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CONTINENTAL ASSIGNMENT HUSSERL 2024

An Analysis of Husserlian Foundationalism and Its

Implication to Epistemenology

Maahi

[email protected]

Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi

Prof. Navneet Chopra

September 22, 2024

Abstract

The paper argues that Husserl’s insights provide a robust framework for epistemological
discussions, particularly in addressing the reliability and validity of knowledge claims. By
grounding knowledge in lived experience, Husserl reorients epistemology towards a more
relational perspective, where the knower and the known are inextricably linked. This perspective
opens avenues for examining how different contexts and individual experiences shape our
understanding of truth and certainty. The history of philosophy highlights a lack of consensus
among philosophers regarding the acquisition of epistemic certainty. This influenced Edmund
Husserl’s approach to epistemology, prompting him to seek a foundation for philosophy that is
beyond question. Husserl sought to establish a rigorous foundation for knowledge that addresses
the complexities of human experience. Central to his philosophy is the concept of intentionality,
which posits that consciousness is always directed toward something. This intentional structure
allows for a deeper investigation into how we come to know and understand the world.

Keywords: Foundationalism, Phenomenology, Epoche, Intentionality

Introduction
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Epistemologists generally agree that knowledge is interconnected and forms a structured body,
but they have differing views on the nature of this structure. Coherentism posits that a belief is
justified if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs. In contrast, Infinitism asserts that a belief is
justified only if it belongs to an infinite chain of reasoning that meets certain criteria.
Foundationalism offers a different perspective, viewing beliefs as organized into a hierarchical
structure with a foundation. This foundational level consists of self-evident beliefs that do not
require justification from other beliefs. The beliefs built upon this foundation are referred to as
the superstructure. René Descartes is often identified as the first modern foundationalist,
famously asserting "Cogito, ergo sum" as an indubitable belief upon which all other knowledge
is constructed. Despite his influence, Descartes' foundationalism has faced significant criticism,
particularly regarding the challenges posed by his dualistic framework. In response to these
critiques, philosopher Edmund Husserl sought to refine Cartesian foundationalism through his
phenomenological method, aiming to establish a more robust basis for understanding knowledge.
In doing so, Husserl provides a pathway to address the epistemic challenges posed by others,
proposing a model where knowledge is based on first-person experiences that are universally
accessible in their essential forms.

Husserl’s Foundationalism

Descartes sought to establish a philosophical foundation built on certainty, beginning with a

process of methodological doubt. This framework significantly influenced Husserl’s own
approach to phenomenology. Husserl’s phenomenology is deeply rooted in the philosophical
legacy of Descartes, who he regarded as a crucial precursor to his own ideas.

"No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene
Descartes. Phenomenology must honour him as its genuine patriarch. It must be said explicitly
that the study of Descartes’ Meditations has influenced directly the formation of the developing
phenomenology and gives it its present form; to such an extent that phenomenology might
almost be called a new twentieth century Cartesianism” (Husserl, 1970, pg.3).

Michael Shim's observation highlights the significant connection between Husserlian

phenomenology and the Cartesian tradition, stating “almost every exegical approach to
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Husserlian phenomenology has at least mentioned the relevance of the Cartesian tradition”
(Shim, 2000, pg. 593).

While acknowledging Descartes’ contributions, Husserl contended that Descartes fell short in
fully developing a new science grounded in absolute foundations. Although Descartes sought to
free himself from biases, he ultimately fell prey to scholastic influences, which led him to accept
some of the very prejudices he aimed to challenge. Recognizing these failures, Husserl
emphasized the need to revive the radical spirit of self-responsibility that had been lost in
Descartes’ work. He aimed to clarify and eliminate the biases and assumptions underlying
Descartes' philosophy to ensure that his own project would maintain its integrity and contribute
to a genuine scientific endeavor. In response, Husserl introduced the concept of methodological
bracketing, which would allow for a more thorough exploration of essence of consciousness.

Husserl’s philosophical development was also shaped by the teachings of his mentor, Franz
Brentano. Brentano is commonly regarded as the figure who brought the concept of
intentionality back into modern philosophy. The work most frequently cited regarding this
discovery is the opening of a chapter from "Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt" published
in 1874:

"Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters
die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir,
obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die
Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente
Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in
gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder
verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehaßt, in dem Begehren begehrt usw" (Brentano,
1973, p. 124-125).

