Navigating New Horizons

A global foresight report on planetary

health and human wellbeing
© 2024 United Nations Environment Programme
ISBN: 978-92-807-4166-7
Job number: EO/2655/NA
DOI: https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/45890

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Acknowledgements

The information, data and insights presented in the Navigating New Horizons Report represents, at its
core, a collective intelligence building exercise. The report draws on the inputs and informed views of
hundreds of individuals including survey respondents, workshop participants, experts, stakeholder and
Member State representatives and youth voices who took valuable time away from their day jobs and
families to participate. There are too many to name here, but their contributions are invaluable.

This report has relied heavily on the dedication and expertise of the distinguished members of the
UNEP-ISC International Foresight Expert Panel: Dr. Andrea Hinwood (Ex-officio Member), Prof. Debra
Davidson (University of Alberta), Prof. Diana Mangalagiu (University of Oxford), Prof. Diana Ürge-
Vorsatz (Central European University), H.E. Dr. Edgar E. Gutiérrez-Espeleta (University of Costa Rica,
Former Minister of Environment and Energy for Costa Rica), Dr. Elham Mahmoud Ali (Suez University;
National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences), Prof. Fang Lee Cooke (Monash
University), Dr. Felix Moronta Barrios (International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology),
Prof. Gensuo Jia (Chinese Academy of Sciences), Dr. Henrik Carlsen (Stockholm Environment
Institute), Dr. Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), Dr. Ljubisa
Bojic (University of Belgrade), Prof. Michelle Mycoo (University of the West Indies), Dr. Nicholas
King (Wilderness Foundation Africa), Dr. Nyovani Madise (African Institute for Development Policy),
Sir Peter D. Gluckman (International Science Council), Prof. Ranjan Datta (Mount Royal University),
Dr. Salvatore Aricò (Ex-officio Member), Dr. Simone Lucatello (Mexican National Agency for Science
and Technology), Dr. Soumya Swaminathan (M S Swaminathan Research Foundation, former WHO
Chief Scientist), Prof. Wibool Piyawatanametha (King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology Ladkrabang)
and Dr. Wilfred Lunga (Human Sciences Research Council).

Special thanks to our UNEP colleagues on the Strategic Foresight Task Team for their critical reflections
and engagement over the last 24-months, namely Abdelmenam Mohamed, Alexandre Caldas, Andrea
Rizzo, Cecilia Morales, Charles Sebukeera, Dina Abdelhakim, Ebrahim Gora, Fatou Ndoye, Francesco
Gaetani, Ifoda Abdurazakova, Janyl Moldalieva, Jason Jabbour (coordinator), Jinhua Zhang, Matthew
Billot, Piedad Martin, Pinya Sarasas, Sandor Frigyik, Tomas Marques and Yujeong Kim.

We thank our UNEP regional colleagues for their substantive contributions and support, particularly
on with the regional foresight workshops in 2023, including: Rose Mwebaza, Fatou Ndoye and Charles
Sebukeera (Africa Office); Dechen Tsering, Marlene Nilsson and Panvirush Vittayapraphakul (Asia
Pacific Office); Janyl Moldalieva and Veronika Hunt Safrankova (Brussels Office); Arnold Kreilhuber,
Matthew Billot and Tomas Marques (Europe Office); Juan Bello, Francesco Gaetani and Suzanne
Howard (LAC Office); Ligia Noronha, Mara Angelica Murillo Correa and Carla Calistri (New York Office);
and Rafael Peralta, Arshia Narang Chander and Churchill Onserio Mauti (North America Office); Sami
Dimassi, Abdelmenam Mohamed and Awatif Abdulla (West Asia Office).

The report and the foresight process also benefited from specific inputs and guidance related to data
analysis, scenario development and the preparation of figures including from Ana Rengel-Goncalves,
Anastasiya Letnikava, Andrea Hinwood, Anne-Katrin Bock, Anne-Sophie Stevance, Cristian Matti,
Dany Ghafari, Devina Lobine, Dina Abdelhakim, Henri Rueff, James Waddell, Jason Jabbour, Judith
Omumbo, Kakuko Yoshida, Lauren Sullivan, Laurent Bontoux, Liane Girier-Dufourni, Nicola Urbani,

i
Marc Gramberger, Mats van Dijk, Maxine Newlands, Michael Asquith, Monica Kerrets, Nicolas Balcolm
Raleigh, Paul de Ruijter, Paula A. Harrison, Pierre Boileau, Shiv Shah, Sol Dorotea Iglesias, Stuart
Barrow, Therese El Gemayel and Vassilis Daioglou.

We are grateful to the following scholars, experts and colleagues who gave their time to peer-review
various sections of the report: Adam Smith, Andrew Raine Catherine McMullen, Clara Wegenast,
Clarissa Rios Rojas, Elie Alhajjar, Elizabeth Sellwood, Eric Usher, Gabriel Labbate, Golestan (Sally)
Radwan, Jesica Andrews, Jonathan McDowell, Julian Blanc, Lai-Tze Fan, Manjari Mahajan, Maria
Eduarda Fernandes, Mirey Atallah, Naomi Koerner, Neville Ash, Peter Bridgewater, Pushpam Kumar,
Rajib Shaw, Richard Hartshorn, Steven Stone, Tiana Mahefasoa Randrianalijaona, Tim Gant, Valerie
Kapos and Virginia Murray.

This work would not have been possible without the support and contributions from global and
regional partners namely the Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, Center for International Forestry
Research and World Agroforestry (CIFOR-ICRAF), Centro de Pensamiento Estratégico Internacional
(CEPEI), Copernicus Science Centre, EU Policy Lab at the European Commission’s Joint Research
Centre (JRC), Future Earth Canada Hub, GRID Warsaw, International Science Council (ISC), Kuwait
Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS), Science for Africa Foundation, Secretariat of
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), Sustainability
in the Digital Age, UN Futures Lab and UN Global Pulse. Special thanks to the following individuals:
Alexandra Roldán, Philipp Shönrock and Javier Surasky (CEPEI); Éliane Ubalijoro (CIFOR-ICRAF);
Anne-Katrin Bock, Cristian Matti, Laurent Bontoux, Thomas Hemmelgran and Tommi Asikainen
(European Commission JRC); Ameenah Farhan, Layla Al-musawi, Ali Bumajdad, Hanady Abdulsalam
(KFAS); Jennifer Garard and Micheline Ayoub, (Future Earth Canada Hub); Maria Andrzejewska
and Zofia Pawlak (GRID Warsaw); Henryk Kwapisz (Saint Gobain); David Cooper and Wadzanayi
Mandivenyi (CBD); Judy Omumbo and Tom Kariuki (Science for Africa Foundation); Albert Salamanca
and Niall O’Connor (SEI Asia); Alana Poole and Chris Earney, (UN Futures Lab); Minke Meijnders and
Tiina Elise Neuvonen (UN Global Pulse); and Aaron Situmorang, Rizqi Ashfina and Ahmed El Saeed
(UN Global Pulse, Indonesia).

This report was developed, produced and authored by a core team from UNEP’s Office of the Chief
Scientist in collaboration with colleagues from the International Science Council (ISC):

Andrea Hinwood, UNEP Chief Scientist

Dina Abdelhakim, Programme Officer
Jason Jabbour, Senior Coordinator (Lead Author)
Michael Asquith, Consultant
Sarah Cheroben, Senior Programme Management Assistant

Anne-Sophie Stevance, Head of Global Science Policy Unit, ISC

James Waddell, Science Officer, ISC
Peter Bridgewater, Senior Advisor, ISC

Editorial team: Amanda Lawrence-Brown, Michael Logan and Richard Crompton

Layout and design: Beverley McDonald

ii
Glossary

Disruptions: Sudden or sharp shifts that can interrupt a trend, behaviour activity or process and
can cause a potential disturbance or problem. Disruptions can be negative or positive (e.g. process
improvements, innovation, solutions etc.).

Environment: The natural world including as a whole or in a particular geographical area, especially as
affected by human activity and includes human settlements.

Exnovation: The concept of exnovation refers to the process of actively discarding outdated, inefficient
or harmful technologies, practices and norms, and that goes hand-in-hand with actively unlearning
ingrained beliefs, attitudes or behaviours that may have underestimated transformative potential to
advance sustainability.

Foresight: A structured, multi-disciplinary approach to thinking systematically and exploring trends,

emerging changes and to inform and enable present-day decisions and priority-setting. Foresight is not
about forecasting or predicting the future, but rather it uses alternative futures and collective intelligence
gathering processes intended to augment traditional forms of analysis and decision-making.

Horizon scanning: The foundation of a Strategic Foresight process and is the systematic outlook
to detect early signs of potentially important developments by examining potential threats and
opportunities. It involves a set of techniques and assumes ongoing monitoring of changes as they
mature into trends. Horizon scanning can be used to support organizations and decision-makers in
anticipating future developments, managing risks and pursuing opportunities to build resilience to
future shocks and reduce uncertainty.

Human wellbeing: Can be understood as how people feel and how they function both on a personal
and social level, and how they evaluate their lives as a whole.

Market leakage: An increase in greenhouse gas emissions when a project changes the supply and
demand equilibrium, causing other market actors to shift their activities. For example, if a large forest-
conservation project reduces the local timber supply so that demand is unmet, this may increase
prices and pressures on forests elsewhere.

Megatrend: A widespread and long-term (or sustained) social, economic, environmental, political
or technological pattern of change that is slow to form but has a major impact once in place—
the trajectory of change (and sometimes the impact) can lead to irreversible transformations or
disruption. While megatrends are global in nature, they can unfold differently from region to region,
Megatrends have the nature of permanent trends that in a growing degree permeate all areas of
human life.

Nature-based solutions (NbS): These are approaches to address societal challenges, such as climate
change or biodiversity loss, through nature and its processes. They involve conservation, restoration or
sustainable management of ecosystems to provide benefits for people and the environment.

iii
Planetary health: Includes the relative condition and ability of our ecosystems, small and large, and
the Earth’s natural systems (e.g. geosphere, biosphere, cryosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere) to
support human societies.

Global Polycrisis: Occurs when two or more crises that may be independent or not, become causally
entangled—i.e. the interactive effects among them escalate the severity of impacts of each—and thereby
significantly degrade global planetary health and thus humanity’s prospects for wellbeing in a relatively
short period of time. These interacting, cascading series of events or sudden (non-linear) crises, across
space and time, occur simultaneously and therefore produce harms greater than the sum of those the
crises would produce in isolation, were their host systems not so deeply interconnected.

Signal of change: The initial symptoms (or early signs) of change—they can be any small but
potentially important development, practice, idea, event or innovation that points to a future possibility,
different to today’s norm or that could potentially disrupt, positively or negatively, current trends.
Signals of change can be thought of as seeds of a possible future development. In foresight, they are
often hidden among disconnected pieces of information that may initially appear to be background
noise but ultimately have disruptive potential through direct or indirect impacts on the global
environment. Signals can also help illuminate an unexpected aspect of an ongoing change.

Social contract: A tacit agreement among members of a society—the state, citizens, as well as private
and civil society sectors—that defines their mutual relationships, respective responsibilities, shared
values and expectations of each other.

Solar radiation modification: Intentional human intervention in the Earth’s climate system to reflect a
portion of incoming sunlight back into space or to reduce the amount of solar radiation reaching the
Earth’s surface, with the aim of counteracting global warming or mitigating its effects.

Trends: A general pattern or direction of change that has been observed over time, which may
continue or shift in the future. Trends can be strong or weak, increasing, decreasing or stable (mature)
and are used in foresight to understand the trajectory of developments.

Triple planetary crisis: The intersecting challenges of pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change,
collectively posing significant threats to the Earth’s environment, ecosystems and human wellbeing.

Unlearning: The process of letting go of outdated or inaccurate information, beliefs or behaviours in

order to make room for new learning and growth.

Zoonotic diseases: Illnesses caused by pathogens, such as viruses, bacteria or parasites, which can
be transmitted between animals and humans.

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Contents

Acknowledgements i
Glossary iii
Foreword vii
Preface viii
Executive Summary ix
Introduction 01
Beyond the horizon 03
UNEP’s Foresight Trajectory: a methodology snapshot 06

Part 1 - The new global context 10

Welcome to the polycrisis 12

Part 2 – Shifts, signals and potential disruptions 14

2.1 The relationship between humans and the environment is in flux 16
Signal of change No.1 | Ancient microbes hidden in thawing Arctic permafrost 19
Signal of change No.2 | New emerging zoonotic disease 20
Signal of change No.3 | Antimicrobial resistance approaching critical levels 21
Signal of change No.4 | Unforeseen impacts of harmful chemicals and materials 22
2.2 Critical resources: scarcity and competition reshaping dynamics of global security 24
Signal of change No.5 | Rapid expansion of space activity and orbital space debris 26
2.3 Artificial intelligence, digital transformation and technology – a wave of change 28
Signal of change No.6 | Emerging mindset of continuous learning and ‘exnovation’ 31
Signal of change No.7 | Deployment of Solar Radiation Modification 33
2.4 A new era of conflict 34
Signal of change No.8 | Autonomous and artificial intelligence weapons systems 36
Signal of change No.9 | New technologies amplify risks of biological agents misuse 38
2.5 Mass forced displacement 40
Signal of change No.10 | Uninhabitable spaces 42
2.6 Persistent and widening inequalities 44
Signal of change No.11 | Privatized micro-environmentalism 45
Signal of change No.12 | Uninsurable future 46
2.7 Misinformation, declining trust and polarization 48
Signal of change No.13 | Decisions increasingly detached from scientific evidence 49
Signal of change No.14 | Eco-anxiety: An emerging crisis hidden in plain sight 51
Signal of change No.15 | Surging fossil fuel subsidies 52
Signal of change No.16 | Escalating risks of corruption in carbon offsetting 54

v
 2.8 Polycentricity and diffusion of governance 56
Signal of change No.17 | New tools for rerouting global financial flows 57
Signal of change No.18 | Local, network-driven resilience 59
2.9 Mobilising insights from Foresight: Shifts, signals and the SDGs 60

Part 3: Managing change and building resilience: A future for planetary health and 62
human wellbeing
3.1 Shared values: A new social contract 63
Embracing the views of a more diverse group of stakeholders 64
Giving young people a stronger voice 65
A new framework for prosperity 65
3.2 Agile and adaptive governance for a sustainable future 66
Facilitating communities to engage, experiment and learn 67
Clear environmental goals and targets 67
3.3 Guiding governance through data and knowledge 68
Integrating and improving monitoring 68
Combining data, information and knowledge, and making it accessible 69

“The Earth turns to Gold, in the hands of the wise.” 70

Annexures 71
Comparative analysis of regional workshop outcomes around the eight critical shifts 72
SDGs mapped against critical shifts and signals of change 76
References 78

vi
Foreword
In the face of the triple planetary crisis of climate change, nature and
biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste, we might easily throw up
our hands and imagine the world of 2050—just 25 years from now—
as a dangerous, damaged place where both human society and the
environment it inhabits face new and heightened threats.

However, the point of this report is not to predict the future. The intention,
by drawing on a wide diversity of disciplines and voices, is to foresee the
future. What, might you ask, is the difference? Prediction is passive: it
means locking in a vision of the future. Foresight is about imagining the
future and then looking at how to change it.

Foresight enables a shift in perspective, opening-up valuable insights and revealing unconsidered or
underestimated threats and opportunities to achieve planetary health and human wellbeing. It enables
us to anticipate shocks and disruptions that the world should prepare for.

From an environmental perspective, this requires looking at and beyond the triple planetary crisis
to include other significant drivers of change, including social and demographic shifts, media and
information, technology and Artificial Intelligence, geopolitical tensions, governance, social and
institutional trust, migration and conflict, among others. Taking this holistic view helps us to see and
understand more.

This report offers insights into the evolving environmental and global context in which we are operating.
This is reflected through a constellation of shifts, while also providing a range of emerging signals of
change—each hinting at potential disruptions that could accelerate or redirect current trends and create
new forces, good and bad. Ignoring such signals and potential disruptions limits future choices.

It is not always easy to identify these signals and disruptions. However, through collective and
strategic intelligence, key areas for action can be identified to intercept these potential disruptions.
These areas are applicable not only to United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), but to governments, decision-makers and stakeholders at all levels.

The disruptions presented in this report are not guaranteed to happen. But they could happen. We
need to be ready. So, this report suggests how to monitor, navigate and prepare for them, not least by
maintaining focus on meeting international goals, avoiding policy traps and missed opportunities.

UNEP’s mission is to place the environment at the heart of the work of the UN and to support Member
States, to look beyond the horizon into the future and reshape the present—so that we can support
the actions, changes and course corrections needed to protect the planet as a basis for human peace,
prosperity and equity.

Inger Andersen, Executive Director, UNEP

vii
Preface
In societies and governments, there are many cognitive and political biases that force a focus on the
short term—to the detriment of long-term prosperity. Lagging Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
climate change, declining biodiversity and a raft of other issues show that our focus on the short and
near term is doing the world no favours. The world faces multiple and cascading issues, which are
affecting all countries and the developing world more acutely.

If our species is to flourish in face of many complex challenges that do not play out within neat
electoral cycles or quarterly financial reports, we need to get better at focusing on and preparing for
the future. COVID-19, conflict and disasters have demonstrated the need to be prepared for both the
expected and unexpected.

When the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Science Council
(ISC) embarked on this discovery of the tools and application of foresight, it became clear that we
are not very good at this, over any timescale. A year ago, a global recession was seen as a foregone
conclusion. Yet, even with war, geopolitical volatility and upheaval, a recession has not been triggered.
In part, this is because forecasting models and precedent often fail to consider the situational and
idiosyncratic context. In other words, the resilience of society and our systems was underestimated.

This is where foresight comes in. Foresight describes the thought processes and analytical
approaches that aid more forward-thinking, so that decisions can direct us towards desirable futures
and prepare for unknowns. While we may not know exactly what or when, it is possible to use robust
foresight processes to understand the risks and trends that societies must prepare for.

This joint UNEP-ISC foresight report describes some of the ways in which capacity for applying
foresight can be built. It extends beyond UNEP’s traditional sources of data and information—the
strictly ‘environmental’—to encompass all factors that could determine the future trajectory for
planetary health and human wellbeing.

The primary intent is to build a focus on the future, so that member states, policymakers and societies
can have the best possible information on how to be prepared for disruptions and take decisive action.
The report also provides actionable insights to the UN system on which aspects should be given
consideration for strategic planning and developing a clear sense of direction. It highlights the need to
integrate policy making across domains to address many so-called wicked problems and help with the
stewardship obligations all policy makers have as we confront the future.

Choices made now will dictate humanity’s success in responding to the triple planetary crisis and
achieving the SDGs. Foresight can help us to make these choices, build resilience by being more
prepared, actively prevent negative disruptions and amplify positive disruptions. The future is coming.
Foresight can help us decide what it will look like.

Sir Peter Gluckman, ISC President Dr Andrea Hinwood, UNEP Chief Scientist

viii
Executive Summary
As the leading global authority on the environment, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) plays a critical role in keeping the environment under review and finding solutions that inspire,
inform and enable nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of
future generations.

UNEP strives to empower the United Nations (UN) community, its Member States and individuals to
identify issues requiring vigilance and to take anticipatory actions that can rebalance planetary health
and human wellbeing. To do this, the organization needs to have a responsive, holistic approach to
meet the demands of a rapidly changing world—a world of more fragility and greater uncertainty.
UNEP has embraced foresight, a strategic capability and set of tools, to identify and explore possible
disruptions on the horizon, to confront our ways of thinking about them and learn how applying such
forward-thinking tools can prepare us for the challenges and opportunities ahead.

Foresight helps detect signs of approaching change, determine their potential developments and
strengthen resilience against the unexpected—translating future uncertainty into present day choices.
Put simply, careful and incisive foresight can help UNEP to achieve its aims of identifying and working
on the right issues at the right time for the right audience.

This Navigating New Horizons report outlines a process focused on planetary health and human
wellbeing—an intentional framing to expand the range of issues and informed views that typically
shape UNEP’s work. Why? To ensure we are looking in places not normally considered, but where the
organization can act or provide advice for others with relevant portfolios.

This 18-month foresight process—which encompassed a two-part Delphi survey, the development of
scenarios, sensemaking at global and regional levels and engaging with youth voices—has resulted in
diverse data points and qualitative feedback to uncover what the future (near and far) could hold for
planetary health and human wellbeing.

Through the process, it has become clear that the world is facing a different context than it faced
even ten years ago. Some of the issues are the same, but the rapid rate of change combined with
technological developments, more frequent and devastating disasters and an increasingly turbulent
geopolitical landscape, has resulted in a new operating context, where any country can be thrown off
course more easily and more often.

The world is already on the verge of what may be termed ‘polycrisis’—where global crises are not just
amplifying and accelerating but also appear to be synchronizing. The triple planetary crisis of climate
change, nature and biodiversity loss, and pollution and waste is feeding into human crises such as
conflict for territory and resources, displacement and deteriorating health.

