S )  Sˆ , and since Ŝ is closed, we have that
cconv ( S )  Sˆ . To complete the proof, we need to show that
Sˆ  cconv( S ) . Let x  Sˆ , where x  y  z with A1 y  b11 ,
A2 z  b2 2 , for some (1 , 2 )  0 such that 1  2  1 . If
(1 , 2 )  0 , then as above we have that x  conv( S ) , so that
x  cconv( S ) . Thus suppose that 1  0 so that 2  1 (the case of
1  1 and 2  0 is similar). Hence, we have A1 y  0 and
A2 z  b2 , which implies that y is a recession direction of S1 and
z  S 2 (if S1 is bounded, then y  0 and then x  z  S2 yields
x  cconv( S ) ). Let y  S1 and consider the sequence
1
xn  n [ y  y ]  (1  n ) z , where 0  n  1 for all n.
n

7
 1
Note that y  y  S1 , z  S 2 , and so xn  conv ( S ) , n .
n
Moreover, letting {n }  0 , we get that {xn }  y  z  x , and so
x  cconv( S ) by definition. This completes the proof. 

2.21 a. The extreme points of S are defined by the intersection of the two
defining constraints, which yield upon solving for x1 and x2 in terms
of x3 that
3  x3  5  2 x3 5
x1  1  5  2 x3 , x2  , where x3 .
2 2
For characterizing the extreme directions of S, first note that for any
fixed x3 , we have that S is bounded. Thus, any extreme direction must
have d3  0 . Moreover, the maximum value of x3 over S is readily
verified to be bounded. Thus, we can set d3  1. Furthermore, if
x  (0, 0, 0) and d  (d1 , d 2 , 1) , then x   d  S ,   0 , implies
that
d1  2d 2  1 (1)

and that 4 d 2   2 d12 , i.e., 4d2   2 d12 ,   0 . Hence, if d1  0 ,

then we will have d 2   , and so (for bounded direction
components) we must have d1  0 and d 2  0 . Thus together with
(1), for extreme directions, we can take d 2  0 or d 2  1/2 , yielding
1
(0, 0, 1) and (0, , 1) as the extreme directions of S.
2
b. Since S is a polyhedron in R 3 , its extreme points are feasible solutions
defined by the intersection of three linearly independent defining
hyperplanes, of which one must be the equality restriction
x1  x2  1. Of the six possible choices of selecting two from the
remaining four defining constraints, we get extreme points defined by
3 3
four such choices (easily verified), which yields (0,1, ) , (1, 0, ) ,
2 2
(0,1, 0) , and (1, 0, 0) as the four extreme points of S. The extreme
directions of S are given by extreme points of D  {(d1 , d 2 , d3 ) :
d1  d 2  2d3  0 , d1  d 2  0 , d1  d 2  d3  1 , d  0} , which is
empty. Thus, there are no extreme directions of S (i.e., S is bounded).

8
 c. From a plot of S, it is readily seen that the extreme points of S are
given by (0, 0), plus all point on the circle boundary x12  x22  2 that
lie between the points ( 2/5, 2 2/5) and ( 2/5, 2 2/5) ,
including the two end-points. Furthermore, since S is bounded, it has
no extreme direction.

2.24 By plotting (or examining pairs of linearly independent active constraints),

we have that the extreme points of S are given by (0, 0), (3, 0), and (0, 2).
Furthermore, the extreme directions of S are given by extreme points of
D  {(d1 , d 2 ) :  d1  2d 2  0 d1  3d 2  0 , d1  d 2  1 , d  0} ,
2 1 3 1
which are readily obtained as ( , ) and ( , ) . Now, let
3 3 4 4
 4    1    3/4  , where  1     3  (1   )  0  ,
x x
1   x2  1/4  x 
 2  0   2 
for (  ,  )  0 . Solving, we get   7/9 and   20/9, which yields
 4   7  3   2  0   20 3/4  .
1  9 0  9  2  9 1/4 

2.31 The following result from linear algebra is very useful in this proof:
() An (m  1)  (m  1) matrix G with a row of ones is invertible if and
only if the remaining m rows of G are linearly independent. In other words,
 B a
if G   t  , where B is an m  m matrix, a is an m  1 vector, and e
e 1 
is an m  1 vector of ones, then G is invertible if and only if B is
invertible. Moreover, if G is invertible, then
M g  1 1
G 1   t  , where M  B 1 ( I  aet B 1 ) , g   B 1a ,
h f  
1 1
ht   et B 1 , and f  , and where   1  et B 1a .
 
By Theorem 2.6.4, an n-dimensional vector d is an extreme point of D
 A
if and only if the matrix  t  can be decomposed into [ BD N D ] such that
e 
 dB  1 0 
 d  , where d N = 0 and d B  BD bD  0 , where bD  1  . From
 N
 A
Property () above, the matrix  t  can be decomposed into [ BD N D ] ,
e 
where BD is a nonsingular matrix, if and only if A can be decomposed into
[ B N ] , where B is an m  m invertible matrix. Thus, the matrix BD must

9
 B aj 
necessarily be of the form  t  , where B is an m  m invertible
e 1
submatrix of A. By applying the above equation for the inverse of G, we
obtain
 1 
 B 1a j  1  1 
B a j
d B  BD bD   
1
 ,
1
   1 
  
where   1  et B 1a j . Notice that d B  0 if and only if   0 and

B 1a j  0 . This result, together with Theorem 2.6.6, leads to the

conclusion that d is an extreme point of D if and only if d is an extreme
direction of S.

Thus, for characterizing the extreme points of D, we can examine bases of

 A
et  , which are limited by the number of ways we can select (m  1)
 
columns out of n, i.e.,

  n
m 1

n!
( m  1)!( n  m  1)!
,

1
which is fewer by a factor of than that of the Corollary to
( m  1)
Theorem 2.6.6.

