Reinforcing identities?

Non-Japanese residents,
television and cultural nationalism in Japan

ALEXANDRA HAMBLETON

Abstract
Between 1997 and 2007 the foreign population of Japan increased by
more than 45 % making it the largest at any time in the postwar period,
constituting 1.69 % of the overall population. At the same time, the trans-
border flows of people, capital and media increased at an unprecedented
rate. In the Japanese media, there has been a marked increase in the
number of television programs featuring non-Japanese. This paper fo-
cuses on the phenomenon of non-Japanese residents of Japan on variety
television programs and shows that the increase of foreign faces on Japa-
nese television is significant as non-Japanese residents are used here to
reinforce ideas of Japanese cultural identity. These programs, while usu-
ally advertised as opportunities to look at issues from an international
perspective, instead highlight perceived differences which exist between
Japan and the outside world as a form of entertainment, rather than to
seriously examine the issues Japan faces as it becomes more interna-
tional. Employing a discourse analysis of recent programs as well as
interviews with program participants, this paper examines media mecha-
nisms which create an image of the foreign “other” that is employed to
create, perpetuate and strengthen the idea of a unique Japanese cultural
identity.

Keywords: non-Japanese residents; cultural nationalism; variety televi-

sion programs; Nihonjinron; discourses of Japanese uniqueness.

Contemporary Japan 23 (2011), 27247 18692729/2011/02320027

DOI 10.1515/cj.2011.003 © Walter de Gruyter
28 Alexandra Hambleton

アイデンティティの強化?日本における在留外国人、
テレビと文化
的ナショナリズム
アレクサンドラ・ハンブルトン

1997年から2007年の10年間で、日本における在留外国人の数は総人口
の1.69％を占めるようになり、 戦後最高となった。 それと同時に人、
資本、 メディアのトランスボーダー化もかつてない速度で進み、 外
国人が出演するテレビ番組が著しく増加した。
本稿は、日本の在留外国人が日本のバラエティ番組に登場する現象に
焦点を当て、近年放映された番組を対象に、言説分析の手法と番組出
演者に対するインタビューを通して、在留外国人がいかにしてメディ
アによって「他者」として映し出され、そのことがいかに日本の文化
的アイデンティティを強化しているかを考察する。
在留外国人が出演する番組はしばしば、日本が抱えている問題を国際
的な視点で考える機会として宣伝されているが、実際にはそうした問
題を真摯に検証することなく、日本と世界との差異を一種のエンター
テイメント化することで、「他者」として在留外国人を表象し、日本の
文化的アイデンティティの強化に寄与しているのに過ぎないのである。

1. Introduction
It is October 1998. We are in a brightly lit television studio in Tokyo,
where one hundred panelists sit in rows, numbered and wearing tags
pinned to their chests. Popular film director and television personality
Beat Takeshi appears, wearing a gaudy dinner jacket composed of hun-
dreds of national flags sewn together. Lights flash, panelists clap and a
heated debate begins. Whilst the flashy studio, smiling television per-
sonalities and scenario are not unusual for a Japanese variety television
program, what differs in this case is the fact that the panelists featured
are all non-Japanese residents of Japan, commonly referred to as gai-
kokujin or its somewhat pejorative abbreviated form, gaijin [foreign-
ers]. The tags on their chests display not only their names but also their
countries’ flags, and when panelists are singled out to speak they are
called not by name, but by nationality.
According to the Japan Ministry of Justice, in 2007 there were more
than two million registered non-Japanese living in Japan, comprising
1.69% of the population, a 45.2% increase in the past ten years. Show-
ing a steady increase over the past two decades, by 2006, 6% of marria-
ges in Japan involved one non-Japanese partner ⫺ and the number of
children born to these couples continues to rise. While such increases
may seem small in comparison to other highly developed economies,
in Japan, which has long been considered racially and ethnically homo-
 Reinforcing identities? 29

geneous (tanitsu minzoku), this shift is of great significance. Whether

by a conscious process or otherwise, Japan is very slowly beginning to
internationalize. In the context of an increasing non-Japanese popula-
tion, questions of Japanese national identity and Japanese nationalism
have become increasingly important. This paper will consider the issue
through the lens of entertainment television programs featuring non-
Japanese residents, by examining depictions of foreign residents on
television and the significance of such images in an increasingly, if re-
luctantly, international Japan.

1.1. Non-Japanese residents of Japan and the media

In the immediate postwar period the majority of foreigners 2 defined
by Arudou (2006) as legal visa holders staying for more than three
months 2 were classified as Special Permanent Residents (tokubetsu
eijūsha), usually of Chinese or Korean heritage, having immigrated or
been forcibly moved to Japan during the Second World War. While
special permanent residents continued to make up the largest foreign
population for a large portion of the postwar period, in the 1980s and
1990s, as Japan began a policy of accepting foreign workers, the demo-
graphics of the non-Japanese population began to change. Growing
Brazilian and other Latin American communities composed primarily
although not entirely of Nikkeijin [i.e., descendents of Japanese who
emigrated to Latin America in the early 20th century] as well as in-
fluxes of South East Asian workers and foreign language teachers from
the United States and Europe mean that today, for the first time, Japan
could be said to have a visible foreign population, many of whom are
choosing to call Japan their permanent home. There were 869,986 per-
manent foreign residents in total in 2007, a figure which 2 according
to Arudou (2006) 2 demonstrates that foreigners in Japan are, “gradu-
ating from `temporary guest' to immigrant.”
As the foreign population has grown, the number of foreign faces in
the media has also increased. Once relegated to television commercials
(Creighton 1997) or shows featuring gaijin tarento [foreign media per-
sonalities] (Hagiwara and Kunihiro 2004), it is now common for “ordi-
nary” non-Japanese residents to appear on television, expressing their
views on everything from Japanese food to politics. Programs featuring
non-Japanese panelists came to prominence with the broadcast of the
phenomenally successful variety show Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin
[This is what is strange about you Japanese]. Hosted by the internation-
ally well-known Takeshi Kitano (better known outside of Japan as Beat
Takeshi) the program featured foreign residents of Japan commenting
on aspects of Japanese culture they found strange or difficult to under-
30 Alexandra Hambleton