The speed of change is staggering. Social norms, employment, leisure and our relationship with nature
are all inexorably shifting. The rapid development of new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI)
are influencing all facets of life. Overlapping and interrelated factors will influence the environment—
these include competition for natural resources, new forms of conflict, mass forced displacement and
migration, persistent widening inequalities, declining trust and weakened institutions, the prevalence
of mis/disinformation and an increasing global multipolarity.

ix
This new global context is giving rise to a series of critical shifts, emerging issues and potential
threats that may or may not eventuate, but which the world needs to keep a watching brief on due to
their potential to significantly disrupt different sectors and hence affect planetary health and human
wellbeing. As witnessed over the past two years, even seemingly improbable or distant disruptions or
circumstances—e.g. COVID-19, the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, major conflicts and mass
displacement in Gaza and Sudan, the global energy and cost-of-living crises—can quickly become a
reality and affect the whole world. Thus, paying attention to signals of change, including weaker ones,
with a view to anticipating disruption and minimising surprise is paramount.

The emerging issues and signals of change presented in the report are both new and old, with the
convergence and interaction between seemingly distinct issues and the new global context making
the signals important. The technology signals include the emergence and diffusion of innovations
including speculative technologies with the report focusing on how AI will interact with and influence
the decisions made about the environment, lives and lifestyles, for both positive and negative. Demand
for critical minerals specifically, including for clean energy technologies, is set to increase rapidly
and could have significant impacts on biodiversity and nature, food and water security and pollution.
These pressures are extending to the deep sea, the outermost reaches to our planet’s atmosphere
and even outer space. This critical shift intersects with other technology signals of change including
the rapid growth in space activity and orbital debris, and the potential deployment of Solar Radiation
Modification (SRM) technologies, also known as solar geoengineering, which while perceived as
unlikely must still be monitored.

Old issues such as weaponization of technologies and access to water, food, energy and critical
infrastructure have been made potentially more problematic with the convergence of new technology
and inability of legal systems to keep pace; notably AI and autonomous weapons systems, which
increase the risk of environmental destruction and biological warfare. Growing antimicrobial
resistance in the environment, emerging zoonotic diseases and ancient viruses arising from thawing
permafrost are all signals requiring monitoring. Uninsurable risks and losses jeopardizing long-term
prosperity, poverty alleviation and environmental protection; surging fossil fuel subsidies eroding the
energy transition; and a looming mental health crisis amongst adolescents whose neural systems are
increasingly primed for anxiety—each of these issues hint at deeper and potentially disruptive changes
on the horizon. Ignoring these signals, as unlikely as they may be, comes with peril.

The good news is that just as the impact of multiple crises is compounded when they are linked,
so are the solutions. This report has leveraged foresight to generate insights that can shift
the momentum from the brink of polycrisis to polystability. Key to a better future is a focus on
intergenerational equity and a new social contract reinforcing shared values that unite us rather
than divides us. A new social contract would involve the global community pursuing transformative
change across technological, economic and social factors and paradigms and collective goals. Such
a contract—including the further refinement and integration of a liveability approach and supplemental
index encompassing new economic and health measures—will better reflect, foster and support local,
network-driven resilience.

Adopting agile and reflexive governance—with shorter-term time-bound targets to enable course
correction combined with multi-layered monitoring at the UN level—would significantly enhance
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Placing a new global emphasis on
wellbeing metrics rather than pure economic growth will help the transformation needed. The future
must be consultative, multilateral, cooperative and integrate the voices of traditionally marginalised
groups, including women, youth, local communities and Indigenous Peoples.

x
Introduction
In 2023, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) set out on a journey with the
International Science Council (ISC) and regional partners to develop and implement a foresight
trajectory. The ambition was threefold: to expand our collective capacity to anticipate the future,
embed foresight and futures thinking in the culture of the organization, and, crucially, deliver a
proactive reading on potential disruptions and untapped opportunities to enable better decisions,
preparedness and anticipatory action. This Navigating New Horizons report aims to deliver on the
latter goal: translating future uncertainty into present day choices that can get the world ready
for what is coming. The insights and issues presented, and the conclusions drawn within this
report, reflect a breadth of ideas, information and collective insights generated through a rigorous,
participatory and multi-method foresight process.

The report presents the main findings of a Global Foresight exercise. It is about roadblocks,
headwinds and accelerators in the form of issues that may or may not happen. The report identifies
and assesses so-called ‘signals of change’—early symptoms or indications of changes that could
result in potential disruptions or important developments on the horizon for which the world may
need to prepare. It also discusses eight critical shifts (or emerging phenomena) and some of
the interconnections between them, and the signals and disruptions identified (Figure 1). These
disruptions are potential events or circumstances that could affect planetary health, human
wellbeing and the way societies function. Taken together, the findings are an opportunity for being
more deliberate about what, where and when actions are taken and to critically examine whether
current interventions are fit for purpose. Available science has been used to support conjecture on
the characterisation of potential disruptions, but these are plausible estimates or ‘what-if’ questions.
Generating the insights presented in this report has enabled reflection on the what ifs and to arrive
at solutions that address many of the pressing issues being faced today.

01
 Critical Shifts

Polycentricity and Humans and the environment:

diffusion of governance 2050 A relationship in flux

2030
Critical
Misinformation, resources,
declining trust scarcity and
and polarization shifting global
dynamics

Persistent AI, digital

and widening transformation
inequalities and technology

Mass forced displacement A new era of conflict

Figure 1: Eight critical global shifts or phenomena that emerged from the foresight process.

02
Beyond the horizon
Humans are ingenious. We have uncovered intricate scientific methods to measure climate change
from times before accurate records even existed. Core samples from the poles or glaciers, season
by season, provide millennia of climate data. The study of how 300-year-old sea sponges, which
have been living off the coast of Puerto Rico since the start of the industrial age, may help reveal
the hidden intricacies of how the Earth’s temperature has been changing during their lifetime
(McCulloch et al. 2024).

Indeed, innovations in science and technology have done much to illuminate both the ability to
understand the past and our propensity to imagine and project it into the future (Jabbour 2021; Pereira
et al. 2021). While the natural world has always been in constant flux, we humans find ourselves in a
version of the world that appears to be changing faster than we can imagine or adapt to. The state of
uncertainty and indeterminacy in which we exist requires the adoption of new approaches to how we
imagine the future and prepare for it.

03
Empirical data, observation and theory are the foundations of scientific inquiry. The scientific method
provides tools like predictive analytics, modelling and forecasting to gain insights by extrapolation;
they facilitate the generation of testable and verifiable predictions about the future that facilitate
preparation for what appear to be established trends or possible outcomes. However, the ability to
find meaningful patterns and to see a future beyond what can be predicted based on historic data also
requires better use of imagination and consideration of early symptoms or indications of change or
signals that might be indicators of a new disruption beyond the horizon.

In some ways, foresight serves as a powerful radar, scanning beyond the horizon to reveal what could
be approaching. Equipped with this advance knowledge, the ability to anticipate potential futures and
stress-test assumptions and strategies against them, enhances the ability to foster resilience in the
face of unforeseen circumstances. Their impacts can be perceived as positive or negative, depending
on one’s perspective.

Building on well-established assessments of current and future trends, this report looks at emerging
issues and signals that may be the precursor of wider changes. In doing so, it delves into the periphery
of plausibility, embracing imagined futures and the inherent uncertainty they hold, to uncover what the
future, near and far, could hold for planetary health and human wellbeing.

The report provides insights into critical shifts (or emerging phenomena), as well as potential
disruptions that could hinder environmental management and impede the achievement of
international goals, ultimately jeopardizing planetary health and human wellbeing. The report outlines
a range of issues grounded in available science while considering existing trends and emerging issues
that are on the horizon to see how they interact, and the potential for disruption and impact.

The timing of this report is intentional and critical. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are
significantly off track, accelerating environmental degradation and a warming climate is evident
globally, violent conflicts are spreading, and the multilateral system is undergoing profound changes to
ensure it is better equipped to address contemporary and legacy challenges. But there are also signs
of hope: the unprecedented expansion of renewables projected to overtake coal to become the largest
source of global electricity generation by 2025 (International Energy Agency [IEA] 2024), a new Global
Biodiversity Framework, the ozone layer on track for full recovery, and the adoption of the so-called
‘high seas treaty’ now protecting two-thirds of the ocean beyond national jurisdictions. On the eve of
the Summit of the Future, all eyes are on the international community—amidst a backdrop a global
tension. One question looms large: can we summon up a better future for the planet and people, with
peace and prosperity for all?

The Summit of the Future provides an additional impetus to reevaluate and develop a more intentional
and systematic approach across the United Nations (UN) system, as well as informing international
responses to complex global disruptions and shocks by guiding anticipation, future-thinking, collective
intelligence and solidarity. The Summit aims to facilitate inclusive, pragmatic and sustainable
decision-making. It will consider the needs of the youth of today and the generations of tomorrow.
Hopefully it will also help to broaden collective resolve for planetary health and wellbeing.

One thing is certain, the broader multilateral system needs to be more nimble, proactive and
interconnected. Strategic Foresight, alongside data, digital, innovation and behavioural science, are the
pillars of a rejuvenated ‘United Nations 2.0’—which aims to create an organization that is empowered
through embracing a forward-thinking culture and cutting-edge skills.

04
HIGH

Uninhabitable places
Unseen risks of harmful chemicals
LIKELIHOOD

AI-enabled weaponization systems New emerging zoonotic

diseases
Eco-Anxiety
Decisions detached from science AMR approaching critical levels
Ancient microbes in Arctic permafrost Uninsurable future
Space activity and Surging
Rerouting global financial flows
orbital space debris fossil fuels
Carbon Local, subsidies
offsetting network-driven Misuse of biological agents
integrity resilience
issues
Privatized micro-
environmentalism SRM / Solar geoengineering deployed

Exnovation
Signals of Change
LOW
LOW IMPACT HIGH

Critical Shifts:
Humans and the Resources, scarcity and AI, digital transformation
environment: A shifting dynamics of and technology – waves
relationship in flux global security of change

Mass forced Persistent and widening

A new era of conflict
displacement inequalities

Misinformation, Polycentricity and

declining trust and diffusion of governance
polarization

Time Range:
2 - 3 years 4 - 6 years 7+ years

Figure 2: Eighteen signals of change and potential disruptions depicted along three dimensions:
likelihood, impact and time horizon.
Notes: The average result for each dimension, generated from Delphi survey respondents, are displayed as follows:
On the y-axis is likelihood (how likely the signal of change is to occur) and on the x-axis is intensity of impact (how
much impact the signal of change could have). Respondents assessed likelihood on a 7-point scale ranging from
exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain to occur and assessed impact on a 3-point scale ranging from low to high.
The potential time horizon (when the signal of change and associated disruption could fully materialize) is represented
by the shape of the icons and is divided into time segments of 2–3 years (circle), 4–6 years (hexagon) and 7+ years
(triangle). The colour of each icon represents which of the eight critical shifts each signal of change falls under.

05
UNEP’s Foresight Trajectory:
A methodology snapshot
This report is the culmination of 18 months of data gathering and experiential learning aimed at
equipping UNEP and the wider UN with a more anticipatory approach. At the core of the Foresight
process is a global horizon scanning exercise to harvest and analyse a vast range of emerging issues,
that could manifest significant future developments—in this case, affecting planetary health and
human wellbeing. Identifying and assessing these ‘signals of change’ involved two rounds of survey
questionnaires (using the Delphi approach), regional and youth sensemaking workshops, scenario-
building and structured debates and discussions with an international Foresight Expert Panel.

06
This group of 22 distinguished members of the scientific community from developing and
industrialized countries represented a wide spectrum of disciplines, expertise and knowledge (see
Acknowledgements). The series of foresight workshops took place across each of the UNEP regions,
specifically Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), North America and
West Asia (Annex 1).

The methods and techniques employed in foresight are subject to contextual and content issues—
thus, approaches must be tailored and adaptive. The process and methodological approach
employed here is distinct in two important ways. First, a strong emphasis is placed on the different
understandings of emerging change in different regional contexts. In particular, the regional
workshops highlighted diversity in worldviews, sociocultural contexts and subtle but important
variations in the perception of risks and opportunities in different parts of the world. This is
particularly important in the detection and interpretation of early or often termed ‘weak’ signals of
change, which are often hidden among disconnected pieces of information that may initially appear
to be background noise but ultimately have direct or indirect disruptive potential. Attention was
paid to involving diverse perspectives and stakeholders (e.g. youth, experts, decision-makers, civil
society actors) across a range of informed views and subject areas including those beyond UNEP’s
traditional domains of engagement.

The second difference in approach involved the concurrent construction and application of four
contrasting scenarios of plausible futures to 2050. The scenarios take the form of qualitative
narratives of ‘alternative futures’ or storylines that conceptualise what the future may hold under
different conditions and assumptions given existing trends, drivers and pressures. They intend to
capture the realm of possible developments that may be faced in different parts of the world when
addressing the environment as the future unfolds, and informed the work undertaken during the
regional workshops. This framing tool challenged any anticipatory assumptions that participants
(individually and collectively) may have brought to the exercise, and helped explore alternative ways
that issues might unfold under different contexts and conditions.

Figure 3 summarises the methodological approach to the foresight process and the detection, analysis
and contextualization of issues presented in this report. The process involved six phases with interactive
and iterative links to support interpretation and provide context. For a more detailed description of the
steps and the rationale for the decisions taken, see Methodology Working Document.

The report draws on nearly 1,200 inputs submitted by 790 respondents to the first Delphi survey in
May 2023. Data from this first survey and sense-making sessions were distilled into 29 ‘clusters’ of
emerging change that affect the environment and manifest in various forms, and 280 specific signals
of change. As part of the initial clustering analysis, issues were concentrated under eight driving
forces: direct environmental change; innovation and technological breakthroughs; laws, regulation
and policy shifts; economic and financial systems; geopolitical developments; social and cultural
dynamics; demographic and shifting behaviours, attitudes and habits; and resource scarcity.

The Foresight Expert Panel further distilled the 280 signals of change prioritised into 20 signals with
high disruptive potential (indirect or direct) and low-to-medium probability of occurrence. Here, the
process of identifying these signals was guided by a conceptual framework of key attributes and
indicators for interpreting and evaluating signals (e.g. prevalence, novelty, probability of occurrence
and perceived impact, adapted from van Veen and Ortt 2021; Nash et al. 2022; Mauno et al. 2023). The
prevailing signals of change were embedded in the second round of the Delphi Survey (April 2024) for
further evaluation by 512 respondents.

07
The Foresight Process
DISCOVERY AND LEARNING

DATA GATHERING
Delphi surveys

Part 1: Scanning
for signals
CONTEXTUALIZING
Probing, validating, adjusting
SCENARIOS
Alternative futures

REPORTING
New Horizons
Part 2: Signal
identification

INTERPRETING
Initial mapping, evaluation and
analysis of signals of change

SCOPING Review | Adapt

Learning,
framing,
adapting

Identified Key Emerging Issues

8 8 prevailing critical shifts which define our world,

today and in the quarter century to come.

18 18 signals of change and potential disruptions.

Figure 3: A conceptual summary of the foresight process and methodological steps, highlighting the
iterative (and non-linear) nature of the process including the data-gathering and interpreting phases,
and the continuous discovery and learning process.

08
Drawing on the information from the Delphi surveys and the collective insights from the regional,
youth and Foresight Expert Panel workshops, the process identified eight critical shifts that define
the world today and in the quarter century to come. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the
process identified 18 signals of change and potential disruptions that require monitoring as they
could significantly influence planetary health and wellbeing.

09
Part 1
The New Global
Context
10
In 2015, UN Member States adopted the SDGs—a call to action with a universal set of
goals, targets and indicators, describing a desired future of peace and prosperity on a
healthy planet.

Ten years later, progress has been disappointing. The world is not just lagging on eradicating poverty,
hunger and inequality—more than halfway to the 2030 Agenda deadline—but the latest SDG Progress
Report shows we are leaving more than half the world behind, with 85 per cent of the 169 SDG targets
are off track and 37 per cent have experienced no progress or, worse, have regressed since 2015
(United Nations [UN] 2023). Perhaps most worrying of all, given the potential for irreversible damage
to our planet, the environment-related targets are far off course, and in some cases, backsliding.
Progress on four key environmental stewardship goals–SDG6 (clean water and sanitation); SDG13
(climate action); SDG14 (life below water) and SDG15 (life on land)–were assessed as having 42.85
per cent of their associated targets in stagnation or regression in the most recent comprehensive
stocktake of global progress on the 169 targets for the SDGs (UN 2023; Figure 4). While SDG6 and
SDG15 show some recent improvements at the indicator level (UNEP 2024), 60 per cent of the
environmental related indicators assessed continue to show deterioration or inability to assert their
status (UN 2023).

Figure 4: Progress assessment of targets for the 17 Goals revealing significant backsliding
(stagnation or regression) for the key environmental stewardship goals: SDG6 (38 per cent),
SDG13 (20 per cent); SDG14 (60 per cent) and SDG15 (42 per cent). Source: UN 2023.

The scale and frequency of global disruptions are increasing (Fatima 2023; Lawrence et al. 2024).
Following on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic, the story of the past two years has been one of
conflict, disaster and despair. The impacts on the global food and energy markets display the growing

11
dysfunction and fragility of the financial system and increase doubts about its capacity to weather
multiple storms. Acute, compounding shocks have become protracted stressors—testing countries
and individuals in new ways and stretching adaptive capacity to the limit.

Seen in combination with rising geopolitical tensions and the extraordinary pace of technological
change—most obviously in the field of artificial intelligence—there is a strong sense that humanity
is already living in a fundamentally different global context. As the world enters this new era of
instability and interdependence, crises are more likely to converge and erode development gains
and environmental buffers, increasing vulnerability to future shocks (International Science Council
[ISC] 2023). It is not just the scale of change which is unprecedented but also the speed. Technology
and innovation have reshaped economies and transformed many societies. Every aspect of life is
undergoing radical, disruptive changes at an accelerating speed. From technology to social norms to
changing patterns of employment, leisure, diet and fashion—even the international geopolitical order
which arose after World War 2 (WWII) and the Cold War—are all inexorably shifting.

The signals of change presented in this report provide further evidence of the pace and scale of global
change today and associated risks and potential disruptions on the horizon. As outlined above, the
foresight exercise culminated in two sets of insights across a broad range of thematic areas. First, a
set of eight critical shifts or emerging phenomena that force us to rethink current work programmes
and hence our expectations about the future. Second, 18 signals of change and potential disruptions
further out on the horizon, offer glimpses that foreshadow some of the underestimated changes to
come. Both sets of change point towards a proliferation of emerging and potentially significant risks
and their cascading impacts.

The signals, critical shifts (e.g. emerging phenomena) and potential disruptions also seem to be
causally connected. Environmental change, for example, is often both a driver and a consequence
of innovation and technological breakthroughs, geopolitical conflicts or forced movements of
populations. This complex web of causal connections makes it all the harder for governments and
societies as they seek to map a path forwards. Faced with this complexity, how can they make sense
of the multiplying challenges ahead? How can they navigate them?

Welcome to the polycrisis

In an interconnected world, a local crisis seldom remains local for long. Territorial conflicts overspill;
migration spreads; resource pressures increase. We see it in the triple planetary crisis of pollution,
biodiversity loss and climate change. Each of these three feeds into and aggravates the others.
Pollution changes climate patterns. This damages ecosystems. Damaged ecosystems fail to filter
water and absorb emissions. Thus, the cycle continues, worsens and widens, and where reversed
improvements are observed.

Start to factor in how this impacts humanity—and the feedback loops which result against a backdrop
of unprecedented convergences between ecological, political and economic strife—the concept
polycrisis might come close to reflecting the new global context. A global polycrisis arises from “the
causal entanglement of crises in multiple global systems in ways that significantly degrade humanity’s
prospects” (Lawrence et al. 2024). These interacting events (or crises) occur simultaneously and
cause more harm, and surprise, than the sum of those crises would produce in isolation. This is now a
feature of the times. As such, the multiplying crises need to be understood as a whole and addressed
as a whole.

12
Just as the impact of multiple crises is compounded when they are linked, so are the solutions.

The growing body of knowledge about complex systems and how they change offers some answers.
According to research in systemic resilience and transformation, several factors can increase the
frequency and intensity of sudden, non-linear shifts in systems. These include changes in conditions
that reduce the resilience of systems—for example, if gradual global warming manifests in sudden
shifts in ocean currents (Johnson and Lyman 2020; Peng et al. 2022; Ditlevsen and Ditlevsen 2023).
They also include the emergence and diffusion of novel species or innovations—for example,
advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) could trigger rapid and disruptive changes in labour markets,
rendering some professions obsolete and creating new concentrations of power and wealth (Duch-
Brown et al. 2022; Szabó and Boncz 2023).

A third important factor is the existence of causal interactions between systems, which means that
a crisis in one system influences the occurrence, frequency or intensity of crises in another. This
situation is explored in a growing literature on ‘global polycrisis’, which captures the idea that the
multiplying shocks that humanity faces today—wars, extreme weather, inflation, pandemics and
hunger—represent interwoven aspects of a larger phenomenon.