2.42 Problem P: Minimize {ct x : Ax  b, x  0}.

(Homogeneous) Problem D: Maximize {bt y : At y  0}.
Problem P has no feasible solution if and only if the system Ax  b ,
x  0 , is inconsistent. That is, by Farkas’ Theorem (Theorem 2.4.5), this
occurs if and only if the system At y  0 , bt y  0 has a solution, i.e., if
and only if the homogeneous version of the dual problem is unbounded.


2.45 Consider the following pair of primal and dual LPs, where e is a vector of
ones in  m :
P: Max et p D: Min 0t x
t
subject to A p  0 Ax  e
p  0. x unres.
Then, System 2 has a solution  P is unbounded take any feasible
solution to System 2, multiply it by a scalar λ, and take     D

10
 is infeasible since P is homogeneous  ∄ a solution to Ax  0 
∄ a solution to Ax  0 . 

2.47 Consider the system At y  c, y  0 :

2 y1  2 y2  3
y1  2 y2  1
3 y1  2
( y1 , y2 )  0 .
The first equation is in conflict with ( y1 , y2 )  0 . Therefore, this system
has no solution. By Farkas’ Theorem we then conclude that the system
Ax  0 , ct x  0 has a solution.

2.49 () We show that if System 2 has a solution, then System 1 is

inconsistent. Suppose that System 2 is consistent and let y0 be its solution.
If System 1 has a solution, x0 , say, then we necessarily have x0t At y0  0 .

However, since x0t At  ct , this result leads to ct y0  0 , thus

contradicting ct y0  1 . Therefore, System 1 must be inconsistent.
() In this part we show that if System 2 has no solution, then System 1
has one. Assume that System 2 has no solution, and let S  {( z1 , z0 ) :

z1   At y , z0  ct y , y   m }. Then S is a nonempty convex set, and

( z1 , z0 )  (0,1)  S . Therefore, there exists a nonzero vector ( p1 , p0 ) and

a real number such that p1t z1  p0 z0    p1t 0  p0 for any

( z1 , z0 )  S . By the definition of S, this implies that

 p1t At y  p0 ct y    p0 for any y   m. In particular, for y = 0, we

obtain 0    p0 . Next, observe that since α is nonnegative and

( p1t At  p0 ct ) y   for any y   m, then we necessarily have

 p1t At  p0 ct  0 (or else y can be readily selected to violate this
inequality). We have thus shown that there exists a vector ( p1 , p0 ) where
1
p0  0 , such that Ap1  p0 c  0 . By letting x  p , we concluce that
p0 1
x solves the system Ax  c  0 . This shows that System 1 has a solution.


11
2.50 Consider the pair of primal and dual LPs below, where e is a vector of
ones in  p :
P: Max et u D: Min 0t x
subject to At u  Bt v  0 subject to Ax  e
u  0, v unres. Bx  0
x unres.
Hence, System 2 has a solution  P is unbounded (take any solution to
System 2 and multiply it with a scalar λ and take     D is
infeasible since P is homogeneous  there does not exist a solution
to Ax  0 , Bx  0  System 1 has no solution. 

2.51 Consider the following two systems for each i  {1,..., m} :

System I: Ax  0 with Ai x  0
System II: At y  0, y  0 , with yi  0 ,
where Ai is the ith row of A. Accordingly, consider the following pair of
primal and dual LPs:

P: Max eit y D: Min 0t x

subject to At y  0 subject to Ax  ei
y0 x unres,

where ei is the ith unit vector. Then, we have that System II has a solution
 P is unbounded  D is infeasible  System I has no solution. Thus,
exactly one of the systems has a solution for each i  {1,..., m} . Let
I1  {i  {1,..., m} : System I has a solution; say xi } , and let

I 2  {i  {1,..., m} : System II has a solution; say, yi } . Note that

I1  I 2  {1,..., m} with I1  I 2   . Accordingly, let x   xi and

i I1
i
y   y , where x  0 if I1   and y  0 if I 2   . Then it is
i I 2
easily verified that x and y satisfy Systems 1 and 2, respectively, with
Ax  y   Axi   y i  0 since Axi  0 , i  I1 , and yi  0 ,
iI1 iI 2

i  I 2 , and moreover, for each row i of this system, if i  I1 then we

have Ai xi  0 and if i  I 2 then we have y i  0 .