Brentano posited that every conscious act is inherently directed towards an object, a principle he
called intentionality. He distinguished between mental and physical realms. However, Husserl
expanded this notion, asserting that consciousness could direct itself towards both mental and
non-mental entities, thereby encompassing all physical objects and experiences. Brentano's
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influence on Husserl's theory of relations highlights a critical development in phenomenology.

While Husserl was inspired by Mill's empirical approach and Lotze's metaphysical insights, he
reinterpreted these ideas to explore the intentionality of consciousness. This investigation aims to
unravel the nuances of Husserl's early thought, emphasizing how his adaptation of relational
concepts from Brentano and others deepens our understanding of the structure of experience and
meaning.

Phenomenological Method

At the heart of Husserl's phenomenology lies a method designed to reveal the essential structures
of experience. This method aims to eliminate biases and preconceived notions that could distort
understanding. Central to this approach are two elements: phenomenological reduction and the
process of bracketing, known as epoche. Although these processes can be distinguished, they
operate simultaneously.

Epoche

Husserl's concept of epoche involves setting aside prior assumptions and distractions, facilitating
an objective investigation of experience. This “methodological bracketing” is heavily inspired by
Descarte’s doubt, which sought to strip away uncertainties to arrive at clear and distinct truths.
Husserl adopted this strategy to conduct a thorough inquiry, due to the fact that our beliefs are
inherently influenced by "natural attitude". The natural attitude represents the default perspective
through which individuals engage with their experiential worlds. "Bracketing" involves
suspending all beliefs associated with this natural attitude.

"I disconnect them all, I make absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single
one of the propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value is perfect,
I take none of them, no one of them serves me for a foundation" (Husserl, 1983, p. 42).

The primary goal of phenomenology is to isolate the transcendental ego by setting aside all
beliefs. This is achieved in the final stage of Husserl’s bracketing processes, known as the
"Transcendental Reduction". This process involves the subject distancing themselves from the
world to attain a state of transcendental independence, free from worldly constraints. From this
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reduction emerges pure consciousness, cleansed of all psychological interpretations and natural
obstacles that may hinder accurate epistemic understanding. For Husserl, this leads to the
realization of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental ego, or pure ego, is a crucial
principle; it serves as the source of truth and the cognitive owner of the world, rather than merely
a part of it. Husserl states, “The posited Ego means that the world is no longer given to me in
advance and outside there, but the positing world is within the transcendental Ego”. This
transcendental ego can perceive the world independently, unencumbered by natural limitations,
achieving an equal distance from all aspects of reality, which Husserl refers to as the
Archimedean point. This suggests a uniform apprehension of truth that is infallible, allowing for
objective knowledge regardless of the perceiver's social context.

In addition to reconstructing the Cartesian understanding of the ego’s certainty, Husserl

addresses another key issue in foundationalism: justifying secondary beliefs based on primary
ones. After establishing the certainty of the ego, Descartes, in his Meditations, sought to validate
other beliefs through deductions from the ego, a method that has faced criticism. Husserl argues
that this deduction is unnecessary; instead, he employs his theory of intentionality to explain how
secondary beliefs can be justified. He asserts that the transcendental ego is not the sole self-
evident truth. He asserted:

"The bare identity of the "I am" is not the only indubitable aspect of transcendental self-
experience; rather, a universal apodictically experienceable structure of the ego extends through
all particular data of self-experience, even if individual details are not absolutely indubitable"
(Husserl, 1966, p. 12).

Husserl argues that the ego is not the only apodictic fact; the entire world experienced by the ego
is also essential. The ego structures and orders the external world, providing the foundation and
meaning to objects within it. According to Husserl, the certainty of the ego ensures the certainty
of the world it perceives. Husserl’s theory of intentionality addresses the epistemic challenge of
bridging the gap between the subject and the object of cognition. His phenomenological
approach suggests that this divide does not exist, as the subject and the object are intrinsically
connected through the intentionality of consciousness. Through the concepts of the
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transcendental ego and intentionality, Husserl aims to provide a robust foundation and
revitalization of Cartesian foundationalism.