Global polycrisis is, in large part, a consequence of globalization. In the era of globalized commerce,
travel and hyperconnectivity, localized crises are transmitted within and between systems by the
movement of energy, matter, information and biota. Meanwhile, the drive towards efficiency and
loss of diversity in socio-economic and ecological systems means that systems are becoming less
resilient to this spread of disruptions. Crucially, the interactions of crises in different systems produce
“harms that are different from and usually greater than the sum of the harms that would be produced
separately” (Lawrence et al. 2023).

The horizon scanning exercise brought to light evidence of rapid, surprising and often alarming shifts,
as accelerating processes of environmental, technological and social change give rise to sudden
disruptions. While the signals are clearly diverse in character, they are deeply intertwined and rooted
in common stressors, particularly the steady degradation of ecological resilience. In addition to
helping understand the scale and nature of global crises, systems thinking also offers ideas about
how societies can respond—mitigating systemic risks and seizing opportunities for positive change
towards sustainability.

This will mean restoring the resilience of complex systems so that they are less vulnerable to shocks,
for example by investing in nature, creating buffers in global systems of finance and trade, improving
social safety nets or finding ways to rebuild trust and social cohesion.

It will also mean guiding the evolution and uptake of innovations such as AI so that their extra-
ordinary transformative potential contributes to human wellbeing and planetary health. In practice
that is likely to necessitate a combination of anticipatory and adaptive governance, supported by
foresight and monitoring.

Finally, it will mean recognizing that the causal entanglement of systems offers the possibility to
move from polycrisis to multiple equilibria. It means that actions to increase resilience and mitigate
risks in one system are likely to have positive implications elsewhere, for example by reducing
harmful feedback loops and preventing the contagion of disruptions across multiple systems.
But seizing these opportunities will require that governments and international organizations
adopt a broad, whole-system perspective, which seeks to understand the interactions between
crises and the architectures that link systems globally. When those connections are understood, it
becomes possible to design interventions that reduce fragility and create a foundation for genuinely
sustainable development.
13
Part 2
Shifts, signals
and potential
disruptions

14
Each of the eight critical shifts identified during the process are outlined below
together with associated signals of change—they have a lower probability of
occurrence and are possibly unintended but have significant potential to disrupt if they
eventuated. The signals of change are not necessarily positive or negative, but simply
early symptoms or indicators of a future development with potential to grow in scale
and distribution.

A synopsis has also been provided of the most acute potential disruptions on the horizon for each signal
of change, which could significantly influence planetary health and wellbeing. They need to be kept on
the radar to observe their direction, character and strength before they develop into stronger trends.
Monitoring signals on the horizon provides information to mute signals that have the potential to disrupt
negatively, but also amplify those that will accelerate positive change.
Critical Shifts

Polycentricity and Humans and the environment:

diffusion of governance 2050 A relationship in flux

2030
Critical
Misinformation, resources,
declining trust scarcity and
and polarization shifting global
dynamics

Persistent AI, digital

and widening transformation
inequalities and technology

Mass forced displacement A new era of conflict

Figure 5: Eight critical global shifts or phenomena that emerged from the foresight process. These
shift together with the 18 signals of change (Figure 2) provide insights about unconsidered and/or
underestimated threats and opportunities on the horizon.

15
2.1 The relationship between humans and the
environment is in flux
The human condition and the health of our planet are inextricably linked. Our collective resilience,
wellbeing and ability to navigate crises is fully connected to the food we eat, the water we drink, the air
we breathe and, crucially, our relationship with the Earth.

And yet human influence has left no corner of our planet untouched. Less than 25 per cent of the land
area remains free from significant human impact, and this area is projected to shrink to less than 10
per cent by 2050 (Teea et al. 2021; Kortetmäki et al. 2024). It is estimated that up to three-quarters of
freshwater areas and over half of marine areas are exploited for food production. The biomass of wild
mammals has fallen by 82 per cent since prehistory with projections that by 2050 humans will have
eliminated 38–46 per cent of all biodiversity measured as mean species abundance (Kortetmäk et al.
2021). Without swift and substantial intervention, nearly a million of the Earth’s estimated eight million
species may be driven to extinction (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services [IPBES] 2019).

The latest figures from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the UNEP Emissions
Gap Report (2023) paint a bleak picture of the accelerating climate crisis. Record-breaking climate
events surge in number, velocity and scale, wreaking havoc across the globe with escalating frequency.
Despite the Paris climate pledges, the current trajectory puts the world on track for a catastrophic
temperature increase beyond between 2.1°C and 3.9°C by 2100 (Liu et al. 2021; IPCC 2022; Kemp et
al. 2022). And that is without considering worst-case climate responses. This trajectory promises a
bleak reality: coral reefs bleaching, extreme weather events intensifying, species dwindling and human
suffering escalating worldwide. At this rate, by 2050, nearly one-quarter of the global population of adults
aged 69 years and older, will be exposed to chronic and acute dangerous heat extremes, putting up to
an additional 246 million older people at risk—largely in Africa and Asia (Falchetta et al. 2024)—with far
reaching impacts on people’s physical and mental health, health care systems, air quality, water quality
and water-related diseases, infrastructure and service disruptions, labour productivity and wellbeing.
These climate impacts will also have disproportionate effects on women (Ngcamu 2023; Desai and
Zhang 2021).

Approximately two-thirds of current greenhouse gas emissions stem from the combustion of fossil
fuels and industrial processes. Methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases are also increasing and
contribute about a quarter of emissions. Collectively, the G20 nations are currently responsible for
approximately 76 per cent of global emissions—with the largest historical cumulative emissions coming
from China, the United States of America and the European Union, while least developed countries
contributed 4 per cent (UNEP 2023a).

16
The past decade showed, as few others have, the speed and scale at which change can happen. The
frequency of extreme weather events has increased dramatically in the last half century. Between 1970
and 2021, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), storms, heat and flooding caused
US$4.3 trillion in economic losses and killed more than two million people (WMO 2024).

To date, research has mainly focused on understanding the effects of drivers on ecosystem functioning,
not on the effects of changed ecosystems on the drivers – the feedback loop. It is evident that the rate of
these changes—particularly since mid-1940s—and the drivers acting on them are accelerating (Figure 6).
It is the speed of change and scale, changing the trajectory of planetary health and human wellbeing.

-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 2023
Warmest year on record (2023)
Temperature CO2 Fossil fuel Global GDP
anomaly (d260ppm/25) supply
Lithium (1960=1)
(°C) (100 Ej)
production Total material
(Mt) Water
extraction
withdrawals
(Gt)
COVID-19 pandemic
Plastic (1000 km³)
Large
production language 2019
5
(Mt) models

10 2014
Great Recession Big data

Social media

Internet
End of Soviet Union

50 Methane Personal computer 1974

(d400ppb/180)
Start of Great Acceleration Electronic computer
World War II
100 Great Depression Television 1924
World War I Human population
Electrification
(billions)
Internal combustion engine
Industrial Revolution Steam engine
Little
American revolution
Ice Mechanical loom
Qing Tokugawa Shogunate Age

500 Ming European colonization begins

Printing press 1524
Incas Black death
Aztecs
1000 Sung 1024
Collapse of Maya Windmills
Tang AD
Paper
2000 Han Roman Empire 0
Zhou Olmecs at peak BC
Shang Ancient Greece Iron Age starts
Hsia First Peruvian cities
5000 Ancient Egypt 2976
First Sumerian cities Writing

10000 Agricultural (Neolithic) Revolution 7976

Pottery
Domestication of dogs

Biologically Human migration to Americas

modern humans
organized in
small hunter/
gather bands
50000 47976
Migration of modern humans out of Africa begins

100000 97976
Years before present (logarithmic scale)

Figure 6: The Great Acceleration after the Second World War. Source: Adapted from Costanza et al.
2007; Global Material Flows Database (UNEP 2023a); Global Resources Outlook; World Energy
Balances Highlights 2023; Minerals UK; Geyer et al. (2017); OECD (2022).
17
No year has yet confounded climate scientists’ predictive capabilities more than 2023, with huge heat
anomalies testing new extremes (Schmidt 2024). We have entered uncharted territory. Unchecked
consumption of natural resources has propelled us into a triple planetary crisis, jeopardising the
wellbeing of both human and non-human inhabitants alike.

Positive feedback loops are exacerbating already desperate situations. For example, severe flash
flooding in the Horn of Africa continues to ravage several countries in 2024—Kenya, Somalia, Sudan,
United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda—nearly 49 million people are experiencing acute food
insecurity and over 2 million people are displaced (ReliefWeb 2024). Record levels of flooding also
continue to severely affect the state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, where hundreds were injured and
over 600,000 people displaced from their homes. With flood water still rising (at the time of print).
Many people now have no access to drinking water or electricity, and internal migration is expected
to explode in the coming months (Price 2024). In just one-year, successive disasters have cost
Brazil over US$20.4 billion from public funds (Fontes 2024). This year, in South and Southeast Asia,
record-breaking temperatures (well above 45°C for several days) has had devasting impacts causing
widespread crop damage and reduced yields, forcing thousands of schools to close and putting
millions in distress and particularly people living in refugee camps and informal housing (Dong et al.
2024; ReliefWeb and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] 2024;
World Weather Attribution [WWA] 2024).

The world is edging ever closer to environmental change that may be irreversible. Thawing permafrost,
glacier loss, mass deforestation, prevalence of microplastics in fauna, corals irreversibly bleached
(triggering their death) and now the looming breakdown of the vast system of ocean currents, the
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC), is a key component in the regulation of the global
climate. New warning signs suggest that the risk of the AMOC breakdown could be much closer than
the modelling has projected and could occur as early as 2057 (Ditlevsen et al. 2023; Cini et al. 2024;
van Westen et al. 2024). At that speed, and the scale of reverberating impacts that would ensue,
adaptation would be near impossible (Ben-Yami et al. 2023).

Looking ahead, there are signals that continuing environmental degradation and systemic shifts are
pushing natural ecosystems and humans to limits, becoming something fundamentally new in how
society and the environment behave towards one another which could be positive or negative.

Signals of change
Each of the signal of change images summarize the information gathered during the learning
phase for each identified signal of change in the foresight process. They provide a concise
description of the potential disruption and their percieved likelihood of occurrence and severity
(responses from the Delphi Survey) along with the following:

Likelihood of Occurance: The proportion of respondents who assessed the probability that the
signal of change will materialize.
Intensity of Impact: An average score representing the percieved severity of impact if/when the
signal of change materializes (postive or negative).
Perception Score: Determined by ranking each signal of change based on its combined likelihood
and impact score.
Expected timeframe: An indication of the time horizon during which survey respondents believe
the signal of change will be most disruptive or transformative.
Regional Impact: The map highlights the regions with the highest perception of severity of impact
(red) and lowest perception of severity (green).
18
 Signal of change 1
Ancient microbes hidden in thawing Arctic permafrost

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Ancient lethal virus frozen in the arctic
permafrost is released by Earth's 2030 2035
warming climate unleashing a
catastrophic global health emergency.

11
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.1
.1
2.4
7+
2.5
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.7
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.9 5.6 17.7 34.4 23 15.7
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

In recent decades, the Arctic has been warming much faster—four times in fact—than in the rest of the
globe; this is a phenomenon known as Arctic amplification (Rantanen et al. 2022). This unprecedented
warming has led to the thawing of vast permafrost areas, which scientists forewarn hold hidden
dangers including massive quantities of methane, a potent greenhouse gas (Miner et al. 2022; Birchall
et al. 2023). Permafrost degradation could also facilitate the transport of toxic waste (Revich et al.
2022) and radioactive material (Miner et al. 2021) into the environment, endangering ecosystem
function and human health.

More recently, researchers

have exposed a new unseen Environment Alert
danger: reservoirs of ancient, Permafrost thaw is a critical issue with severe impacts
mostly uncharacterized, for people and the environment. Beyond the well-known
microorganisms and viruses environmental consequences, potentially large number
that could be viable if not of microbes released from thawing permafrost, including
lethal (Wu et al. 2022; pathogens, pose new risks to all modern ecosystems.
Alempic et al. 2023).

As the thawing and disappearance of permafrost accelerates, it raises concerns about the potential
introduction of ancient microorganisms into the environment, with large uncertainties regarding their
implications for modern ecosystems and human health (Strona et al. 2023). Novel antibiotic-resistant
bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites could be released posing significant challenges to human and
animal immunity (Chiappelli and Penhaskashi 2022). The recirculation of long-frozen microorganisms,
including viruses and bacteria, when exposed to conducive conditions such as liquid water and
contact with live animals, pose contamination risks (Charlier et al. 2020).

19
Researchers have estimated that up to four sextillion (4,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) micro-
organisms could be released from thawing cryosphere each year as result of climate change
(Yarzábal et al. 2021). This phenomenon has already led to the revival of ancient mega-viruses and
the emergence of an outbreak of anthrax in western Siberia from rapid thawing of Bacillus anthracis
spores in permafrost killing thousands of reindeer and affecting dozens of people (Charlier et al. 2020;
Stella et al. 2020). Of course, the consequences of permafrost thawing extend beyond infectious
diseases impacting various aspects of life and prosperity on Earth.

Signal of change 2
New emerging zoonotic disease

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Unabated climate and environmental
change give rise to shift in species 2030
ranges leading to new interactions 2030
between species that did not previously
exist, increasing zoonotic spillovers,
ultimately triggering another pandemic.

3
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.7
4-6
2.8
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.7
LIKELIHOOD OF 2 2 9.6 31.4 35.9 18.5
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Zoonotic diseases are infectious diseases caused by pathogens that transfer to humans from non-
human hosts. These diseases may pose significant systematic global public health risks due to
their potential to spread rapidly and unpredictably. Changes in land use, deforestation and habitat
destruction, urbanization, wildlife trafficking and unsustainable agricultural practices are already
considered as activities increasing the risk of the emergence and spread of zoonotic disease
(Plowright et al. 2021; Rush et al. 2021; Esposito et al. 2023; Plowright et al. 2024). Recent studies
indicate that if the increase in spillover events continues, estimated at between 5 and 8 per cent
annually, the most common types of such pathogens are likely to result in 12 times the number of
deaths in 2050 compared with 2020 (Meadows et al. 2023).

Recent outbreaks, such as SARS, influenza A/H1N1, H5N1, MERS, Nipah virus disease, Ebola and
COVID-19, have resulted in substantial human and economic losses (Debnath et al. 2021). These have
also underscored the potential of previously unknown or neglected pathogens to cause epidemics
(Dobson et al. 2020), the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 891 human cases of avian

20
 influenza (H5N1) from 24 countries
resulting from contact with live or dead
Environment Alert birds or contaminated environments
Ecological factors play an extremely important (WHO 2024). This in combination with
role in zoonotic disease emergence and are the potential of previously unknown or
critical for safeguarding planetary health. neglected pathogens to cause epidemics
Land-use changes, deforestation and certain (Dobson et al. 2020), with an estimated 1.7
agricultural practices disrupt ecosystems and million undiscovered viruses in the global
increase human-wildlife interactions, creating virome, the aggregate of all viruses across
conditions for zoonotic spillover. the entire biosphere (Lawrence et al. 2023)
amplifies concern about the issue.

Signal of change 3
Antimicrobial resistance approaching critical levels

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Antibiotics become ineffective and
common infections become near 2030 2032
impossible to treat leading to global
health crisis and main cause of death.

6
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.5 2.6
7+
2.6
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.7
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.4 5.4 12.8 34.9 28.4 15.4
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) refers to the ability of microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses,
fungi and parasites to resist the effects of antimicrobial drugs, making infections caused by these
microorganisms more difficult to treat (UNEP 2023b). This resistance occurs when microorganisms
evolve and adapt so the drugs designed to kill them become ineffective (Aijaz et al. 2023), and thus
rendering the medications ineffective. AMR poses a significant challenge to public health. Murray et al.
(2022) estimates that 1.27 million deaths globally were attributed directly to drug-resistant infections. It
is estimated that by 2050 the number of deaths resulting from AMR may reach 10 million (UNEP 2023b).

AMR proliferation stems from increased antimicrobial use and misuse, alongside other microbial
stressors like pollution, fostering resistance in both human and environmental settings potentially
passing other causes of mortality (Tang 2023; Cella et al. 2023; UNEP 2023b; Ahmed et al. 2024).

21
 Recognised by WHO as one of the top ten global
health threats, AMR is already jeopardising
Environment Alert human and animal health, the environment, food
The widespread use and misuse of security, economic development and societal
antibiotics and other microbial stressors, equity (Weldon 2024). Low- and middle-income
such as pollution, create a breeding countries are disproportionately affected by
ground for AMR—favourable conditions AMR, exacerbating poverty and inequality
for microorganisms to develop resistance (Ahmed et al. 2024). Women, children, migrants,
both in humans and the environment— refugees, people employed in certain sectors
with significant implications for human (e.g. agriculture or healthcare) and those living
wellbeing and ecosystems. in poverty may be particularly vulnerable and/or
more exposed to drug-resistant infections (WHO
2021; UNEP 2023b).

AMR undermines modern medicine by complicating infection treatment and rendering medical
procedures riskier, thus threatening healthcare gains (UNEP 2023b). Economically, AMR imposes
substantial costs, with projected healthcare expenditures of up to US$1 trillion by 2050 and potential
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses of up to US$3.4 trillion annually by 2030 pushing more people
into poverty (World Bank 2017; Roope et al. 2019). The ramifications of AMR extend beyond human
health, impacting agriculture, economies and the environment (Varaldo et al. 2020; UNEP 2023b).

Signal of change 4

Unforeseen impacts of harmful chemicals and materials

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Large-scale unchecked chemical
contamination and exposure unleashes 2030
a global health crisis with devastating 2030
effects on young people with impacts
on immune function, cognitive health
and fertility.

2
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.4 2.6
4-6
2.7
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.6 1.9
LIKELIHOOD OF 3.2 6.8 29.6 30.7 27.3
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

22
There are thousands of chemicals in use globally with the number of new chemicals increasing
every year (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2019; UNEP 2019)—there are
currently 350,000 chemical and substances listed for production and use (Wang et al. 2020; Muir
et al. 2023). Demand for chemicals is expected to increase associated with decarbonization
and digital transformation (Lopez et al. 2023; Kloo et al. 2024) and may increase the number of
chemicals and substances in use and hence finding their way to the environment.

Current findings suggest that the “identities of many chemicals remain publicly unknown because
they are claimed as confidential (over 50,000) or ambiguously described (up to 70,000)” (Wang et al.
2020). In addition, of those that are known from high producing countries only an estimated five
per cent are measured in the environment (Muir et al. 2023). Chemicals registered as being toxic,
or persistent, by a few countries are numbered in the thousands (Karlsson 2023; Muir et al. 2023; Li
et al. 2024), yet the vast majority have not been measured in the environment or in humans.

The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is an international treaty to regulate

the release of toxic organic chemicals. Twenty-six chemicals have been banned globally, and nine
compounds are under review (Karlson 2023).

While it is noted many of the chemicals registered for use may not make their way to the
environment, many do. The volume of pollution and waste arising from processes that make and
use these chemicals projected increase as are the number of products with a variety of harmful
chemical additives (UNEP 2023c).

Many of these chemicals, including microplastics, find

their way into the environment and the human body via
agriculture, industry, transport and domestic products. Environment Alert
Some are associated with adverse health effects, but
The ever-increasing number of
the number and nature of multiple exposures is not
chemicals in use, coupled with
well understood, and the hidden health and ecological
limited knowledge about their
costs likely underestimated. The implications for
presence in the environment, the
the young are already of concern given placental
combined impact of mixtures
and early childhood exposure and for those who are
and potential long-term impacts
vulnerable and have pre-existing illness (Muir et al.
is a serious concern. Many
2023). The implications of an increase in chemicals
of these chemicals, including
being synthesized, the lack of environmental and
persistent and toxic substances,
human monitoring and the complex mixtures to which
are finding their way into the
ecosystems and humans are exposed (Carpenter et al.
environment through various
2002) make the task of characterizing impacts both
pathways, harming ecosystems
challenging and crucial. There are many efforts and
and human health.
work ongoing to address these challenges (Escher et
al. 2020; Naidu et al. 2021).

23
2.2 Critical resources: scarcity and competition
reshaping dynamics of global security
Recent trends have seen increased competition over resources and the global commons (Dou et al.
2023; UNEP 2024). Some are familiar such as oil and gas while others are newer like rare earth
minerals. And some are worryingly fundamental: food, water and land. In some cases, demand has
outpaced supply, and in others access to vital resources has become increasingly controlled by few and
conditioned by instability and volatility. These shifts are reshaping the dynamics of global security. As
countries discover more sources for materials—including through new techniques and environments
such as deep-seabed mining—heightened competition and potential confrontation are likely to increase.

The global transition to clean energy is expected to create an enormous increase in demand for critical
minerals, particularly those used in manufacturing batteries and electricity networks, key inputs in
emerging technologies and markets (UNEP 2024). The International Energy Agency (2024) estimates
that achieving the Paris Agreement, improving air quality and providing access to modern energy globally
would increase demand for rare earth metals more than seven-fold and more than 10-fold increase in
lithium demand (Figure 7). Even under existing policies, which fall far short of achieving global climate
and sustainability targets, the projected increases in demand for minerals are substantial.