12
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cannot be any, because it is a simple and absolute impossibility, that
God should be the author of sin as these arguments do sufficiently
testifie.
1. That of James 1. 13. Argum. 1.
necessity must be Deut. 32. 3. Psal. 5. 4.
false, which the
Scriptures do declare to be so, in open and plain terms. But that God
should be the author of sin or evil, the Scriptures do deny in open
and plain terms, as where the Text saith: God cannot be tempted
with evil: where both the act, and the possibility of it is absolutely
denied. Again: For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in
wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. Therefore it is false
that God is, or can be the author of sin; and so by consequence the
supposed absurdity is a meer impossibility; and an absurdity urged
that is impossible, is most of all absurd.
2. He is ens summè perfectum, & Argum. 2.
quicquid est in Deo, est Deus; but sin
howsoever understood, or accepted, is an imperfection, defect and an
aberration from a just and perfect rule, and therefore it is simply
impossible that God can be the cause of any thing that is imperfect,
sinful or evil, if sin be considered as malum culpæ.
3. God is not Rom. 4. 15. Argum. 3.
under any binding
law given to him by some other, for then he should cease to be
supream, independent and omnipotent: Now to whom there is no
law given to observe, there can be no transgression, for the Apostle
saith, where there is no law, there is no transgression; and therefore
it is simply impossible that God should be the author, or causer of
sin, or evil, because there is no law that he can transgress against.
4. God De Civitat. Dei, l. 2. Argum. 4.
prohibiteth and c. 7.
hateth sin, as the Scriptures do every where testifie, but God is the
cause of nothing but that which he loveth, and therefore cannot be
the cause of the evil of sin. And to speak properly sin hath no
efficient cause, but a deficient, such as is the will of faln Angels, and
wicked Men, whose irregularity of will, from the command of God, is
all the cause that sin and evil hath or can have. An efficient cause is
only of those things that are good, because every efficient cause doth
by working put something in being: But privations (of which sort are
sins) do put nothing in being, but do truly note the absence of beings.
Therefore did S. Augustine say well: Mali causa efficiens nulla est,
sed tantùm deficiens.
5. That which Gen. 1. 3. Argum. 5.
properly hath an 1 John 3. 8. John 8. 44.
efficient cause,
hath also an end properly so called: But sin hath not an end properly
so called, because the end is being, and therefore good, and the
perfection of the thing. But the Scripture doth declare that all things
that God created were exceeding good; and that the cause of sin was
Man, and the Devil; for the text saith, that the Devil was a murderer
from the beginning, and abode not in the truth: And again, He that
committeth sin, is of the Devil, for the Devil sinneth from the
beginning. Therefore from hence it is clear, that God neither is nor
can be the author or causer of sin.
6. That which Vid. Schar. de Argum. 6.
God is the author miser. hom. stat.
of, doth not make sub peccato, c. 3.
Man worse. but sin doth make Man worse, Fulgent. lib. 1. ad
therefore God is not the author of it. And all Monim
sin is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that
respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth
incline all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he
turn them from himself, because he is summum bonum. And further
as Fulgentius saith: Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At
Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor. And therefore we conclude,
that this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible
that God should be the author or causer of sin.
This plausible pretence to seem to be Job 13. 7.
zealous, not to make God the author of sin,
we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes
and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend
that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought
to remember the argument of Job, which is this: will ye speak
wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him? For as we ought not
to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to
rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence,
nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the
Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him
separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the
denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a
providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as
we shall shew hereafter.
Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his
efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that
for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or
properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado
about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way
than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note
these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must
be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and
authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted
that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would
be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action
that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person
permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.
1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission
unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself
that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and
so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation
betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no
existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God
when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be
attributed unto him before the Creation.
2. It is as Job 34. 14, 15. Heb. 1. 3.
improper to Psal. 104. 19. Vid. Chrysost. in
attribute Verse 9. Loc.
permission unto Job 38. 11. Psal. 107. 25.
God in respect of De Caus. Dei, l. 1. c. Jerem. 5. 22.
the Physical 2. p. 165.
agency of second Exod. 14. 21, 22, 23. Isai. 38. 8.
causes, because he
Jonah 1. 4. Id. v. 17.
not only worketh
Psal. 119. 91. Id. 2. 10.
all in all, and by
his Divine Thom. de Christ. Greg. 16. mor. 4.
Religion. 133.
concourse and De Caus. Dei, p. 171.
conservative power sustaineth all things by
the word of his power, and Job tells us: If he gather unto himself his
spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn
again into dust. Upon which place of the Hebrews S. Chrysostome
saith thus: Feratq; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet omnia. Siquidem
cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est
continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod
admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex
nullis extantibus rerum essentiæ productæ sunt: in continendo verò,
ea quæ facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Hæc ergo
dum reguntur, & ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum
& valdè mirabile, plurimæq; virtutis judicium declaratur: But also
because he hath set all natural things their bounds, and ordered,
decreed and determined their ends in acting. Now what he hath
appointed, ordered and decreed to be the agency of every creature,
and determinated its end in acting, cannot properly be called
permission, but his will, ordination and providence. As if one should
say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and Moon to run their
course, it is an improper expression and injurious to his wisdom and
power in his providential government of the creatures, seeing that it
is a certain truth, Deus operatur in omni operante: And he hath
appointed the Moon for seasons, and the sun knoweth his going
down. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow,
when he hath set it a bound that it cannot pass over. For he
commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the
waves thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further:
And here shall thy proud waves be staid. And again, Will ye not
tremble at my presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand
for the bound of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it,
and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not
prevail; though they roar, yet can they not pass over it. And
therefore we may conclude that the whole Creation in respect of
Physical agency is ruled according to those orders, and not by a
fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1. For first all
creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections and
properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to
this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended
by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and
they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden,
sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of
his mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation,
which if it should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would
fall into that nothing, from whence his Eternal and Omnipotent Fiat
did raise and call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profound
Bradwardine, Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet
Creaturam immediatiùs quacunq; causa creata. 3. When he
pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and agency of natural causes, as
in making the Sun stand still in the victory of Joshua, and of the
three Children in the fiery Furnace. Sometimes he causeth them to
act contrary to their innate powers and qualities, as in making the
shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz sun-dial: and in causing the
waters of the red sea, contrary to their natures, which are to tend
downwards, to be divided, and to go backward, and to be as a wall
on the right hand, and on the left, until Moses, and the children of
Israel were passed through. And by many other wayes and means
doth he alter and change the course of natural agents, to serve his
will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his justice, and yet here is
no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these he ordereth all the
particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient unto his will: So
when Jonah fled to Tarshish, the Lord sent forth a great wind into
the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake Jonah; and when
he was cast into the Sea, the Lord prepared a great fish to swallow
him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited up
Jonah upon the dry land. Now the wind was not carried nor the
storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of the
Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his
immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they
wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as
to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and
appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by
chance or permission, but God in his merciful providence had
prepared him for the preservation of Jonah, and caused him to be
vomited on the dry land; so that all creatures do not only continue
according to his ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational
creatures do praise the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and
providence. And lest we be either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or
to be single in this opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S.
Gregory (as he is quoted by learned Bradwardine) tells us thus
much: Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum
sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic
adest singulis, ut simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic itaq; exteriora
circundat, ut interiora impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora
circundet; sic summa regit, ut ima non deserat; sic imis præsens
est, ut à superioribus non recedat. And Thomas Aquinas their great
Schoolman (as the same author cites him) saith: Quòd Deus
immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas
medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione quodammodò immediatè
se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causæ mediæ agunt
in virtute causæ primæ, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere
videatur, & omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui,
sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Therefore we will
conclude this with that of S. Augustine: Proculdubio nullus est locùs
ab ejus præsentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè præsidet
regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed
infatigabili virtute, quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se
subsistere valet, nisi ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra
omnia est, sed non exclusus, intra omnia, sed non conclusus. And
these places need no fiction of an Hebraism to expound them, nor no
device of a verb of an active termination, and a permissive
signification to evade the pressure of this truth. And therefore in
respect of Physical agency we are bold with Bradwardine to assert
these three Corollaries.

1. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo.

2. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus per se &
immediate facit illud idem.
3. Quod nulla res potest facere aliquid, nisi Deus faciat illud idem
immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente.
4. So that however permission may be Amos 3. 6.
understood, it must properly relate to
intellectual and rational creatures, and that only and especially in
respect of those actions which we call moral, that is, in regard of sin,
evil or malum culpæ; for whatsoever is malum pœnæ, God is the
author, causer and inflicter of, according to the Text: Shall there be
evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? To understand aright
the nature of permission, we are to consider the affections,
properties and adjuncts of it, both in regard of the person permitting,
the creature permitted to act, and the thing permitted to be done,
with all the circumstances about them, and these we shall take from
their Ring-leader and great Champion Arminius himself in these
points.
5. And first in respect of the person Vid. Twisse Vindic.
permitting (he saith) it is necessary that he grat. de permiss. p.
know, what, to whom, and the ability of 341.
performance, that is to be granted, or used, by the person permitted,
and that the person permitting have power to permit and to impede,
and also that he have the right and authority of permitting. 2. In the
person permitted, it is necessarily requisite, that he have sufficient
power to effect and perform the thing permitted, if not hindered; for
otherwise it would be nonsense to say, that a person is permitted to
do an act that he hath no power to perform. 3. If the person
permitted have sufficiency of power to perform the act permitted, yet
there is also required a propension and disposition in the person
permitted, to perform the thing permitted, otherwise the permission
as to that act would be without a certain end, and so would be in
vagum, inconstant and not to be performed, and therefore he
concludeth thus: Imò nec rectè dici potest quod alicui actus
permittatur, qui actus illos præstandi affectu nullo tenetur.
6. We shall omit Eccles. 7. 29. De permiss. p. 342.
the exceptions that
the learned and subtile Dr. Twisse hath made against diverse
particulars in these passages, and shall only fix upon one that is
manifestly false (if he mean of permission in general which he
confesseth.) For in the Angels and Adam before their falling and
committing of sin, there was not any propension or disposition to
sin, and therefore to this we shall give the most acute answer of Dr.
Twisse in these words: Nam licèt insit homini propensio ad
peccandum (scilicet post lapsum) per modum dispositionis, quæ
præcedanea sit permissioni actus peccaminosi; At in Adamo (ante
lapsum) nulla inerat hujusmodi dispositio, aut ad peccandum
propensio, ante peccatum ejus primum. Sed neq; in Angelis, qui à
statu suo ceciderunt. Secundo, ut ut dispositio, sive habitus insit qui
inclinet ad agendum, non est ex natura dispositionis sive habitus
cujuscunq; ut faciat hominem propendere ad actum aliquem
particularem, cujus vel solius ratione dicitur permissio. And though
it be granted that God did create the Angels, and Adam in statu
labili, wherein they had a sufficiency of power or grace not to have
sinned, or faln, and though that power or grace was not withdrawn
from them, and that there was no coaction upon their wills to inforce
them to sin; for if it had been so, their falls would have been no sin:
so neither did God supply them with more assisting grace to have
upholden them, for then their estate had not been labile, nor they in
a possibility to sin. But it is manifest that they in their Creation were
set in æquilibrio, and had equal power of freedom of will either to sin
or not to sin, and so had no propension or disposition at all to
commit that sin, to which they were left by a free permission: and so
propension and disposition to the act permitted (if permission be
understood generally) had no place in the Angels nor Adam before
their first sinning, according to the Text, God made man upright,
that is like a straight or right line that falling perpendicularly upon
another right line, doth incline to neither end of the line upon which
it falls, so Adam was made upright without any propension or
inclination to sin at all. And if this propension and disposition be
understood, and applied to Angels in their condition after their fall,
then it is true they have not only an inclination but a most strong will
and desire to commit more evil and mischief than God in his
goodness permits them to perform, for the Devil goeth about like a
roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour, and it was Satan that
not only had a disposition, but desired to sift Peter as wheat. And it
is manifest that wicked Men have a strong will and desire to commit
mischief; but that God hath an hook in their Nostrils, and a Bridle in
their Jawes wherewith he curbs and restrains them, that they cannot
act out all the mischief that they intend, as is manifest in the example
of Sennacherib and many others.
7. Permission Fran. Jun. de Twisse de Permiss.
must be referred peccat. prim. ut supra.
and reduced to the Adam. p. 111, 114.
will of God, for nolition is an act of his will August. Enchir. 75,
as well as volition: and to speak properly 76.
and truly, permission is but an act of the Divine Will not to impede
such or such particular actions of the creatures; and therefore the
same things will follow from his volition or his will non impediendi,
as from his volition to the acts of a free agent, seeing neither do put
coaction upon the will of the Creature that is to act. And that
permission is an act of the Divine will, and to be reduced unto it
Arminius confesseth in these words: Permissionem ad genus
actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum, sive per se sive
reductive, ut in Scholis loquuntur. Cessatio enim ab actu, ad actum
quoq; est reducenda: causam autem proximam & immediatam
habet voluntatem, non scientiam, non potentiam, non potestatem,
licet & ista in permittente requirantur. And when he defineth
permission, he saith: Permissio Dei, est actus voluntatis Divinæ;
than which nothing can be more clear. And not much different from
this is the definition of permission, that is given by learned Junius
thus: Est autem permissio actus voluntatis, quo is penes quem est
alienas actiones inhibere, eas non inhibet, sed agentis voluntati
permittit earum modum. And again he saith: Apud Deum verò Opt.
Max. nulla est omnino permissio, nisi voluntaria: quandoquidem
omnis divina permissio à principio interno est, id est, à voluntate
ipsius, & movetur ad finem quem voluntas præfinivit ejus. But we
will conclude this with that of S. Augustin thus Englished: “Not any
thing cometh to pass, unless the Omnipotent will have it to be done,
either that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither
is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things
to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just
judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although
therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they
are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as
they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should
be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent
good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which
he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to
be.” By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine
Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so
the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from
Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will.
8. It is a certain Prov. 16. 4. Twisse ut supra.
truth that all moral 346.
actions are performed by a physical power in respect of the
sustentation of the will in its natural being while it acteth, and that
the creature is conserved even in the act as it is natural, though there
be obliquity in the will of the creature acting in reference to the law
given, or made known unto it. And this Arminius acknowledgeth in
these words: Necesse itaq; est, ut cum Deus potentiæ creaturæ
actum aliquem permittit, creatura illa conservetur, ut sit, & vivat,
potentia ejusdem permaneat, idonea ad actum producendum, nulla
major vel æqualis potentia opponatur, objectum deniq; offeratur, &
potentia permittatur. From whence therefore to instance in the first
sin of the Angels and Adam, besides the equal power and liberty of
will that they had to sin or not to sin, it is manifest that God willed
and determined not to withdraw his conservative power from them,
but that they might be and live in the very act of their sinning.
Neither did he withdraw that power they had, nor opposed a greater,
or equal power to impede them, much less did he create or infuse any
evil into their natures, nor put upon them any coaction of will, to
inforce them to sin, but solely left them to the power and liberty of
their own free wills. And though by his prescience he certainly knew
that they would sin and fall, yet he determined in his purpose not to
hinder them, but by his providential decree did set down how to
guide and order that fall and defection the most advantagiously for
his glory both in his Mercy and Justice. So that even in this there was
no bare passive permission, separate and distinct from his will and
decree in his providence, but only permission to the moral act of
their wills, which by his wisdom, decree and providence, he ordered
for his own glory, according to the Text: The Lord hath made (or
wrought) all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of
evil. The Hebrew word hath wrought, doth properly signifie, to work
by polishing, trimming, or framing and fitting, so that the wicked
(who have made themselves so by the acts of their own wills) God by
his decree and providence doth polish, fit and order for the setting
forth of his own glory in framing the wicked for the day of evil, the
evil of punishment and judgment.
9. Further it is necessary that the creature acting a moral act
(especially in this case of the Angels and Adam before their fall) have
the liberty and freedom of will, and that the will at the instant of the
act, be not restrained nor under a coactive power, for otherwise
malum culpæ or sin would cease to be evil, and so there could be no
sin at all. And thus far, and in this peculiar respect only, the Angels
and Adam before their acting of sin, and in the very instant of the act
it self, were permitted, that is, God willed and determined not to
impede them, but for the ordering of that sin and fall, the permission
was conjoined with his will and providence, and not separate from it,
or a nude permission.
10. That malum culpæ, or sin doth arise Rom. 7. 8, 11.
by the occasion of a law; for where no law is,
there can be no sin, and therefore the Apostle saith: But sin taking
occasion by the Commandment, wrought in me all manner of
concupiscence. So that sin considered as it is sin, is an Aberration or
Deviation of the Will of the creature from the revealed law of the
Creator, and hath simply and absolutely no other causality, but only
the deficiency and ἀταξία of the Creature to produce it, especially in
these cases of the Angels and Adam in their first acts of sin.
11. Now we will Psal. 37. 10. Psal. 73. 18.
come to the Psal. 75. 6, 7.
application of this unto wicked Men as they
are under original and actual sins, and that in these few examples. 1.
It is not by a bare permissive power, but by his will and order in his
providence, for he setteth up the wicked in slippery places, and yet a
little while and the wicked shall not be: yea, thou shalt diligently
consider his place, and it shall not be. So Cain was suffered to slay
his Brother Abel, but by and by he was sent from the presence of the
Lord into the land of Nod: So he set up Saul to be King over Israel,
and soon after rejected him, and also destroyed him: these were by
providence, not only bare permission. 2. For promotion cometh
neither from the East nor the West, nor from the South: But God is
the judge, he pulleth down one, and setteth up another. So wicked
Haman was set up to be the highest in the Kingdom next Ahasuerus,
and got a decree to have all the Jewes put to death, and had set up a
pair of Gallows to hang Mordecai upon, and yet see the providence of
God, who quickly brought him to be hanged upon them himself: and
this will be further made out where we speak of providence.
12. Though those that ascribe so large a Resp. Fludan. ad
power unto Devils and Witches, do take it Lanov. p. 18.
for granted that they are only under a bare passive permission, and
that the faln Angels do act, what, when, where and how they list, yet
is it a meer falsity, for they are under the rule of Gods Divine Will,
decree and providence, and do act nothing, but as and so far as they
are licensed, ordered and limited by his will and providence, and are
under a punctual restraint, nay kept in the chains of everlasting
darkness unto the judgment of the great day, as we shall prove at full
in that Chapter where we handle the knowledge and power of faln
Angels. And therefore here we shall only say this, that if Devils could
do as much mischief as they would, and were under no restraint or
chains, then none of the godly would be left alive. But it is manifest
that Devils do act nothing (excepting the obliquity and evil of their
own wills) but meerly as instruments of the Divine Will and
Providence, for as the Christian Philosopher saith: Illa est impietas;
nimirum ea falso attribuere creaturis, quæ radicaliter Deo soli sunt
propria, & inter cætera, actum aliquem peculiarem in diabolo esse
existimare, qui non est originaliter à Deo, & consequenter
immediatè, cum essentialis Dei actus sit per se sine divisione in
omni re.
Concerning Isai. 42. 9. Greg. in Dialog.
Divine prescience, August. de. Trinit. l. Acts 15. 18.
which is as S. 15. c. 7.
Gregory saith, Psal. 115. 3. Ephes. 1. 11.
Præscientia est Vid. Rivet. de Psal. 33. 13, 14, 15.
unamquamq; rem Provid. Disput. 1.
antequam veniat, August. de lib.
videre, & id quod futurum est priusquam arbitr. l. 3.
præsens sit prævidere, we may only note
this, That it is certain and infallible, as saith the Lord by the Prophet:
Behold the former things are come to paß, and new things do I
declare, before they spring forth I tell you of them: Also, known
unto God are all his works from the foundation of the World. “So
that his prescience is that infallible vision, by which he
comprehendeth all what he knows by one eternal, immutable and
ineffable vision.” But this prescience in God doth not flow from the
things that are to come to pass, but from his decree, by which all
future things are determined, who doth all things according to the
counsel of his own will, for God is in heaven, he hath done
whatsoever he pleased. But this prescience is not to be considered
only by it self, as a bare vision, or inspection, but as it is coupled and
joined with his providence, For the Lord looketh from heaven, he
beholdeth all the sons of men. From the place of his habitation he
looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth. Forming (or framing)
likewise their hearts, and considering all their works. And this
prescience considered solely by it self, is not the cause of the things
that come to pass, for as the Father saith well: Sicut tu memoria tuâ
non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt, sic Deus præscientia suâ non
cogit facienda quæ sunt futura. So that we conclude that God by a
naked prescience doth not only behold infallibly the things that are
to come, and so is only a spectator of what Devils and wicked Men
will do, but also that he doth order, rule and predesign all their
works and actions.
1. As touching De provid. Trac. p. Andr. Rivet.
Gods Government 9. disputat. Thes. 1. p.
and Isagog. Christ. c. 4.
Administration of 32. p. 52.
the World by his Divine providence, we shall in the first place lay
down some of the definitions of it from the most sound and learned
Divines of the Reformed Churches, and that in English, after this
order. The acute and learned Rivet describes it thus: “Providence is
an ineffable force and virtue of the Divine Sapience and Potency, by
which God doth conserve and govern to his own Glory all his Works
according to his eternal, most wise, and most free decree, and
directing every thing in time unto its end.” Johannes de Spina
defines it thus: “Providence is the prescience and counsel of God
eternal, most free, immutable, most just, most wise; most good,
whereby God worketh and determineth all good things in all, but
doth only permit evil things, and doth dispose and direct all things to
his own Glory and the Salvation of his elect.” And much to the same
purpose doth Lambertus Danæus speak in these words: “Providence
is a most free and most powerful action of God, by which he not only
stirreth up and governeth universals, but also singulars, in every one
of their single actions. And (he saith) it is called a most free and most
powerful act, because it can neither be hindered nor overcome by any
law.” And to these for substance do agree Calvin, Musculus, Beza,
Zanchius, and the rest of all Orthodox Divines.
2. But we shall chiefly insist on that Exeges. Loc. 6. p.
definition that is given by learned Piscator 143, 144. &c.
in these words: “The providence of God is his eternal, most wise,
most just and immutable counsel or decree, whereby he doth most
freely govern all things by him created to the glory of himself, and
the Salvation of his elect.” To which he giveth this explication: “That
it doth consist of a Genus and three differences. The Genus is the
word Decretum which is illustrated by four adjuncts; Eternity,
Sapience, Justice and Immutability. The first difference is taken from
the objects; which are all created things. The second from the ends,
which are two, the Glory of God, and the Salvation of the elect. The
third from the effect, which is the government of things created,
which Gubernation is illustrated by the adjunct which is liberty.”
3. The parts of Acts 4. 27, 28. Acts 2. 23.
this definition are Matth. 10. 29, 30, Heb. 1. 3.
thus proved. 1. 31.
That the Gen. 45. 5. Deut. 19. 4, 5.
providence of God Prov. 16. 4. Prov. 16. 33.
is his counsel and Rom. 8. 28, 30. Rom. 9. 22, 23.
decree, appeareth Rom. 9. 15, 18. Psal. 115. 3.
most plainly from
Job 34. 13.
these Scriptures: Peter in his Sermon to the
Jews upon the day of Pentecost saith: Him (that was Jesus) being
delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God (τῇ
ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει Θεοῦ) ye have taken, and by
wicked hand have crucified and slain. And again the Church at
Jerusalem in their prayers say thus: Of a truth against thy holy
Child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius
Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel were gathered
together, For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel
determined (ἡ χείρ σου καὶ ἡ βουλή σου προώρισε γενέσθα) before
to be done. 2. That all things created (nay also those things which do
seem to happen fortuitously, or to be by permission, as sinful
actions) are governed and ordered by the providence of God, as these
Scriptures will sufficiently demonstrate. Christ Jesus the son of God,
doth uphold (or sustain) all things by the word of his power. And
doth not our Saviour tell us: Are not two sparrows sold for a
farthing, and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your
father? But the very hairs of your heads are all numbred. Fear ye
not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows. That place
concerning the Cities of refuge, and the fleeing of the ignorant man-
slayer thither is most remarkable, and is this. And this is the case of
the slayer, which shall flee thither, that he may live: whoso killeth
his neighbour ignorantly, whom he hated not in times past, as when
a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to hew wood, and his
hand fetcheth a stroak with the ax to cut down the tree, and the
head slipeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he
die, he shall flee unto one of those Cities, and live. And was not the
action of Josephs brethren, sin and sinful in selling of him to the
Ismaelites, and yet he acknowledgeth, that God sent him before them
to preserve life. So that God brought good forth of evil, and doth
order even the sins of the wicked to just and good ends by his Divine
Providence. Again: The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole
disposing thereof is of the Lord. So when the Men in the Ship with
Jonah did cast lots, by the Lords disposing the lot fell upon Jonah
who was justly guilty, and so by providence pointed out. 3. That God
doth govern all things to his own glory is manifest by these Texts:
The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the wicked for
the day of evil. And, what if God, willing to show his wrath, and to
make his power known, endured with much long suffering the
vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make
known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had
afore prepared unto glory? And that he governeth all things for the
Salvation of his elect, is plain: And we know that all things work
together for good, to them that love God, to them who are the called
according to his purpose. So that if God be for the Elect, who can be
against them? 4. That God doth govern all things most freely is clear,
because he is omnipotent and supream, and there is no power that
can either impede, or constrain him, For he hath done whatsoever
he would, both in Heaven and Earth. And the Apostle saith; I will
have mercy upon whom I will have mercy. Therefore hath he mercy
on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. For
who hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed
the whole world?
4. The several Id. 45. 5. & 50. 20. Gen. 37. 18, 19, 20,
ways that God Prov. 21. 1. 26, 27.
useth in governing Id. 9. 16, 17. Exod. 7. 3.
the creatures in Psal. 105. 25. Rom. 9. 17.
the world whether Matth. 4. 1. Rom. 8. 14.
good or bad, may
Luke 4. 1. Mark 1. 12.
be comprised in
these four ways. 1. 2 Sam. 24. 1. Gen. 9. 27.
He ruleth and 1 Kings 22. 22. 1 Chron. 21. 1.
ordereth them, by Psal. 81. 11, 12. Judges 9. 23, 56, 57.
bending, inclining Rom. 1. 24. Acts 14. 16.
and turning of Gen. 20. 6.
their wills and intentions, to serve and fullfil
his decree and pleasure. So when the Brethren of Joseph were fully
resolved to murther him, God by the means of Reuben and Judah, so
wrought upon their minds and wills, that they were contented to sell
him to the Ismaelites, that so the determinate counsel of God might