The eidetic method

The second key methodological step in phenomenology is the eidetic reduction. In contrast to the
epoché reduction, which involves setting aside biases and assumptions, the eidetic reduction
focuses on uncovering the meaning or essence of what we perceive. It seeks to reveal the
fundamental structures of human consciousness instead of the transient content of individual
experiences. During eidetic reduction, the specific existence of an object is bracketed, allowing
us to discern its common characteristics or essence through a process known as "imaginative
variation"(Omoregbe, 2005, p. 52). The eidetic reduction is a technique for envisioning possible
variations of the phenomenon being examined. While it’s impossible to realistically imagine
every variation—given that they are likely infinite—phenomenologists aim to envision as many
as possible. The goal of this process is to identify the essence or eidetic structure of the
phenomenon, which includes all features that remain unchanged despite imaginative variations.
This method is experimental because the phenomenologist must actively conceive a wide range
of variations without prior knowledge of how the phenomenon will manifest in each instance or
which features will remain consistent.

Analysis

Husserlian phenomenology shares a similar aim with Plato’s quest for fundamental truths,
focusing on uncovering irreducible essences. Plato had to bypass appearances to ascend to the
truth of things (Guthrie, 1972, p. 88). This pursuit requires bracketing the world to engage it as
an object of deeper inquiry. By isolating the transcendental ego from distracting influences, the
bracketed world becomes more accessible to pure consciousness.

Both Husserlian phenomenology and Cartesianism emphasize the necessity of critically

examining prior beliefs. They advocate a return to foundational principles to reconstruct
knowledge that is pure and reliable. While Descartes employed systematic doubt to question all
aspects of reality, Husserl’s bracketing technique enables a more revealing engagement with the
world. The synthesis of Husserl and Descartes remains foundationalist, prioritizing a departure
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from previous epistemological assumptions to uncover reliable foundations for empirical or

scientific theories.

Kant introduced a distinction between phenomena and noumena within his metaphysical
framework. Phenomena refer to objects as they appear to us, while noumena denote things in
themselves. Our understanding of phenomena is filtered through the constructs of space and
time, rendering only the former knowable. As a result, the noumenon exists outside human
comprehension. In contrast, Husserlian phenomenology expands the discourse on knowability
beyond Kant’s limitations. Husserl views phenomenology as a rigorous science that aims to
uncover the essential structures of experience, transcending the boundaries established by
Kantian thought. Paradoxically, while Kant’s noumenon exists in a realm of unknowability,
Husserl acknowledges it as knowable within his framework. If knowledge were entirely
unattainable regarding the noumenon, the pursuit of essences would be rendered meaningless.
Husserlian phenomenology thus pushes the boundaries of knowledge, aspiring for universal
understanding and revealing the constraints of Kantian transcendentalism.

Epistemological implication of Husserlian Foundationalism

Husserlian foundationalism invites a rethinking of epistemology, moving away from purely

objective standards toward a more nuanced understanding that incorporates subjectivity, context,
and inter-relational dynamics. His view suggests that epistemological certainty is achievable,
countering the perspectives of some philosophers who claim that objective knowledge is
unattainable. This means that certainty cannot be derived from sensory experiences or from a
worldly ego but solely from the transcendental ego.

Husserl emphasized that consciousness is always directed towards something. This challenges
traditional foundationalist views by suggesting that knowledge is inherently relational and
context-dependent, undermining the idea of objective, isolated truths. Husserl argues one can
arrive at the essences of things only from a position free of presuppositions. Husserl's method of
bracketing presuppositions allows for the exploration of pure experiences.

Furthermore, Husserl’s foundationalism opens the possibility for a universal science, allowing
philosophy to comprehensively encompass all of nature. Unlike Hume, who argued that we
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cannot conceive of the world as a totality due to a lack of underlying connections, or Kant, who
claimed metaphysical agnosticism regarding knowledge of the cosmos, Husserl asserts that a
universal science is attainable.

In Husserlian foundationalism, the ego serves as the source of knowledge. However, Husserl
critiques Descartes' cogito by arguing that it lacks a comprehensive understanding of the ego's
transcendental nature.

"Descartes neglected to describe the ego in the full concretion of its transcendental being and
life, nor did he regard it as an unlimited work project to be pursued systematically. Had he
pursued this project, he would have discovered that the expression ego cogito must be expanded
by one term. Every cogito contains a meaning; its cogitatum… consciousness is always
consciousness of something. … The guiding schema for our exposition and description is
[accordingly] a three sided concept: ego cogito cogitatum"(Husserl, 1970, pg. 12-14).