Copper Cobalt Lithium

40,713 539 1,728

25,915
x1.63 x2.51 215 x10.5 165
Projected growth Projected growth Projected growth
in demand in demand in demand

Nickel Rare earths Graphite

3,104 202 16,352

2023
4,632 2050
x1.94 6,030 x2.19 93 x3.53 All units in
Projected growth Projected growth Projected growth
in demand in demand in demand kilo tonnes

Figure 7: Projected growth in demand for critical minerals in 2050 to achieve net zero emissions.
Source: IEA 2024.

24
 As demand for minerals intensifies, so do the pressures on terrestrial reserves. In some locations,
extraction now focuses on poorer quality ores, increasing energy needs and generation of wastes
(Hund et al. 2023). The concentration of reserves in certain regions and countries (Figure 8) increases
the risks of disruption to supply chains arising from shocks such as mining conflicts, trade restrictions
or geopolitical tensions. Climate risks are also growing, for example in mining areas where there is
pressure on water resources (Balaram et al. 2023).

Many low- and middle-income countries are blessed with an abundance of natural resources. While
this has the potential to fuel development and prosperity, concerns remain over resources either due
to scarcity or the desire for control (Muigua 2020; Dinga et al. 2024). Countries like the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Djibouti and Angola have vast mineral wealth which is
being exploited (Shiquan et al. 2022; International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2024), often with little to
no consent and participation of local communities or structures to hold stakeholders accountable
for environmental and social impacts and exploitation (Dinga et al. 2024; Kuttu et al. 2024). Recent
economic growth in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa highlights the potential for resources to be a
catalyst for positive change. By prioritizing sustainable and transparent practices, just transition,
fostering community engagement and ensuring equitable distribution of benefits—in-line with the
recommendations of the UN’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals—Africa for example can
harness its natural resources for the long-term wellbeing of its people and the environment.

Rare earths China Myanmar USA

Graphite China Mozambique Madagascar

Nickel Indonesia Philippines New Caledonia

Lithium Australia Chile China

Cobalt DR of the Congo Indonesia Russia

Copper Chile DR of the Congo Peru

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Figure 8: Percentage of global supply of critical minerals deriving from the three largest producers,
2023 for select critical minerals and metals. Source: IEA 2024.

Collectively, such concerns about security of access mean that many countries are keen to diversify
supply (Ponomarenko et al. 2021). The large quantity of untapped critical minerals and metals on the
deep-sea floor is therefore receiving increasing attention both within and beyond national jurisdictions
(Balaram 2023; Cadena et al. 2024). There is substantial concern and debate about the necessity
and desirability of deep-sea mining, including about the quality of ores on the seabed, the technical
feasibility and timeframe for extracting minerals and the associated environmental impacts and risks
and benefit sharing in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

25
Meanwhile, the most essential resources—water and food—are also becoming the most threatened.
Climate change exacerbates water scarcity and variability, leading to more frequent and severe
droughts, floods and water stress. Approximately 2.4 billion people live in water-stressed countries
(UN 2023). Climate-related impacts can further strain water resources and increase the likelihood of
conflicts, particularly in regions already vulnerable to water insecurity.

Food and water are inextricably interrelated with 72 per cent of freshwater withdrawals supporting
agriculture (UN Water 2023). Pollution, over-extraction and unsustainable water management practices
contribute to environmental degradation and diminish the availability of clean water. Disputes over
pollution control, water quality and ecosystem preservation can arise between stakeholders with
competing interests (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO] 2023). While the
prevalence of severe food insecurity globally has declined slightly—from 11.7 per cent in 2021 to 11.3 per
cent in 2022—nearly 900 million people are still severely food-insecure (FAO 2023) and as many as 783
million are facing chronic hunger and teetering on the brink of famine, with a greater number of women
than men affected in every region of the world (World Food Programme [WFP] 2023). The declining
availability of clean water also has a greater effect on women and young girls who are usually most
involved in the process of water gathering and have greater water needs for sanitation.

Signal of change 5

Rapid expansion of space activity and orbital space debris

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
The rapid expansion of space activity
damages the ozone layer, increases risk 2030 2035
to critical communication and
observation infrastructure while
undermining national security, and
geopolitical stability.

15
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
1.9
2.2
2.0
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
7+
years
1 2 3
Low High
1.4
LIKELIHOOD OF 6.4 9.7 20.9 28.2 23.2 10.2
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

As humanity goes above and beyond our planetary home, the increase in commercial spacecraft,
growth of space debris and re-entry emissions caused by the return of infrastructure to Earth may
have unintended consequences for the stratosphere and other environmental issues. Recent studies
on space activity suggests that the launch of objects into space, payloads and rocket bodies and

26
associated payloads, have increased demand for critical resources, contribute to climate change
through emissions of greenhouse gases, affect stratospheric radiative forcing and increase pollution
(Calabuig et al. 2024; Donou-Adonsou et al. 2024). As commercial space exploration intensifies, the
prospect of mineral and metals extraction (and processes) on the lunar surface is becoming more of a
reality (Shaw et al. 2022).

Rocket launches and re-entry emit combustion emissions including carbon dioxide, water vapour and
nitrogen oxides—black carbon (BC) from carbon-based solid and hypergolic fuels and kerosene, and
alumina particles (Al2O3) and gaseous chlorine from solid fuels (Ryan et al. 2022); a number of these
combustion emissions are ozone depleting (Maggi et al. 2023).

Recent studies suggest that emissions from rockets

released in the upper atmosphere have nearly 500-times
greater warming potential than surface and aircraft Environment Alert
emissions sources (Ryan et al. 2022). The US National While the burgeoning space
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2024) industry unlocks opportunities
reports that “the atmosphere more than seven miles for exploration and resource
above the surface is peppered with particles containing extraction, it also introduces
a variety of metals from satellites and spent rocket novel environmental concerns.
boosters vaporised by the intense heat of re-entry.” Rocket emissions and debris
These metals have the potential to cause stratospheric pose a risk to the stratosphere,
ozone depletion (National Oceanic and Atmospheric potentially undermining decades
Administration [NOAA] 2024). Re-entering debris can of ozone layer protection efforts.
affect the atmosphere not just by the deposition of re- The increasing volume of space
entry substances but also by the shock waves of their debris raises concerns about light
re-entry causing chemical reactions in the atmosphere pollution and climate disruption.
itself (Park et al. 2021). The impacts are being modelled
but have yet to be determined.

The collision of satellites in space can generate hundreds of thousands of pieces of debris (Clormann
and Klimburg-Witjes 2021). The environmental impacts of space debris include light pollution and re-
entry depositing alumina into the upper atmosphere, with changes to solar radiation that could affect
the Earth’s climate (Maloney et al. 2022). Space debris could be considered the new microplastics
problem in a different dimension.

With the global space industry is projected to grow to US$3.7 trillion by 2040 (Tyler 2023), monitoring
is needed to ensure that the solid progress made on protecting the ozone layer through the Montreal
Protocol is not undone; given the potential impacts of re-entry emissions on the stratosphere but also
other atmospheric layers (Ferreira et al. 2024). Other environmental impacts such as light pollution
and impacts on infrastructure require monitoring as the benefits of communications and earth
observations could be undermined.

27
2.3 AI, digital transformation and technology – a
wave of change
The astonishing rate of change in technology, notably digital and artificial intelligence, could
reshape our world in the coming years in ways that are unimaginable. As the pace of technological
advancements and digital transformation accelerate, so will the impacts both positive and negative.
These innovations hold tremendous promise to accelerate improvements across various systems,
from energy to mobility to food and beyond.

Yet the trajectories for certain technological advances not least the digital transformation and
AI’s impending influence on society, is far from given. No revolution comes without risks. It is
widely believed that this digital revolution will profoundly impact planetary health, environmental
sustainability, prosperity and human agency by enabling global decarbonization, revolutionizing
connectivity and inclusivity, and fundamentally altering the way society interacts, learns,
communicates and perceives reality. From that perspective, AI and digital transformation is both a
technological revolution and a cultural one.

Since the start of industrialisation, successive and accelerating waves of technological innovation
have transformed societies and economies globally, radically altering ways of living and working
(Figure 9). Scientific and technological breakthroughs have created opportunities and boosted living
standards in many regions, and further technological advances will be essential if humanity is to
achieve sustainability in coming decades.

Innovation cycles also produce creative destruction: radically uncertain and difficult trade-offs. The tech-
nological advances of the past century are inextricably linked with today’s ecological and climate crises.

28
 Figure 9: Waves of Innovation since the industrial revolution. Source: Adapted from Hilbert (2020).
Digital technology and social change: the digital transformation of society from a historical
perspective.

As societies globally strive to implement sustainability transitions, governance of innovation has become
crucially important. Yet achieving effective governance looks increasingly difficult. Public institutions
struggle to keep up with the pace of innovation driven by exponential growth in computational power and
rapid diffusion of technologies in global markets (Schmidt 2023). Businesses have powerful commercial
incentives to deploy new ideas as rapidly as possible. And the scale and pace of global environment
and climate crises makes it easier to justify experimentation with large-scale ‘quick fixes’ that create
unknown risks (Petrescu et al. 2023; Søgaard Jørgensen et al. 2024).

Three main drivers underpin current trends in the digital landscape: the proliferation of mobile phones
and smart devices; expanded internet access and Internet of Things; and the exponential growth and
rapid ubiquitous adoption of AI and the explosion of computational power and performance.

29
 Mobile and other devices have become part of our lives, ensuring constant connectivity. Mobile
phone usage has become ubiquitous, with over 8.89 billion subscriptions—and approximately
5.6 billion individuals worldwide possessing at least one subscription according to GSMA (2024)
near-real time data (Figure 10). In many regions, mobile phones symbolise progress and inclusion,
providing access to technological platforms and social media, thereby fostering global connectivity
and economic participation.

10

9
8.89Bn
8
8.05Bn
7
BILLIONS

0
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2023

Global population Mobile cellular subscriptions Individuals using the internet

Figure 10: Estimated number of mobile-cellular phone subscription has eclipsed the number of
people in the world population. Source: Adapted from ITU DataHub 2024.

Internet usage continues to surge, with 67.4 per cent of the global population using the internet at
the start of 2023 (International Telecommunication Union [ITU] 2023). The proliferation of internet
usage—predominantly through mobile devices—facilitates advancements across various sectors,
including education, political engagement, healthcare and digital services, promoting societal
integration and progress.

Meanwhile AI, a driving force behind the digital revolution, is increasingly integrated into decision-
making processes across sectors such as health, education and governance. This rapid growth has
prompted over 60 nations to develop national strategies for AI, recognising its potential to reshape
individual autonomy, economic development and social welfare (Vats et al. 2022). However, the
proliferation of AI could also propagate existing inequalities, especially for women, minorities and
people from low-income backgrounds. This is largely due to the potential biases in the training data,
which often do not adequately represent women and communities from the Global South (Hall and
Ellis 2023; Roche et al. 2023; Young et al. 2023).

30
While digitalization and AI offer opportunities for economic growth and social progress, their
implications for the environment are complex and multifaceted. The potential implications for
increased demand for both critical minerals and rare earth elements, as well as water resources to
meet new data centre demands, needs careful consideration.

Practices such as e-waste recycling, energy-efficient data centres, renewable energy adoption and
responsible resource management are essential to mitigate environmental harms.

Of course, the nature and dynamics of technological transformation—not least the distribution of
both its benefits and harms—vary considerably from one region to the next. In Africa, for example,
digital technology and AI advances play a crucial role in its development trajectory, including its
potential to accelerate the transition towards energy security and efficiency. Yet, the development
and implementation of ethical frameworks and governance of AI remain heavily concentrated
within the Global North. Balancing this potential double-edged sword and ensuring that AI and other
technologies remain tools to drive progress and innovation rather than instruments that perpetuate
existing inequalities, require Africa’s valuable contributions and perspectives in shaping AI’s future and
stringent policies to govern its usage (Nwokolo et al. 2023; Okolo et al. 2023).

Signal of change 6
Emerging mindset of continuous learning and ‘exnovation’
2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
An expansion of the emerging
exnovation mindset moves from being a 2030 2035
marginal undercurrent in society to the
mainstream—ushering a new paradigm
where status quo is no longer accepted
and sustainability transitions prevail.

17
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
1.9 2.0
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
7+
years
2.1
1 2 3
Low High

LIKELIHOOD OF 9
5.2 8.8 23.1 30 20.5 3.3
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Transforming the underlying systems driving environmental pressures—energy, food, mobility and
finance—depends on the emergence and diffusion of technological and social innovations that offer
new ways for societies to meet their needs. But it also requires a concurrent process of ‘exnovation’—
the practice of actively discarding outdated, inefficient, or harmful technologies, practices and norms
(Hölscher and Frantzeskaki 2020; Schlaile et al. 2024).

31
Exnovation often generates substantial resistance across society. For example, transitioning to new
sources of energy or food inevitably leaves stranded assets and impacts profits and livelihoods across
value chains, potentially disrupting entire regional economies. Established modes of producing and
consuming are also embedded in cultural norms and sense of individual and collective identity. Most
people have very strong emotional connections to their existing ways of living.

For this reason, the concept of exnovation is frequently taboo; politicians are often keen to celebrate
innovation but seldom want to focus on its destructive counterpart even though it is an essential
aspect of transformative change.

Recent years have provided ample evidence of resistance to exnovation, whether in the form of
protests, against efforts to transform farming or the successes for populist agendas that seek to
discredit climate science and deny the need for systemic change. Yet there are also signals of an
emerging public discussion that accepts and even embraces exnovation (Pel et al. 2022). This is
apparent, for example, in the rapid growth of the sharing economy—projected to grow 34-fold in a
single decade to US$335 billion by 2025 (Sharma 2023). This may point to a weakening association of
ownership and social status; the scale and impact of the global divestment movement; the increasing
popularity of so-called ‘exnovative lifestyles’ that promote decluttering or deceleration (e.g. the slow
food movement); and the growing discourse on ‘sufficiency’ and ‘degrowth’ and their practical uptake
in the context of community initiatives such as ecovillages and transition towns (Pel et al. 2022).
Central to these shifts is a mindset of continuous learning, which goes hand in hand with active
unlearning of engrained beliefs, attitudes and behaviours.

The long-term implications of these signals are

unclear but there is already evidence that the
exnovation mindset is moving into the mainstream
Environment Alert
of public discourse. In the political domain,
Achieving a sustainable governments increasingly introduce deliberate
future necessitates a two- measures to phase out harmful products and
pronged approach: embracing technologies, including fossil fuel power and vehicles.
innovation while actively The prominence of the ‘just transition’ in government
discarding practices that harm policies also signals a recognition of the need for
the environment, or exnovation. exnovation and a tool to facilitate the process. Some
This emerging mindset can governments are actively advocating for new ways
serve as a catalyst for the ‘just of living and seeking to mobilize their populations.
transition’—opening discourse on India’s Lifestyle for Environment campaign is one
sufficiency and paving the way prominent example. And at the intergovernmental
for widespread adoption. level, there are even signs of engagement with
concepts such as sufficiency, for example in the
International Resource Panel’s Global Resource
Outlook 2024 (IRP 2024).

Collectively these shifts could have a big impact. Although transforming cultural paradigms, mindsets
and worldviews is often very difficult, it potentially offers the most powerful leverage point for effecting
change in societal systems (O’Brien 2016).

32
 Signal of change 7
Deployment of Solar Radiation Modification

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Speculative solar geoengineering is
widely deployed through large-scale 2037
2030
interventions with immediate effects on
the Earth's climatic system.

16
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.1
7+
2.3
EXPECTED
2.1
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High

LIKELIHOOD OF 2.6 12.8 19.6 25.2 23.7 12 4.1

OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

The concept of Solar Radiation Modification (SRM), also known as solar geoengineering or climate
altering technologies, proposes to cool the planet by reflecting sunlight back into space, thereby
reducing global mean temperatures. The idea is not new with research on the possibility of measures
to cool the planet arising from the volcanic eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (Bluth et al. 1991; UNEP 2023d).
Despite this, geoengineering and SRM occupies a particular space, where even 10 years ago such
untested schemes, while potentially feasible, seemed little more than the fancy of science fiction
writers and fringe scientists. Today, with climate impacts rising and becoming more severe and
frequent, concerns over the apparent inability to drastically cut emissions and scale up carbon dioxide
removal are driving scientific research, investments and development, as well as political and public
interest, on the topic of SRM. Looming large over the discussions and debate around SRM is the moral
hazard concern—that normalizing the discourse and even research into these technologies will detract
from mitigation efforts (Cherry et al. 2022; Stephens et al. 2023).

The understanding of the environmental, biophysical and socioeconomic impacts of SRM is extremely
limited. If SRM technology was deployed the cooling effects would start to diminish as soon as SRM
deployment was halted leading to what is known as a termination shock—a rapid and substantial
rise in global temperatures following a sudden and sustained cessation—with potentially devastating
impacts on ecosystems (Trios et al. 2018; UNEP 2023d). Other impacts and unintended environmental
consequences include a delay in the closing of the ozone hole, warming of polar regions and cooling
of the tropics. These technologies are seen as potentially influencing geopolitics, introducing security
risks and aiding developed countries at the expense of developing ones, which are already deeply
impacted by changes to the environment and climate. The technologies do not solve the underlying
causes of climate change.

33
Recognizing that SRM technologies remain speculative and highly contentious, scientific scrutiny and
more inclusive public discourse on the implications (including ethical issues) of SRM is critical at this
stage. Choosing to ignore SRM altogether at this stage, could carry its own risks—leaving society and
decision-makers ill-prepared and potentially misguided (Wiener et al. 2023).

In February 2024, international negotiations

at the Sixth United Nations Environment
Environment Alert Assembly (UNEA-6) on a draft resolution to
If deployed, SRM poses substantial initiate a thorough independent scientific
environmental and social risks and impacts review on the potential risks of SRM
including unintended consequences like was unsuccessful, as several countries
termination shock, changes in stratospheric strengthened their resolve in taking strong
ozone and regional climate variation and proactive positions on what clearly
including potential extreme events, acid rain remains a highly complex, under-studied
and altered precipitation patterns. group of technologies and a growing source
of interstate tensions (Biermann and Gupta
2024; Morrissey 2024).

Detractors and proponents of SRM alike are emphasising the need for a governance architecture.
The European Union, United Sates of America and China are currently funding research to better
understand the science, and at present do not openly support the ‘full-scale’ deployment of SRM
technologies. However, pressure for a ‘quick fix’ to climate-related problems and insecurity is likely to
increase as temperatures continue to rise.

2.4 A new era of conflict

Armed conflict and violence are on the rise. Between 2021–23 there was a dramatic increase in
casualties, mainly caused by four conflicts: the civil war in the Tigray region in Ethiopia, the civil war
in Sudan, the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, and the conflict in Gaza. Fifty-nine state-based
conflicts across 34 countries were registered, higher than any time since 1946 (Rustad 2024).

The nature of conflict has also transformed substantially (Davies et al. 2023; Alderdice 2024). Regional
tensions, a breakdown in the rule of law, absent or co-opted state institutions, illicit economic gain and
the scarcity of resources exacerbated by climate change have all become dominant drivers of conflict

34
(UN 2024a). Increasingly, conflicts are propagated and sustained by the engagement of non-state
actors, political militias, domestic criminal groups and terrorist organizations, which in some cases are
supported overtly or covertly by state actors. Civilians are in the firing line, and the neglect of forcibly
displaced people has become the new normal (Abu-Hanna et al. 2023; International Committee of the
Red Cross [ICRC] 2024; Semerdjian 2024).

As this report was being written, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen, Ukraine and
Gaza are facing humanitarian and environmental catastrophes. These hotspots, which represent
the deadliest of armed conflicts since the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Institute for Economics and
Peace [IEP] 2024), are characterized by severe disruptions to societal functioning, extensive human,
material and environmental losses, and impacts surpassing the affected society’s coping capacity.
Critical infrastructure, including water systems and waste management facilities, were compromised,
exacerbating environmental hazards. Climate change adds to the stresses caused by conflict, and is
characterised by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths as “a rapidly increasing driver of
humanitarian need”. Humanitarian diplomacy, Griffiths argues, has been “obliged to take a front seat in
the absence of much political diplomacy because of the divisions, the geopolitics that we face today…
the use of negotiation and dialogue to end conflict is a trait, a norm, a commitment which is now no
longer an essential component in international diplomacy” (Griffiths 2024).

Armed conflicts consistently result in environmental degradation and destruction. This leads to
enduring repercussions that heighten the vulnerability of affected populations and can also exacerbate
pre-existing patterns of discrimination, especially for women and children, which exposes them to
heightened risks of violence (UNEP 2022; OHCHR 2024; UNEP 2024). Although certain international
laws aim to safeguard the natural environment and mitigate damage (ICRC 2019), armed conflicts
remain a significant driver of environmental harm, triggering food and water insecurity, loss of
livelihoods and biodiversity depletion.