stand. Aired from 1998 to 2002 on the TBS network, this show featured
a panel of 100 foreign residents of Japan, “facing off” against Beat
Takeshi and four other Japanese tarento. Although the theme varied
from week to week, one aspect remained constant 2 the animated and
often antagonistic debate between Japanese and non-Japanese partici-
pants.
It has been ten years since Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin was first
broadcast and the genre of variety shows with foreign panelists at their
core remains popular. Sanma’s koi no karasawagi gaikokujin supesharu
[Much ado about love foreigner specials] Ai chiteru! [I love you]
Generation Y, Cool Japan, and many other recent programs have fea-
tured panels of non-Japanese and demonstrate how the “foreigner
panel show” has become a regular part of the Japanese television scene.
However, despite an initial slew of research into the Koko ga hen da
yo, Nihonjin phenomenon (Hagiwara and Kunihiro 2004; Iwabuchi
2005), very little work has focused on recent programs of the genre
and their significance, despite the fact that the foreign population con-
tinues to increase. Although the shows themselves claim to be contrib-
uting to international understanding by creating a space for dialogue
between Japanese and non-Japanese, this paper will argue that upon
deeper examination, programs featuring non-Japanese residents are in
fact vehicles of cultural nationalism which, rather than providing a
space for dialogue, instead provide a platform upon which ideas of
Japanese national identity and even nationalism may be enforced.

1.2. From Japanese nationalism to “banal” and “cultural” nationalism

in Japan
Much research has been dedicated to understanding mechanisms of
national identity, national character and nationalism. Gellner (1983: 7)
offers two definitions of the nation: first, that “Two men are of the
same nation if and only if they share the same culture” and, second, if
those two men “recognize each other as belonging to the same nation.”
In other words, an idea of a shared identity and culture is paramount.
Similarly, Burgess (2010) draws on the concept of an imagined national
identity created through discourses and narratives of a community with
a shared history and culture. Concepts of nationalism in the postwar
period continue to widen. As Karasawa (2002: 647) explains, “modern
forms of nationalism, particularly in the post-Cold War era, are not
limited to a political or militaristic nature,” but instead are played out
in the everyday. To explain such everyday nationalism, Billig (1995: 6)
coined the term “banal nationalism” to refer to the “ideological habits
which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.”
 Reinforcing identities? 31

This paper focuses on one particular form of banal nationalism,

termed by Yoshino (1992) as “cultural nationalism,” as a lens through
which to examine depictions of non-Japanese in the Japanese media.
While different forms of nationalism remain mutually dependent and
deeply intertwined, cultural nationalism is somewhat different to politi-
cal nationalism in both purpose and aim and is described by Yoshino
as aiming to “regenerate the national community by creating, preserv-
ing or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be
lacking, inadequate or threatened” (Yoshino 1992: 1). Cultural nation-
alism underwent somewhat of a resurgence in Japan in the 1970s and
1980s, Yoshino points out, adding that during this period Japanese
nationalism was expressed in a new form of literature commonly
known as Nihonjinron, which can be translated as “theories of the Jap-
anese” or “discussions on the Japanese.”
Nihonjinron writings cover a vast range of topics, but almost all are
examined in a particular fashion 2 through comparison with other
countries and cultures. In fact, Nihonjinron draws almost exclusively
on comparisons with the outside world, in particular the West, in order
to maintain its argument of Japanese uniqueness. Wallman's explana-
tion of the creation of the boundary perspective of ethnicity 2 namely
that “the process by which `their' difference is used to enhance the
sense of `us' for the purposes of organization or identification” (Wall-
man 1979: 3) 2 is one way to understand the way in which the “other”
is used as a category to understand and demarcate an “us.” As de Bary
explains, “the image of the nation as an organic unity always relies
on the configuration of that nation's cultural `other'” (de Bary et al.
2005: ix).
Some studies have focused on elements of Nihonjinron theory found
in the Japanese media without mentioning Nihonjinron directly. In one
such study, Creighton (1997) describes the way in which foreigners in
television commercials are used to circumvent Japanese social conven-
tions and reinforce homogeneity, explaining that media portrayals of
foreigners in Japan usually show them as nothing more than misemono
[i.e., something to be displayed or put on show] in order to sell an
image. Creighton draws on the concepts of uchi [inside] and soto [out-
side] to explain how images of the foreign are “part of the process
through which Japaneseness is constructed as normative in contrast to
foreigners who represent universal `Otherness'” (Creighton 1997: 212),
adding that while uchi and soto are concepts that have previously ap-
plied to the definition between networks and groups within Japan,
there is also a general sense that all of Japan constitutes an uchi, as
opposed to the soto of everything that lies outside of Japan. Creighton
thus concludes that television commercials using the image of the for-
32 Alexandra Hambleton

eign “help construct and perpetuate an imagined Japanese self-iden-

tity” and reinforce a cultural “other.” While the process of “othering”
is by no means limited to the media, or even to Japan, when it appears
in the Japanese media it fits very well with the intentions of Nihonjin-
ron-style cultural nationalism in Japan, presenting the image of a very
different “other” in order to re-examine Japanese cultural identity, a
process continually played out in the national media.