"Husserl therefore extends Descartes cogito into ego cogito cogitatum, showing that the subject
(ego) and the object (cogitatum) are both revealed in the cogito"(Omoregbe, 2007, pg. 31).
Husserl posits that intentionality is key: consciousness is always directed at something beyond
itself. Thus, understanding the ego necessitates recognizing this relationship between subject and
object, highlighting the interconnectedness of thought and experience. As Unah states," it is a
kind of symbiotic relationship between thought and object of experience" (Unah, 1998, pg. 211).
This connection between subject and object is referred to by Husserl as intentionality.

Critique of Husserl’s Foundationalism

However, critiques of Husserl’s foundationalism, which relies on the theory of transcendental

subjectivity, suggest it is fundamentally untenable. It can be argued that any form of
foundationalism is inadequate, stemming from the erroneous belief in an ultimate ground for
diverse knowledge claims. A theory of knowledge that perceives it as a dynamic enterprise is
proposed, which would discard the dogmatism of foundationalism in favor of recognizing
multiple sources of knowledge rather than a singular ultimate source. Such a perspective sees the
justification of knowledge as contextually determined and dismisses any absolute a priori
standard of justification. This epistemic approach fosters open-mindedness and tolerance in
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society, addressing the dogmatism, fanaticism, and intolerance that often accompany entrenched
foundationalism—issues that are especially critical in contemporary discourse.

Additionally, Husserl's principle of all principles asserts that every intuition offers immediate
justification, yet not all intuitions are valid knowledge sources, as they may encompass illusions
or hallucinations. Therefore, the notion that phenomenology serves as the ultimate foundation for
human knowledge remains philosophically contestable. Philosophers like Bonjour have
challenged the belief that our convictions can be justified without inference, asserting that any
justification must be accessible to us.

While Husserl's work presents significant advancements in understanding consciousness and its
structures, the foundationalist claims he posited face substantial philosophical scrutiny. The need
for a more nuanced and contextually aware epistemology remains paramount in addressing the
complexities of knowledge and understanding in contemporary thought.

Conclusion

Despite the various criticisms he has faced, he deserves recognition for his efforts to establish a
foundation for human knowledge based on consciousness, echoing the Socratic call to “know
thyself.” At the core of Husserl's thought is the idea that consciousness is always directed toward
something—this concept, known as intentionality, emphasizes that our perceptions and
experiences are inherently tied to the objects of our awareness. By examining how these objects
present themselves to consciousness, Husserl sought to uncover the essential structures that
govern our experiences. Husserl’s method of epoché, or bracketing, serves as a cornerstone of
his phenomenological approach. This process reveals not only the richness of consciousness but
also the ways in which our experiences shape our interaction with reality.

One of the key successes of Husserl’s foundationalism lies in its ability to articulate a
comprehensive view of consciousness that transcends traditional empiricism and rationalism.
While empiricism focuses on sensory experience and rationalism on abstract reasoning, Husserl's
phenomenology bridges these perspectives by emphasizing the lived experience of the
individual. He posits that understanding consciousness requires an examination of how we
experience time, space and self, thus enriching our comprehension of human existence.
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Husserl’s work not only laid the groundwork for existentialism and hermeneutics but also had a
lasting impact on psychology and cognitive science. His exploration of consciousness paved the
way for subsequent thinkers, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who further developed his
ideas, emphasizing embodiment and the situatedness of experience.

"Husserl's method provides a way of grasping the essential structures of experience that is
unmatched in its rigor" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 39).

Reference

Husserl, E. (1970). The Paris lectures (P. Koestenbaum, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Shim, M. (2000). Descartes and Husserl: The philosophical project of radical beginnings.
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Brentano, F. C. (1973). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (O. Kraus, Ed., Vol. 1). Felix
Meiner. (Philosophische Bibliothek, Vol. 192)

Husserl, E. (1983). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological

philosophy (F. Kersten, Trans.). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1972). The Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. London: Methuen &
Co Ltd.

Omoregbe, J. (2005). Epistemology: A systematic and historical study. Lagos: Joja Press.

Unah, J. (1998). Metaphysics, phenomenology and African philosophy. Ibadan: Hope

Publications.

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row
(Original work published 1927).