In Gaza, heavy restrictions on access to basic goods and the collapse of local agrifood systems
have exacerbated a dire humanitarian situation (FAO and WFP 2024). Wastewater and solid waste
management infrastructure collapsed as a result of conflict, leaving sewage and waste to spread,
infiltrate groundwater and present human exposure and disease risks. The contamination of land and
water, and damage to agricultural land, presents significant challenges in remediation and recovery
(UNEP 2024; World Bank and UN 2024a).

Technological advances are contributing to the changing nature of conflict. The proliferation of
internet access and smartphones has drastically altered the landscape. The use of big data, satellite
imagery, AI and other emerging technologies facilitates environmental monitoring and accountability
in conflict zones. But some technological advances—namely AI and machine learning—are also
reshaping the dynamics of warfare in concerning ways, for example, by making attacks (cyber or
physical) more finely targeted, harder to attribute and easier for small groups to carry out (UN 2024a).
Additionally, the deployment of autonomous aerial and ground-based vehicles, coupled with satellite
technology, redefines the boundaries and nature of warfare. While initially perceived as tools to
minimise damage, drone technology has become increasingly prevalent in conventional warfare and
accessible to non-state actors (UN 2024a).

Natural conditions, compounded by climate volatility and extremes, pose escalating risks, exacerbated
and manipulated by a new spectrum of conflict and the weaponization of access to water, food, energy
and critical infrastructure (Daoudy et al. 2022; Kenna and Alexander 2022; Scissa 2024). Since 2011,
during conflicts in Gaza, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen an estimated 180 instances of
deliberate targeting of water infrastructure has occurred (World Bank 2021b).

35
The weaponisation of access to natural resources—such as water, energy and food—is a pressing
concern, especially in the face of climate change. Water scarcity has reached crisis levels globally, and
projections indicate that by 2025 two-thirds of the global population will experience water stress with
1.8 billion people experiencing complete water scarcity (Padder and Bashir 2023). There is increasing
evidence of weaponisation of supply chains for key commodities (Parasecoli and Varga 2023;
Bednarski et al. 2024; Glencross 2024). This is having ripple effects on regional and global systems—
as we have seen with Ukraine and the Middle East—with financial markets, security dynamics and
geopolitical stability (Farrell and Newman 2022).

Signal of change 8

Autonomous and artificial intelligence weapons systems

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Wide use of AI-driven weapons systems
that operate without human oversight 2030
with machines having capacity to select 2030
targets and destroy them without direct
human guidance resulting in massive
civilian casualties.

4
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.7 2.6 2.6

EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
4-6
years
1 2 3
Low High
0.4
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.4 13.4 14 34.4 25.4 8.5
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

The rapid progress in applied AI solutions for a range of commercial and military applications,
availability of open-source AI solutions (Ams 2023; Hunter et al. 2023; Rashid et al. 2023; Garcia 2024)
and the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, which are active testing grounds for drones
and other advanced AI applications (Greene 2022), are all signals of a dangerous global shift in the
arena of AI weaponization and robotic warfare (Horowitz 2016; Roumate 2024).

This opens up the potential for swift, unchecked developments, which could be used to covertly create
new types of weaponry systems and conceal abuses of technology in modern warfare and thereby
compromise global security (Johnson 2020; Raska 2024; Roumate 2024; Simmons-Edler et al. 2024).
Concerns have been raised about a lack of human oversight regarding AI systems used in military
activities and the large language models (LLMs) that support them. The 2024 study by Rivera et al.
(2024) found that LLMs could recommend pro-escalation tactics without clear logic or rationale.

36
This was noted as similar to the arms races and calls for nuclear weapons use. A specific example of
these concerns and lack of oversight is the Israeli ‘Lavender’ AI system used for civilian classification
and military targeting in operations in Gaza (Abraham 2024; Raska 2024; Simmons-Edler et al. 2024).

AI-enabled systems radically accelerate the speed and scale of warfare in terms of inflicting harm on
both civilians and the environment, particularly as conflict is becoming increasingly concentrated in
urban areas (Hägerdal 2023; Hook and Marcantonio 2023). Here, heavy bombardment of populated
areas can contaminate soil and groundwater in the long term; both through the munitions themselves
and as collapsed buildings release hazardous materials including asbestos, industrial chemicals and
fuel into the surrounding air, soil and groundwater (UNEP 2022).

Concurrently, emerging
commercial humanoid
Environment Alert robots, like those recently
AI weaponization and robotic warfare raises ethical developed by Berkeley Labs
security and environmental concerns. Conflicts involving (Council 2023) and Tesla
AI-enabled warfare can result in unintended large- (Alvarez 2023), along with the
scale damage or destruction to critical resources, expansion of autonomous
such as water supplies, agricultural land and natural vehicles and drones (Shladover
reserves, exacerbating the environmental toll of warfare. 2016; Rashid et al. 2023;)
Open-source AI and ongoing conflicts act as testing and the deployment of non-
grounds for autonomous weapons, potentially leading humanoid battlefield robots
to unforeseen environmental consequences. Such (Horowitz et al. 2020; Askew
technologies may recommend tactics with unclear 2023) may signal the advent
environmental ramifications. of a new era of warfare
dominated by AI and robotics.

Developments in artificial neural networks capable of simulating, and sometimes surpassing,

human thought (Mnih et al. 2015; Bojic et al. 2023; Du 2023; Hagendorff et al. 2023), coupled with
the speed at which these technologies can perform tasks, introduce potential threats in the creation
and manipulation of viruses and other substances (Sawaya 2023) posing added risks in warfare and
conflicts. As machine-learning technology continues to advance, bringing us closer to superintelligent
systems (Bostrom 2016; OpenAI 2024), the regulation of these technologies becomes critical to
mitigate potential misuse.

These signals point to a host of legal and moral questions and entered uncharted territory for
advanced warfare that could have unfathomable consequences for civilization. As the UN Secretary
General mentioned in a recent address: “We cannot sleepwalk into a dystopian future where the power
of AI is controlled by a few people – or worse, by the opaque algorithms beyond human understanding
[and control]. We need rules. Safety. Universal guardrails. And how we act now will define our era”
(Guterres 2024).

37
 Signal of change 9

New technologies amplify risks of biological agents misuse

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
The convergence of AI, biotechnological
advancements and their dual-use 2030
nature, combined with a lack of 2030
regulatory oversight (and inadequate
frameworks) gives rise to the creation
and use of biowarfare and bioterrorism
threatening global security.

12
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.5
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
4-6
years
2.3
2.6
1 2 3
Low High
0.5
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.9 10.5 21.5 36.5 18.9 9.3
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

The use of biological agents, such as pathogens or their associated toxins, is not new in the context of
warfare and terrorism. However, despite their use in war being prohibited under the Geneva Protocol
(1925) and the Biological Weapons Convention (1972), their potential for harm is being amplified
by the convergence of emerging bio- and other technologies, the pace of developments and the
inability of existing legal and safety frameworks to keep pace with such change. International fora are
discussing regulation of synthetic biology with ad hoc expert groups established to ensure appropriate
horizon-scanning of these issues as well as discussion on benefit sharing of genetic resources
(Convention on Biological Diversity 2022, Cartagena Protocol, Nagoya Protocol). These do not include
risk assessment of biological agents for use in wider warfare.

Preceding these international frameworks, concerns about genetic engineering have persisted since
the 1970s (Paris 2023), with technical, social and organizational challenges impeding progress (Trump
et al. 2021). However, the traditional framework for biological warfare, centred on known pathogens,
like anthrax and plague, is undergoing a profound shift due to synthetic biology (Sandberg and Nelson
2020; Trump et al. 2021).

The combination of genomic technologies driving synthetic biology with AI and machine learning
could lead to the development of novel biological weapons targeting specific demographics (Lentzos
2020). Additionally, the prospect of employing nano-aerial vehicles controlled by AI to disseminate
bioagents poses a novel challenge (Kambouris et al. 2023). A biological attack on livestock or crops
could yield significant economic repercussions (Roberge 2015). The recent COVID-19 pandemic has
demonstrated the potential consequences on society and economies from biological threats, and how
easily biological agents can spread across societies. In addition to widespread direct impacts, future

38
biological conflicts may employ
small-scale, targeted assaults Environment Alert
to instil psychological impact,
The potential development of novel, targeted
capitalising on advancements
bioweapons capable of disrupting ecosystems, harming
in synthetic biology (Gisselsson
agriculture and causing widespread ecological damage
2022). Even if not purposefully
necessitates urgent action. Existing frameworks must
deployed, research into such
adapt to keep pace with rapid scientific progress,
substances bears a risk
ensuring that these powerful tools are used for good,
associated with accidental or
not to unleash environmental destruction.
malicious release (WHO 2022).

39
2.5 Mass forced displacement
When home becomes uninhabitable—whether due to conflict, climate change or other external
pressures—people are faced with little choice other than to move. This can be over borders and across
continents. Human mobility and migration have long been a driver of development and innovation. But
in a world characterized by multiple crises—economic, conflicts and disasters—the magnitude and
character of these crises have changed over time and are amongst the most important phenomena
this century (Dao et al. 2021; United Nations Refugee Agency [UNHCR] 2024). Global transformations
in geopolitical and technological domains have played a key role in the changing nature of human
movement and its impacts (McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou 2021). The effects of climate and
environmental changes are increasingly forcing people from their homes. Water scarcity is linked with
a 10 per cent rise in global migration (World Bank 2021a), and forcibly displaced persons and their
host communities face numerous water-related risks (World Bank 2021b).

140M

120 Million
128.1M**
120M 120M*

FORCIBLY DISPLACED WORLDWIDE

100M by the end of April 2024 as a result of persecution, conflict, violence,
human rights violations or events seriously disturbing public order.

80M

60M

40M

20M

0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
APR

31.6 million refugees 63.3 million 6.7 million 11.7 million

under UNHCR’s mandate internally displaced asylum-seekers other people in need of
1.4 million stateless persons people international protection
* Based on operational data. ** Projected annual increase of 8.1M extrapolating existing 2024 operational data.

Figure 11: Forced displacement. Source: Adapted from IOM 2024 Global Trends report, UNHCR 2024.

40
Today, one in every 69 people, or 1.5 per cent of the entire world’s population, is now forcibly
displaced—nearly a doubling of the people that were displaced a decade ago (UNHCR 2024) with
women and girls affected the most. In the latest report of International Organization for Migration
(IOM) forced displacement is now reported as the highest on record in the modern age (IOM 2024).
Places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Myanmar,
Ethiopia and the Middle East have shown that most the world’s forcibly displaced people are
internally displaced, moving from their homes and communities but generally within national borders
(Figure 11). Notably, according to new data from IOM, 10.7 million people are now displaced by
conflicts in Sudan, nine million of which are internally displaced (IOM 2024). In Gaza, over 1.9 million
people (85 per cent of the population) became internally displaced in less than 150 days, with their
homes, amenities and support networks completely unreachable, even if they had only moved a few
miles (Buheji and Hasan 2024; Norwegian Refugee Council [NRC] 2024; Sahara 2024; UNEP 2024).

While the number of internally displaced persons remains a relatively small proportion of the
global population (71.4 million), in two decades the numbers have risen by 340 per cent (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC] 2023). This not only poses significant humanitarian
challenges but also contributes to and is worsened by environmental and climate impacts, further
exacerbating the complexities of forced migration. The persistence of the trend of extreme
temperatures and climate-related events disasters has triggered an unprecedented surge in large-
scale, prolonged and repeated displacements worldwide in last two years in many parts of the world in
Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, China, India, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia and Kenya (IDMC 2023;
WMO 2024).

Projections from IOM suggest that between 25 million and 1 billion people could become
environmental migrants by 2050 (IOM 2024). According to the IPCC “approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion
people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change”. Climate-induced human migration
and displacement affect certain regions and their populations more than others, with some countries
in Africa, Central America, the Pacific Islands and South Asia more at risk than other regions.

Climate-migration relationships are complex and context-specific. It is difficult to pin down precisely
the extent to which human mobility and displacement is solely caused by climate hazards because
this humanitarian crisis, as found in the Honduras case for example, is often intertwined with political
instability, economic structure/changes, agricultural disruptions, food scarcity, physical insecurity
due to crime and violence and so on (Pappas et al. 2021; Reichman 2022). Forced displacement has
grown at an accelerating speed worldwide in the last decade or so not least due to global warming
and geopolitical tensions. In 2018 it was estimated that some 22.5 million people have left their
homes since 2008 due to climate change (IDMC 2018; UNHCR 2019). According to the World Bank’s
Groundswell report (2021) 216 million people worldwide could be forcibly displaced within their
countries by 2050 due to climate change.

Migration can be a solution to the problem for affected areas, but it often creates new socio-economic
problems and even political tensions in destination countries/locales (Sergievskaya 2021). Climate-
induced migration is also associated with ethical and social justice considerations with human rights
on the one hand and how to share the burden fairly amongst nation states on the other. Many nation
states are under-resourced in accommodating climate-induced and humanitarian migrants more
broadly. The effectiveness of relocation programmes remains to be improved, as are international
regulation frameworks in managing this challenge.

The environmental considerations and implications are many from the provision of land, infrastructure,
services, resources to dealing with unintended environmental impacts such as wastes and pollution
from rapid forced migration placing impacts on nature and other natural resources.

41
 Signal of change 10

Uninhabitable Spaces

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Large tracts of land become unfit for
human habitation due to climate- 2030 2035
induced extreme conditions such as
wildfires, flooding, air quality, intolerable
heat and/or the aftermath of prolonged
conflict. Large-scale relocation of entire
communities becomes the norm.

1
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.8 2.7
7+
2.6
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.8
LIKELIHOOD OF 1 3.7 5.4 27.3 34.2 27.5
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Climate change and other factors combine to influence habitability, which is defined as a characteristic
of environments that support human safety, resilient livelihoods, people’s capacity to adapt to risk
and sustainable intergenerational development (Horton et al. 2021; Wrathall et al. 2023). Habitability
has five pillars: land, freshwater, food, settlement and infrastructure, and economic and subsistence
activities (Spencer et al. 2024).

In many locations, and specifically in small island nations, habitability is expected to decrease. This
is anticipated due to rising temperatures, rising sea levels and degradation of buffering ecosystems,
which in turn exacerbate human exposure to ocean hazards (Mycoo et al. 2022). The IPCC Sixth
Assessment Report noted the threats of climate change on low-lying areas and vulnerability of
communities. They report that those relying on coral reef systems for livelihoods may exceed
adaptation limits well before 2100 even for a low greenhouse gas emission pathway. Those low-lying
and coastal areas are at particular risk and hence the ability of these areas to support human life and
livelihoods. The future habitability of atoll islands is a major concern (Duvat et al. 2021). Extreme heat
also threatens habitation of communities in urban areas in the tropics and arid and semi-arid regions
of the world (Cissé et al. 2022).

In a recent modelling study, scientists projected that over the coming 50 years, up to three billion
people could be living well outside climate conditions (and particularly temperature) that have served
humanity over the past 6,000 years, and worse, that by 2070, absent climate mitigation or migration,
certain regions—Northern South America, central Africa, India and northern Australia—could simply
become too hot to allow human life (Xu et al. 2020). While the temperate regions of the world are
unlikely to become uninhabitable due to temperatures alone, extreme conditions such as flooding,

42
wildfires, intolerable low air quality, could eventually
render some densely populated urban areas as well as
rural communities—like those exposed to wildfires in Environment Alert
the wildland-urban interface—as prohibitively dangerous Climate change will affect
locales, where seasonal displacement (temporary human habitability. Rising
uninhabitability) becomes the norm (Palinkas 2020; temperatures, extreme
Yadav et al. 2023). A recent study showed the number of weather events and rising
extreme fires has risen more than 10-fold in the past 20 sea levels threaten the future
years in temperate conifer forests, and nearly seven-fold availability of habitable
in the boreal forests of northern Europe and Canada as environments. Low-lying
result of climate change (Cunningham et al. 2024). As island nations and coastal
places become uninhabitable, migration is anticipated communities are particularly
and the need for social services will increase. Semi-arid vulnerable, facing potential
areas, the tropics and some low-lying deltas and islands displacement due to
require prioritization for climate justice. Solutions need ecosystem degradation and
to be generated and investments made to address rising sea levels.
habitability risks focussing on areas to implement
adaptation (Horton et al. 2021).

43
2.6 Persistent and widening inequalities

Over recent decades, the global community has witnessed remarkable progress in reducing extreme
poverty (UN 2023). That progress has stalled. The COVID-19 pandemic brought considerable setbacks,
particularly in the poorest countries (World Bank 2024a). Immense inequalities of income and wealth
intensify within and between countries worldwide (World Inequality Database [WID] 2024). While the
top 10 per cent account for more than three quarters of total global wealth, the bottom 50 per cent
of the world population own just 2 per cent or almost nothing. The ultra-wealthy are gaining the most
and much faster than the rest. Between 1995 and 2021, the top 1 per cent captured 38 per cent of
the global increase in total wealth, while the bottom 50 per cent again accounted for just 2 per cent
(Chancel et al. 2022).

This growing concentration of wealth not only confers huge economic and political power on a tiny
elite, but it is also contributing to social stratification and undermining public institutions and social
solidarity (Obeng-Odoom 2020; Gautney 2023; Remington 2023; Xu 2023).

Within nations, income inequality is rising due to unequal access to education, limited employment
opportunities and inadequate social services, as well as regressive tax policies. Globalization
contributes to economic growth in many parts of the world, but it has also led to increased
competition and job displacement in specific sectors. Widening inequality also perpetuates unequal
access to essential services, including ecosystem services: clear air and water, fertile soil, stable
climate and vibrant biodiversity. Marginalized communities—including ethnic minorities, women,
children and persons with disabilities—are disproportionately affected by inadequate access to these
services, reinforcing the cycles of poverty and exclusion (Mackenbach 2017; MacDonald et al. 2020;
Petrikova 2020).

Consequently, inequalities of wealth and income lead to ecological inequities. On one hand, the
wealthiest people contribute massively to climate change and environmental degradation. One
recent study finds that the wealthiest 1 per cent of the global population and the poorest 66 per cent
each account for 16 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions (Khalfan et al. 2023). On the other hand,
the poorest people face the most significant exposure to pollution and disasters resulting from the
mismanagement of nature (Ajide and Ibrahim 2022; Kopp and Nabernegg 2022). For example, poorer
people live in areas with worse air and noise pollution or industrial intensity because housing is
cheaper there (Hajat et al. 2015; Rentschler and Leonova 2023). In practice, environmental harms of
this kind often intersect with other forms of injustice, such as those linked to race, disability or gender.
The result is multiplying the inequities visited on society’s weakest and most vulnerable people.

44
 Signal of change 11

Privatized micro-environmentalism

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
The increasing commoditization and
inequitable access to nature and 2030 2035
ecosystem services—available only to
the wealthy elite—exacerbate social
and economic inequalities and
polarization.

18
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
1.6 1.8
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
7+
years
2.1
1 2 3
Low High

LIKELIHOOD OF 3.1 9.6 14.5 21.9 27.4 16.2 7.2

OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Figure 7.11

‘Privatised micro-environmentalism’ refers to the creation of private-access, enclosed and sometimes

artificial habitats that offer stable ecosystem services to highly paying members. Independent of
broader planetary decline, these ‘private bubbles’ greatly limit equal access to nature-based quality
of life and bypass shared responsibility for conservation efforts, therefore disrupting notions of
environmental stewardship (Bollig et al. 2023; Preston 2024).

A fundamental principle of environmental justice

dictates that clean air, water and a healthy
Environment Alert ecosystem are basic human rights, and not privileges
reserved for the wealthy. For the first time in its
Privatized micro-environmentalism
history, the UN has recognised that everyone,
undermines environmental justice
everywhere has the right to live in a clean, healthy
and collective responsibility. By
and sustainable environment (Office of the High
commodifying clean air and nature
Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] 2022).
access, it exacerbates existing
However, as wealth continues to become more
inequalities. Furthermore, these
concentrated, privatised micro-environmentalism
enclaves risk draining resources
may risk the erosion of equal access to a healthy
and distracting from vital efforts
environment. By creating exclusive enclaves, this
to conserve and restore natural
concept while supporting biodiversity goals has the
ecosystems for everyone, not just
potential to exacerbate existing social and economic
the privileged few.
inequalities; a world where breathable air and a
connection to nature are commodified by the ultra-

45
rich, denied to those with less wealth and contributes to the overall effects of the polycrisis. Generally
viewed as positive, there are numerous examples of private game or conservation reserves, in both
developing and developed countries, where typically there are fauna or ecosystems of interest (Kamal
et al. 2014). Not much is known about the success of social and environmental outcomes in privately
protected areas (PPAs) globally.

Privatised micro-environmentalism may foster a sense of detachment from the broader environmental
crisis, which is already being driven by those in higher wealth brackets. Creating and maintaining
enclosed ecosystems could require significant resources and energy, potentially leading to increased
resource depletion and pollution. The focus on enclosed, controlled environments may also distract
from efforts to conserve and restore existing natural ecosystems.