1.3. Media effects, stereotyping and ideology

Of all popular media consumed today, television exerts one of the
greatest, if not the greatest influence on people's perceptions of the
outside world. Yoshimi (2006) goes so far as to call television “the
national medium” and claims that television programs play to a na-
tional consciousness (in Japan) now more than ever before. Chun
(2007) similarly argues that television played an important role in the
construction of a postwar national identity and came to fill the void
left after the collapse of national pride in the wake of World War II.
As Japan has faced increasing contact with the outside world, social
relations and identities have become more complicated, and “TV has
continued to play a central catalytic role in social change” (Yoshimi
2006: 483). The mediascape of the 21st century may have begun a rapid
transformation, but as Gerbner et al. (2002: 43244) explain, “televi-
sion's mass ritual shows no signs of weakening, as its consequences are
increasingly felt around the globe,” adding that television maintains its
place as the “primary common source of socialization and everyday
information”, information that is “usually cloaked in the form of enter-
tainment.”
Television programs of all genres contain ideological messages. Fiske
(1987: 14) stated that “the dominant ideology is structured into popular
texts by the discourses and conventions that inform the practices of
productions and that are part of their reception.” Whilst this research
focuses particularly on the texts themselves, it cannot be overlooked
that media, even entertainment television has a large, if ultimately un-
measurable impact on audiences and their perceptions of the world
around them. The images television projects to audiences are signifi-
cant because, as Hagiwara (1998: 222) explains, “[i]n constructing social
reality, mass-mediated information generally plays a greater role in do-
mains where we do not have direct experience or other means to test
its veracity.” Hagiwara et al. (2004: 77) sum up the issue concisely,
pointing out that most people garner information via the media regard-
ing situations with which they do not have direct contact themselves
and that in Japan's case this is especially true, particularly in the case
 Reinforcing identities? 33

of countries where few Japanese visit. Burgess (2010) mentions that

less than one in ten Japanese have opportunities to speak or interact
with foreigners, meaning that the media plays a great role in the forma-
tion of Japanese perceptions of non-Japanese even within Japan. The
media's role in creating an image of worlds that viewers have no oppor-
tunity to experience firsthand cannot be disregarded.

2. Research focus and design

2.1. The programs
Two programs representative of the foreigner panel program genre
were selected, one from commercial broadcaster TBS, one from the
national broadcaster NHK, and subjected to detailed analysis. Appear-
ing ten years after Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin first aired on NHK, Ai
chiteru! 1 featured a large panel of foreign residents and a confronta-
tional style similar to its predecessor. However, Ai chiteru! differed
from Koko ga hen da yo, Nijonjin in two important ways. First, the
panelists were all foreign women. Second, rather than focusing on dis-
cussing Japan directly, the women were called upon to give “un-
scripted” advice to weekly guests about love and dating in a Japanese
context, but from their own cultural perspectives. Although the focus
was not exclusively on critiquing Japanese culture, the fact that panel-
ists spoke from their own cultural perspectives in relation to dating in
Japan meant that an overarching theme of comparing “outside coun-
tries” to Japan was sustained throughout the show. Reference to the
TBS-run Ai chiteru! website gives some insight into the type of pro-
gram the producers were aiming to create.

This is a program featuring foreigners who are worried about love!

However, the main focus of the show are the “very experienced
foreign women from a variety of countries and with a variety of
views about love who provide advice about love.” What kind of
advice will they give? There is no doubt that they will provide
many strange answers that Japanese could not even imagine!!
(TBS Terebi Ai chiteru! 2005)2

As the above passage demonstrates, Ai chiteru! appeared to be deliber-

ately controversial. Female panelists were dressed in a provocative
manner, often more closely resembling bar hostesses than “ordinary”
foreign residents, and weekly discussions included such topics such as
homosexuality, difficulties dating Japanese men, cheating and affairs
(i.e., dating married men and women), otaku and men with strange
hobbies, sadomasochistic practices, and other sexual practices.
34 Alexandra Hambleton

The second program analyzed was NHK's Cool Japan.3 The pro-
gram's main objective is to present an apparently “unscripted” discus-
sion of various aspects of Japanese culture and to predict what the next
“cool” thing to come out of Japan would be. Similarly to Koko ga hen
da yo, Nihonjin and Ai chiteru!, this program features confrontation
and debate between the non-Japanese panelists and the Japanese hosts
and weekly guests. Fronted by a middle-aged Japanese male host and
a younger Japanese-American bicultural female co-host, Cool Japan
also features a weekly guest, usually a Japanese with experience living
overseas who is described as “having an international career.” The pro-
gram invites eight non-Japanese panelists to discuss the coolness of
Japan, sending them on fact-finding missions before playing the pre-
taped segments on the show and debating the culture or broadly de-
fined topic that was presented in the tapes with input from the three
Japanese representatives in the studio. Previous episodes included ti-
tles/topics such as song, idols, Japanese men, Japanese women, under-
ground, agriculture, railroads, appliances, sightseeing, and alcohol.
The participants were from a variety of backgrounds, and the pro-
gram website requests that applicants wishing to appear on the show
have lived in Japan for less than a year.4 At the beginning of the pro-
gram, as the panelists are shown taking their seats, a voice-over an-
nounces that eight foreigners who have only been in Japan a short
while will be participating in “heated discussions” (atsui tōku batoru)
about the topic of the week.