be fulfilled; for though they intended it for evil, that he might never
return to his Father, nor to have his dream fulfilled that they might
bow down before him, yet God intended it for good, and so brought it
to pass. And this he did not by changing or taking away their natures,
nor by putting a coactive power upon their wills; but by inclining and
bending them to his own purpose, so that the act was the act of their
own wills, but the moving of their wills to spare his life was from the
Lord: for as he that made the eye must needs see, so he that made
the will must needs have a power to move, incline and turn it. And
therefore the Father said well, Certum est, nos velle cum velimus,
sed Deus facit, ut velimus bonum. And it is apparent that the hearts
of all men are in the hands of the Lord, and he turneth and inclineth
them according to his will and purpose, as saith Solomon, The Kings
heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it
whithersoever he will. Upon which the note of Tremellius and
Junius is this: Est quidem animus omnium hominum
gubernaculum, quo velut naves in mediis aquis reguntur corpora &
actiones nostræ: tamen ne ipsorum quidem regum animus ex seipso
permovetur, impellitur, inhibeturque, sed Deus in singulorum
animis, veluti clavum tenet. And concerning the wicked God saith: I
will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and multiply my signes and
wonders in the land of Ægypt. And again: And indeed for this cause,
have I raised (made thee stand, feci ut existeres, as Beza notes) thee
up, for to shew in thee my power, and that my name may be
declared throughout all the earth. And as yet exaltest thou thy self
against my people, that thou wilt not let them go? And further the
Text saith: He turned their hearts, to hate his people, to deal subtilly
with his servants. 2. God also ruleth and ordereth his creatures by
leading, drawing, inciting and moving their wills to his own ends and
purposes, as sometimes to good, as in his own people: For as many
as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God. And so was
our Saviour led, or driven (ἐκβάλλει, ἤγετο, ἀνήχθη) into the
wilderness, to be tempted of the devil. To this agreeth the blessing
and prophecie of Noah: God shall perswade, or allure Japhet, to
dwell in the tents of Shem. Sometimes God inciteth the creatures to
evil by the ministery of Satan, as is manifest in these examples. For
the Text saith, And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against
Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel
and Judah. And another place saith: And Satan stood up against
Israel, and provoked David to number the people. Whereby it is
plain that Satan was the instrument, as sent and ordered of God to
move David to number the people, that thereby the King and people
might be punished, and the King thereby brought to a deeper sight of
his sins, repentance, and a closer trusting and adhering to his God.
So when the Lord intended to have Ahab to go up to Ramoth Gilead
that he might be slain, he sent forth an evil Angel, to be a lying spirit
in all Ahabs Prophets, and said unto him, Thou shalt perswade him,
and prevail also: Go forth and do so. So that what God orders, Satan
doth but execute. So when God intended to punish and destroy
Abimelech, and the Men of Shechem, he sent an evil spirit between
them to divide them, and so accomplisht his will upon both parties,
as saith the Text: Thus God rendred the wickedness of Abimelech
which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren. And all
the evil of the men of Shechem, did God render upon their heads:
and upon them came the curse of Jotham the son of Jerubbaal. 3.
God ruleth his creatures by permission, or his will of not impeding
them to act according to their wills and power, as in these cases. For
God speaking of his people of Israel saith: But my people would not
hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of me. So I gave
them up unto their own hearts lusts, and they walked in their own
counsels. Agreeable to which is that in the Acts: Who in times past
suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: which is as Beza
notes: Ex arbitrio suo vivere, nulla ipsis præscripta ratione
religionis. And in this sense, and to this purpose it is that God gave
(παρέδωκεν) them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own
hearts; because of that horrible Idolatry that formerly they were
guilty of. 4. God ruleth his creatures by his providence, sometimes by
repressing, prohibiting and impeding the execution of their wicked
wills, as is clear in the case of Abimelech King of Gerar, who took
Sarah Abrahams Wife intending to have had carnal knowledge of
her, but God plagued him and his Family, and said; For I also
withheld thee from sinning against me; therefore I suffered thee not
to touch her.
Now we shall come to consider how the faln Angels are under the
rule and restraint of this Divine and all-governing providence,
wherein we shall make it appear, that they act nothing in this
elementary and sublunary World, after any corporeal manner, but as
they are ordered, licensed and limited by the will and decree of the
Almighty, and so do not wander and rove at their own pleasures to
act in corporeal things, what, when and how they list, as the
Witchmongers vainly suppose, and this we shall clear in these
particulars.
1. It cannot rationally be supposed that God is less wise, in ruling
and ordering the Prince of darkness, the Prince of Devils, and the
head of all Rebellion and Rebels, than he is in ruling his Subjects and
Servants, which are all wicked men; but all these he ruleth with a rod
of Iron, and breaketh them in sunder like a Potters vessel: And
therefore much more hath he a restraint upon, and a rule over the
faln Angels who kept not their first estates, and therefore are
reserved in chains in darkness until the judgment of the great day.
2. As he is the Luke 8. 31. Matth. 25. 41.
Prince and Ring-
leader of all Sin and Rebellion against God, though he yet have not
his final punishment, unto which he is reserved for the judgment of
the great day, and though he be not yet thrust into the abysse or
great depth, nor into that everlasting fire that is prepared for him
and his Angels; yet is he kept in chains and darkness, and can act
nothing but as he is licensed, ordered and limited by the Almighty.
3. And though he compass the earth to Thom. Aquin.
and fro, and walk about like a roaring lion Caten. aur. in Luc.
seeking whom he may devour, yet is that 8. p. 200.
but according to the malice and purpose of his wicked will, for in
punishing or afflicting of the godly he must have licence from God
first, or else he can do nothing in this Elementary World, as is most
manifest in the affliction of Job, neither could he enter into the herd
of Swine, but by Christs leave and order, nor deceive Ahabs Prophets
but by order from the Lord. And therefore an ancient Father said
well: Quod si super porcos potestatem non habent, multò magis
nullam habent Dæmones contra homines factos ad imaginem Dei;
oportet ergo Deum solum timere, contemnere autem illos.
Therefore we shall conclude this briefly here, having occasion to
handle it more fully hereafter, to wit, that the Witchmongers can
have no shelter for their opinion from the Doctrine of Gods
permission (if rightly understood) because God doth neither order,
nor permit faln Angels to act any thing (especially in corporeal
things) but what is for just, good, and wise ends, which cannot be
shewed in these actions attributed to Witches.
 CHAP. X.