Signal of change 12

Uninsurable future

2050
POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Residential properties and critical
infrastructure in certain locales are no
2
203
2035
longer serviced by an insurance industry 2030
in crises, exposing people to greatly
increased risks, with a surge in losses
and mortgage defaults. Governments
are forced to step in to prevent collapse
of the housing market and wider global
contagion in financial systems.

9
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.5
7+
2.2
EXPECTED 2.7
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
1.2
LIKELIHOOD OF 3.4 6.1 6.5 44 28.5 10.3
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

The increasing severity and frequency of disasters is destroying assets and livelihoods, eroding the
resilience of socio-ecological systems and undermining the ability of governments and communities
to cope. A resulting increase in uninsured risk and losses and a lack of opportunities to transfer
financial risk create additional burdens on the public sector. This risks further jeopardizing the state’s
capacity to promote long-term prosperity, poverty alleviation and environmental protection.

Governments are under growing pressure to provide disaster relief to key sectors, including agriculture,
municipal infrastructure and real estate. As the planet’s warming and its extreme weather events
intensify, agricultural insurance and particularly small farmers, has become unavailable or prohibitively
unaffordable as drought and floods increasingly threaten their crops (Mensah et al. 2023; Cooley 2024).
In certain regions, government intervention and state assistance has become essential.

46
Yet shifting the risk to the state brings its own problems. For most crops, insurance is already heavily
subsidized and the burden on state budgets is set to grow rapidly as climate change impacts intensify
(Diffenbaugh et al. 2021).

In the area of real estate, private insurers are likewise

withdrawing from regions exposed to substantial climate
risks. Some subnational governments such as Florida and Environment Alert
California, which historically have served as ‘insurer of last Extreme climate events strain
resort’ for homeowners, are at growing risk of insolvency government budgets due to
(Farmer 2023; Taylor and Knuth 2024). In 2022, the Office prioritizing disaster relief, and
of Management and Budget for the United States reported crucial environmental programs
its assessment of the nation’s financial risk exposure, may face cuts. This potential
finding that climate change could reduce GDP by 3–10 per lack of investment weakens
cent, translating into revenue loss of 7 per cent by 2100, capacity to protect ecosystems,
while facing an additional US$25–128 billion in additional jeopardizing biodiversity and
disaster relief expenditures annually (Office of Management hindering our fight against
and Budget for the United States [OMB] 2022). Meanwhile climate change itself.
the developing world continues to face increasingly limited
access to disaster relief and recovery capital.

Innovations in the financial and public sectors can help manage climate risks and sustain access
to insurance. For example, insurers can offer reduced premiums or additional coverage benefits to
policyholders that invest in adaptation strategies, early warning systems or resilient infrastructure—
recognizing that mitigating risks beforehand is often much more cost-effective than repairing damage
after a disaster (Feofilovs et al. 2024). Parametric insurance and reinsurance policies can help speed
up responses and improve coverage. Unlike traditional insurance, parametric policies focus on the
magnitude of a specific type of event (e.g. a tropical cyclone reaching a certain wind speed), enabling
a simple, straightforward payout process (World Economic Forum [WEF] 2024). Governments can
likewise support the development of supportive regulations, tax incentives, and risk-sharing frameworks,
including effective collaborations between insurers and the public sector (Feofilovs et al. 2024).

47
2.7 Misinformation, declining trust and polarization

Reliable knowledge and scientific evidence has long been recognized as an essential foundation for
effective public policy and good governance. In recent years, a combination of intertwined political,
technological and social changes has weakened trust in science and undermined democratic
institutions.

Scepticism and mistrust about climate change science has become an important political dividing
line in many countries (Buzogány and Mohamad-Klotzbach 2021). Climate and energy transition
policies have become a focus of populist rhetoric and agenda-setting. Populists have been successful
in mobilizing substantial constituencies by linking climate change denial to a wider attack on (urban)
elites and the political establishment, grounded in anxieties about the pace and cost of social
and economic change, and the loss of national sovereignty. Misinformation and disinformation,
increasingly powered by AI, is identified as the most severe global risk over the next two years in the
latest Global Risk Report of the World Economic Forum (2024) undermining social cohesion, trust in
institutions and fuelling political divides.

Populist actions to discredit scientific research and institutions have been enabled, in part, by rapid
changes in information and communication technologies and dynamics in news media. The news
media industry has gone through profound changes in the past decade that have impacted the way
news is both produced and consumed. Across the world, people increasingly source news from social
media, which attract and retain users by providing personalized and often emotionalized content
on controversial topics. By creating silos of like-minded people and enabling an overrepresentation
of radical viewpoints, social media can fuel polarization foment conspiratorial ideas and a create
fragmentation of public discourse (Stark and Stegmann 2020; Xing et al. 2024).

Online social networks also enable rapid and widespread dissemination of deliberate disinformation
and empower highly influential and disruptive political or cultural voices. Recent crises, including the
ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and the shifts to a more digital, mobile, and platform-based media
environment have accelerated since the COVID-19 pandemic (Ilan 2024). For example, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2022) notes that in September
2020, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, “over 1 million posts were circulating on Twitter with
inaccurate, unreliable, or misleading information related to the pandemic. …These false claims were
often amplified by unscrupulous or misguided public figures”. In this acceleration of manipulation,
advances in AI-enabled machine learning and deep learning are actively being leveraged to deceive
people by generating and delivering targeted fake content (Aïmeur et al. 2023).

48
The growth of ‘fake news’ has the dual effect of misleading people and undermining trust in all news
content, including from traditional news sources and government bodies. The disinformation potential
of AI and ‘deepfakes’ further amplifies these risks—where foreign and domestic actors alike will
exploit disinformation to further widen societal and political polarization (WEF 2024). A sharp decline
in public confidence in large news media empires, including distrust with ownership and funding
flows, and polarization of news audiences have had profound effects on civic life including peoples’
relationship to science. Meanwhile, the continuing volatility in advertising revenues for mainstream
news media and the shift towards digital social media is further undermining the ability to provide
accurate news—an essential component of democratic governance (UNESCO 2022). In a context of
eroding trust in science and public institutions, it becomes much harder to design and deliver effective
policies to tackle societal challenges, including the climate crisis.

Dwindling trust in external entities, including other nations, reverberates on a global scale, exacerbating
social, economic, environmental, and climate crises. As faith in established institutions wanes,
individuals and communities gravitate towards spokespersons whose rhetoric resonates with distrust,
often aligning with populist or ‘anti-establishment’ leaders (Ceron et al. 2021; Blake et al. 2024).

The decline in trust in science manifests differently in various contexts. In some regions, it stems
from perceived failures to fulfil commitments, such as in climate mitigation or efforts to preserve and
restore nature as well as pandemic response efforts. Other factors contributing to this decline include
worsening economic instability, rising inequality, corruption and the proliferation of misinformation via
social media platforms that has eroded trust in traditional media sources.

Signal of change 13

Decisions increasingly detached from scientific evidence

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Poor policy decisions are made based
on populist rhetoric and community 2030
pressures, and not on science or other
2026
knowledge.

5
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.7 2.6
2-3
2.3
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
0.9 1.7
LIKELIHOOD OF 5.6 16.5 26.8 27.7 20.8
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

49
Despite the growing knowledge and understanding of global challenges, effective actions remain
insufficient. For over fifty years, the causes and impacts of climate change have been well-established,
yet the targets of the 2015 Paris Agreement seem unattainable. Similarly, none of the global
biodiversity targets have been fully met, despite clear evidence of increasing biodiversity loss (Global
Biodiversity Outlook 5; IPBES 2019). The science is unequivocal: the cumulative impact of humanity’s
ecological footprint is becoming increasingly unsustainable. The COVID-19 pandemic exemplified
issues around delayed governmental actions, influenced by public opposition, lack of trust and
widespread misinformation (Lancet 2022).

Trust in science is influenced by various individual and social factors, including scientific literacy,
social consensus and confidence in public institutions (Wellcome Global Monitor 2018; ISC 2023).
During crises, trust in scientific evidence is often complicated by political agendas and historical
tensions between stakeholder groups (Lewandowsky et al. 2022; ISC 2024), especially in the early
stages of a crisis. The rise of AI-generated information will likely exacerbate these uncertainties. A
recent study found that the individual propensity for confidence in public policy, and trusting evidence-
based decisions, are conditioned by a societies’ (or country’s) level of agreement on how trustworthy
science and scientists are (Sturgis et al. 2021).

Effective decision-making in the face of multiple, sometimes conflicting, values and priorities requires
stronger, localized and equity-centred evidence-to-policy mechanisms (Evidence Commission 2022).
The credibility, legitimacy and relevance of information are crucial for knowledge to support action
(Cash and Belloy 2020). Emphasizing the social construction of knowledge and integrating diverse
sources of information are vital for building trust and engagement (Pielke 2012; Pielke 2019). This
involves equitable engagement, capacity building in evidence synthesis and better contextualization and
communication of science (Pinto et al. 2021; ISC 2022; Lieu et al. 2023; Rasooly et al. 2023; ISC 2024).

Several factors contribute to the gap between

accumulating knowledge and meaningful action,
including political and cognitive biases and a tendency
Environment Alert to prioritize short-term issues over long-term risks
The capacity to effectively (ISC 2024). Current development paradigms often
address environmental issues undervalue nature, overlook social and environmental
is adversely affected when externalities and favour short-term cost-benefit
the gap between scientific analyses over long-term wellbeing measures
knowledge and effective (ISC 2023). This leads to policymakers pursuing
action widens. Despite clear potentially detrimental objectives, leading to potential
evidence of environmental unintended effects including social impacts, such
threats, political agendas, as direct impacts to income and wellbeing among
misinformation and social certain trade or labour groups (Haywood et al. 2021).
inequalities often stand in the Consequently, this may lead to resistance to resulting
way of meaningful solutions. policy proposal, as illustrated by community resistance
to policy proposals, such as farmer protests in Europe
against net-zero policies.

Political resistance may also arise due to inadequate consideration of social and cultural contexts,
as seen with opposition to carbon levies in some Western countries (Umit and Schaffer 2020).
Unintended environmental impacts can also occur due to high uncertainty in complex ecosystems
(Scoones and Stirling 2020). The urgency of the climate crisis can result in poorly informed policies,
particularly affecting the Global South, which often faces the consequences of international policies
made without sufficient consultation with affected communities.

50
 Signal of change 14

Eco-Anxiety: An emerging crisis hidden in plain sight

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Climate- and eco-anxiety among
children and youth becomes 2030
widespread and gives rise to global 2030
mental health crisis where isolation,
loneliness, mass disaffection
profoundly influence societal
wellbeing and functioning.

8
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.2 2.4
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
4-6
years
2.6
2 6
1 2 3
Low High
0.5
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.3 4.3 11.9 31.7 28.1 21.2
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

The physical threats of environmental degradation and climate change are well established.
In addition, direct and indirect exposure to climate-related disasters—such as floods, storms,
wildfires, heatwaves and droughts that can lead to displacement and food shortages—can lead to
psychological harms including depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress (IPCC 2020; Haseley
and Lament 2024). Recent research also provides evidence of disorders that are unconnected to
specific climate events (Wu et al. 2020; Passmore et al. 2023; Haseley and Lament 2024).

‘Eco-anxiety’, ‘climate grief’ and ‘climate anxiety’ are terms used for the negative emotional
responses related to the threat of environmental and climate crises. Unsurprisingly, climate
researchers and communicators are vulnerable to such anxieties (Gilford et al. 2019). However, eco-
anxiety affects people globally, and recent research suggests young people are especially affected.
A 2021 survey asked young people in 10 countries including Brazil, India, Nigeria and the Philippines
about their climate concerns and belief in government responses (Hickman et al. 2021). Their survey
showed 59 per cent of respondents were very or extremely worried about climate change. More than
half reported each of the following emotions: sad, anxious, angry, powerless, helpless and guilty.
Correlations between climate anxiety and distress and perceived inadequate government response
as well as feelings of betrayal were positive (Hickman et al. 2021). Further study emphasizes how
children in particular face feelings of confusion, betrayal and abandonment because of inaction
and their own lack of agency in the face of existential threats (Hickman 2024). Sustained exposure
to chronic emotional stressors caused by climate crises can have long-lasting impacts, increasing
mental health problems over time (Wu et al. 2020). And the internet and social media are further
augmenting the challenge, for example by creating echo chambers, spreading misinformation (Zollo
2019) and generating emotional contagion (Goldenberg and Gross 2020).

51
 Of course sometimes emotions like
anxiety and anger are natural and even
Environment Alert healthy emotional responses to impending
Increasing anxiety and stress around climate crises that could motivate engagement,
change and social unrest present an indirect understanding and action—individually
threat to the environment. They can lead to and collectively. Indeed, the surge of youth
decreased pro-environmental behaviours and engagement in climate action during recent
a weakened sense of collective responsibility years illustrates the potential for positive
therefore finding solutions to address the responses. Yet there is also ample evidence
mental health impacts of such existential that it can lead to counter-productive
threats is crucial. or destructive reactions like denial and
avoidance (Léger-Goodes 2022; WEF 2022).

Reflecting on the accumulating evidence, Haseley and Lament (2024) suggest that climate anxiety
in young people is “a crisis in plain sight” and that there are growing indications of “an emotional
catastrophe being visited on the next generations”. The potential implications of this for society
are substantial. According to the World Health Organization, some 15 per cent of the global adult
population experiences mental health problems to various degrees and some 12 billion working
days are lost every year to depression and anxiety at a cost of US$1 trillion per year in lost
productivity globally (WHO 2022).

To mitigate these risks, it is essential that children and young people are given a sense of agency,
empowerment and hope. This will depend in part on the information young people are provided
and how it is framed. Here the development of solutions and action-oriented knowledge is key.
Ultimately, everyone has a role to play—families, teachers, care and health professionals, civil
society and international organizations (Léger-Goodes 2022; WEF 2022).

Signal of change 15

Surging fossil fuel subsidies

2050
POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Surging subsidies continue unabated,
reorienting global capital flows and
investments away from clean-energy 2030
2030
technologies further entrenching
inequalities and triggering a massive
regression on climate mitigation
policies and backlash against the
energy transition.

10
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.5
4-6
2.3
EXPECTED
2.7
TIMEFRAME 1 2 3
years
Low High
1.7
LIKELIHOOD OF 3.2 12.9 17.7 29.1 22.8 12.7
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

52
Fossil-fuel subsidies hit a record US$7 trillion in 2023, up by US$2 trillion in just two years, as
governments responded to the global spike in energy prices. This trajectory, even if short term, may
critically undermine the cost-competitiveness of renewable (clean) energy and further accelerate the
reliance on fossil fuels and create a major stumbling block for the energy transition.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines subsidies as
government actions that provide advantages to consumers or producers, supplementing their
income or reducing their costs (Central Statistics Office [CSO] 2019). Fossil fuel subsidies are often
motivated by one or more objectives: energy independence, encouraging industry or safeguarding
household purchasing power among impoverished and vulnerable groups. The recent surge in
subsidies may be attributed to increased consumption by various countries, reflecting rising prices
of fuel, transportation and industrial activities (Henseler and Maisonnave 2018). This surge could
also signify heighten fossil fuel usage as the necessity to develop alternative sources persists.
Eliminating all fossil fuel subsidies would particularly impact sectors such as mining, transportation
and electricity production.

However, reforming the subsidy system

presents several challenges. For
instance, while reforming fuel subsidies
Environment Alert
can enhance a country’s macroeconomic
The surge in fossil fuel subsidies will performance and alleviate fiscal
influence the trajectory of addressing pressures, the resultant price changes
climate change. While intended can lead to adverse direct and indirect
to address short-term economic impacts on the welfare of vulnerable
concerns they inadvertently undercut groups and consequently exacerbate
the cost-competitiveness of clean poverty (Cooke et al. 2016). Subsidy
energy and incentivize continued reductions entail higher prices for
reliance on environmentally destructive energy products directly consumed by
fossil fuels. households and potentially increased
prices for non-energy products due to
elevated energy input costs.

Given these impacts on household budgets and the popularity of subsidies, many governments
find it challenging to decrease or eliminate them. Sectors benefiting significantly from fossil fuel
subsidies may resist their removal, further complicating reform efforts. The environmental costs of
continued fossil fuel use are considerable and the longer the sector takes to reduce and phase out
such practices, the more CO2 is being emitted.

53
 Signal of change 16

Escalating risks of corruption in carbon offsetting

2050
POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Fraudulent carbon sequestration
schemes proliferate, undermining
climate mitigation efforts and causing
2030
2028
widespread harm to ecosystems and
vulnerable communities. Confidence
in carbon offset markets collapses,
cutting off urgently needed
investments in nature-based solutions.

14
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.1 2.2
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
2-3
years
2.4
1 2 3
Low High
0.9
LIKELIHOOD OF 3.1 7.8 23.1 36.2 18 10.9
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Carbon offsetting is a widely used tool in the fight against climate change. It offers individuals,
companies or governments a way to negate (or compensate for) their fossil fuel emissions by funding
an equivalent emissions reduction or removals practice elsewhere. In other words, investing in
activities that either sequester carbon dioxide (CO2), for example by planting trees or restoring forests
and wetlands, or prevent it from being emitted in the first place, for example through energy efficiency
improvements or by avoiding the destruction of mangroves. Strictly speaking, the practice of offsetting
is considered the last step in the mitigation hierarchy (Bergès et al. 2021)—i.e. only once every effort
has been made to reduce/avoid emissions, the ‘residual’ emissions that cannot be eliminated are
those that could potentially be offset.

Carbon offset schemes often include tradable certificates or ‘rights’ linked to offset activities or
projects, where the trading of certificates occurs in both voluntary and compliance carbon markets.
In principle, well designed and implemented carbon offsetting initiatives can help to mitigate climate
change while also providing valuable co-benefits, such as reducing health impacts from air pollution,
and increasing biodiversity and other services for example through restoring ecosystems. In practice,
however, problems associated with some carbon offsetting include a range of issues and questionable
practices, both historical and emerging, that are undermining the effectiveness (including long-term
climate benefits) of carbon offsetting and the credibility of such schemes. Issues range from weak
verification processes that allow fictitious or fraudulent projects to be certified (Battocletti et al. 2023;
Espenan 2023) to misrepresentation of an activity’s sequestration potential or the duplicative sale of
individual credits to multiple buyers (Gill-Wiehl et al. 2024).

There is mounting evidence and concern that large-scale offset initiatives, even those believed to be of
‘high-integrity’, have been overstating their ability to contribute to limiting atmospheric greenhouse gas
emissions. Recent investigations reveal that most offset schemes vastly underestimate the magnitude

54
of market leakage effects (Filewod and McCarney 2023). In 2023, one study reportedly found that
more than 90 per cent of projects by a global certifier were likely ‘phantom credits’ (Ross 2024).
The results of this specific study continue to be securitized. However, a growing body of empirical
evidence that demonstrate irregularities and issues of integrity (e.g. Roopsind et al. 2019; West et al.
2020; Calel et al. 2021; Guizar-Coutiño et al. 2022; West et al. 2023) and a subsequent erosion of trust
and confidence in the voluntary carbon offset market (King 2024; Pande 2024).

In some instances, projects are actively harmful. Afforestation of land with monoculture, alien (often
invasive) species can degrade ecosystems, such as natural grasslands (Aguirre-Gutiérrez et al. 2023).
Offset projects have also led to the eviction of local communities from their land and reinforced injustices
against marginalized groups (Lyons and Westoby 2014; Chomba et al. 2016; Fisher et al. 2018).

At the heart of many of the problems with carbon offsetting is a lack of market regulation, oversight
and accountability. The existence of large money flows in any unregulated market creates substantial
corruption risks (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC] and the World Bank 2024b) and
there are indications that the scale of these risks could expand very rapidly in the coming years. The
voluntary carbon market is projected to grow exponentially this decade, from US$2 billion in 2021 to
US$50 billion in 2030 (Blaufelder et al. 2021). This growth could represent an important opportunity
in the fight against climate change and in environmental protection. However, without effective
regulation it could instead have a rebound effect and generate significant harms: wasting vast
amounts of resources; undermining climate mitigation efforts; harming ecosystems and communities;
eroding trust in public and private institutions; and undermining investments in the broader array of
nature-based solutions that could deliver substantial environmental, social and economic benefits.

To seize the opportunities presented

by carbon offsetting, governments
Environment Alert must ensure effective regulation
Carbon offset initiatives, if poorly designed and to ensure offset permanence,
implemented can be counterproductive by providing independent monitoring and oversight,
a false sense of progress, delaying essential consultation with Indigenous
emissions reductions, and even undermining nature- communities and crucially shift the
based solutions. Fraudulent schemes can lead to focus from avoided emissions and
ineffective emission reductions, ecosystem damage, temporary carbon storage to long-
and a loss of public trust, ultimately harming duration carbon removal at source
environmental and conservation efforts. while using carbon offsets as a
supplementary measure (Cullenward
et al. 2023).

While carbon offsetting holds promise for environmental challenges, its effectiveness hinges on
responsible implementation. Corruption, fraud and systemic credibility risks in carbon offsetting
schemes is a major cause for concern. Using blockchain to underpin carbon offsetting markets could
potentially dramatically increase transparency, traceability and accountability, reducing risks such as
double counting while increasing market liquidity (Sipthorpe et al. 2022; Vilkov and Tian 2023; WEF
2023) but requires further research.