2.2. Methodology
Both programs were subjected to what Baldry and Thibault (2006)
term a “multimodal transcription and text analysis” in which they were
broken down shot by shot in order to examine the visual and audio
components that come together to create a unique discourse. Baldry et
al. (2006) and Deacon et al. (1999) utilized similar methodologies in
order to examine how shot type, framing, scene content and soundtrack
come together to create a story and meaning in television program-
ming. This methodology, adjusted to suit the style of Japanese variety
television, was employed with each shot divided into time, shot (i.e.,
wide, mid, close, zoom), shot content (i.e., action), music/sounds,
speaker, dialogue, screen drops/subtitles, symbols/graphics, and the
viewing window.
There are some particular features commonly used in Japanese televi-
sion that are rarely seen on television in either Europe or the United
States. The first is the viewing window, used to show studio panelists'
reactions to pre-recorded videos featured on the program. Second is
 Reinforcing identities? 35

the screen drop (teroppu), which frequently subtitles speakers or adds

graphics to emphasize what is being said. Another particular feature of
the Japanese variety show is the high rate of shot change, up to once a
second in some cases. Although Baldry et al. (2006) recommend that
an extra “meaning” column be added to the analysis set, due to the
extremely high shot change rate of both programs, I decided that mean-
ing would be better examined not shot by shot, but in the context of
the flow and narrative of each segment, and the show as a whole.
With the categories selected, the next task was to submit the two
programs to a shot-by-shot transcription and create data sets to be
analyzed and examined for common patterns, including both visual and
linguistic symbols. Trends visible throughout both programs and the
mechanisms employed to create images of and ideological messages
about non-Japanese could then be identified. Finally, interviews were
conducted with program participants which offered insights into as-
pects of these panel programs, insights that a simple text analysis could
not provide.

3. Results
Preliminary viewings of each show chosen for analysis could well have
revealed that they were indeed providing a platform on which ex-
change between Japanese and non-Japanese could take place. How-
ever, upon conducting a detailed discourse analysis of both programs
and interviews with participants, it could be seen that the issues at play
were much deeper and that the shows did indeed create images of and
messages about non-Japanese residents that were problematic.

3.1. From the perspective of the panelists

In addition to the discourse analysis of Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan,
three panelists from Cool Japan were available for interview. They had,
despite the program's requirements, lived in Japan for more than one
year; two of the three were studying at Japanese universities and spoke
very high levels of Japanese. Despite this, as the three interviewees
explained, it is an “unspoken rule” on the show that foreign panelists
only speak English and do not use Japanese, even if they are able to.
When Japanese is used, either accidentally or because a concept is diffi-
cult to express in English, the dialogue is either edited out or the di-
rector orders that the scene be reshot. Participants in the program are
not allowed to demonstrate detailed knowledge of the Japanese lan-
guage and are often asked to pretend to be ignorant of other aspects
of life in Japan. One interviewee spoke of her reluctance to express
36 Alexandra Hambleton

surprise and joy at a Japanese husband doing what she perceived to be

a minimal share of housework. Similarly, all three interviewees relayed
the story of an Italian panelist who was asked to pretend not to know
what a train sounded like so that the program could feature a segment
demonstrating that such a well constructed and organized train system
is unique to Japan.
Although Cool Japan portrays an image of non-scripted, spontane-
ous discussion, in fact both the studio discussion as well as filming of
the pre-recorded “fact finding'” video sections were controlled to some
extent. During fact finding recording, despite panelists being told by
directors that they were free to discuss the topic anyway they wished,
when discussion failed to move in intended direction, the director
would step in and make suggestions for the next take. Similarly, the
studio discussion sections were actually rehearsed and an outline or
script of the discussion was prepared beforehand. Panelists were made
aware of their lines and should they forget to participate in the discus-
sion at the required moment, they would be singled out by the hosts
for their opinions with the expectation that they would reply as re-
quested. Even answers to seemingly unimportant questions, such as
about a favorite Japanese dish, were controlled by producers. One im-
portant aspect of control occurred before the shooting of each show
even began. Panelists explained that they were selected for certain pro-
grams on the basis of answers given to detailed questionnaires pre-
pared by the production company. Only regular panelists deemed ap-
propriate for each panel were selected; and from those eight, another
three or four were sent out to film fact-finding videos before the taping
of the panel took place.
When asked what they thought the aim of Cool Japan was, intervie-
wees provided a range of responses. In the episode analyzed, host Kōk-
ami explained that he believed that one reason for making Cool Japan
was to discover how Japanese were able to take culture from all over
the world, combine it with traditional Japanese culture and turn it into
something new and “uniquely Japanese.” The interviewees however
had very different ideas. One went so far as to suggest it was a form of
Nihonjinron, using non-Japanese residents to judge and value Japanese
culture so that it may be re-discovered and appreciated by younger
generations of Japanese. The theme of “rediscovery” was important to
all three interviewees, who believed that the program was primarily
made to “sell” the virtues of Japanese culture to a generation of young
Japanese raised on Disney. As one interviewee explained, producers
told her that they marketed the program to NHK as a show about
encouraging the youth of Japan to be interested in their own culture
once again.
 Reinforcing identities? 37