Whether faln Angels be Corporeal or simply Incorporeal, and the

absurdity of the assuming of Bodies, and the like consequents.

I am not insensible what great censure I may incurr for entring upon
such a ticklish and nice point as the corporeity or incorporeity of
Angels, seeing it hath exercised and crucified the wits of the most
learned in all ages, especially being but an obscure person, and not
heightned with those lofty titles that usually elevate Mens fames,
more by those attributes than by the weight and strength of their
arguments. Yet it being no necessary Article of the Christian Faith,
but that a Man may lawfully defend either, it cannot rationally be
judged by understanding Readers either to be pride or just offence
for me to handle this subject. For seeing that most of the Christian
and Learned Fathers for the space of four hundred years after Christ,
were of the opinion that they were corporeal, it can be no novelty in
me to revive or assert that opinion, and therefore I shall labour to
make it manifest in this ensuing order.
1. There is a late Nov. Organ. lib. 1. The immort. of the
way of arguing p. 49. Soul, p. 7, 8.
taken up by Dr. Moore and others, that they Ibid. p. 21.
will undertake to prove a thing to be so or
so, or else to make Man to deny his own faculties. And so the said
Doctor doth undertake to prove the existence of immaterial and
incorporeal beings, or else he thinketh he bringeth Men to deny their
own faculties: And these faculties he maketh to be, common notions,
external sense, and evident and undeniable deductions of reason.
And concludeth that, what is not consonant to all or some of these is
meer fancy, and is of no moment for the evincing of truth or
falshood, by either its vigour or perplexiveness. But this will not