Poorly designed carbon offsetting, can exacerbate social inequities, undermine conservation efforts
and fail to deliver promised environmental benefits.

55
2.8 Polycentricity and diffusion of governance

The role of national governments in global governance is evolving rapidly. In part this reflects
eroding trust in public institutions (Section 2.7) and the growing influence of non-state actors,
ranging from transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations
and ‘ultra-wealthy’ individuals to private military contractors and international criminal networks
(Bäckstrand et al. 2017; Setzer and Nachmany 2018; Mbeva et al. 2023). In part it reflects
a recognition that national governments have been unable to address global sustainability
challenges—either operating individually or multilaterally. In this context, governments have allowed
some relocation of power and responsibilities, engaging non-state actors as agents of change.

At the international scale, the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 was identified as an important
inflection point, which signalled both the limitations of intergovernmental processes and the need
for a more decentralized approach to climate governance (Bäckstrand et al. 2017). In subsequent
years, there have been many signals of a shift towards more polycentric governance, which
disperses political authority to diverse centres of decision-making and emphasises experimentation
and learning (Jordan et al. 2018). The global regulatory regime based on intergovernmental
agreements is increasingly complemented by climate action orchestrated by transnational networks
of cities, corporations and civil society groups (Bulkeley et al. 2018).

While research on polycentric governance emphasises its emergent, bottom-up character, it also
acknowledges that states often have an important role in mobilizing subnational or non-state actors
(Setzer and Nachmany 2018). For example, legal concepts such as ecocide and rights of nature are
increasingly being codified in national legislation, creating the basis for environmental groups or
others to bring legal action against companies or public bodies.

There is already evidence of the potential impact of private litigation. For example, in 2021 the Dutch
branch of Friends of the Earth (Milieudefensie) won a major decision against Shell. The court ruled
that Shell group reduce its Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. including all indirect emissions
across its value chain) by 45 per cent by 2030, compared to 2019 levels (López et al. 2023).

As has long been acknowledged, “more diffuse approaches to governance in all parts of society
will only work if there are frameworks in place that assure very high levels of transparency,
accountability and integrity” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]
2001). Governments have an important role in creating harmonized frameworks that can enable this
transparency and accountability.

56
 Signal of change 17

New tools for rerouting global financial flows

2050
POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Governments in the world’s biggest
economies require businesses to report
on the social and environmental 2030
2030
impacts of all their operations and
stringently penalise firms for harms
caused. Declining share prices and
investments in unsustainable
businesses lead to a paradigm shift
in corporate governance.

7
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE
2.3 2.6
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
3-4
years
2.7
1 2 3
Low High
1.9
LIKELIHOOD OF 2.8 11.1 18.6 30.9 23.1 11.6
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

There is growing global support for actions that reconfigure financial systems in ways that can help
mitigate inequalities, eradicate extreme poverty and address environmental crises. The need for a
transformation to the financial systems was clearly expressed at the Africa Climate Summit and its
Nairobi Declaration, during India’s G20 presidency in 2023 and at the African Union Summit in 2024.
Similar calls were made through the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact and the Bridgetown
Initiative. The UN Common Agenda (2023) describes the existing international financial architecture
as “entirely unfit for purpose in a world characterized by unrelenting climate change, increasing
systemic risks, extreme inequality, entrenched gender bias [and] highly integrated financial markets”.
The agenda highlights the need for a broad array of actions and reforms to the global financial
architecture, including lowering sovereign borrowing costs; massively increasing and reorienting
cheap development lending by development banks; making businesses more sustainable; increasing
incentives to invest in the low-carbon, net-zero transition; identifying positive business opportunities
associated with a more sustainable and inclusive economy; aligning the financial system with the
Paris Agreement via Article 2.1.c.; reforming fiscal systems to reduce tax avoidance; and increasing
transparency in financial flows.

There are promising signals that aspects of this agenda are being put into effect; for example, the
introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 per cent at the start of 2024, agreed by 135
countries (OECD 2024). Perhaps even more influential are measures that aim to reorient financial
flows to and from sustainable businesses and shift the focus of corporate decision-making away from
short-term profit maximization towards broader social purpose.

57
Under the UN’s Race to Zero campaign, over 14,000 non-state actors, including financial institutions,
business and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), have committed to halving their emissions
by 2030 and striving for a net-zero economy by 2050. Such voluntary action is swiftly being
institutionalised in policy and regulation. This is of global importance because the decisions of
multinational enterprises can impact social and environmental outcomes across entire value chains,
including in lower-income areas.

Multiple environmental, social and governance

(ESG) reporting initiatives have emerged in
recent years that provide tools for businesses to
Environment Alert track and report their social and environmental
Reforming financial systems impacts (Tsang et al. 2023; Chopra et al. 2024).
presents an opportunity to tackle For example, the UN Principles for Responsible
environmental challenges. By Banking; EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting
reorienting financial flows, promoting Directive (in force since January 2023); the
sustainable business practices, and Global Reporting Initiative; the International
demanding greater transparency, Sustainability Standards Board.
environmentally responsible
These important developments will be
decision-making can be incentivized
amplified with more robust, standardized,
throughout global value chains.
comprehensive and binding systems that can
better compare performance, hold firms to
account and redirect financial flows.

Encouragingly, there are signals that binding, non-financial reporting may become much more rigorous
and effective. The recently adopted United States Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC)
Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate Related Disclosures for Investors responds to investor
demand for more consistent, comparable and reliable information on climate-related risks and their
financial effects on companies. The increased data availability and transparency will allow investors
to take such information into account in investment decision-making and may help correct the present
mispricing of climate risk and climate-associated opportunities. The European Union’s new Corporate
Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (Patz 2022) goes further, creating an obligation on very large
companies to identify, prevent, mitigate and end actual and potential human rights violations and
environmental harms in their own operations, as well as those of subsidiaries and business partners
along the value chain, and compelling them to issue 1.5°C-aligned transition plans. Failing to comply
will lead to huge financial penalties and civil liability for damages caused.

Worldwide, jurisdictions are adopting taxonomies that label net-zero aligned economic activity to
create greater transparency, direct financial flows towards climate-supportive activities and prevent
greenwashing. Finally, the Basel Committee Pillar 3 disclosure requirements compel large banks to
release the level of net-zero alignment of their sector holdings and their Green Assets Ratio (GAR),
both of which help enable greater transparency in unlocking the financial flows necessary for a
sustainable future.

58
 Signal of change 18

Local, network-driven resilience

2050

POTENTIAL DISRUPTION
Frustrated by the failures of national
governments and enabled by digital 2030 2032
technologies, networks of local
communities become the primary
driving force behind global actions to
increase resilience.

13
PERCEPTION REGIONAL VARIATION INTENSITY OF IMPACT (positive or negative)
SCORE

2.2 2.3
EXPECTED
TIMEFRAME
7+
years
2.4
1 2 3
Low High
1.2
0.8
LIKELIHOOD OF 3.5 13.4 14 34.4 25.4 8.5
OCCURRENCE
(% proportion of respondents) Exceptionally unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Neutral Likely to occur Very likely Virtually certain

Communities and local-level networks and initiatives play a major role in coping with short-term
shocks and build long-term resilience and adaptive capacities. They are increasingly necessary as
governments, under pressure from financial, social and environmental challenges, often fail to address
the nuanced needs of local communities and vulnerable populations. Rural and urban communities
also serve as important incubators of innovation and experimentation with novel ways of living or
working (Steward 2018; Olmedo et al. 2023).

This agility is facilitated by the availability of strong local networks and dedicated community
engagement that encompass a diverse range of actors, including individuals, community-based
organizations, grassroots initiatives and informal support systems that also draw from the traditional
and local knowledge of indigenous peoples, women and other vulnerable populations most affected
by climate change (Datta 2018; Datta 2024). All this plays a pivotal role in fostering resilience by
providing social support, sharing resources and facilitating collective action (Adger et al. 2018).
Promising signs are emerging that the agility and transformative capacity offered at the level of cities
and local network-communities make it possible to radically reconfigure things like energy or mobility
systems at these scales much more quickly than at a national scale.

The success of these bottom-up initiatives is supported by robust local government leadership that
provides the necessary governance and structural arrangements as well as important connections
with national authorities in a way that complements ongoing initiatives (Khaldoun et al. 2018; Panday
2018; Gbadegesin et al. 2022). Cities and local governments can also build on their deep community
connections to inform their environmental stewardship strategies, which provides complementary top-

59
down mechanisms for the implementation of adaptation and mitigation measures. This is possible
through the development of policies and programs that address specific environmental challenges
faced by their citizens. Unlike broader national initiatives, they can be more pragmatic in their
approach. There are numerous examples of cities across the globe—from Montreal to Barcelona, Cape
Town to Busan and Surat to Bogota—that demonstrate this local government nimbleness in areas like
monitoring and reducing emissions, water management, improving public transportation, managing
waste effectively, and protecting green spaces. The promotion of the ‘10/15 - minute city’ (Di Marino
et al. 2022; Logan et al. 2022; Salvador et al. 2021) and ‘Smart City’ initiatives further exemplify this
focus on local solutions (Ismagiloiva et al. 2019; Irvine et al. 2022; Yang et al. 2024). By showcasing
innovative solutions and best practices, they can inspire others to follow suit.

Despite their potential, cities, community-based approaches

and local level networks and initiatives face various
Environment Alert
challenges, including limited resources, unequal power
Strong cities and local dynamics and institutional barriers (Oliver-Smith 2019).
communities that are supported Addressing these challenges requires concerted efforts to
by robust local leadership and foster collaboration, strengthen local governance structures
governance are the bedrock of and promote inclusive decision-making processes (Cutter
environmental resilience in a et al. 2019). Leveraging technology and digital platforms
complex world. From coping can enhance the reach and effectiveness of community-
with immediate crises to driven initiatives, enabling greater connectivity and
fostering long-term adaptation, knowledge exchange (Meier and Selanikio 2018). The
empowered communities pivotal role of cities, community-based approaches and
with robust social networks local level networks and initiatives in fostering resilience
can experiment and innovate speaks to the continuing need to foster collaboration,
to address environmental empower communities and integrate diverse perspectives
challenges faster than from the traditional and local knowledge of indigenous
centralized systems. peoples and women in resilience-building efforts, which
ultimately promotes more effective and agile governance.

2.9 Mobilising insights from Foresight: Shifts,

signals and the SDGs
The surest way to know the future is to shape it. Information from foresight only becomes valuable
when it is used to guide action, and is woven into the fabric of an organization. Taking strategic
decisions about appropriate policies, institutions and resources, based on signals of change, offers a
clear opportunity to reduce or increase, as appropriate, the chances of these signals becoming trends.
However, to realize the full potential of foresight, signals of change must be considered in specific
contexts, accounting for regional priorities and perspectives.

The previous sections have mapped out important global shifts and signals of change that could
shape planetary health and human wellbeing. The combination of disruptions and opportunities point
to broader, interrelated insights about how societies could tackle the challenges ahead. It is important

60
to note that no signal of change can be considered too small to completely dismiss. Like the tiny
parasite that invades an oyster and causes a pearl to form, or the pebble that begins an avalanche,
small changes now can become world-altering changes later. We ignore them at our peril.

The signals of change point to major opportunities to advance progress towards the SDGs, particularly
the environmental dimension. For example, actions to address SDG 13: Climate Action will necessarily
resolve the signal of change of ancient microbes from thawing permafrost. Restoring and maintaining
ecosystems and biodiversity will assist in Climate Action, while also mitigating zoonoses spillover.
Addressing SDG14: Life below the water and SDG15: Life on land will maintain ecosystem services
and so facilitate poverty alleviation. Annex 2 shows the SDGs mapped against the shifts and signals of
change and points to where action can ensure desirable futures and preparation for disruptions.

The commitments to achieve the SDGs and carbon neutrality rest on empowering and amplifying
actions from all parts of society. However, such unity is challenging in the current context of eroding
trust in governments, increasing social polarization and geopolitical tensions. These tensions imply an
urgent need to forge a new social contract.

In addition, identifying ways to increase resilience and steering innovation towards sustainable
outcomes will require governments and societies to use agile and adaptive governance approaches.
This will mean empowering communities and private enterprise to experiment and innovate, guided
by goals, targets and visions at different timeframes or scale. Introducing shorter-term targets
emphasizes the scale and speed with which transformations are needed, and enables unintended
consequences to be dealt with in an agile and flexible manner.

To facilitate more agile and flexible governance, data, information and knowledge across different
disciplines—environment, social, economic, agriculture and so on—will be essential. This encompasses
information on non-traditional and indigenous knowledge. Technological advances are creating a huge
increase in available knowledge. However, there is a need for more integration of data, knowledge and
actions to plug major gaps in data, information and their accessibility for integrated decision making.

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Part 3
Managing change
and building
resilience: A future
for planetary health
and human wellbeing
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This report shows that humanity has a stark and urgent choice to make: continue to
destabilise planetary health and risk losing humanity’s life support system, or build
a future that embraces equity, addresses the underlying drivers of environmental
degradation and achieves sustainable development. What humanity decides now will
shape the world that future generations will inherit.

There are challenges. However, there are also signals of opportunities. Innovations offer novel ways
to address social and environmental problems or create new ways of meeting needs or organizing
governance. Crucially, just as the impact of multiple crises is compounded when they are linked, so are
solutions. There are already many actions underway that would address the global shifts identified and
potential signals of change. There is hope.

Delivering on this hope starts by asking a simple question and acting on it: what kind of world do I
want my future self and my descendants to live in? It continues by ensuring that the people who will
live the longest in this future—the youth of today and those yet to come—are considered and, where
possible, represented in decision-making. The surveys and regional workshops that formed the basis
for this report emphasised this by pointing to a need for intragenerational equity, which addresses
equity within people alive today, and intergenerational equity, which is concerned with generations not
yet born.

The principle of intergenerational equity is codified in multiple international agreements, such as

the 1992 Rio Declaration, the Paris Agreement and the SDGs (Kreilhuber and Kariuki 2020; United
Nations Chief Executives Board [UNCEB] 2023). However, these principles were established centuries
ago. Concepts such as ‘seven generations’, attributed to Native American Haudenosaunee (Iroquois)
philosophy, emphasize the obligation to consider the impacts of decisions over the next seven
generations (Da Costa et al. 2021). The Māori concept of Kaitakitanga means guardianship of the sky,
sea and land, and implies a duty of care from one generation to the next (Krishil 2021).

Embedding these principles and addressing the huge environmental and social challenges ahead will
require the voices and knowledge of all society—nationally and globally. This will only be possible if
the burdens and opportunities are shared fairly, and if youth and other marginalized groups are given a
voice. The world needs a new social contract.

3.1 Shared values: A new social contract

The idea that the different parts of society are bound together in a web of trust and reciprocity—a
social contract—is found in cultures and religious traditions across the world. Humans rely on each
other for safety, security and a sense of belonging. In Kiswahili, it is known as Umoja: a belief that
strength stems from unity. Ubuntu, of African origin, emphasises the connections of individuals with
their surrounding world (Etieyibo 2017).

The resilience of any society depends on the cohesion of individuals, communities, civil society,
businesses and governments (Bouwer et al. 2021). In Martin Luther King’s words: “It really boils down

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to this: that all life is interrelated. We are all caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied into a
single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly” (King 1967).

However, this social contract is being ignored in many places of the world: where short-term profit and
individual success have become dominant, to the detriment of most of the world— and even to the
future of those who benefit the most now.

A new social contract is identified as a priority in the UN Secretary General’s report ‘Our Common
Agenda’ (UNSG 2021). It was also highlighted repeatedly during the foresight process that underpins
this report. Participants and experts called for a more active role for citizens in shaping their societies
and for increased accountability and transparency from leaders. They also called for a rebalancing of
priorities, with greater attention to planetary health and human wellbeing of communities. They urged
leaders to place the environment at the heart of a social contract, providing a foundation for efforts to
tackle poverty and inequality.

The idea that the social contract should include a focus on humanity’s relationship with the
environment has emerged relatively recently in academic literature (O’Brien et al. 2009; Huntjens 2021;
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development [UNRISD] 2021; Heffron and De Fontenelle
2023). But in many cultures, the notion that humanity has responsibilities towards nature is much
older. It is particularly evident in indigenous communities and traditional knowledge systems that
recognize the interconnectedness of all living things, and the importance of maintaining a healthy
relationship with the natural world (Århem 1996; Brand et al. 2023; Ohenhen and Abakporo 2024;
Parker and Tanana 2024).

From the foresight process, three areas stand out as important opportunities to renew the social
contract and increase society’s resilience: engaging and embracing a broader and diverse range of
stakeholders including women, indigenous and local peoples; giving young people a stronger voice;
and rethinking measures of progress.

Embracing the views of a more diverse group of stakeholders

The active participation of individuals and groups in the decision-making processes that affect their lives
is central to social cohesion and trust in government. Forging a new social contract with actions that
reverse the worldwide trend of declining public engagement in and support for democratic processes is
a priority (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA] 2023).

Technological and social innovations are increasing the range of tools that could achieve this. Digital
platforms can enhance public participation by enabling citizens to express their concerns and participate
in shaping environmental policies. At the same time, tools and international cooperation that combat
mis/disinformation and lasting investments in building societal resilience and media and information
literacy are essential. Citizen assemblies and processes such as participatory budgeting can increase
cohesion and transparency, along with an understanding of the trade-offs inherent in public policy
decisions (Ahn et al. 2023). Open communication and access to the data that support decision-making
can likewise build trust and ensure public scrutiny of policy processes (UNEP 2023e). Governments can
support local resilience by providing the funding and tools to support analysis and decision making.

Strong local engagement filters upward. Communities that are heard and can express their views
support robust national institutions. In turn, secure and stable states are more inclined towards
multilateralism, which is the strongest bulwark against shocks.

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Giving young people a stronger voice

Young people will bear the consequences of today’s decisions for decades to come. In some
developing regions that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, young people make up a large
part of the population. In other regions, smaller youth cohorts face the burden of financing the
expanding population of pensioners in many parts of the world. In any event, young people face a
difficult inheritance from earlier generations.

The energy, creativity, passion and resilience of young people serve as a powerful reminder that
lifting youth voices and participation can ignite positive change that reverberates far beyond political
or sociocultural boundaries. Yet, all too often, there is a lack of representation and influence in
political debate. Achieving intra- and inter-generational equity will require the active engagement of
young people in decision-making at national and international levels, with special considerations for
participation from developing and least developed countries.

The youth and regional sense-making workshops were unanimous in calling for more involvement in
decision-making, and a more powerful youth voice at all levels of governance.

A new framework for prosperity

A new social contract would entail a fundamental reimagining of the role of businesses and markets.
Current economic systems reward businesses for focusing narrowly on maximizing short-term
financial returns for shareholders and externalizing environmental and social harms. Consequently,
humanity’s resources and ingenuity are largely invested in activities that cause widespread harm
across globalized value chains.

At the national scale, GDP has long been the primary measure of economic performance, which has a
number of well-documented shortcomings (Stiglitz et al. 2008; Dasgupta 2021; Nature 2022; Managi
and Kumar 2024).

Throughout the foresight process, the demand for alternative economic and wellbeing measures was
strongest among young people, who criticized GDP for marginalizing many essential dimensions
of wellbeing and sustainability (Mazzucato 2018). The need for new indicators, such as those that
are considered through wellbeing economies (Fioramonti et al. 2022), to address both health and
environmental issues has been widely acknowledged (Hosseini et al. 2023). The Inclusive Wealth Index
is one such metric, conveying human, social, manufactured and natural capital. Information on these
capital stocks can help in guiding investments that will be essential to achieve the SDGs (UNEP 2024b).

Elements of a new beyond GDP framework that the UN Secretary-General called for have already
been developed. For example, the recent proposal for a Multidimensional Vulnerability Index offers a
valuable tool to support governance, helping the international community to understand the specific
development needs of Small-Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries and deliver
targeted and effective assistance (UN 2024b).

Corporations and markets could also play a very different role to contribute to the adoption of
alternative measures of prosperity, serving as engines for prosperity, social cohesion and healthy
environments. To do so, they need to be guided and constrained by values such as solidarity, fairness,
responsibility, resilience, sustainability, dynamism and humility (Carney 2021). The same values would
be at the core of the new social contract.

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Already there is some evidence of change, notably in the emergence of ESG metrics and their
integration into binding legislation (Signal 17). A similar shift is apparent in growing calls for a shift in
the economic paradigm towards ‘stakeholder capitalism’ that acknowledges corporate obligations to
a broad range of stakeholders, including the environment (Rajan 2019; Schwab and Vanham 2021). An
overarching complementary tool that emerged through the foresight process is the development of
a ‘wellbeing or liveability index’, which would combine physical environmental and social and cultural
dimensions of human and community wellbeing with data on material living standards with other key
wellbeing determinants, such as environmental aspects, cost of living, physical spaces, cultural and
mental health and poverty (Paul and Sen 2020). It could be particularly useful at the regional or local
community scale, providing insights into the successes or limitations of policy interventions (Paul and
Sen 2020).