Panelists' motivations for appearing on the program were varied;

financial reasons were not of primary concern. One hoped it would be
the start of a career in media, either in Japan or back in his country of
birth. The other two female Cool Japan panelists expressed that ap-
pearing on the show was more of a hobby, something to do when they
had time to earn some extra money. The three panelists interviewed
all expressed that they were not particularly concerned with the way
in which they were portrayed in the program, and did not feel a heavy
burden to represent their countries of birth single-handedly. Despite
noticing that the Japanese subtitles added to the final cut could differ
from their comments in English considerably, panelists did not seem
worried. What did concern panelists, however, was how they may be
portrayed to lack knowledge about even basic aspects of Japanese life.
While the male interviewee was happy that he was always shown to be
the “knowledgeable one” when shooting the fact-finding videos, the
two female interviewees expressed that although they were happy to
play up for the camera to a certain extent, at times they had told the
director that they were only willing to go so far. One even said that
she felt that the editing out of what she perceived to be good shots,
and the use of shots in which she made mistakes or was laughing a
lot, had created an image of her as being something of an imbecile.
Nevertheless, all three interviewees were quite happy to continue ap-
pearing on the program as long as it remained fun and did not make
them think that it posed any problems for their lives in Japan in the
long term.
Interestingly, interviewees seemed aware that Cool Japan does not
offer an accurate picture of the demographic of foreigners in Japan.
Due to the English proficiency requirements of the program, despite
apparent efforts on the part of producers to find more panelists from
Korea, China and other Asian countries, panelists from Europe, North
America, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand tended to domi-
nate the discussion. Interviewees believed that this led to a lack of
balance on the program and projected an inaccurate image of the types
of non-Japanese who call Japan their home. The final point of note
mentioned by interviewees was the way in which 2 despite the pro-
gram purporting to be a “heated talk battle” 2 issues of real contro-
versy were off limits during the studio discussion. The most notable of
these was any mention of World War II, but topics such as drugs were
also disallowed.

3.2. Program analysis: Creating the “other”

The original research design was created with the aim of gaining insight
into images and portrayals of non-Japanese on variety television pro-
38 Alexandra Hambleton

grams. However, during the course of the analysis it became apparent

that rather than focusing solely on the image of these foreign panelists
being created, in fact it is the dynamic between the foreign panelists
and the Japanese hosts and studio guests which gives the greatest in-
sight into the messages conveyed by the two programs. Similarly, the
way in which foreign behavior and culture is contrasted with that of
Japan contributes to the great image of “difference” built up by the
programs. By flagging the foreign and reiterating stereotypes, the two
programs served to strengthen stereotypical ideas of foreigners from
various countries, and in the process, re-examine and reiterate what it
is to be “Japanese.” Thinking back to Wallman's perspective of ethnic-
ity (1979: 3), “the process by which `their' difference is used to enhance
the sense of `us' for the purposes of organization or identification,” it
can be seen that the two programs do just that.

3.3. Symbols of the foreign: Flagging the “other”

Examining the analysis of the visuals employed in both programs, it can
be seen that flags play an important part in defining the non-Japanese
residents and connecting them with the “foreign” countries from which
they come. Panelists featuring in Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin, Ai chit-
eru! and Cool Japan all appear wearing name tags with their name,
country of origin and their national flag clearly visible. As Iwabuchi
(2005: 110) explains, in Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin, panelists are often
referred to by either their country name or nationality, not by their
actual names. Similarly, whenever a panelist is shown speaking in Ai
chiteru!, a graphic featuring their name, age, country of birth, flag and
a short “catchphrase”-style statement about the speaker is screened.
These catchphrases usually center on stereotypical assumptions about
the panelists' countries of birth. For example, Egyptian born Fifi is
shown with the Egyptian flag and the catchphrase “The pharaoh's
heaven-sent child” and Chinese participant Chen Chu is described as
“An innocent Chinese princess.” In Cool Japan, when the panelists are
introduced at the beginning, a graphic is screened with each panelist's
face and their nationality underneath. Panelists are constantly linked
with their countries of birth. Similarly, throughout Cool Japan, the red
and white colors of the Japanese flag are highlighted both in the studio
set design and the graphics employed between segments. The flag is
an omnipresent symbol throughout both programs. Billig (1995) has
discussed in detail the place of flags in contemporary life. He concludes
that the national flag has a symbolic function, as a focus for sentiment
about society and as an unquestioned symbol of “banal” nationalism.
This paper concludes that in the case of Japanese television programs
 Reinforcing identities? 39

featuring foreign residents, the display of national flags plays a differ-

ent role 2 highlighting the foreign “other.” The red and white colors of
the Cool Japan logo may comprise a routine employment of a usually
unquestioned national symbol of Japan, but the constant display of for-
eign flags ensures that viewers are constantly reminded that the panel-
ists represent specific countries. As Iwabuchi (2005: 106) explains,
“[w]hat is crucial here is that ordinary foreigners are explicit about
where they are from.” The constant linking of foreign “others” to their
countries of birth serves as an implicit reminder to the Japanese audi-
ence that they too are bound by an unbreakable link to their country
of birth.
The second function of such symbols is to allow the diversity within
each nation to be overlooked. Each foreign panelist is required to rep-
resent their entire country. In Ai chiteru!, when one of three Chinese-
born panelists begins singing in Chinese at an inappropriate time, the
two other Chinese panelists stand and apologize for her behavior, ask-
ing viewers not to see her behavior as “destroying China's image.” By
asking participants to speak as members of their country rather than
as individuals 2 something that is referred to by Iwabuchi (2005: 116)
as the “burden of representation” 2 the diversity within each nation is
overlooked, an image of “one nation, one culture” is re-affirmed and
ideas of national identity are oversimplified. Any differences within a
nation's borders, as well as any similarities between Japan and other
cultures are unseen and, as McVeigh (2006: 142) explains, “the assump-
tion is that all people have natural `national' boundaries.” This assump-
tion underpins both programs as they clearly demarcate cultural
boundaries and legitimize claims of Japan's own homogeneous culture.
Linking foreign panelists to their countries of birth achieves one final
aim, namely the disconnection of foreign residents from Japan and any
idea that they may become permanent residents. This is particularly
the case in Cool Japan, where foreign panelists are depicted only as
short-term residents 2 they will spend a short time in Japan, learn
about its culture but eventually return permanently to their own coun-
tries. By reinforcing the idea that each foreigner is enduringly attached
to their country of birth, its culture and language, viewers are not re-
quired to consider the idea that foreigners appearing on the show may
be seeking a long term life in Japan and that Japan is indeed becoming
an increasingly international country. In fact, despite many Ai chiteru!
participants actually being married to Japanese men and, therefore,
highly likely to remain in Japan long term, the women featured in Ai
chiteru! are required to behave in such an outlandish manner 2 con-
stantly highlighted by the male hosts 2 that the audience cannot possi-
bly forget their foreignness, thus cementing them as outsiders, no mat-
40 Alexandra Hambleton

ter what their visa status is. Programs featuring foreign residents
thereby represent them in a manner that does not threaten the concept
of a culturally, linguistically and racially homogeneous Japan. Ghassan
Hage (13 March 2008) provides a very good description of the difficul-
ties of multiculturalism when he defined multiculturalism as a relation-
ship of encompassment, explaining that in a multicultural society, the
entering “outside culture” is required by the host country to remain in
a safe place or sphere and not bleed into the surrounding space,
thereby preventing it from changing the host country's culture or val-
ues. Similarly, Iwabuchi (2005) refers to this phenomenon as “them
within us” and describes how foreigners in the Japanese media are de-
picted in such a way as to be confined to certain areas of society and
thus remain unthreatening. Both Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan contribute
to this process, presenting foreign residents without any acknowledge-
ment of the problems which may arise as the result of an increasing
foreign population. The dominant discourse of a homogeneous Japan
is able to remain intact despite the foreign spectacle on display.

3.4. Emotions, gendered discourse and the “voice of reason”

It is not only through the use of symbols that the image of foreign
residents as undeniably “`different” is created. Creighton's (1997) idea
of foreign misemono [show, spectacle] is very much present in both Ai
chiteru! and Cool Japan. Both programs are spectacles with foreign
panelists on display as the television studio becomes a circus of com-
parison. This spectacle also revolves around the issue of gender, con-
structing an image of foreign women as the ultimate “other.” While an
in-depth discussion of gender in Japanese popular culture is beyond
the scope of this paper, a brief examination is needed, however, as both
Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan contain strongly gendered ideologies.
Darling-Wolf (2004: 331) mentions that “[t]he Japanese popular cul-
tural scene is quite segregated along gender lines” but she also notes
that there has been very little research into how consumers might nego-
tiate representations of gender. Yuval-Davis (1997) explains how
women are commonly used as signifiers of traditional culture. Freed-
man (2001: 85) describes them as “the key actors in the transmission
of the community's values […] and active participants in national strug-
gles.” Thereby, the process of presenting women from “outside” cul-
tures aids the creation of a strong image of a foreign “other” to which
one can compare and contrast one's own culture. Such female others
are often portrayed as highly-sexualized, over-emotional, exotic and
irrational, and allow the “inside” culture to feel a sense of superiority
(Yuval-Davis 1997). The analysis of Ai chiteru! demonstrates this to be
 Reinforcing identities? 41

very much the case as female panelists are presented as being ex-
tremely emotional as well as prone to angry outbursts and sexual dis-
plays. Although, within the program, such behavior may only be explic-
itly compared with the calm voices of the male hosts and guests, taken
within the context of wider society the image of the irrational foreign
female may contrast strongly with the images of Japanese women as
protectors and signifiers of traditional Japanese culture.
The portrayal of women is highly gendered not only in Ai chiteru!
but also in the pre-recorded video segments of Cool Japan, segments
that feature male panelists teaching the female panelists and thus de-
picting them as hapless and unable to survive in Japan without such
assistance. Similarly, the male host and male guests are in command of
the requisite knowledge and they control the flow of discussion. The male
Japanese “voice of reason,” which appears in both programs, plays an
important role in legitimizing claims of a homogeneous Japan, con-
trasted with outside cultures. Ultimately, the power rests with the Japa-
nese hosts, who are able to make themselves heard over the panelists
and are given the role of moderating the debate and helping make
sense of the situation for the audience at home. The assigned role of
Japanese men to return the debate to one that is “rational and calm”
centers the discussion clearly from the standpoint of the Japanese audi-
ence. Despite claims of seeking an intercultural perspective, the Japa-
nese hosts ultimately have the last word and put things into “perspec-
tive” so that no significant changes are required of society.
Homogeneity remains the unquestioned status quo. Audiences are in-
vited here to dally with and even participate in an international society,
but only from afar, because the spectacle ultimately reminds them that
their loyalties lie with Japan.