The proposed ‘liveability index’ can build on the existing complementary measures mentioned
above. As such, it would provide a valuable input to the monitoring, learning and knowledge sharing
processes that are integral to agile and adaptive governance (discussed below). It could also provide
an important signal to guide investments and actions by national governments and international
bodies, such as regional development banks.

Integrating these indices into a comprehensive ‘liveability index’ could more effectively measure
success in achieving the SDGs and environmental goals. Drawing together these kinds of indicators
into a new framework will only contribute to real change if the framework is embedded into the
strategic planning and decision-making processes of governments at all scales, and citizens are
empowered to contribute. To be effective, new knowledge may need to be accompanied by new
processes, rights or institutions.

3.2 Agile and adaptive governance for a

sustainable future

Across many of the signals of change identified in Part 2, accelerating change has emerged
as a core theme. Communities across the world face more frequent and severe disruptions as
the effects of climate change intensify and the interdependence of globalized systems causes
localized crises to spread. In parallel, rapid technological advances, powered by an exponential
growth in computational power, are transforming how we live, work and interact. These changes
create opportunities to meet material needs in more sustainable ways. But they also bring risks
and uncertainties, potentially jeopardizing privacy and human agency, undermining democratic
governance and contributing to conflict.

How can new technologies be developed and used in ways that promote sustainability? How can
communities find ways to adapt to the changing context and environmental conditions to ensure
their resilience? Part of the answer lies in promoting agile, adaptive governance, which puts an
emphasis on empowering communities and fostering innovation across society, while using long-
term targets and visions to guide these dispersed processes.

66
Facilitating communities to engage, experiment and learn

Cities and communities have an essential role in achieving sustainability transitions. They are
often places of learning, innovation and creativity, enabling the potential for systemic change at
the local level (Signal 18). Yet communities also face specific vulnerabilities and challenges in a
rapidly changing global context.

Empowering communities to take ownership of their resilience strategies enhances their adaptive
capacity and fosters self-reliance (Holling 2018). Encouraging women’s participation and
enhancing their roles as agents of change is essential for sustainable development (Bryan et al.
2024). It allows them to co-create responses that speak to their needs (Pelling et al. 2015; Asian
Development Bank [ADB] 2020; Leal Filho et al. 2023). This also creates space for the meaningful
inclusion of gender and indigenous perspectives into resilience-building efforts, which drives
cultural continuity and enhances the effectiveness of interventions by aligning them with local
values and practices (Whyte et al. 2020) that ultimately improves trust.

Governments and international organizations can support community goals by providing funding
or insurance and removing legal barriers to engagement and experimentation (Pisor et al. 2022).
They can also invest in establishing coherent monitoring frameworks, to collect and organize data
and information about environmental change and the outcomes of local initiatives. The availability
of such data, information and knowledge is crucial to inform agile decision-making.

Public authorities can also support the creation of horizontal networks between communities that
allow ideas to be shared and adapted to new contexts, as well as coordination of response efforts
(Aldrich 2019). Local networks and community engagement are particularly critical in supporting
indigenous cultural preservation by providing education on sustainable resource management,
adaptation strategies and coping mechanisms (Berkes 2018; Datta 2018).

Environmental goals and targets

The overall goals and boundaries for the environment are established in international agreements,
such as the SDGs and global biodiversity and climate targets. They are typically long-term targets.
But these goals are only a first step. At the international level, translating the goals into shorter-
term, measurable and high-impact targets and indicators, allowing for agile course correcting or
setting more ambitious targets as necessary, could mark a significant initiative to help facilitate
implementation. At the national level, shorter-term global goals could be integrated into national
legislation with plans that set clear obligations and parameters for economic activity and
innovation, while addressing established environmental targets.

Transforming economies and societies to achieve prosperity within environmental limits will
inevitably be disruptive, but it can be a just transition. This can be achieved through dialogue that
fosters collaboration between governments, businesses and civil society to co-create effective
and just solutions. At regional and local levels, stakeholders can be brought into the fold of the
community to build shared visions for the future that can reconcile their competing interests,
mobilize and inspire action, and deliver on national goals and targets. Ultimately, shared values
such as a healthy environment, social equity and justice provide the compass for navigating
complex challenges, developing goals, targets and visions at all levels of governance and,
ultimately, guiding decision-making and fostering collaboration.

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3.3 Guiding governance through data and
knowledge

It will be difficult to navigate the challenges ahead without a transformation in the knowledge
systems that support governance. Creating and implementing a new social contract requires the
creation of open knowledge sharing platforms that empower citizens, as well as new metrics
that go far beyond GDP to create a much richer representation of the health of societies and
ecosystems. Supporting agile and adaptive governance depends on monitoring and assessing
the impacts of innovation, experimentation and systems that enable information to be shared
horizontally and vertically to guide investments and actions. But the needs and value of leveraging
data and knowledge extend far beyond this.

Integrating and improving monitoring

Stronger and better integrated systems to monitor and understand environmental change to track
what’s coming down the line and across systems will support better decision making. Monitoring is
currently undertaken by a diverse range of actors, including international organizations, governments
and non-governmental actors. It also employs a wide range of techniques, with Earth observation from
satellites increasingly providing a primary source of information¹.

At national and sub-national levels, public institutions are also very active in collecting data to monitor
environmental change and support the enforcement of legislation. For example, the Group on Earth
Observations (GEO), the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) and Copernicus
provide substantial remote sensing data. Earth observation data from organisations like US National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are being used to support assessment of vulnerability
and exposures of communities to environmental changes. They provide open access to data, software
and tools available through NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS)
for scientists and decision- makers (Langlois et al. 2023).

For these investments and activities to be effective in increasing the knowledge base, supporting
governance and decision-making, monitoring must be integrated and any gaps addressed in a
coordinated manner. Actors such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the
World Economic Forum can potentially play an important role in increasing coordination.

A key issue for monitoring relates to scale: while local monitoring is easier to implement, global
level impacts are important to measure as local issues become global issues and vice versa.
Advancements in AI and computational power can be leveraged to collate and analyse large volumes
of data in short timeframes, making it possible to accelerate responses to major environmental
changes and events. Linking AI and Earth Observation, with appropriate ground-truthing, can enable
the development of a globally linked and integrated monitoring network covering land-use change,
biodiversity, water (surface and ground), climate, air and marine domains.

¹ At present, three UN-mediated global monitoring schemes exist, addressing climate systems (GCOS), ocean systems (GOOS) and terrestrial
systems (GTOS). GTOS and GCOS have a joint Global Terrestrial Network for Glaciers (GTN-G), helping to understand the role of glaciers for
climate and hydrology. The OECD supports Earth observation from satellites, aircraft, and drones, with in-situ measurements or ground-based
monitoring across countries and regions.

68
It is also critical that monitoring of the state and trends of environmental systems is complemented
with more knowledge about ‘tipping points’—thresholds after which complex systems can change
rapidly and irreversibly. At present, environmental monitoring is insufficiently focused on these
thresholds (Hewitt and Thrush 2019). Tipping points are usually discussed in relation to ecosystems
or earth system processes, such as the reversal of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation
(AMOC) and melting of the West Antarctica ice sheet. But positive tipping points are increasingly
being explored, for example in the literature of sustainability transitions, which focuses on the
transformation of unsustainable socio-economic systems (Arora and Stirling 2023; Calisto et al. 2024).

Finally, the imperative for improved monitoring of the diverse range of policy interventions that are
being adopted and implemented at various levels of governance would aid international organisations
to focus efforts and resources where it is needed. Better tracking of policy instruments and
institutional structures would provide a basis for exploring and understanding what works best in
different contexts. It would also provide a basis for civil society groups to advocate for changes that
lead to the development and uptake of more effective and locally relevant policies. Such tools would
help identify where governments or donors could best invest to protect people and planet, while
strengthening national institutions.

Combining data, information and knowledge, and making it accessible

Generating data and knowledge across disciplines and portfolios to inform effective governance is
an essential first step. But its true value can only be realized when it can be accessed and analysed in
ways that offer new insights.

In part, this means taking better advantage of the opportunities created by recent technological
advances. In the era of big data, the internet of things and AI, combined with supercomputing, the
opportunities for analysis of complex data sets are expanding rapidly. Insights from combining
monitoring and other data across disciplines will better enable not only the nature of problems to be
identified but also the ability of solutions to be identified quicker, supporting agile governance.

In a world where we are sometimes drowning in information, there is also a more basic need
for platforms that enable people to access and navigate the information they need. Data driven
assessments, foresight, global environmental monitoring and citizen science can all be used to
support understanding and decision making. Platforms to enable insights into implementation of
the environment-related SDGs and multilateral environmental agreements—along with measures of
poverty, vulnerability and economic welfare—are entirely possible with current tools. UNEP’s World
Environment Situation Room (WESR) aims to do this. WESR is a UNEP tool that aims to support
environmental governance by integrating geospatial data, digital libraries, data driven assessments,
foresight, global environmental monitoring and citizen science. It also provides insights into
implementation of the environment-related SDGs and multilateral environmental agreements. Efforts
have also been made to consolidate the definition, data collection and monitoring of key variables
including for climate, biodiversity and ocean.

These platforms—combined with efforts to consolidate the definition, data collection and monitoring
of key variables including for climate, biodiversity and ocean mean—would allow countries and
organisations to take decisions across portfolios and strengthen implementation, because
environmental, societal and economic factors have been taken into account.

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“The Earth turns to Gold, in
the hands of the wise.”
Jalaluddin Rūmī (1207-1273)

Everyone alive today, particularly those in vulnerable communities, knows all too well what
happened when past generations made decisions without considering the future implications.
Basing human development on fossil fuels has brought devastating climate change. Dismantling
reuse models in favour of single-use plastics has polluted nature. Making products that contain
harmful chemicals and compounds, such as lead and mercury, have impacted the health of
millions of people. Nobody can travel back in time to warn against this path. We can only try to
correct these mistakes, and ensure they do not happen again. The use of foresight tools can
assist in this endeavour.

This foresight exercise tells us that paying attention to signals of change and underestimated
disruptions, even those that are on the edges of plausibility, can provide insights and early
indicators of events and circumstances that could significantly impact future generations.
By systematically monitoring and analysing these signals, UNEP and other organisations can
anticipate shifts in political will, emerging technological disruptions, or socio-economic changes
that can hinder or advance environmental protection efforts—allowing for strategic interventions
that address issues before they escalate, ensuring the continuity and effectiveness of climate
change planning and environmental safeguarding initiatives.

Change is inevitable. It is up to humanity, the one species that has evolved to the point where
it can affect natural processes on a planetary scale, to unite, look forward and ensure that the
decisions we make today shape a future that works for everyone, everywhere.

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Annexures

71
Annex 1
Comparative analysis of regional workshop
outcomes around the eight critical shifts
Critical shift 1 – The relationship between humans and the environment in flux

Participants in regional workshops universally emphasized the importance of sustainable practices

and robust environmental governance frameworks. Key priorities included preserving biodiversity,
enhancing community stewardship and implementing nature-based solutions to address
environmental changes. Additionally, addressing food insecurity and the adverse effects of pollution
on water and air quality were common concerns.

Regional approaches varied according to unique circumstances and developmental contexts.

Europe focused on enhanced environmental regulations and nature-positive investments to address
biodiversity loss and food system vulnerabilities. North America highlighted multi-species justice and
decentralized governance, emphasizing Indigenous stewardship. Africa stressed robust environmental
governance and community stewardship, while Asia Pacific called for global cooperation to manage
zoonotic diseases and chemical proliferation. West Asia leaned towards technological solutions like
AI and renewable energy, and LAC emphasized reconnecting humans with nature through value-based
systems and stakeholder involvement in sustainable resource management.

Overall, enhancing environmental regulations and governance, preserving biodiversity and fostering
sustainable practices emerged as shared priorities. While Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific
focused on biodiversity and climate resilience, Africa, West Asia and LAC emphasized community
involvement and local stewardship.

Critical shift 2 - Critical resources: scarcity, competition and the shifting dynamics of global
security

The intensifying competition over critical resources such as water, food, minerals and energy is
reshaping global security dynamics. Workshops across various regions emphasized sustainable
resource management, equitable distribution and community involvement as essential strategies.
Europe and North America highlighted sustainable practices and equitable distribution to address
resource scarcity and promote stability, with North America additionally raising concerns about the
privatization of public goods and corporate ownership of resources.

Africa focused on transitioning to regenerative agriculture and ensuring benefit-sharing for local
communities through transparent governance. In West Asia, balancing natural resource distribution
and implementing equitable economic development legislation were prioritized, along with local
solutions for resource management. LAC underscored the need for territorial, environmental and
production transformation, emphasizing collaboration with indigenous communities. Asia Pacific
highlighted the challenges posed by worsening food and water scarcity due to climate change,
pointing to innovative governance models for managing space resource exploitation and mitigating
environmental degradation.

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Critical shift 3 - AI, digital transformation and technology – a wave of change

Europe and North America emphasized the importance of robust governance frameworks to address
the ethical, societal and environmental implications of AI. Both regions highlighted concerns about the
loss of human agency in decision-making and stressed the need for adaptive regulation and ethical AI
development. Africa and LAC focused on technological sovereignty, developing local, context-specific
solutions and bridging the digital divide. These regions advocated for AI development that prioritizes
social and economic equity and stressed the need for policies to enhance digital literacy.

West Asia and Asia Pacific highlighted the integration of AI into informed decision-making and
policymaking, with a strong focus on creating smart societies and infrastructures. Both regions
recognized the need for up-to-date regulations and collaboration across sectors to ensure the
sustainable and equitable use of AI technologies. Concerns about privacy erosion and managing
tech-related job losses were prominent, emphasizing the need for well-regulated AI to prevent
potential abuses.

Critical shift 4 – A new era of conflict

The rise of armed conflicts—driven by resource competition, climate change and technological
advancements—necessitates comprehensive strategies to mitigate their impacts. European and
North American workshops stressed the need for robust governance frameworks to manage AI-driven
weapons systems and prioritize conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding. Both regions linked
environmental health to security, calling for integrated policies to address these interconnected issues.

Africa emphasized the importance of localized governance and cross-sectoral interactions for
effective resolution to conflicts driven by non-state actors and militias, often fuelled by resource
competition. LAC participants noted the rise of social unrest driven by resource competition and
socioeconomic disparities, advocating for multi-actor interventions to promote social cohesion. West
Asia highlighted the transformative impact of AI and drones, stressing the need for governance to
manage these technologies and environmental drivers of conflict. Asia Pacific emphasized the risks
of neocolonialism and resource-related conflicts, calling for strict regulations to ensure global security
and protect human wellbeing.

A common theme was the transformative role of new technologies in changing the nature of warfare,
raising significant ethical, safety and regulatory concerns. Climate change as a critical driver of
conflict was also a recurring emphasis, with resource scarcity leading to heightened tensions and
environmental degradation exacerbating humanitarian crises. The workshops revealed a shared
recognition of the need for comprehensive and integrated approaches to address modern warfare’s
multifaceted nature, tailoring strategies to regional contexts and fostering cooperation for sustainable
peace and security.

Critical shift 5 – Mass forced displacement and migration

Mass forced displacement and migration—driven by conflicts, climate change and economic
pressures—present complex challenges across various regions. The workshop in Europe highlighted
the persistent inequality among migrant and minority communities, the political instrumentalization
of migration and the need for fostering social cohesion and equitable integration. North America
stressed ethical and social justice concerns, emphasizing better relocation programs and international
regulations to protect migrants’ rights.

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In Africa, the focus was on the role of conflicts and climate change in driving displacement, with
an emphasis on inclusive policies to address root causes, such as conflict resolution, economic
development and environmental sustainability. LAC participants echoed this focus, advocating
cooperation strategies across the Global South Coalition and comprehensive strategies for climate
adaptation. West Asia highlighted localism and local governance as key responses, while Asia Pacific
stressed the need for international regulations and integrated health and environmental justice to
address climate-induced migration.

Common themes included the significant impact of climate change on forced displacement,
necessitating better relocation programs and comprehensive climate adaptation strategies.
Ethical and social justice concerns associated with migration were recurring points of discussion,
emphasizing policies that protect the rights and wellbeing of displaced populations. Despite
regional differences, there was a shared understanding of the need for inclusive and comprehensive
approaches to address the multifaceted challenges of forced displacement and migration.

Critical shift 6 – Persistent and widening inequalities

Persistent and widening inequalities present significant challenges globally, with common themes
around the need for systemic changes to address income disparities, promote social equity and
integrate environmental justice into economic policies. European workshops highlighted income
disparity and unequal access to resources, advocating for economic systems prioritizing human and
planetary wellbeing. North America focused on rising income inequality and the erosion of the middle
class, emphasizing the need for equitable access to education, employment and resources.

In Africa, the focus was on wealth disparities and limited access to education and healthcare, calling
for redistributive policies and inclusive economic growth. LAC participants emphasized persistent
inequalities exacerbated by political instability and social tensions, advocating for benefit-sharing and
comprehensive socioeconomic policies. West Asia highlighted wealth concentration and ineffective
governance, promoting local governance and community empowerment. Asia Pacific pointed to
private monopolies and market access blocks, emphasizing robust governance mechanisms for
compliance and accountability.

Environmental justice intersected with inequality discussions, with poorer communities facing greater
exposure to pollution and climate impacts. Regional priorities varied, with West Asia focusing on
equitable economic development legislation and Asia Pacific exploring new approaches like Universal
Basic Income. LAC emphasized reconstructing the social fabric through inclusive policies. The
workshops revealed a shared recognition of the need for comprehensive and inclusive approaches to
address inequalities, tailored to regional contexts and fostering international cooperation.

Critical shift 7 – Misinformation, declining trust, and polarization

Misinformation, declining trust and polarization were identified as critical challenges undermining
governance and public policy globally. The Europe workshop highlighted the need for building trust
and enhancing media literacy to combat misinformation and foster informed decision-making. Africa
emphasized transparency, evidence-based decision-making and media literacy to restore trust and
combat misinformation, noting the impact of social media in exacerbating these issues.

North America focused on the manipulation of information and AI-powered disinformation, advocating
for transparency, accountability and stronger evidence-to-policy mechanisms. West Asia highlighted
the rise of mistrust in traditional information sources, emphasizing media literacy and effective

74
communication among decision-makers, scientists and civil society. LAC stressed the impact of
misinformation on governance and social cohesion, advocating for increased transparency and
accountability to rebuild trust. Asia Pacific pointed to divisive politics and declining trust in science,
emphasizing the need for integration of environmental and social wellbeing in education and
enhancing media literacy.

Common themes included the detrimental effects of misinformation on governance and the critical
need for media literacy. Regional differences emerged in specific approaches, with North America
and LAC focusing on protecting marginalized groups’ rights and establishing global governance
mechanisms, while West Asia and Asia Pacific emphasized effective communication and educational
transformation.

Critical shift 8 – Polycentricity and diffusion of governance

Workshops highlighted the importance of transparency, integrity and diverse stakeholder inclusion
in governance structures. Europe, Africa and North America focused on local governance and
participatory decision-making for addressing inequalities and fostering sustainable development.
West Asia and Asia Pacific underscored local entities and regional networks’ role in driving change
and building resilience.

Regional differences included Europe’s focus on aligning trade deals with sustainability goals and
reforming international institutions to enhance multilateralism. Africa emphasized strengthening
local governance and community-based solutions to manage inequalities. North America highlighted
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination and integrating traditional knowledge systems. West Asia
advocated for collaboration among decision-makers, scientists and civil society, stressing stronger
environmental legal frameworks. LAC called for institutionalizing citizen participation and protecting
regional and local environmental leaders. Asia Pacific emphasized new governance models that
empower marginalized communities and integrate Indigenous values.

75
Annex 2
SDGs mapped against critical shifts and signals
of change

EMERGING TRENDS AND SIGNALS OF CHANGE SDGs AFFECTED

Humans and the environment:

A relationship in flux
Ancient microbes hidden in thawing Arctic permafrost

New emerging zoonotic diseases

Antimicrobial resistance approaching critical levels

Unforeseen impacts of harmful chemicals and materials

Resources, scarcity and shifting

dynamics of global security
Rapid expansion of space activity and orbital space debris

AI, digital transformation and

technology – waves of change
An emerging exnovation mindset

Deployment of Solar Radiation Modification

A new era of conflict

Autonomous and artificial intelligence weapons systems

New technologies amplify risks of biological agents misuse

Mass forced displacement

Uninhabitable spaces

Persistent and widening

inequalities
Privatized micro-environmentalism
76

Uninsurable future
 Mass forced displacement

Uninhabitable spaces

Persistent and widening

inequalities
Privatized micro-environmentalism

Uninsurable future

Misinformation, declining
trust and polarization
Decisions increasingly detached from scientific evidence

Eco-anxiety: An emerging crisis hidden in plain sight

Surging fossil fuels subsidies

Escalating risks of corruption in carbon offsetting

Polycentricity and diffusion

of governance
New tools for rerouting global financial flows

Local, network-driven resilience

77
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