3.5. The global battle: Naturalized differences and the avoidance of

meaningful debate
Both Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan are billed as heated discussions (atsu
tōku batoru). In fact, both programs emphasize the “war of words”
between foreign panelists and Japanese hosts throughout, and hint at
greater battles outside the studio. Throughout Ai chiteru!, the battle
appears to be between foreign women and Japanese men, as difference
is emphasized. In the case of Cool Japan, however, the battle is for
recognition from the foreign panelists of the uniqueness and value of
Japanese culture, despite the implicit message that it is this very
uniqueness that means that they will never be able to fully comprehend
and appreciate the culture entirely. The simplification of complex issues
42 Alexandra Hambleton

of identity and culture into binaries of “us” and “them” means that
any opportunity for meaningful discussion and debate is lost.
The concept of the “them and us” battle is further legitimized by the
apparent “naturalness” of the discussions that take place. In Ai chiteru!,
hosts and panelists face off against each other in a round, coliseum-
like set. However, as panelists and hosts only address each other, never
the camera directly, and the emotion of the discussion is paramount,
such friction is made to appear unscripted and spontaneous. Although
the Ai chiteru! panelists are dressed provocatively and asked to com-
ment on seemingly scripted adult topics, the emotional ways in which
they present their arguments and the constant use of close-ups invites
audiences to share their emotions 2 a strategy which, in turn, con-
structs the image of a “natural” outpouring of frustrations. Similarly,
although Cool Japan panelists explained to me in interviews that they
were given explicit instructions about what to say during the show and
unscripted comments were edited out of the final version, the program
itself still presents the discussion as a spontaneous debate, thus “natu-
ralizing” the opinions of its foreign panelists and reinforcing the legiti-
macy of the spectacle.
The symbolic flagging of panelists' nationalities, the highlighting of
their over-emotional states and the constant reference to “battle” mean
that the show is turned into an extended and heavily controlled media
spectacle. It must of course be acknowledged that variety television is
created primarily as entertainment rather than as a sphere in which real
debate about the issues that Japan is facing can take place. Nonetheless,
against the backdrop of an increasing foreign population in Japan, the
showing of non-Japanese residents on television as misemono and ulti-
mately as an “other” that is very different, while simultaneously “natu-
ralizing” this image by constructing programs that appear to be “un-
scripted” debates, any genuine debate about emerging social issues and
problems can be avoided and issues conveniently neglected.

4. Implications for cultural nationalism

Cultural nationalism is the process of regenerating a national commu-
nity or identity when it is perceived to be under threat, and can be
seen in behavior as simple as displaying the national flag, or in more
complicated performances such as the examples described in this pa-
per. Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan both clearly contain elements designed
to strengthen Japanese viewers' national identities. The reasons for this,
however, are less clear.
As the number of foreign residents in Japan continues to increase,
the concept of a homogeneous Japan with a unique culture, history and
 Reinforcing identities? 43

language may appear to be under threat. As the foreign population of

Japan continues to increase, a reexamination of what it means to be
Japanese and the reassertion of Japanese identity are not unexpected
phenomena. Highlighting the difference between the “foreign other”
and the Japanese, as well as discussion on the part of non-Japanese
about unique aspects of Japanese culture reinforce and legitimize the
Nihonjinron theory of Japan's uniqueness (Dale 1986). Just as televi-
sion was linked to the Japanese national identity in the postwar period,
in the last decade, programs featuring foreign residents have continued
to contribute to the creation of an “essentialized identity” (Weiner
1997).
The variety television programs analyzed above play a role in creat-
ing, sustaining and strengthening ideas of Japanese cultural identity.
Employing a Nihonjinron-style discourse of comparing Japan with the
outside world, they conclude that Japan is indeed “uniquely unique”
and depict foreign panelists in such a way that they become a spectacle,
rather than a threat to the dominant ideology of a homogeneous Japan.
Both Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan can therefore be described as vehicles
of Japanese cultural nationalism. Befu (2001) speculates that Nihonjin-
ron-style culturally nationalistic discourses have come back into focus
in Japan as the country's identity comes under increasing threat from
outside influences. Similarly, Iwabuchi (2005) describes the way in
which an increasingly international Japanese society may create a per-
ceived need for reassessment of cultural identity. Such reassessment is
visible in both Ai chiteru! and Cool Japan, most likely in response to
the perceived threat of an increased foreign population within Japan
as globalization advances.

5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the phenomenon of cultural nationalism in
Japan through the lens of variety television programs featuring foreign
residents. Detailed analysis of two programs, Ai chiteru! and Cool Ja-
pan, and interviews with participants have revealed that by utilizing a
number of conventions of representation, the programs create a dis-
course of “them” and “us.” This, in turn, allows a “foreign other” to be
compared with a Japanese “us.” The conventions employed throughout
the programs ensure that the nationalities of foreign panelists are con-
stantly “flagged” as a device to construct an image of them as unbreak-
ably tied to their countries of birth. Foreign panelists are represented
as over-emotional and irrational and the spirit of an ongoing “battle”
is invoked. The entire spectacle is given legitimacy and an air of appar-
ent truth via the strategies that each program employs to ensure that
44 Alexandra Hambleton

the debate appears as unscripted and spontaneous as possible. These

methods combine to create a seemingly “international” spectacle in
which the non-Japanese participants, despite their presence in Japan
being acknowledged and superficially celebrated, are depicted in a way
that never threatens the dominant ideology of a homogeneous and
unique Japan. In other words, the programs can be read as a form of
visual Nihonjinron. Whilst it may be hoped with Beck (2005: 36) that
“the nation and state are decoupled” as social circles open transnation-
ally and flows of information increase beyond national borders, in the
case of the Japanese media, a great reluctance to embrace true interna-
tionalization and the preference of maintaining the non-threatening
status quo are clearly apparent. Burgess (2010) explains that a large
proportion of news featuring non-Japanese residents of Japan centers
on an inaccurate reporting of crime statistics. Such reporting contrib-
utes to the creation of a culture of fear regarding non-Japanese. Al-
though entertainment programs may not be quite so blatant in their
treatment of non-Japanese residents, Iwabuchi (2005: 117) explains his
disappointment in Koko ga hen da yo, Nihonjin by expressing his desire
“to create a more egalitarian and democratic public media space”. In
this context, examining entertainment media offers further insights into
the implicit social imbalances and biases that may not be immediately
visible. As McVeigh (2006: 142) argues, within Japan “the discourse
on `internationalization' is a tactic for discussing Japaneseness, thereby
reinforcing nationalism.” This paper has shown that despite purport-
ing to be a place for international dialogue between non-Japanese and
Japanese, variety television programs actually further marginalize and
stereotype foreign residents, removing the possibility of open dialogue
and debate about their place in Japanese society.
In any examination of a media text it must be remembered that view-
ers of television programs come from diverse backgrounds, have differ-
ing ideas and interests in foreign countries and foreign people, and pay
differing amounts of attention to programs they see on television. Stu-
art Hall's (1974) work on the encoding and decoding process high-
lighted the impossibility of reading a media text in a singular manner.
As a result, the level of influence that such programs may have varies
widely from person to person and text analysis does not allow the re-
searcher to delve into the complexities of reception. As Deacon et. al
suggest, “textual analysis is in the end no substitute for audience analy-
sis” (1999: 244), as one can never truly know how an audience has
chosen to read and interpret an image, message or ideology. An exami-
nation of audiences reactions to television programs featuring foreign
residents would be of great interest in future research.
 Reinforcing identities? 45

Finally, my hope for future research is that it will step away from a
consideration of cultural nationalism in Japan through the narrow win-
dow of Nihonjinron instead allowing an acknowledgement of forms of
nationalism in Japan similar to Billig's “banal” nationalism or at the
very least Befu's “cultural” nationalism. It must be remembered that
cultural nationalism is in no way an exclusively Japanese phenomenon.
Research of this kind must be careful not to be critical of Japan, or the
Japanese, as a single or collective entity. As Befu (2001: 1) explains,
such a response “assumes the same monolithic approach” in so far as
“irrespective of variations within Japan and regardless of differences
among the Japanese, Japanese culture is said to have certain uniform
characteristics, and the Japanese are supposed to behave and think in
a certain monolithic manner.” Similarly, citing Nihonjinron discourse
presents many dangers, the first of which is the possibility that by dis-
cussing Japan in a context of cultural nationalism, authors themselves
become guilty of participating and/or perpetuating this discourse. John
Dower (1999) warns against viewing Japan hermetically, and this paper
has not set out to describe Japanese cultural nationalism as “different”
or “special” in any way. Cultural nationalism is not unique to Japan;
rather it is simply one phenomenon visible in a country that is facing
increasing demographic shifts due to both internal and external pres-
sure. No media text can be removed from the context in which it is
produced and consumed. Variety television programs featuring non-
Japanese residents of Japan and the resulting representations of the
“foreign” provide insight into just one of the many complicated proc-
esses involved in creating, perpetuating and strengthening national
identity in Japan. It is an area that will remain of importance as the
number of foreign residents continues to increase and Japan struggles
with increasing internationalization within its borders.

Alexandra Hambleton ([email protected]) is a Ph.D.

candidate at the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Interdisci-
plinary Studies. Her main research interests include media and popular
culture, nationalism and gender, with a particular focus on Japan. Her
most recent research explores the connection between media depic-
tions of love and sex in television and magazines, and the desires and
identities of women in contemporary Japanese society.

Notes
1. Ai chiteru! was broadcast on the TBS network from October 2005 to September
2007 on Wednesday nights from 11.55 pm. Running for half an hour (including
commercial breaks), its late-night time slot allowed the program to cover topics
46 Alexandra Hambleton
not usually discussed on prime time television. Hosted by the male comedy duo
Ameagarikesshitai and billed as “a show about love by foreigners, for foreigners,”
the program invited a non-Japanese resident each week to ask a panel of ten non-
Japanese regular panelists for their advice about love, dating or sex in Japan. The
particular episode analyzed for this paper was the final episode which aired on
September 26, 2007.
2. Own translation of the following text:
Kono bangumi ni wa koi ni nayamu gaikokujin no katatachi ga tōjō! Shikashi,
kono bangumi no mein to naru no wa, koi no sōdan ni kotaeru “samazama na
kuni no tayō na renaikan o motsu keiken yutaka na gaikokujin joseitachi” da.
Hatashite donna kotae ga tobidasu no ka? Nihonjin ni wa sōzō mo tsukanai chink-
aitō ga zokushutsu suru koto to chigai nashi!!
3. Debuting in April 2006, Cool Japan was still on air at the time of writing. The
program is broadcast weekly on BS1, BSHi and NHK World and runs for forty-
five minutes examining Japanese culture from a variety of perspectives with the
aim of discovering what “cool” aspects of Japanese culture can be considered
“cool” from an international perspective. The episode subjected to analysis was
titled “Music” and first aired on the May 12, 2007.
4. See the official website of Cool Japan at: https://www.nhk.or.jp/cooljapan/form/
bosyu.html (last accessed 30 September 2010).

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